China's Engagement with an Evolving International Monetary System: A
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CHINA’S ENGAGEMENT WITH AN EVOLVING INTERNATIONAL MONETARY SYSTEM A PAYMENTS PERSPECTIVE SPECIAL REPORT CHINA’S ENGAGEMENT WITH AN EVOLVING INTERNATIONAL MONETARY SYSTEM A PAYMENTS PERSPECTIVE SPECIAL REPORT Thomas A. Bernes, Paul Jenkins, Perry Mehrling and Daniel H. Neilson Copyright © 2014 by the Centre for International Governance Innovation and the Institute for New Economic Thinking The opinions expressed in this publication are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of The Centre for International Governance Innovation or its Operating Board of Directors or International Board of Governors. This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution — Non-commercial — No Derivatives License. To view this license, visit (www.creativecommons.org/ licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/). For re-use or distribution, please include this copyright notice. 67 Erb Street West 300 Park Avenue South, 5th floor Waterloo, Ontario N2L 6C2 New York, NY 10010 Canada USA tel +1 519 885 2444 fax + 1 519 885 5450 tel +1 212 444 9612 www.cigionline.org www.ineteconomics.org TABLE OF CONTENTS iv About the Authors 1 Executive Summary 3 Introduction 4 The Evolving IMS and China 4 The Hierarchy of International Money 5 Eurodollar Market as a Payments System 5 The Spectrum of Hybridity: Public and Private Money 6 Liquidity versus Solvency 6 Managing Money 7 The RMB 7 Steps Going Forward 9 Payments and Risk Consequences of China’s Growth Model 9 Payment Flows — International and Domestic 10 The PBoC’s Risk Exposures 12 The Political Economy of Reform 12 Sustaining Economic Growth: A Prerequisite of Reform 14 The Importance of Political Will 15 Building Strong, Accountable Institutions 17 Conclusion 17 Acknowledgements 18 Annex: The Relative Price of Onshore and Offshore RMB 19 Works Cited 21 Acronyms 24 About CIGI 24 About INET 24 CIGI Masthead CHINA’S ENGAGEMENT WITH AN EVOLVING INTERNATIONAL MONETARY SYSTEM: A PAYMENTS PERSPECTIVE ABOUT THE AUTHORS Thomas A. Bernes is a CIGI distinguished fellow. After a distinguished career in the Canadian public service and at leading international economic institutions, Tom was CIGI’s executive director from 2009 to 2012. He has held high-level positions at the IMF, the World Bank, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development and the Government of Canada. Tom was appointed the executive secretary of the joint IMF-World Bank Development Committee in 2001, where he participated as a member of the Task Force on Reform of the Multilateral Development Banks established by the Development Committee. Prior to joining CIGI, Tom was director of the IMF’s Independent Evaluation Office. Paul Jenkins is a CIGI distinguished fellow. He provides strategic advice to the Global Economy Program, including activities related to CIGI’s partnership with the Institute for New Economic Thinking and broader macroeconomic issues. His own research focuses on international policy coordination and financial stability, with a particular interest in the G20. From 2003 to 2010, he served as senior deputy governor of the Bank of Canada. Paul received his M.Sc. in economics from the London School of Economics and Political Science and his B.A. in economics from the University of Western Ontario. In addition to his position at CIGI, Paul is a member of the board of governors of the University of Western Ontario; senior distinguished fellow in the Faculty of Public Affairs, Carleton University; and a senior fellow, C. D. Howe Institute. Perry Mehrling is the director of Education Programs for the Institute for New Economic Thinking. Perry has been professor of economics at Barnard College since 1987. He teaches courses on the economics of money and banking, the history of money and finance, and the financial dimensions of the US retirement, health and education systems. He also has held visiting positions at the MIT Sloan School of Management and Boston University. Perry is the author of The New Lombard Street: How the Fed Became the Dealer of Last Resort (Princeton University Press, 2011), and Fischer Black and the Revolutionary Idea of Finance (John Wiley & Sons, 2005; reissued in a revised paperback edition in 2012). He received a bachelor’s degree from Harvard University, a master’s degree from the London School of Economics and a Ph.D. from Harvard University. Daniel H. Neilson is an economist at the Institute for New Economic Thinking whose expertise is centred on money, the financial system and their role in the macroeconomy. He has responsibility for the Institute for New Economic Thinking’s financial stability research program. His dissertation research included measurement of liquidity premia in interest-rate derivatives markets. More recent work studies the changing role of the Federal Reserve in the financial system over the course of the financial crisis, raising questions for the future conduct of liquidity and monetary policy. Dan earned his B.A. from Bard College of Simon’s Rock in 2001 and his Ph.D. from Columbia University in 2009. In addition to his work for the institute, he teaches economics at Simon’s Rock. IV • WWW.CIGIONLINE.ORG | WWW.INETECONOMICS.ORG SPECIAL REPORT EXECUTIVE SUMMARY informal cooperation among the major central banks in ways considered appropriate for any given set of global The global financial crisis of 2008 and its aftermath vividly conditions. Put differently, each national central bank demonstrated the interconnectedness and evolving nature takes responsibility for lender-of-last-resort backstop in of today’s financial markets. In considering China’s its own national money market, knowing that it can call engagement with the international monetary system on support from other central banks as needed to provide (IMS), it is important to take account of the nature of liquidity through a swap arrangement. At present, the the system into which China is integrating and potential most important swap lines are those linking the “C6” — consequences of further integration for both China and the the Federal Reserve, Bank of England, European Central world. In this report, the authors develop an alternative Bank (ECB), Swiss National Bank, Bank of Japan and Bank perspective to examine this issue, starting from the idea of Canada. These central bank swap lines help knit the that the IMS is fundamentally a payments system. system together at the global level. A central feature of this perspective is the hierarchy of For the Chinese, one consequence of the global financial “international money” that extends top-down from the crisis was the policy decision to move further along the dominant role currently played by the US dollar as the path of internationalization of the renminbi (RMB). Given system’s reserve currency, to central bank swap lines, to the underdeveloped character of domestic money markets, the issuance of national money and expansion of national as well as that of the domestic banking system, the decision credit. The payments approach has two additional was made first to concentrate on developing an offshore distinguishing features: the importance of both public and market in Hong Kong. To a significant extent, the urgency private sources of liquidity to settle obligations between of this internationalization effort has been driven by the debtors and creditors; and the importance of gross flows enormous and growing dollar exposure of the People’s and balance sheets (stocks) in assessing financial risks and Bank of China (PBoC). The PBoC has on its balance sheet vulnerabilities. an over US$4 trillion foreign exchange swap exposure, long dollars and short RMB. From this perspective, the In the financially developed part of the world, private ultimate objective of RMB internationalization would money markets in normal times are able to absorb seem to be about creating a robust private market with the fluctuations in the net settlement of payments, providing capacity to absorb some of this exposure. In the absence liquidity by expanding and contracting short-term of an RMB-denominated capital market, however, offshore international credits. In this way, each of the globally money markets are probably not enough. integrated money markets has its own point of contact with a national money. The Eurodollar, for example, is It follows from this perspective that internationalization essentially a promise to pay privately issued US bank of the RMB will critically involve a shift in the position money, but US bank money is ultimately a promise to pay of the RMB both in terms of its place in the network of the publicly issued US currency. During the recent financial international private money markets, and in terms of its crisis when money markets seized up, advanced economy place in the international central bank backstop system of central banks had to assume this role by expanding their swaps. balance sheets. This is, however, seen as an exception. The challenge for China is to figure out how exactly it In the less financially developed part of the world, where wishes to manage its engagement with this emerging there are no deep and liquid markets, this same task of IMS. At present, the PBoC acts more or less as lender of absorbing fluctuations in payments more normally falls first resort, absorbing all fluctuations in net international on the central bank, which must use its own balance settlement on its own balance sheet. Current efforts to sheet. A key dimension of engagement and integration support development of the offshore RMB market can into today’s IMS, therefore, concerns the development of be understood, in this context, as the first step toward money markets that allow the central bank to step back developing a deep and liquid money market that could to focus on supporting the private market rather than take some of the burden off the PBoC, at least in normal making it. Indeed, in considering the future of the IMS, times.