DOCSLIB.ORG

1 the United States and Global Terrorism

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
1 the United States and Global Terrorism NOTES 1 The United States and Global Terrorism 1. Andrew T. H. Tan (ed.), The Politics of Terrorism (London: Routledge, 2006), pp. 211–212. 2. “Bin Laden Voice on Channel, Says TV Channel: Al Qaeda Tape Finally Claims Responsibility for Attacks,” The Guardian, September 10, 2002, http://www.guardian. co.uk/media/2002/sep/10/alqaida.september112001 3. “After the Abadan Fire,” Time, September 4, 1978, http://www.time.com/time/magazine/ article/0,9171,912118–1,00.html 4. See Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006). For a more succinct description of the New Terrorism, see Bruce Hoffman, “The New Terrorism,” in Andrew Tan and Kumar Ramakrishna (eds.), The New Terrorism: Anatomy, Trends and Counter-Strategies (Singapore: Times Academic/Eastern Universities Press, 2003). 5. Remarks by the president, September 12, 2001, http://www.americanrhetoric.com/ speeches/gwbush911cabinetroomaddress.htm 6. Radio address of the president to the nation, September 15, 2001, http://www. americanrhetoric.com/speeches/gwbush911radioaddress.htm 7. The 9/11 Commission Report, p. 336, http://www.gpoaccess.gov/911/pdf/fullreport.pdf 8. The 9/11 Commission Report, p. 66. 9. The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, September 2002, http:// www.lib.umich.edu/govdocs/pdf/nss02.pdf 10. National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, February 2003, http://www.globalsecurity. org/security/library/policy/national/counter_terrorism_strategy.pdf, p. 10. 11. National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, February 2003, p. 2. 12. National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, February 2003, pp. 15–28. 13. National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, February 2003, p. 30. 14. National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, September 2006, http://www.globalsecurity. org/security/library/policy/national/nsct_sep2006.pdf 15. National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, September 2006, pp. 1–4. 16. National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, September 2006, pp.11–17. 17. “All Change at the Pentagon,” Strategic Comments, 14(6), August 2008, pp. 1–2. See also National Defense Strategy, June 2008, http://www.defenselink.mil/news/2008%20 National%20Defense%20Strategy.pdf 18. National Defense Strategy, June 2008, p. 8. 19. National Defense Strategy, June 2008, p. 8. 194 Notes 20. National Defense Strategy, June 2008, pp. 8–9. 21. National Defense Strategy, June 2008, p. 20. 22. See Nadine Gurr and Benjamin Cole, The New Face of Terrorism: Threats from Weapons of Mass Destruction (London: IB Taurus, 2000). 23. See Walter Lacqueur, The New Terrorism: Fanaticism and the Arms of Mass Destruction (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999). 24. David C. Rapoport, “Modern Terror: History and Special Features,” in Andrew T. H. Tan (ed.), The Politics of Terrorism, p. 23. 25. See David C. Rapoport, “The Four Waves of Rebel Terror and September 11,” in Charles W Kegley Jr., The New Terrorism: Characteristics, Causes and Controls (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 2003), pp.37–45. See also David C. Rapoport, “Modern Terror: History and Special Features,” and David C Rapoport, “The Fourth Wave: September 11 in the History of Terrorism,” Current History, December 2001. 26. David C. Rapoport, “The Four Waves of Rebel Terror and September 11,” p. 50. 27. See Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism (New York: Columbia, 1998). An expanded and revised version appeared in 2006. A more concise exposition of Hoffman’s ideas can be found in Bruce Hoffman, “The New Terrorism,” in Andrew Tan and Kumar Ramakrishna (eds.), The New Terrorism: Anatomy, Trends and Counter-Strategies (Singapore: Times Academic/Eastern Universities Press, 2003). See also Bruce Hoffman, “The Congruence of International and Domestic Trends in Terrorism,” Terrorism and Political Violence, 9(2), summer 1997, pp. 8–9. 28. Back-cover summation, Rohan Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda (London: Hurst, 2002). 29. Rohan Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda, p. 238. 30. Jason Burke, Al Qaeda (London: Penguin, 2003), p. 312. 31. Jason Burke, Al Qaeda, p. 313. 32. Jason Burke, Al Qaeda, p. 313. 33. Ahmed S Hashim, Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Iraq (London: Hurst, 2006), p. 365. 34. Ali A. Allawi, The Occupation of Iraq: Winning the War, Losing the Peace (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007), pp. 459–460. 35. See Peter W. Galbraith, The End of Iraq: How American Incompetence Created a War Without End (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2006), and Thomas E. Ricks, Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq (New York: Penguin, 2006). 36. Isaiah Wilson, New Thoughts on War and Peace, prologue, http://www.thinkbeyondwar. com/Documents/Prologue_New_Thoughts_on_War_and_Peace.pdf (accessed February 1, 2008) 37. Austin Long, On “Other War”: Lessons from Five Decades of RAND Counterinsurgency Research (Santa Monica: RAND, 2006), pp. 19–20. 38. See, for instance, Bruce R. Pirnie and Edward O’Connell, Counterinsurgency in Iraq: 2003–2006 (Santa Monica: RAND, 2008), and Seth G. Jones, Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan (Santa Monica: RAND, 2008). 39. See James S. Corum, Fighting the War on Terror: A Counterinsurgency Strategy (St. Paul, MN: Zenith Press, 2007), pp. 257–265. 40. David Kilcullen, “Twenty-Eight Articles: Fundamentals of Company-Level Counterinsurgency,” http://www.au.af.mil/info-ops/iosphere_summer06_kilcullen.pdf 41. Rebecca Weisser, “Strategist Behind War Gains,” The Australian, August 18, 2007, http:// www.theaustralian.news.com.au/story/0,25197,22263435–31477,00.html 42. Daniel Byman, The Five Front War (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley and Sons, 2008), pp. 3–4. 43. Michael Chandler and Rohan Gunaratna, Countering Terrorism: Can We Meet the Threat of Global Violence? (London: Reaktion Books, 2007), p. 14. 44. See Audrey K. Cronin, Ending Terrorism: Lessons for Defeating Al Qaeda, Adelphi Paper 394, International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, 2008. 45. Bruce Hoffman, “Combating Al Qaeda and the Militant Islamic Threat,” Testimony Before the Committee on Armed Services Subcommittee on Terrorism, Unconventional Threats Notes 195 and Capabilities, United States House of Representatives, February 16, 2006, p. 14, http:// www.rand.org/pubs/testimonies/2006/RAND_CT255.pdf 46. Thomas R. Mockaitis, “Winning Hearts and Minds in the War on Terrorism,” in Thomas R. Mockaitis and Paul B Rich (eds.), Grand Strategy in the War against Terrorism (London: Frank Cass, 2003), p. 21. 47. See the executive summary of David Kilcullen, “Countering Global Insurgency.” 48. David Kilcullen, “Countering Global Insurgency,” pp. 1–2. 49. Linda J. Bilmes and Joseph E. Stiglitz, “The Iraq War Will Cost Us $3 Trillion, and Much More,” Washington Post, March 9, 2008, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/ content/article/2008/03/07/AR2008030702846.html 50. “US Is Studying Military Strike Options in Iran,” Washington Post, April 9, 2006, http://www. washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/04/08/AR2006040801082_pf.html 51. Gwynne Dyer, After Iraq: Where Next for the Middle East? (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008), p. 78. 52. See Coral Bell, The End of the Vasco da Gama Era: The Next Landscape of World Politics (Sydney: Lowy Institute, 2007). 53. See Jeffrey H. Norwitz (ed.), Armed Groups: Studies in National Security, Counterterrorism and Counterinsurgency (Newport: U.S. Naval War College, 2008). 2 The Failure of the GWOT 1. North Atlantic Treaty Organization—Chronology Update, September 10–16, 2001. 2. Christopher Bennett, “Combating Terrorism,” NATO Review, Spring 2003, http://www. nato.int/docu/review/2003/issue1/english/art2.html 3. Condemnation of Terrorist Attacks in the United States, United Nations General Assembly, September 12, 2001, http://www.un.org/documents/ga/docs/56/agresolution.htm 4. Background Note: Australia, U.S. State Department, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/ bgn/2698.htm 5. United Nations Security Council Resolution 1373, September 28, 2001, http://www. un.org/Docs/scres/2001/sc2001.htm 6. UN Security Council Counter Terrorism Committee, http://www.un.org/sc/ctc 7. See Zahid Hussain, Frontline Pakistan: The Struggle Within Militant Islam (London: I. B. Taurus, 2007), pp. 119–140. 8. “Terror Suspect Hambali Quizzed,” BBC News, August 15, 2003, http://news.bbc. co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/3152755.stm See also “Confessions of an Al Qaeda Terrorist,” Time, September 15, 2002, http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,351169,00.html 9. “How Much of Al Qaeda’s Leadership has been Captured or Killed,” News Center for the Study of Terrorism and Political Conflict, http://www.borrull.org/e/noticia. php?id=40842 10. The Guardian, November 19, 2001. 11. “US Kills Al Qaeda Suspects in Yemen,” USA Today, May 11, 2002 http://www.usatoday. com/news/world/2002–11-04-yemen-explosion_x.htm 12. UN Security Council Resolution 1390, January 16, 2002 http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/ UNDOC/GEN/N02/216/02/PDF/N0221602.pdf?OpenElement 13. “Bush Delivers Ultimatum,” CNN.com, September 21, 2001, http://edition.cnn. com/2001/WORLD/asiapcf/central/09/20/ret.afghan.bush/index.html 14. Presidential Address to the Nation, The White House, October 7, 2001, http://www. whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/10/20011007–8.html accessed February 1, 2008. 15. “Afghan Opposition Leader’s Fate Unclear,” BBC News, September 10, 2001, http://news. bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/1534629.stm 196 Notes 16. Donald H. Rumsfeld, “Transforming the Military,” Foreign Affairs, May/June 2002, p. 20. 17. Afghan Bonn Agreement, http://www.afghangovernment.com/AfghanAgreementBonn. htm 18. UN Security Council Resolution 1386, December 20, 2001, http://daccessdds.un.org/ doc/UNDOC/GEN/N01/708/55/PDF/N0170855.pdf?OpenElement 19. UN Security Council Resolution 1401, March 28, 2002, http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/ UNDOC/GEN/N02/309/14/PDF/N0230914.pdf?OpenElement 20. NATO in Afghanistan: Factsheet, http://www.nato.int/issues/afghanistan/040628- factsheet.htm 21. Julianne Smith, “NATO Battles the Taliban and Tests Its Future in Afghanistan,” China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly, 4(4) (2006) 25. 22. International Security Assistance Force, http://web.archive.org/web/20070628124507/ http://www.nato.int/isaf/media/pdf/placemat_isaf.pdf 23.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Open Letter on CIA MDR Regs- Final.Pdf
    To: Director of National Intelligence, James Clapper Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, David Petraeus Director of the Information Security Oversight Office, John Fitzpatrick February 23, 2012 Re: CIA Regulation change to 32 CFR Part 1908 allowing the Agency to charge requesters as high as $72 per hour for Mandatory Declassification Review requests. To whom it may concern: We the undersigned would like to call to your attention an alarming regulation that the Central Intelligence Agency entered into the Federal Register on 23 September 2011. Finalized without any notice for public comment, this regulation could cut off access to the most effective tool the public can use to request declassification of the CIA’s secret documents, the Mandatory Declassification Review (MDR) program. The regulation states that declassification reviews will now cost requesters up to $72 per hour, even if no information is found or released. The public must now also agree to pay a minimum of $15 in duplication fees. Throughout the government, and previously at CIA, MDR fees are commensurate to FOIA fees. Under FOIA, Congress stipulated that public interest, educational, journalism, and other fee waivers must be granted, when applicable under the statute. Furthermore, agencies must forfeit their right to collect some FOIA processing fees when they miss their processing deadline. The effect of the CIA’s new policy will be to price the public out of submitting MDR requests, a result not at all consonant with Obama Administration transparency policy in general or its declassification policy under Executive Order 13,526 in particular. The MDR process is a popular and successful tool for researchers, historians, public interest advocates and others, in part because of the independent accountability and oversight the program provides.
    [Show full text]
  • Gen. David H. Petraeus on Withdrawing US Troops from Afghanistan Featuring General David H
    The Dangers of Disengagement: Gen. David H. Petraeus on Withdrawing US Troops from Afghanistan Featuring General David H. Petraeus MARCH 16, 2021 Civil war and an unrestrained al Qaeda are all but certain should the US withdraw its forces from Afghanistan in May per the US-Taliban deal signed over a year ago. American disengagement will only embolden revisionist powers and create an even more dangerous security situation for the region and beyond. On this episode of Overwatch, Frederick W. Kagan, director of the Critical Threats Project at the American Enterprise Institute, and General David H. Petraeus sit down to discuss the US-Taliban agreement, the consequences of a US withdrawal, and a sustainable way forward that protects not only American interests, but also advances those of the Afghan people. Jacob Taylor: This is Overwatch, a podcast presented by the Institute for the Study of War. Just over one year has passed since the United States signed an agreement with the Taliban that commits US forces to leave Afghanistan this May if the Taliban has met certain conditions. On this episode of Overwatch, Freder- ick Kagan, Director of the Critical Threats Project at the American Enterprise Institute, sits down with General David H. Petraeus, to discuss the situation in Afghanistan, the state of the US-Taliban deal and the dangers for American national security of withdrawing US Forces from Afghanistan under the circumstances. General Petraeus is the former Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. His 37-year career in the US Military included command of the 101st Airborne Division in Iraq, Multinational Force Iraq, in which capacity he de- veloped and executed the Surge Strategy, the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan and the US Central Command.
    [Show full text]
  • Where Is Al-Qaida Going? by Anne Stenersen
    PERSPECTIVES ON TERRORISM Volume 11, Issue 6 Articles Thirty Years after its Foundation – Where is al-Qaida Going? by Anne Stenersen Abstract This article presents a framework for understanding al-Qaida, based on a new reading of its thirty-year history. Al-Qaida today is commonly labelled a ‘global insurgency’ or ‘global franchise.’ However, these labels are not sufficient if we want to understand what kind of threat al-Qaida poses to the West. Al-Qaida is better described as a revolutionary vanguard, engaged in a perpetual struggle to further its Salafi-jihadi ideology. Its strategy is flexible and opportunistic, and the organization uses a range of tools associated with both state and non-state actors. In the future al-Qaida is likely to treat international terrorist planning, and support to local insurgencies in the Muslim world, as two separate activities. International terrorism is currently not a prioritised strategy of al-Qaida, but it is likely to be so in the future, given that it manages to re-build its external operations capability. Keywords: Al-Qaida, terrorism, insurgency, strategy, external operations Introduction The status and strength of al-Qaida (AQ) are the subject of an ongoing debate. [1] There are two opposite and irreconcilable views in this debate: The first is that al-Qaida is strong and cannot be discounted. The other is that al-Qaida is in decline. [2] Those who suggest al-Qaida is strong, tend to emphasise the size and number of al-Qaida’s affiliates, especially in Syria, Yemen and Somalia; they also point to the rise of new leaders, in particular bin Laden’s son Hamza.
    [Show full text]
  • Kelley.V..Fbi.Amended.11-22-13.Pdf
    UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA Gilberte Jill Kelley, and ) Scott Kelley, M.D. ) 1005 Bayshore Blvd. ) Tampa, Florida 33606 ) ) Plaintiffs, ) Civil Action No: 13-cv-825 (ABJ) ) v. ) ) The Federal Bureau of Investigation, ) 935 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W. ) Washington, D.C., 20535-0001, ) ) United States Department of Defense ) 1400 Defense Pentagon ) Washington, D.C., 20301, ) ) United States Department of State ) 2201 C Street NW ) Washington DC, 20520 ) ) The United States of America ) 950 Pennsylvania Ave., NW ) Washington DC, 20530, ) ) Leon Edward Panetta ) ) Sean M. Joyce ) ) George E. Little ) ) Steven E. Ibison ) ) Adam R. Malone ) ) John and Jane Does 1 through 10 ) individually, ) 1 Defendants. ) 1 By agreement with counsel for the FBI, DOD State Department and United States, home addresses for the individual defendants have been suppressed out of respect for the privacy and security of the current and former government officials named. 1 VERIFIED FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL 1. Plaintiffs Mrs. Gilberte Jill Kelley and Scott Kelley, M.D., bring this action to vindicate their legal rights to privacy and dignity that were infringed by the government’s improper searches, maintenance, and disclosures of their personal, private, and confidential information. While the government’s investigation led to the resignation of Central Intelligence Agency (“CIA”) Director David Petraeus (“Director Petraeus”) and abrupt retirement of General John Allen, the government was not legally entitled to treat the Kelleys’ like criminals, pry into and disclose their personal communications, violate their privacy, and disseminate confidential records as well as false information about them. 2. Therefore, Mrs.
    [Show full text]
  • The Situation in Afghanistan Hearings Committee On
    S. HRG. 111–867 THE SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN HEARINGS BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES UNITED STATES SENATE ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS SECOND SESSION JUNE 15 AND 16, 2010 Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services ( Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov/ U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 64–545 PDF WASHINGTON : 2011 For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800 Fax: (202) 512–2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402–0001 VerDate Aug 31 2005 14:09 Feb 18, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00001 Fmt 5011 Sfmt 5011 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\64545.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES CARL LEVIN, Michigan, Chairman ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia JOHN MCCAIN, Arizona JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma JACK REED, Rhode Island JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia BILL NELSON, Florida LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska JOHN THUNE, South Dakota EVAN BAYH, Indiana ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi JIM WEBB, Virginia GEORGE S. LeMIEUX, Florida CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri SCOTT P. BROWN, Massachusetts MARK UDALL, Colorado RICHARD BURR, North Carolina KAY R. HAGAN, North Carolina DAVID VITTER, Louisiana MARK BEGICH, Alaska SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine ROLAND W. BURRIS, Illinois JEFF BINGAMAN, New Mexico EDWARD E. KAUFMAN, Delaware RICHARD D. DEBOBES, Staff Director JOSEPH W. BOWAB, Republican Staff Director (II) VerDate Aug 31 2005 14:09 Feb 18, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00002 Fmt 0486 Sfmt 0486 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\64545.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB C O N T E N T S CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES THE SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN JUNE 15, 2010 Page Flournoy, Hon.
    [Show full text]
  • A Tale of Two Manuals
    A Tale of Two Manuals BY RAPHAEL S. COHEN n January 13, 2009, in the waning days of the George W. Bush administration, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, and U.S. Agency for O International Development (USAID) Administrator Henrietta Fore unveiled the U.S. Government Counterinsurgency Guide. The guide was the first of its kind—an attempt at an inter- agency doctrine reaching across civilian and military agencies in the U.S. Government. It sought to create unifying principles for the counterinsurgency fight and to unite the involved agencies through a common game plan to “achieve synergy among political, security, economic and informa- tion activities.”1 Coordinated by the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs at the Department of State, the guide was coauthored by all the major government stakeholders in the counterinsurgency fight: USAID; the Departments of State, Defense, Justice, Treasury, Homeland Security, Transportation, and Agriculture; and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. Moreover, the guide’s creation brought together some of the leading counterinsurgency strategists from across the U.S. Government and drew upon current experience. Seemingly, the finished product was well poised to shape the way the U.S. Government thinks about and conducts counterinsurgencies. And yet, more than a year and a half after its publication, the guide has languished in relative obscurity with little apparent impact on interagency planning, strategy, or operations in Iraq and Afghanistan or elsewhere. The result is particularly surprising in historical context, given the great success of two other doctrinal guides in shaping counterinsurgency strategic thought.
    [Show full text]
  • Strategy, Grand Strategy, and the Enduring War on Terror 3
    A HOOVER INSTITUTION ESSAY ON A US STRATEGIC VISION IN A CHANGING WORLD Strategy, Grand Strategy, and the Enduring War on Terror HAL BRANDS Strategy, in national security as in other fields, consists of using the available means to accomplish some important end. Grand strategy requires, among other things, incorporating a nation’s various strategies into a coherent—and solvent—whole. There can be, then, an inherent tension between the demands of successful strategy and those of sustainable grand strategy, for the requirements of maintaining solvency across the range of national programs may limit the amount of resources made available to accomplish some particular objective or meet some pressing threat. This is precisely the challenge the United States faces today in dealing with the problem of jihadist terrorism: the demands of strategy and the demands of grand strategy are Islamism and the International Order International the and Islamism becoming progressively harder to reconcile. The United States has now been fighting a global war on terror (GWOT) for nearly two decades, but the threat posed by extremist groups—particularly those capable of creating geographic safe havens and mounting significant external attacks— remains. The confrontation with al-Qaeda’s “core” after 9/11 led to a struggle against the al-Qaeda “affiliates” in Iraq and elsewhere. That struggle continues, even as the campaign against the Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham (often referred to as ISIS) has taken pride of place in American counterterrorism strategy since 2014. No sooner has the United States suppressed or even defeated one terrorist organization, it often seems, than a new and dangerous successor or group of successors takes its place.
    [Show full text]
  • The New Insurgents: a Select Review of Recent Literature on Terrorism and Insurgency
    The New Insurgents: A Select Review of Recent Literature on Terrorism and Insurgency George Michael US Air Force Counterproliferation Center Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama THE NEW INSURGENTS: A Select Review of Recent Literature on Terrorism and Insurgency by George Michael USAF Counterproliferation Center 325 Chennault Circle Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama 36112-6427 March 2014 Disclaimer The opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied in this publication are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Air University, Air Force, or Department of Defense. ii Contents Chapter Page Disclaimer .............................................................................................. ii About the Author..................................................................................... v Introduction ........................................................................................... vii 1 Domestic Extremism and Terrorism in the United States ....................... 1 J.M. Berger, Jihad Joe: Americans Who Go to War in the Name of Islam ................................................................................................ 3 Catherine Herridge, The Next Wave: On the Hunt for Al Qaeda’s American Recruits ........................................................................... 8 Martin Durham, White Rage: The Extreme Right and American Politics ........................................................................................... 11 2 Jihadist Insurgent Strategy ....................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • Al Qaeda: Beyond Osama-Bin Laden
    IDSA Issue Brief IDSIDSAA ISSUEISSUE BRIEFBRIEF1 al Qaeda: Beyond Osama-bin Laden Shruti Pandalai Shruti Pandalai is OSD Outreach & Research Analyst at the Institute for Defence Studies & Analyses (IDSA), New Delhi May 3, 2011 Summary “Justice has been done” exclaimed a visibly re-energised but sombre US President, Barack Obama, as impromptu celebrations broke outside the White House. A decade since the “World’s Most Wanted Terrorist” had declared war against the US and made “Jihad global”, bin Laden’s elimination has been touted as “closure”. Conspiracy theories – the “suspect timing” with Obama’s bid for second term closing in, “level of compliance of Pakistani authorities”, “Was Osama’s head the price Pakistan had to pay to save the cracking relationship?”, “is this the master plan to ease Pakistan’s entry and US exit from Afghanistan?” – seem to cloud the right here and now; but naturally. Yet, the importance of this development on the movement of “global jihad” pioneered by Osama and al Qaeda remains a pivotal conceptual question that will require nuanced analysis. The war is not over yet, even Obama says so. al Qaeda: Beyond Osama-bin Laden 2 “This has nothing to do with the poor servant of God, nor with the al-Qaeda organisation. We are the children of the Islamic nation whose leader is Mohammed.” -Osama bin Laden, October 21, 2001 to al Jazeera (on the importance of Osama to al-Qaeda). 1 e “The death of Bin Laden marks the most significant achievement to date in our nation’s effort to defeat Al Qaeda.
    [Show full text]
  • Introduction an End to ISIS?
    1 Introduction An End to ISIS? Feisal al- Istrabadi and Sumit Ganguly he Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS throughout this volume) Tseemed to rise dramatically in 2014, taking over Iraq’s second-largest city, Mosul, in four hours. A frenzy of activity and hand-wringing en- sued, both amongst the ranks of policymakers in vari ous capitals and in the media. Indeed, no major observer of the region, in or out of govern- ment, had seen this rise coming, and U.S. officials, starting with the pres- ident, had been openly dismissive of ISIS while touting what they deemed to be their far more impor tant success against al Qaeda. Yet here was ISIS achieving what al Qaeda had never even aspired to do in the course of its existence: taking over territory through military means from two governments that had previously controlled it. Overnight, ISIS erased the internationally recognized border between Iraq and Syria and pro- claimed the existence of its so- called caliphate and named its amir al- muminin— commander of the faithful—an Iraqi, Ibrahim Awad al- Badri, known by his nom de guerre, Abu Bakr al- Baghdadi. The backdrop to these events, however, was far less dramatic. ISIS had been building for years. Particularly in Iraq, as the Sunni insurgency was 3 01-3216-7-ch01.indd 3 04/17/18 12:46 am 4 al-Istrabadi and Ganguly largely defeated—or at least reduced in size—in the wake of the surge of U.S. troops in 2007 and subsequently, what was then known as the Is- lamic State in Iraq rose to displace al Qaeda.
    [Show full text]
  • The Backlash Against Nation-Building
    The Backlash Against Nation-Building BY DOMINIC TIERNEY uring a meteoric rise, David Petraeus became the champion of the “COINdinistas,” or the soldiers, analysts, and policy-makers dedicated to improving the Army and Marine DCorps’ capabilities at counterinsurgency and nation-building. In 2012, Petraeus resigned as head of the Central Intelligence Agency. His fall from grace occurred for private reasons, but it nevertheless symbolized the decline of the COINdinistas and the backlash against nation-build- ing in the United States. In recent years, American elites and the public have exhibited growing disapproval of the war in Afghanistan, and increasing opposition toward the idea of stabilization operations as a core function of the military. The backlash against nation-building will significantly shape the coming era of American foreign policy, by heightening the pressure to withdraw from Afghanistan, deterring the United States from involvement in foreign civil wars, and encouraging a shift in military training and planning away from stabilization operations toward conventional inter-state conflicts. Despite the backlash, however, Washington will almost certainly end up nation-building again. And the aversion to stabilization missions may impede the military’s capacity to carry out “non-tradi- tional” roles, and heighten the odds of being drawn into a prolonged quagmire. COIN-Star In the course of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the star of the COINdinistas ascended in the U.S. military, as nation-building became prioritized as a central task for the Army and Marine Corps. Nation-building refers to the use of force to construct a state and create order within another country, including: peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, training of indigenous secu- rity forces, counter-terrorism, and counterinsurgency.
    [Show full text]
  • Islamic State Vs. Al-Qaeda
    NEW INTERNATIONAL AMERICA SECURITY DAVEED GARTENSTEIN-ROSS, JASON FRITZ, BRIDGET MORENG AND NATHANIEL BARR ISLAMIC STATE VS. AL-QAEDA STRATEGIC DIMENSIONS OF A PATRICIDAL CONFLICT DECEMBER 2015 About the Authors Daveed Gartenstein-Ross’s academic Nathaniel Barr is an analyst at Valens and professional work has focused on Global whose work focuses on violent non- understanding the evolving role of violent state actors in North Africa, the Sahel, and non-state actors in the world, with a the Horn of Africa. Barr has co-authored concentration in al-Qaeda and the Islamic four monographs, including a report State. He is a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense examining the Islamic State’s propaganda strategy, and of Democracies and the chief executive officer of the has been published in Foreign Affairs, Foreign Policy, and consulting firm Valens Global. An adjunct professor Jamestown Foundation’s Militant Leadership Monitor. at Georgetown University and lecturer at the Catholic Before coming to Valens Global, Barr worked as a research University of America, Gartenstein-Ross is the author assistant with the Western Jihadism Project, a research or volume editor of nineteen books and monographs, project funded by the National Institute of Justice that including Bin Laden’s Legacy, which Georgetown explores radicalization and salafi jihadist networks in the University terrorism scholar Bruce Hoffman described West. Barr received his bachelor’s degree from Brandeis as “one of the few books to probe systematically [al- University. Qaeda’s] strategy and its effect on the U.S. and its allies.” Gartenstein-Ross has also been published widely in the academic and popular press, including in The New Jason Fritz is a senior researcher at York Times, The Washington Post, The Atlantic, Foreign Valens Global and a doctoral student in the Policy, and the peer-reviewed journals Studies in Conflict Department of Justice, Law and Criminology and Terrorism and Terrorism and Political Violence.
    [Show full text]