Prospects for Japan's Domestic Politics and Implications for Its

Japan Center for International Exchange Vol. 3 No. 3 | July 2008 Prospects for Japan’s Domestic Politics and Implications for Its Foreign Policy Hitoshi Tanaka, Senior Fellow, JCIE Since the historic defeat of the Liberal Democratic Core Issues in Domestic Politics Party (LDP) in the House of Councillors election The most significant issue in recent domestic politics last year, many foreign observers have become con- is the public’s growing dissatisfaction with LDP rule. cerned about an apparent “stagnation” in Japan’s Long-festering voter discontent with the LDP tempo- domestic politics. Some have suggested that divided rarily abated under former Prime Minister Junichiro government has had an adverse impact on Japan’s Koizumi, whose exceptional popularity was largely foreign policy and are uneasy about the long-term due to his reputation as a maverick within the party. implications of this development for Japan’s inter- Nevertheless, it resurfaced under previous Prime national role. Minister Shinzo Abe and led to the unprecedented East Asia is in the midst of a major transforma- defeat of the ruling party in the July 2007 House of tion and it would be very unfortunate if Japan—the Councillors election. The Democratic Party of Ja- world’s second largest economy and a major democ- pan’s (DPJ) victory in that election marked the first racy in the region—were to fail to meet the chal- time since 1955 that the LDP lost its status as the lenges presented by its changing environment. At most powerful party in both houses of the Diet. The arguably no other time in the postwar era has it been ruling LDP-Komeito coalition will probably remain more necessary for Japan to adopt a proactive lead- in the minority in the Upper House at least through ership role in East Asia and actively work to ensure the next election in 2010 and, barring a significant the long-term stability of the region. Nevertheless, reversal of public sentiment, probably until 2013. In the manner in which circumstances will evolve in the short, the upper and lower houses are likely to re- coming months and years on the domestic political main at loggerheads for years to come. front remains uncertain; there is little doubt that the Another issue concerns the timing of the next July 2007 election was a harbinger of further change general election. Although the government is consti- to come. How events play out will have significant tutionally mandated to call a general election upon bearing on the kind of regional and global role that the expiration of the Lower House’s four-year term Japan is able to undertake. in September 2009, the prime minister is afforded the authority to call a “snap election” at any time. Cur- of power between competing political parties. They rent Prime Minister Fukuda was elected LDP presi- contend that such a system would set the stage for dent in the immediate aftermath of Mr. Abe’s abrupt a more open and robust debate over domestic and resignation and has yet to receive a popular man- foreign issues, which in time would lead to more ef- date. As a result, he faces a great deal of pressure to fective policy and more accountable leadership. call an election to legitimize his premiership. How- In the second scenario, the ruling coalition would ever, the cabinet’s low support ratings suggest that win a sufficient number of seats to maintain a ma- an election in the near future would almost certainly jority (or plurality) in the Lower House but forfeit result in the ruling coalition losing its overwhelming its current supermajority (and thus its ability to majority (70 percent) of seats in the Lower House. steamroll legislation through the Lower House with- It should also be noted that some observers expect out opposition support). Although much has been Mr. Fukuda’s support ratings to rise following the made in the press about widespread dissatisfaction upcoming G8 Summit in Hokkaido, a development with the LDP, the fact remains that the voting pub- that would go far toward silencing his critics within lic is largely skeptical of the DPJ’s ability to govern the LDP and allow him to consolidate his power. and hesitant to hand control of the government to a Lastly, the possibility that Mr. Fukuda may yield party of which only a few members (most of whom to pressure from within the LDP to resign prior to are former members of the LDP) have actual experi- the end of the current Lower House’s term should ence running the government. The fact that the LDP not be discounted. However, contrary to widespread is able to call the election at a time of its choosing media speculation about the prospects of several further complicates the DPJ’s electoral prospects. possible candidates for the party presidency—par- Since this scenario is unlikely to result in an end to ticularly Taro Aso, former chief cabinet secretary the current political deadlock, the LDP would prob- and foreign minister, and Sadakazu Tanigaki, for- ably attempt to recruit opposition forces (especially mer finance minister and the current chairman of independents and disgruntled DPJ members) to join the LDP Policy Research Council—there is no clear the party and end the impasse. frontrunner to succeed Mr. Fukuda. Unless a can- Recent developments in domestic politics sug- didate capable of inspiring the electorate and unit- gest a third possible scenario, one with the potential ing the increasingly factious LDP emerges soon, the to usher in a new era in Japanese politics and bring Fukuda administration will probably be afforded about a systemic transformation of Japan’s politi- more time to turn things around. cal process. It is no secret that a substantial number of politicians (including many LDP Diet members) Three Scenarios for the General Election sense a dramatic LDP electoral defeat looming on There are three possible outcomes for the next gen- the horizon. If this group were to reach critical mass, eral election. The first is a scenario in which the DPJ the result could be a historic realignment of political would garner a plurality (or majority) of seats in the parties, which would probably see the LDP and DPJ Lower House and thus receive a popular mandate to splinter along policy lines. form a Democratic cabinet. Several recent polls have A number of obstacles remain in the way of large- suggested the DPJ’s popularity now exceeds that of scale political realignment, however. The first obstacle the LDP, a development that seems to bode well for relates to the nature of Japan’s single-member elec- the former party’s prospects in the upcoming electoral districts. In the event of political realignment, tion. An increasing number of observers, including party mergers and shifting loyalties would cause many who are otherwise highly critical of the DPJ, many former political rivals to become members support a Democratic victory out of a belief that a of the same party overnight. When deciding which change in power could lead to the emergence of a candidates to endorse in each electoral district, lead- permanent two-party system and the regular transfer ers of newly formed parties would find themselves EAST ASIA INSIGHTS 2 Vol. 3 No. 3 | July 2008 with the unenviable task of having to choose be- “gentlemen’s agreement” to cooperate or, although tween these former rivals. In other words, many cur- highly unlikely, more formally through the forma- rent politicians are likely to resist realignment out of tion of an LDP-DPJ grand coalition. concern for their jobs. The second obstacle relates to voter preferences and long-existing questions about Foreign Policy Implications policy distinctions among Japan’s political parties. A While it is impossible to predict how current politi- number of experts, including many current political circumstances will evolve in the coming months, cians, have expressed doubts about whether policy there is no doubt that a debate over foreign policy is differences among DPJ and LDP Diet members are bound to occur. A change in government—or even substantive enough to warrant the creation of new merely a change in the premiership—could have sig- parties based on policy lines. nificant implications for Japan’s foreign policy. Which of these three scenarios materializes will At the risk of over-simplifying, Japan’s foreign undoubtedly depend on how the political situation policy community can be roughly divided into the evolves prior to the general election. At least one following three camps: alliance traditionalists, glo- issue, however has the potential to divide the vot- balists, and pragmatic moderates. ing public into two distinct blocs: the debate over Alliance traditionalists place the maintenance big versus small government. Many Diet mem- of a robust alliance with the United States above bers—both within and outside the LDP—have all other foreign policy priorities. They advocate blamed the recent expansion of the gap between a more proactive Japanese contribution to the al- rich and poor on the structural reforms initiat- liance, push for constitutional revision to allow ed under Mr. Koizumi. This gap, as well as rising Japan’s Self-Defense Forces (SDF) to participate food and fuel prices, pensions and healthcare for in collective defense, tend to emphasize common the elderly, and a decades-old debate over a pos- values in foreign relations, and call for Japan to sible consumption tax increase, have reemerged strengthen ties with other democracies. This line as political flashpoints with the potential to bring is perhaps best exemplified by the foreign policy of down the LDP. the previous Abe administration, in particular the Nevertheless, the degree to which “bread and “Arc of Freedom and Prosperity” and the call for butter” issues will influence voter choices at the next Japan to deepen its strategic ties with democratic election will largely depend on the “political winds” states in the region, particularly the United States, at the time.

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