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Home , Cai Wu, Hu Xijin, Liu Qibao, Li Changchun, Qi Xin, Wu Guoguang

Notes

Prelims

1. Kong Genhong, “‘Zhongguo meng’ de duiwai jiedu [The external decoding of the ‘’],” Xinhua, June 18, 2013, http://news.xinhuanet. com/politics/2013–06/18/c_124873602_2.htm; “Renmin Ribao: keg- uan renshi dangdai Zhongguo yu waibu shijie [People’s Daily: objectively understand contemporary and the outside world],” Xinhua, August 29, 2013, http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2013–08/29/c_117150243. htm. 2. Cai Mingzhao, “Jiang hao Zhongguo gushi, chuanbo hao Zhongguo shengyin [Tell China’s story well, propagate China’s voice well],” Renmin Wang, October 10, 2013, http://politics.people.com.cn/n/2013/1010/ c1001–23144775.html.

Introduction

1. See Evan S. Medeiros and M. Taylor Fravel, “China’s New Diplomacy,” Foreign Affairs 82, no. 6 (2003): 22–35; Peter Nolan, China and the Global Economy: National Champions, Industrial Policy and the Big Business Revolution (Houndmills, UK: Palgrave, 2001); Alastair Iain Johnston, Social States: China in International Institutions, 1980–2000 (Princeton: Press, 2008); Mingjiang , ed., Soft Power: China’s Emerging Strategy in International Politics (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2009). 2. Some of the collected editions that address such issues include Robert S. Ross and Zhu Feng, eds., China’s Ascent: Power, Security, and the Future of International Politics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2008); Alastair Iain Johnston and Robert S. Ross, eds., New Directions in the Study of China’s Foreign Policy (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2006); David Shambaugh, ed., Power Shift: China and Asia’s New Dynamics (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005). See also Yong Deng, China’s Struggle for Status: The Realignment of International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008); Robert G. Sutter, China’s Rise in Asia: Promises and Perils (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 192 Notes

2005); Alastair Iain Johnston, “’s Security Behavior in the Asia- Pacific: Is China a Dissatisfied Power?,” in Rethinking Securit y in E ast A sia: Identity, Power, and Efficiency, ed. J. J. Suh, Peter J. Katzenstein, and Allen Carlson (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2004); Ching Kwan Lee, “Raw Encounters: Chinese Managers, African Workers and the Politics of Casualization in Africa’s Chinese Enclaves,” The China Quarterly 199 (2009): 647–66; Sheng Ding, “To Build a ‘Harmonious World’: China’s Soft Power Wielding in the Global South,” in “Harmonious World” and China’s New Foreign Policy, ed. Sujian Guo and Jean-Marc F. Blanchard (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2008); Yongjin , “China and the Emerging Regional Order in the South Pacific,” Australian Journal of International Affairs 61, no. 3 (2007): 367–81; R. Evan Ellis, China in Latin America: The Whats and Wherefores (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2009). 3. Yongjin Zhang, “Reconsidering the Economic Internationalization of China: Implications of the WTO Membership,” Journal of Contemporary China 12, no. 37 (2003): 699–714; Johnston, Social States. 4. For an assessment of Chinese debates about globalization, see Nick Knight, Imagining Globalisation in China: Debates on Ideology, Politics and Culture (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2008). 5. See Susan L. Shirk, “Changing Media, Changing China,” in Changing Media, Changing China, ed. Susan L. Shirk (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011). 6. For example, see James S. Fishkin et al., “Deliberative Democracy in an Unlikely Place: Deliberative Polling in China,” British Journal of Political Science 40, no. 2 (2010): 435–48. 7. Susan L. Shirk argues that the domestic insecurity of the Chinese leader- ship is an important factor in China’s foreign policy decision making; William A. Callahan, who employs a constructivist approach, argues that Chinese national insecurity stems from the way that discourses— particularly a discourse of national humiliation—shape national identity. Similarly, historian Julia Lovell claims that the failure of outside observ- ers to realize that Chinese political leaders prioritize domestic problems and have relatively little interest in foreign relations was an important factor in pushing Britain into war with China in the nineteenth century and continues to generate conflict today. Susan L. Shirk, China: Fragile Superpower (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007); William A. Callahan, China: The Pessoptimist Nation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010); Julia Lovell, The Opium War: Drugs, Dreams and the Making of China (London: Picador, 2011). See also Deng, China’s Struggle for Status. 8. For example, Sheng Ding, The Dragon’s Hidden Wings: How China Rises with Its Soft Power (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2008); Joshua Kurlantzick, Charm Offensive: How China’s Soft Power Is Transforming the World (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007); Bates Gill and Yanzhong Huang, “Sources and Limits of Chinese ‘Soft Power,’” Survival 48, no. 2 (2006): 17–36. Notes 193

9. Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, Activists beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998), 213; Miles Kahler and David A. Lake, “Globalization and Changing Patterns of Political Authority,” in Governance in a Global Economy: Political Authority in Transition, ed. Miles Kahler and David A. Lake (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003), 428. 10. See Juan J. Linz, Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2000); Patrick Köllner and Steffen Kailitz, “Comparing Autocracies: Theoretical Issues and Empirical Analyses,” Democratization 20, no. 1 (2013): 1–12. 11. See Bruce Gilley, “Beyond the Four Percent Solution: Explaining the Consequences of China’s Rise,” Journal of Contemporary China 20, no. 72 (2011): 795–811. 12. The majority of these have focused on political and economic governance. For example, Suisheng Zhao, “The China Model: Can It Replace the Western Model of Modernization?,” Journal of Contemporary China 19, no. 65 (2010): 419–36; Barry Naughton, “China’s Distinctive System: Can It Be a Model for Others?,” Journal of Contemporary China 19, no. 65 (2010): 437–60; Scott Kennedy, “The Myth of the Beijing Consensus,” Journal of Contemporary China 19, no. 65 (2010): 461–77; William A. Callahan, “Chinese Visions of World Order: Post-Hegemonic or a New Hegemony?,” International Studies Review 10, no. 4 (2008): 749–61. A few have examined the potential of Chinese cultural or philosophical ideas to gain greater international influence. For example, Daniel A. Bell, China’s New Confucianism: Politics and Everyday Life in a Changing Society (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), 19–37. 13. See Andrew Moravcik, “The New Liberalism,” in The Oxford Handbook of International Relations, ed. Christian Reus-Smit and Duncan Snidal (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008). 14. See Ted Hopf, “The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory,” International Security 23, no. 1 (1998): 171–200; Jim George, Discourses of Global Politics: A Critical (Re)Introduction to International Relations (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1994); David Campbell, Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1992). Recent examples of studies that focus on discourse in international politics include Charlotte Epstein, “Who Speaks? Discourse, the Subject and the Study of Identity in International Politics,” European Journal of International Relations 17, no. 2 (2011): 327–50; Lene Hansen, Security as Practice: Discourse Analysis and the Bosnian War (London: Routledge, 2006); Krista Hunt and Kim Rygiel, eds., (En)Gendering the War on Terror: War Stories and Camouflaged Politics (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2006). 15. For example, Ren Xianliang, Yulun yindao yishu: Lingdao ganbu ruhe miandui meiti [The art of guiding public opinion: How leading cad- res should face the media] (Beijing: Xinhua Chubanshe, 2010); Hong Xianghua, ed., Meiti lingdao li: Lingdao ganbu ruhe yu meiti da jiaodao [Media leadership strength: How leading cadres deal with the media] 194 Notes

(Beijing: Zhonggongdang Shi Chubanshe, 2009); Wu Hao, Wu Hao shuo xinwen: Yi wei Xinhuashe jizhe de xinwen shizhan shouji [Wu Hao dis- cusses the news: A Xinhua journalist’s notes from the news frontline] (Beijing: Xinhua Chubanshe, 2008); Ye Hao, ed., Zhengfu xinwenxue anli: Zhengfu yingdui meiti de xin fangfa [Government media studies cases: The government’s new methods of responding to the media] (Nanjing: Jiangsu Renmin Chubanshe, 2007). 16. See Peter Gourevitch, “The Second Image Reversed: The International Sources of Domestic Politics,” International Organization 32, no. 4 (1978): 881–912; Peter Gourevitch, “Domestic Politics and International Relations,” in Handbook of International Relations, ed. Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse, and Beth A. Simmons (London: Sage, 2002). 17. Callahan, The Pessoptimist Nation. 18. Chris Buckley, “China Internal Security Spending Jumps Past Army Budget,” Reuters, March 5, 2011, http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/03/05/ us-china-unrest-idUSTRE7222RA20110305. 19. For example, Zheng Yongnian first differentiates between the Party and the state when examining their relationship with each other and only treats them as a collective entity when he moves to analyze the Party- state’s relationship with Chinese society. Zheng Yongnian, The as Organizational Emperor: Culture, Reproduction and Transformation (Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2010). 20. Richard K. Herrmann, “Linking Theory to Evidence in International Relations,” in Handbook of International Relations, ed. Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse, and Beth A. Simmons (London: Sage, 2002), 130.

1 Propaganda, Power, and Cohesion in Chinese Politics

1. Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall, “Power in Global Governance,” in Power in Global Governance, ed. Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 2. See also Stephen Lukes, Power: A Radical View, 2nd ed. (London: Palgrave, 2005), 9. 2. Lukes, Power, 26. 3. Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall, “Power in International Politics,” International Organization 59, no. 1 (2005): 45. 4. Ibid., 49–57. 5. As Zheng Yongnian points out, culture influences “the way the CCP exercises its power over the state, and the way the Party-state exercises its power over society.” Yongnian Zheng, The Chinese Communist Party as Organizational Emperor: Culture, Reproduction and Transformation (Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2010), 34. 6. The CCP’s propaganda in this period was not only based on communist ide- ology. It also included appeals to anti-Japanese nationalism. See Chalmers Johnson, Peasant Nationalism and Communist Power: The Emergence Notes 195

of Revolutionary China 1937–1945 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1962). 7. W. Phillips Davison, International Political Communication (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965), 9. 8. Outside the realm of official discourse, however, propaganda (xuanch- uan) is occasionally used in a negative way. For example, when a group of Chinese scholars, lawyers, and media workers called for a boycott of the Chinese state broadcaster CCTV, they claimed that the major CCTV news programme Network News (Xinwen Lianbo) should be renamed “Network Propaganda” (Xuanchuan Lianbo). “Dizhi yangshi, jujue xinao [Boycott CCTV, reject brainwashing],” Dwnews.com, January 12, 2009, http://blog.dwnews.com/?p=48886; Shirong Chen, “China TV Faces Propaganda Charge,” BBC News, January 12, 2009, http://news.bbc. co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/7824255. 9. Xuanchuan gongzuo (propaganda work) is commonly used as a noun to refer to the task of conducting propaganda. 10. “Xuanchuan,” Zaixian xinhua cidian [Xinhua online dictionary], accessed February 19, 2009, http://xh.5156edu.com/html5/93311.html. 11. “Xuanchuan,” Baidu Baike, accessed February 19, 2009, http://baike. baidu.com/view/193752.htm. 12. On media diplomacy, see Zhao Kejin, “Meiti waijiao jiqi yunzuo jizhi [Media diplomacy and its operating mechanism],” Shijie jingji yu zhengzhi [World economics and politics] 4 (2004): 21–26. 13. Ithiel de Sola Pool, foreword to Communications and National Integration in Communist China, by Alan P. L. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), xiv–xv. 14. Lenin distinguished between agitation, which was designed to mobilize the masses to action, and propaganda, which was designed to educate and indoctrinate Party members and others in communist ideology. I do not make use of that distinction here and instead use the term “propaganda” to cover both activities. V. I. Lenin, What is to Be Done?, trans. S. V. and Patricia Utechin, ed. S. V. Utechin (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963), 92–93. 15. See Robert Jay Lifton, Thought Reform and the Psychology of Totalism: A Study of “Brainwashing” in China (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1961); Frederick T. C. Yu, Mass Persuasion in Communist China (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964). 16. Yu, Mass Persuasion in Communist China, 4. 17. Martin King Whyte, Small Groups and Political Rituals in China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974), 13. 18. Yu, Mass Persuasion in Communist China, 5. 19. David Shambaugh, “China’s Propaganda System: Institutions, Processes and Efficacy,” The China Journal, no. 57 (2007): 26. 20. Franklin W. Houn, To Change a Nation: Propaganda and Indoctrination in Communist China (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1961), 1. 21. A number of factors predicated this shift, including economic stagnation, the damage to political stability and perceptions of the official ideology 196 Notes

caused by the , and discontent and frustration through- out society with the restrictions on personal freedom and economic oppor- tunity that Maoism had imposed. See Gordon White, Riding the Tiger: The Politics of Economic Reform in Post-Mao China (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1993), 29–42. 22. Daniel C. Lynch, After the Propaganda State: Media, Politics, and “Thought Work” in Reformed China (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999), 5. 23. See Ann Anagnost, “The Corporeal Politics of Quality (Suzhi),” Public Culture 16, no. 2 (2004): 189–208; Andrew Kipnis, “Suzhi: A Keyword Approach,” The China Quarterly 186 (2006): 295–313; Tamara Jacka, “Cultivating Citizens: Suzhi (Quality) Discourse in the PRC,” positions 17, no. 3 (2009): 523–35. 24. Michael Dutton, Policing Chinese Politics: A History (Durham: Duke University Press, 2005), 251–55. 25. Xinhua, “ tong quanguo xuanchuan sixiang gongzuo huiyi daib- iao zuotan,” Xinhua Wang, January 22, 2008, http://news.xinhuanet.com/ newscenter/2008–01/22/content_7475040. 26. Hu Jintao, “Gaoju Zhongguo tese shehui zhuyi weida qizhi, wei duoqu quanmian jianshe xiaokang shehui xin shengli er fendou—zai Zhongguo gongchandang di shiqi ci quanguo daibiao dahui shang de baogao [Raise high the great banner of socialism with Chinese characteristics, struggle to capture the new victory of building an overall prosperous society— report to the Chinese Communist Party Seventeenth National Party Congress],” October 15, 2007, http://www.cssc-cul.org.cn/dxp/17d. htm. 27. See Yuezhi Zhao, Communication in China: Political Economy, Power, and Conflict (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2008). 28. Juan J. Linz, Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2000), 35. 29. Ibid. 30. Zhao, Communication in China, 35. 31. Ibid., 22. 32. Ingrid d’Hooghe, “Public Diplomacy in the People’s Republic of China,” in The New Public Diplomacy: Soft Power in International Relations, ed. Jan Melissen (Houndmills, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 103. 33. Yiwei Wang, “Public Diplomacy and the Rise of Chinese Soft Power,” ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 616, no. 1 (2008): 264–65. 34. Ibid., 265. 35. Xiaoling Zhang, “China’s International Broadcasting: A Case Study of CCTV International,” in Soft Power in China: Public Diplomacy through Communication, ed. Jian Wang (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 68–69. 36. Jian Wang, “Introduction: China’s Search of Soft Power,” in Soft Power in China: Public Diplomacy through Communication, ed. Jian Wang (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 9–10. Notes 197

37. Zhang, “China’s International Broadcasting,” 68–69; Wang, “Public Diplomacy,” 264; d’Hooghe, “Public Diplomacy,” 103. 38. Joshua Kurlantzick, Charm Offensive: How China’s Soft Power Is Transforming the World (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007), 64. 39. Joseph S. Nye Jr., Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (New York: Public Affairs, 2004). 40. Yanzhong Huang and Sheng Ding, “Dragon’s Underbelly: An Analysis of China’s Soft Power,” East Asia: An International Quarterly 23, no. 4 (2006): 31. See also Bates Gill and Yanzhong Huang, “Sources and Limits of Chinese ‘Soft Power,’” Survival 48, no. 2 (2006): 27. 41. Zhao Litao and Tan Soon Heng, “China’s Cultural Rise: Visions and Challenges,” China: An International Journal 5, no. 1 (2007): 108. 42. David M. Lampton, The Three Faces of Chinese Power: Might, Money, and Minds (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008), 161. 43. Ibid., 140. Joshua Cooper Ramo, in a report sponsored by public relations firm Hill and Knowlton, similarly argues that “there is little agreement about what China stands for at home and abroad” and that this creates mistrust and misunderstanding of China among foreign publics (although it should be noted that Ramo sees this as more of an error in public rela- tions strategy than a problem with the political system). Joshua Cooper Ramo, Brand China (London: Foreign Policy Centre, 2007), 13. 44. Sheng Ding, The Dragon’s Hidden Wings: How China Rises with Its Soft Power (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2008), 91. 45. Yong Deng, “The New Hard Realities: ‘Soft Power’ and China in Transition,” in Soft Power: China’s Emerging Strategy in International Politics, ed. Mingjiang Li (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2009), 73–74. 46. Lampton, The Three Faces of Chinese Power, 163. Lampton’s approach to power, like Nye’s, focuses on compulsory and institutional power. He divides the means by which a state exercises power into three types: coer- cive, remunerative, and normative power. Ibid., 10–11. 47. Huang and Ding, “Dragon’s Underbelly,” 31–32. 48. Yong Deng, “Escaping the Periphery: China’s National Identity in World Politics,” in China’s International Relations in the 21st Century: Dynamics of Paradigm Shifts, ed. Weixing Hu, Gerald Chan, and Daojiong Zha (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 2000), 43. 49. Barnett and Duvall, “Power in International Politics,” 49–51. 50. Zhao, Communication in China, 20. 51. Anne-Marie Brady, Marketing Dictatorship: Propaganda and Thought Work in Contemporary China (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2008), 95–117. 52. Barnett and Duvall, “Power in International Politics.” 53. David Howarth and Yannis Stavrakakis, “Introducing Discourse Theory and Political Analysis,” in Discourse Theory and Political Analysis: Identities, Hegemonies and Social Change, ed. David Howarth, Aletta J. Norval, and Yannis Stavrakakis (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2000), 3–4. 198 Notes

54. Ibid., 4. 55. See ibid., 3; Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics, trans. Winston Moore and Paul Cammack (London: Verso, 1985), 112; Mark Haugaard, “Power and Hegemony in Social Theory,” in Hegemony and Power: Consensus and Coercion in Contemporary Politics, ed. Mark Haugaard and Howard H. Lentner (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2006), 54. 56. Xiaobo Su, “Revolution and Reform: The Role of Ideology and Hegemony in Chinese Politics,” Journal of Contemporary China 20, no. 69 (2011): 314. 57. For an explanation of the process through which audiences respond to the discursive articulations that take place during political “performances,” see Jeffrey C. Alexander, “Cultural Pragmatics: Social Performance between Ritual and Strategy,” in Social Performance: Symbolic Action, Cultural Pragmatics, and Ritual, ed. Jeffrey C. Alexander, Bernhard Giesen, and Jason L. Mast (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006). 58. Barnett and Duvall, “Power in International Politics,” 55–56. 59. Philip G. Cerny, “Dilemmas of Operationalizing Hegemony,” in Hegemony and Power: Consensus and Coercion in Contemporary Politics, ed. Mark Haugaard and Howard H. Lentner (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2006), 83. 60. Yong Deng, China’s Struggle for Status: The Realignment of International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 66. 61. Huang and Ding, “Dragon’s Underbelly,” 40. 62. Kurlantzick, Charm Offensive, 229. 63. Wang, “Public Diplomacy,” 265. 64. Ibid., 262. 65. The Pew Global Attitudes Project, 24-Nation Pew Global Attitudes Survey (Washington, DC: Pew Research Center, 2008), 35–46. 66. Patricia Reaney, “U.S. Most Admired Country Globally: Survey,” Reuters, October 5, 2009, http://www.reuters.com/article/newsOne/ idUSTRE59447120091005. 67. Wasserstrom has argued that Americans tend to seesaw between the dream of a liberal, democratic, and friendly China and the nightmare of a totali- tarian communist China (neither of which, it should be noted, are ideas the Party-state would want to encourage). Jeffrey N. Wasserstrom, “Big Bad China and the Good Chinese: An American Fairy Tale,” in China beyond the Headlines, ed. Timothy B. Weston and Lionel M. Jensen (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2000). On the relationship between the “China threat theory” and American identity, see Chengxin Pan, “The ‘China Threat’ in American Self-Imagination: The Discursive Construction of Other as Power Politics,” Alternatives: Global, Local, Political 29, no. 3 (2004): 305–31. 68. Lynch calls this process the “struggle to control communications flows and thus ‘structuration’ of the symbolic environment.” Lynch, After the Propaganda State, 2. On “structuration,” see Anthony Giddens, Central Notes 199

Problems in Social Theory: Action, Structure, and Contradiction in Social Analysis (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979). 69. I do not treat “cohesive power” as an analytical concept. 70. Although such propaganda practices may not appear directly to involve public discourse and seem more concerned with shaping the beliefs of their internal membership, the exercise of power through propaganda practices within these organizations does have an impact on public discourse in that propaganda discipline at the higher levels of the CCP and the armed forces is intended not to enforce complete ideological uniformity, but rather to ensure that internal disagreements are not made public. 71. Zhonggong Zhongyang Wenxian Yanjiusuo, “Dang de wenxian shiye fazhan de guanghui licheng yu qishi [The magnificent progress and rev- elations of the development of the Party document project],” Qiu Shi 13 (2011): 33–36. 72. “Shenru xuexi guanche Hu Jintao zongshuji ‘qi yi’ zhongyao jianghua jingshen wei tuijin Zhongguo tese shehuizhuyi weida shiye ningju qi qiang da liliang [Deeply study and implement the spirit of general secretary Hu Jintao’s ‘July 1’ important speech to advance the great undertaking of socialism with Chinese characteristics and coalesce great power],” Renmin Ribao, July 18, 2011, 1. 73. Brady, Marketing Dictatorship, 26. 74. Alice L. Miller, “Leadership Presses Party Unity in Time of Economic Stress,” China Leadership Monitor 28 (2009), http://media.hoover.org/ documents/CLM28AM.pdf. 75. Zheng, The Chinese Communist Party, 162–63. 76. “Yu redian mian dui mian, tong baixing xin tie xin [In facing hotspots, become close with the common people],” Renmin Ribao, August 5, 2011, 5. 77. Hu Jintao, “Zai qingzhu Zhongguo gongchandang chengli 90 zhou nian dahui shang de jianghua [Address to the conference to celebrate the nineti- eth anniversary of the founding of the CCP],” People’s Daily, July 1, 2011, http://theory.people.com.cn/GB/15053598.html. 78. “Renmin Ribao shelun: Ningju sixiang gongshi, heli gong jian ke nan [People’s Daily editorial: Coalesce ideological consensus, cooperate to tackle resolutely and overcome difficulties],” People’s Daily, March 3, 2012, opinion.people.com.cn/GB/17281299.html. 79. “Ningjuli cong he er lai? [Where does cohesion come from?],” Zhongguo Gongchandang Xinwen Wang, July 4, 2008, http://cpc.people.com.cn/ GB/68742/123889/123890/7472023.html. 80. Ibid. 81. “Shanghai Expo a Pride of all Chinese, Hu Tells Taiwan Dignitaries,” Xinhua, April 29, 2010, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/ china/2010–04/29/c_13272639_2.htm. 82. “Hu Jintao, , , , fenbie canjia quan- guo lianghui yixie tuanzu shenyi he taolun [Hu Jintao, Wu Bangguo, Jia Qinglin, Xi Jinping, attend group deliberations and discussions at the national two meetings],” Renmin Ribao, March 7, 2011, 1. 200 Notes

83. “Communique of the Fifth Plenum of the 17th CPC Central Committee,” The Beijing Review, October 25, 2010, http://www.bjreview.com/Cover_ Story_Series_2010/2010–10/25/content_305968.htm. 84. “Mao Xinyu tan chang hong ge: Hong yang zhengqi, zengjia Zhongguo renmin de ningjuli [Mao Xinyu discusses singing red songs: Greatly raise a positive environment, increase Chinese people’s cohesive power],” People’s Daily, July 13, 2011, http://military.people.com.cn/ GB/15148360.html. 85. Tania Branigan and Ian Sample, “China Unveils Rival to International Space Station,” The Guardian, April 26, 2011, http://www.guardian. co.uk/world/2011/apr/26/china-space-station-tiangong. 86. Shi Yinhong, “Guanyu Zhongguo de daguo diwei jiqi xingxiang de sikao [Regarding China’s great power status and thinking on its image],” Guoji jingji pinglun [International economic review] (September–October 1999), 44. 87. Zhou Tianyong, Wang Changjiang, and Wang Anling, eds., Gong Jian: Shiqi da hou Zhongguo zhengzhi tizhi gaige yanjiu baogao [Storming the barricades: Research report on China’s political system reform after the Seventeenth Party Congress] (Wujiaqu: Xinjiang Shengchan Jianshe Bingtuan Chubanshe, 2007), 65. 88. “Hu Jintao: Zhashi zuohao xuanchuan sixiang gongzuo, tigao guojia wen- hua ruanshili [Hu Jintao: Firmly carry out propaganda and thought work, raise national cultural soft power],” Xinhua Wang, January 22, 2008, http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2008–01/22/content_7476705.htm.

2 Propaganda in Chinese Domestic Politics

1. Anne-Marie Brady, Marketing Dictatorship: Propaganda and Thought Work in Contemporary China (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2008); David Shambaugh, “China’s Propaganda System: Institutions, Processes and Efficacy,” The China Journal, no. 57 (2007): 25–58. 2. Alice L. Miller, “The CCP Central Committee’s Leading Small Groups,” China Leadership Monitor 26 (2008): 1, 3, http://media.hoover.org/docu- ments/CLM26AM.pdf. 3. Ibid., 3. 4. Shambaugh, “China’s Propaganda System,” 32. 5. Ibid., 31. 6. The others are the PLA, the internal security bureaucracies, and the Organization Department, which is responsible for most CCP and government appointments. Susan L. Shirk, China: Fragile Superpower (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 83–84. 7. Brady, Marketing Dictatorship, 16. 8. “: Zujian Guojia Xinwen Chuban Guangbo Dianying Dianshi Zongju [Ma Kai: Establish State Administration of Press, Publication, Radio, Film, and Television],” People’s Daily, March 10, 2013, http: //finance.people.com.cn/n/2013/0310/c1004–20738004.html. Notes 201

9. “General Administration of Press and Publications,” Ministry of Culture of the People’s Republic of China, accessed June 22, 2009, http://www1. chinaculture.org/library/2008–01/16/content_127444.htm; “GAPP,” Danwei, August 8, 2008, http://www.danwei.org/media_guide/regula- tory_agencies/gapp.php. 10. Shambaugh, “China’s Propaganda System,” 42. 11. “SARFT,” Danwei, August 8, 2008, http://www.danwei.org/media_guide/ regulatory_agencies/sarft.php; Brady, Marketing Dictatorship, 17. 12. “Zhongyang dangxiao gaikuang [Central Party School summary],” Zhonggong zhongyang dangxiao [Central Party School], June 2, 2008, http://www.ccps.gov.cn/dxgk.php?col=4. 13. See Miller, “Leadership Presses Party Unity in Time of Economic Stress,” China Leadership Monitor 28 (2009), http://media.hoover.org/documents/ CLM28AM.pdf. 14. “Guanyu chengli zhongyang jingshen wenming jianshe zhidao weiyuanhui de tongzhi [Notice on establishing a central spiritual civilization build- ing advisory committee],” Zhongguo Wenming Wang [China Civilization Net], 1997, accessed on June 4, 2009, http://www.godpp.gov.cn/zlzx/2007– 10/31/content_11542846.htm; Shambaugh, “China’s Propaganda System,” 33. 15. Brady, Marketing Dictatorship, 18. 16. Unger writes that after the Communist revolution historians “were to serve as handmaidens to the Party propagandists.” Jonathan Unger, Introduction, to Using the Past to Serve the Present: Historiography and Politics in Contemporary China, ed. Jonathan Unger (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1993), 3. 17. Shambaugh, “China’s Propaganda System,” 53. 18. “MIIT,” Danwei, August 8, 2008, http://www.danwei.org/media_guide/ regulatory_agencies/miit.php. 19. Lu Hui, “Ministry of Industry and Information Technology Inaugurated,” Xinhua, June 29, 2008, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008–06/29/ content_8458271.htm. 20. Shambaugh, “China’s Propaganda System,” 40. Emphasis in original. 21. Ibid. 22. Brady, Marketing Dictatorship, 128–29. 23. “Xinwen ban jieshao [Information Office introduction],” State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, 2011, accessed October 30, 2013, http://www.scio.gov.cn/xwbjs/. 24. Michael Wines, “China Creates New Agency for Patrolling the Internet,” , May 4, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/05/ world/asia/05china.html?_r=1. 25. “Xinwen ban jieshao [Information Office introduction].” 26. For an account of an ideological campaign within the PLA, see James Mulvenon, “Hu Jintao and the ‘Core Values of Military Personnel,’” China Leadership Monitor 28 (2009), http://media.hoover.org/documents/ CLM28JM.pdf. 27. Brady, Marketing Dictatorship, 18. 202 Notes

28. David Bandurski, “Pulling the Strings of China’s Internet,” Far Eastern Economic Review, December 2007, http://www.feer.com/essays/2007/ december/pulling-the-strings-of-chinas-internet. 29. Brady, Marketing Dictatorship, 10. 30. Ibid. 31. On professionalism and Chinese journalists, see Zhongdang Pan and Ye Lu, “Localizing Professionalism: Discursive Practices in China’s Media Reforms,” in Chinese Media, Global Contexts, ed. Chin-Chuan Lee (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003); Hugo de Burgh, The Chinese Journalist: Mediating Information in the World’s Most Populous Country (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003), 105–21. 32. Ashley Esarey, Speak No Evil: Mass Media Control in Contemporary China (Washington, DC: Freedom House, 2006), 4–5. 33. Shambaugh, “China’s Propaganda System,” 44. 34. The United States–based website China Digital Times regularly publishes leaked propaganda guidelines under the heading “Directives from the Ministry of Truth.” See http://chinadigitaltimes.net/china/ministry-of-truth/. During the Beijing Olympics a list of propaganda instructions also found its way into the hands of foreign journalists. Jacquelin Magnay, “Censors Make News,” The Age, August 14, 2008, http://www.theage.com.au/news/off-the- field/censors-make-news/2008/08/14/1218307066384.html. 35. For example, see Xiao Qiang, “Internet Censor’s Latest ‘Working Instructions,’” China Digital Times, January 16, 2008, http://chinadigi- taltimes.net/2008/01/internet-censors-latest-working-instructions/. 36. Yuezhi Zhao, Communication in China: Political Economy, Power, and Conflict (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2008), 44. 37. David Bandurski, “What Happened at The Beijing News?,” China Media Project, September 15, 2011, http://cmp.hku.hk/2011/09/15/15432/. 38. Shambaugh, “China’s Propaganda System,” 44. 39. Jonathan Hassid, “Controlling the Chinese Media: An Uncertain Business,” Asian Survey 48, no. 3 (2008): 414–30. 40. He Qinglian, The Fog of Censorship: Media Control in China, trans. Paul Frank (New York: Human Rights in China, 2008), xviii; Zhao, Media, Market, and Democracy in China: Between the Party Line and the Bottom Line (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1998), 127. 41. The intellectual magazine Yanhuang Chunqiu and the Southern Media Group that publishes newspapers such as Nanfang Dushi Bao (Southern Metropolis Daily) and Nanfang Zhoumo (Southern Weekend) are two likely examples of this. Pan describes the Southern Media Group as “a camp for the party’s liberal wing.” Philip Pan, Out of Mao’s Shadow: The Struggle for the Soul of a New China (London: Picador, 2008), 239. 42. Esarey, Mass Media Control in Contemporary China, 3. 43. For example, Philip P. Pan, “In China, an Editor Triumphs, and Fails,” Washington Post, August 1, 2004, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp- dyn/articles/A30835–2004Jul31.html. 44. Wen Ya, “Journalist for Hire,” , September 17, 2013, http:// www.globaltimes.cn/content/812165.shtml. Notes 203

45. For some examples of the use of laws against journalists see Esarey, Mass Media Control in Contemporary China, 7–8. 46. “Chinese Reporter Detained after Accusing Official,” South China Morning Post, August 25, 2013, http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1299278/ chinese-reporter-detained-after-accusing-official. 47. Committee to Protect Journalists, “Attacks on the Press in 2008: China,” cpj.org, February 10, 2009, http://cpj.org/2009/02/attacks-on-the-press- in-2008-china.php. 48. Madeline Earp, “Although Not Explicit, Legal Threats to Journalists Persist,” in Challenged in China: The Shifting Dynamics of Censorship and Control (Committee to Protect Journalists, March 2013), http://cpj. org/reports/china2013.pdf. 49. See Wang Heyan, Zhu Tao, and Ye Doudou, “The Sanlu Trial: Diary of a Dairy Disaster,” Caijing, January 15, 2009, http://english.caijing.com. cn/2009–01–15/110048298.html. 50. For example, see “Hitting the Female Reporter,” ESWN, June 8, 2009, http://www.zonaeuropa.com/200906a.brief.htm#014; He Qinglian, The Fog of Censorship, 78–86. 51. See Xie Yu, “Reporter Arrested for Accepting Bribes,” , December 9, 2008, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/regional/2008–12/09/ content_7285026.htm; Zhang Lei, “Reporter Lost for 14 Days Found in Police Custody,” China Daily, December 16, 2008, http://www.china- daily.com.cn/china/2008–12/16/content_7307284.htm; Emma Lupano, “Detentions Raise Old Questions About Protecting Journalists,” China Media Project, December 22, 2008, http://cmp.hku.hk/2008/12/22/1434/. 52. See Xie Liangbing, “Dai Xiaojun: I Wanted to Show People the Dark Side,” The Economic Observer Online, November 14, 2008, http://www.eeo. com.cn/ens/Industry/2008/11/14/120439.shtml. 53. Zhao, Media, Market, and Democracy in China, 72–93. 54. Pan writes that the system of staff bonuses at Southern Metropolis Daily was classified as embezzled funds by authorities in an attempt to pres- sure editor Cheng Yizhong—who had been publishing critical articles— into admitting he had engaged in criminal activity. Pan, Out of Mao’s Shadow, 261, 264. See also Esarey, Mass Media Control in Contemporary China, 6–7. The president of the Supreme People’s Court has stated that courts, when making judgments, should place the needs of the CCP first, the needs of the masses second, and the requirement to follow the law third. David Hechler, “Lost in Translation,” Columbia Law School Magazine, 2009, http://www.law.columbia.edu/magazine/162122/lost- in-translation. 55. For example, “People/Points No. 1, 2009,” The Beijing Review, January 1, 2009, http://www.bjreview.com.cn/newsmaker/txt/2008–12/29/ content_172323.htm. Chan notes that while his study of CCTV news and current affairs reveals that the state media can be critical of the Party-state, this criticism focuses on the provincial, city, or village level administration, and on government departments and bureaus, never the central authorities, and only looks at policy implementation, rather than policy formulation or 204 Notes

problems connected to existing institutions. Alex Chan, “From Propaganda to Hegemony: Jiaodian Fangtan and China’s Media Policy,” Journal of Contemporary China 11, no. 30 (2002): 44. 56. Patrick Boehler, “China Orders Nation’s Journalists to Take Marxism Classes,” South China Morning Post, August 27, 2013, http://www.scmp. com/news/china-insider/article/1299795/china-orders-nations-journalists- take-marxism-classes. 57. Zhao, Media, Market, and Democracy in China, 167–68. 58. , “Full Text of Jiang Zemin’s Report at 16th Party Congress II,” Xinhua Wang, November 18, 2002, http://news.xinhuanet.com/ english/2002–11/18/content_632548.htm. 59. Alex Chan, “Guiding Public Opinion through Social Agenda-Setting: China’s Media Policy since the 1990s,” Journal of Contemporary China 16, no. 53 (2007): 547–59. 60. “China Media Should Boost Party Image, Official Says,” Agence France- Presse, November 8, 2009, http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/ article/ALeqM5gWj1B8Jd64BeQ6giOG_FDrPsETRg. 61. Tianyong Zhou, Wang Changjiang, and Wang Anling, eds., Gong Jian: Shiqi da hou Zhongguo zhengzhi tizhi gaige yanjiu baogao [Storming the barricades: Research report on China’s political system reform after the 17th Party Congress] (Wujiaqu: Xinjiang Shengchan Jianshe Bingtuan Chubanshe, 2007), 15, 68. 62. Ibid., 68. 63. Brady, Marketing Dictatorship, 3. 64. See Xin Xu, “Modernizing China in the Olympic Spotlight: China’s National Identity and the 2008 Beijing Olympiad,” in Sport Mega-Events: Social Scientific Analyses of a Global Phenomenon, ed. John Horne and Wolfram Manzenreiter (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2006); Maurice Roche, Mega-Events and Modernity: Olympics and Expos in the Growth of Global Culture (London: Routledge, 2000). 65. Susan Brownell, Beijing’s Games: What the Olympics Mean to China (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2008), 88. 66. Anne-Marie Broudehoux, The Making and Selling of Post-Mao Beijing (New York: Routledge, 2004), 161. 67. Quoted in Sang Ye and Geremie R. Barmé, “Thirteen National Days, a Retrospective,” China Heritage Quarterly 17, March 19, 2009, http:// www.chinaheritagequarterly.org/features.php?searchterm=017_national- days.inc&issue=017. 68. Yongnian Zheng, Technological Empowerment: The Internet, State, and Society in China (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2007), xiii. However, Internet cafes and commercial Internet accounts did not appear until 1995. Guobin Yang, The Power of the Internet in China: Citizen Activism Online (New York: Press, 2009), 162. 69. On the satirical use of mobile phone text messages during the SARS crisis, see Haiqing Yu, “Talking, Linking, Clicking: The Politics of AIDS and SARS in Urban China,” positions 15, no. 1 (2007): 46–50. Notes 205

70. “Di 32 ci Zhongguo hulian wangluo fazhan zhuangkuang tongji baodao [The thirty-second statistical report on the condition of China’s Internet development],” China Internet Network Information Center, July 2013, 5, http://www.cnnic.cn/hlwfzyj/hlwxzbg/hlwtjbg/201307/ P020130717505343100851.pdf. 71. Sage Brennan, “Respite from the Fireworks: Commentary; Wireless Firms to Cash in on New Year, BBS Still Rules the Net,” MarketWatch, February 19, 2007, http://www.marketwatch.com/story/correct-wireless-firms-pig- out-bulletin-boards-still-rule-roost. 72. Hu Yong, Zhong sheng xuanhua: Wangluo shidai de geren biaoda yu gonggong taolun [The rising cacophony: Personal expression and public discussion in the Internet age] (Guilin: Shifan Daxue Chubanshe, 2008), 93. 73. The authorities closed the Tsinghua-based BBS in 2005. Yang, The Power of the Internet in China, 53. Qiangguo Luntan was originally set up by the People’s Daily website in response to the outpouring of nationalist sentiment following NATO’s 1999 bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade. Xu Wu, Chinese Cyber Nationalism: Evolution, Characteristics, and Implications (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2007), 48. 74. Isaac Mao, “China’s First Blogger Isaac Mao: It was Just Like a Fairy Story,” The Guardian, August 5, 2008, http://www.guardian.co.uk/tech- nology/2008/aug/05/blogging.digitalmedia. 75. “Di 32 ci Zhongguo hulian wangluo fazhan zhuangkuang tongji baodao [The thirty-second statistical report on the condition of China’s Internet development],” China Internet Network Information Center, 28. 76. The blog of the Internet star Han Han, also a professional racing driver and successful author, has had more than 593 million hits. http://blog.sina. com.cn/twocold, accessed August 27, 2013. 77. In mid-2013, only 41.8 percent of netizens used email, while 84.2 per- cent used instant messaging. “Di 32 ci Zhongguo hulian wangluo fazhan zhuangkuang tongji baodao [The thirty-second statistical report on the condition of China’s internet development],” China Internet Network Information Center, 28. 78. Ibid., 36. 79. “Beijing’s New Tough Security Boss Cracks Down on Internet Rumors,” Caijing, August 21, 2013, http://english.caijing.com.cn/2013–08– 21/113200205.htm. 80. See Yang, The Power of the Internet in China, 55–57. 81. In mid-2013 464 million Chinese people used mobile phones to access the Internet. “Di 32 ci Zhongguo hulian wangluo fazhan zhuangkuang tongji baodao [The thirty-second statistical report on the condition of China’s Internet development],” China Internet Network Information Center, 13. 82. Haiqing Yu, Media and Cultural Transformation in China (London: Routledge, 2009), 11. See also Hu Yong, Zhong sheng xuanhua [The rising cacophony], 259–74. 206 Notes

83. Kathrin Hille, “How China Polices the Internet,” Financial Times, July 18, 2009, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/2/e716cfc6–71a1–11de-a821– 00144feabdc0.html. 84. James Fallows, “The Connection Has Been Reset,” The Atlantic.com 301, no. 2 (2008), http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/200803/chinese-firewall. 85. Lokman Tsui has argued that the Great Firewall metaphor is misleading as it can lead to the assumption that Internet control in China is primar- ily focused on preventing information from the outside world getting in, when in fact the Party-state is more concerned about controlling infor- mation that is generated within the country. Lokman Tsui, “The Great Firewall as Iron Curtain 2.0: The Implications of China’s Internet Most Dominant Metaphor for U.S. Foreign Policy” (paper presented at the 6th Annual Chinese Internet Research Conference, Journalism and Media Studies Centre, University of , 2008). 86. Fallows, “The Connection Has Been Reset.” 87. Banned sites and undesirable content can be detected in four different ways: a DNS block, the detection of a banned IP address, a URL keyword block, or a scan of the contents of the page itself. Ibid. 88. Rebecca MacKinnon, “Cyber Zone,” Index on Censorship 37, no. 2 (2008): 84. 89. Rebecca MacKinnon, “China’s Censorship 2.0: How Companies Censor Bloggers,” First Monday 14, no. 2, February 2, 2009, http://www.uic.edu/ htbin/cgiwrap/bin/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/2378/2089. 90. Li Hui and Megha Rajagopalan, “At Sina Weibo’s Censorship Hub, China’s Little Brothers Cleanse Online Chatter,” Reuters, September 11, 2013, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/09/12/us-china-internet- idUSBRE98A18Z20130912. 91. See Reporters Without Borders and Chinese Human Rights Defenders, China: Journey to the Heart of Internet Censorship (Paris: Reporters Without Borders and Chinese Human Rights Defenders, October 2007), http://www.rsf.org/IMG/pdf/Voyage_au_coeur_de_la_censure_GB.pdf; Xiao Qiang, “Government Order to Filter Search Results: July 8, 2009,” China Digital Times, July 9, 2009, http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2009/07/ government-order-to-filter-search-results-july-8–2009/. 92. MacKinnon, “Cyber Zone,” 85. 93. Kaiser Kuo, “A Funeral Dirge for 56.com?,” Ogilvy China Digital Watch, June 26, 2008, http://digitalwatch.ogilvy.com.cn/en/?p=281; Jeremy Goldkorn, “56.com Back Online,” Danwei.org, July 11, 2008, http://www. danwei.org/media_regulation/56com_back_online.php. 94. MacKinnon, “China’s Censorship 2.0.” 95. “China Eases off Proposal for Real-Name Registration of Bloggers,” Xinhua, May 22, 2007, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2007–05/22/ content_6136185.htm. 96. “Real Name Angst,” China Daily, August 14, 2005, http://www2.china- daily.com.cn/english/doc/2005–08/14/content_468833.htm. 97. Brady, Marketing Dictatorship, 130. Notes 207

98. David Bandurski, “Mugshots for All in Beijing’s Internet Bars,” China Media Project, October 19, 2008, http://cmp.hku.hk/2008/10/19/1293/. 99. “China Tightens Press Controls, in Particular on Weibo,” Caijing, April 16, 2013, http://english.caijing.com.cn/2013–04–16/112680980.html. 100. “Guangbo zongju guanyu jiaqiang hulianwang shiting jiemu neirong guanli de tongzhi [SARFT notice on strengthening the management of Internet audiovisual programming content],” State Administration of Radio, Film, and Television, March 30, 2009, http://www.sarft.gov.cn/ articles/2009/03/30/20090330171107690049.html. 101. “New Rules to Quash Internet Rumours,” China Daily, October 18, 2006, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/bizchina/2006–10/18/content_710648. htm; Qian Yanfeng, “New Internet Law Mere Scrap of Paper,” China Daily, May 26, 2009, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2009– 05/26/content_7941545.htm; “Police Detain Six People for Spreading Rumors Connecting Kunming Bus Blasts,” People’s Daily, August 1, 2008, http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90001/90776/90882/6465001. html. 102. “Qi tiao dixian quanti wangmin yinggai gongshou [Seven bottom lines all netizens should defend together],” Xinhua, August 14, 2013, http://news. xinhuanet.com/comments/2013–08/14/c_116945101.htm. 103. Guoguang Wu, “In the Name of Good Governance: E-Government, Internet Pornography and Political Censorship in China,” in China’s Information and Communications Technology Revolution: Social Changes and State Responses, ed. Xiaoling Zhang and Yongnian Zheng (London: Routledge, 2009). 104. “China Tightens Press Controls, in Particular on Weibo.” 105. Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, “The Internet in China [White Paper],” June 8, 2010, http://www.china. org.cn/government/whitepaper/node_7093508.htm. 106. “Hu Jintao Talks to Netizens via People’s Daily Online,” People’s Daily, June 20, 2008, http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90001/90776/90785/6433952. html; Sky Canaves, “Local Officials Urged to Get Savvy on Internet PR,” China Journal, June 2, 2009, http://blogs.wsj.com/chinajournal/2009/06/02/ local-officials-urged-to-get-savvy-on-internet-pr/. 107. Tania Branigan, “Chinese Internet Users Asked to Help Investigate Suspicious Death in Custody,” The Guardian, February 20, 2009, http:// www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/feb/20/china-internet-death-custody. 108. Yang, The Power of the Internet in China, 50–51. 109. Xiao, “Government Order to Filter Search Results.” 110. Guobin Yang, “Contesting Food Safety in the Chinese Media: Between Hegemony and Counter Hegemony,” The China Quarterly 214 (2013): 341. 111. Zheng, Technological Empowerment, 166. 112. For an in-depth discussion of intellectuals in contemporary China, see Edward Gu and Merle Goldman, eds., Chinese Intellectuals between State and Market (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2004). 208 Notes

113. For example, see Peter Foster, “Leading Chinese Dissident Claims Freedom of Speech Worse than before Olympics,” The Telegraph, April 27, 2009, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/china/5230707/ Leading-Chinese-dissident-claims-freedom-of-speech-worse-than-before- Olympics.html. 114. Mark Leonard, What Does China Think? (London: Fourth Estate, 2008), 17. This is not to say, however, that there is a simple dividing line between those intellectuals who work for the political establishment and those who follow a dissenting line—the reality is much more complex. See Timothy Cheek, “Xu Jilin and the Thought Work of China’s Public Intellectuals,” The China Quarterly 186 (2006): 401–20. 115. Dai Qing is one example of a blacklisted writer. Liu Xiaobo was charged with subversion in 2009. Benjamin Kang Lim, “China’s Top Dissident Arrested for Subversion,” Reuters, June 24, 2009, http://www.reuters.com/ article/worldNews/idUSTRE55N0F020090624?sp=true. 116. Perry Link, “The Anaconda in the Chandelier,” The New York Review of Books 49, no. 6 (2002): 67–70; Edward Gu and Merle Goldman, “Introduction: The Transformation of the Relationship between Chinese Intellectuals and the State,” in Chinese Intellectuals between State and Market, ed. Edward Gu and Merle Goldman (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2004), 10. According to Link this self-censorship also affects foreign intel- lectuals and businesspeople of both Chinese and non-Chinese origin. For a personal account of such self-censorship, see Ann Condi, “Changing the Subject: The ‘Invisible’ Control Mechanism in Chinese Media,” AsiaMedia, June 22, 2004, http://www.asiamedia.ucla.edu/article. asp?parentid=12169. 117. Kraus notes that most screening of artwork is carried out by editors, man- agers, and administrators, with only some areas, like film and television, under close official supervision. Richard Curt Kraus, The Party and the Arty in China: The New Politics of Culture (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2004), 109–10. 118. Two artists involved with the 2008 Beijing Olympics— and Zhang Yimou—provide contrasting examples of the role artists can take in contemporary China. After many of his early films were banned by the authorities, Zhang Yimou was perceived by many critics as having been coopted by the Party-state after his 2002 film Hero (Yingxiong) appeared to provide a justification for authoritarian rule. Zhang went on to direct the opening and closing ceremonies at the Beijing Olympics. Ai Weiwei, while contributing to the design of the “Bird’s Nest” National Stadium for the Olympics, was highly critical of both the Party-state and the Beijing Games. Ai has been involved in a grassroots project to record the details of all the children who were killed by collapsing school buildings during the 2008 earthquake and was held by authorities for a period in 2011, ostensibly under suspicion of tax evasion, before being released on the condition that he not make public statements. David Barboza, “Gritty Renegade Now Directs China’s Close-Up,” The New York Times, August 7, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/08/sports/olympics/08guru.html; Notes 209

David Barboza, “Artist Defies Web Censors in a Rebuke of China,” The New York Times, March 19, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/20/ world/asia/20quake.html; Keith Bradsher, “Conditions of Chinese Artist Ai Weiwei’s Detention Emerge,” The New York Times, August 12, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/13/world/asia/13artist.html. 119. See Francesco Sisci, “China’s Catholic Moment,” First Things, June–July 2009, http://www.firstthings.com/print.php?type=article&year=2009&m onth=05&title_link=chinas-catholic-moment-1243211148. 120. See Pitman B. Potter, “Belief in Control: Regulation of Religion in China,” The China Quarterly 173 (2003): 317–37. 121. Brady, Marketing Dictatorship, 53. 122. Ge Yunsong, “On the Establishment of Social Organization Under Chinese Law,” The International Journal of Not-for-Profit Law 2, no. 3 (2000), http://www.icnl.org/research/journal/vol2iss3/art_2.htm. 123. Ibid; Tony Saich, “Negotiating the State: The Development of Social Organizations in China,” The China Quarterly 161 (2000): 129–30. 124. Guobin Yang, “Environmental NGOs and Institutional Dynamics in China,” The China Quarterly 181 (2005): 54–55. 125. Saich, “Negotiating the State,” 131. 126. Yongnian Zheng, The Chinese Communist Party as Organizational Emperor: Culture, Reproduction and Transformation (Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2010), 146. 127. Suisheng Zhao, “A State-Led Nationalism: The Patriotic Education Campaign in Post-Tiananmen China,” Communist and Post-Communist Studies 31, no. 3 (1998): 288–89. 128. Ibid., 292–93. See also Suisheng Zhao, A Nation-State by Construction: Dynamics of Modern Chinese Nationalism (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004), 9. 129. See Rachel Murphy, “Turning Peasants into Modern Chinese Citizens: “Population Quality” Discourse, Demographic Transition and Primary Education,” The China Quarterly 177 (2004): 1–20. 130. Hassid, “Controlling the Chinese Media.” 131. Andrew J. Nathan, “Authoritarian Resilience,” Journal of Democracy 14, no. 1 (2003): 16. 132. David Shambaugh, China’s Communist Party: Atrophy and Adaptation (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2008), 169. 133. See Zhao, A Nation-State by Construction; Peter Hays Gries, China’s New Nationalism: Pride, Politics, and Diplomacy (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004); William A. Callahan, “National Insecurities: Humiliation, Salvation, and Chinese Nationalism,” Alternatives: Global, Local, Political 29, no. 2 (2004): 199–218; Maria Hsia Chang, Return of the Dragon: China’s Wounded Nationalism (Boulder, CO: Westview, 2001); Edward Friedman, “Still Building the Nation: The Causes and Consequences of China’s Patriotic Fervor,” in Chinese Political Culture 1989–2000, ed. Shiping Hua (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 2001). 134. Yu, Media and Cultural Transformation, 23. 135. Ibid., 23–27. 210 Notes

136. On heroic news narratives, see Peter C. Pugsley, “Constructing the Hero: Nationalistic News Narratives in Contemporary China,” Westminster Papers in Communication and Culture 3, no. 1 (2006): 78–93. 137. On the importance of international status for China see Yong Deng, “Better than Power: ‘International Status’ in Chinese Foreign Policy,” in China Rising: Power and Motivation in Chinese Foreign Policy, ed. Yong Deng and Fei-Ling Wang (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2005). 138. It is not uncommon for educated Chinese to contrast unfavorably the “chaos” (luan) of democratic India with China’s own politically controlled road to economic development. Nathan notes that the CCP uses Russia as a negative example of the chaos that could follow a collapse of its rule, Buruma writes that Chinese intellectuals “are so frightened of disorder that they are prone to shun the common cause, and opt instead for stabil- ity,” while deLisle calls the Chinese fear of chaos “a centuries-old politi- cal trope.” Nathan, “Authoritarian Resilience,” 14; Ian Buruma, Bad Elements: Chinese Rebels from Los Angeles to Beijing (New York: Vintage Books, 2002), 335; Jacques deLisle, “‘One World, Different Dreams’: The Contest to Define the Beijing Olympics,” in Owning the Olympics: Narratives of the New China, ed. Monroe E. Price and Daniel Dayan (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2008), 23. 139. Shirk, Fragile Superpower, 7. 140. Joseph Fewsmith, “Social Order in the Wake of Economic Crisis,” China Leadership Monitor 28 (2009): 2, http://media.hoover.org/documents/ CLM28JF.pdf. 141. Qiu Shi, “Gonggu dang he renmin tuanjie fendou de gongtong sixiang jichu [Consolidate the common ideological foundation that is the joint struggle of the party and the people],” Qiu Shi [Seeking Truth], October 16, 2013, http://www.qstheory.cn/zxdk/2013/201320/201310/t20131012_278250. htm.

3 China’s Foreign Propaganda Practices

1. Cited in Xiao Qiang, “: The Core Interests of the People’s Republic of China,” China Digital Times, August 7, 2009, http://chinadigitaltimes. net/2009/08/dai-bingguo-%E6%88%B4%E7%A7%89%E5%9B%BD- the-core-interests-of-the-prc/. 2. , “Weihu shijie heping, cujin gongtong fazhan [Protect world peace, promote common development],” Qiu Shi 19 (2009): 23. 3. Policy Research Unit of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, Zhongguo waijiao: 2008 nianban [China’s Foreign Affairs: 2008 Edition] (Beijing: Shijie Zhishi Chubanshe, 2008), 279. 4. Hu Jintao, “Gaoju Zhongguo tese shehui zhuyi weida qizhi, wei duoqu quanmian jianshe xiaokang shehui xin shengli er fendou—zai Zhongguo gongchandang di shiqi ci quanguo daibiao dahui shang de baogao [Raise high the great banner of socialism with Chinese characteristics, struggle to capture the new victory of building an overall prosperous society—report Notes 211

to the Chinese Communist Party Seventeenth National Party Congress].” See also Yang, “Weihu shijie heping, cujin gongtong fazhan [Protect world peace, promote common development],” 24. 5. Kang Fu, “Hexie shijie linian yu Zhongguo ruan shili waijiao [Harmonious world concept and China’s soft power diplomacy],” People’s Daily, July 6, 2010, http://theory.people.com.cn/GB/12070736.html. Emphasis added. 6. Bonnie S. Glaser, “Ensuring the ‘Go Abroad’ Policy Serves China’s Domestic Priorities,” China Brief 7, no. 5, April 2007. 7. Denny Roy, China’s Foreign Relations (Houndmills, UK: Macmillan, 1998), 243. 8. Yang, “Weihu shijie heping, cujin gongtong fazhan [Protect world peace, promote common development],” 24. 9. Avery Goldstein, “The Diplomatic Face of China’s Grand Strategy: A Rising Power’s Emerging Choice,” The China Quarterly 168 (2001): 836. See also Avery Goldstein, Rising to the Challenge: China’s Grand Strategy and International Security (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2005). 10. Michael Pillsbury, China Debates the Future Security Environment (Honolulu: University Press of the Pacific, 2005), 317. 11. One list of factors includes, for example, population and natural resources, the “hard” elements of economic, military and scientific capabilities, and the “soft” elements of political values, the morale of the armed forces, social cohesion, foreign policy values, ideology, and cultural attractive- ness. Zhao Kejin and Ni Shixiong, Zhongguo guoji guanxi lilun yanjiu [China international relations theory research] (Shanghai: Fudan Daxue Chubanshe, 2007), 141. 12. Ibid. 13. Gerald Chan, Chinese Perspectives on International Relations: A Framework for Analysis (Houndmills, UK: Macmillan, 1999), 30–31. 14. In an article in the journal Foreign Affairs, Zheng Bijian, an influential foreign policy advisor, stated: “China will not follow the path of Germany leading up to World War I or those of Germany and Japan leading up to World War II, when these countries violently plundered resources and pur- sued hegemony. Neither will China follow the path of the great powers vying for global domination during the Cold War. Instead, China will tran- scend ideological differences to strive for peace, development, and coop- eration with all countries of the world.” Zheng Bijian, “China’s ‘Peaceful Rise’ to Great Power Status,” Foreign Affairs 84, no. 5 (2005): 22. See also Shao Yalou, “Daguo jueqi zhong de waijiao zhanlüe ji dui Zhongguo de qishi [The diplomatic strategy of rising great powers and implications for China],” in Guoji tixi yu Zhongguo de ruan liliang [The International System and China’s Soft Power], ed. Liu Jie and Huang Renwei (Beijing: Shi Shi Chubanshe, 2006). 15. Li Changchun, “Zai xin de lishi qidian shang nuli kaichuang xuanchuan sixiang wenhua gongzuo xin jumian (er ling ling ba nian yi yue ershiyi ri) [At a new historical starting point, work hard to initiate a new pro- paganda, thought, and cultural work situation (January 21, 2008)],” in Shiqi da yilai: Zhongyao wenxian xuanbian (shang) [Since the Seventeenth 212 Notes

Congress: Selected important documents (Part One)], ed. Ma Yunfei and Yu Lijuan (Beijing: Zhongyang Wenxian Chubanshe, 2009), 189. 16. Zhao Qizheng, Xiang shijie shuoming Zhongguo [Explain China to the World] (Beijing: Xin Shijie Chubanshe, 2006), 192. 17. David M. Lampton, The Three Faces of Chinese Power: Might, Money, and Minds (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008), 119. 18. For an in-depth discussion of China threat theories and Chinese responses, see Yong Deng, China’s Struggle for Status: The Realignment of International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 97–127. 19. Ibid., 8. 20. See Wang Yanhong, “‘Zhongguo de ruan liliang jianshe’ zhuanjia zuotan- hui zongshu [Summary of the Expert Symposium ‘Building China’s Soft Power’],” in Guoji tixi yu Zhongguo de ruan liliang [The International System and China’s Soft Power], ed. Liu Jie and Huang Renwei (Beijing: Shi Shi Chubanshe, 2006), 134–35, 139. 21. For example, Zhao Kejin, “Meiti waijiao jiqi yunzuo jizhi [Media diplo- macy and its operating mechanism],” Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi [World eco- nomics and politics] 4 (2004): 21–26. 22. For example, Guo Xuetang, “Zhongguo ruan shi li jianshe zhong de lilun he zhengce xin sikao [New thinking in the theory and policy of building China’s soft power],” Shehui Kexue [Social science] 2 (2009): 20–26. For a comprehensive overview of Chinese public diplomacy and the relation- ship between public diplomacy and soft power, see Yiwei Wang, “Public Diplomacy and the Rise of Chinese Soft Power,” ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 616, no. 1 (2008): 257–73. 23. Sunny Lee, “China Grooms New Breed of Journalists,” Asia Times Online, September 4, 2009, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/KI04Ad01. html. 24. See Li Xiguang, “Li Xiguang: Huayuquan bi guoji xingxiang zhongyao [Li Xiguang: Speech power more important than international image],” Xinhua, July 30, 2009, http://news.xinhuanet.com/newmedia/2009–07/30/ content_11796681.htm; Wu Huaiting, “How Can China Speak to the World?,” Global Times, August 17, 2009, http://opinion.globaltimes.cn/ editor-picks/2009–08/458431.html. 25. For example, one senior editor bemoaned the fact that it is often difficult for foreign news organizations to get a timely response to a request for comment from the Chinese government, either from foreign embassies or in Beijing. Zhang Yong, “Poor Public Relations in Grand Press Rooms,” Global Times, September 7, 2009, http://opinion.globaltimes.cn/commen- tary/2009–09/465095.html. 26. David Bandurski, “More Hard Words on China’s ‘War for Public Opinion’,” China Media Project, September 30, 2009, http://cmp.hku. hk/2009/09/30/1957/. 27. David Barboza, “News Media Run by China Look Abroad for Growth,” The New York Times, January 14, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/15/ business/worldbusiness/15tele.html?_r=0. Notes 213

28. David Shambaugh, “China’s Propaganda System: Institutions, Processes and Efficacy,” The China Journal, no. 57 (2007): 47. 29. Wang, “Public Diplomacy,” 264–65. Cull argues that despite this frag- mentation “Chinese Public Diplomacy displays remarkable cohesive- ness.” Nicholas J. Cull, “Testimony Before the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission Hearing: China’s Propaganda and Influence Operations, Its Intelligence Activities that Target the United States and Its Resulting Impacts on US National Security,” April 30, 2009, http:// www.uscc.gov/hearings/2009hearings/written_testimonies/09_04_30_ wrts/09_04_30_cull_statement.pdf. 30. “Guide to P.R.C. Government Agencies,” China Daily, accessed July 29, 2009, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/government/zhishu.html#g3. 31. Zhao, Xiang shijie shuoming Zhongguo [Explain China to the world], 31. 32. “Xinwen ban jieshao [Information Office introduction],” State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, 2011, accessed October 30, 2013, http://www.scio.gov.cn/xwbjs/. 33. This occurs by way of a practice that Brady translates as “one office, two name plates,” and Shambaugh translates as “one organ, two signs.” Anne- Marie Brady, Marketing Dictatorship: Propaganda and Thought Work in Contemporary China (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2008), 13; Shambaugh, “China’s Propaganda System,” 47. 34. Brady, Marketing Dictatorship, 23; Shambaugh, “China’s Propaganda System,” 47. 35. State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, “Xinwen ban jieshao [Information Office introduction].” The eighth and ninth bureaus were added in 2010. Jonathan Ansfield, “China Starts New Bureau to Curb Web,” The New York Times, April 16, 2010, http://www. nytimes.com/2010/04/17/world/asia/17chinaweb.html. 36. Policy Research Unit of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, Zhongguo waijiao: 2008 nianban [China’s Foreign Affairs: 2008 Edition], 280–90. 37. The Shanghai Daily is another large English-language newspaper but it is not distributed nationally. 38. Shambaugh, “China’s Propaganda System,” 49–50. 39. Wang, “Public Diplomacy,” 260. 40. See Shambaugh, “China’s Propaganda System,” 48. 41. Zhonghua renmin gongheguo nianjian [People’s Republic of China year- book] (Beijing: Zhonghua renmin gongheguo nianjian she, 2008), 193. 42. Ibid. 43. “China’s Press Freedoms Extended,” BBC News, October 18, 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/7675306.stm; “Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Guowuyuan ling, di 537 hao: Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo waiguo changzhu xinwen jigou he waiguo jizhe caifang tiaoli [State Council of the People’s Republic of China, order number 537: People’s Republic of China regulations for foreign correspondent news organizations and interviews by foreign journalists],” October 17, 2008, http://www.gov.cn/ zwgk/2008–10/17/content_1124261.htm. 214 Notes

44. For one foreign journalist’s account of this situation, see Jonathan Watts, “One Journalist’s View,” Foreign Correspondents’ Club of China website, March 2008, http://www.fccchina.org/reporters-guide/one-journalists- view/. 45. See Foreign Correspondents Club of China, “Government Should Allow Reporters Access to Tibetan Areas,” March 9, 2009, http://www.fccchina. org/what/statement100309.html. 46. See Foreign Correspondents Club of China, “Olympic Progress Marred by Intimidation,” August 6, 2009, http://www.fccchina.org/2009/08/06/ olympic-progress-marred-by-intimidation/; Foreign Correspondents Club of China, “Results of July Membership Survey,” August 6, 2009, http:// www.fccchina.org/2009/08/06/results-of-july-membership-survey/. 47. Andrew Jacobs, “Chinese Move to Stop Reporting on Protests,” The New York Times, March 1, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/02/world/ asia/02china.html. 48. Christopher Bodeen, “China Expels Sole English-Language Reporter Melissa Chan, Claims Al-Jazeera,” The Independent, May 8, 2012, http:// www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/china-expels-sole-englishlan- guage-reporter-melissa-chan-claims-aljazeera-7722138.html. 49. Zhao, Xiang shijie shuoming Zhongguo [Explain China to the world], 34. 50. “Chinese FM to Hold Regular Briefings Every Weekday from September,” Xinhua, August 26, 2011, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/ china/2011–08/26/c_131077590.htm. 51. Loretta Chao, “Pro-China Ad Makes Broadway Debut,” China Realtime Report, January 18, 2011, http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2011/01/18/ pro-china-ad-makes-broadway-debut/. 52. Loretta Chao, Jason Dean, and Bob Davis, “Wary Powers Set to Square Off,” Wall Street Journal, January 19, 2011, http://online.wsj.com/article/ SB10001424052748704678004576089881162633472.html. 53. Aaron Rutkoff, “Chinese News Agency Takes on Times Square,” Metropolis, August 1, 2011, http://blogs.wsj.com/metropolis/2011/08/01/ chinese-news-agency-xinhua-takes-o-times-square/. 54. See http://chinawatch.washingtonpost.com/, accessed September 12, 2011. 55. Kathrin Hille, “China Agency to Launch English TV News,” Financial Times, June 28, 2009, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/ab91e79a-63f7–11de- a818–00144feabdc0,s01=1.html. 56. Thomson Reuters, “Reuters Delivers China’s News to the World [Press Release],” January 18, 2011, http://thomsonreuters.com/news_ideas/ press_releases/?itemId=381280. 57. See David Bandurski, “Another Party Media Treatise on Control 2.0,” China Media Project, June 15, 2009, http://cmp.hku.hk/2009/06/15/1661/. 58. Fu Ying, “We’ve Made Huge Strides, But China’s Influence Has Its Limits,” The Telegraph, July 28, 2009, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/ comment/personal-view/5927146/Weve-made-huge-strides-but-Chinas- influence-has-its-limits.html; Fu Ying, “Unity Is Deep in China’s Blood,” The Guardian, July 13, 2009, http://www.guardian.co.uk/ Notes 215

commentisfree/2009/jul/13/china-urumqi-uighur-han; Fu Ying, “Chinese Ambassador Fu Ying: Western Media Has ‘Demonised’ China,” The Telegraph, April 13, 2008, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/comment/per- sonal-view/3557186/Chinese-ambassador-Fu-Ying-Western-media-has- demonised-China.html. 59. For example, during the press conference at the 2008 Beijing Olympics, Beijing Organizing Committee spokesperson Wang Wei lashed out at foreign reporters, claiming that their excessive criticism was a reflection of how biased some of the media were toward China and how little they understood the country. See “Tenth IOC/BOCOG Press Conference,” August 22, 2008, http://en.beijing2008.cn/live/pressconference/mpc/ n214573397_2.shtml. 60. This norm of nondisclosure, which often involves officials assuming that anything related to dealing with the media must be the responsi- bility of the propaganda department, also applies to attitudes toward domestic journalists. It has been criticized in the Chinese media, how- ever, as representing an outdated mode of dealing with public opinion. See David Bandurski, “China and the ‘Crisis’ of Public Opinion,” China Media Project, August 17, 2009, http://cmp.hku.hk/2009/08/17/1706/. 61. http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/default.htm. 62. In English at http://eng.mod.gov.cn/ and in Chinese at http://www.mod. gov.cn/. 63. In 2009 the head of the US Pacific Command, Admiral Tim Keating, described China’s defense white paper as “less than fulfilling.” Jonathan Pearlman, “Australia, US Call on China for War Games,” The Sydney Morning Herald, September 3, 2009, http://www.smh.com.au/world/aus- tralia-us-call-on-china-for-war-games-20090902-f8h4.html. 64. “White Papers of the Government,” accessed October 30, 2013, http:// www.china.org.cn/e-white/index.htm. 65. Anne-Marie Brady, “Testimony of Associate-Professor Anne-Marie Brady: U.S.-China Economic & Security Review Commission: China’s Propaganda and Perception Management Efforts, Its Intelligence Activities that Target the United States, and the Resulting Impacts on U.S. National Security,” April 30, 2009, 4, http://www.uscc.gov/hearings/2009hearings/ written_testimonies/09_04_30_wrts/09_04_30_brady_statement.pdf. 66. Ibid., 3. 67. David Shambaugh, “China Flexes Its Soft Power,” The New York Times, June 7, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/08/opinion/08iht-edsham- baugh.html. 68. Herbert Passin, China’s Cultural Diplomacy (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962), 1. 69. Stephen Adams, “Chinese Exhibition Will Feature World’s Oldest Jam Tarts,” The Telegraph, January 12, 2009, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/cul- ture/culturenews/4223099/Chinese-exhibition-will-feature-worlds-oldest- jam-tarts.html. 70. “California Museum Hosts Terra Cotta Warriors,” MSNBC, May 16, 2008, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/24655444/. 216 Notes

71. “Chinese Minister of Culture on ‘Chinese Culture Year in France,’” China.org.cn, February 21, 2004, http://china.org.cn/english/interna- tional/88063.htm; “Years of China, Russia Boost Ties,” China Daily, March 25, 2007, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2007–03/25/ content_835799.htm. 72. Bates Gill and Yanzhong Huang, “Sources and Limits of Chinese ‘Soft Power,’” Survival 48, no. 2 (2006): 19. 73. Hanban, “Constitution and By-Laws of the Confucius Institutes (Provisional Version),” accessed September 14, 2009, http://english.hanban.edu.cn/ kzxy_list.php?ithd=xyzc. 74. Ibid. 75. Joshua Kurlantzick, Charm Offensive: How China’s Soft Power Is Transforming the World (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007), 68. 76. Ben Blanchard, “China Worries Too Few Foreigners Learning Chinese,” Reuters, March 12, 2009, http://www.reuters.com/article/lifestyleMolt/ idUSTRE52B1UW20090312; Wang Ying, “Costa Rica Gets ,” China Daily, November 19, 2008, http://www.chinadaily.com. cn/china/2008–11/19/content_7218050.htm. 77. Don Starr, “ Education in Europe: The Confucius Institutes,” European Journal of Education 44, no. 1 (2009): 71. 78. Ibid., 78. 79. Established by artists in the late 1990s, and at one stage marked for demolition by property developers, the art district is now run by its own dedicated government office. “Beijing’s 798 Art District Counting Down to Olympics,” Xinhua, July 3, 2008, http://news.xinhuanet.com/ english/2008–07/03/content_8485540.htm; “Art with Ambition at 798 Art Factory,” Xinhua, April 14, 2004, http://news.xinhuanet.com/eng- lish/2004–04/14/content_1418363.htm. 80. For example, Jin Yuanpu and Zhang Jiangang, “Miandui ‘wenhua maoyi nicha’ Zhongguo gai dang ? [Facing the ‘cultural trade gap,’ what should China do?],” Xinhua, July 28, 2005, http://news.xinhuanet.com/ newmedia/2005–07/28/content_3279069.htm. 81. The event was not without controversy and conflict, however. See Didi Kirsten Tatlow, “Throwing the Book at China: The Frankfurt Book Fair and Beijing’s Censors,” The Wall Street Journal, September 17, 2009, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405297020451850457441798272 9885504.html. 82. “Cultural Industry Potential,” Xinhua, May 25, 2006, http://news.xinhua- net.com/english/2006–05/25/content_4598537.htm. 83. Keith Bradsher, “Conditions of Chinese Artist Ai Weiwei’s Detention Emerge,” The New York Times, August 12, 2011, http://www.nytimes. com/2011/08/13/world/asia/13artist.html. 84. Andrew Jacobs, “Dissident Chinese Writer Flees to Germany,” The New York Times, July 12, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/13/world/ asia/13writer.html?pagewanted=all. 85. See Xin Xu, “Modernizing China in the Olympic Spotlight: China’s National Identity and the 2008 Beijing Olympiad,” in Sport Mega-Events: Notes 217

Social Scientific Analyses of a Global Phenomenon, ed. by John Horne and Wolfram Manzenreiter (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2006); Maurice Roche, Mega-Events and Modernity: Olympics and Expos in the Growth of Global Culture (London: Routledge, 2000). 86. Liang Lijuan, He Zhenliang and China’s Olympic Dream, trans. Susan Brownell (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 2007), 442–43. 87. Ibid., 249. 88. Ibid., 255. 89. Michael Gawenda, “Chinese Defector Takes Story to US,” The Age, July 23, 2005, http://www.theage.com.au/news/national/chinese-defector- takes-story-to-us/2005/07/22/1121539148431.html. 90. Anne-Marie Brady, Making the Foreign Serve China: Managing Foreigners in the People’s Republic (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2003), 251. 91. For an account by one of the scholars, see Dru C. Gladney, “How China Says No: Thoughts on Being Blacklisted by China,” The China Beat, August 31, 2011, http://www.thechinabeat.org/?p=3754. 92. Perry Link, “The Anaconda in the Chandelier,” The New York Review of Books 49, no. 6 (2002): 67–70. 93. See Jiang Bing, “Civilise the City for the 2008 Olympics,” China Review, no. 43 (Summer 2008): 12; “Beijingers Mastering Manners,” China.org. cn, February 5, 2008, http://english1.china.org.cn/english/China/242145. htm; Yan Zhen, “Shanghai Gets Civilized as Expo Approaches,” Shanghai Daily, March 28, 2009, http://www.shanghaidaily.com/sp/arti- cle/2009/200903/20090328/article_395734.htm. 94. Zhou Yin, “‘Tisheng Zhongguo gongmin lüyou wenming suzhi xingdong’ zhuti biaoshi jiexiao [‘Raising the civilized quality of Chinese citizens’ tourist behavior’ logo revealed],” www.163.com, February 1, 2007, http:// news.163.com/07/0201/03/367E8VDN000120GU.html. See also Candy Zeng, “Chinese Travelers’ Uncivil Liberties,” Asia Times Online, October 5, 2006, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/HJ05Ad01.html. 95. “Violence Flares in Algeria’s ‘Chinatown,’” Financial Times, August 4, 2009, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/a74efac2–8177–11de-92e7–00144fe- abdc0.html; Shashank Bengali, “African Workers Find Harsh Conditions in Chinese-Run Plants,” McClatchy Newspapers, July 24, 2009, http:// www.mcclatchydc.com/226/story/72419.html; Colin Freeman, “Africa Discovers Dark Side of Chinese Master,” Times Online, February 4, 2007, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/1541566/Africa-discovers- dark-side-of-Chinese-master.html. For a study of the relations between local workers and Chinese managers in Zambia and Tanzania, see Ching Kwan Lee, “Raw Encounters: Chinese Managers, African Workers and the Politics of Casualization in Africa’s Chinese Enclaves,” The China Quarterly 199 (2009): 647–66. 96. “Guoyouqiye waixuan gongzuo zuotanhui juxing, chuxi [State-owned enterprises’ foreign propaganda work conference held, Liu Yunshan attends],” Sina.com, June 23, 2010, http://news.sina.com. cn/c/2010–06–23/160917697613s.shtml. 218 Notes

97. The other main areas of activity are encouraging them to meld into (rongru) and contribute to local society, promoting harmony and unity within overseas Chinese communities, and actively supporting Chinese language and cultural education. Zhonghua renmin gongheguo nianjian [People’s Republic of China yearbook], 318. 98. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, “Zhu Aodaliya dashi Zhang Junsai hui jian Zhongguo kexueyuan renliziyuan peixuntuan yixing [Ambassador to Australia Zhang Junsai to meet Chinese Academy of Sciences human resources training group delega- tion],” September 21, 2009, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/chn/gxh/tyb/zwbd/ nbhd/t585626.htm. 99. France held the rotating EU presidency at the time. “China Protest at EU-Dalai Meeting,” BBC News, December 7, 2008, http://news.bbc. co.uk/2/hi/europe/7769123.stm; “China Postpones Summit with EU Due to French Leader’s Planned Meeting with Dalai Lama,” Xinhua, November 27, 2008, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008–11/27/ content_10418058.htm. 100. James Walsh, “Cornell’s Reunion is China’s Nightmare,” Time 145, no. 23, June 1995. 101. “China Complains to Australia about Uighur’s Visit,” The Sydney Morning Herald, July 30, 2009, http://www.smh.com.au/world/china-complains- to-australia-about-uighurs-visit-20090730-e1vw.html; Mary-Anne Toy, “China’s New Film Threat,” The Age, August 8, 2009, http://www.theage. com.au/national/chinas-new-film-threat-20090807-ecxz.html; Jayanth Jacob, “Delhi Shuts Out Uighur Matriarch,” The Telegraph (Calcutta), July 26, 2009, http://www.telegraphindia.com/1090726/jsp/frontpage/ story_11283909.jsp. 102. When the Dalai Lama was denied a visa to visit South Africa for a confer- ence in 2009 the South African government claimed that his attendance would have been a “distraction” and rejected claims that their decision had been influenced by Chinese objections. “South Africa Bans Dalai Lama Trip,” BBC News, March 23, 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_ asia/7958881.stm. 103. Brady, Marketing Dictatorship, 163. 104. Ibid., 53. 105. Gawenda, “Chinese Defector Takes Story to US.” 106. Ibid. 107. “Defectors Say China Running 1000 Spies in Canada,” CBC News, June 15, 2005, http://www.cbc.ca/canada/story/2005/06/15/spies050615. html. 108. Many attacks of this nature are carried out by individuals driven by nation- alism, while others may be the result of commercial criminal activity. For a detailed report on cyber-attacks on overseas Tibetan groups, see Citizen Lab and the SecDev Group, “Tracking GhostNet: Investigating a Cyber Espionage Network,” Information Warfare Monitor, March 29, 2009, http://www.scribd.com/doc/13731776/Tracking-GhostNet-Investigating- a-Cyber-Espionage-Network. Notes 219

109. Elena Barabantseva, “Change vs. Order: Shijie Meets Tianxia in China’s Interactions with the World,” Alternatives: Global, Local, Political 34, no. 2 (2009): 138. 110. Jacques deLisle, “‘One World, Different Dreams’: The Contest to Define the Beijing Olympics,” in Owning the Olympics: Narratives of the New China, ed. Monroe E. Price and Daniel Dayan (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2008), 25–31. 111. See Yuan Peng, “Sino-American Relations: New Changes and New Challenges,” Australian Journal of International Affairs 61, no. 1 (2007): 98–113; Xia Liping, “China: A Responsible Great Power,” Journal of Contemporary China 10, no. 26 (2001): 17–25. 112. Hongying Wang, “National Image Building and Chinese Foreign Policy,” China: An International Journal 1, no. 1 (2003): 65. 113. Susan L. Shirk, China: Fragile Superpower (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 108. 114. For the full text of Hu’s speech, see Hu Jintao, “Hu Jintao zhuxi zai Tiananmen chenglou shang fabiao zhongyao jianghua (quan wen) [Chairman Hu Jintao delivers important speech on Tiananmen gate (full text)],” Hexun.com, October 1, 2009, http://news.hexun.com/2009–10– 01/121267767.html. 115. deLisle, “One World, Different Dreams,” 19–29. 116. Wang, “National Image Building.” 117. “Openness to Foreign Media to Remain after Games,” China Daily, July 30, 2008, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/olympics/2008–07/30/con- tent_6892243_2.htm. 118. Alastair Iain Johnston, “The State of International Relations Research in China: Considerations for the Ford Foundation,” c. 2002, 37, accessed April 3, 2007, http://www.fordfound.org/publications/recent_articles/ docs/china_IRSC/IRSC_johnston_English.pdf. 119. Cited in Wang Yizhou, “Zhongguo waijiao yu goujian hexie shijie [Chinese diplomacy and building a harmonious world],” Goujian hexie shijie: Lilun yu shixian [Building a harmonious world: Theory and practice] (Beijing: Shehui Kexue Wenxian Chubanshe, 2008), 33. 120. The earlier concept of “peaceful rise” (heping jueqi) was dropped from official usage in favor of “peaceful development” due to concerns about the first term’s potential to generate anxiety in other countries. Scholars still use “peaceful rise” from time to time, though. 121. Chan, Chinese Perspectives on International Relations, 16.

4 Conceptual Interaction: Soft Power and Cultural Cohesion

1. Joseph S. Nye Jr., “Soft Power,” Foreign Policy 80 (1990): 154. See also Joseph S. Nye Jr., Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power (New York: Basic Books, 1990). 220 Notes

2. Joseph S. Nye Jr., Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (New York: Public Affairs, 2004). 3. Ibid., 8. 4. Ibid., 5. 5. Nye, “Soft Power,” 166. 6. Nye, Soft Power, 11. 7. Ibid., 3– 4. 8. Ibid., xiii. 9. Ibid., 107–10. 10. Ibid., 110. 11. Ibid., 14. 12. Ibid., 55–60. 13. , “Zuowei guojia shili de wenhua: Ruan quanli [Culture as national strength: Soft power],” Fudan Xuebao (Shehui Kexue Ban) [Fudan journal (social science edition)] 3 (1993): 91–96, 75. 14. Mingjiang Li, “Soft Power in Chinese Discourse: Popularity and Prospect,” in Soft Power: China’s Emerging Strategy in International Politics, ed. Mingjiang Li (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2009), 22–24. 15. Yiwei Wang, “Public Diplomacy and the Rise of Chinese Soft Power,” ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 616, no. 1 (2008): 258; Wang Yanhong, “‘Zhongguo de ruan liliang jianshe’ zhuanjia zuotanhui zongshu [Summary of the Expert Symposium ‘Building China’s Soft Power’],” in Guoji tixi yu Zhongguo de ruan liliang [The International System and China’s Soft Power], ed. Liu Jie and Huang Renwei (Beijing: Shi Shi Chubanshe, 2006), 135. 16. See “Kua wenhua chuanbo luntan: Kua wenhua jiaoliu yu ruan shi li jian- she [Cross-cultural transmission forum: Cross-cultural communication and building soft power],” 2006, accessed August 26, 2009, http://www. cccf.china.cn/. 17. Yang Jiechi, “Da biange, da tiaozheng, da fazhan: 2009 nian de guoji xing- shi he Zhongguo waijiao [Great transformation, great adjustment, great development: The 2009 international situation and China’s diplomacy],” Qiu Shi 1 (2010): 59; Yang Jiechi, “Gaige kaifang yilai de Zhongguo wai- jiao [China’s diplomacy since reform and opening],” Qiu Shi 18 (2008): 36; Yang Jiechi, “2007 nian guoji xingshi he Zhongguo waijiao gongzuo [The 2007 international situation and China’s diplomatic work],” Qiu Shi 1 (2008): 53. 18. Yang, “Da biange, da tiaozheng, da fazhan: 2009 nian de guoji xingshi he Zhongguo waijiao [Great transformation, great adjustment, great develop- ment: The 2009 international situation and China’s diplomacy],” 59. 19. Li Songlin and , “Shixi Kongzi Xueyuan wenhua ruan shi li zuoyong [Analysis of Confucius Institutes’ cultural soft power function],” Sixiang Jiaoyu Yanjiu [Studies in ideological education] 4 (2010): 43–47; “2006: Kongzi Xueyuan chengwei Zhongguo ‘ruan shi li’ de zui liang pinpai [2006: Confucius Institute becomes China’s ‘soft power’s’ bright- est brand],” Xinhua, January 1, 2007, http://news.xinhuanet.com/over- seas/2007–01/01/content_5556842.htm; James F. Paradise, “China and Notes 221

International Harmony: The Role of Confucius Institutes in Bolstering Beijing’s Soft Power,” Asian Survey 49, no. 4 (2009): 647–69. 20. Li Changchun, “Zai xin de lishi qidian shang nuli kaichuang xuanchuan sixiang wenhua gongzuo xin jumian (er ling ling ba nian yi yue ershiyi ri) [At a new historical starting point, work hard to initiate a new pro- paganda, thought, and cultural work situation (January 21, 2008)],” in Shiqi da yilai: Zhongyao wenxian xuanbian (shang) [Since the Seventeenth Congress: Selected important documents (Part One)], ed. Ma Yunfei and Yu Lijuan (Beijing: Zhongyang Wenxian Chubanshe, 2009), 190; “Senior Party Official Urges Enhancing Cohesion, Appeal of Socialist Ideology,” November 25, 2007, http://english.gov.cn/2007–11/25/content_814762. htm. 21. Wang, “‘Zhongguo de ruan liliang jianshe’ zhuanjia zuotanhui zongshu [Summary of the Expert Symposium ‘Building China’s Soft Power’],” 137–38. 22. Hu Jintao, “Gaoju Zhongguo tese shehui zhuyi weida qizhi, wei duoqu quanmian jianshe xiaokang shehui xin shengli er fendou—zai Zhongguo gongchandang di shiqi ci quanguo daibiao dahui shang de baogao [Raise high the great banner of socialism with Chinese characteristics, struggle to capture the new victory of building an overall prosperous society—report to the Chinese Communist Party Seventeenth National Party Congress],” October 15, 2007, http://www.cssc-cul.org.cn/dxp/17d.htm. 23. Ibid. 24. “Zhuanjia cheng Zhongguo ying tongguo gonggong waijiao tisheng ruan shili huayuquan [Experts say China should raise soft power and discourse power through public diplomacy],” Renmin Wang, July 26, 2010, http:// world.people.com.cn/GB/12250460.html. 25. See Kang Fu, “Hexie shijie linian yu Zhongguo ruan shili waijiao [Harmonious world concept and China’s soft power diplomacy],” Renmin Wang, July 6, 2010, http://theory.people.com.cn/GB/12070736.html; Sheng Ding, “To Build a ‘Harmonious World.’: China’s Soft Power Wielding in the Global South,” in “Harmonious World” and China’s New Foreign Policy, ed. Sujian Guo and Jean-Marc F. Blanchard (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2008). 26. Sheng Ding, The Dragon’s Hidden Wings: How China Rises with Its Soft Power (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2008), 24–25. See also Hongying Wang and Yeh-Chung Lu, “The Conception of Soft Power and its Policy Implications: A Comparative Study of China and Taiwan,” Journal of Contemporary China 17, no. 56 (2008): 427. 27. Yong Deng, “The New Hard Realities: ‘Soft Power’ and China in Transition,” in Soft Power: China’s Emerging Strategy in International Politics, ed. Mingjiang Li (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2009), 64. 28. Nye, Soft Power, 144. 29. Li, “Soft Power in Chinese Discourse,” 37. 30. “Ruan shi li zai Zhongguo de shijian zhi yi: Ruan shi li gainian [The prac- tice of soft power in China (1): The soft power concept],” in Lun jian: Jueqi 222 Notes

jincheng zhong de Zhongguo shi ruan shi li (yi) [Lun jian: Chinese-style soft power in the process of rising (1)], ed. Tang Jin (Beijing: Renmin Ribao Chubanshe, 2008), 4–5. 31. Zhou Qing’an, “Huanqiu Shibao: Tigao ruanshili, zhongdian zai guo- nei [Global Times: Key to raising soft power lies within the coun- try],” Renmin Wang, November 12, 2007, http://world.people.com.cn/ GB/57507/6513880.html. 32. Wang and Lu, “The Conception of Soft Power,” 430. 33. Li, “Soft Power in Chinese Discourse,” 28. 34. Deng, “The New Hard Realities,” 77. 35. “Zhonggong zhongying guanyu shenhua wenhua tizhi gaige, tuidong she- hui zhuyi wenhua da fazhan da fanrong ruogan zhongda wenti de jueding [Central Party decision on some questions of deepening cultural system reform and pushing forward the great development and great flourishing of socialist culture],” Zhongguo Fayuan Wang, October 26, 2011, www. chinacourt.org/html/article/201110/26/467709.shtml. 36. Li, “Soft Power in Chinese Discourse,” 25. 37. Tang Jin, ed., Lun jian: Jueqi jincheng zhong de Zhongguo shi ruan shi li (yi) [Lun jian: Chinese-style soft power in the process of rising (one)] (Beijing: Renmin Ribao Chubanshe, 2008). 38. , “Guowuyuan Xinwen Bangongshi zhuren Cai Wu wei luntan zhici [State Council Information Office director Cai Wu addresses the forum],” August 31, 2006, http://www.cccf.china.cn/whcb/txt/2006–08/31/con- tent_164263.htm. 39. “Chinese President Stresses Deepening of Reform of Cultural System,” Xinhua, July 23, 2010, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/ china/2010–07/23/c_13412334.htm. 40. “How to Improve China’s Soft Power?,” People’s Daily, March 11, 2010, http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90001/90776/90785/6916487.html. 41. Li, “Soft Power in Chinese Discourse,” 25; Wang and Lu, “The Conception of Soft Power,” 431. 42. Ding, The Dragon’s Hidden Wings, 29. 43. “Senior Chinese Leader Stresses Protection of Cultural Heritage,” People’s Daily, June 12, 2010, http://english.people.com. cn/90001/90776/90785/7024525.html. 44. “2006: Kongzi Xueyuan chengwei Zhongguo ‘ruan shi li’ de zui liang pin- pai [2006: Confucius Institute becomes China’s ‘soft power’s’ brightest brand].” 45. “China Promoting Taoism’s Influence Abroad,” Xinhua, October 23, 2011, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2011–10/23/c_131208100. htm. 46. “Xi Jinping: Xionghuai daju bawo dashi zhuoyan dashi, nuli ba xuanchuan sixiang gongzuo zuo de geng hao [Xi Jinping: Consider the general situa- tion, grasp major trends, focus on major events, strive to do better propa- ganda and thought work],” CCP News, August 21, 2013, http://cpc.people. com.cn/n/2013/0821/c64094–22636876.html. Notes 223

47. For example, Shen Yajun, “Ruhe xiaojie ‘Zhongguo wenhua chizi’ [How to eliminate ‘China’s culture deficit’],” Xinhua, January 25, 2007, http:// news.xinhuanet.com/overseas/2007–01/25/content_5650132.htm; Zhao Qizheng, “Zhao Qizheng: Kuayue wenhua zhang’ai, geng hao de xiang shijie shuoming Zhongguo [Zhao Qizheng: Overcome cultural barriers, explain China better to the world],” August 25, 2006, http://www.cccf. china.cn/whcb/txt/2006–08/25/content_161788.htm. 48. Nick Knight, Imagining Globalisation in China: Debates on Ideology, Politics and Culture (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2008), 130–34. 49. Hu, “Gaoju Zhongguo tese shehui zhuyi weida qizhi, wei duoqu quanmian jianshe xiaokang shehui xin shengli er fendou—zai Zhongguo gongchan- dang di shiqi ci quanguo daibiao dahui shang de baogao [Raise high the great banner of socialism with Chinese characteristics, struggle to capture the new victory of building an overall prosperous society—report to the Chinese Communist Party Seventeenth National Party Congress]”. 50. Li, “Zai xin de lishi qidian shang nuli kaichuang xuanchuan sixiang wen- hua gongzuo xin jumian (er ling ling ba nian yi yue ershiyi ri) [At a new his- torical starting point, work hard to initiate a new propaganda, thought, and cultural work situation (January 21, 2008)],” 181; “Hu Jintao tichu, tui- dong shehui zhuyi wenhua da fazhan da fanrong [Hu Jintao proposes push great development and flourishing of socialist culture],” Netease, October 15, 2007, http://news.163.com/07/1015/10/3QRDSTDE000120GU. html; “Tigao guojia wenhua ruanshili [Raise the country’s cultural soft power],” Renmin Wang, January 30, 2008, http://theory.people.com.cn/ GB/166866/10062681.html. 51. See also Liu Yunshan, “Hao bu dongyao de gaoju Zhongguo tese shehui zhuyi weida qizhi: Xuexi dang de shiqi da baogao de tihui [Unwaveringly raise high the great banner of socialism with Chinese characteristics: Study the knowledge of the Party’s Seventeenth Congress report],” Qiu Shi 2 (2008): 8. 52. “Zhonggong zhongying guanyu shenhua wenhua tizhi gaige, tuidong she- hui zhuyi wenhua da fazhan da fanrong ruogan zhongda wenti de jueding [Central Party decision on some questions of deepening cultural system reform and pushing forward the great development and great flourishing of socialist culture].” See also “Mai xiang shehui zhuyi wenhua qiangguo de weida jinjun (shelun) [Great advance towards a strong nation of socialist culture (editorial)],” People’s Daily, October 19, 2011, http://paper.people. com.cn/rmrb/html/2011–10/19/nw.D110000renmrb_20111019_2–02. htm?div=-1. 53. “Liu Yunshan qiangdiao: Yi gao du de wenhua zijue tuidong wenhua fanrong fazhan [Liu Yunshan emphasizes: With a high level of cultural conscious- ness push forward cultural expansion and development],” Xinhua, July 31, 2010, http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2010–07/31/c_12394998.htm. 54. Jiang Dafeng, “Ruhe tuidong wenhua da fazhan da fanrong? [How to promote the great development and expansion of culture?],” in Shiyi jie quanguo renda yi ci huiyi, zhengfu gongzuo baogao: Xuexi wenda [First 224 Notes

meeting of the 11th National People’s Congress, government work report: Questions and answers], ed. State Council Research Office (Beijing: Zhongguo Yanshi Chubanshe, 2008). 55. “China to Deepen Reform of Cultural Sector Over Next 5 Years: Official,” Xinhua, September 20, 2010, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/ china/2010–09/20/c_13522030.htm. 56. “Party Poopers: China’s Rulers Get Sniffy about Popular Culture,” The Economist, August 12, 2010, http://www.economist.com/ node/16793041?story_id=16793041; “Senior Official Calls for Fight Against Vulgarity in Cultural Products,” Xinhua, August 15, 2010, http:// news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2010–08/15/c_13446214.htm; Michael Sainsbury, “Hu’s Vulgarity Crusade to Fail,” The Australian, September 13, 2010, http://www.theaustralian.com.au/business/media/ hus-vulgarity-crusade-to-fail/story-e6frg996–1225919844588. 57. “Senior Leader Asks Publishing House for Further Reforms,” China Daily, September 30, 2009, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/bizchina/2009–09/30/ content_8757073.htm. 58. “Senior Chinese Official Urges Reform of Cultural Sector,” Xinhua, July 27, 2010, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2010– 07/27/c_13417873.htm. 59. For example, Liu Yunshan, “Liu Yunshan: Zai xin de lishi qidian shang kaichuang xuanchuan sixiang wenhua gongzuo xin jumian [Liu Yunshan: At a new historical starting point initiate a new propaganda, thought, and cultural work situation],” Xinhua, January 1, 2009, http://news.xin- huanet.com/politics/2009–01/01/content_10588336.htm; Li, “Zai xin de lishi qidian shang nuli kaichuang xuanchuan sixiang wenhua gongzuo xin jumian (er ling ling ba nian yi yue ershiyi ri) [At a new historical starting point, work hard to initiate a new propaganda, thought, and cultural work situation (January 21, 2008)].” 60. “Zhonggong zhongying guanyu shenhua wenhua tizhi gaige, tuidong she- hui zhuyi wenhua da fazhan da fanrong ruogan zhongda wenti de jueding [Central Party decision on some questions of deepening cultural system reform and pushing forward the great development and great flourishing of socialist culture].” 61. Cai Wu, “Guowuyuan Xinwen Bangongshi zhuren Cai Wu wei luntan zhici [State Council Information Office director Cai Wu addresses the forum].” 62. Li Xiguang, “Soft Power’s Reach Depends on Friendly Internet,” Global Times, November 2, 2010, http://opinion.globaltimes.cn/commen- tary/2010–11/588597.html. 63. He Lan, “Fahui chuanmei gongneng suzao guojia xingxiang,” Xiandai guoji guanxi [Contemporary international relations] 10 (2005): 28. 64. Joseph S. Nye Jr., “Public Diplomacy and Soft Power,” ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 616, no. 1 (2008): 102, 107. 65. Li Changchun, “Li Changchun: Nuli goujian xiandai chuanbo tixi, tigao guonei guoji chuanbo nengli [Li Changchun: Strive to construct a mod- ern broadcast system, raise domestic and international broadcasting Notes 225

capability],” China.com, December 23, 2008, http://news.china.com/zh_ cn/news100/11038989/20081223/15248144.html. 66. Li, “Soft Power in Chinese Discourse,” 27. 67. Didi Kirsten Tatlow, “Throwing the Book at China: The Frankfurt Book Fair and Beijing’s Censors,” The Wall Street Journal, September 17, 2009, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405297020451850457441798272 9885504.html. 68. Wang and Lu, “The Conception of Soft Power,” 431. 69. Li, “Soft Power in Chinese Discourse,” 29. 70. Zhongying Pang, “China’s Soft Power Dilemma: The Beijing Consensus Revisited,” in Soft Power: China’s Emerging Strategy in International Politics, ed. Mingjiang Li (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2009). 71. See Joshua Cooper Ramo, The Beijing Consensus (London: The Foreign Policy Centre, 2004); Zheng Yongnian, ed., Zhongguo moshi: Jiangyan yu kunju [The China Model: Experiences and difficulties] (Hangzhou: Zhejiang Renmin Chubanshe, 2010). 72. Li, “Soft Power in Chinese Discourse,” 22. 73. Suisheng Zhao, “The China Model: Can it Replace the Western Model of Modernization?,” Journal of Contemporary China 19, no. 65 (2010): 434. 74. For analysis of the political values held by the Chinese public, see Steve Chan, “Chinese Political Attitudes and Values in Comparative Context: Cautionary Remarks on Cultural Attributions,” Journal of Chinese Political Science 13, no. 3 (2008): 225–48. 75. Daniel A. Bell, China’s New Confucianism: Politics and Everyday Life in a Changing Society (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008). 76. “Zhongguo de ruanshili you na xie buzu? [Where is China’s soft power insufficient?],” Renmin Wang, September 16, 2009, http://theory.people. com.cn/GB/166866/166886/10068388.html. 77. Tony Saich, “Negotiating the State: The Development of Social Organizations in China,” The China Quarterly 161 (2000): 127. 78. David Shambaugh, China’s Communist Party: Atrophy and Adaptation (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2008), 105.

5 Strategic Interaction: Global Times and the Main Melody

1. Daniel C. Lynch, After the Propaganda State: Media, Politics, and “Thought Work” in Reformed China (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999). 2. David Shambaugh, “China’s Propaganda System: Institutions, Processes and Efficacy,” The China Journal, no. 57 (2007): 52–53. 3. Ibid. 28. 4. “The Three Closenesses,” China Media Project, accessed March 6, 2009, http://cmp.hku.hk/2007/03/20/212/. 226 Notes

5. For example, Nicholas D. Kristof, “Death by a Thousand Blogs,” The New York Times, May 24, 2005, http://www.nytimes.com/2005/05/24/ opinion/24kristoff.html. 6. David Shambaugh, China’s Communist Party: Atrophy and Adaptation (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2008), 106–27; Anne- Marie Brady, “Regimenting the Public Mind: The Modernization of Propaganda in the PRC,” International Journal 57, no. 4 (2002): 563–78. 7. “Chinese Gov’t Calls on Celebrities to Take up Social Responsibilities,” Xinhua, August 11, 2013, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013– 08/11/c_132620324.htm . 8. “China Tightens Press Controls, in Particular on Weibo,” Caijing, April 16, 2013, http://english.caijing.com.cn/2013–04–16/112680980.html. 9. An Baijie and Cao Yin, “Judicial Move Aims at Online Rumors,” China Daily, September 10, 2013, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2013– 09/10/content_16955947.htm. 10. Fu Ying, “Zhiku fazhan da you kongjian qianli” [Great potential for think tank development], Renmin Ribao, June 20, 2013, http://world.people. com.cn/n/2013/0620/c1002–21906823.html. 11. Yang Zhenwu, “Renmin Ribao: Xin shiqi Zhongguo tese shehui zhuyi xin- wen shiye de xingdong gangling” [People’s Daily: Action plan for news activities in a new period of socialism with Chinese characteristics], Renmin Wang, October 16, 2013, http://opinion.people.com.cn/n/2013/1016/ c1003–23215020.html. 12. See David Bandurski, “Lose Public Opinion and We Lose it All,” China Media Project, November 2, 2010, http://cmp.hku.hk/2010/11/02/8448/. 13. Ren Xianliang, Yulun yindao yishu: Lingdao ganbu ruhe miandui meiti [The art of guiding public opinion: How leading cadres should face the media] (Beijing: Xinhua Chubanshe, 2010), 43–112. 14. This strategy seemed to be aimed predominantly at foreign journalists, how- ever. Vivian Wu, “Censors Allow Reports on State Media, But Go to Work on Internet,” South China Morning Post, July 7, 2009; Tania Branigan, “Uighurs Cling to Life in People’s Hospital as China’s Wounds Weep,” The Guardian, July 7, 2009, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/jul/06/ china-uighur-urumqi-victims-deaths; Michael Wines, “In Latest Upheaval, China Applies New Strategies to Control Flow of Information,” The New York Times, July 6, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/07/world/ asia/07beijing.html. 15. Bandurski notes he originally heard the phrase used by a Chinese edi- tor. David Bandurski, “ Reiterates Media Control as It Pushes for Change,” China Media Project, March 19, 2009, http://cmp.hku. hk/2009/03/19/1515/; David Bandurski, “Taxi Strikes in China Highlight Changing Press Controls,” China Media Project, November 12, 2008, http://cmp.hku.hk/2008/11/12/1344/. 16. David Bandurski, “The Shishou Riots and the Uncertain Future of Control 2.0,” China Media Project, June 29, 2009, http://cmp.hku. hk/2009/06/29/1673/. Notes 227

17. Ren Xianliang, foreword to Yulun yindao yishu: Lingdao ganbu ruhe miandui meiti [The art of guiding public opinion: How leading cadres should face the media] (Beijing: Xinhua Chubanshe, 2010), 1. 18. For example, Ye Hao, ed., Zhengfu xinwenxue anli: Zhengfu yingdui meiti de xin fangfa [Government media studies cases: The government’s new methods of responding to the media] (Nanjing: Jiangsu Renmin Chubanshe, 2007); Wu Hao, Wu Hao shuo xinwen: Yi wei Xinhuashe jizhe de xinwen shizhan shouji [Wu Hao discusses the news: A Xinhua journalist’s notes from the news frontline] (Beijing: Xinhua Chubanshe, 2008); Hong Xianghua, ed., Meiti lingdao li: Lingdao ganbu ruhe yu meiti da jiaodao [Media leadership strength: How leading cadres deal with the media] (Beijing: Zhonggongdang Shi Chubanshe, 2009); Ren, Yulun yindao yishu. 19. Yuezhi Zhao, Communication in China: Political Economy, Power, and Conflict (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2008), 35–36. 20. “Shenru xuexi guanche Hu Jintao zongshuji ‘qi yi’ zhongyao jianghua jingshen wei tuijin Zhongguo tese shehuizhuyi weida shiye ningju qi qiang da liliang [Deeply study and implement the spirit of general secretary Hu Jintao’s ‘July 1’ important speech to advance the great undertaking of socialism with Chinese characteristics and coalesce great power],” Renmin Ribao, July 18, 2011, 1. 21. , “Wang Chen: Zhuazhu nande lishi jiyu, suzao lianghao guojia xingxiang [Wang Chen: Grasp the rare historical opportunity, shape a favorable national image],” Renmin Wang, June 1, 2010, http: //politics.people.com.cn/GB/1026/11752222.html; Ren, Yulun yindao yishu, 56. 22. “Zhongguo jixie di ba jie lishihui di yi ci huiyi zai jing kai mu: Li Changchun daibiao dangzhongying jianghua, Xi Jinping chuxi [The first plenum of the eighth committee of the China Journalists’ Association opens in Beijing: Li Changchun speaks on behalf of the Central Party Committee, Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang attend],” Xinhua, October 29, 2011, http:// news.xinhuanet.com/zgjx/2011–10/29/c_131218503.htm. 23. Hu Shuli, “The Rise of the Business Media in China,” in Changing Media, Changing China, ed. Susan L. Shirk (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011). 24. For example, Ren, Yulun yindao yishu, 52–53. 25. Ron Javers, “Buying American,” The China Beat, November 11, 2010, http://www.thechinabeat.org/?p=2863. 26. Li Changchun, “Li Changchun: Nuli goujian xiandai chuanbo tixi, tigao guonei guoji chuanbo nengli [Li Changchun: Strive to construct a modern broadcast system, raise domestic and international broadcasting capabil- ity],” China.com, December 23, 2008, http://news.china.com/zh_cn/news 100/11038989/20081223/15248144.html. 27. David Barboza, “News Media Run by China Look Abroad For Growth,” The New York Times, January 14, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/15/ business/worldbusiness/15tele.html?_r=0. 228 Notes

28. Vivian Wu and Adam Chen, “Beijing in 45b Yuan Global Media Drive: State Giants to Lead Image Campaign,” South China Morning Post, January 13, 2009. 29. “China Launches Arabic TV Channel,” Al Jazeera, July 25, 2009, http:// english.aljazeera.net/news/asia-pacific/2009/07/200972563026919452. html; Malcolm Moore, “Communist Party Magazine Gets English Edition,” The Telegraph, July 25, 2009, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/ worldnews/asia/china/5902715/Communist-Party-magazine-gets-English- edition.html. 30. http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/ and http://europe.chinadaily.com.cn/ (accessed September 12, 2011). 31. “Xinhua Launches CNC World English Channel,” Xinhua, July 1, 2010, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2010–07/01/c_13378575. htm. 32. David McKenzie, “Chinese Media Make Inroads into Africa,” CNN, September 25, 2012, http://edition.cnn.com/2012/09/05/business/china- africa-cctv-media/index.html. 33. “Xinhua she jiang zai Ouzhou chaoshi tuichu yingwen dianshi xinwen [Xinhua will release English television news in European supermar- kets],” Sina.com, June 29, 2009, http://dailynews.sina.com/gb/tw/twchn/ bcc/20090629/0233414053.html. 34. Raymond Li, “Beijing Trains Elite Journalists to Boost Media Clout,” South China Morning Post, February 9, 2010, 1. 35. “Beijing-Based Newspaper Global Times Launches English Edition,” Xinhua, April 19, 2009, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009–04/19/ content_11217292.htm. 36. For clarity throughout this chapter I will use Global Times when referring to the English version of the paper and Huanqiu Shibao when referring to the Chinese version. 37. Susan L. Shirk, “Changing Media, Changing Foreign Policy,” in Changing Media, Changing China, ed. Susan L. Shirk (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 227. 38. “Sheping: Hulianwang nongsuo le tai duo fuzaxing [Editorial: The inter- net condenses too much complexity],” Huanqiu Shibao, March 25, 2011, http://opinion.huanqiu.com/roll/2011–03/1587315.html. 39. Susan L. Shirk, “Changing Media, Changing China,” in Changing Media, Changing China, ed. by Susan L. Shirk (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 12. 40. http://www.huanqiu.com/siteinfo/about.html (accessed November 15, 2010). 41. “Discover China, Discover the World,” Global Times, April 20, 2009, http: //www.globaltimes.cn/www/english/opinion/choice/2009–04/427005. html. 42. For example, “Tenth IOC/BOCOG Press Conference”; “To Foreign Friends: Experience the Real China,” People’s Daily, August 8, 2008, http://english. peopledaily.com.cn/90001/90780/91345/6469659.html. Notes 229

43. Yuezhi Zhao, “From Commercialization to Conglomeration: The Transformation of the Chinese Press Within the Orbit of the Party State,” Journal of Communication 50, no. 2 (2000): 11. 44. Ibid., 6. 45. Susan L. Shirk, China: Fragile Superpower (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 86; Malcolm Moore, “The Chinese Government’s Smart Media Move,” The Telegraph, April 21, 2009, http://blogs.telegraph. co.uk/news/malcolmmoore/9586396/The_Chinese_governments_ smart_media_move/; Michael Sainsbury, “China’s People’s Daily Starts Printing English Offshoot,” The Australian, April 20, 2009, http://www. theaustralian.com.au/business/media/china-daily-starts-offshoot/story- e6frg996–1225700218681. 46. “Beijing-Based Newspaper Global Times Launches English Edition”; “Global Times Goes English,” Zhongnanhai Blog, April 19, 2009, http:// www.zhongnanhaiblog.com/web/articles/372/1/Global-Times-goes- English/Page1.html. 47. Shirk, Fragile Superpower, 86. 48. Suisheng Zhao, “A State-Led Nationalism: The Patriotic Education Campaign in Post-Tiananmen China,” Communist and Post-Communist Studies 31, no. 3 (1998): 287–302. 49. For an example of Chinese criticism see Zhang Wen, “Huanqiu Shibao shi fenqing da ben ying [Global Times is a home base for fenqing],” my1510. cn, April 23, 2009, http://my1510.cn/article.php?id=a4c87287ff32cc03. 50. Chin-Chuan Lee, “The Global and the National of the Chinese Media,” in Chinese Media, Global Contexts, ed. Chin-Chuan Lee (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003), 5. 51. Zhao, Communication in China, 171. 52. William A. Callahan, China: The Pessoptimist Nation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010) 53. Lee, “The Global and the National of the Chinese Media,” 5; Shirk, Fragile Superpower, 100. 54. Shirk, Fragile Superpower, 87. 55. Bonnie S. Glaser and Phillip C. Saunders, “Chinese Civilian Foreign Policy Research Institutes: Evolving Roles and Increasing Influence,” The China Quarterly 171 (2002): 597–616. 56. Evan S. Medeiros and M. Taylor Fravel, “China’s New Diplomacy,” Foreign Affairs 82, no. 6 (2003): 30. 57. Shirk, Fragile Superpower, 86. 58. Ibid. 59. Elisabeth Rosenthal, “China Changes Its Approach in the Latest Espionage Incident,” The New York Times, January 27, 2002, 6. 60. Shirk, “Changing Media, Changing Foreign Policy,” 229. 61. Zhao, “From Commercialization to Conglomeration,” 6. 62. Shirk notes that there were more than two thousand newspapers published in China in 2005. Shirk, “Changing Media, Changing China,” 9. 63. http://www.huanqiu.com/siteinfo/about.html (accessed November 15, 2010). 230 Notes

64. Zhao, “From Commercialization to Conglomeration,” 17. 65. Anne-Marie Brady, Marketing Dictatorship: Propaganda and Thought Work in Contemporary China (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2008), 114. 66. The analysis here is based on material collected from copies of Huanqiu Shibao purchased in Beijing on August 8–11, 2008. I selected articles con- taining references to foreign criticism of China from the “Eyes on China” (guanzhu Zhongguo) section, which consisted of translations of op-ed pieces or other articles about China that had originally been published in the international media, and the news sections (including the front and back pages), which consisted of short articles as well as in-depth articles. After identifying the 43 articles from both sections that described foreign views of China I then focused on the 23—7 from Eyes on China and 16 from the news section—that included specific references to foreign criti- cism. Some articles, particularly the longer front-page and back-page news articles, contained references to multiple kinds of critique. 67. Shang Weichi et al., “Beijing, jin wan [Beijing, Tonight],” Huanqiu Shibao, August 8, 2008, 1; Wang Lei, “Yin huayi Zhongguo shezu Miandian xiao dao [India suspects China landing on Burmese small island],” Huanqiu Shibao, August 10, 2008, 3. 68. There were also two references to criticism of Beijing’s weather—either the potential for rain or scorching heat during the Olympics—that did not clearly fit into any of the four types listed here. 69. Yao Meng, “Faguo jingfang li zu ‘Jizhe wu guojie’ naoju [French police block ‘Reporters without borders’ farce],” Huanqiu Shibao, August 9, 2008, 3. 70. Zhang Lei, “Yi yundongyuan jujue dizhi Aoyun [Italian athletes reject Olympic boycott],” Huanqiu Shibao, August 8, 2008, 3. 71. Ibid. 72. Duan Congcong, “Mei bao wu Beijing chu zu ‘che nei you er’ [US report falsely accuses Beijing taxis of ‘having ears’],” Huanqiu Shibao, August 8, 2008, 3. 73. Ma Xiaoning, “‘Daerfuer tuandui’ chuangshi ren Zhongguo bu huany- ing [China does not welcome ‘Team Darfur’ founder],” Huanqiu Shibao, August 8, 2008, 3. 74. Ren Yan and Liang Yan, “Yindu Niboer zhizhi ‘Zangdu’ naoshi [India and Nepal put a stop to ‘Tibetan independence’ disturbance],” Huanqiu Shibao, August 10, 2008, 3; Liu Yang, “Aodaliya ju bo ‘Zangdu’ guang- gao [Australia rejects broadcast of ‘Tibetan independence’ advertisement],” Huanqiu Shibao, August 10, 2008, 3; Yao, “Faguo jingfang li zu ‘Jizhe wu guojie’ naoju [French police block ‘Reporters without borders’ farce].” 75. Yao, “Faguo jingfang li zu ‘Jizhe wu guojie’ naoju [French police block ‘Reporters without borders’ farce].” 76. Duan, “Mei bao wu Beijing chu zu ‘che nei you er’ [US report falsely accuses Beijing taxis of ‘having ears’].” 77. Ma, “‘Daerfuer tuandui’ chuangshi ren Zhongguo bu huanying [China does not welcome ‘Team Darfur’ founder].” Notes 231

78. Of the seven Eyes on China articles, I was able to identify six of the original source articles and compare their texts as published in the international press with their translated and edited versions in Huanqiu Shibao. The editorial changes made to the Eyes on China articles can be divided into two broad categories: the wholesale removal of sentences, paragraphs, or larger continuous sections of text from the piece, and the micro-editing of sentences—including removing, changing, or even adding individual words—in ways that clearly altered the meaning of those sentences beyond the usual gloss that would be expected in any translation. 79. Daian Fulangxisi [Diane Francis], “Zhongguo liying ying de jinpai [China ought to win gold medal],” Huanqiu Shibao, August 8, 2008; Diane Francis, “China Deserves Olympic Gold,” National Post, August 6, 2008, http://network.nationalpost.com/np/blogs/francis/archive/2008/08/06/ china-deserves-olympic-gold.aspx. 80. Patelike Shuersi [Patrick Schultz], “Zhongguo bi ni xiangxiang de ‘geng lüse’ [China is ‘even greener’ than you imagine],” Huanqiu Shibao, August 11, 2008, 6. 81. Ximeng Danfo [Simon Denyer], “Beijing de weixiao zhangxian shidai bian- qian [Beijing’s smile manifests generational change],” Huanqiu Shibao, August 8, 2008, 6. 82. Henry G. Schwarz, “The Ts’an-k’ao Hsiao-hsi: How Well Informed Are Chinese Officials about the Outside World?,” The China Quarterly 27 (1966): 54–83; Jörg-Meinhard Rudolph, “Cankao-Xiaoxi: Foreign News in the Propaganda System of the People’s Republic of China,” Occasional Papers/Reprints Series in Contemporary Asian Studies 65, no. 6 (1984); Jörg-Meinhard Rudolph, “Media Coverage on Taiwan in the People’s Republic of China,” Occasional Papers/Reprints Series in Contemporary Asian Studies 56, no. 3 (1983). 83. Danfo, “Beijing de weixiao zhangxian shidai bianqian [Beijing’s smile manifests generational change]”; Fulangxisi, “Zhongguo liying ying de jinpai [China ought to win gold medal]”; “Zhongguo zai renquan fang- mian qude le jida jinbu [China has achieved great advances in the area of human rights],” Huanqiu Shibao, August 8, 2008, 6; Palawei Aiya [Pallavi Aiyar], “Zhongguo cong ‘zhifu guangrong’ dao ‘paidui guan- grong’ [China goes from ‘to get rich is glorious’ to ‘to line up is glo- rious’],” Huanqiu Shibao, August 9, 2008, 6; Yao Meng, “Shakeji: Fa Zhong guanxi huifu zhengchang [Sarkozy: France China relations back to normal],” Huanqiu Shibao, August 10, 2008, 3; Shuersi, “Zhongguo bi ni xiangxiang de ‘geng lüse’ [China is ‘even greener’ than you imagine].” 84. Aiya, “Zhongguo cong ‘zhifu guangrong’ dao ‘paidui guangrong’ [China goes from ‘to get rich is glorious’ to ‘to line up is glorious’]”; Shuersi, “Zhongguo bi ni xiangxiang de ‘geng lüse’ [China is ‘even greener’ than you imagine].” 85. Brady, Marketing Dictatorship, 80. 86. Wu and Chen, “Beijing in 45b Yuan Global Media Drive.” 232 Notes

87. Kathrin Hille, “China Agency to Launch English TV News,” Financial Times, June 28, 2009, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/ab91e79a-63f7–11de- a818–00144feabdc0,s01=1.html. 88. “Xinhua Launches CNC World English Channel.” 89. Ren, Yulun yindao yishu, 56. 90. Sainsbury, “China’s People’s Daily.” 91. Vivian Wu, “Big Offers for English Speakers in Media Jobs,” South China Morning Post, January 13, 2009. 92. Ibid. 93. Sainsbury, “China’s People’s Daily.” 94. “Chat with the Editor-In-Chief of the Global Times,” Global Times, April 27, 2009, http://www.globaltimes.cn/www/english/photo_news/2009– 04/428124.html. 95. “About Us,” Global Times, accessed October 28, 2010, http://www.global- times.cn/www/english/about_us/index.html. 96. An American blogger who had previously worked for Global Times and maintains close contacts in that news organization claimed that following Ai Weiwei’s arrest in 2011 the editor in chief, Hu Xijin, ordered all Chinese staff at the newspaper to find discussions of Ai Weiwei on Chinese web- sites and then post comments supporting the Party line. In other words, the journalists were to perform the role of a Party-state Internet commen- tary team. This order, which reportedly was not issued to foreign staff at the paper and is impossible to independently verify, highlights the close links between the Party-state and the media organization of which Global Times is a part. Richard Burger, “The Global Times and Ai Weiwei,” The Peking Duck (blog), April 13, 2011, http://www.pekingduck.org/2011/04/ the-global-times-and-ai-weiwei/. 97. “Beijing-Based Newspaper Global Times Launches English Edition.” 98. Kathrin Hille, “New Daily Aims to Improve Foreign Perception of China,” Financial Times, April 21, 2009, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/a2aab11a- 2e0b-11de-9eba-00144feabdc0.html; Sainsbury, “China’s People’s Daily.” 99. “About Us,” http://www.globaltimes.cn/www/english/about_us/index. html. 100. “Beijing-Based Newspaper Global Times Launches English Edition.” 101. “Global Times Goes English.” 102. Zhang Yong, “Poor Public Relations in Grand Press Rooms,” Global Times, September 7, 2009, http://opinion.globaltimes.cn/commen- tary/2009–09/465095.html. 103. Wu Huaiting, “How Can China Speak to the World?” Global Times, August 17, 2009, http://opinion.globaltimes.cn/editor-picks/2009–08/458431. html. 104. “How Can We Make the World Like Us?,” Global Times, August 4, 2010, http://opinion.globaltimes.cn/editorial/2010–08/559328.html. 105. “Let Many Voices Speak in Sino-US Ties,” Global Times, April 15, 2010, http://opinion.globaltimes.cn/editorial/2010–04/522341.html. 106. Guo Ke, “Foreign Audience Won’t Swallow Always Sunny News,” Global Times, December 6, 2010, http://opinion.globaltimes.cn/ Notes 233

commentary/2010–12/599061.html; “China Can Learn from Li Na’s Personality,” Global Times, January 31, 2011, http://opinion.globaltimes. cn/editorial/2011–01/618703.html. 107. “Global Times Goes English.” 108. Jiang Xueqing, “Prosperity Tangible Along Chang’an Ave,” Global Times, June 4, 2009, http://www.globaltimes.cn/www/english/top- news/2009–06/434370.html. 109. Xu Donghuan, “Journalists Hail Top Investigative Stories,” Global Times, December 10, 2010, http://special.globaltimes.cn/2010–12/600744.html. 110. “About Us,” Global Times [True Xinjiang], July 27, 2009, http://www. globaltimes.cn/www/english/truexinjiang/2009–07/451519.html. 111. Zhang Han, “Ai Barred From Studio Party,” Global Times, November 8, 2010, http://china.globaltimes.cn/society/2010–11/590058.html. 112. “West’s Support of Ai Weiwei Abnormal,” Global Times, April 16, 2011, http://opinion.globaltimes.cn/editorial/2011–04/645201.html; “Political Activism Cannot Be a Legal Shield,” Global Times, April 8, 2011, http:// opinion.globaltimes.cn/editorial/2011–04/642315.html. 113. Liang Chen, “Exclusive: Ai Weiwei Breaks His Silence,” Global Times, August 9, 2011, http://www.globaltimes.cn/NEWS/tabid/99/ID/670150/ Exclusive-Ai-Weiwei-breaks-his-silence.aspx. 114. “The Nobel Committee Owes China an Apology,” Global Times, October 18, 2010, http://opinion.globaltimes.cn/editorial/2010–10/582894.html. 115. For example, see Edward Wong, “China Rebuffs Clinton on Internet Warning,” The New York Times, January 22, 2010, http://www.nytimes. com/2010/01/23/world/asia/23diplo.html; David Barboza, “China Puts Best Face Forward with News Channel,” The New York Times, July 1, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/02/world/asia/02china.html; Tania Branigan, “Protesters Gather in Guangzhou to Protect Cantonese Language,” The Guardian, July 25, 2010, http://www.guardian.co.uk/ world/2010/jul/25/protesters-guangzhou-protect-cantonese; Tania Branigan, “Beijing Artists Say Development Is Driving Them Out,” The Guardian, February 24, 2010, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/ feb/24/beijing-chinese-artists-studios-evictions. 116. At least one foreign correspondent, the Australian media group Fairfax’s John Garnaut, has written that Huanqiu Shibao “egregiously misrepre- sented” some of his articles. John Garnaut, “A Cocktail of Conspiracies Delivered Daily,” The Sydney Morning Herald, December 18, 2010, http:// www.smh.com.au/opinion/politics/a-cocktail-of-conspiracies-delivered- daily-20101217–190pb.html. 117. Liu Zhiqin, “Confucius Prize Could Be Weapon in Battle of Ideas,” Global Times, November 17, 2010, http://opinion.globaltimes.cn/commen- tary/2010–11/592778.html. 118. Alan Cowell, “19 Countries to Skip Nobel Ceremony, while China Offers Its Own Prize,” The New York Times, December 7, 2010, http://www. nytimes.com/2010/12/08/world/08nobel.html. 119. Tania Branigan, “China’s Confucius Peace Prize Has Chaotic Launch as Winner’s Office Says He Was Not Notified,” The Guardian, December 9, 234 Notes

2010, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/dec/09/confucius-prize- china-winner; Liu Linlin, “NGO Creates ‘Peace Prize,’” Global Times, December 9, 2010, http://china.globaltimes.cn/society/2010–12/600306. html; “China Counters Nobel Peace Prize with Confucian Peace Prize,” Christian Science Monitor, December 8, 2010, http://www.csmonitor.com/ World/Latest-News-Wires/2010/1208/China-counters-Nobel-Peace-Prize- with-Confucius-Peace-Prize; Benjamin Haas and Edward Wong, “Winner of Beijing’s Peace Award Is Also Absent,” The New York Times, December 9, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/10/world/asia/10confucius. html. 120. Branigan, “China’s Confucius Peace Prize Has Chaotic Launch as Winner’s Office Says He Was Not Notified.” 121. Edward Wong, “Competing Confucius Award Bares Discord in China,” The New York Times, October 1, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/02/ world/asia/competing-confucius-award-bares-discord-in-china.html?_r=1.

6 Tactical Interaction: Public Opinion Crises and the Official Truth

1. “Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo tufa shijian yingdui fa (quan wen) [People’s Republic of China sudden incident response law (full text)],” Renmin Wang, August 31, 2007, http://politics.people.com.cn/GB/1026/6195721.html. 2. Ibid. 3. “Jiedu: ‘Guojia tufa gonggong shijian zongti yingji yu’an’ [Explanation: ‘National sudden public incident overall emergency plan’],” www.gov.cn, January 8, 2006, http://www.gov.cn/zwhd/2006–01/08/content_151018. htm. 4. Propaganda official Ren Xianliang differentiates between sudden incidents (tufa shijian), which he defines as events that threaten the nation and the people’s lives, livelihood, and safety, and “news mass incidents” (xinwen qunti shijian), which he defines as incidents that threaten public trust in the government. I do not make such a distinction here. Ren Xianliang, Yulun yindao yishu: Lingdao ganbu ruhe miandui meiti [The art of guiding pub- lic opinion: How leading cadres should face the media] (Beijing: Xinhua Chubanshe, 2010), 298. 5. Zheng Hongling, “Tufa shijian yingji guanli mianlin de tiaozhan ji duice [The challenges facing sudden incident emergency management and coun- termeasures],” Lingdao Kexue [Leadership science] 29 (2010): 55–56. 6. Jae Ho Chung, “Managing Political Crises in China: The Case of Collective Protests,” in China’s Crisis Management, ed. Jae Ho Chung (London: Routledge, 2012), 31–32; Yanhua Deng and Kevin J. O’Brien, “Relational Repression in China: Using Social Ties to Demobilize Protesters,” The China Quarterly (2013), accessed October 30, 2013, doi: 10.1017/ S0305741013000714. 7. Xi Chen, “The Rising Cost of Stability,” Journal of Democracy 24, no. 1 (2013): 57–64. Notes 235

8. “China Policeman’s Son Gets 6 Years for Deadly Hit-and-Run Case that Stirred Public Outrage,” Los Angeles Times, January 29, 2011, http:// www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/wire/sns-ap-as-china-police- mans-son,0,1557183.story; Michael Wines, “China’s Censors Misfire in Abuse-of-Power Case,” The New York Times, November 17, 2010, http: //www.nytimes.com/2010/11/18/world/asia/18li.html. 9. Alan Wheatley, “A Worry for Beijing That Goes beyond Cities,” The New York Times, April 25, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/26/busi- ness/global/26iht-inside26.html?_r=1. 10. Guo Shaofeng, “Daxuesheng yu nongmingong qi xin chaju suoxiao [Discrepancy between university student and migrant worker starting sala- ries decreases],” Xin Jing Bao, November 22, 2010, http://epaper.bjnews. com.cn/html/2010–11/22/content_172275.htm?div=-1. 11. For a detailed study of a sudden incident involving ethnic Han national- ism, see James Leibold, “More than a Category: Han Supremacism on the Chinese Internet,” The China Quarterly 203 (2010): 539–59. 12. Yoko Nishikawa and Ben Blanchard, “Beijing Protests as Japan Arrests China Boat Captain,” Reuters, September 8, 2010, http://www.reuters. com/article/2010/09/08/us-japan-china-idUSTRE6871BX20100908. 13. Ian Johnson and Thom Shanker, “Beijing Mixes Messages Over Anti-Japan Protests,” The New York Times, September 16, 2013, http://www.nytimes. com/2012/09/17/world/asia/anti-japanese-protests-over-disputed-islands- continue-in-china.html?_r=0. 14. See Peter Hays Gries, “Tears of Rage: Chinese Nationalist Reactions to the Belgrade Embassy Bombing,” The China Journal 46 (2001): 25–43; Peter Hays Gries and Kaiping Peng, “Culture Clash? Apologies East and West,” Journal of Contemporary China 11, no. 30 (2002): 173–78. 15. Long Xingchun, “Swift Evacuation Casts Benigh [sic] Glow on China,” Global Times, March 9, 2011, http://en.huanqiu.com/opinion/commen- tary/2011–03/631486.html. 16. Richard Spencer, “China Milk Scandal: Two Sentenced to Death,” The Telegraph, January 22, 2009, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/world- news/asia/china/4313878/China-milk-scandal-Two-sentenced-to-death. html. 17. Ren, Yulun yindao yishu, 297. 18. See Du Xuyu, “Yingdui tufa shijian de sixiang zhengzhi jiaoyu dongyuan jizhi fenxi [Analysis of ideology and political education mobiliza- tion mechanisms in response to sudden incidents],” Qiu Shi 9 (2010): 74–77. 19. See Liu Zejiang, Zhao Kai, and Liu Yanjun, “Wangluo tiaojian xia tufa shi- jian dui daxuesheng xinli de yingxiang jiqi duice [The influence of sudden incidents on the psychology of university students under internet condi- tions, and countermeasures],” Sixiang Jiaoyu Yanjiu [Studies in ideological education] 11 (2010): 102–05; Wang Hong, “Yingdui tufa shijian de sixi- ang zhengzhi jiaoyu yujing fangfan jizhi tanxi: Yi gaoxiao weili [Analysis of ideological and political education advanced warning mechanisms in response to sudden incidents: The case of high schools],” Sixiang Zhengzhi 236 Notes

Gongzuo Yanjiu [Research on ideological and political work] 12 (2010): 179–82. 20. Ni Chen, “Beijing’s Political Crisis Communication: An Analysis of Chinese Government Communication in the 2009 Xinjiang Riot,” Journal of Contemporary China 21, no. 75 (2012): 464. 21. “Jiedu: ‘Guojia tufa gonggong shijian zongti yingji yu’an’ [Explanation: ‘National sudden public incident overall emergency plan’]”; “Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo tufa shijian yingdui fa (quan wen) [People’s Republic of China sudden incident response law (full text)].” 22. “Chinese President Urges Improved Social Management for Greater Harmony, Stability,” Xinhua, February 19, 2011, http://news.xinhuanet. com/english2010/china/2011–02/19/c_13739874.htm. 23. “Senior Chinese Official Calls for Improved Social Management for Long- Term Stability,” Xinhua, February 20, 2011, http://news.xinhuanet.com/ english2010/china/2011–02/20/c_13740791.htm. 24. “Jiedu: ‘Guojia tufa gonggong shijian zongti yingji yu’an’ [Explanation: ‘National sudden public incident overall emergency plan’].” 25. Hong Xianghua, Meiti lingdao li: Lingdao ganbu ruhe yu meiti da jiaodao [Media leadership strength: How leading cadres deal with the media] (Beijing: Zhonggongdang Shi Chubanshe, 2009), 185–86. 26. Ye Hao, ed., Zhengfu xinwenxue anli: Zhengfu yingdui meiti de xin fangfa [Government media studies cases: The government’s new methods of responding to the media] (Nanjing: Jiangsu Renmin Chubanshe, 2007), 108. 27. Yongnian Zheng, “The Political Cost of Information Control in China: The Nation-State and Governance,” in China’s Information and Communications Technology Revolution: Social Changes and State Responses, ed. Xiaoling Zhang and Yongnian Zheng (London: Routledge, 2009), 151. 28. Hong, Meiti lingdao li, 191–94. 29. Peter C. Pugsley, “Constructing the Hero: Nationalistic News Narratives in Contemporary China,” Westminster Papers in Communication and Culture 3, no. 1 (2006): 78–93. 30. Ye, Zhengfu xinwenxue anli, 50, 105–06. 31. Hong, Meiti lingdao li, 182. 32. “Jiedu: ‘Guojia tufa gonggong shijian zongti yingji yu’an’ [Explanation: ‘National sudden public incident overall emergency plan’].” 33. Ye, Zhengfu xinwenxue anli, 103. 34. Ibid., 108. 35. Ibid., 104; Hong, Meiti lingdao li, 191. 36. Ren, Yulun yindao yishu, 302. 37. Ye, Zhengfu xinwenxue anli, 107. 38. Hong, Meiti lingdao li, 85. 39. Ibid., 191; Ye, Zhengfu xinwenxue anli, 106. 40. Wines, “China’s Censors Misfire.” 41. Bandurski, “China and the ‘Crisis’ of Public Opinion,” China Media Project, August 17, 2009, http://cmp.hku.hk/2009/08/17/1706/. Notes 237

42. Hong, Meiti lingdao li, 191. 43. Ibid., 185–86. 44. Ye, Zhengfu xinwenxue anli, 108. 45. Hong, Meiti lingdao li, 189–90. 46. “Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo tufa shijian yingdui fa (quan wen) [People’s Republic of China sudden incident response law (full text)].” 47. Damian Grammaticas, “Chinese Woman Jailed Over Twitter Post,” BBC News, November 18, 2010, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia- pacific-11784603. 48. “Three People Punished for Spreading Rumours Online,” Xinhua, October 25, 2011, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2011– 10/25/c_131212021.htm. 49. “China Waging War against Online Rumors,” Xinhua, May 2, 2013, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013–05/02/c_132355281.htm. 50. Hong, Meiti lingdao li, 185. 51. Ye, Zhengfu xinwenxue anli, 51–52. 52. Jeremy Brown, “When Things Go Wrong: Accidents and the Legacy of the Mao Era in Today’s China,” in Restless China, ed. Perry Link, Richard Madsen, and Paul G. Pickowicz (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2013), 20. 53. Douglas C. Foyle, Counting the Public In: Presidents, Public Opinion, and Foreign Policy (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), 14. 54. For example, Wang Junsheng, “Ruhe zai yingji tufa shijian zhong zuo hao shewai guanli [How to conduct good foreign affairs management during emergency incidents],” Xingzheng Lingdao [Administration leadership] 29 (2010): 25–26. 55. For example, Matt O’Sullivan, “Stern Hu ‘Thrown to the Wolves,’” Sydney Morning Herald, July 11, 2009, http://www.smh.com.au/business/ stern- hu-thrown-to-the-wolves-20090710-dg1r.html. 56. Nicholas Bariyo, “Chinese Mine Managers to Go on Trial in Zambia,” Wall Street Journal, February 8, 2011, http://online.wsj.com/article/S B10001424052748704364004576131921582037738.html; Shashank Bengali, “African Workers Find Harsh Conditions in Chinese-Run Plants,” McClatchy Newspapers, July 24, 2009, http://www.mcclatchydc.com/226/ story/72419.html. 57. For example, Ariana Eunjung Cha and Ellen Nakashima, “Google China Cyberattack Part of Vast Espionage Campaign, Experts Say,” Washington Post, January 14, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/ article/2010/01/13/AR2010011300359.html. 58. Li Changchun, “Li Changchun: Nuli goujian xiandai chuanbo tixi, tigao guonei guoji chuanbo nengli [Li Changchun: Strive to construct a modern broadcast system, raise domestic and international broadcasting capabil- ity],” China.com, December 23, 2008, http://news.china.com/zh_cn/news 100/11038989/20081223/15248144.html. 59. Ni Chen, “The Evolving Chinese Government Spokesperson System,” in Soft Power in China: Public Diplomacy through Communication, ed. Jian Wang (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011). 238 Notes

60. Jiang Yu, “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Jiang Yu’s Remarks,” Website of the Foreign Ministry of the People’s Republic of China, December 11, 2010, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/xwfw/s2510/2535/t777815.htm. 61. Alan Cowell, “19 Countries to Skip Nobel Ceremony, While China Offers Its Own Prize,” The New York Times, December 7, 2010, http://www. nytimes.com/2010/12/08/world/08nobel.html. 62. Ibid. 63. For example, Guo Jisi, “Nobel Peace Prize Not International Community Voice,” China Daily, November 1, 2010, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn /opinion/2010–11/01/content_11482466.htm; “The Nobel Committee Owes China an Apology,” Global Times, October 18, 2010, http:// opinion. globaltimes.cn/editorial/2010–10/582894.html; “Oslo Puts on a Farce against China,” Global Times, December 10, 2010, http://opinion.global- times.cn/editorial/2010–12/600648.html. 64. Tsering Topgyal, “Insecurity Dilemma and the Tibetan Uprising in 2008,” Journal of Contemporary China 20, no. 69 (2011): 183. 65. Ibid., 190. 66. For example, Li Keyong, Bianba Ciren, and Laba Ciren, “Lasa ‘3.14’ da za qiang shao shijian zhenxiang [The truth of the ‘3.14’ Lhasa major riots],” Xinhua, March 22, 2008, http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscen- ter/2008–03/22/content_7837535.htm; Li Keyong, Bianba Ciren, and Gama Duoji, “Lasa yidong 1 ming zhigong wei jiu 2 ming Zangzu haizi bei ge xia erduo [Lhasa migrant worker has ear slashed while saving two Tibetan children],” China.com, March 25, 2008, http://www.china.com. cn/news/txt/2008–03/25/content_13465107.htm. 67. Topgyal, “Insecurity Dilemma,” 200. 68. Ibid., 199. 69. Jane Macartney, “’s Most Famous Woman Blogger, Woeser, Detained by Police,” Times Online, August 26, 2008, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/ tol/news/world/asia/article4607454.ece. 70. Topgyal, “Insecurity Dilemma,” 193. 71. Jerome Taylor, “Olympic Spirit Comes to Britain,” The Independent, April 7, 2008, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/olympic- spirit-comes-to-britain-805390.html. 72. Thierry Leveque and Chrystel Boulet-Euchin, “Olympic Flame Falters on Chaotic Paris Visit,” Reuters, April 7, 2008, http://www.reuters.com /article/2008/04/07/us-olympics-torch-france-idUSL0772655920080407. 73. See http://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/xwfw/s2510/2535/t422367.htm; http: //it.china-embassy.org/ita/zt/fyrth/t422367.htm. 74. Fu Ying, “Chinese Ambassador Fu Ying: Western Media Has ‘Demonised’ China,” The Telegraph, April 13, 2008, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/ comment/personal-view/3557186/Chinese-ambassador-Fu-Ying-Western- media-has-demonised-China.html. 75. “Shijie duo guo huaren fan ‘Zangdu’ aiguo youxing [Chinese in many countries patriotically protest to oppose ‘Tibetan independence’],” Xinhua, April 14, 2008, http://news.xinhuanet.com/overseas/2008–04/14/con- tent_7970922.htm. Notes 239

76. Nick Squires, “Chinese in Australia Vow to Defend Olympic Torch from Pro-Tibet ‘Scum,’” The Telegraph, April 16, 2008, http://www.telegraph. co.uk/news/worldnews/1895803/Chinese-in-Australia-vow-to-defend- Olympic-torch-from-pro-Tibet-scum.html. 77. For a collation of such photos and reports, see Ren Xinwen, ed., Huangyan yu zhenxiang [Lies and truth] (Beijing: Shenghuo Dushu Xinzhi San Lian Shudian, 2008), 39–43. 78. This and similar statements are cited in Peter Hays Gries et al., “Patriotism, Nationalism and China’s US Policy: Structures and Consequences of Chinese National Identity,” The China Quarterly 205 (2011): 2. 79. Geremie R. Barmé, “China’s Flat Earth: History and 8 August 2008,” The China Quarterly 197 (March 2009): 68. 80. See “Girl Who Protect the Olympic Flame with Body(4),” China. com, April 9, 2008, http://english.china.com/zh_cn/news/society /11020309/20080409/14775788_3.html. 81. Ren Xinwen, ed., Huangyan yu zhenxiang [Lies and truth] (Beijing: Shenghuo dushu xinzhi san lian shudian, 2008). See also Joel Martinsen, “The Truth About Tibet, Now in Book Form,” Danwei.org, April 8, 2008, http://www.danwei.org/books/lies_truths_and_the_profit_mot.php. 82. See Gries, “Tears of Rage.” 83. Paul Maley, “Chinese Students Bully Torch Crowds,” The Australian, April 25, 2008. 84. Ibid; Peter Jean, Ben Packham, and Ben English, “Olympic Games Torch Passions Inflame Canberra,” Herald Sun, April 25, 2008, http://www. heraldsun.com.au/news/national/olympic-games-torch-passions-inflame- canberra/story-e6frf7l6–1111116158192. 85. See Xiao Qiang, “South Korea to Charge Chinese Students for Torch Relay Violence,” China Digital Times, April 28, 2008, http://chinadigitaltimes. net/2008/04/anti-chinese-sentiment-looms-after-torch-relay/. 86. Jonathan Watts, “Old Suspicions Magnified Mistrust into Ethnic Riots in Urumqi,” The Guardian, July 10, 2009, http://www.theguardian.com/ world/2009/jul/10/china-riots-uighurs-han-urumqi. 87. James A. Millward, “Introduction: Does the 2009 Urumchi Violence Mark a Turning Point?,” Central Asian Survey 28, no. 4 (2009): 351. 88. Watts, “Old Suspicions Magnified Mistrust.” 89. Lucy Hornby, “China Says Xinjiang Riot Media Openness a Success,” Reuters, July 31, 2009, http://www.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idUS- TRE56U3JD20090731; Michael Wines, “In Latest Upheaval, China Applies New Strategies to Control Flow of Information,” The New York Times, July 6, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/07/world/asia/07beijing. html. 90. Chen, “Beijing’s Political Crisis Communication,” 478. 91. For example, www.truexinjiang.com. 92. Jonathan Watts, “Death and Debris on Urumqi’s Streets, But in Beijing the Blame Games Begins,” The Guardian, July 6, 2009, http://www.the- guardian.com/world/2009/jul/06/china-urumqi-uighur-united-nations. 240 Notes

93. “China Tries to Block Uighur Film,” BBC News, July 15, 2009, http: //news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/8152385.stm. 94. Mary-Anne Toy, “China’s New Film Threat,” The Age, August 8, 2009, http://www.theage.com.au/national/chinas-new-film-threat-20090807- ecxz.html. 95. “China Squeezes Press Club over Kadeer,” ABC News, August 11, 2009, http://www.abc.net.au/news/stories/2009/08/11/2651913.htm. 96. Dan Levin, “Film Festival in the Cross Hairs,” The New York Times, August 9, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/10/movies/10festival. html. 97. David Bandurski, “‘Fake News’ and a Real Tragedy,” China Media Project, January 27, 2011, http://cmp.hku.hk/2011/01/27/9751/. 98. See Suisheng Zhao, A Nation-State by Construction: Dynamics of Modern Chinese Nationalism (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2004). 99. Zhi Xin, “Wending shi renxin suoxiang [Stability is the direction of popular feeling],” Jiefang Ribao [Liberation Daily], March 6, 2011, http: //newspaper.jfdaily.com/jfrb/html/2011–03/06/content_524656.htm.

Conclusion

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50-cent party, 63, 162, 232n96 criticism of China before and 798 Art District, 87, 216n79 during, 136–40 national cohesion and, 69–70 advertising, 65, 83–4 symbolism of, 56, 88–9, 93–4 agenda-setting, 54, 56, 103, 127, torch relay, 141, 171–6 153–4 Beijing Review, 79 international, 83, 109, 177 Belgrade embassy bombing. See online, 59 embassy bombing incident Ai Weiwei, 87, 146, 208n118, Bell, Daniel, A., 118 232n96 blogs, 57, 58, 59, 61, 153, 205n76 Al-Jazeera, 83, 129 see also microblogs art, 65, 87–8 books, 51, 65, 79 see also 798 Art District; Ai Frankfurt Book Fair, 116–17 Weiwei; culture Brady, Anne-Marie, 66, 78, 85, 92, Australia 213n33 Chinese demonstrations in, 173, broadcasting 175, 181–2 China National Radio pressure on Falun Gong in, 92–3 (CNR), 45 tension with China, 165, 176, China Radio International (CRI), 178–9 45, 79–80 see also Melbourne International CNC World, 80, 130–1, 141 Film Festival foreign-language, 79–80, 84 authoritarianism, 5, 27, 35, 36, 68, radio, 45, 79–80 124, 188 State Administration of Press, Publication, Radio, Film, and Bandurski, David, 127, 226n15 Television (SAPPRFT), 45, 46, Barabantseva, Elena, 93 47, 51, 62, 65, 124 Barnett, Michael, 20, 30, 32 State Administration of Radio, BBC, 53, 115, 129, 130 Film, and Television (SARFT), BBS, 57, 58, 59, 61, 62, 205n73 45, 61 “Beijing Consensus,” 117 television, 65 Beijing Olympics, 81, 106, 132, 167, Xinwen Lianbo, 135–6, 195n8 170, 208n118, 215n59 see also advertising; CCTV; films; civic education campaigns, 67, 90 media 256 Index

Cai Mingzhao, ix China National Radio (CNR), 45 Cai Wu, 110 China Publishing Group, 174 Callahan, William A., 134, 192n7 China Radio International (CRI), CCTV, 141, 142, 195n8, 203n55 45, 79–80 international broadcasting, “China threat theory,” 76, 166 79, 84 Chinese Academy of Sciences international expansion, 130–1 (CAS), 91 supervision by propaganda Chinese Academy of Social Sciences system, 45 (CASS), 45, 70 Xinwen Lianbo, 135–6, 195n8 Chinese Communist Party (CCP) censorship, 22–3, 30, 50, 116–17, cadre training, 11, 37, 46, 126–7, 123, 127 127–8, 158, 159 delegation to private sector, 59, ideology, ix, 33, 46, 55, 111–13, 60–1 114, 119, 120 (see also Hu legitimization of, 54, 62, 131 Jintao; Marxism; Xi Jinping) resistance by netizens, 60, 63, 71 legitimacy, 28, 119, 133, 153, see also Internet; media; self- 154, 160 censorship relationship with the state, 11–12, Central Leading Small Group for 118–19 Propaganda and Thought “Chinese dream,” ix, 33, 55, 69, Work, 44, 71 71, 119 Central Party School (CPS), 37, Chinese People’s Political 46, 128 Consultative Conference Central Propaganda Department (CPPCC), 38, 53, 80 (CPD), 3, 4, 23, 38, 44, 51, 54, civil society, 14, 26, 28, 30–1, 44, 63, 80, 158 64–8, 187–8 directives, 49, 61, 134–5, CNC World, 80, 130–1, 141 202n34 CNN, 52, 115, 129, 130 leadership, 44 cohesion, 6, 13, 36–41, 183–6, 187, regulations, 162 188, 189 supervised units, 45–8, 174 within Party-state, 37 Chen, Ni, 158, 177 between Party-state and people, China Central Television. See 40, 69–71, 155, 181, 182 CCTV Party-state discourse and, China Daily, 79, 83–4, 130, 131, 68–72, 95 167, 168 among the people, 38–9, 40, competition with Global Times, 69–71 10, 141, 142 from shared culture and values, China dream. See “Chinese 39–40, 108 dream” as source of power, 7, 37, 75, 108, China International Publishing 109, 115 Group, 79 Comprehensive National Power China Internet Information (CNP), 75, 76, 106–7, 114, Center, 79 211n11 “China model,” 117 Confucianism, 29, 70, 107, 118 Index 257

Confucius Institutes, 80, 86–7, 93 education, 67 soft power and, 106, 110 see also scholars; students; Confucius Peace Prize, 147–8 universities corruption, 53–4, 58, 154–5, embassy bombing incident, 134, 157, 164 156, 175, 205n73 Cull, Nicholas J., 213n29 EP-3 incident, 134, 156 Cultural Revolution, 70, 195–6n21 culture Falun Gong, 66, 89, 91, 92–3 as component of soft power, 103, films, 51, 65 107, 109–15, 120 Melbourne International Film exchanges, 23, 81, 86, 106 Festival, 165, 178–9, 182 industries, 3, 15, 40, 65, 81, 87, food safety, 53, 152, 157 106, 111, 120, 121, 123, 184 foreign friends, 89 international competition over, Foreign Languages Press, 79 106–7 foreign policy, China’s Ministry of Culture, 45 debates, 134 nation-building role, 15, 111–15 relationship with domestic policy, 74 Dai Bingguo, 74 strategic objectives, 73–4, 107–8, Dalai Lama, 40, 84, 91, 170, 171, 120 174, 218n102 Foreign Propaganda Leading Small see also Tibet Group, 77, 78 deLisle, Jacques, 93, 94, 210n138 Frankfurt Book Fair, 116–17 democracy, 29, 34 Fu Ying, 84, 125, 172 China’s progress toward, 95, 124 criticism of China over, 129, 136, General Administration of Press 165, 176 and Publication (GAPP), 45, “Fifth Modernization,” 69 95, 116 “Jasmine Revolution,” 82–3, 181 Global Times, 10, 15, 79 representation in Chinese coverage of sensitive topics, media, 146 145–7, 168, 232n96 threat to Party-state, 3, 22, editorials, 132, 143, 144, 146, 34–5, 69 167, 168 see also human rights establishment, 131 Deng Xiaoping, 24, 94, 96 goals, 132, 143 Deng, Yong, 28, 29, 34, 76, 107, international perceptions of, 147 109 “main melody” in, 144–6, 147, d’Hooghe, Ingrid, 26, 27 149, 184 Diaoyu/Senkaku dispute, 156 personnel, 142 Ding, Sheng, 28, 29, 34, 110 relationship with propaganda discourse, 32–5 authorities, 79, 131–2, 145, counter-hegemonic, 69, 154 149–50, 232n96 Party-state, 68–72 role in Party-state propaganda power of, 8, 20–1, 32 strategy, 132, 140–2, 145, 184 Duvall, Raymond, 20, 30, 32 see also Huanqiu Shibao 258 Index globalization, 1, 8, 183 ideology. See Chinese Communist cultural, 111, 120–1 Party (CCP) domestic politics and, 5 Internet, 14, 25, 57–63, 205n77, of information and ideas, x, 2, 3, 205n81, 206n85 6, 25, 187 “civilized” use of, 62 of news media, 10 companies, 60–1 Party-state response to, 2, 111, 120 hacking, 93, 166, 178 risks of, x, 1–2, 3 monitoring, 60, 153 Goldstein, Avery, 74 Party-state use of, 46, 62–3, “Great Firewall,” 59–60, 206n85 79–80, 85, 168, 172 “great rejuvenation of the public opinion crises and, 153, Chinese nation.” See national 154–5, 162–3, 168, 173, 177 “rejuvenation” (fuxing) regulation, 47, 61–2, 78, 124 Guomindang. See Kuomintang technical controls, 59–60, 127 (KMT) see also 50-cent party; BBS; blogs; microblogs Hainan Island incident, 134, 156 Hanban, 80, 87 Japan, tension between China and, “harmonious society,” x, 29, 33, 55, 135, 156, 163, 176, 194n6 70–1, 74, 80, 111, 158 “Jasmine Revolution,” 82–3, 181 “harmonious world,” 74, 80, 87, Jia Qinglin, 110 93–4, 96, 107 Jiang Yu, 167, 172 Hu Jintao, 46 Jiang Zemin, 105, 134–5 ideology of, 55, 70, 74, 94, 96 Johnston, Alastair Iain, 95 statements and speeches, 25, 38, journalism 40, 74, 94, 106 citizen, 58 Hu, Stern, 165 cross-border reporting, 50 Hu Xijin, 142, 143, 232n96 investigative, 52, 53, 54, 145 Huang, Yanzhong, 28, 29, 34 norms of, 50, 55 Huanqiu Shibao, 10, 15, 125, online, 52, 62 131–42, 145, 147, 233n116 see also broadcasting; “main “main melody” in, 135–40, 149 melody;” media; newspapers nationalism of, 133–4, 140 journalists public opinion research arrests of, 52, 53–4 center, 135 blogging by, 57, 124 relationship with propaganda foreign, 81–3, 84, 85, 89, 142, authorities, 131–2, 134–5, 149, 147, 175 184–5 interaction with propaganda reporting of foreign criticism in, authorities, 49–50, 124, 127, 135–40, 230n66, 231n78 161, 162 see also Global Times professional association, 48 human rights, 34, 35, 78, 85, 149 training, 131 criticism of China over, 95, violence against, 53–4 129–30, 136, 137, 146–7, 165, see also broadcasting; 167–8, 171–2 “main melody;” media; Hurrell, Andrew, 187 newspapers Index 259

Kadeer, Rebiya, 92, 165, 169, in Huanqiu Shibao, 135–40, 149 178, 182 in international media, 141–2, see also Xinjiang 149–50, 184–5 Kissinger, Henry, 89 Marxism, 54, 67 Kuomintang (KMT), 22, 39 “mass incidents.” See public opinion Kurlantzick, Joshua, 27, 35 crises mass organizations, 48, 66–7 Lampton, David, 28, 29, media, Chinese 197n46 commercialization, 10, 24, Lee, Chin-Chuan, 134 123–4, 127, 133, 141 Lee Teng-hui, 91 competition, 141, 142, 144, 149 Lenin, V. I., 23, 195n14 globalization, 10, 24, 123 Li Changchun, 44 international capacity, 3, 10, on importance of propaganda 124–5, 130, 141, 149, 167 work for consensus, 37 international expansion, 129–32, on international propaganda, 76, 140–1, 142, 145 129, 130, 166 as Party mouthpiece, 24, on the “main melody,” 128 54, 140 on media and propaganda pluralization, 15, 24, work, 56 123–4, 126–7, 128, 133, 135, on soft power, 110, 114, 116 141, 148 on timely reporting of “sudden regulation, 45, 50–2, 62 incidents,” 166 relationship to soft power, Li Gang incident, 52, 115–16, 120 154–5, 162 see also advertising; broadcasting; Li, Mingjiang, 109, 117 films; journalism; journalists; Li Xiguang, 77, 115 “main melody;” newspapers; Liao Yiwu, 87–8 publishing Lien Chan, 39, 148 media, international, 78–9, Link, Perry, 208n116 81–5, 147 Liu, Hong, 187 bias against China, 84, 129–30 , 44 Chinese-language, 85 Liu Xiaobo, 146–7, 149, 165, foreign journalists, 81–3, 84, 85, 167–8, 208n115 89, 142, 147, 175 Liu Yunshan, 44, 46, 77, 80–1, 91, “mega-events,” 56, 88–9, 106 113, 130 Melbourne International Film Lu Wei, 124 Festival, 165, 178–9, 182 Lu, Yeh-Chung, 109, 117 microblogs, 52, 57–8, 153 Lynch, Daniel C., 123, 124, arrest of users, 163 198n68 Party-state use, 63 regulation, 60–1, 62, 124 “main melody” (zhu xuanlü), 15, Ministry of Civil Affairs, 48, 66, 128–9, 148, 149, 163, 184, 186 67, 148 challenges to, 156 Ministry of Culture, 45, 47, 148 in Global Times, 144–6, 147, Ministry of Defense, 85 149, 184 Ministry of Education, 46, 47, 80 260 Index

Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 91–2, regulation, 45, 49–50 167, 172, 177 Western, 84, 147 press conferences, 31, 83, 85, see also China Daily; Global 166–7 Times; Huanqiu Shibao; public diplomacy, 74 journalism; journalists; media; role in propaganda system, People’s Daily 78–9, 96 Newsweek, sale of, 130 soft power policies, 106 NGOs, 26, 119 website, 85, 168 foreign, 89, 137 Ministry of Health, 46 government-organized, 66, 80 Ministry of Industry and regulation of, 48, 66 Information Technology, 47 Nobel Prize for Peace, 146–7, Ministry of Information 147–8, 149, 165, 167–8 Industry, 47 Nye, Joseph S., Jr., 27, 102–5, 108, Ministry of Public Security, 47 109, 115–16, 117, 118 Ministry of Tourism, 46 Office of Foreign Propaganda, 78 national identity, Chinese, 29, see also State Council 69–70, 174, 192n7 Information Office National People’s Congress, 80 Olympic Games. See Beijing national “rejuvenation” (fuxing), ix, Olympics x, 33, 55, 70, 71, 113, 155–6 overseas Chinese, 90–1, 92, nationalism, Chinese, 11, 16, 68, 218n97 69–70, 152, 180–2, 194n6, assistance from Chinese 218n108 government, 156–7 Beijing Olympics and, 169, 173–6 Beijing Olympic torch relay and, ethnic, 119, 235n11 172–3, 175–6, 181–2 in Huanqiu Shibao and Global media outlets, 85 Times, 133–4, 140, 147 nationalism of, 91, 175–6, online, 58, 163, 178, 182, 181–2, 187 205n73 as source of international of overseas Chinese, 91, influence, 187 175–6, 187 protests and activism, 156, patriotic education campaign, 67, 175–6, 178, 181–2, 218n99 133, 134 see also patriotic education “peaceful development,” 80, 94, 96, campaign 219n120 “netizens,” 57, 63, 71, 205n77 “peaceful rise,” 94, 211n14, anonymity of, 60, 61 219n120 newspapers, 85, 202n41 People’s Armed Police, 152–3, 170 commercialization, 133 People’s Daily, 38, 45, 49, 51, 54, English-language, 79, 213n37 79, 110, 126, 133, 167 fake news stories, 179–80 relationship with Huanqiu op-ed articles, 84, 167 Shibao/Global Times, 133, pluralization, 135, 229n62 147, 149 Index 261

People’s Liberation Army (PLA), 33, connection between domestic and 37, 39, 47–8, 199n70, 200n6, international, 116, 125–6, 131, 201n26 132, 148–50 Politburo Standing Committee focus on key battlegrounds, (PSC), 44 124–5, 127, 140–1, power 148, 149 Chinese assessments of, 75 Global Times as component compulsory, 20–1, 27, 29–33, of, 132, 140–2, 145, 35–6, 40, 104, 179–82, 188, 149–50, 184 197n46 international media expansion, definitions of, 20 129–32, 140–1, 142, 145, 149, discourse and, 8, 13, 167, 184 20–1, 36 media conglomeration, 135 normative, 20, 30, 197n46 pluralization, 141, 142, 144, productive, 20–1, 30, 35–6, 148, 184 104, 189 propaganda system, China’s of transnational coalitions, civil society and, 64–8 187–8 creativity and, 28 see also Comprehensive National credibility and, 6, 16 Power; soft power in education, 67 press conferences flexibility of, 59, 65, 67–8, 124, following “sudden incidents,” 145, 185 127, 161, 166–7 historical development, 22–6 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 31, institutions, 44–8, 77–80 78, 79, 83, 85, 166–7 news media and, 10, 47, 49–54 propaganda online, 59–63 in communist ideology, 23 state-owned enterprises and, 91 definitions of, 8, 22–3 proxy servers, 60 directives, 49, 61, 134–5, public diplomacy, 79, 85–9, 96, 202n34 213n29 objectives, 23–6, 76, 80–1 soft power and, 103, 106, power and, 21, 29–36 107, 115 practices, 8, 21, 30, 48–68, weakness of China’s, 26–7, 77 80–93, 179–85, 187–9 public opinion, Chinese, 7, 144 tension between domestic and in Global Times, 143, 147–8 international, 6, 16, 26–9 guidance, 54, 56, 62–3, 106, “thought reform” (sixiang 126–8, 158–63 gaizao), 23, 24 in Huanqiu Shibao, 134 “thought work” (sixiang online, 58, 78, 162 gongzuo), 23, 24–5, 25–6, research, 135 40, 114 see also public opinion crises propaganda strategy, China’s, 10, public opinion crises, 11, 16, 185 123, 184–5 definitions, 152, 234n4 adaptation, 124, 125, 127 incidents that cause, 152, 154–7, challenges to, 123–4, 126, 129 164–6 262 Index public opinion crises—Continued see also China Daily; Global information flow during, 153, Times; Huanqiu Shibao; media; 154–5, 157, 159–61, 163 newspapers; People’s Daily; media management during, Xinhua 153–4, 159, 160–1, 162–3, 170–1, 173, 177 radio, 45, 79–80 Party-state response to, 61–2, 63, Ramo, Joshua Cooper, 197n43 152, 153–4, 157–64, 166–75, religion, 65–6 177–81, 185 Buddhism, 66 prevention, 153 Catholicism, 2, 66 threat posed to Party-state, 153, Taoism, 107, 110 154, 155–6, 157, 168, 170 see also Confucianism transnational, 169–79, 180 Renmin Ribao. See People’s Daily see also public relations Reuters, 84 public opinion, international, 74, “Road to Rejuvenation” 76, 77, 81, 84, 129–30 exhibition, ix crises, 164–9 see also national “rejuvenation” public relations, 56, 177 (fuxing) criticism of China’s, 143–4, rumors, 16, 159–60, 179–80 212n25, 215n60 campaigns against, 163 international, 78, 172–3, 177, laws against, 52, 61–2 197n43 online, 61–2, 163, 177 online, 62–3 training and guidance for Sanlu milk scandal, 53, 157 officials, 11, 126–7, 127–8, SARS, 160, 167, 204n69 158, 159 scholars, 57, 64–5, 95–6, 138, publishing 208n114 Beijing Review, 79 foreign, 89 books, 51, 65, 79, 116–17 self-censorship, 50, 55, 65, 89–90, China International Publishing 134–5, 208n116 Group, 79 Shambaugh, David, 23, 47, 49, China Publishing Group, 174 78, 120 foreign-language, 79, 84 Shi Yinhong, 40 General Administration of Press Shirk, Susan L., 45, 70, 131, 133, and Publication (GAPP), 45, 134, 192n7, 229n62 95, 116 Sichuan earthquake, 38, 57, 106, online, 65 157, 208n118 periodicals, 79 Snow, Edgar, 89 Southern Media Group, 130, social networking, 57, 153 202n41 see also blogs; microblogs State Administration of Press, soft power, 1, 4–5, 7–8, 9, 14–15, Publication, Radio, Film, and 27–8, 77, 184 Television (SAPPRFT), 45, 46, Chinese reconceptualization, 47, 51, 62, 65, 124 14–15, 108–16 Index 263

compatibility with Chinese Taiwan concepts, 106–7 independence issue, 91 cultural, 109–15, 120 international tension over, domestic policies and, 74, 104–5, 91–2, 136 108–10, 113–14, 115 media, 85 media and, 115–16, 120, 131 national cohesion and, 39 Nye’s conception of, 102–5 television, 65 popularity in China, 105–8 think tanks, 125 Southern Media Group, 130, Tiananmen Square protests, 67, 202n41 133, 155 Soviet Union, 126 coverage in Global Times, 145 space program, China’s, 40, 57 Tibet, 91, 169–76 Spiritual Civilization Offices, 46 ethnic unrest, 92, 155–6, stability 169–71 as component of official discourse, foreign criticism of China 33, 70–1, 119, 154, 156 over, 136, 137, 138, 139, global, 93, 107 171–2, 175, 176 maintenance of, 153 independence, 50, 172, 173 threats to, 163, 170, 171 religious restrictions, 66 State Administration of Press, reporting restrictions, 82, 170, Publication, Radio, Film, and 175, 177 Television (SAPPRFT), 45, 46, representation in Chinese media, 47, 51, 62, 65, 124 39, 50, 170–1, 174 State Administration of Radio, Film, see also Dalai Lama and Television (SARFT), 45, 61 Twitter, 163 State Council Information Office (SCIO), ix, 78, 79, 80, 83, 109 “united front” organizations, 80 responsibility for public United States, 34, 35, 74, diplomacy, 96 76, 125 role in Internet regulation, 47 representation in Chinese media, State Internet Information Office 134, 135, 138 (SIIO), 47, 124, 163 soft power, 102, 103, 106, 109, state secrets, 52, 82 117, 118 students tensions with China, 166 journalism, 131 universities nationalism, 173, 176, 181–2 academic restrictions, 64–5 Party membership, 64 cooperation with propaganda patriotic education, 67 authorities, 131 role in “sudden incidents,” 155 graduate employment, 155 unions, 67 ideological education, 25, 158 see also education; scholars; student unions, 67 universities see also education; scholars; “sudden incidents.” See public students opinion crises USSR, 126 264 Index values, Chinese international activities, 79, 80, Confucian, 29, 70 83, 84, 85, 130–1, 141, 142 international appeal, 6, 28, 34, relationship to propaganda 101–2, 117 system, 27, 46–7, 49, 51, Party-state promotion, 46, 83, 85 67, 116 Xinjiang political, 117, 118–19, 225n74 Chinese diplomatic pressure uncertainty over, 101–2, 111, over, 92 118–19 ethnic unrest, 92, 127, 155, values, Western, 34, 117, 118 176–8 VPNs, 60 foreign criticism of China over, 136, 145 Wang, Hongying, 94, 109, 117 information control, 127, 178 Wang Huning, 105, 110 representation in Chinese media, Wang, Jian, 27 39, 145–6, 177–8 Wang, Yiwei, 26, 27, 35, 105 “Xinjiang 13,” 89 websites. See BBS; blogs; Internet; see also Kadeer, Rebiya microblogs Xinwen Lianbo, 135–6, 195n8 Weibo. See microblogs , 57 Yang Jiechi, 74, 106 World Uighur Congress, 178 Yang Zhenwu, 126 wu mao dang, 63, 162, 232n96 Zhang, Xiaoling, 27 Xi Jinping, 105, 111 Zhang Yimou, 208n118 ideological agenda, ix, 55, 71, Zhao Qizheng, 76, 78, 83 113, 119 Zhao, Yuezhi, 30, 128, 134, 135 role in propaganda system, 44–5, Zheng Bijian, 211n14 46, 128 Zheng, Yongnian, 63, 194n5, Xinhua 194n19 agenda-setting role, 83, 127, , 94, 186 163, 171 , 158