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For the R ule o f Law THE REVIEW INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF JURISTS HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE WORLD East Timor 1 Pakistan 19 Haiti 6 South Africa (KaNgwane) 21 Japan 15 Western Sahara 25 COMMENTARIES UN Commission on Human Rights 33 Individual Petitions under the Convention on Racial Discrimination 40 ARTICLES Developments in International Human Rights Law Eric Suy 44 The Fight against Torture J.H. Burgers 47 Plant Genetic Resources Upendra Baxi and Clarence Dias 49 Arrest and Detention in Mexico Raul F. Cardenas 58 Self Rule Proposals for Canadian Indians 63 The Dark Side of Trees Cecil Rajendra 68 No. 32 June 1984 Editor: Niall MacDermot Human Rights in the World East Timor and Self-Determination Since December 1975, the United Na­ Prior to the April 1974 coup in Portugal, tions General Assembly has passed numer­the political system in East Timor reflected ous resolutions on East Timor, assertingthe character of the Portuguese dictator­ the right of the people to self-determina­ ship. It was considered a province of Por­ tion and demanding that they be enabledtugal under the Organic Law of Portuguese freely to determine their future under UNOverseas Territories of 1953. Under Por­ auspices. Indonesia, on the other hand,tuguese rule the territory was divided into claims that the integration of East Timor thirteen administrative divisions, called with Indonesia was the result of an act ofConcelhos or Councils with populations self-determination by the representatives ofranging from 25,000 to 84,000. The ad­ the people. As is frequently the case in suchministration of theConcelhos was headed disputes, the historical facts are complex. by the administrator do concelho, a Portu­ East Timor, previously known as Por­guese official whose powers were very ex­ tuguese Timor, is situated at the south-east­ tensive and varied. EachConcelho was fur­ ern extremity of, the sprawling Indonesianther divided intopostos or sub-districts, ad­ archipelago. The people are predominantly ministered by anadministrator do posto. Malay or Malanesian in origin with someBy 1974, there were some 58 postos and African, Arab and Chinese influences. The60% of their administrators were Timorese. most widely spoken language in the terri­These Timorese became politically active in tory if Tetum. Until 1975, it was a colonythe territory after the April 1974 coup in of Portugal for more than four hundred Portugal. years. The coup brought to power the Armed East Timor’s population, approximately Forces Movement (MFA) whose objectives 650,000 in 1974, is largely rural. It is eco­ were to establish democracy in Portugal nomically backward and in the colonial pe­and withdrawal from Portugal's colonies. riod was heavily dependent on imports andIn June of the same year, the new regime subsidies from Portugal. The majority of in Portugal spelt out three options for the the population depend on subsistenceTimorese people. They were: continued as­ farming. Socially, the territory is character­ sociation with the metropolitan power, in­ ised by the survival of traditional groupings,dependence, or integration with Indonesia. loyalties and beliefs. Although Catholicism Interestingly, it was Portugal that offered had made some impact and Islam had a few integration with Indonesia as one of the adherents, the local animist beliefs of the options, when Indonesia had stated on pre­ people remain the dominant religion. vious occasions that it had no territorial claims to Portuguese Timor. gration party advocating ‘recolonisation’ Within a few weeks of the coup in Por­ should not be allowed to play a role in de­ tugal, political groupings emerged in East colonisation talks. Timor. The three main political parties that Fretilin’s impatience, combined with its emerged at first represented the three op­ interests in radical agrarian and educational tions offered by the Portuguese govern­reforms, alienated the UDT which unilater­ ment. They were the Timorese Democratic ally withdrew from the coalition at the end Union or UDT, the Association of Timorese of May. Social Democrats or ASDT, which later be­ Fretilin boycotted the talks that took came the Revolutionary Front of Indepen­place in Macau between 26 and 28 June dent East Timor (Fretilin), and the Timor­since Apodeti was a participant. After the ese Popular Democratic Association of conference, the Portuguese government pro­ Apodeti. claimed a constitutional law based on the The UDT started as a party strongly in conference text agreed to by UDT and favour of continued association with Por­Apodeti. The new law provided for a three- tugal but later changed its position to fed­ year interim period before the termination eration with Portugal as an intermediaryof Portugal sovereignty. It also provided step before achieving complete indepen­for the setting up of a High Commissioner’s dence. The ASDT or Fretilin advocated the Council, comprising a High Commissioner ‘right to independence and the rejection ofand five Joint Secretaries, two of them to colonialism and countermeasures againstbe nominated by Portugal and the other neocolonialism7. Though initially the lead­three to come from UDT, Fretilin and ers of ASDT envisaged a lengthy time frame Apodeti respectively. There was also to be for the process of decolonisation, their a consultative government council consist­ position changed in September 1974 whening of two representatives nominated by ASDT became Fretilin and the leaders de­ each of the regional councils. In addition, manded an immediate declaration from theeach of the three political parties was to Portuguese authorities that they would nominate four members to the government grant independence to East Timor. Thecouncil. The new law stated that elections Apodeti, claiming that there were close eth­ would be held in October 1976, envisaging nic and cultural links between the peoplethe end of Portuguese sovereignty two of East Timor and Indonesia, advocated in­years later. tegration with Indonesia. In contrast with It is well-known that in many decoloni­ the other two parties, Apodeti never gained sation situations opposing political inter­ large support, but it became a focal point ests have found it difficult to arrive at a for Indonesian interests in relation to Eastconsensus and East Timor was no excep­ Timor. tion. But the political crisis in Portugal, In January 1975, the two main parties,particularly shifts in the ideological posi­ UDT and Fretilin, agreed to form a coali­ tion within the MFA, aggravated the rifts tion. On 7 May of the same year the firstwithin the parties in East Timor. For exam­ phase of talks on decolonisation took place ple, after the abortive right-wing coup by between the Portuguese authorities and aforces under the leadership of General joint delegation of UDT and Fretilin mem­Spinola, the suspicion of the UDT Leaders bers. At the talks Fretilin objected to the increased that the MFA officers were con­ inclusion of Apodeti in the future talks tospiring to place Fretilin in the leading deco­ be held in Macau, arguing that a pro-inte­lonisation role at the expense of the UDT. This state of flux was effectively usedTimor and was responsible for its decoloni­ by Indonesia to create further tensionsation. The two Ministers agreed on the among the parties. The Indonesian news­need to hold a meeting of all political par­ papers frequently alleged Chinese and Viet­ties of East Timor with a view to ending namese involvement in Timor, saying,the in fighting. particular, that the members of Fretilin On 28 November, Fretilin declared East were receiving military training from Viet­Timor an independent ‘Democratic Repub­ namese officers who had entered East lic’ and announced that some fifty Afro- Timor clandestinely. These reports created Asian countries had pledged support to the fears among the conservative section of thenew republic. On 1 December, Mozambique population. announced its recognition of East Timor The state of tension and mistrust be­under Fretilin. tween the parties culminated in a coup by The Portuguese government rejected the UDT. On 11 August 1975, members of Fretilin’s declaration as well as a statement the UDT attacked and seized key installa­made on 29 November by UDT, Apodeti tions and gained control of the capital, Dili.and two other parties which said that Freti­ This was followed by an outbreak of vio­ lin’s action had removed the last remains of lence between members of UDT and Freti­Portuguese sovereignty and declared East lin. Already, by 20 August the territoryTimor to be part of the Indonesian territo­ was in the midst of a civil war. On 26 Au­ry. On the next day, 30 November, Portu­ gust, the Portuguese governor and his staff guese representatives at the United Nations left Dili for Atuaro, an island 30 miles formally requested the UN to help settle north of Dili. On 11 October, Fretilin an­the East Timor question. nounced that it was in full control of the On 7 December, Indonesia made a full- territory and had established a transitionalscale invasion of East Timor, seized the administration. However, this was counter­capital, Dili, and drove the Fretilin sup­ ed by the Indonesian government sayingporters to the hills. The Portuguese govern­ that pro-Indonesian forces had control ofment reacted by breaking diplomatic rela­ large areas of the territory and predicting tions with Indonesia and said it would seek that by the end of October they would re­the help of the UN to put an end to Indo­ gain control of the whole of it. nesia’s military intervention. On the other Meanwhile, the then Australian Primehand, Indonesia reacted by stating that Minister, Mr. Gough Whitlam, ruled out Portugal’s sovereignty had ended on 28 any military or political role for Australia November when Fretilin declared indepen­ in East Timor, stating that “the future of dence. the territory is a matter for resolution by On 11 December, the UN Trusteeship Portugal and the Timorese people them­ Committee called on Indonesia to with­ selves, with Indonesia also occupying andraw and urged it to desist from ‘further important place because of its predominantviolation’ of East Timor’s territorial integri­ interest”.

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