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Mergers and Acquisitions in Digital Markets

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Mergers and Acquisitions in Digital Markets Mergers and Acquisitions in Digital Markets March 30, 2021 Congressional Research Service https://crsreports.congress.gov R46739 SUMMARY R46739 Mergers and Acquisitions in Digital Markets March 30, 2021 Some Members of Congress have expressed concern about mergers and acquisitions in digital markets, specifically those involving “Big Tech”—Alphabet (Google), Amazon, Apple, Clare Y. Cho Facebook, and Microsoft. Mergers can be separated into three categories: (1) a merger between Analyst in Industrial competitors (i.e., horizontal merger), (2) a merger with a firm in the supply chain (i.e., vertical Organization and Business merger), and (3) a merger with a firm in an unrelated or adjacent market. Some Members have specifically raised concern about Big Tech companies’ acquisitions of nascent firms, which can occur across all three categories. A merger could potentially increase or decrease competition in digital markets, depending on the characteristics of the markets involved. Section 7 of the Clayton Act prohibits mergers whose effect “may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly” (15 U.S.C. §18). Citing this law, the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice (DOJ), the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), state attorneys general, and private parties can challenge mergers. Merging parties that meet certain conditions must file a premerger notification with the FTC and DOJ under the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvement Act of 1976 (HSR Act). After investigating a proposed merger, the agencies can (1) allow the transaction to proceed unchallenged, (2) allow the transaction to proceed after entering a consent decree with the merging parties with conditions to maintain competition in the market, or (3) seek to stop the transaction by filing suit in federal court. The FTC and DOJ have not sued to block a proposed merger involving Big Tech since 2000; during this time, the Big Tech companies acquired at least 710 companies. Determining the effect of a merger on competition in digital markets can be challenging. For example, it can be difficult to anticipate how a digital market might evolve and how to determine the merging parties’ competitors. Some of these challenges are exemplified in Amazon’s acquisition of Whole Foods Market in 2017, Facebook’s acquisition of Instagram in 2012, and Google’s acquisition of Fitbit in 2021. The FTC allowed Amazon’s and Facebook’s respective acquisitions to proceed unchallenged when it reviewed the premerger notifications, and Google completed its acquisition in January 2021, while the DOJ continued to investigate the merger. In 2020, the FTC and a coalition of state attorneys general filed parallel lawsuits against Facebook, alleging that it has purchased companies that present competitive threats rather than competing with them, specifically citing its acquisition of Instagram and WhatsApp. Amazon’s acquisition of Whole Foods Market may have increased competition in the grocery retail market. Competitive pressure from Amazon may have incentivized other grocery retailers, such as Walmart and Kroger, to offer online grocery delivery services. The acquisition also raised concerns that Amazon could dominate e-commerce by expanding the scope of products it offers online, in addition to strengthening its bargaining power with suppliers. Instagram was a relatively new firm when it was acquired by Facebook. It cannot be known whether Facebook’s acquisition of Instagram prevented Instagram from becoming a viable competitor, or if Instagram’s success after the merger was partially due to Facebook’s resources, such as its advertising services and data-processing infrastructure. Google’s acquisition of Fitbit could increase competition in the smartwatch market, which is currently dominated by Apple. Google’s access to Fitbit users’ health and fitness data following the merger could also reduce competition, including in other markets Google operates in. The DOJ, FTC, and coalitions of state attorneys general have filed antitrust lawsuits and have ongoing investigations of Big Tech companies. Some Members of the 117th Congress have proposed different legislative actions to address merger enforcement in digital markets. Congress could increase funding for antitrust enforcement in appropriations bills and by increasing merger filing fees paid to these agencies under the HSR Act. Increasing funding could prevent anticompetitive mergers, but there is no guarantee that it will. Congress could also amend antitrust laws. It could shift the burden of proof to the merging parties to show that the proposed merger would not materially lessen competition. It could also establish that enforcement of antitrust laws does not require the definition of a relevant market—allowing the plaintiff to provide evidence of actual or likely harm on competition caused by the merger—or broaden the welfare standard used to evaluate mergers to include more than consumer welfare, such as protecting workers, entrepreneurs, and independent businesses. Congress could create a new federal agency, designate an existing agency, or create a new division within an existing agency to regulate firms that operate in digital markets. These regulations could range from establishing a code of conduct—such as methods to enable greater data mobility across firms—to regulating digital markets as a public utility. Any legislative action, including a decision not to take action, could have significant effects on digital markets. Congress is not the only legislative body concerned about competition in digital markets; state and foreign laws and regulations could also affect mergers involving U.S. companies. Congressional Research Service Mergers and Acquisitions in Digital Markets Contents Introduction ................................................................................................................... 1 Potential Effects of Mergers on Competition ....................................................................... 1 Horizontal Mergers .................................................................................................... 2 Vertical Mergers ........................................................................................................ 2 Mergers in Adjacent or Unrelated Product Markets ......................................................... 3 Acquisitions of Nascent Firms ..................................................................................... 3 Oversight of Mergers and Acquisitions ............................................................................... 4 Examples of Mergers and Acquisitions ............................................................................... 8 Amazon’s Acquisition of Whole Foods Market .............................................................. 8 Facebook’s Acquisition of Instagram .......................................................................... 11 Google’s Acquisition of Fitbit.................................................................................... 13 Options for Congress ..................................................................................................... 15 Increase Funding for Antitrust Enforcement................................................................. 16 Amend Antitrust Laws.............................................................................................. 17 Shifting Burden of Proof ..................................................................................... 17 Shifting from Defining the Relevant Market ........................................................... 18 Shifting Focus from Consumer Welfare ................................................................. 19 Regulate Digital Markets .......................................................................................... 20 Considerations for Congress ........................................................................................... 21 Figures Figure 1. Share of U.S. Retail E-Commerce Sales .............................................................. 10 Figure 2. Global Smartwatch Shipment Revenue Share by Company .................................... 14 Tables Table 1. Selected Mergers in Digital Markets Reviewed by the DOJ or FTC............................. 6 Table 2. Selected Legislation in the 117th Congress Related to Antitrust Laws......................... 16 Table A-1. Selected Legislation in the 116th Congress Related to Antitrust Laws ..................... 22 Appendixes Appendix. Selected Legislation in the 116th Congress Related to Antitrust Laws ..................... 22 Contacts Author Information ....................................................................................................... 23 Congressional Research Service Mergers and Acquisitions in Digital Markets Introduction Some Members of Congress have raised antitrust concerns about “Big Tech”—Alphabet (Google), Amazon, Apple, Facebook, and Microsoft.1 The first four companies were the focus of an investigation on competition in digital markets conducted by the Subcommittee on Antitrust, Commercial, and Administrative Law of the House Judiciary Committee. 2 A staff report issued by the subcommittee in 20203 asserts that, in digital markets, the “significant and durable market power is due to several factors, including a high volume of acquisitions by the dominant platforms.”4 According to the report, over the past 20 years, Facebook acquired at least 63 companies, Alphabet at least 260, Amazon at least
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