The PHILJA Judicial Journal
The PHILJA Judicial Journal is published twice a year by the Research, Publications and Linkages Office of the Philippine Judicial Academy (PHILJA). The Journal features articles, lectures, research outputs and other materials of interest to members of the Judiciary, particularly judges, as well as law students and practitioners. The views expressed by the authors do not necessarily reflect the views of either the Academy or its editorial board.
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ISSN 2244-5854 SUPREME COURT OF THE PHILIPPINES
CHIEF JUSTICE Hon. MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
ASSOCIATE JUSTICES Hon. ANTONIO T. CARPIO Hon. PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, Jr. Hon. TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO Hon. ARTURO D. BRION Hon. DIOSDADO M. PERALTA Hon. LUCAS P. BERSAMIN Hon. MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO Hon. ROBERTO A. ABAD Hon. MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, Jr. Hon. JOSE P. PEREZ Hon. JOSE C. MENDOZA Hon. BIENVENIDO L. REYES Hon. ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE Hon. MARVIC MARIO VICTOR F. LEONEN
COURT ADMINISTRATOR Hon. JOSE MIDAS P. MARQUEZ
DEPUTY COURT ADMINISTRATORS Hon. RAUL B. VILLANUEVA Hon. ANTONIO M. EUGENIO, Jr.
CLERK OF COURT Hon. ENRIQUETA ESGUERRA VIDAL
ASSISTANT COURT ADMINISTRATORS Hon. THELMA C. BAHIA Hon. JENNY LIND A. DELORINO
DEPUTY CLERK OF COURT Atty.FELIPA B. ANAMA
DIVISION CLERKS OF COURT Atty.EDGAR O. ARICHETA Atty.MA. LOURDES C. PERFECTO Atty.LUCITA A. SORIANO PHILIPPINE JUDICIAL ACADEMY
Board of Trustees
Hon. MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO Chief Justice Chair
Hon. ANTONIO T. CARPIO Senior Associate Justice, Supreme Court Vice Chair
Members
Hon. ADOLFO S. AZCUNA Hon. JOSE MIDAS P. MARQUEZ Chancellor Court Administrator
Hon. ANDRES B. REYES, Jr. Hon. FRANCISCO H. VILLARUZ, Jr. Presiding Justice, Court of Appeals Presiding Justice, Sandiganbayan
Hon. ERNESTO D. ACOSTA Hon. FRANKLIN J. DEMONTEVERDE Presiding Justice, Court of Tax Appeals President, Philippine Judges Association
Hon. LUIS ENRIQUEZ REYES Dean AMADO D. VALDEZ Presiding Judge, MTC, Guiguinto, Bulacan President, Philippine Association of Law Schools
Hon. AMEURFINA A. MELENCIO HERRERA Founding Chancellor Emeritus
Executive Officials Hon. ADOLFO S. AZCUNA Hon. JUSTO P. TORRES, Jr. Chancellor Vice Chancellor Hon. MARINA L. BUZON Executive Secretary
Chiefs of Office Hon. JUSTO P. TORRES, Jr. Finance Office Hon. DELILAH VIDALLON-MAGTOLIS Hon. MARINA L. BUZON Academic Affairs Office Acting Chief, Philippine Mediation Center Office
Dean SEDFREY M. CANDELARIA Hon. THELMA A. PONFERRADA Research, Publications and Linkages Office Administrative Office
Chairpersons, Curricular Departments
Dean PACIFICO A. AGABIN Prof. RUBEN F. BALANE Constitutional Law Civil Law
Hon. MAGDANGAL M. DE LEON Hon. EDILBERTO G. SANDOVAL Remedial Law Criminal Law
Hon. JOSE MIDAS P. MARQUEZ Hon. HILARION L. AQUINO Court Management Ethics and Judicial Conduct
Hon. JOSE C. VITUG Dean MERLIN M. MAGALLONA Commercial Law International and Human Rights Law
Fr. RANHILIO C. AQUINO Prof. MYRNA S. FELICIANO Jurisprudence and Legal Philosophy Legal Method and Research
Dean SEDFREY M. CANDELARIA Atty.EMMANUEL L. CAPARAS Special Areas of Concern Court Technology
Prof. ALFREDO F. TADIAR Hon. JAINAL D. RASUL Alternative Dispute Resolution Shari’a and Islamic Jurisprudence Justice Adolfo S. Azcuna Chancellor
Dean Sedfrey M. Candelaria Editor in Chief
Editorial and Research Staff Atty. Ma. Melissa R. Dimson-Bautista Atty. Ronald Paz Caraig Ms. Armida M. Salazar
Ms. Regina Maria Sofia M. Babasa Atty. Rizsa Rose S. Baer Ms. Jocelyn D. Bondoc Atty. Gabriella Louise OJ. Candelaria Mr. Jonel M. Candelaria Mr. Joseph Arvin S. Cruz Ms. Judith B. del Rosario Ms. Christine A. Ferrer Mr. Michael Angelo P. Laude Ms. Joanne Narciso-Medina Ms. Charmaine S. Nicolas Ms. Sarah Jane S. Salazar
Circulation and Support Staff Mr. Lope R. Palermo Ms. Carmela D. Panganiban Mr. Daniel S. Talusig
Printing Services Mr. Ponciano M. Santiago and Staff Contents
Officials of the Supreme Court of the Philippines iv Officials of the Philippine Judicial Academy v
Program 1
Lecture 3 Legal Nuances to the Philippine Ratification of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court Professor Herminio Harry L. Roque, Jr.
Reaction 11 Dean Raul C. Pangalangan
Closing Remarks 16 Justice Arturo D. Brion
References Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 18 Republic Act No. 9851 101 An Act Defining and Penalizing Crimes Against International Humanitarian Law, Genocide and Other Crimes Against Humanity, Organizing Jurisdiction, Designating Special Courts, and for Related Purposes Approved on December 11, 2009 1
Supreme Court of the Philippines Philippine Judicial Academy in cooperation with the Metrobank Foundation, Inc.
present the Eighth Metrobank Foundation Professorial Chair Lecture December 9, 2011, Friday, 2:00 p.m. Court of Appeals Auditorium Centennial Building, Court of Appeals Maria Orosa Street, Manila Program Doxology Philippine National Anthem Supreme Court Hymn Supreme Court Choir Opening Remarks Honorable Adolfo S. Azcuna Chancellor, Philippine Judicial Academy Message Mr. Aniceto M. Sobrepeña President, Metrobank Foundation, Inc. Musical Number Supreme Court Choir Introduction of Lecturer Dr. Diane A. Desierto Professor of Public International Law, University of the Philippines College of Law
LECTURE LEGAL NUANCES TO THE PHILIPPINE RATIFICATION OF THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT Professor Herminio Harry L. Roque, Jr. Holder, 2011 Metrobank Foundation Professorial Chair in International and Human Rights Law Director, Institute of International Legal Studies, University of the Philippines Law Center Member, PHILJA Department of International and Human Rights Law Reactor Dean Raul C. Pangalangan Member, PHILJA Department of Constitutional Law Professor, University of the Philippines
The Professorial Chair in International and Human Rights Law endowed by The Metrobank Foundation, Inc. “The Metrobank Foundation Professorial Chair provides assistance to the Philippine Judicial Academy to develop and enhance its programs in Judicial Education in order to encourage its Corps of Professors to author and publish treatises that introduce innovative concepts and approaches in designated areas of law to promote competence, excellence, and efficiency in the Philippine Justice System.”
Presentation of Paper To the Metrobank Foundation, Inc. by the Chairholder
To the Supreme Court represented by Justice Arturo D. Brion by the Metrobank Foundation, Inc.
Presentation of Endowment to the Chairholder by the Metrobank Foundation, Inc.
Presentation of Plaques of Appreciation to the Metrobank Foundation, Inc. and to the Chairholder by Supreme Court Justice Arturo D. Brion and PHILJA Chancellor Adolfo S. Azcuna
Closing Remarks Honorable Arturo D. Brion Associate Justice, Supreme Court
Philippine Judiciary Hymn
Master of Ceremonies Atty. Gilbert T. Andres Associate Lawyer, Roque and Butuyan Law Offices 3
Legal Nuances to the Philippine Ratification of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court*
Professor Herminio Harry L. Roque, Jr.
Prof. Herminio Harry L. Roque, Jr. is the holder of 2011 Metrobank Foundation Professorial Chair in International and Human Rights Law. Prof. Roque holds a Bachelor of Arts degree in Economics and Political Science with Honors from the University of Michigan as well as a Bachelor of Laws from the University of the Philippines College of Law. He obtained his Master of Laws with Merits from the London School of Economics and Political Science at the University of London. He is an Associate Professor at the UP College of Law where his teaching interests include International Humanitarian Law, Public International Law, and Constitutional Law, among others. Prof. Roque was admitted to practice before the International Criminal Court (the First Asian to have the honor) and the UN War Crimes Tribunal by the National University of Singapore. In for Rwanda. He is currently the Director of the addition, Prof. Roque holds memberships Institute of International Legal Studies of the in the Executive Council of the International UP Law Center and a PHILJA Professor II in the Criminal Bar in The Hague as well as in the Department of International and Human Rights Governing Council of the Asian Society of Law. International Law in Singapore. Prof. Roque has authored various publications. Prof. Roque has been the lead counsel He is the Editor in Chief of the Asia Pacific Yearbook in many public interest cases, the latest and of International Humanitarian Law, a joint most publicized of which is the Ampatuan publication of the UP Law Center and the Regional Massacre where he represents 13 media Delegation of the International Committee on the victims of the 57 people killed. He is a partner Red Cross. He is a member of the Editorial Board at the Roque and Butuyan Law Offices in of the Asian Journal of Comparative Law published Makati City.
* Lecture delivered at the Eighth Metrobank Foundation Professorial Chair Lecture held on December 9, 2011, at the Court of Appeals Auditorium, Centennial Building, Court of Appeals, Manila. 4 PHILJA JUDICIAL JOURNAL VOL 14:38 2012
The adoption in 1998 of the Rome Statute or the International Criminal Court (ICC) by at least 120 states marked a remarkable paradigm shift in international criminal justice. Ad hoc tribunals in the past such as Nuremberg and Tokyo were described as victors’ courts which were out to punish those vanquished by the war. The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (lCTY) and Rwanda (lCTR), which were created in the 1990s following the end of the Cold War, were similarly criticized. While the establishment of the lCTY and the ICTR was indeed an unprecedented move by the United Nations Security Council acting under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter “to deal with threats to international peace,” their jurisdiction was limited, unfortunately, in terms of geography and time. Moreover, the creation of these UN Tribunals was a product of the power politics prevalent in the Security Council. Grave and systematic violations of humanitarian and human rights law also happened in places such as Vietnam, Chechnya, Tibet, among others, but the veto vote precluded the Security Council from creating similar tribunals for these other theaters of impunity. It is against this backdrop that the need for a permanent and institutional response to impunity was conceived—a response that ought to be devoid of power politics that is found in the UN Security Council. This resurgence of commitment to ensuring individual criminal responsibility for barbaric acts prompted countries of the world to congregate in Rome to draft the Rome Statute of the ICC. In the ICC, we finally have a permanent international court vested with jurisdiction over the most serious crimes or concern to the international community: genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and aggression. For the Philippines, it was only last May 6 of this year that the president, on the occasion of the visit of the ICC President Judge Sang-Hyun Song, finally manifested his willingness to transmit the Rome Statute, long signed by then President Joseph Estrada, to the Senate for its concurrence. On August 22, 2011, and after 11 long years of continuous lobby, the Philippine Senate gave its concurrence to the treaty, thus paving the way for the deposit of the instrument of ratification with the UN Secretary-General. With this deposit, the Philippines became the 117th State-Party to the Rome Statute. This became effective last November 1. Despite the inordinate long time that it took the Philippines to become a party to the Rome Statute, ratification marks only the beginning of the country’s journey to end impunity. Issues relative to its effective domestic implementation need now to be addressed. Two of these deserve serious consideration: first, the issue on complementarity; and second, our capacity to cooperate fully with the ICC. By the principle of complementarity, the Court can exercise its jurisdiction only when domestic courts are unable and unwilling to do so. If complementarity means that the ICC will only function if domestic courts are unable or unwilling to do so, it follows that the ICC actually defers to domestic courts to act as courts of primary jurisdiction. However, this requires the national government to ensure that we criminalize under our domestic law the crimes cognizable by the ICC. On this, the enactment of Republic Act No. 9851 is worthy of our attention. EIGHTH METROBANK FOUNDATION PROFESSORIAL CHAIR LECTURE: LEGAL NUANCES TO THE PHILIPPINE RATIFICATION 5 OF THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT
Republic Act No. 9851 or the Philippine IHL Law is an accomplishment of civil society, the ICRC, the International Humanitarian Law (IHL) Committee of the PNRC and the Institute of International Legal Studies of the UP Law Center. It penalizes grave breaches and serious violations of IHL by restating certain provisions of the Geneva Conventions and the Rome Statute. Hence, it penalizes any attack directed against protected persons and property, as well as any resort to prohibited means and methods of warfare committed in an armed conflict—whether international or non-international. Under the Philippine IHL Law, crimes within the competence of our courts are genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity. Similar to the Rome Statute, the law defines genocide as any act with the intent, in whole or in part, to destroy a nationality, ethnic race, or religious group of people. It then provides for the different means by which genocide may be committed, borrowing the language of the Rome Statute. With respect to crimes against humanity, among the enumerated acts are torture and enforced disappearance, both of which occurring in the Philippines in alarming numbers. In defining torture, the law adopts the definition proffered by the Rome Statute. Hence, torture may be committed by anyone, not just state agents. On the other hand, the definition of the crime of Enforced Disappearance was borrowed from the Convention Against Enforced Disappearances: there has to be an abduction perpetrated by state agents, a refusal to acknowledge such an arrest, and the mens rea of intending to remove the victim from the protection of the law for an extended period of time. The law then provides for stiff penalties for violations thereof. The imposable penalty is reclusion temporal in its medium to maximum period, and a fine of P100 to P500,000. In the event that the violation leads to death or serious physical injury, or constitutes rape, the penalty of reclusion perpetua and a fine ranging from P500,000 up to P1,000,000 shall be imposed. Finally, the law provides for a statutory basis for principles intended to implement the binding nature of international humanitarian and human rights law as they exist under customary international law. There is to be universal jurisdiction for the crimes enumerated by the new law, the principle of non-prescriptibility, and the operation of the principles of command and superior responsibility. For the first time, our own law has provided that immunity cannot be invoked as a defense for a criminal prosecution. These are all well and good, but there are several controversial points that should be noted. The first point here is that while a penal statute does not have retroactive effect (as otherwise, it would amount to an ex post facto law), it could not be said that grave and serious violations of IHL only became criminal when the Philippine IHL Law became effective. On the contrary, the cases of Yamashita and Kuroda ruled that war crimes were already criminal because the duty to prosecute war criminals is a jus cogens norm and subject to the duty of aut dedere aut ajudicare (duty to extradite or prosecute). 6 PHILJA JUDICIAL JOURNAL VOL 14:38 2012
What the Philippine IHL Law really did was to address the need for a law providing specific penalties for these violations. Otherwise, there would be serious questions on what penalties to impose under the country’s Indeterminate Sentence Law, which requires that if the offense is punished by a penal law other than the Revised Penal Code, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence, the maximum term of which shall not exceed the maximum fixed by said law and the minimum shall not be less than the minimum term prescribed by the same. Secondly, the Philippine IHL Law adopted the progressive definition of torture as provided in the Rome Statute. Again, it is a crime that may be committed by anyone, and not just state actors. The problem arises because months before the passage of RA No. 9851, Congress also enacted a special law, RA No. 9745 or the Anti-Torture Act of 2009. This earlier statute adverted to the Convention against Torture, which defines torture as a crime that may only be committed by state actors. As a matter for drafting history, Congress was cognizant of the progressive definition of the crime. Despite this, there was a conscious choice to adopt the Conventional definition of torture. The question now is this: when should a person be charged with torture under RA No. 9851 and torture under RA No. 9745? Under the rules on statutory construction, the query may be answered pursuant to the following rules. First, effort must be had to reconcile the conflicting laws on the presumption that Congress knew about the conflicting definitions. Unless the definitions of torture under both laws are irreconcilable, resort must be had to reconcile the laws. Here, there does appear to be an irreconcilable difference on who may be charged for torture. Perhaps, the most that can be proffered as a means of reconciling the two statutes is that RA No. 9851 shall be the basis for prosecuting torture when it is committed as part of a widespread or a systematic attack, while RA No. 9745 shall be utilized when torture is committed as an isolated act. Otherwise, the following rules on statutory construction will have to be applied, to wit: the later enactment superseded the earlier one, and the specific prevails against a general one. Under the first rule of statutory construction, the later enactment shall prevail. Under the second rule, the definition provided under the Anti-Torture Law, being the special law, shall prevail. Third, there remains the issue of whether Enforced Disappearance has become criminal with the passage of RA No. 9851. Unlike war crimes, genocide, the absolute prohibition of torture, and crimes against humanity, enforced disappearance is not a crime prohibited by customary international law. At most, the UN Human Rights Committee, in a View on the communication submitted by Bleier against Uruguay, qualified it as a form of torture or cruel and inhumane punishment prohibited by Article 7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). Here, the Philippine IHL Law is not merely an enabling legislation for criminalizing an international crime under customary international law. Rather, it is the legal basis for its criminalization. Being a crime against humanity, enforced disappearance under the Philippine IHL Law is committed when it forms part of a widespread or systematic attack against a civilian EIGHTH METROBANK FOUNDATION PROFESSORIAL CHAIR LECTURE: LEGAL NUANCES TO THE PHILIPPINE RATIFICATION 7 OF THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT population, with knowledge of the perpetrator that the attack is being directed against a civilian population. Absent either of the qualifying circumstance of widespread or systematic, an enforced disappearance that is isolated is still not criminal under the IHL Law. Hence, the need for special legislation to punish isolated acts of enforced disappearances. Fourth, Section 9 of the Philippine IHL Law adopted verbatim Article 27 of the Rome Statute in providing that sovereign immunity cannot be invoked as a defense for criminal prosecution under the law. This provision in turn is a codification of the so-calledNuremberg principles and the UK House of Lords decision in In re Pinochet. In this case, the House of Lords ruled that while sovereign immunity continues to be recognized under international law, immunity covers only official sovereign acts. The commission of an international crime such as torture, extralegal killings and enforced disappearances, according to the House of Lords, cannot be taken as official sovereign acts and are hence, not accorded immunity. Cited in the Pinochet case is that of Hilao v. Marcos, a civil case for damages under the Alien Tort Claims Act. Under this law, American federal courts were vested with jurisdiction to award civil damages to victims of international crimes, provided that the defendant can be served summons in the territory of the United States. Outside of In re Pinochet, the US Supreme Court in the cases of Nixon v. Fitzgerald and Clinton v. Jones also ruled that sovereign immunity had ceased to be absolute and should cover only official acts. InClinton, the Court ruled that an alleged act of sexual harassment allegedly committed before Bill Clinton became president is not covered by the presidential immunity from suit. Section 9 of the IHL law sets a legal precedent in the Philippines. Since the 1910 case of Forbes v. Chuoco Tiaco until its most recent restatement in the 2010 case ofRoque v. Court of Appeals, the latter being a criminal complaint that sought to charge then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo for violations of the Philippine Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, the Philippine Supreme Court has repeatedly ruled, almost like a mantra, that sitting Philippine Presidents are immune from civil and criminal cases while in office. In a still pending petition in the Supreme Court, the same petitioners in Roque asked the court to at least declare that sitting Presidents may at least be investigated by the Ombudsman. This investigation is neither a civil nor a criminal case and pursuant to the Ombudsman Law, may be used as basis for the office to recommend an impeachment to the House of Representatives. The issue has become whether immunity that arises from the constitutional principle of separation of powers may be repealed by an act of Congress. Those who believe that it cannot be done will argue that under the hierarchy of legal norms, the Constitution, including its penumbras, is superior to any act of Congress. Those who believe otherwise will argue that even the Constitution should give way to thejus cogens norm of aut dedere aut ajudicare. While the IHL Law now clearly adopts a restrictive application of Presidential immunity and is a welcome change for human rights and humanitarian law advocates, there nonetheless remain lingering doubts about whether the law may in fact do away with the defense of immunity. 8 PHILJA JUDICIAL JOURNAL VOL 14:38 2012
Fifth, the passage of the IHL Law came shortly after the passage of the country’s anti- terrorism law which is referred to the as “Human Security Act.” The issue now is how the courts would construe the relationship between these two new laws. This is because in the drafting of both laws, the Philippine Congress proceeded as if the two laws would operate independently of each other. In fact, the drafting of the IHL Law was a result of concerted lobbying by non-governmental authorities such as the UP Law Center Institute of International Legal Studies and the IHL Committee of the Philippine National Red Cross. The emphasis was on enacting the required enabling legislation for the Geneva Conventions. In any case, all reference to ‘terrorism’ under IHL may be found in the Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions and not in the convention itself. Sixth is the issue of court jurisdiction. There needs to be clarification from the Supreme Court by way of actual jurisprudence on which court, which particular RTC, exercises jurisdiction. The reason is, in a non-international armed conflict, IHL only applies in areas directly controlled by domestic fighters. Note that one of the elements to qualify as a domestic fighter or group of fighters in a non-international armed conflict is control of territory. Hence, the RTC, for instance, of Maguindanao and not all of the RTCs of Cotabato, could exercise jurisdiction under domestic law for war crimes committed in Maguindanao. It has to be the specific RTC which has territorial jurisdiction over the part controlled by the MILF. Again, because it is very new, this still needs to be the subject of judicial interpretation. Finally, while the passage of the IHL Law has finally filled the legal vacuum in terms of legislation required under our treaty obligation as a party to the Geneva Conventions and now, also the Rome Statute, the new law, however, cannot address inherent weaknesses in the Philippine legal system which gives rise to disregard for the law in general. These weaknesses we will see later. Now, unless these matters are addressed by the new Aquino administration, new legislation notwithstanding, the Philippine legal system may still prove ineffective in the fight against both impunity and terrorism. So, by and large I think we can work with RA No. 9851. It could be refined but that could wait. Where the challenge lies is in the second issue that I wish to discuss this afternoon— the issue of cooperation with the ICC. There is a general obligation to cooperate fully with the ICC’s orders and requests. This means that we have to look at specific functions of the ICC that would require our cooperation. First of all, which government office or channel should the ICC deal with in this regard? The Rome Statute provides that cooperation shall be through diplomatic channel. Hence, it would appear that for purposes of cooperation, the ICC must cooperate with the Department of Foreign Affairs. And yet, the question that should be asked is: should the DFA in fact be the competent authority to cooperate with the ICC on matters, which pertain to the prosecution of international crimes? Should we not in fact designate the Department of Justice as our competent agency? Then there is also a provision in the statute itself that provides that state parties must, by law, require courts and authorities to fully cooperate with the ICC. Now, although the Rome Statute requires a law, my conviction is that because the exercise of judicial power EIGHTH METROBANK FOUNDATION PROFESSORIAL CHAIR LECTURE: LEGAL NUANCES TO THE PHILIPPINE RATIFICATION 9 OF THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT
is not legislative in this country, but judicial, perhaps this can be complied with by a mere issuance from the Supreme Court to provide the legal basis for the ICC to sit in the Philippines, should it so desire. This is because while the Court is based at The Hague, it could sit anywhere. The problem here is, if they sit in a place outside of The Hague, by what legal basis should it exercise judicial power? In the Philippines, it is the Philippine Supreme Court that exercises judicial power. But if the ICC sits here, we have to then do some kind of balancing act. This does not require legislation. The promulgation of new Rules of Court may be sufficient to recognize that the ICC can in fact sit in the Philippines and lay down certain standards and procedures when it does so. Then there is the need to recognize the legal personality of the court. Here, we need a law recognizing the legal personality of the ICC because the domestic law does not provide for this. However, it can be achieved either through a legislative act or through an executive agreement. Anyway, it is through Executive Agreements that we recognize that certain international organizations also have legal personality in our jurisdiction. An executive agreement can also be sufficient to cover the issue of the privileges and immunities of the court, its personnel, counsels, experts and witnesses. I think we can already say that we do not need a law. That agreement will be enforced in the same way that we enforce immunity granted to international organizations such as the ADB. The Rome Statute also provides that after we become a member, we can nominate a judge to the ICC, but in this regard, the statute says that we must comply with the same procedure for nominating judges to our highest court or to the International Court of Justice. We all know of course that we have already nominated Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago to be a judge of the ICC. I am one of those who believe that the good senator is infinitely qualified for the post, as in fact I will be in New York on the 12th to campaign actively for her candidacy. But the issue I speak about today is not her fitness for the post of judge at the ICC. The issue is whether we complied with the procedure for an appointment to the Supreme Court through the Judicial Bar Council, or through the nomination of our accredited arbitrators in the Permanent Court of Arbitration, which is the procedure for nominations to the ICJ. I hope that Senator Santiago will not otherwise be disqualified for an appointment for which she is in fact overqualified just because of our failure to comply with the procedure provided in the Rome Statute. What are the other areas of cooperation that need to be addressed? Well, there are the areas relating to evidence, the accused, witnesses, as well as the duty to cooperate in complying with and implementing court orders and procedures. Of course, an area that we might have trouble with is the duty to cooperate in arresting individuals subject of warrants of arrests issued by the ICC. Our problem here is that we cannot arrest our people wanted by our own local courts. In the Maguindanao massacre, majority of the accused remain at large. How could we cooperate in arresting international fugitives when our law enforcement agents cannot arrest local fugitives? Another problem is Article 98. This article was intended by the framers of the convention to respect agreements already signed before the Rome Statute. If we have an agreement 10 PHILJA JUDICIAL JOURNAL VOL 14:38 2012 not to surrender, then that applies. The problem with the Philippines is that we entered into an Article 98 agreement with the United States where we undertook never to surrender the person of a US serviceman to the ICC after the Rome Statute was already effective. In Bayan Muna v. Executive Secretary, the Supreme Court even said that this immunity agreement is constitutional. This is a huge problem. How do we comply with ICC orders and still comply with Section 98, given the decision inBayan Muna v. Executive Secretary? Then there is the issue of reparation. This is our waterloo outside of the fact that we cannot arrest criminals. We have no provision in our domestic laws nor in our rules on criminal procedure to provide reparations to victims of violations of humanitarian or human rights law, other than the payment of civil indemnity in civil cases, which are deemed instituted impliedly in every criminal case. The duty to provide reparation, which includes the duty to restore the psychosocial being of victims of crimes, is a progressive feature of the Rome Statute of the ICC. Here in the Philippines, the duty of the state to provide reparations, while provided in special statutes intended to protect children and women from domestic violence, is still not widely accepted. For instance, when I asked Judge Jocelyn Solis-Reyes in the Ampatuan massacre case to order local governments to provide psychosocial support for the widows of the Maguindanao massacre arguing that the duty to make reparations includes restoring their psychological state prior to the crime, the defense filed a petition to cite me in contempt. According to the defense, the motion is premised on a pre-judgment that the accused are already guilty of the crime charged. While utterly devoid of merit, such a reaction is understandable given that in our criminal laws, the duty to provide civil indemnity is a duty of the accused himself, and not of the state. The ratification of the Rome Statute is a step in the right direction to end impunity in the Philippines and the rest of the world. In my discussion today, I have identified only a few of the legal nuances, which have arisen, as a result of our accession to our treaty. Be that as it may, the road to justice appears to be straightforward and exciting. The message is loud and clear. With our membership to the ICC, we have—as a nation—decided that barbaric acts should not go unpunished. Hence, no person may target civilians in Maguindanao and in the other conflict-ridden areas of the Philippines. This journey will spell the difference between life and death for many Filipinos. But make no mistake: with our ratification of the Rome Statute of the ICC, there will be no turning back. War criminals and perpetrators of genocide, crimes against humanity and aggression: take heed. Your days are numbered. Ultimately though, statutes as a means of promoting a normative system will only be effective in the context of a working criminal justice system. Perhaps, it is here where the Philippines must exert tremendous efforts in rebuilding existing but badly damaged institutions. New legislation notwithstanding, impunity and terrorism may only be effectively addressed if there is a working legal system that would ensure that those who break the law would in fact be investigated, prosecuted, and punished for their acts. As evidenced by the evolution of the concept of international criminal justice, the lCC and its predecessor ad hoc tribunals, albeit structurally different, were created for a common purpose—to ensure that the gravest international crimes do not go unpunished. I see no reason for our courts to depart from this, if IHL were to have any meaning at all within Philippine territory. 11
Reaction*
Dean Raul C. Pangalangan**
First of all, I would like to start on a point of history. Atty. Harry Roque began with the Yamashita case and perhaps you will be interested to note that the crimes against humanity committed then were done right here in this area. This is ground zero. Padre Faura and Maria Orosa were ground zero for the atrocities. In fact, the biggest battle was fought right in front of Philippine General Hospital (PGH). The heroes in the story were the doctors, the residents and nurses at PGH who took in the victims inside the hospital. The Americans had basically cornered the Japanese. They bound all the bridges—the Quiapo Bridge, the Binondo Bridge, and the Santa Cruz Bridge. So the Japanese could not cross Pasig River. They could not escape along Roxas Boulevard because beyond that would be Manila Bay. The Americans were advancing by land and the Japanese had nowhere to go. Their philosophy was, “Well if I am going to die, I am going to take you along with me,” and “we’re dying anyway so we might as well rape all the women along the way.” So they rounded up all the women in this area and brought them into the hotels along Roxas Boulevard, then they told all their soldiers that they were free to go to the hotels where the women were held captive. As Atty. Roque said, this case presented a difficult legal point because Tomoyuki Yamashita was captured in Kiangan, Ifugao. The only way Yamashita could be charged for crimes against humanity was via the doctrine invented specifically for that case—the doctrine of command responsibility. The test that the commander knew or should have known is actually the controlling test derived from Yamashita. The other point that Atty. Roque raised, which I also would like to elaborate on, was that Yamashita v. Styer was brought all the way to the US Supreme Court. Wilhelm Styer was the American Commanding General for the Philippines. It was brought for habeas corpus before the Philippine Supreme Court and then elevated to the US Supreme Court also for habeas corpus. * Delivered at the Eighth Metrobank Foundation Professorial Chair Lecture held on December 9, 2011, at the Court of Appeals Auditorium, Centennial Building, Court of Appeals, Manila. Transcribed. ** Professor Pangalangan teaches Constitutional Law and Public International Law at the University of the Philippines, focusing on human rights law. He has taught at the Harvard Law School and The Hague Academy of International Law. He was a Philippine Delegate to the Rome Conference that established the International Criminal Court. He has had extensive exposure to rule of law and judicial reform activities in the Philippines. The Supreme Court appointed him amicus counsel during the impeachment of the Chief Justice (Francisco v. House of Representatives) and more recently in a case involving gas extraction from contested portions of the country’s continental shelf. He was also lead counsel before the Supreme Court in David v. Arroyo, challenging successfully President Arroyo’s proclamation of a state of emergency. 12 PHILJA JUDICIAL JOURNAL VOL 14:38 2012
The dissent was actually issued by Justice Frank Murphy. Filipinos were disappointed that Justice Murphy would dissent on the conviction of Yamashita because he was the last American Governor General of the Philippines and so Filipinos expected Justice Murphy to be very sympathetic to them. In his dissent, Justice Murphy said that under the doctrine of command responsibility, Yamashita can be held liable even though he had absolutely no control over the troops in Manila. But, there were actually nuances about the command, that a different service of the Japanese military was in control of Manila, apparently the Navy. It was not directly under the command of Yamashita. Also, the Americans had already cut off the telegraph cable, which ran from Manila all the way to Dagupan, and run by the Philippine National Railways. Therefore, there was no way by which Yamashita could have known what was happening in Manila or by which he could have commanded otherwise. What the Yamashita case and all the developments mentioned by Atty. Roque show us is actually the challenge of expanding what began as a rule governing states—the rule of state responsibility—into an individual criminal responsibility. What Atty. Roque did was to identify for us all the difficulties along the way. The major difficulty, which Atty. Roque identified specially for genocide, is the elements of the crime. For as long as we were dealing with the liability of states, not the liability of individuals, we do not need to identify the elements of crimes. We take Criminal Law II—the elements of crimes—during the second semester of our first year at the College of Law. The elements of crimes had to be drafted afresh for the Rome Statute because for the first time we are applying a prohibition against
He also teaches Constitutional Law at the Philippine Judicial Academy. He has undertaken rule of law, legal ethics and judicial reform projects with various international programs. He chairs the Bantay Katarungan (Sentinels of Justice), a lawyers’ organization to strengthen the rule of law, and writes an Op-Ed column for the Philippine Daily Inquirer, one of the nation’s most popular newspapers. At The Hague Academy, he lectured on Disputed Islands in the South China Sea and Southeast Asia during its 2008 session and served as Director of Studies in 2000. He taught Comparative Asian Constitutionalisms at Melbourne University (Spring 2009 and Fall 2005) and Hong Kong University/Duke University (2008). He has lectured at the Irish Centre for Human Rights (2003); Japan Society of International Law (2002); Thessaloniki Institute of International Public Law (2001); and the International Committee of the Red Cross. He sits in the governing councils of the International Association of Constitutional Law and of the Asian Society of International Law. Professor Pangalangan received his A.B. cum laude (1978) and LL.B. (1983) from the University of the Philippines, and his LL.M. (1986) and S.J.D. (1990) from the Harvard Law School. At Harvard, he won the Laylin Prize in 1986 for best paper in public international law and the Sumner Prize for best dissertation on issues relating to international peace in 1990. He received the Diploma of The Hague Academy of International Law in 1987. He currently holds the Edgardo J. Angara Fellowship established during the Centennial of the University of the Philippines and the George Malcolm Chair in Constitutional Law at the U.P. College of Law. EIGHTH METROBANK FOUNDATION PROFESSORIAL CHAIR LECTURE: LEGAL NUANCES TO THE PHILIPPINE RATIFICATION 13 OF THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT REACTION states and applying them as prohibitions on individuals. To do so, we also have to satisfy a higher level of due process. Moreover, it is also demonstrated in the case of Slobodan Milosevic, the President of Yugoslavia. He was charged before two tribunals. First, before the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY), which is similar to the ICC except that the jurisdiction is specific to Yugoslavia. Before that case before the ICTY, he was charged criminally exactly for the crimes already mentioned by Atty. Roque. That is individual criminal responsibility. However, there was also a case for state responsibility for genocide filed before the International Court of Justice (ICJ). Notice that these are two tribunals: the ICJ hearing the liability of the State for genocide, and the Criminal Tribunal hearing the liability of President Milosevic also for genocide. When the ICJ rendered its decision, it ruled against Yugoslavia for genocide. But the ruling was rather soft because the Tribunal said, “you do not have enough evidence to implicate the state directly.” So the conclusion of the Court was that Yugoslavia was liable because it did not do enough to stop the commission of the crimes. That was a very soft accusation. It did not say that the State actually committed the crimes, merely that the State did not do enough to stop it. Then, they discovered one month later that all the evidence needed to establish that the State had a direct hand in the genocide was already available in the criminal tribunal of the ICTY. Notice these are two courts, both are international courts, and both are at The Hague. They are one stop away in the tram and four minutes away from one another. In that place they do not have traffic, and they use bicycle. So they wondered, if all the evidence was already available in one court, “Bakit naman hindi ipinasa doon sa kabila?” But the answer is exactly what Atty. Roque explained to us—these are two entirely different proceedings. The criminal proceeding dealt with individual criminal responsibility. When the evidence was subpoenaed by the prosecutor, the prosecutor made an undertaking that the evidence will be held under seal, it will be held confidentially. So she kept it a secret even from the judges of the ICJ. And the world was aghast. They said, “how could we have created a system like this.” But it only demonstrates to us, again going back to the point of Atty. Roque, that the moment you convert it from state responsibility, into individual criminal responsibility, what you actually do is to depoliticize the whole contest. In another words, you are not asking whether this guy supported this ideology or not, all you are saying is, I have the elements of the crime needed. If your acts meet the elements of the crime, I have a crime, I will charge to my advantage. And that is why, for me, that is in fact the best endorsement for the ICC, it depoliticizes the offense. Atty. Roque suggested that we apply that to the beheading of the 19 Filipino soldiers by the Moro International Liberation Front (MILF). Notice that, unfortunately, the best defense by the MILF for the cruel savage beheading of Filipino soldiers was offered by Dean Marvic Leonen, the Chief Negotiator for the Philippines with the MILF. He said, “Oh it was just an isolated incident.” If you give the legal equivalent of that argument before the ICC, what it means is that it did not rise to the level of a grave breach justifying jurisdiction by the ICC because the ICC exercises jurisdiction only for the most serious violations of international humanitarian law (IHL). So, when our own Chief Negotiator with the MILF 14 PHILJA JUDICIAL JOURNAL VOL 14:38 2012 goes around saying that it was just an isolated incident, he would be Exhibit A for the MILF should they be charged before the ICC. I would like now to move to the point on symmetry. In fact, one of the best points going for the ICC. Notice that Atty. Roque pointed out the prohibition on the recruitment of child soldiers. That is a prohibition under state responsibility on human rights. The bizarre thing about human rights is that it is an obligation of states, it is not an obligation of rebels. There is something weird when the New People’s Army (NPA) recruits child soldiers. In Geneva, when they hear the Philippine Report on the Convention on the Rights of the Child or on the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) or Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ESCR), “Sino yung tatanungin nila about child soldiers?” They would not ask the NPA because they do not have any personality before these Conventions. They will ask only the Philippine government. So why did the Philippine government have to defend a rebel group in shooting at them. That is the bizarre thing about human rights. It is one sided. It is asymmetrical. It binds one party to the conflict of the state. It does not bind the rebel party because it is technically a non-state private party. That is why the duty of the ICC is that it restores the symmetry. That it does not look at which army you belong to, it only asks whether this individual committed war crimes, whether they committed crimes against humanity, or displaced recruited child soldiers. And if they committed it, the ICC will determine whether that entity belongs to a state or to a rebel group. For as long as, again, they meet the elements of the crime, they can be held liable for that crime. And finally, just by way of phrasing Atty. Roque, this is one of the most original points, one of the most innovative points he made: that for the desaparecidos, the disappeared, we cannot limit the jurisdiction of the ICC by temporal jurisdiction. In other words, temporal jurisdiction says the jurisdiction is prospective, you cannot apply it retroactively. It cannot apply to the two UP students who disappeared two or three years ago. Atty. Roque is correct, it partakes of the nature of a continuing offense because although they disappeared two or three or four years ago, for as long as their bodies are hidden we really do not know who killed them. The point of the desaparecido phenomenon, which arose in Latin America and followed in the Philippines, is that if a person is tortured and he is released then he can testify that he is tortured. He can identify his torturers, and show the body that had the marks of torture. The torturers, on the other hand, would have to invent, to conjure a version that is barely believable. In the Hilao case, student activist Lilioasa Hilao, the main petitioner in the Honolulu case against Marcos, was captured. After she was tortured, she had to be hospitalized at V. Luna. Then she died. The autopsy report said that she died because she saw a bottle of Pepsi containing acid and she had basically drunk the whole thing. That was what happens if you torture someone and you let that someone live. The desaparecido phenomenon is designed specifically to preclude all those legal problems. You kidnap the person, torture the person and basically just bury the person somewhere. For as long as the person had disappeared, no one will be charged because there will be no evidence, no witness whatsoever. And that is the hope of the criminal. EIGHTH METROBANK FOUNDATION PROFESSORIAL CHAIR LECTURE: LEGAL NUANCES TO THE PHILIPPINE RATIFICATION 15 OF THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT REACTION For me, the scariest thing, about the Maguindanao massacre is that they buried the victims. I understand they had this backhoe. They used the backhoe to drag the bodies, dumped them into a pit, and they covered them. In other words, it is a massive super effort. It is like a Superman-kind of desaparecido. Desaparecido in small scale is, they will do it in one or two victims. In Maguindanao it was wholesale—instead of burying them in some ditch, they mashed up some parts and just buried the entirety. That is why, I agree with Atty. Roque when he said that the desaparecido phenomenon in the Philippines vintage 2002 to 2006, fully documented by Philip Alston, the UN Special Rapporteur, can be a proper exercise of ICC jurisdiction. I want to congratulate Atty. Roque. I want to thank PHILJA and the Metrobank Foundation for having sponsored this lecture. Atty. Roque and I were activists during the Marcos years. I am much older than Atty. Roque. He was my student. I can tell you that, over the years, it has become more and more difficult to teach human rights law. For the first generation of students that I taught, Atty. Roque included, Martial Law was still a real thing for them. I saw the violation, it was a real thing. You know for kids today, it is like history. In fact, I tell my contemporaries, it is like my parents talking to me about the Japanese time. It is something which happened in the past. And for the Hilao case, I used to just use the Marcos verdict in the case in Honolulu. Today I use the autopsy report for it to be more dramatic, to be a bit more real. For the comfort women case, I would even use some pictures of the comfort women when they were young because if they see them as “lolas” it is hard for the kids to imagine that, once upon a time, these were like voluptuous women who were raped 10 times a day over two years by the Japanese. In other words, and I am saying this to both Metrobank and PHILJA, I think the teaching of this course will benefit a lot from the legal material presented by Atty. Roque. How to reach out to the next generation? It is a continuing challege for all of us. Thank you. 16 PHILJA JUDICIAL JOURNAL VOL 14:38 2012
Closing Remarks*
Honorable Arturo D. Brion Associate Justice, Supreme Court
At the heart of all human rights is the right to life—the basic right of every individual to live and to enjoy life to its fullest poten al. This is the right from which all other rights— civil, poli cal, and social—stem and without which all other rights would be rendered insignifi cant. The establishment of the Inte rna onal Criminal Court underscores the value the world places on the right to life; at its most basic, the four crimes1 under the ICC’s jurisdic on are viola ons of the individual’s right to life—viola ons that the signatories to the Rome Statute labeled and elevated as most serious crimes of concern to the interna onal community as a whole. According to reports, the Philippines is in the human rights watch list of the United Na ons and the US Congress: “The Philippine government is consistently failing in its obliga ons under interna onal human rights law to hold accountable perpetrators of poli cally mo vated killings x x x. With inconclusive inves ga ons, implausible suspects, and no convic ons, impunity prevails.”2 The Philippine’s ra fi ca on of the Rome Statute is our signal to the world that those days may soon be over. Our ra fi ca on reaffi rms the value we place on the right to life and our commitment to guarantee full respect for human rights and all other rights guaranteed in our Cons tu on.3 This ra fi ca on is our commitment to pursuing a path where impunity is not tolerated, and where atrocious viola ons of human rights will not remain unpunished. But as our dis nguished lecturer has pointed out, “the ra fi ca on marks only the beginning of the country’s journey to end impunity.” Our goal is certainly not just ra fi ca on; nor is it the ins tu on of the necessary changes and adjustments that our laws and legal system will have to make in light of our commitment to provide full coopera on with the ICC. The ul mate goal is the prosecu on and punishment of all those who are accountable and responsible for these serious crimes, and the ICC is an eff ec ve legal mechanism to help us achieve this objec ve.
* Delivered at the Eighth Metrobank Founda on Professorial Chair Lecture held on December 9, 2011, at the Court of Appeals Auditorium, Centennial Building, Court of Appeals, Manila. 1 The crime of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and the crime of aggression. (Ar cle 5, paragraph 1 of the Rome Statute). 2 Phl s ll fails to address extrajudicial killings—rights group, The Philippine Star, July 21, 2011, h p://www.philstar.com/Ar cle.aspx?publica onSubCategory Id=63&ar