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Prelims Introduction Notes Prelims 1. Kong Genhong, “‘Zhongguo meng’ de duiwai jiedu [The external decoding of the ‘Chinese dream’],” Xinhua, June 18, 2013, http://news.xinhuanet. com/politics/2013–06/18/c_124873602_2.htm; “Renmin Ribao: keg- uan renshi dangdai Zhongguo yu waibu shijie [People’s Daily: objectively understand contemporary China and the outside world],” Xinhua, August 29, 2013, http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2013–08/29/c_117150243. htm. 2. Cai Mingzhao, “Jiang hao Zhongguo gushi, chuanbo hao Zhongguo shengyin [Tell China’s story well, propagate China’s voice well],” Renmin Wang, October 10, 2013, http://politics.people.com.cn/n/2013/1010/ c1001–23144775.html. Introduction 1. See Evan S. Medeiros and M. Taylor Fravel, “China’s New Diplomacy,” Foreign Affairs 82, no. 6 (2003): 22–35; Peter Nolan, China and the Global Economy: National Champions, Industrial Policy and the Big Business Revolution (Houndmills, UK: Palgrave, 2001); Alastair Iain Johnston, Social States: China in International Institutions, 1980–2000 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008); Mingjiang Li, ed., Soft Power: China’s Emerging Strategy in International Politics (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2009). 2. Some of the collected editions that address such issues include Robert S. Ross and Zhu Feng, eds., China’s Ascent: Power, Security, and the Future of International Politics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2008); Alastair Iain Johnston and Robert S. Ross, eds., New Directions in the Study of China’s Foreign Policy (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2006); David Shambaugh, ed., Power Shift: China and Asia’s New Dynamics (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005). See also Yong Deng, China’s Struggle for Status: The Realignment of International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008); Robert G. Sutter, China’s Rise in Asia: Promises and Perils (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 192 Notes 2005); Alastair Iain Johnston, “Beijing’s Security Behavior in the Asia- Pacific: Is China a Dissatisfied Power?,” in Rethinking Securit y in E ast A sia: Identity, Power, and Efficiency, ed. J. J. Suh, Peter J. Katzenstein, and Allen Carlson (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2004); Ching Kwan Lee, “Raw Encounters: Chinese Managers, African Workers and the Politics of Casualization in Africa’s Chinese Enclaves,” The China Quarterly 199 (2009): 647–66; Sheng Ding, “To Build a ‘Harmonious World’: China’s Soft Power Wielding in the Global South,” in “Harmonious World” and China’s New Foreign Policy, ed. Sujian Guo and Jean-Marc F. Blanchard (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2008); Yongjin Zhang, “China and the Emerging Regional Order in the South Pacific,” Australian Journal of International Affairs 61, no. 3 (2007): 367–81; R. Evan Ellis, China in Latin America: The Whats and Wherefores (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2009). 3. Yongjin Zhang, “Reconsidering the Economic Internationalization of China: Implications of the WTO Membership,” Journal of Contemporary China 12, no. 37 (2003): 699–714; Johnston, Social States. 4. For an assessment of Chinese debates about globalization, see Nick Knight, Imagining Globalisation in China: Debates on Ideology, Politics and Culture (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2008). 5. See Susan L. Shirk, “Changing Media, Changing China,” in Changing Media, Changing China, ed. Susan L. Shirk (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011). 6. For example, see James S. Fishkin et al., “Deliberative Democracy in an Unlikely Place: Deliberative Polling in China,” British Journal of Political Science 40, no. 2 (2010): 435–48. 7. Susan L. Shirk argues that the domestic insecurity of the Chinese leader- ship is an important factor in China’s foreign policy decision making; William A. Callahan, who employs a constructivist approach, argues that Chinese national insecurity stems from the way that discourses— particularly a discourse of national humiliation—shape national identity. Similarly, historian Julia Lovell claims that the failure of outside observ- ers to realize that Chinese political leaders prioritize domestic problems and have relatively little interest in foreign relations was an important factor in pushing Britain into war with China in the nineteenth century and continues to generate conflict today. Susan L. Shirk, China: Fragile Superpower (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007); William A. Callahan, China: The Pessoptimist Nation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010); Julia Lovell, The Opium War: Drugs, Dreams and the Making of China (London: Picador, 2011). See also Deng, China’s Struggle for Status. 8. For example, Sheng Ding, The Dragon’s Hidden Wings: How China Rises with Its Soft Power (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2008); Joshua Kurlantzick, Charm Offensive: How China’s Soft Power Is Transforming the World (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007); Bates Gill and Yanzhong Huang, “Sources and Limits of Chinese ‘Soft Power,’” Survival 48, no. 2 (2006): 17–36. Notes 193 9. Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, Activists beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998), 213; Miles Kahler and David A. Lake, “Globalization and Changing Patterns of Political Authority,” in Governance in a Global Economy: Political Authority in Transition, ed. Miles Kahler and David A. Lake (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003), 428. 10. See Juan J. Linz, Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2000); Patrick Köllner and Steffen Kailitz, “Comparing Autocracies: Theoretical Issues and Empirical Analyses,” Democratization 20, no. 1 (2013): 1–12. 11. See Bruce Gilley, “Beyond the Four Percent Solution: Explaining the Consequences of China’s Rise,” Journal of Contemporary China 20, no. 72 (2011): 795–811. 12. The majority of these have focused on political and economic governance. For example, Suisheng Zhao, “The China Model: Can It Replace the Western Model of Modernization?,” Journal of Contemporary China 19, no. 65 (2010): 419–36; Barry Naughton, “China’s Distinctive System: Can It Be a Model for Others?,” Journal of Contemporary China 19, no. 65 (2010): 437–60; Scott Kennedy, “The Myth of the Beijing Consensus,” Journal of Contemporary China 19, no. 65 (2010): 461–77; William A. Callahan, “Chinese Visions of World Order: Post-Hegemonic or a New Hegemony?,” International Studies Review 10, no. 4 (2008): 749–61. A few have examined the potential of Chinese cultural or philosophical ideas to gain greater international influence. For example, Daniel A. Bell, China’s New Confucianism: Politics and Everyday Life in a Changing Society (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), 19–37. 13. See Andrew Moravcik, “The New Liberalism,” in The Oxford Handbook of International Relations, ed. Christian Reus-Smit and Duncan Snidal (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008). 14. See Ted Hopf, “The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory,” International Security 23, no. 1 (1998): 171–200; Jim George, Discourses of Global Politics: A Critical (Re)Introduction to International Relations (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1994); David Campbell, Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1992). Recent examples of studies that focus on discourse in international politics include Charlotte Epstein, “Who Speaks? Discourse, the Subject and the Study of Identity in International Politics,” European Journal of International Relations 17, no. 2 (2011): 327–50; Lene Hansen, Security as Practice: Discourse Analysis and the Bosnian War (London: Routledge, 2006); Krista Hunt and Kim Rygiel, eds., (En)Gendering the War on Terror: War Stories and Camouflaged Politics (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2006). 15. For example, Ren Xianliang, Yulun yindao yishu: Lingdao ganbu ruhe miandui meiti [The art of guiding public opinion: How leading cad- res should face the media] (Beijing: Xinhua Chubanshe, 2010); Hong Xianghua, ed., Meiti lingdao li: Lingdao ganbu ruhe yu meiti da jiaodao [Media leadership strength: How leading cadres deal with the media] 194 Notes (Beijing: Zhonggongdang Shi Chubanshe, 2009); Wu Hao, Wu Hao shuo xinwen: Yi wei Xinhuashe jizhe de xinwen shizhan shouji [Wu Hao dis- cusses the news: A Xinhua journalist’s notes from the news frontline] (Beijing: Xinhua Chubanshe, 2008); Ye Hao, ed., Zhengfu xinwenxue anli: Zhengfu yingdui meiti de xin fangfa [Government media studies cases: The government’s new methods of responding to the media] (Nanjing: Jiangsu Renmin Chubanshe, 2007). 16. See Peter Gourevitch, “The Second Image Reversed: The International Sources of Domestic Politics,” International Organization 32, no. 4 (1978): 881–912; Peter Gourevitch, “Domestic Politics and International Relations,” in Handbook of International Relations, ed. Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse, and Beth A. Simmons (London: Sage, 2002). 17. Callahan, The Pessoptimist Nation. 18. Chris Buckley, “China Internal Security Spending Jumps Past Army Budget,” Reuters, March 5, 2011, http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/03/05/ us-china-unrest-idUSTRE7222RA20110305. 19. For example, Zheng Yongnian first differentiates between the Party and the state when examining their relationship with each other and only treats them as a collective entity when he moves to analyze the Party- state’s relationship with Chinese society. Zheng Yongnian, The Chinese Communist Party as Organizational Emperor: Culture, Reproduction and Transformation (Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2010). 20. Richard K. Herrmann, “Linking
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