Tanzania in 2009

In a year without major political changes or excitement, politi- cal discussions mainly centred on several allegations of high-level ­corruption, ever clearer signs of deepening rifts between quarrelling factions of the ruling party CCM, and the continuing confrontation between the two leading parties, CCM and CUF, in semi-autonomous Zanzibar. The overwhelming dominance of CCM was not in seri- ous jeopardy, while internal cracks were partly a forerunner of infighting for a rearrangement of power positions in the election year 2010. Local government elections were convincingly won by CCM, while all opposition parties remained relatively weak as op- ponents of the long-dominant governmental forces. Despite some reluctance, finally accepted the next step in deepening the EAC into a common market. The economy remained surprisingly resilient to the negative effects of the global economic recession, but some fall in the growth trend of recent years was unavoidable. International financial institutions continued to support the gov- ernment’s economic policies, while the majority of the population became increasingly dissatisfied with not seeing any direct tangible improvements.

Domestic Politics

One year before the next general elections, the ruling party ‘’ (CCM/Revolutionary Party) maintained its dominant position despite severe internal rifts and the first signs of infighting about the nomination of candidates. Support for opposition parties, namely ‘Chama cha Demokrasia na Maendeleo’ (CHADEMA/Party of Democracy and Progress), increased slightly but without pos- ing a serious threat to CCM’s political dominance. Several opinion­

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2019 | doi:10.1163/9789004407879_007 tanzania in 2009 83 polls conducted throughout the year indicated a still significant but decreasing and by no means compelling degree of sympathy for President , and massive dissatisfaction with the per- formance of his government and the CCM. Public discontent result- ed mainly from a perception of continuous and increasing hardship for the majority of Tanzanians while a small minority among the elite were seen to be benefiting excessively from government poli- cies, mostly through corrupt practices, and – despite all the official anti-corruption rhetoric – without being prosecuted. The campaign against corruption remained one of the hot is- sues. Numerous cases involving accusations against high-ranking politicians and civil servants had been revealed in previous years, but hardly any visible measures had been taken against the alleged culprits. Former prime minister Edward Lowassa, who had to resign in February 2008 in the wake of corruption allegations, creating the severest government crisis in more than 25 years, was never legally taken to task and also retained his powerful position on the CCM Central Committee. Two other former ministers, who had alleged- ly been involved in the same scandal – known as ‘the Richmond- Saga’ – and had stepped down with Lowassa, also got off scot- free. During the parliamentary budget session (June/July), Deputy Minister for Energy and Minerals submitted a gov- ernment report that cleared three senior civil servants (former at- torney general Johnson Mwanyika, former permanent secretary in the Ministry of Energy and Minerals Arthur Mwakapugi, and Director-General of the Prevention and Combating of Corruption Bureau Edward Hosea) of any wrongdoing in the scandal. Parliament firmly rejected the report and demanded clear answers to the out- standing questions, which, however, had not been provided before end-2009. Shortly after the parliamentary debate, the state house issued a detailed response to rumours that Kikwete had been di- rectly involved in the scandal. The statement elaborated four areas in which the president had played a role in the deal, but rejected any involvement in corrupt practices.