Cloaking Malware with the Trusted Platform Module
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Trusted Platform Module (TPM) TCG 1.2 / 2.0
Trusted Platform Module (TPM) TCG 1.2 / 2.0 USER GUIDE Revision 1.20 The information in this user's guide has been carefully reviewed and is believed to be accurate. The vendor assumes no responsibility for any inaccuracies that may be contained in this document, and makes no commitment to update or to keep current the information in this manual, or to notify any person or organization of the updates. Please Note: For the most up-to-date version of this manual, please see our website at www.supermicro.com. Super Micro Computer, Inc. ("Supermicro") reserves the right to make changes to the product described in this manual at any time and without notice. This product, including software and documentation, is the property of Supermicro and/ or its licensors, and is supplied only under a license. Any use or reproduction of this product is not allowed, except as expressly permitted by the terms of said license. IN NO EVENT WILL SUPER MICRO COMPUTER, INC. BE LIABLE FOR DIRECT, INDIRECT, SPECIAL, INCIDENTAL, SPECULATIVE OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES ARISING FROM THE USE OR INABILITY TO USE THIS PRODUCT OR DOCUMENTATION, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGES. IN PARTICULAR, SUPER MICRO COMPUTER, INC. SHALL NOT HAVE LIABILITY FOR ANY HARDWARE, SOFTWARE, OR DATA STORED OR USED WITH THE PRODUCT, INCLUDING THE COSTS OF REPAIRING, REPLACING, INTEGRATING, INSTALLING OR RECOVERING SUCH HARDWARE, SOFTWARE, OR DATA. Any disputes arising between manufacturer and customer shall be governed by the laws of Santa Clara County in the State of California, USA. The State of California, County of Santa Clara shall be the exclusive venue for the resolution of any such disputes. -
Introduction to Trusted Computing: TPM 101
Introduction to Trusted Computing: TPM 101 Ariel Segall [email protected] Day 1 Approved for Public Release: 12-2749. Distribution unlimited Day 1 Approved for Public Release: 12-2749. Distribution unlimited 1 Ariel Segall [email protected] () TPM 101 / 1 License All materials are licensed under a Creative Commons \Share Alike" license. http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0 Day 1 Approved for Public Release: 12-2749. Distribution unlimited 2 Ariel Segall [email protected] () TPM 101 / 1 What We'll Be Covering In this section: What is a TPM? What does it do? What's it good for? Some TPM myths (and the truths behind them) Why enterprises should care about TPMs All at a high level{ deep dive this afternoon. Day 1 Approved for Public Release: 12-2749. Distribution unlimited 3 Ariel Segall [email protected] () TPM 101 / 1 What is a TPM? Trusted Platform Module Inexpensive (<$1, usually) chip on almost all motherboards today Not in Macs Only some servers have them{ ask. Hardware basis for platform trust In secrets In platform state Combined with a Root of Trust for Measurement1 In platform identity Current version is 1.2 Unless otherwise specified, we'll always refer to 1.2 TPMs Previous version 1.1; next, 2.0. 1We'll get to these in a little while Day 1 Approved for Public Release: 12-2749. Distribution unlimited 4 Ariel Segall [email protected] () TPM 101 / 1 What's In a TPM? TPM Non−Volatile Memory Cryptographic Co−Processor Volatile Memory Execution Engine (Processor) Random Number Generator Day 1 Approved for Public Release: 12-2749. -
Trusted Platforms UEFI, PI and TCG-Based Firmware
White Paper by Intel Corporation and IBM Corporation Trusted Platforms UEFI, PI and TCG-based firmware Vincent J. Zimmer Intel Corporation Shiva R. Dasari Sean P. Brogan IBM September 2009 Executive Summary This document provides an overview of the interactions of the Trusted Computing Group (TCG) [TCG Overview], the firmware standards work within the Unified Extensible Firmware Interface (UEFI) Forum, and implementation practices of UEFI PI-based [UEFI Book][UEFI Shell Book][UEFI Overview] implementations. In addition, this paper will provide some use-cases and implementation examples of this technology in addition to the industry threats that motivate the design of this class of technology. This paper is mainly intended for Hardware, firmware, software, and BIOS engineers. But beyond this audience, some of the information in this paper will be valuable for IT decision makers, marketing, and other parties. The goal of the paper is to take away an understanding of the motivations behind trusted platform design, the terminology of trust, how to navigate the Trusted Computing Group set of specifications and technology that relate to platform, impact on platform firmware and UEFI, instances of deployment in the market, and some future possible directions for hardware and firmware. ii Table of Contents Overview ............................................................................................................2 Problems to solve ...........................................................................................3 Security architecture -
Analysis of Malware and Domain Name System Traffic
Analysis of Malware and Domain Name System Traffic Hamad Mohammed Binsalleeh A Thesis in The Department of Computer Science and Software Engineering Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy at Concordia University Montréal, Québec, Canada July 2014 c Hamad Mohammed Binsalleeh, 2014 CONCORDIA UNIVERSITY Division of Graduate Studies This is to certify that the thesis prepared By: Hamad Mohammed Binsalleeh Entitled: Analysis of Malware and Domain Name System Traffic and submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy complies with the regulations of this University and meets the accepted standards with respect to originality and quality. Signed by the final examining committee: Chair Dr. Christian Moreau External Examiner Dr. Nadia Tawbi Examiner to Program Dr. Lingyu Wang Examiner Dr. Peter Grogono Examiner Dr. Olga Ormandjieva Thesis Co-Supervisor Dr. Mourad Debbabi Thesis Co-Supervisor Dr. Amr Youssef Approved by Chair of the CSE Department 2014 Dean of Engineering ABSTRACT Analysis of Malware and Domain Name System Traffic Hamad Mohammed Binsalleeh Concordia University, 2014 Malicious domains host Command and Control servers that are used to instruct in- fected machines to perpetuate malicious activities such as sending spam, stealing creden- tials, and launching denial of service attacks. Both static and dynamic analysis of malware as well as monitoring Domain Name System (DNS) traffic provide valuable insight into such malicious activities and help security experts detect and protect against many cyber attacks. Advanced crimeware toolkits were responsible for many recent cyber attacks. In order to understand the inner workings of such toolkits, we present a detailed reverse en- gineering analysis of the Zeus crimeware toolkit to unveil its underlying architecture and enable its mitigation. -
Opentext Product Security Assurance Program
The Information Company ™ Product Security Assurance Program Contents Objective 03 Scope 03 Sources 03 Introduction 03 Concept and design 04 Development 05 Testing and quality assurance 07 Maintain and support 09 Partnership and responsibility 10 Privavy and Security Policy 11 Product Security Assurance Program 2/11 Objective The goals of the OpenText Product Security Assurance Program (PSAP) are to help ensure that all products, solutions, and services are designed, developed, and maintained with security in mind, and to provide OpenText customers with the assurance that their important assets and information are protected at all times. This document provides a general, public overview of the key aspects and components of the PSAP program. Scope The scope of the PSAP includes all software solutions designed and developed by OpenText and its subsidiaries. All OpenText employees are responsible to uphold and participate in this program. Sources The source of this overview document is the PSAP Standard Operating Procedure (SOP). This SOP is highly confidential in nature, for internal OpenText consumption only. This overview document represents the aspects that are able to be shared with OpenText customers and partners. Introduction OpenText is committed to the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of its customer information. OpenText believes that the foundation of a highly secure system is that the security is built in to the software from the initial stages of its concept, design, development, deployment, and beyond. In this respect, -
Revention of Coldboot Attack on Linux Systems Measures to Prevent Coldboot Attack
Special Issue - 2017 International Journal of Engineering Research & Technology (IJERT) ISSN: 2278-0181 ICIATE - 2017 Conference Proceedings Prevention of Coldboot Attack on Linux Systems Measures to Prevent Coldboot Attack Siddhesh Patil Ekta Patel Nutan Dhange Information Technology, Atharva Information Technology, Atharva Assistant Professor College of Engineering College of Engineering Information Technology, Atharva Mumbai University Mumbai University College of Engineering Mumbai, India Mumbai, India Mumbai University Mumbai, India Abstract— Contrary to the popular belief, DDR type RAM boot attack techniques. We implement measures to ensure that data modules retain stored memory even after power is cut off. stays secure on system shutdown. Data security is critical for most Provided physical access to the cryptosystem, a hacker or a of the business and even home computer users. RAM is used to store forensic specialist can retrieve information stored in the RAM non-persistent information into it. When an application is in use, by installing it on another system and booting from a USB drive user-specific or application-specific data may be stored in RAM. to take a RAM dump. With adequate disassembly and analytic This data can be sensitive information like client information, tools, this information stored in the RAM dump can be payment details, personal files, bank account details, etc. All this deciphered. Hackers thrive on such special-case attack information, if fallen into wrong hands, can be potentially techniques to gain access to systems with sensitive information. dangerous. The goal of most unethical hackers / attackers is to An unencrypted RAM module will contain the decryption key disrupt the services and to steal information. -
CIS 4360 Secure Computer Systems Attacks Against Boot And
CIS 4360 Secure Computer Systems Attacks against Boot and RAM Professor Qiang Zeng Spring 2017 Previous Class • BIOS-MBR: Generation I system boot – What BIOS and MBR are? – How does it boot the system? // Jumping to MBR – How does multi-boot work? // Chain-loading • The limitations of BIOS and MBR – Disk, memory, file system, multi-booting, security, … • UEFI-GPT: Generation II system boot – What UEFI and GPT are? – How does it boot the system? // UEFI boot manager – How does multi-boot work? // separate dirs in ESP CIS 4360 – Secure Computer Systems 2 Limitations of BIOS-MBR • MBR is very limited – Support ~2TB disk only – 4 primary partitions at most (so four OSes at most) – A MBR can store only one boot loader • BIOS is very restrictive – 16-bit processor mode; 1MB memory space (little spare space to accommodate a file system driver) – Blindly executes whatever code on MBR CIS 4360 – Secure Computer Systems 3 UEFI vs. BIOS • Disk partitioning schemes – GPT (GUID Partition Table): part of UEFI spec.; to replace MBR – MBR supports disk size 232 x 512B = 2TB, while UEFI supports much larger disks (264 x 512B = 8,000,000,000 TB) – MBR supports 4 partitions, while GPT supports 128 • Memory space – BIOS: 20-bit addressing; UEFI: 32-bit or 64-bit • Pre-OS environment – BIOS only provides raw disk access, while UEFI supports the FAT file system (so you can use file names to read files) • Booting – BIOS supports boot through boot sectors (MBR and VBR) – UEFI provides a boot partition of hundreds of megabytes (and boot manager and secure boot) CIS 4360 – Secure Computer Systems 4 Previous Class How does dual-boo-ng of Linux and Windows work in UEFI-GPT? Each vendor has a separate directory storing its own boot loader code and configuraon files in the ESP (EFI System Par--on). -
Low-Cost Mitigation Against Cold Boot Attacks for an Authentication Token
Low-cost Mitigation against Cold Boot Attacks for an Authentication Token Ian Goldberg?1, Graeme Jenkinson2, and Frank Stajano2 1 University of Waterloo (Canada) 2 University of Cambridge (United Kingdom) Abstract. Hardware tokens for user authentication need a secure and usable mechanism to lock them when not in use. The Pico academic project proposes an authentication token unlocked by the proximity of simpler wearable devices that provide shares of the token’s master key. This method, however, is vulnera- ble to a cold boot attack: an adversary who captures a running Pico could extract the master key from its RAM and steal all of the user’s credentials. We present a cryptographic countermeasure—bivariate secret sharing—that protects all the credentials except the one in use at that time, even if the token is captured while it is on. Remarkably, our key storage costs for the wearables that supply the cryp- tographic shares are very modest (256 bits) and remain constant even if the token holds thousands of credentials. Although bivariate secret sharing has been used before in slightly different ways, our scheme is leaner and more efficient and achieves a new property—cold boot protection. We validated the efficacy of our design by implementing it on a commercial Bluetooth Low Energy development board and measuring its latency and energy consumption. For reasonable choices of latency and security parameters, a standard CR2032 button-cell battery can power our prototype for 5–7 months, and we demonstrate a simple enhancement that could make the same battery last for over 9 months. -
Trusted System Concepts
Trusted System Concepts Trusted System Concepts Marshall D. Abrams, Ph.D. Michael V. Joyce The MITRE Corporation 7525 Colshire Drive McLean, VA 22102 703-883-6938 [email protected] This is the first of three related papers exploring how contemporary computer architecture affects security. Key issues in this changing environment, such as distributed systems and the need to support multiple access control policies, necessitates a generalization of the Trusted Computing Base paradigm. This paper develops a conceptual framework with which to address the implications of the growing reliance on Policy-Enforcing Applications in distributed environments. 1 INTRODUCTION A significant evolution in computer software architecture has taken place over the last quarter century. The centralized time-sharing systems of the 1970s and early 1980s are rapidly being superseded by the distributed architectures of the 1990s. As an integral part of the architecture evolution, the composition of the system access control policy has changed. Instead of a single policy, the system access control policy is more likely to be a composite of several constituent policies implemented in applications that create objects and enforce their own unique access control policies. This paper first provides a survey that explains how the security community developed the accepted concepts and criteria that addressed the time-shared architectures. Second, the paper focuses on the changes currently ongoing, providing insight into the driving forces and probable directions. This paper presents contemporary thinking; it summarizes and generalizes vertical and horizontal extensions to the Trusted Computing Base (TCB) concept. While attempting to be logical and rigorous, formalism is avoided. This paper was first published in Computers & Security, Vol. -
Address Munging: the Practice of Disguising, Or Munging, an E-Mail Address to Prevent It Being Automatically Collected and Used
Address Munging: the practice of disguising, or munging, an e-mail address to prevent it being automatically collected and used as a target for people and organizations that send unsolicited bulk e-mail address. Adware: or advertising-supported software is any software package which automatically plays, displays, or downloads advertising material to a computer after the software is installed on it or while the application is being used. Some types of adware are also spyware and can be classified as privacy-invasive software. Adware is software designed to force pre-chosen ads to display on your system. Some adware is designed to be malicious and will pop up ads with such speed and frequency that they seem to be taking over everything, slowing down your system and tying up all of your system resources. When adware is coupled with spyware, it can be a frustrating ride, to say the least. Backdoor: in a computer system (or cryptosystem or algorithm) is a method of bypassing normal authentication, securing remote access to a computer, obtaining access to plaintext, and so on, while attempting to remain undetected. The backdoor may take the form of an installed program (e.g., Back Orifice), or could be a modification to an existing program or hardware device. A back door is a point of entry that circumvents normal security and can be used by a cracker to access a network or computer system. Usually back doors are created by system developers as shortcuts to speed access through security during the development stage and then are overlooked and never properly removed during final implementation. -
An Analysis of the Asprox Botnet
An Analysis of the Asprox Botnet Ravishankar Borgaonkar Technical University of Berlin Email: [email protected] Abstract—The presence of large pools of compromised com- motives. Exploitable vulnerabilities may exist in the Internet puters, also known as botnets, or zombie armies, represents a infrastructure, in the clients and servers, in the people, and in very serious threat to Internet security. This paper describes the way money is controlled and transferred from the Internet the architecture of a contemporary advanced bot commonly known as Asprox. Asprox is a type of malware that combines into traditional cash. Many security firms and researchers are the two threat vectors of forming a botnet and of generating working on developing new methods to fight botnets and to SQL injection attacks. The main features of the Asprox botnet mitigate against threats from botnets [7], [8], [9]. are the use of centralized command and control structure, HTTP based communication, use of advanced double fast-flux service Unfortunately, there are still many questions that need to networks, use of SQL injection attacks for recruiting new bots be addressed to find effective ways of protecting against the and social engineering tricks to spread malware binaries. The threats from botnets. In order to fight against botnets in future, objective of this paper is to contribute to a deeper understanding of Asprox in particular and a better understanding of modern it is not enough to study the botnets of past. Botnets are botnet designs in general. This knowledge can be used to develop constantly evolving, and we need to understand the design more effective methods for detecting botnets, and stopping the and structure of the emerging advanced botnets. -
Detecting Botnets Using File System Indicators
Detecting botnets using file system indicators Master's thesis University of Twente Author: Committee members: Peter Wagenaar Prof. Dr. Pieter H. Hartel Dr. Damiano Bolzoni Frank Bernaards LLM (NHTCU) December 12, 2012 Abstract Botnets, large groups of networked zombie computers under centralised control, are recognised as one of the major threats on the internet. There is a lot of research towards ways of detecting botnets, in particular towards detecting Command and Control servers. Most of the research is focused on trying to detect the commands that these servers send to the bots over the network. For this research, we have looked at botnets from a botmaster's perspective. First, we characterise several botnet enhancing techniques using three aspects: resilience, stealth and churn. We see that these enhancements are usually employed in the network communications between the C&C and the bots. This leads us to our second contribution: we propose a new botnet detection method based on the way C&C's are present on the file system. We define a set of file system based indicators and use them to search for C&C's in images of hard disks. We investigate how the aspects resilience, stealth and churn apply to each of the indicators and discuss countermeasures botmasters could take to evade detection. We validate our method by applying it to a test dataset of 94 disk images, 16 of which contain C&C installations, and show that low false positive and false negative ratio's can be achieved. Approaching the botnet detection problem from this angle is novel, which provides a basis for further research.