Prelims Introduction
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How China's Leaders Think: the Inside Story of China's Past, Current
bindex.indd 540 3/14/11 3:26:49 PM China’s development, at least in part, is driven by patriotism and pride. The Chinese people have made great contributions to world civilization. Our commitment and determination is rooted in our historic and national pride. It’s fair to say that we have achieved some successes, [nevertheless] we should have a cautious appraisal of our accomplishments. We should never overestimate our accomplish- ments or indulge ourselves in our achievements. We need to assess ourselves objectively. [and aspire to] our next higher goal. [which is] a persistent and unremitting process. Xi Jinping Politburo Standing Committee member In the face of complex and ever-changing international and domes- tic environments, the Chinese Government promptly and decisively adjusted our macroeconomic policies and launched a comprehensive stimulus package to ensure stable and rapid economic growth. We increased government spending and public investments and imple- mented structural tax reductions. Balancing short-term and long- term strategic perspectives, we are promoting industrial restructuring and technological innovation, and using principles of reform to solve problems of development. Li Keqiang Politburo Standing Committee member I am now serving my second term in the Politburo. President Hu Jintao’s character is modest and low profile. we all have the high- est respect and admiration for him—for his leadership, perspicacity and moral convictions. Under his leadership, complex problems can all get resolved. It takes vision to avoid major conflicts in soci- ety. Income disparities, unemployment, bureaucracy and corruption could cause instability. This is the Party’s most severe test. -
Contemporary China: a Book List
PRINCETON UNIVERSITY: Woodrow Wilson School, Politics Department, East Asian Studies Program CONTEMPORARY CHINA: A BOOK LIST by Lubna Malik and Lynn White Winter 2007-2008 Edition This list is available on the web at: http://www.princeton.edu/~lynn/chinabib.pdf which can be viewed and printed with an Adobe Acrobat Reader. Variation of font sizes may cause pagination to differ slightly in the web and paper editions. No list of books can be totally up-to-date. Please surf to find further items. Also consult http://www.princeton.edu/~lynn/chinawebs.doc for clicable URLs. This list of items in English has several purposes: --to help advise students' course essays, junior papers, policy workshops, and senior theses about contemporary China; --to supplement the required reading lists of courses on "Chinese Development" and "Chinese Politics," for which students may find books to review in this list; --to provide graduate students with a list that may suggest books for paper topics and may slightly help their study for exams in Chinese politics; a few of the compiler's favorite books are starred on the list, but not much should be made of this because such books may be old or the subjects may not meet present interests; --to supplement a bibliography of all Asian serials in the Princeton Libraries that was compiled long ago by Frances Chen and Maureen Donovan; many of these are now available on the web,e.g., from “J-Stor”; --to suggest to book selectors in the Princeton libraries items that are suitable for acquisition; to provide a computerized list on which researchers can search for keywords of interests; and to provide a resource that many teachers at various other universities have also used. -
Journal of the British Association for Chinese Studies, Vol
Journal of the British Association for Chinese Studies, Vol. 6 November 2016 ISSN 2048-0601 © British Association for Chinese Studies Gorbachev’s Glasnost and the Debate on Chinese Socialism among Chinese Sovietologists, 1985-1999 Jie Li University of Edinburgh Abstract Mikhail Gorbachev’s glasnost (openness) was a popular topic in 1980s China. Existing scholarship remarks that Chinese Soviet-watchers admired Gorbachev’s programme as a model for China’s democratisation in the 1980s. However, after 1991, because of their impact on China’s pro-democracy movement, as perceived by the Chinese government, the same Chinese scholars consistently criticised Gorbachev and his liberalisation policies for being the fundamental catalysts in bringing down the USSR. This paper suggests that the attractiveness of Gorbachev’s glasnost policy to 1980s Chinese Sovietologists was not because it symbolised Western-style democracy; instead, they embraced glasnost as a type of government-led democracy. The impact of Gorbachev’s policies after the mid-1980s can also be seen in Chinese scholars’ use of them to support the reformist General Secretary Zhao Ziyang in his power struggle against the Party conservatives leading up to the Tiananmen Incident. This paper further posits that Chinese scholars’ scorn for Gorbachev after Tiananmen was not primarily owing to his role in promoting democratisation; rather, it was because of Gorbachev’s soft line approach towards dissent when communism in Europe was on the verge of collapse. By drawing attention to Gorbachev’s soft line approach, Chinese critics justified China’s use of the Tiananmen crackdown and the brutal measures adopted by Deng Xiaoping to preserve socialist rule and social stability. -
Hong Kong SAR
China Data Supplement November 2006 J People’s Republic of China J Hong Kong SAR J Macau SAR J Taiwan ISSN 0943-7533 China aktuell Data Supplement – PRC, Hong Kong SAR, Macau SAR, Taiwan 1 Contents The Main National Leadership of the PRC 2 LIU Jen-Kai The Main Provincial Leadership of the PRC 30 LIU Jen-Kai Data on Changes in PRC Main Leadership 37 LIU Jen-Kai PRC Agreements with Foreign Countries 47 LIU Jen-Kai PRC Laws and Regulations 50 LIU Jen-Kai Hong Kong SAR 54 Political, Social and Economic Data LIU Jen-Kai Macau SAR 61 Political, Social and Economic Data LIU Jen-Kai Taiwan 65 Political, Social and Economic Data LIU Jen-Kai ISSN 0943-7533 All information given here is derived from generally accessible sources. Publisher/Distributor: GIGA Institute of Asian Affairs Rothenbaumchaussee 32 20148 Hamburg Germany Phone: +49 (0 40) 42 88 74-0 Fax: +49 (040) 4107945 2 November 2006 The Main National Leadership of the PRC LIU Jen-Kai Abbreviations and Explanatory Notes CCP CC Chinese Communist Party Central Committee CCa Central Committee, alternate member CCm Central Committee, member CCSm Central Committee Secretariat, member PBa Politburo, alternate member PBm Politburo, member Cdr. Commander Chp. Chairperson CPPCC Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference CYL Communist Youth League Dep. P.C. Deputy Political Commissar Dir. Director exec. executive f female Gen.Man. General Manager Gen.Sec. General Secretary Hon.Chp. Honorary Chairperson H.V.-Chp. Honorary Vice-Chairperson MPC Municipal People’s Congress NPC National People’s Congress PCC Political Consultative Conference PLA People’s Liberation Army Pol.Com. -
New Media in New China
NEW MEDIA IN NEW CHINA: AN ANALYSIS OF THE DEMOCRATIZING EFFECT OF THE INTERNET __________________ A University Thesis Presented to the Faculty of California State University, East Bay __________________ In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Master of Arts in Communication __________________ By Chaoya Sun June 2013 Copyright © 2013 by Chaoya Sun ii NEW MEOlA IN NEW CHINA: AN ANALYSIS OF THE DEMOCRATIlING EFFECT OF THE INTERNET By Chaoya Sun III Table of Contents INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................. 1 PART 1 NEW MEDIA PROMOTE DEMOCRACY ................................................... 9 INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................... 9 THE COMMUNICATION THEORY OF HAROLD INNIS ........................................ 10 NEW MEDIA PUSH ON DEMOCRACY .................................................................... 13 Offering users the right to choose information freely ............................................... 13 Making free-thinking and free-speech available ....................................................... 14 Providing users more participatory rights ................................................................. 15 THE FUTURE OF DEMOCRACY IN THE CONTEXT OF NEW MEDIA ................ 16 PART 2 2008 IN RETROSPECT: FRAGILE CHINESE MEDIA UNDER THE SHADOW OF CHINA’S POLITICS ........................................................................... -
Targeting the Anti- Extradition Bill Movement
TARGETING THE ANTI- EXTRADITION BILL MOVEMENT China’s Hong Kong Messaging Proliferates on Social Media The Digital Forensic Research Lab (DFRLab) is a start-up incubated at the Atlantic Council and leading hub of digital forensic analysts whose mission is to identify, expose, and explain disinformation where and when it occurs. The DFRLab promotes the idea of objective truth as a foundation of governance to protect democratic institutions and norms from those who would undermine them. The Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security works to develop sustainable, nonpartisan strategies to address the most important security challenges facing the United States and the world. The Center honors General Brent Scowcroft’s legacy of service and embodies his ethos of nonpartisan commitment to the cause of security, support for US leadership in cooperation with allies and partners, and dedication to the mentorship of the next generation of leaders. The Scowcroft Center’s Asia Security Initiative promotes forward-looking strategies and con-structive solutions for the most pressing issues affecting the Indo- Pacific region, particularly the rise of China, in order to enhance cooperation between the United States and its regional allies and partners. COVER PHOTO (BACKGROUND): “Hong Kong Waterfront,” by Thom Masat (@tomterifx), Unsplash. Published on June 6, 2018. https://unsplash.com/photos/t_YWqXcK5lw This report is written and published in accordance with the Atlantic Council Policy on Intellectual Independence. The authors are solely responsible for its analysis and recommendations. The Atlantic Council and its donors do not determine, nor do they necessarily endorse or advocate for, any of this issue brief’s conclusions. -
Bloomberg Xi Jinping Millionaire Relations Reveal Elite Chinese Fortunes by Bloomberg News
NEWSBloomberg Xi Jinping Millionaire Relations Reveal Elite Chinese Fortunes By Bloomberg News June 29, 2012 – Xi Jinping, the man in line to be China’s next president, warned officials on a 2004 anti-graft conference call: “Rein in your spouses, children, relatives, friends and staff, and vow not to use power for personal gain.” As Xi climbed the Communist Party ranks, his extended family expanded their business interests to include minerals, real estate and mobile-phone equipment, according to public documents compiled by Bloomberg. Those interests include investments in companies with total assets of $376 million; an 18 percent indirect stake in a rare- earths company with $1.73 billion in assets; and a $20.2 million holding in a Xi Jinping, vice president of China, visits the China Shipping terminal at the Port of Los Angeles in Los Angeles, California, U.S., on publicly traded technology company. The figures Thursday, Feb. 16, 2012. Source: Bloomberg don’t account for liabilities and thus don’t reflect the family’s net worth. No assets were traced to Xi, who turns 59 this provinces and joining the ruling Politburo Standing month; his wife Peng Liyuan, 49, a famous People’s Committee in 2007. Along the way, he built a Liberation Army singer; or their daughter, the reputation for clean government. documents show. There is no indication Xi intervened He led an anti-graft campaign in the rich coastal to advance his relatives’ business transactions, or of province of Zhejiang, where he issued the “rein in” any wrongdoing by Xi or his extended family. -
Elite Politics and the Fourth Generation of Chinese Leadership
Elite Politics and the Fourth Generation of Chinese Leadership ZHENG YONGNIAN & LYE LIANG FOOK* The personnel reshuffle at the 16th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party is widely regarded as the first smooth and peaceful transition of power in the Party’s history. Some China observers have even argued that China’s political succession has been institutionalized. While this paper recognizes that the Congress may provide the most obvious manifestation of the institutionalization of political succession, this does not necessarily mean that the informal nature of politics is no longer important. Instead, the paper contends that Chinese political succession continues to be dictated by the rule of man although institutionalization may have conditioned such a process. Jiang Zemin has succeeded in securing a legacy for himself with his “Three Represents” theory and in putting his own men in key positions of the Party and government. All these present challenges to Hu Jintao, Jiang’s successor. Although not new to politics, Hu would have to tread cautiously if he is to succeed in consolidating power. INTRODUCTION Although the 16th Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Congress ended almost a year ago, the outcomes and implications of the Congress continue to grip the attention of China watchers, including government leaders and officials, academics and businessmen. One of the most significant outcomes of the Congress, convened in Beijing from November 8-14, 2002, was that it marked the first ever smooth and peaceful transition of power since the Party was formed more than 80 years ago.1 Neither Mao Zedong nor Deng Xiaoping, despite their impeccable revolutionary credentials, successfully transferred power to their chosen successors. -
Journal of Current Chinese Affairs
China Data Supplement March 2008 J People’s Republic of China J Hong Kong SAR J Macau SAR J Taiwan ISSN 0943-7533 China aktuell Data Supplement – PRC, Hong Kong SAR, Macau SAR, Taiwan 1 Contents The Main National Leadership of the PRC ......................................................................... 2 LIU Jen-Kai The Main Provincial Leadership of the PRC ..................................................................... 31 LIU Jen-Kai Data on Changes in PRC Main Leadership ...................................................................... 38 LIU Jen-Kai PRC Agreements with Foreign Countries ......................................................................... 54 LIU Jen-Kai PRC Laws and Regulations .............................................................................................. 56 LIU Jen-Kai Hong Kong SAR ................................................................................................................ 58 LIU Jen-Kai Macau SAR ....................................................................................................................... 65 LIU Jen-Kai Taiwan .............................................................................................................................. 69 LIU Jen-Kai ISSN 0943-7533 All information given here is derived from generally accessible sources. Publisher/Distributor: GIGA Institute of Asian Studies Rothenbaumchaussee 32 20148 Hamburg Germany Phone: +49 (0 40) 42 88 74-0 Fax: +49 (040) 4107945 2 March 2008 The Main National Leadership of the -
The Rise of China with Cultural Soft Power in the Age of Globalization
Journal of Literature and Art Studies, May 2018, Vol. 8, No. 5, 763-778 doi: 10.17265/2159-5836/2018.05.006 D DAVID PUBLISHING The Rise of China with Cultural Soft Power in the Age of Globalization WU You School of Foreign Studies/ Center for Global Studies, Shanghai University Culture has been exerting an even greater influence on China’s image construction and nation branding in today’s globalizing world. As “culture” is the core of Chinese soft power strategy, the concept of “soft power” has been redefined as “cultural soft power” in the Chinese context. Cultural instruments, including the Chinese language as well as traditional and popular cultures, are widely implemented as the “charm” tools to wield and project China’s soft power. Cultural diplomacy is also viewed as an effective way to promote an understanding of China’s ideals, support Chinese economic goals and enhance Chinese national security in subtle, wide-ranging, and sustainable ways. Although Chinese soft power is still in its “embryonic phase”, partly due to its close link to the country’s economic performance and huge market attraction as well as the disadvantages generated by the political and ideological issues, it has contributed greatly to expand China’s international influence and create a circle of like-minded allies on its periphery, in which process its increasing importance shall not be neglected. Keywords: Chinese culture, soft power, cultural influence, cultural diplomacy, globalization Cultural influence, besides the continued momentum of economic growth and military strengthening, becomes more and more important in an ever-increasingly interdependent and interconnected world, which turns out to be a crucial factor in expanding China’s international influence today. -
China's Fear of Contagion
China’s Fear of Contagion China’s Fear of M.E. Sarotte Contagion Tiananmen Square and the Power of the European Example For the leaders of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), erasing the memory of the June 4, 1989, Tiananmen Square massacre remains a full-time job. The party aggressively monitors and restricts media and internet commentary about the event. As Sinologist Jean-Philippe Béja has put it, during the last two decades it has not been possible “even so much as to mention the conjoined Chinese characters for 6 and 4” in web searches, so dissident postings refer instead to the imagi- nary date of May 35.1 Party censors make it “inconceivable for scholars to ac- cess Chinese archival sources” on Tiananmen, according to historian Chen Jian, and do not permit schoolchildren to study the topic; 1989 remains a “‘for- bidden zone’ in the press, scholarship, and classroom teaching.”2 The party still detains some of those who took part in the protest and does not allow oth- ers to leave the country.3 And every June 4, the CCP seeks to prevent any form of remembrance with detentions and a show of force by the pervasive Chinese security apparatus. The result, according to expert Perry Link, is that in to- M.E. Sarotte, the author of 1989: The Struggle to Create Post–Cold War Europe, is Professor of History and of International Relations at the University of Southern California. The author wishes to thank Harvard University’s Center for European Studies, the Humboldt Foundation, the Institute for Advanced Study, the National Endowment for the Humanities, and the University of Southern California for ªnancial and institutional support; Joseph Torigian for invaluable criticism, research assistance, and Chinese translation; Qian Qichen for a conversation on PRC-U.S. -
New Leaders Begin the Search for Economic Reform
Signaling Change: New Leaders Begin the Search for Economic Reform Barry Naughton Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang are now the two top leaders in China. Both have moved quickly to break with the Hu-Wen Administration and signal their support for dramatic new economic reforms. The structure of the new Politburo Standing Committee appears to support their aspirations. Neither Xi nor Li has yet committed to specific reform measures, and the obstacles to reform are formidable. However, both Xi and Li have committed to a process that will lead to the creation of a reform program by late 2013. From the standpoint of economic reform policy, the outcome of the 18th Party Congress was clear and unambiguous. The two top leaders, Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang, emerged from the Congress with a substantial degree of room to maneuver. Both leaders quickly displayed their willingness to break with what had become business as usual under Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao. Xi and Li, each in his own way, moved quickly to express their intention to support a revitalized program of economic reform. Xi Jinping has received most of the attention, which is certainly appropriate. Xi has brought a more direct and personal style to the top job, a refreshing change of pace that has generally been welcomed both in China and abroad, and has shown that he intends to keep an eye on economics. Li Keqiang has also begun to signal his intentions. Although Li’s approach is more understated—in part because he will not actually step in as Premier until the March National People’s Congress meetings—his comments merit close attention.