How Sudden Censorship Can Increase Access to Information∗ William Hobbsyand Margaret E. Robertsz October 23, 2016 Abstract Conventional wisdom assumes that increased censorship will strictly decrease access to information. We delineate circumstances when increases in censorship will expand access to information. When governments suddenly impose censorship on previously uncensored information, citizens accustomed to acquiring this information will be incentivized to learn methods of censorship evasion. These tools provide continued access to the newly blocked information and also extend users' ability to access information that has long been censored. We illustrate this phenomenon using millions of individual-level actions of social media users in China before and after the block of Instagram. We show that the block inspired millions of Chinese users to acquire virtual private networks (VPNs) and join censored websites like Twitter and Facebook. Despite initially being apolitical, these new users began browsing blocked political pages on Wikipedia, following Chinese political activists on Twitter, and discussing highly politicized topics such as opposition protests in Hong Kong. ∗We thank the following people for helpful comments and suggestions on this work: Alexei Abrahams, Eli Berman, Allen Carlson, Dean Eckles, James Fowler, Navid Hassanpour, Ruixue Jia, Holger Kern, Gary King, Shuhei Kurizaki, Jennifer Pan, Maria Petrova, Susan Shirk, Zachary Steinert-Threlkeld, Brian Tsay, Yiqing Xu, Jason Wu, the participants in the Social Media and Political Participation Global Conference and the Pacific Peace Science Conference. We specifically thank Zachary Steinert-Threlkeld for graciously supplying geo-located Twitter data from China and Pablo Barber´awho helped us access geo-located Instagram data. We thank joint funding from the Policy Design and Evaluation Lab and Center for Global Transformation at UC San Diego and the Hellman Fellows Fund. yDepartment of Political Science, University of California, San Diego, Social Sciences Building 301, 9500 Gilman Drive, #0521, La Jolla, CA 92093-0521, http://polisci2.ucsd.edu/whobbs/ zAssistant Professor, Department of Political Science, University of California, San Diego, Social Sciences Building 301, 9500 Gilman Drive, #0521, La Jolla, CA 92093-0521, [email protected], MargaretRoberts.net 1 Introduction Scholars have studied censorship by assuming it has an exogenous impact on a passive citizenry. Conventional wisdom posits that censorship should lower the probability that citizens access information (Morozov, 2012; Lessig, 1999). Not surprisingly, then, authoritarian governments appear to be tightening their grip on information environments, increasing their use of search filtering, content removal, and website blocking (Deibert et al., 2010; Kelly et al., 2012; Shirk, 2011), along with rapid online censorship during large-scale collective action events (King, Pan and Roberts, 2013, 2014), Here, we show that information environments more realistically function like ecosystems and are therefore not always predictable. Because citizens quickly adapt to censorship, the imposition of Internet restrictions can sometimes have unexpected consequences. In certain circumstances, sudden censorship can even result in the opposite of the intended effect: an increase in access to off-limits information. We show that censorship can increase access to information when a government extends censorship to previously uncensored media, especially when individuals have no ready alterna- tives to replace it. When favorite and difficult to replace media are suddenly blocked, those who would otherwise not take the time to evade censorship restrictions will have a stronger motive to learn how to continue to access the newly censored information. Because censorship evading technology (and, more broadly, social networks) that assist in evasion are rarely specific to par- ticular information sources, acquisition of these tools and networks can give users unhindered access to many country-specific blocked sources. Although many users might learn censorship evasion only to maintain access to a preferred source, censorship evasion incidentally expands the set of information these users can easily access. We name this phenomenon a \gateway ef- fect" as the motivation to access the newly censored information provides a gateway into access to information that has long been censored or blocked. We illustrate this phenomenon by bringing to bear one of the first large, detailed, and individual-level datasets of the real-time censorship evasion behavior of Internet users under policies of increased censorship. Using geo-located social media data from websites that are blocked by the Great Firewall in China, we measure the number and types of people who use Virtual Private Networks (VPNs) to \jump" the Great Firewall to access information and networks blocked by the Chinese government. We show how increases in censorship through blocking of the popular social networking website Instagram in China disrupted the habits of millions of individuals accustomed to visiting that site and increased evasion of the Great Firewall. In doing so, censorship of Instagram created a sudden increase in the number of people from China accessing websites and networks such as Twitter and Facebook that the Chinese government has blocked for many years. We present evidence that previously apathetic Chinese social media users began to engage in topics related to ongoing protest events and with people in Chinese activist circles shortly after the Instagram block. Our evidence suggests a mechanism that could explain previous work that has found a 2 positive correlation between censorship and the likelihood of government resistance (Hassanpour, 2014; Nabi, 2014). However, importantly, the \gateway effect” we explore does not rely on backlash against censorship which has commonly explained this phenomenon in the past. Our mechanism also does not require pre-existing or nascent political interest on the part of the censored individuals. As governments expand the types of information that are off limits, they can simply create more incentives for individuals to engage in networks and technologies that allow them to access the media they are accustomed to consuming, and these technologies in turn allow them to access to information they did not have access to before. We want to be clear that our findings do not suggest that censorship is ineffective in general or that increases in censorship will always backfire against governments. Our evidence suggests that through the gateway effect, there are circumstances where censorship can increase access to information. As we explore in our discussion, our findings suggest that gateway effects are most likely when increases in censorship are sudden and blunt { when applied during emerging protests or crises, for example.1 By motivating more people to acquire the ability to evade censorship, a sudden increase in censorship can erode its own effectiveness, can politicize previously apolitical citizens, and can accumulate collective action potential that it often seeks to suppress. The paper proceeds as follows. First, we describe the previous literature on the effects of censorship and introduce the logic behind how censorship can increase access to information and politicize previously apolitical users. Second, we describe our research design and the case we use to test our theory { the sudden block of Instagram in China in September 2014. Using our data, we describe the types of users who evade censorship before the sudden block of Instagram. Then, we show how the Instagram block increased access to information for the majority of Instagram users. We end with implications of this research, including a description of the circumstances under which censorship will lead to the gateway effects that we describe. Censorship and Access to Information A large literature has contributed to our knowledge of how censorship influences the political views and behavior of its intended targets. Most of the literature finds that censorship generally decreases access to information among citizens. Scholars have shown that by reducing con- nectivity to information sources, censorship and repression can successfully restrict information and demobilize individuals from engaging in the behavior the government deems objectionable (Enikolopov, Petrova and Zhuravskaya, 2011; Pierskalla and Hollenbach, 2013; Edmond, 2013). Others have found that when media is restricted in authoritarian governments, citizens access what is readily available to them (Stockmann, 2012; Geddes and Zaller, 1989) and do not discuss alternative information with each other because they do not know what others believe (Kuran, 1997). Government control of the media can also provide signals to citizens to follow the gov- 1Censorship might be more sudden and thus less effective when collective action events are decentralized and spontaneous (Steinert-Threlkeld, Forthcoming). 3 ernment line. Huang (2015) finds that propaganda in China can signal government strength and Stern and Hassid (2012) find that the ambiguous nature of off limits information can induce risk-averse journalists to self-censor instead of spreading information. Censorship may even have adverse effects on information outside of a country by reducing incentives for citizens of other countries to engage in social media without a wider audience (Zhang and Zhu, 2011). Perhaps it is no wonder, then, that governments tend