The Absolute Weapon Atomic Power and World
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. 4 )0 q // --— — -— ._.___ ..— —_ ——. .. ., w,/ . .-.....> ‘&uJtJJ*‘ ., \ .:,,:,- :’.=~.,~....r...,.q-.’%.F##$#$wMf5t%, .,. 3“: - w“’ ? .....”., ‘-ld+,~~-..::+7:?%:”+... “. ,.-’-:<., :,,.-..,-> .“:,. ..;:.?., -. .: .-,.-<-.+%..*+~fizwz, k&y&+%@Jf - ,. .- .- .,, - -, ....-. .- ..’.. >., ,, ,>, ,-- .?.&J-!+.YA.‘++% -. “ ... “. -2rel+mf Draft for’i-:. 4? /’” - RestrictedDistriWim, ,/’ o*. Not for otation. “ ., .,.. * . \. ~. ,--*. ‘.\ . r Tili3ABSOLUTEK32.POH, . Ahnic Power and World Order .nh;a,e, ‘,s <,6 m 0“ ~z T ?.7 o Bernard13rodie,editor o %1 ArnoldWolfers PercyE. Corbett WilliaznT. R. Fox Introductionby FrederickS. Dunn I .“ c New Haven,Connecticut Yale Instituteof IntcrnationdStudies FrederickS. Dunn,Dfiector February1#, 1946 ... “i — .-.f!’~“3- \, c TABLEOF CONTENTS ● ’ Introduction. The CommonProblem m FrederickS. Dunn PART I. The Weapon ChapterI. war in the AtomicAge w BernardBrodie ChapterII. Implicationsfor MilitaryPolicy w iernardBrodie PART II. //-, ., Chapter111. The AtomicBomb and Soviet-flmericaRelations m AKALUJSLwOLCers ChapterIv. Effecton Internation~ :,.. w ,.,.. percyE. Corbett PART III. Control ChapterV. The InternationalControlof AtomicWeapons m WWan T. R. FOX <: ,/,/’- \\ /“,. ‘-t ‘i # IntroductiL THE COMMONPROBLEM & nhnwe, m < FrederickS. Dunn ~’--7 ~ , 0 0 e4J fIme Comon probl~, yOWS, II&@, eV~OXle tS, Is—not to”fancywhat were fair in life Providedi% couldbe--but,findingfirst ~t may be, then find how to make it fair Up to our means:a very differentthing!” Robert&cmnlng, ‘lBishopBlougramlsApology~’ Whateverelsethe successfulexplosionof the first atomicbomb at Alamagordosignified,it was a victoryof the most startlingand conclusivesort t fur scientificresearch. 13ya huge effortof combinedaction,the physical scientistsand engineershad succeededin compressinginto a mere sliverof time perhapsseveraldecadesof work h applyingthe energyof the atom to military purposes. But havingachievedthis miracle,the scientiststhemselveswere not at all sure that mankindwas the gainerby their desperatelabors. At least some of . them had ardentlyhopedt& theirresearchwould provenothingmore than the On the surfaceof things,the capacityof ., impossibilityof reachingthe goal. atomicenergyfor mass destructionfar exceededany immediatelyrealizablevalue in enhancing human comfortand welfare. Moreover,like all physicalforces,i! was morallyindifferentand could just as easilyserveevil purposesas good. Unlesssomemeans couldbe foundfor separating out and controllingits powers of annfilation,the scientists most striktigvictoryof all the threatenedon balanceto becomethe heaviestblow ever struckagainsthumanity. About one thingthe physicalscientistshad no doubtwhatever,and thatwas the surpassingurgencyof the problem. They pent to extraordinarylengthsto stir up the publicto a realizationof the magnitudeof the dangerconfronttig w~rld. the/ They resortedto etiramund.aneterms to make the non-scientistsee that the new physicalforcewas really somethingdifferent,that it was even a different kind of difference. If they shinedperhapstoo greata tendencyto expect ( ‘ii ‘? -2- mechanicalanswersto the problemof how to controlthis new and terrifying force,thatwas understandablesincethey were accustomedto that kind of answer . in their own field. But in their effortsto drivehome the urgencyof the problem,theywere se- a high and importantpurpose. * members The more perceptive~of the militaryprofessionwere equallydisturbed, althoughfor slightlyclifferentreasons. Whatevervalue for peacet~e uses . atomicenergymight have, it had been developedas a weapon of war, and its first shatteringeffectshad been felt in tlnatsphere. What botheredthe generalsand admiralsmost was the startlingefficiencyof this new weapon. It was so.far a&a3.of the otherweaponsir’destructivepower as to threatento reduceeven the giantsof yesterdayto dwarfsize; In fact to speakof it as just anotherweapon was highlymisleading. It was a revolutionaz’y~lopnent which alteredthe 6 &“’”’’<~\ “,basic characterof war itself. [I-.-+ <i In the pre-atomicdays of the 19@thi&&&ul )been bad enough,but one did not have to contemplatevery seriouslythe probableannihilationof both victor and vanquished. l?ow,even the strongeststateswere facedwith the prospect that they might no longerbe able,by their own strength,to save their cities from destruction.Not onlymight their regularrivalson the same levelbe equippedwith powersof attackhundredsof times ~~eaterthan before,but possi- bly some of the nations’lowerdown in the power scalemight get hold of atomic weaponsand alteiithe whole relationshipof greatand small.states. It was beco~ very hard to see how a tolerablewar couldbe foughtany more. Unlessatoticwarfsrecouldbe limited,no singlestate,no matterhuw strongits militsryforcesmightbe, c’ouldbe at all certainto avoidbeing mortallywoundedin a futurewar. Therewas not and very likelywould not be a sure defenseagainstatomicattack,or any reliableway of keepingbombs away from a nationlsterritory. A greatpowermight,it is true,by buildingup to the limit of its strength,have a soocichanceof winninga war in the end, but what good was that if in the meantimethe urban populationof the nationhad ‘\ -*, 1 been wiped out? Ev_m militarymen were beginningto thinkthat perhapsit would -aE be a good ideato look very carefullyinto the possibilitiesof restricting . atomicwarfare by internationalaction. In any case it was not the task of eitherthe physicalscientistor the m militarystrategistto find means of subjectingthe new force to effectivecon- . trol. That was clearlya politicalproblem,to be undertakenby the expertsin .-..3.... politicalrelationships. b’ ~:;\ rcl” c!,.~~ Mter a few earlyflightsof fancy,mostb‘~c}he &liticalanalystslapsed “d . into a discreetsilenceon the subject. It was quicklyapparentthat they had . been handedone of tinetoughestproblemswhich tinemembersof their guildhad ever had to face. The profoundsignifica??ceof atoticenergyas a physical force calledfor politicalthtig on a cormnensuratescale. Initialprobings with the ordinarytools of politicalanalysisbroughtdisappointinglysmallre- sults. Each sortieinto some promisingopeningeitherendedup againsta solid wall or led into anothertangleof seeminglyinsolublepro’blems.No clue could be foundto a simpleformulawhichwould offerreposeto menismindswhile openingup new vistas of unruffledprosperity. In fact therewas reasonto believethat nothingof the sort everwould be found and that the jobwas one of arduousand patientexaminationof a whole mosaic of relatedproblems=ending indefinitelyinto the future. One was met right at the beginningwith two dilemmasof really@oSing dimensions. The first of these arisesout of the nature of the procedures availablefor the commonregulationof the actionsof free nations. On the one hand, any schemefor titernationalcontrolof atomicwarfaremust be put into effectby voluntaryagreement. There is no supremepower to imposeit from above. On the otlnerhand, it seemedetireme~ T>robable that.statespossessingbombs or the capacityto make themwould voluntarilyrestricttheirpower to carry on atomicwarfaremerely on the promisesof other statesto do likewise. Becauseof the natureof the bomb, any statewhich broke its word and surreptitiously -4- ‘? manufacturedatomicweaponscouldput itselfin a positionto exert its wilJ over . all thosewho kept theirpledge. The more statesobservedthe agreement,the greaterthe rewardto the transgressor. The seconddilemmaarisesout of the time elementin the carryingon of atomicwsrfare. On the one hand, sinceno stateby its own strengthcanbe sure of stavingoff a bomb attack,there is a growingconvictionthat effectivecon- ~olofatomic warfaremust come throughinternationalaction. onthe other hand,the speed of attackby bombs cam be so greatthat therewould not appe-& a’tfirst.sightto be sufficienttime for any mechanismof international collectiveactionto operatesuccessfully.Beforethe air age, one couldhave countedon a fatilylongperiodof gracebetweenthe the when an a.g.=essor~s P’ Mtentions becameevidentand the timewhen he could”attac$in full.force. The \~i ‘ developmentof air bombardmentshortenedthis peribd~iaerably, and the comingof atomicwarfareprorisesto reduceit almostto zero. If a &tion suddenlythreatenedby atomicbomb attackhas to wait while an international agencyarrivesat a decisionas to what countermeasuresshouldbe taken~the chancesof satig its citieswould seem to be very small indeed. Both of these dilemms are directlyconcernedwith the procedureswhereby nationsarriveat means of reodating their actionswith respect.toeach other. Both of them receiveattentionin the chaptersthat follow. At the presenttime it is ofiy necessaryto make some very generalobservationsaboutthe treaty mechanismand the kinds of strainsit might be expectedto bear mhe; put to the task of controllingatordcwarfare. Currentpopularbeliefsregardingthe efficacyof treatiesare proneto be both too optimisticand too pessimisticas to what can be accomplishedby tlnem. On the one hand, there is a tendencyto believethat practicallyany tiiternational . problemcan be solvedif only the nationsconcernedcan be cajoledinto signing a treaty. On the otherhand, the spectacular$ailuresof some treatiesin tine past have led to the widespreadconvictionthat governmentsin r+eneralare very ‘\ f -5- casualabouttheir internationalobligationsand will disregardthem whenever they are inconvenient.It is not unusualto find both of thesewlewsbeingheld by the sameperson. Neitherof them findsmuch supportin practice. Thoser~hobelievethat a treatyis the answerto everythingoverlookthe drearywastelandof ineffective