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C-uppsats Statsvetenskapliga institutionen, Uppsala universitet Ideal or non-ideal theory?

The challenge of Charles W. Mills

Antal ord: 13 951 Sidor: 31 Julius Lagerlöf Handledare: Mats Lundström 2020-12-29

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Table of contents

1. Introduction ...... 2 2. Background ...... 2 2.1 Rawls ideal method ...... 3 2.2 The non-ideal approach...... 5 2.3 Contemporary critiques of ideal theory ...... 6 3. Purpose statement and research question ...... 7 4. Methodology ...... 7 4.1 Reconstructing an argument ...... 7 4.2 Logical validity, empirical and normative feasibility ...... 8 4.3 Limitations ...... 9 5. Material ...... 9 6. Mills argument ...... 9 6.1 Mills distinctions ...... 10 6.2 Ideal theory as exclusion of the actual ...... 12 6.3 Ideal theory as ...... 13 6.4 Non-ideal theory ...... 14 6.5 Summary ...... 16 7. Discussion and critique ...... 17 7.1 Problems with Mills distinctions ...... 17 7.2 Deriving normative ideals ...... 19 7.3 Differences in kind or differences in degree? ...... 21 7.4 The efficacy of ideal theory ...... 22 7.5 Mills ideological critique ...... 24 7.6 The danger of relativism ...... 27 8. Conclusion ...... 30 9. References ...... 31

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1. Introduction Recently political philosophers have begun to critically examine their own methodology. The problematic that stimulate this “methodological turn” is the feeling that political theory does not sufficiently engage with real and does little to improve actual circumstances in society (Valentini, 2012, s. 1). The mainstream, and largely Rawlsian, approach stand accused of being too abstract and too far removed from actual conditions and injustices. The discourse surrounding these methodological issues and its consequences has become known as the debate between ideal and non-ideal theory.

The relationship between the ideal and the non-ideal is a long-standing issue in many areas of . For mainstream political theory, however, it is largely a question over methodology. Here the challenge by non-idealists is significant because of the widespread use and importance of ideal content, particularly in the liberal tradition. An interrogation of ideal theory would be an interrogation of the established methodology of the entire discipline.

One of the more damning and controversial critiques sees ideal theory as ideological in the pejorative sense of upholding certain (illegitimate) power relations. Indeed, in his seminal paper “Ideal theory as ideology” Charles W. Mills constructs the ideal frameworks of contemporary political theory as a false consciousness emerging out of masculine, white Anglo perspectivity and argues for an alternative non-ideal approach to political theory (Mills, 2005). This reflects the additional concern that the theoretical framework and philosophical methodology hitherto employed is maladaptive for guiding increasingly diverse populations towards a and ethical political order. Considering the importance of ideal content to political theory and its use by important thinkers such as this would constitute a major upset to the discipline. Mills argument, therefore, requires careful examination.

2. Background In the general history of philosophy, it is difficult to pinpoint the origin of the concept of the ideal. However, is, as with so many things, often cited as an important progenitor. Famously his theory of the forms posits perfect ideal forms of all things by means of which they are defined and evaluated. A perfect circle, for example, has a precise definition as a shape in which all points are equidistant to the center. Such an ideal circle can then be found to have very precise mathematical 3 qualities common to all such forms regardless of time, place and even what consciousness, or machine, is interacting with it.

However, as Nietzsche pointed out, there are no perfect circles in . This raises the question of the relationship between the ideal and the non-ideal or empirical world. For Plato this relationship between the ideal form and the empirical world we inhabit is one between the perfect and the imperfect. Every circular shape share in the ideal form of the perfect circle but is flawed in some way. We can perceive and evaluate these flaws because of our of the ideal form (the circle in this case) which is imperfectly instantiated in nature. By cross-referencing empirical things with their ideal forms, we can attain knowledge of how well they approximate their ideals, how they could be improved and what their flaws are. However, for political theory, the true relevance of platonic forms lies not in their metaphysical or geometric application but in normative societal ideals. Famously, in The , describes an ideal city arrived at in thought by philosophical investigation. This method of positing ideal states, arguably inaugurated by Plato, is still, in its essence, at work today. We can, through philosophy, gain knowledge of the ideal society, ideal citizens and the ideal forms of such as , beauty, and goodness. If we know the ideal state of a just society, we can “apply” it to the actual societies we live in to gauge their level of justice and posit a goal towards which we should strive to become “more just”.

2.1 Rawls ideal method In contemporary political theory the notion of ideal theory is contrasted and compared with non- ideal theory. However, despite attempts at thematizing the issue such as Marceta (2019), Valentini (2012) and Stemplowska (2008) there is little consensus on what exactly the debate is about. One thing that seems clear is that the notion of ideal theory most relevant to the contemporary debate was first brought up by Rawls (1999, s. 8 & 215). Therefore, taking account of Rawls use of ideal theory will help provide some clarification. For Rawls ideal theory entails the use of abstract and categories which help orient, guide and assess empirical reality. This is reminiscent of Plato’s ideals, although there are important differences. For Rawls, an ideal society1 is a

1 Rawls ideal is laid out in his famous book A Theory of Justice (Rawls, 1999). In this book Rawls argues that a just society would fulfil several principles in descending priority. The structure of “lexical” priority is such that in the case of conflict between any two principles the higher one wins out. The first is sometimes called the “ principle” and guarantees equal access to fundamental such as of expressions, suffrage, due process etc. This has absolute priority for Rawls and cannot be infringed upon. The second principle is that of equal opportunity which merits meritocratic selection for societal positions. However, due to the morally arbitrary distribution of natural talents that influence performance in such competitive selection Rawls introduces the third principle. The third principle is called the “difference principle” and holds that socioeconomic inequality is only permissible if it benefits those who are worst off. Rawls argues that this 4 counterfactual to actual circumstances by means of which they are judged. For example, we could identify the ideal of non-violence, as a condition in which no one is the victim of intentional physical harm at the hands of another, and subsequently juxtapose this ideal state with the current condition of society. Doing so grants us a scale of reference from which to judge the level of violence as well as a potential state of reality to emulate or avoid.

Rawls considered this ideal type of orientation as a necessary propaedeutic exercise before we could address non-ideal, actual or empirical questions properly. In his model there are two primary differences between ideal and non-ideal theory. First ideal theory assumes “strict compliance” of agents to the “principles of justice”. This means that the realm of partial compliance where we encounter things like crime, antisocial behaviour and non-cooperation falls under the purview of non-ideal theory. This also includes measures to curb such issues of compliance including punishment and deterrence. Secondly, the Rawlsian ideal assumes “favourable circumstances” capable of sustaining liberal whereas non-ideal theory concerns itself with the actual obstacles to such circumstances. So, we have ideal theory as compliance and favourable conditions and non-ideal as dealing with issues of partial compliance and unfavourable conditions. Importantly Rawls attempts to be realistic in constructing his ideal assumptions. He is not engaged in utopian thinking but is rather abstracting from historical, social, political and economic obstacles in order to ensure greater generalizability. It is also important to note that Rawls is very aware of the space left to intuition when utilizing ideal theory to orient towards social goals and assessing the state of actual society. For Rawls ideal theory is then informative but not rigidly prescriptive. (Stemplowska & Swift, 2012, ss. 373-377).

Unlike the metaphysical connotations of Plato’s forms Rawls is much more “local” in his philosophical undertaking. He is highly aware of operating within a specific liberal tradition whilst working on models and theories that apply to contemporary democratic societies above all. Crucially for Rawls ideal theory is constrained by its empirical or actual feasibility. There is not a timeless hierarchy between the ideal and the non-ideal but a symbiotic relationship, not in any metaphysical sense, but as a methodology for political theory. This methodology is always and everywhere constructed with

system is better aligned with our moral intuitions than an ideal of only equality of opportunity. Additionally, Rawls provides a famous contractual dubbed the “veil of ignorance” or “original position”. In the original position we imagine all individuals in a state of total equality where we abstract their subjectivity from their socio-economic conditions and natural talents as well as their personal conceptions of the good. They are left in a state of radical equality, but their is intact. Rawls then pose the question, what society would they choose? He claims they would adopt a “maximin” strategy that is one where the worst-off have the maximum quality of life. Rawls thinks this is a powerful argument for his difference principle and lexical ordering.

5 the specific goal in mind of aiding political action. Ideal theory is a pragmatic tool to guide and inform non-ideal theory not an end in itself. Plato is seen by many to inaugurate because of his understanding of forms as grounding every kind of truth. This allows him to provide a holistic theory of reality that includes both and ontology and an epistemology to gain access to the truth of the forms thus making metaphysics as a discipline possible. Rawls has no such holistic ambitions, but he is arguably engaged in an epistemological undertaking reminiscent of Platonic theory in his attempt to structure moral intuitions into a stable system.

What Rawls is trying to overcome is dubbed by him as “intuitionism”. The of “Intuitionism” is that our moral feelings and impulses are either too complex, or simply impossible, to be modelled into a coherent system of priority. Rawls project is to nevertheless attempt to build such a system. As he says: “The only way to dispute intuitionism is to set forth the recognizably ethical criteria that account for the weights which, in our considered judgments, we think appropriate to give to the plurality of principles. A refutation of intuitionism consists in presenting the sort of constructive criteria that is said not to exist.” (Rawls, 1999, s. 35). However, unlike a more Platonic conception, Rawls is initially agnostic about the existence or feasibility of such a system (Kymlicka, 2002, ss. 52- 55). Nevertheless, much like Plato attempted to bring order to the disparate claims of the sophists of his time Rawls wants to bring order to the competing ethical claims and impulses of today. In both thinkers there can be identified a desire for ethical unity and structure, away from relativism and particularism and towards shared ideals and shared projects. The use of “ideal theory”, despite the many differences between Plato and Rawls, can be understood as both the means and the answer to this perennial problematic. Subsequent critics in the discourse of political theory would largely take Rawls and his method as paradigmatic of the ideal theory they wish to assess even though, in principle, the issue is over the methodology as such and not Rawls specifically.

2.2 The non-ideal approach This ideal approach can then be contrasted with the non-ideal or “empirical approach” tracing its methodological roots back, at least, to . The non-ideal is empirical in the sense of beginning with an investigation of the actual circumstances and then constructing theories or models to describe these observations. These theories or models generalize from empirical information and are in some sense also ideal because of their abstract nature. The model itself is not empirical but it is timeless and can be thought of as an abstract object that remains the same regardless of who thinks it. The crucial difference to ideal theory is that it doesn’t refer to a perfect form of whatever is the target of inquiry. For example, we might imagine a political investigation of an ancient Greek city state which holds all sorts of peculiarities and idiosyncrasies. Rather than beginning with positing an ideal form of the city-state the non-ideal approach collects information of the actual workings of the 6 singular city under investigation. The non-idealist then abstracts a descriptive model from this empirical information. This model will hold simplified assumptions, it will not account for every single minute detail of the city, but it will attempt to derive general principles about how the city functions. The non-idealist is interested in, and attempt to describe, the imperfect reality without theorizing about the ideal realm. It is a more “empirical” approach and it might also be called “realistic” in contrast to “idealistic”.

What this “empirical” or “non-ideal” approach seem to lack is an ethical epistemology. If our method is purely descriptive in that it describes, and models empirical reality then where does our ethical goals come from? For Aristotle there may be an inherent telos in all things that can be discovered by empirical investigation, but this is not necessarily a popular position in contemporary philosophy, even among non-idealists. Barring the discovery of a telos there is nothing in a description of society which lets us know what to do or what to work towards. Political theory is sometimes described as “” but how can ethics be a purely descriptive enterprise? If we accept that doing politics and improving society needs information about what to do, i.e. ethical goals then non-ideal theorists need to explain how one can derive an “ought” from an “is”. If not, that then how is normativity possible without positing ideal states which serve as goals and measurement orientation as with the utopian society in Plato’s republic?

2.3 Contemporary critiques of ideal theory Contemporary critics of ideal theory generally question the practical use of idealized assumptions by arguing that they do little to inform us how to act in a non-ideal world. Rawls ideal of strict compliance is argued to be unrealistic and lacking prescriptions for actual circumstances with partial compliance. In such conditions there can be shown to exist ethical dilemmas which seem to warrant (in)action that is not in line with Rawls normative framework. As for Rawls realistic constrains on ideal circumstances they have come under attack both from those who consider them too “utopian” and those who consider them too fact bound. The latter advance a platonic conception of ideals as timeless concepts that can be intended by different individuals across time and space. Under this “Platonism” political theory shifts from a mostly normative discipline to a descriptive exercise concerned with identifying timeless . The former instead believe Rawls to be too idealistic and can properly be considered “non-idealists”. Their position holds a plethora of critiques including the exhortation to devalue or even abandon certain abstract ideals such as justice, shifting concern from ideals to non-ideal issues like security and material conditions and modelling imperfect human traits like greed and resentment. Rawls assumption that ideal modelling is a necessary precursor to normative theory has also been questioned. These critics argue that identifying where justice is lacking does not require a holistic 7 model of a just society and are perhaps misguiding. In response to all these objections there exists a broadly “Rawlsian” defence sometimes granting the points of the critics, sometimes qualifying them and sometimes rejecting them entirely (Valentini, 2012).

A lot of these critiques are echoed in Mills. Under his pejorative notion of ideal theory it is defined as “the reliance on idealization to the exclusion, or at least marginalization, of the actual” (Mills, 2005, s. 168). This highlight Mills ideological critique in which ideal theory is not a neutral method but an interpretative framework concealing important parts of political reality. As shall be seen, Mills agrees with the general critique of ideal theory as being too abstract and far removed from actual social issues. This removal is then what is examined as ideological and its social basis in minority of white, middle-to-high income men is posited as a critical explanation. Mills line of argument is found in several disciplines including gender studies, literary theory, black and indigenous studies, cultural and media studies and sociology. The importance of this debate for the future of academic studies in social science, philosophy and the humanities underscore the relevance of the type of argumentative critique provided by this paper.

3. Purpose statement and research question My purpose statement is to critically examine Mills critique of ideal theory and his defence of non- ideal theory in order to highlight the strength and weaknesses of his arguments. Given Mills seminal contributions to the debate I also hope that a critical explication of his argumentation will generalize to a better understanding of the respective advantages and disadvantages of both methods.

My guiding research question is: What are some of the most important strengths and weaknesses of Mills arguments?

4. Methodology Answering the research question will require a critical examination of Mills argumentation. This is done through reconstructing Mills argument and then evaluating its logical validity and empirical feasibility (Beckman, 2005, s. 57). I will also evaluate Mills arguments according to their normative feasibility.

4.1 Reconstructing an argument Reconstructing an argument is a complicated and precise process. Fortunately there exist a variety of guides such as Bowell & Kemp (2015) and Beckman (2005) that provide instructions and advice on the subject. The former argues for a syllogistic format, also known as the “standard form”, in which arguments are schematized as a number of premises supporting a conclusion. This has the advantage 8 of logical clarity but also the potential disadvantage of losing linguistic nuance. In an attempt to achieve both clarity and nuance this paper will combine standard form arguments with normal text.

One needs to read carefully to distinguish the actual argument from mere emotional appeals, buzzwords, jargon as well as other extraneous material, argumentative errors and rhetorical ploys (Bowell & Kemp, 2015, ss. 28-59). At the same time, the principle of charity, in which the best version of all reasonable interpretations of an argument is chosen, should be adhered to (Bowell & Kemp, 2015, ss. 66-69). This paper is not an attempt to “win” an argument against Mills but to contribute to our understanding of his reasoning and its implications. This brings us to one of the most important tasks for argumentative critiques, and philosophy in general, namely the practice of making explicit what is implicit. All arguments have some implicit premise(s) which isn’t stated explicitly but which may be crucial to its evaluation (Bowell & Kemp, 2015, ss. 141-146). In fact, there is often a lot of surrounding argumentation, from the use of ambiguous words, to implications or highly contextualized meanings. Reconstructing an argument is largely a process of making such things explicit and understanding their proper relations.

When encountering vague words, the distinction between primary and secondary connotation might be helpful. The primary connotation of a word are the referents which always fall under that word, for example, every -made structure intended for habitation falls under the word “house”. Secondary connotations are things which are thought to generally fall under the word, but which logically might be absent. In the case of the word “house”, the secondary connotations might be things like windows, central heating, kitchen, beds and chimney. All these things are associated with the word “house” but there are, or might be, houses which lack any number, or indeed all, of these (Bowell & Kemp, 2015, ss. 35-37).

4.2 Logical validity, empirical and normative feasibility Here logical validity simply refers to whether the conclusion follow from the premises (given that they are true), this can be tested by asking if there is a counterfactual in which the argumentative premises are true, but the conclusion is false. If there is no such counterfactual the argument is said to be “deductively valid” (Bowell & Kemp, 2015, ss. 71-73). I take empirical feasibility to mean the investigation of the truth- of premises but also the extent to which they probabilistically support the conclusion. If the probability, given our limited information, that the premises support the conclusion is greater than 0,5 but less than 1 it is said to be “inductively forceful” (Bowell & Kemp, 2015, ss. 103-111). In the text I will not quantify probability but merely argue about whether a premise is likely or not. 9

Assessing the logical validity and empirical and normative feasibility will largely be an internal critique following Beckman’s definition of internal critique as one that doesn’t accept any normative claims external to Mills text to perform it (Beckman, 2005, s. 71). An external critique subsequently does rely on external normative premises. Some issues in Mills argumentation cannot, somewhat ironically, be revealed from within his normative framework. Hence, I will employ both internal and external critiques.

4.3 Limitations No text can be interpreted in isolation, but it is beyond this paper to account for all of Mills work in order to avoid misrepresentation. To compensate I have tried to be fair to Mills and give a charitable interpretation whenever there was ambiguity. Whilst the purpose of this paper is to assess Mills arguments, I hope the results will generalize to similar critiques of ideal theory. In my discussion I have articulated several counterarguments to Mills. However, it’s quite possible these counterarguments have, or could be, addressed in other of Mills writings or by different authors. It was not possible to provide a complete survey of all the relevant contributions, but Mills paper was a strategic pick due to its impact and, relatively comprehensive, critique.

5. Material For the purpose of this paper I will refer to Mills original article and material from the relevant discourse surrounding it including Stemplowska & Swift (2012), Marceta (2019), Stemplowska (2008) and Valentini (2012). For overviews of political theory I am leaning on Kymlicka (2002) and for commentaries on ideology I have Mannheim (1936) who deals with the implications of our historical understanding of ideology and Eagleton (2007) that provides a more general and modern overview. I also utilize Rawls seminal text “A theory of Justice” for occasional reference. For methodology I am using Beckman (2005) and Bowell & Kemp (2015) both dealing explicitly with the practice of reconstructing and critiquing arguments.

6. Mills argument Mills motivations for adopting non-ideal methodology is laid out on page 166. He sees it as “being potentially universalist in its application” because it’s “able to address the many, if not all, of the concerns not only of women, but also of those of men as well as women, subordinated by class, race and the underdevelopment of the south… while avoiding particularism and relativism.” Mirroring this is Mills critique of ideal theory as “obfuscatory” and “ideological”. However, there are important distinctions laid out by Mill in the following pages. He wants to delimit different senses of the word “ideal”. Firstly, he considers the sense of ideal as a normative or prescriptive category. While Mills has no objection against normative ideals as such, he will object against certain content of these 10 normative ideals. The other sense of ideal is ideal-as-model. This modelling can be constructed in two ways. First it can be descriptive as in an empirically informed approximate abstraction describing the essential features of something, let’s call it “P”. This would be analogous to the “empirical” or “non- ideal” methodology discussed earlier. The other way of modelling P is as what Mills calls “ideal-as- idealized-model”. What this ostensibly tautological naming entails is a conception of ideal models as systems considered under perfect circumstances. It is, for example, possible to model behaviour in perfect vacuum, movement on a frictionless plane or price in a perfectly competitive market even though no such thing exists. In the realm of politics this would entail attributing to agents and institutions capacities and functions that deviate from the actual state of society and citizens. Here Mills takes aim at both of Rawls core ideal assumptions: perfect compliance and favourable circumstances.

6.1 Mills distinctions Mills distinctions require some nuance in thinking. We have noted how he distinguishes the use of ideal in a normative sense. What Mills is trying to get at here is that all ethical theory, which includes political theory, entail value judgements, in other words it is normative. Mills is simply not willing to identify the use of normative ideals with ideal theory as such, that would make it indispensable to all ethics, including political theory, and Mills is trying to show that is not the case. That is why he separates normative ideals from the rubric of ideal theory. We have seen how, for Plato, normative ideals are understood in a strong metaphysical sense with ideals existing as the highest form of truth. Mills and contemporary non-idealists are uncomfortable with such grand assertions but what is important is that Mills grants that normative ideals, or simply goals, is always in use, even if implicitly, when doing ethics. All ethical theory, including political theory, use normative ideals in this sense. This is trivially true for Mills and his critique does not target normative ideals as such. In summary then, Mills separates normative ideals, that is ethical goals, from the rubric of “ideal theory”. His real critique of ideal theory will concern the other sense of “ideal”.

The second sense of ideal-as-model is more complex and gets to the heart of the debate between ideal and non-ideal theory. Ideal modelling, by which Mills simply refers to any abstract model of a system or object, is distinguished into descriptive and idealized versions. Let’s consider the descriptive first and let’s refer to the object or system being modelled as “P”. The ideal-as-descriptive is roughly analogous to the non-ideal empirical method of modelling described earlier. A descriptive model is a representation of P’s “crucial aspects” that is its “essential nature” and its “basic dynamics” that is “how it actually works” (Mills, 2005, s. 166). Of course, any model does not completely instantiate its target. A descriptive model does not entail everything about its target, it is 11 to some extent, a heuristic. When trying to describe the dynamics of parliamentary negotiations, for example, not everything is included whether that be due to complexity, ideology, irrelevance etc.

Such a descriptive model of a parliament will be based on empirical observations and abstract from them to what is taken to be the most important aspects and how they interact. Going back to Plato’s republic we saw how Socrates posited an ideal society, a kind of utopia. If Socrates was building a descriptive model of society it would look quite different. A descriptive model would take stock of the way a society actually functions through empirical investigation. It would not be utopian and, crucially, it would not be normative. In describing how a society seems to function there is no normative implication. It is not necessarily good or bad that society functions the way it does, it merely is what it is. What a descriptive model does then is observing P, identifying P’s crucial aspects and their basic dynamics and then creating a model that describes what those are and how they work.

It must be understood that a descriptive model is imperfect and may be limited in scope. A parliament may be found to negotiate using bribes, threats and involving all kinds of personal pettiness, and power games. It may also be that one parliament functions quite differently from another and that there is no common model that describes all of them that isn’t simplified to the point of triviality. Nevertheless, such imperfections and idiosyncrasies must be modelled if they are relevant to describing the crucial aspects and basic dynamics of P. It is debatable then if descriptive models should still be considered “ideal” in any meaningful sense. They do share many ideal characteristics including abstraction, not being reducible to any single instantiation and atemporality but they are also local, subject to change and not normative. Nevertheless, Mills considers them to be a type of ideal model.

Moving on to the “ideal-as-idealized” model this correspond more thoroughly to what might be considered “ideal”. An idealized model is “an exemplar of how P should work. And obviously the should here will in general not necessarily be a moral “should,” but may involve norms of a technical functionalist kind … or just limiting assumptions convenient for the purposes of mathematization and calculation…” (Mills, 2005, s. 167). So, for Mills the idealized model is the perfect form of P. In the case of parliamentary negotiation an idealized model would ignore imperfections such as bribery and threats to focus on how a parliament should work in theory. This would entail, for example, viewing politicians as democratic representatives without individual agendas following the rules and regulations to negotiate via official channels in good . In the case of geometric forms, it would entail considering a perfect circle where every point is equidistant form the center and where the area always equal pi times the square radius. As opposed to an imperfect circle found in nature or in 12 an art class. The idealized model is normative but as we’ve seen this normative character needn’t be moral. A perfect circle or triangle is not necessarily to be conceived of as more morally good than an imperfect circle or crooked triangle, and yet their perfect forms represent an idealized model of such a shape. However, in political theory, and as to what is relevant for the debate over ideal and non- ideal theory, we are considering societal ideals. These are certainly normative in the sense of being desirable and “good”. Strictly speaking, perhaps one could devise an ideally just society without also claiming that ideal to be desirable but that would seem quite strange. Anyway, it is not something done by Rawls and other ideal theorists, they certainly argue for the desirability of their idealized models.

If the descriptive model is reminiscent of empiricism, going back to Aristotle, then the idealized model is reminiscent of Platonic forms. Obviously neither Mills, nor most political theorists, are doing metaphysics but there is a resemblance between the idealized model as the perfect instantiation of P and the idea of a platonic form of P which every empirical P imperfectly resemble. With that said the lack of metaphysical thinking in Mills should be stressed. He is interested in methodology not timeless forms. The descriptive model is simply that, a description, an attempt to describe the most important aspects and working of P. An idealized model is how P should be like in a perfect world. Both are methodologies and Mills stays firmly in the realm of method, he never strays into metaphysics. For him descriptive models are going to be associated with non-ideal theory and the idealized model with ideal theory. The main problem with ideal theory is a preoccupation with these idealized models. To use geometric forms as a metaphor, Rawls and other ideal theorists are building theories and models with perfect circles, squares and triangles, all the while ignoring the real world in which there are no such perfect shapes. The ideal theorists have his head in the clouds and is naively concerned only with perfect and abstract models thus failing to pay attention, or even to see, the real problems of actual society. However, as we shall see, it is not merely quaint naiveté that keeps the ideal theorist in his realm of imaginary idealizations. For Mills this methodology is ideological and come with very real harmful consequences for those from the imperfect flaws of actual society. This is why Mills defines ideal theory as “the reliance on idealization to the exclusion, or at least marginalization, of the actual” (Mills, 2005, s. 168).

6.2 Ideal theory as exclusion of the actual So, Mills is highly sceptical of the practical use of ideal-as-idealized-model and is, perhaps surprisingly, accepting of both normative ideals and ideal-as-descriptive. He is careful to “rescue” the use of abstractions and (descriptive) models from the methodological conception of “ideal theory” which, as stated, he distinguishes as “the reliance on idealization to the exclusion, or at least 13 marginalization, of the actual”. According to Mills there are several problematic assumption or concepts utilized by ideal methodology that affect such “marginalization”:

• Ideal social ontology which attributes atomistic and undifferentiated qualities to human individuals thus “abstracting away from relations of structural domination…”. • Idealized capacities including rationality and . • “Silence on oppression” meaning not considering historical, actual, circumstances. In other words, the absence of descriptive modelling of actual circumstances that are “oppressive”. • Ideal social institutions conceptualized in ideal-as-idealized models i.e. functioning perfectly. • An idealized “cognitive sphere” not considering the distortions of ideology but instead presuming a “social transparency with cognitive obstacles minimized”. • Strict compliance where Rawls ideal assumption of perfect compliance is presented as emblematic.

These methodological characteristics serve to abstract away from the actual political circumstances which Mills thinks should be the real object of ethical consideration. It is by way of such assumptions as those above that ideal theorists “abstract away from realities crucial to our comprehension of the actual workings of injustice”. For Mills, if political theory is applied ethics the subject to which ethics is applied must be empirical and experienced circumstances rather than idealized models without correspondence in the actual. For those “oppressed” the actual historical realities are the main problematics that motivate political engagement, but it is precisely this type of historical content that is put aside when doing ideal theory.

6.3 Ideal theory as ideology We’ve seen that Mills grants the use of normative ideals and descriptive models and on page 171 this is broadened to include the conception of other ideals such as an “ideally just society”. We’re told non-ideal theory “can and does appeal to an ideal also”. While these uses can, allegedly, be appropriated there is another conception of the use of ideal theory Mills reject. The descriptive conception of ethics in which the ambition of ideal theory is to describe objective ideal content regardless of its feasibility is not to be conceived as ethics at all. The classical goal of ethics, to improve society, means that “ought” must imply “can”. Instead ideal theory is an ideology “a distortional complex of , values, norms, and beliefs that reflects the nonrepresentative interests and experiences of a small minority of the national population” (Mills, 2005, s. 172). The minority in questions turn out to be “middle-to-upper-class white males” who have, without realizing it, constructed ideal theory to reflect their nonrepresentative experience of reality. Not only is this 14 historically verifiable but is borne out of a power analysis showing that bourgeois white men are the only ones who benefit from the influence of ideal theory and its distortive effects.

6.4 Non-ideal theory After the negative critique of ideal theory Mills moves on to a positive defence of non-ideal theory. The first issue is that of particularism and relativism. While Mills is sympathetic to group-based particularism, which holds that the differing social positions of groups cannot be reduced to a single universal perspective of reality, he also sees dangers with this position. Putatively objective abstractions may be rescued by leaning on Mills earlier distinction between ideal-as-descriptive and ideal-as-idealized. What is required, according to Mills, is not the wholesale abandonment of objective categories but the incorporation of elements of identity that constitute the perceived reality of groups into our abstract descriptive models. “The problem is that they are deficient abstractions of the ideal-as-idealized-model kind, not that they are abstractions tout court” (Mills, 2005, s. 173). Concepts like “patriarchy”, “white supremacy” and ” would be examples of abstract concept taking group position into account to descriptively “illuminate rather than obfuscate the reality of different kinds of subordination.”. Here Mills is considering concepts at a deeper level. Mills agrees with Kant that concepts are “necessary to apprehend things, both in the moral and empirical realm”. We all use concepts or categories to structure how our reality is perceived but unlike Kant Mills thinks that there are many possible combinations of concepts, or categories, that can be used to structure reality. If our concepts don’t match then we may perceive reality quite differently and any shared sociality will be difficult, or even impossible. What is meant by “objective categories” then are concepts that do not succumb to relativism but hold the same meaning for all humans. It’s important for Mills to be able to state that “objectively, women and people of colour are indeed oppressed” (Mills, 2005, s. 174). Doing so require a common ground of meaning where “oppression” does indeed apply to the situation of women and minority ethnic groups. It is for this purpose and in this sense that Mills defends the use of “objective categories”. I have chosen to refer to this as “common categories” to avoid metaphysical connotations.

Without common categories, there is the danger of relativism which is highly undesirable for Mills. As stated, this is because it would undermine any claim of oppression. It also carries additional problems such as obstructing the possibility of adjudication of differences between groups and it risks having emancipatory movements ghettoising themselves within “a self-circumscribed intellectual space, rather than challenging the broader mapping of that space.”.

So, an important way non-ideal theory better approximates reality is by taking group-based differences into account. While ideal theory structures agents to be essentially featureless the non- 15 ideal method will lean on the “elaborate meta-theories” of Marxism, feminism and critical race theory to map “how systems of domination negatively affect the ideational.” (Mills, 2005, s. 174). The need for these meta-theories stem from the historical and social understanding lacking in philosophers like Kant who doesn’t recognize the “huge range of possible conceptual systems”. We should look to marginalized groups to tell us new things of reality that are only visible from their social standpoint. Concepts like “patriarchy” and ”white supremacy” abstract but they do not idealize because “they map accurately (at least arguably) crucial realities…”. The failure of ideal theory to incorporate these new concepts betray the obfuscatory nature of this system, according to Mills.

Even in the realm of normative concepts is ideal theory problematic. First a normative concept may be “illegitimate” (if it contributes to “oppression”), secondly there may be concern with the way a concept is applied and, third, it may serve to exclude, or divert from, other viable normative concepts. Therefore, certain concepts may need to be jettisoned (Mills brings “purity” as an example) or reconceptualized (here Mills example is “”).

Finally Mills wants to show that the advantages of non-ideal theory cannot be derived by merely applying ideal theory to empirical reality. For Mills this approach fails not in principle but in practice as the “cognitive rethinking required” is too fundamental and obscured by the ideological workings of the conceptual-theoretical frameworks at our disposal. The evidence of these limitations is in the failure to incorporate and address issues of gender, race, class, culture etc. Additionally, empirical content is clearly exterior to ideal theory and yet is required to achieve actual equality and justice. Ideal notions of equal rights offer de jure equality but not de facto. In the case of women, they have nominally been granted equal rights but face actual obstacles (such as pregnancy) which are abstracted away from when modelling ideal conditions. The argument that the insights of non-ideal theory can be attained by merely applying ideal theory properly is analogous to this situation. Hegemonic concepts and argumentative patterns reflect their society and will have the inequalities of said society “baked in”.

Amending these conceptual structures requires the intervention of the actual as “when Susan Moller Okin uses the original position, a Rawlsian construct, to take the nonideal family into account the result is not (somehow) Rawl’s “real view” instead “What is doing the work are the real general facts about human society”. While Rawls pays lip service to the real pressing concerns of the actual political sphere these concerns nevertheless are “endlessly deferred” from consideration under his ideal framework. Evidently ideal theory is incapable of addressing these issues but as we’ve seen, for Mills, it is also obstacle in that endeavour. In these ways non-ideal theory is superior not only as a 16 descriptive model of society but as affecting real change “by of realistically recognizing the obstacles to their acceptance and implementation” (Mills, 2005, s. 181).

6.5 Summary In summary ideal theory is understood by Mills as a kind of methodology which privileges the use of idealized models of society to the exclusion of descriptive models focusing on the actual state of social reality. In effect ideal theorists deal with perfect models far divorced from how society actually is. For Mills this makes ideal theory constitute an ideology which upholds illegitimate power relations. The prevalence of ideal theory, which deals with unrealistic abstractions, mean that political theory excludes non-ideal actual problems from consideration. The actual problems of society, which are abstracted away from idealized models, are forgotten, ignored or missed altogether. The people hit the hardest are those “marginalized groups” most exposed to non-ideal circumstances. In contrast the privileged group of bourgeois white men benefit from the omission of marginalized perspectives. Mills sees ideal theory as emerging out of the privileged gaze of such men. Their own experiences of social reality are reflected in the presuppositions of ideal theory. Therefore, ideal theory is not merely a methodological mistakenness but a power structure that upholds the privilege of a certain group in society to the detriment of others. As an ideology it structures the perception of reality to exclude the non-ideal and thereby also the oppression of marginalized groups.

For clarity let’s rewrite some of Mills arguments by paraphrasing them as an argument-chain using premises and conclusions in standard form:

P1: Ideal content can be distinguished into ideal-as-descriptive and ideal-as-idealized.

P2: Out of these only ideal-as-descriptive concerns itself with actual circumstances.

P3: What separates ideal theory from non-ideal theory is a reliance on ideal-as-idealized while avoiding ideal-as-descriptive.

C: Ideal theory doesn’t concern itself with actual circumstances.

Mills also distinguishes ideal-as-normative but the claim that ethical and political theory use normative ideals is trivially true according to Mills and has little bearing on his argument against ideal theory. The next argument concerns the understanding of ideal theory as ideological:

P1: An ideology is a set of conceptual tools and social patterns that privilege and reflect a dominant group in society.

P2: Ideal theory privileges and reflects bourgeois white men. 17

P3: are unfair and lead to bad outcomes.

C: Ideal theory is an ideology, and this is unfair and lead to bad outcomes.

The third premise may seem superfluous and is, indeed, implicitly assumed by Mills but it’s important to leave this explicit for the sake of critique.

There are more arguments and claims made by Mills but these two are the ones best served by the explication of standard form.

7. Discussion and critique

7.1 Problems with Mills distinctions What is to be included under the umbrella of “ideal theory”? Mills would limit ideal theory only to the “ideal-as-idealized” and define ideal theory as the “reliance on idealization to the exclusion, or at least, marginalization of the actual”. Here the understanding of ideal theory as exclusionary and marginalizing is already contained in the definition. However, for Rawls, ideal theory does interact with the actual and is constrained by it. As we’ve seen Rawls does attempt to be realistic when constructing his ideal models, an approach that doesn’t fit neatly into Mills distinction between ideal- as-idealized contra ideal-as-descriptive. Rawls realistic ideals are constrained by actual circumstances and yet provide idealized models that serve to orient political action. Rawls does posit an “ideal social ontology” with “strict compliance”, an “idealized cognitive sphere” etc. but this is done under realistic constraints thus taking care that the idealized models are realistically achievable. The actual is of course “marginalized” to the extent that ideal theory isn’t a model of a particular historical society, but this is intentional to produce a general model of a just society and hardly “ideological”.

While Mills extracts normative and descriptive ideals from ideal theory their use is clearly intended by Rawls. As noted by Stemplowska and Swift the point of ideal theory is twofold: to identify the objective of non-ideal theory (which deals with the imperfect reality) and to assess the severity and urgency of injustices (Stemplowska & Swift, 2012, ss. 376-377). So, for Rawls, ideal theory is intended to inform and guide the actual, it is also supposed to consider realistic constraints. The idealized assumptions, which ostensibly exclude the actual, are designed to aid political action under non-ideal circumstances precisely by their very nature of being ideal. This doesn’t seem to fit Mills definition of ideal theory as “excluding or marginalizing the actual” very well. Seeing as Rawls is the paradigmatic ideal theorist this does cast doubt on the accuracy of Mills definition. It also seems to be unclear, or even arbitrary, what counts as “excluding or marginalizing”. Clearly Rawls abstracts away from actual 18 circumstances but as we’ve seen he does so in order to help non-ideal theory better deal with those very circumstances. Is this an “exclusion” or “marginalization”? If so, it seems like an unsophisticated charge that fails to take the synergistic relationship between ideal and non-ideal theory into account.

The usefulness or even accuracy of Mills distinction between ideal-as-descriptive and ideal-as- idealized is also unclear. It doesn’t seem obvious that many political theorists can be shown to utilize either one or the other. As seen above, in the case of Rawls, the distinction seems to destroy more nuance in analysing methodology than it creates. It also raises the question of whether the descriptive and idealized models are different in kind or are rather better reconceptualized as a spectrum of idealization. We can move to the idealized model from the descriptive by mentally extrapolating the circular character of an imperfect circle into a perfect one. Similarly, we can imagine the descriptive and non-ideal by thinking of deviations from our idealized models. If both models exist on a spectrum where any model can be more or less ideal, depending on how many ideal assumptions are incorporated, it seems Mills isn’t necessarily objecting to ideal theory as such but rather to the excesses of idealization. Most importantly, we have seen Mills grant the use of normative ideals, descriptive models as well as ideals such as “an ideally just society” which appears quite reminiscent of idealized models as described by Mills himself. After all an idealized model is “an exemplar -in the case of how P should work” (Mills, 2005, s. 167) but how is that different from appealing to an “ideally just society”?

Let’s consider Mills own words: “All moral theory is ideal in the ideal-as-normative sense, but of course that’s not the sense at stake here… Nor is ideal theory just a model, which every theory requires… Nor does the simple appeal to an ideal (say, the picture of an ideally just society) necessarily make the theory ideal theory, since nonideal theory can and does appeal to an ideal also.” (Mills, 2005, ss. 170-71). So, if “non-ideal theory” utilizes normative ideals, ideal models and appeals to perfect ideals such an “ideally just society” then how is it different in kind from ideal theory? An argument could be made that Mills is granting the methodology of ideal theory in all but name and is merely arguing against its excesses. After all, if the distinction of ideal theory from non- ideal theory isn’t to be found in the formers exclusive use of some type of ideal content, we are left with answering whether it fits Mills definition of “excluding or marginalizing the actual”. However, the answer to this can only be subjective and up for debate. We’ve already seen the difficulty in assessing whether Rawls method fits this description. The obvious charge against Mills here is that he is not being nearly rigorous enough. It is of course entirely valid to object that a specific method errs too much on the side of only considering ideal conditions but when making a general argument against ideal theory as such this is insufficient. This is particularly true when arguing for a different 19 methodological alternative. One would expect this alternative to be different in kind, but as seen above I believe it fails to properly distinguish itself.

7.2 Deriving normative ideals Another problem is how to derive normative ideals if not by using ideal theory. Mills grants the use of normative ideals and the appeal to something that appears very much like idealized models but doesn’t explain where such ideals come from. If we refer to both of these as simply, “normative ideals”, for the sake of simplicity it appears Mills simply takes the form and existence of such normative ideals for granted. Take an “ideally just society”, for example, which Mills explicitly cites as an example of an ideal that can be posited by non-ideal theory. How can we learn what an ideally just society looks like without positing ideal assumptions, in other words by doing ideal theory? This is exactly Rawls point about the propaedeutic and epistemological use of ideal theory. It seems that “marginalizing the actual” is necessary to derive the ideals used to orient the theory that deals with such “actual” circumstances. If so, Mills non-ideal theory, to the extent that it appeals to normative ideals (which all ethical theory does according to Mills), is dependent and related to ideal theory in just the way Rawls claims it to be.

This normative aspect might be the crux of the problem. Mills cannot give this up because, as he says, all ethics is normative, but normativity cannot be derived from descriptive models only (barring a teleological understanding of nature). Mills attempts to solve this issue by separating normative ideals form the rubric of ideal theory, instead creating a rather forced distinction between descriptive models and idealized models. It would be more accurate to talk of descriptive models and normative ideals which may be more or less realistic. However, this would make the use of ideal theory clear and undermine Mills argument. As it stands Mills ends up granting the use of ideal theory in all but name.

However, whilst Mills doesn’t treat this issue it is arguably treated by Amartya Sen who claims that ideal theory is not necessary to guide political action under non-ideal circumstances. For Sen “all we need is the ability to compare the relative justice, and injustice, of the options available to us.” (Stemplowska & Swift, 2012, s. 377). So non-ideal theory can lean on a purely comparative approach as opposed to a transcendental one. In the face of any political issue where human agency has a role to play there are several feasible alternatives that present themselves. For example, are the taxes to be raised, lowered, kept as is or reformed some other way (for example so that the proportional burden for different groups change)? For Sen, when assessing this question, it is not necessary to know about the perfect ideal tax code. What is required is only to compare the different realistic alternatives to identify the best option. 20

This is ostensibly plausible but a comparison with Rawls approach reveal the limitations of Sen’s non- ideal approach. Firstly, it’s important to keep in mind that Rawls ideals are designed to be realistic in the sense of being achievable. However, for Rawls this achievability is meant in a long-term context at the limits of what is possible (Stemplowska & Swift, 2012, s. 379). So, we can think of Rawls ideals as long-term goals for society. These ideals would be the very best we could realistically aim for. Now, Amartya Sen doesn’t specify a time horizon, but her critique takes aim at Rawls thus implying that his long-term goals are too far removed to be relevant to the non-ideal consideration of alternatives. But, as noted by Stemplowska and Swift, there doesn’t seem to be any good for why this is the case. Presumably we are interested in the state of society long-term which makes long-term goals quite practical. Additionally, goals and reforms which make sense in the short term may well be counterproductive for the long-term well-being of society. In fact, “actual” politics is awash with such issues of time preference. In economics, for example, there is the choice between spending or investing, borrowing or saving and between structural reforms or status quo. As for ethics Stemplowska and Swift quote A J. Simmons who argues that: “without knowing our long term goal, a course of action that might appear to advance justice, and might indeed constitute a short term improvement with respect to justice, might nonetheless make less likely, or perhaps even impossible, achievement of the long-term goal.” (Stemplowska & Swift, 2012, s. 379). Myopically making more or less impulsive changes predicated on what is pragmatic at the moment may have long-term repercussions. This is where Rawls second use of ideal theory is helpful, namely the ability to help us assess the urgency of current injustices.

Obviously, all things should be within reason as Stemplowska and Swift notes: “It would be irrational to eschew certain immediate progress for the sake of a hugely ambitious vision that, though feasible, was vanishingly unlikely ever to be reached.”. It may be argued, at any given point, that political theory is leaning too much on the side of ideal theory and not paying enough attention to the actual. However, this is quite different from an abandonment of ideal theory as such, something that neither Sen nor Mills has been able to show why it should be done.

Furthermore, if we are to follow Sen’s method of assessing the options that present themselves as realistic alternatives in our present situations without guidance from long-term goals, then by what metric will we be choosing between them? It seems Sen’s comparative approach would have to fall back on moral intuitions to asses these alternatives, possibly in combination with some calculation of their respective probability of success. If so, Sen’s approach would ultimately come back to intuitionism with all its associated problems. For example, there is no guarantee that different moral intuitions are compatible, that they are stable over time or that a community even agrees on what is intuitively ethical. Additionally, following the guide of immediate moral intuitionism can, as explored 21 above, be counterproductive in the long-term. It is an old truth that the way to hell is paved with good intentions after all.

Rawls project is to attempt to provide a systematic alternative to the chaos of intuitionism on the one hand and the rigidity and non-intuitive nature of on the other. The result is intended to be a “reflective equilibrium” in which “principles of justice are mutually supported by reflecting on the intuitions we appeal to in our everyday practices, and by reflecting on the nature of justice from an impartial perspective that is detached from our everyday positions.” (Kymlicka, 2002, ss. 69-70). The reflective equilibrium establishes a reflexive, or hermeneutic, relationship between ethical intuitions and ethnical theories. Our intuitions “test” our theories to see if they lead towards desirable circumstances and theories, in turn, “test” our intuitions to see if they make sense when considered holistically and in relation to other considerations. An ethical intuition can, for example, be found to be misguided or hasty, which is why legal systems of due process are preferable to mob justice. Similarly, ethical theories may lead to absurd conclusions such as utilitarianism making a case for expanding the world population indefinitely to increase total experienced utility even if per capita living standards plummets. The benefit then of making our intuitions cohere into an ethical theory is the mitigation, or avoidance, of the problems with intuitionism without ending up with unintuitive conclusions as with utilitarianism.

7.3 Differences in kind or differences in degree? Returning to Mills distinction between different senses of the “ideal”. Even if granting the distinction between descriptive and idealized models there remains other problems. Looking at Mills argument in standard form there is reason to question the second and third premises.

P1: Ideal content can be distinguished into ideal-as-descriptive and ideal-as-idealized.

P2: Out of these only ideal-as-descriptive concerns itself with actual circumstances.

P3: What separates ideal theory from non-ideal theory is a reliance on ideal-as-idealized while avoiding ideal-as-descriptive.

C: Ideal theory doesn’t concern itself with actual circumstances.

We’ve seen how Mills distinguishing schema of ideal content fails to properly model Rawls project. The idea of a “realistic utopia” is both idealized and yet interface with actual circumstances making P2 dubious. As noted, Mills grants the “appeal to an ideal (say the picture of an ideally just society)” but doesn’t show how this is different from an idealized model. Unless we take Mills word for it, which would be bad philosophy, non-ideal theory seems to utilize ideal content in similar (or even identical) ways as do ideal theory. The difference seems to be a difference in degree rather than a 22 difference in kind. Correspondingly ideal theory does relate to and interact with actual circumstances. However, again, this is because ideal theory functions as propaedeutic to non-ideal theory. It is a prerequisite to identify the goals and the normative “yardstick” before attending to the actual circumstances. Since ideal theory operates at the propaedeutic level the avoidance of descriptive models is intentional. This casts doubt on Mills assertion that the exclusion of actual non- ideal conditions is subconsciously ideological.

Recall that Rawls has been criticised both for being too ideal in his assumptions and for not being ideal enough. If there exist a sharp distinction between ideal and non-ideal methodology that would seem rather strange. However, if we do accept that non-ideal and ideal theory exist on a spectrum from more to less ideal without a clear distinction it makes perfect sense. Designating any point on that spectrum as delimiting between ideal and non-ideal would be arbitrary, and this might explain why we have found Mills definition of ideal theory to be so also.

7.4 The efficacy of ideal theory Mills claims that in practice ideal theorists ignore “actual oppression” in their writings and doesn’t propose real solutions to real problems. However this is disputed by Stemplowska and Swift: “Ronald Dworkin is often seen as an arch exemplar of ideal theory, but the same book in which he sets out his highly idealized clam-shell auction explicitly discusses the transition from “the ideal ideal world of fantasy,” through the “ideal real world, only somewhat less fantastic” to “the real real world” (Dworkin 2000, 169–80) and applies his ideal theory to pressing issues such as health care and affirmative action.”2 (Stemplowska & Swift, 2012, s. 390). Rawls too, isn’t unconcerned about actual oppression but merely has a different idea of its epistemological priority than does Mills. For Rawls, as we’ve seen, ideal theory is the necessary precursor to non-ideal theory. His ideal methodology is deployed for the exact purpose of making the project of non-ideal theory possible, or at least not misguided.

In light of this understanding it makes perfect sense that ideal theory doesn’t attend much to “actual oppression”. The purpose of ideal theory is propaedeutic, it is what must be established before we attend to actual problems. In this way ideal and non-ideal methods are complementary, and both are needed. Ideal theory because of its “realistic utopia” and aid in judging the urgency of injustice and non-ideal theory because “it fills the gap, as it were, between the theoretical ideal and political reality.” (Stemplowska & Swift, 2012, s. 380). Mills objection that ideal theory keeps us from attending to actual injustices seems misguided here. He is free to produce as much non-ideal content

2 Dworkin 2000 refers to his book Sovereign Virtue. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 23 as he wishes. There is not a zero-sum relationship between ideal and non-ideal methodology but there is a complementary relationship which makes Mills claim that we should abandon one for the other dubious. That is, granting that ideal and non-ideal theory is even different in kind and not existent on a methodological continuum, which, as seen when treated above, is dubious indeed.

Mills proposed remedies to the supposed marginalization affected by ideal theory is also questionable. He claims the track record of associated with ideal theory, such as liberal , to be one of exclusion and marginalization. However, is this claim sustainable relative to Mills proposed alternatives? Mills is not a Marxist but is obviously sympathetic to that tradition and yet the practical record of those states most explicitly Marxist have not been quite up to par in the areas of social transformation that Mills would like to see. Raising the spectre of warfare and genocide would be alarmist. However, it does bear pointing out that the societies that have most acknowledged and attended to those types of issues Mills are concerned about have been those most closely approximating liberal egalitarian states. Few would deny that the prevalence of oppression and, at least overt, ideology in Marxist states have far exceeded those in their liberal counterparts. To judge liberal states as oppressive Mills would ironically have to appeal to an idealized model of a just society because, on the metrics which Mills cares about i.e. social justice, they hold by far the best historical track record. In a situation where we enacted Sen’s comparative approach and considered the realistic non-ideal alternatives available to us contemporary liberal societies would surely be among the better picks, and certainly above any Marxist alternative.

As for feminism and racial issues nowhere are these more prevalent than in contemporary western liberal . The critical tradition Mills take inspiration from, including third wave feminism, and critical race theory, emerged in the USA and are arguably coeval with Rawlsian liberal egalitarianism. Mills himself and his impact on the disciplinary discourse of political theory is an example of the centrality of these questions to modern liberal democracies. In the years following the publication of Mills paper issues relating to social justice has continued to garner attention to the point where they have arguably overtaken traditional economic issues in political discourse. These are distinctly non-ideal and empirical questions and not relating to such “idealized modelling” that Mills would cast as dominating mainstream political theory. The fact is that Mills philosophy and concerns are the product of a progressive milieu that has both its genesis in, and take its nurture from, the liberal tradition. He very much shares a pedigree with Rawls and liberal egalitarianism and he also shares most of the same norms and presuppositions. This is the liberal background that has spawned both Mills and Rawls as political philosophers. 24

7.5 Mills ideological critique What about Mills ideological critique? The term “ideology” is tricky as it can be meant in many different senses for example: a) The process of production of meanings, signs and values in social life. b) A body of ideas characteristic of a particular . c) Ideas which help to legitimate a dominant political power. d) False ideas which help to legitimate a dominant political power. e) Socially necessary illusion.

Along with several others (Eagleton, 2007, ss. 1-2). Mills use of the term would fall under d) although the ideas in question are not so much false as they are distortional. This implies that there is either a) an objective worldview which is obscured by ideology or b) that there are multiple worldviews which all hold some truth but none of which are complete. We can see that Mills combines both options from his position on standpoint theory “that certain realities tend to be more visible from the perspective of the subordinated than the privileged” (Mills, 2005, s. 175). For Mills “The thesis can be put in a strong and implausible form, but weaker versions do have considerable plausibility, as illustrated by the simple fact that for the most part the crucial conceptual innovation necessary to map nonideal realities has not come from the dominant group” (Mills, 2005, s. 175). I noted earlier that a shared reality is important for Mills for several , but even in the weak form, the implication of standpoint theory is that the unveiling of that reality is a cooperative effort. When Mills refer to “realities” in plural, he is presumably referring to the differences in experienced reality. So, I take Mills to be saying that we all live in one reality but perceive it differently, partly as a condition of our social placement. That is, depending on our experiences some things will be foregrounded, i.e. it will capture our attention, and some things will be backgrounded, i.e. recede towards the margins where it is not explicitly attended to or disappear form view altogether. For example, an upper-class person living in a wealthy and dynamic city might think society is doing well in terms of material wealth, services, cohesion and safety whereas a poor person living in a depressed area might have the opposite idea.

An ideology then is “a distortional complex of ideas, values, norms, and beliefs that reflects the nonrepresentative interests and experiences of a small minority of the national population” (Mills, 2005, s. 172). It is these codified and habituated means of action and signification that constitutes the ideology. For Mills ideal theory fits this description as it brings certain methods, concepts and 25 norms with which to theorize about political theory that only reflect and benefit a “small minority of the population”. This small minority is white, male and middle to upper-class. Let’s look at the argument in standard form:

P1: An ideology is a set of conceptual tools and social patterns that privilege and reflect a dominant group in society.

P2: Ideal theory privileges and reflects bourgeois white men.

P3: Ideologies are unfair and lead to bad outcomes.

C: Ideal theory is an ideology, and this is unfair and lead to bad outcomes.

As for P1 there is the issue of semantics and pragmatics, or of primary and secondary connotations. As noted earlier there is no consensus on the exact definition of the word “ideology” which makes the primary connotation amorphous and “up for grabs” in a sense”. One could accept Mills definition, or reject it, but why bother arguing about semantics? The semantic issue is important because of the secondary connotations of the word ideology. Calling something an ideology has rhetorical force in that it conjures up images of falsity, dogmatism, oppression and deceit. Put another way the pragmatic effect of designating ideal theory as an ideology is pejorative and serves to put it under suspicion without providing an actual argument.

Furthermore, when taking P1 in isolation, even if we accept Mills definition, there is no reason why this necessarily makes ideology a problem. Firstly, it is hardly surprising that the concepts and social patterns of a group benefit them, otherwise why perform them? Likewise, it’s obvious that the language and social characteristics of a group reflect that group, who else would it reflect? Presumably political theory must be developed and performed by someone, and, according to Mills own argument, that someone will not hold an objective “view from nowhere”. It is almost as if Mills is implicitly positing an ideal objective standpoint that ideal theory fails to fulfil, but that would clash with his own presuppositions. With that in mind, the western liberal tradition is arguably one of, if not the, tradition that has gone the furthest in ensuring the universalism of its tenets.

Secondly, an ideology could benefit a certain group, and other groups as well, in fact an ideology such as liberalism might very well fulfil Rawls “difference principle” in that it makes the worst-off of society better off than they would have otherwise been. That is, if we grant that liberalism produces a “difference” by privileging certain perspectives in the first place. The main secondary connotation of the word “privilege” is that it comes at the expense of those that are not privileged but that needn’t be the case. If the method of ideal theory benefits white bourgeoise men, it may just as well 26 also benefit other groups. In fact, as discussed earlier, those societies which has most adopted the “ideology” of Rawls are the same that have been the most accommodating towards other groups.

Moving on to P2, there is further doubt. If ideal theory is reflective of, and a privilege to, this group, then why are liberal societies the origin and center of political and theoretical movements which concern themselves with other groups? In a country like Nazi , or the USSR, it would it be difficult to argue that the prevailing ideology benefited anyone but ethnic Germans or the proletariat (or perhaps rather their self-elected representatives). However, in contemporary liberal democracies, one of the main political projects of the last decades has been gender and ethnic equality. In practice this means diversifying political, social and economic power, often away from white men to other groups. I have also noted how all the perspectives Mills champions are actually highly influential on the agenda of political theory (as exemplified by this paper) and politics writ large. If liberalism in general, and ideal theory in particular, is an ideology to the exclusionary benefit of white men and the marginalization of others, it’s not a very good one.

Finally, P3 depends a lot on what we take an ideology to be, if an ideology is understood as a comprehensive “worldview” it’s difficult to see how that might be considered unfair in and of itself. If everyone has a “standpoint” then judging any standpoint, or perspective, as unfair would require some standard to judge them by. This is, of course, the purpose of ideal theory, to provide an ideal with which to orient towards. As we’ve seen, the role of “abstracting away” from actual circumstances fulfils the function of equalizing, and thus, universalizing that ideal. This very method is then critiqued by Mills as “ideological”, as being unfair and as leading to bad outcomes. However, as noted, it’s doubtful whether ideal theory, or liberalism broadly, leads to bad outcomes. In fact, it appears quite friendly to those marginalized groups Mills is concerned with. As for being ideological, by what metric is Mills approach less ideological? Ideal theory has as its very purpose to think the universal individual and abstract away from social position, as exemplified by Rawls veil of ignorance. In contrast Marxism, feminism and critical race theory are explicitly tied to the standpoint of their respective social group: women, workers and ethnic minorities. It seems hard to argue that the latter is somehow less “perspectival” than the former. Of course, Mills defines only the perspective of the “dominant group” as being ideological. It would be easy to sarcastically reply that the dominant group always seem to be someone else. But even taking this claim seriously opens a lot of confusing questions. If the “ideology” of the dominant group is dismantled and replaced with the perspectives of “marginalized” groups, then is the dominant group still dominant? If ideology is decoupled from dominance then by what metric is dominance determined, economic, political, demographic? What happens when the dominant group is no longer dominant by any metric, will the previously marginalized group become the new “oppressor”? If so, is there any end to the dialectic of removing 27 the dominant group from power and, if so, what would that look like? Won’t there be excess societal resentment from every “inversion” of the power hierarchy provoking another inversion? Mills, answers none of these questions, in fact he doesn’t even mention them. In contrast an ideal theorist, like Rawls, would have no problem answering all of them by positing a universal societal ideal.

7.6 The danger of relativism Finally let’s address the danger of relativism which is of explicit concern to Mills. The kind of relativism he is worried about is where the truth of a statement depends on the group, or social, or historical position, of the person interpreting the claim. This would, for example, make it impossible to say that women and ethnic minorities are oppressed in any objective sense because there wouldn’t be a neutral position from which to claim this. At most it could be said that they appear oppressed from a given frame. Mills wants to avoid this but here the issue of pragmatics return. Even though Mills might desire to avoid relativism, the practical effect of his argument could still tend towards the breakdown of any shared perspective that makes good faith discussion or moral agreement possible. For example, once one framework is understood to be socio-historically contingent and therefore, in some sense, arbitrary, this charge can be levelled against any system, including the one belonging to the original critic. Mills does critique ideal theory as being a mere product of the socio-historical perspective of a specific group in society and therefore not universal. Of course, Mills non-ideal alternative is also socio-historically contingent and might by the same be said to reflect the lived situation, and interests, of a social group. Why couldn’t Mills critique simply be turned back upon himself?

Mills provide many normative and, from his perspective, pragmatic reasons for why it shouldn’t, but not why it couldn’t (Mills, 2005, s. 174). He does say, on page 171, that non-ideal theory can appeal to ideals such as an “ideally just society”. Whilst Mills doesn’t explicitly connect the use of common categories with relativism it could be considered a way of creating shared meaning. If there are common categories with agreed upon meaning, like “oppression”, it’s possible to say objectively (or intersubjectively) that X and Y are oppressed. I have already argued that granting the use of such common categories as “an ideally just society” is tantamount to doing ideal theory and not non-ideal theory, so let’s leave that aside. The other common categories Mills suggest introducing are “patriarchy”, “capitalism” and “white supremacy” (Mills, 2005, s. 175) but why couldn’t these be critiqued as merely representing, and serving the interests of, certain groups, as Mills has accused other concepts of doing? These concepts are quite controversial already, many economists wouldn’t agree that contemporary markets represent an historical “-ism” but that they are emergent phenomena of economic agents making rational decisions. Similarly, conservatives and some liberals would characterize concepts like “patriarchy” and “white supremacy” not as neutral descriptors but 28 as nomenclature of a progressive, identity-based, ideology. Mills provides no real argument for why these groups, or others, should accept his theoretical approach as non-ideological whilst simultaneously critiquing (and possibly abandoning) their own for being just that.

In 1936 Karl Mannheim produced an historical investigation into the origins and effects of the emergence of many different competing ideologies, or worldviews, within a society. He notes that “previously, one's adversary, as the representative of a certain political-social position, was accused of conscious or unconscious falsification. Now, however, the critique is more thoroughgoing in that, having discredited the total structure of his consciousness, we consider him no longer capable of thinking correctly” (Mannheim, 1936, ss. 61-62). Mills is dangerously close to this kind of thinking when he claims that it is not the arguments of ideal theorists that are “wrong” per se, or even only their method that is misguided, but that they themselves cannot perceive and interpret parts of reality correctly due to who they are. If Mills truly held this position, there would be no point in arguing with his ideological opponents (at least about certain topics). From such a perspective the disagreement could only be “solved” with either re-, i.e. ideological conformity with Mills, or simply by removing his opponents from positions of power whether they liked it or not. Fortunately, Mills himself does not truly believe this as evidenced by his good faith arguments and work as a philosopher. However, his arguments do, whether he realizes it or not, balance between what Mannheim calls the “particular” and the “total” conceptions of ideology. Mannheim explains them in this way:

“(a) Whereas the particular conception of ideology designates assertions only a part of the opponent's assertions as ideologies-and this only with reference to their content, the total conception calls into question the opponent's total Weltanschauung (including his conceptual apparatus), and attempts to understand these concepts as an outgrowth of the collective life of which he partakes.

(b)

The particular conception of ideology "makes its analysis of ideas on a purely psychological level. If it is claimed for instance that an adversary is lying, or that he is concealing or distorting a given factual situation, it is still nevertheless assumed that both parties share common criteria of validity-it is still assumed that it is possible to refute lies and eradicate sources of error by referring to accepted criteria of objective validity common to both parties.” (Mannheim, 1936, ss. 50-51).

Mills clearly dabbles in the total conception of ideology where the entire worldview (Weltanschauung) of his ideological opponents “including his conceptual apparatus” is called into question. The implication is, as noted above, that his opponents are “not capable of thinking 29 correctly” which in turn means good faith discourse breaks down. Mills is still within the particular conception of ideology insofar as he, if even implicitly, thinks, or acts as if, his opponents can be convinced via arguments that refer to “accepted criteria of objective validity common to both parties.”. However, Mills conception of ideology does seem to err towards the total as seen in his explication of what an ideology is:

“As theorists of ideology emphasize, this should not be thought of in terms of conscious conspiratorial manipulation, but rather in terms of social privilege and resulting differential experience, a nonrepresentative phenomenological life world (mis)taken for the world, reinforcement (in this case) by professional norms of what counts as respectable and high-prestige philosophy, and-if not to be inflated into the sole variable, certainly never to be neglected in the sociology of -the absence of any countervailing group interest that would motivate dissatisfaction with dominant paradigms and a resulting search for better alternatives.” (Mills, 2005, s. 172). So, ideology is thought by Mills to be an unconscious and emergent phenomenon of a particular social milieu, in this case belonging to bourgeois white men. This is clearly more in line with a total conception rather than a particular one. Mills probably thinks he is being charitable here, by not attributing conscious intent to his ideological opponents he casts them as mere “victims” of their social circumstances and puts the “structure” that produced the ideology as the real enemy. However, this also disqualified his opponents as equal participants in a rational argument because they are, in Mills eyes, possessed by the false consciousness of ideology. Why would this tend towards relativism, couldn’t it be that Mills is simply correct? Mannheim shows us why the logical next step of this discourse of ideological critique is to devolve into a kind of relativism by discussing the historical example of the Marxist movement. The Marxists would critique bourgeois thought as ideological in a total sense, that is as a mere expression of their social position and not “true” in any objective sense. With this the Marxists believed that they were uncovering the illusory “superstructure” that concealed the true economic forces that determined history. However, as Mannheim points out:

“The analysis of thought and ideas in terms of ideologies is much too wide in its application and much too important a weapon to become the permanent monopoly of any one party. Nothing was to prevent the opponents of Marxism from availing themselves of the weapon and applying it to Marxism itself.” (Mannheim, 1936, s. 67).

This “weapon” was quickly turned against Marxism itself and the political arena of descended into factionalism where each faction accused the others of being “ideological”, their entire worldview 30 was wrong, and they were unable to “think correctly”. I noted earlier that the kind of relativism Mills was afraid of was the one: “where the truth of a statement depends on the group, or social, or historical position, of the person interpreting the claim.”. If Mannheim is correct, and I think he is, Mills ideological critique might very well lead towards this kind of relativistic state of discourse. We can see then how Mills, unintentionally, by invoking a total conception of ideology, does introduce the danger of relativism. The kind of ideological critique that mills is engaged in, if taken seriously, simply doesn’t lend itself to good faith discourse.

8. Conclusion The purpose of this paper has been to evaluate Mills arguments against ideal theory. In conclusion there appears to be several problems with Mills arguments:

1, Mills distinctions between different senses of ideal seem to confuse rather than clarify the methodological differences between ideal and non-ideal theory. They also fail to map on to Rawls seminal methodology and broadly fail to delimit what makes a theory “ideal” as opposed to non- ideal.

2, Mills grants the use of normative ideals but doesn’t show how they are to be derived without ideal theory. The “comparative” approach of Amartya Sen (see page 20-21) seem to be a problematic alternative to Rawlsian long-term societal goals.

3, Mills fails to show that non-ideal theory is different in kind to ideal theory and not merely a difference in degree.

4, Mills claim that ideal theory has been ineffective in addressing social justice for marginalized groups seem dubious. Especially relative to the likely alternatives.

5, It’s not clear that ideal theory should be considered an ideology or that it disadvantages certain groups. Mills argument, at least partly, rely on associating ideal theory with the negative connotations of the word “ideology” by using a contested definition of the word.

6, Mills fail to argue why his own position couldn’t be considered ideological by his opponents. His way of conceptualizing ideology run the danger of inviting a relativistic conception of truth and fracturing the space of shared discourse.

Given these problems the advice to abandon (Rawlsian) ideal theory for the sake of “non-ideal theory” seems dubious and also confusing given that the distinction between the two is not entirely clear. Mills version of non-ideal theory doesn’t seem to be markedly different from the method of ideal theory in practice and his ideological critique seems to house many problems of its own. 31

9. References Beckman, L. (2005). Grundbok i idéanalys. Stockholm: Santérus förlag.

Bowell, T., & Kemp, G. (2015). A Concise Guide 4th edition. New York: .

Eagleton, T. (2007). Ideology An Introduction. London: Verso.

Kymlicka, W. (2002). Contemporary Political Theory: an Introduction. Cornwall: .

Mannheim, K. (1936). Ideology and Utopia. London: Routledge.

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Mills, C. W. (2005). "Ideal theory" as ideology. Hypathia A Journal of Feminist Philosophy, 165-184.

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