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Sin g e r , D o n a l d L e w is

GERMAN DIPLOMATS AT NUREMBERG: A STUDY OF THE FOREIGN OFFICE DEFENDANTS OF THE MINISTRIES CASE

The American University PH.D. 1980

University Microfilms International300 N. Zeeb Road, Ann Arbor, MI 48106

Copyright 1980 by Singer, Donald Lewis All Rights Reserved

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. GERMAN DIPLOMATS AT NUREMBERG: A STUDY OF THE

FOREIGN OFFICE DEFENDANTS

OF THE MINISTRIES CASE

by

Donald L. Singer

submitted to the

Faculty of the College of Arts and Sciences

of The American University

in Partial Fulfillment of

The Requirements for the Degree

of

Doctor of Philosophy

in

History

Signatures of Committee:

Chairman: I

Date

1980

The American University Washington, D.C. 20016

THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LIBRARY

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. GERMAN DIPLOMATS AT NUREMBERG: A STUDY OF THE

FOREIGN OFFICE DEFENDANTS

OF THE MINISTRIES CASE

BY

DONALD L. SINGER

ABSTRACT

The role of the German Foreign Office officials in

Hitler's plan to exterminate the Jews of Europe raises

the following questions: How much did the officials know?

Did the officials' actions contribute to Hitler's criminal

program? How did the officials justify their continued

service in the Nazi regime? Could they have acted differently

The Nuremberg trials dealt with these questions.

Ostensibly formulated from existing international law, it

dealt with a variety of charges. Of all these charges,

the attempt to exterminate the European Jews represented

the most obvious violation of international conduct. Thus

the trial of German diplomats for crimes against the Jews

tests the validity of Nuremberg law and provides information

on the diplomats themselves. Eight individuals associated with the Foreign Office

were defendants at the Nuremberg trial known as the Ministries

ii

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. case: Ernst von Weizsacker, Ernst Woermann, Otto von

Erdmannsdorff, Karl Ritter, Ernst Wilhelm Bohle,

Wilhelm Keppler, Gustav Adolf Steengracht von Moyland, and

Edmund Veesenmayer. This dissertation examines that portion

of the Ministries case which dealt with these defendants

and the charge of deporting Jews to death camps.

This dissertation's principal sources are the

Transcripts of the trial, the prosecution and defense exhibits,

and the Official Court File. The Transcripts contain the

trial proceedings, including the testimony of defendants

and witnesses, plus the judgment and a dissenting opinion.

Most prosecution exhibits are documents from the Third

Reich Foreign Office. Most defense exhibits are affidavits

by individuals who knew or worked with the defendants.

Generally, the prosecution exhibits tell what the defendants

did, while the defense exhibits explain why they did it.

The prosecution exhibits often distort the defendants'

attitudes, as the defendants had written these documents to

please their Nazi superiors. Similarly, defense affidavits

must be read discerningly. An affiant's background and

cross-examination provide means of assessing the affidavit's

credibility. The Official Court File contains motions

presented to the Court and the resulting Court orders,

providing information on procedural fairness.

I have also interviewed five individuals associated

with the Ministries trial. These interviews provide details

iii

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. and corroborate impressions derived from the Transcripts.

The following standards of determining the defendants'

legal accountability were suggested during the trial pro­

ceedings: a defendant's initial or signature on an

incriminating document; reliable testimony of a defendant's

involvement with incriminating activities; admission of

incriminating activity. The Tribunal did not adhere strictly

to these standards, and several times reached a conclusion

on the basis of probability.

The following paragraphs contain my conclusions.

Most of the defendants (possible exceptions being

Bohle and Ritter) knew enough about the treatment of the

Jews to be held legally accountable for any participation in

that treatment. Three (Weizsacker, Woermann, and Veesenmayer)

or possibly four CSteengracht) defendants signed documents

or took actions which made them participants in the deporta­

tion program. There is, however, a discrepancy between

legal guilt and moral guilt. Weizsacker and Woermann, for

example, were among the less morally culpable defendants.

Most of the defendants said that duty compelled them

to remain in office, but their concepts of duty differed

markedly. It is plausible that the defendants knew more

than could be legally proven. However, psychologically

they may have refused to comprehend the obvious.

The defendants could have offered greater resistance

to the deportations, though not without undetermined personal

risk. This coercion justified mitigated punishments, but

not acquittals.

* i \ t Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. The Tribunal made some questionable decisions.

Furthermore, Bohle's and Keppler's convictions for membership

in the SS, an organization associated with the deportations,

were contrary to international law. The Tribunal, however,

conducted the trial fairly. Generally, its verdicts were

sound regarding direct involvement of defendants with the

deportations. The Ministries trial of German diplomats

for crimes against the Jews was a valid exercise of inter­

national law.

v

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. PREFACE

When I began this dissertation my main interest in

history was European diplomacy, particularly the diplomacy

of the 1920s and 1930s. My preferred type of history was

biography. The Nuremberg trial of German diplomats was a

vehicle to satisfy that interest and preference. The

trial, however, soon became the focal point of my research.

My original intent was to cover all the major aspects

of the Foreign Office defendants’ trial, but this proved

impractical. I therefore limited the dissertation to what

I believe was the most significant charge directed against

the defendants--the charge of having been criminally

involved with the deportation of the Jews. In adopting this

topic, I rejected the good advice given by a professor

many years ago. The professor said that a historian should

not write on a subject to which he is emotionally tied.

As a Jew two generations removed from Europe, I cannot look

upon the deportations with detachment, nor would I wish to.

But as an historian, I have tried to view dispassionately

the diplomats who were accused of furthering the deportations.

Whether I have succeeded is for others to judge.

In this dissertation, there are two matters of spelling

and one matter of citations which should be clarified. The

American participants at Nuremberg spelled the name of that

vi

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. city in a variety of ways: the English spelling, the

German spelling with a diacritic, the German spelling with

"ue," and wrongly. I have used the English spelling

"Nuremberg," but in citing titles of works I have retained

the original spelling. The same procedure applies to the

use of a diacritic versus the use of an "e" in regard to

umlauts. I have used the diacritic in spelling "Weizsacker,"

but in citing the Nuremberg publications and Official Record

I have retained their spelling of "Weizsaecker." A small

percentage, but nonetheless significant portions, of the

Ministries case records have been published in Trials of

War Criminals before the Nuernberg Military Tribunals under

Control Council Law No. 10. Nuernberg October 1946 - April

1949, vols. 12-15. In regard to English material published

in Trials of War Criminals, I have cited only the published

source. In regard to German documents translated into

English in Trials of War Criminals, I have cited both the

published English translation and the unpublished German

source.

Most of my research has been done at the National

Archives in Washington, D.C. I appreciate the willing

assistance provided by Robert Wolfe and his staff at the

National Archives. Special gratitude is due John Mendelsohn,

who originally suggested my subject and whose expertise and

concern with the Nuremberg trials has aided and inspired my

own quest. I am indebted to my dissertation committee:

vii

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Richard Breitman, Carl Anthon, and Ira Klein. Without their

guidance, prodding, and editing, this dissertation would

not have attained whatever level of proficiency it has

attained. I cannot adequately thank my wife Pat for

having endured this dissertation for too long, but I -an

thank her for contributing her exceptional talents as an

editor, Finally, thanks to my daughter Valerie for

tolerating the grouch in the basement vho too often was

unwilling to interrupt his work to help with her homework.

viii

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. CONTENTS

ABSTRACT ...... ii

PREFACE ...... vi

I. INTRODUCTION: THE TRIAL AND THE L A W ...... 1

II. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE THIRD REICH FOREIGN OFFICE RELEVANT TO THE MINISTRIES TRIAL.... 28

III. THE FOREIGN OFFICE DEFENDANTS ...... 47

IV. THE TRIAL: PROCEDURES AND PROCEEDINGS ...... 103

V. WEIZSACKER, WOERMANN, AND ERDMANNSDORFF AND THE DEPORTATION OF THE JEWS, 1942-43.... 150

VI. VEESENMAYER, STEENGRACHT, AND RITTER AND THE DEPORTATION OF THE HUNGARIAN JEWS, 1944 ...... 219

VII. CONCLUSION: EVALUATIONS OF THE DEFENDANTS AND THE T R I A L ...... 268

APPENDIX: GUIDE TO IDENTIFICATION OF SELECTED INDIVIDUALS WHO ARE MENTIONED MORE THAN ONCE .... 281

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY ...... 283

ix

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION: THE TRIAL AND THE LAW

The involvement of the German Foreign Office in the

destruction of European Jewry is of particular interest to

the student of international diplomacy. Adolf Hitler and

the Nazi elite needed help to carry out their campaign to

exterminate the Jews of Europe. They turned to professional

diplomats, as well as to outsiders who were Nazi loyalists,

in order to deport Jews from conquered and allied nations to

death camps. But did the Foreign Office officials recognize

what they were doing? And if so, how did they justify their

actions?

The Ministries trial, held at Nuremberg from 1947 to

1949, provides some incisive answers to these questions.

Unlike the more famous International Military Tribunal

(hereafter generally referred to as IMT) which in 1945-46

tried the top Nazi officials (including Hitler's two foreign

ministers, Konstantin von Neurath and Joachim von PdLbbentrop) ,

the Ministries Tribunal tried eight former Foreign Office

officials who had held second or third level positions. Some

of the Ministries case defendants were professional civil

servants whose government careers predated the Nazi seizure of

power. Other defendants were members of the Nazi Party who

1

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. entered the foreign service through their party connections.

The trial provides information on both the traditional diplomat

in a radical government and the radical official in a

traditional bureaucracy. While we would expect the civil

servant to be more critical of Nazi policies than his colleague

from the party, we cannot equate this attitude with greater

immunity from entanglement in Nazi crimes.

The eight Foreign Office defendants in the Ministries

trial were Ernst von Weizsacker, Ernst Woermann, Otto von

Erdmannsdorff, Karl Ritter, Ernst Wilhelm Bohle, Wilhelm

Keppler, Gustav Adolf Steengracht von Moyland, and Edmund

Veesenmayer. The majority of these men held several positions

within the German Foreign Office during their careers (chapter

three will survey these careers), but each had a particular

assignment which was most relevant to his trial, Weizsacker

served from 1938 to 19.43 as state secretary of the Foreign

Office, a position second in importance only to that of

foreign minister. Woermann, as head of the Foreign Office's

Political Department during the same years, was Weizsacker's

chief assistant. Erdmannsdorff, as director of the Political

Department from 1941 to 1945, functioned as the key subordinate

to Woermann and to Woermann's successor. Ritter, in the years

1940 to 1945, had the assignment of liaison officer between

Foreign Minister Ribbentrop and Armed Forces Chief of Staff

Wilhelm Keitel. As head of the Auslandsorganisation (or AO)

from 1933 to 1945, Bohle was primarily a functionary of the

Nazi Party; however, his leadership of the AO led to a place

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in the Foreign Office in 1937. From 1938 to 1945, Keppler

bore the title of state secretary for special assignments.

The title sounds important, but Keppler's position should

not be equated with that of the actual state secretary.

Steengracht succeeded Weizsacker as state secretary, and held

that office from 1943 to 1945. In 1944 Veesenmayer was

appointed minister and Reich plenipotentiary to Hungary, and

retained that job until 1945.

Most historians have viewed the German Foreign Office

officials of the Nazi era with varying degrees of disfavor,^- 2 yet most have also been critical of the Nuremberg trials.

There is an explanation for this apparent inconsistency.

Many of those who have discussed the Wilhelmstrasse (an

informal name for the German Foreign Office, derived from its

address) have used the Nuremberg trial records as a source

without evaluating the trials. This research has predominantly

The following quotations provide examples. "Clinging to their posts, purportedly 'to prevent worse,1 they [the Foreign Office officials] acquiesced passively to Foreign Office participation in the mass-murder of the Jewish people." Christopher R. Browning, "Referat Deutschland, Jewish Policy and the German Foreign Office (1933-1940)," Yad Vashem Studies 12 (1977): 73. "The Foreign Office became an auxiliary to the SS in the murder of the Jews." Lucy S. Dawidowicz, The War Against the Jews 1933-1945 (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1975) , p . 139. '‘The German bureaucracy made its weighty and drastic decisions to destroy . . . the Jews of Europe." Raul Kilberg, The Destruction of the European Jews (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, l96l), p . v. 2 Two recent thoughtful works are Bradley F. Smith's Reaching Judgment at Nuremberg (New York: Basic Books, 1977) and Werner Maser's Nttmberg: Tribunal der Sieger (Dusseldorf: Econ Verlag, 1977). See, in particular, Smith s conclusions on pp. 301-6 and Maser's conclusions on pp. 517-78, 607-8.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 4

utilized the prosecution documents, which would naturally 3 produce a negative analysis of the Foreign Office. The

scholars who have focused on Nuremberg have not been primarily

concerned with the charges which involved the murder of the

Jews, but have emphasized the charge of crimes against peace.

Unfortunately for the reputation of the trials, the subject

of crimes against peace has been the most controversial

aspect of Nuremberg law,^ and, as one scholar says, has tended

"to discredit the enterprise as a whole.Examining the

judicial handling of the diplomats accused of crimes against

the Jews provides a different perspective' on both the

Nuremberg process and the conduct of these defendants during

the Third Reich.

There is universal agreement that the Nazi program

against the Jews was a grossly immoral violation of human

rights. But immorality and illegality are not the same.

O The following monographs are examples of works which frequently cite the Nuremberg prosecution documents, but not the Nuremberg defense documents: Hilberg, De'struction of the European Jews. Gerald Reitlinger, The Final Solution.- The Attempt to Exterminate the Jews of Europe, 1939-1945 (London: Vallentine, Mitchell, 1953)! Paul Seabury, The Wilhelmstrasse: A Study of German Diplomats under the Nazi Regime (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1954).

^Franz B. Schick, "The Nuremberg Trial and the Interna­ tional Law of the Future," American Journal of International Law 41 (October 1947): 783. William D. Mallard, Jr., "Nuremberg - A Step Forward?" The International Lawyer 4 (July 1970): 674.

“*0tto Kirchheimer, Political Justice: The Use of Legal Procedure (Princeton"! Princeton University Press, 1961) , p . 324.

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Some critics of Nuremberg assert that bureaucrats who carry

out their government's orders, regardless of how reprehensible

those orders are, are not accountable to international law.

Some who argue in this vein concede that bureaucrats should

be held accountable, but add that international law at the

time of World War II was insufficiently developed. Other

critics cite the argument of "victor's justice," essentially

a procedural charge. According to this point of view,

authorities from the victor country could not justly try

authorities from the loser nation because of the emotional

atmosphere following armed conflict.

The trial of the Foreign Office defendants, particularly

their trial for crimes against the Jews, can be used, I

believe, to evaluate all these arguments. Of all the crimes

charged against the Nuremberg defendants, those involving

the Jews are the most odious. Furthermore, the Ministries

trial was marked by great procedural care. Finally, of all

the Nuremberg trials, it was the most distant in time from

the war. If, several years after the war, German officials

could not be tried justly for alleged participation in the

most barbaric acts of the Nazi regime, then the whole idea of

Nuremberg is eviscerated.

My study of the Ministries trial has led me to the

following perspective on the trial and on the Nuremberg pro­

ceedings in general. International law as it existed at the

fL For comments on "victor's justice," see August von Knieriem, The Nuremberg Trials, trans. Elizabeth D,. Schmitt (Chicago: H. Regnery, 1959),p. 105.

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end of the war did provide a basis to prosecute six of the

Foreign Office defendants for crimes against the Jews.

However, the formulation of Nuremberg law also permitted

the prosecution of two individuals whose activities, though

morally questionable, would not have been prosecutable

under the existing international law. The Ministries case

judges conscientiously applied procedural measures which,

although not perfect, were fair. Despite justifiable

criticisms, the trial of German officials for participation

in crimes against the Jews was both legally and morally

sound. Thus the Nuremberg trials in general cannot be

dismissed wholesale. If human rights are to be safe­

guarded by international society, Nuremberg presents a

worthwhile precedent.

The Ministries trial is also valuable because the

documents it generated illuminate the character of the

defendants, not just their official acts. Through their own

testimony and that of their friends and former colleagues,

the Foreign Office defendants gave revealing and significant

portraits of themselves. Scholars have not fully used the

defense material in evaluating the German bureaucrats of

the Nazi regime; while the defendants’ evidence is undoubt­

edly self-serving, a careful analysis of it provides a

fuller understanding of the bureaucrats and how they saw them­

selves, In the case of most of the Foreign Office defendants,

this new understanding allows one to develop sympathy for their

plight without condoning their behavior, I believe that one Foreign

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Office defendant, Weizsacker, displayed good intentions

but poor judgment in his decision to stay in office. Other

defendants in remaining in office displayed indifference to

the fate of the Jews, rather than intentional maliciousness.

Even Veesenmayer, the one defendant who attempted at the

trial to provide a raison d'etat for the deportation of the

Jews, does not appear to have been a psychologically abnormal

individual. The sobering thought is that, under the right

circumstances, quite ordinary people can participate in

extraordinary crimes.^

The German diplomats' relationship to their government's

criminal policies is of current as well as historical interest.

The senseless killing of the Jews may never be repeated, but

totalitarian governments with disdain for international law

still exist. And even officials in a nontotalitarian state

could be asked, in the name of national interest, to support

a policy which would bring death to innocent millions. At

what point is an official's loyalty to his government and

his nation overridden by individual conscience or international

law? This study attempts to elucidate the conduct of German

diplomats who were accused of not answering this question

properly. I would also suggest that although there are no

ethical absolutes, it is possible for the historian to make

moral judgments.

Before discussing in detail either the diplomats or

^See Hannah Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil, revised and enlarged ed. (New York: Viking Press, 1964), pp. 252, 287-88.

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their trial, it would be helpful to show the relationship

of the Ministries trial to the other Nuremberg trials and to

explore international law as it related to the Nuremberg

charge of crimes against the Jews.

The Nuremberg Trials

The Ministries case was one of twelve trials con­

ducted by American authorities at Nuremberg. It was the

last Nuremberg trial to deliver a verdict, it was in session

the longest, and--of greatest importance--it used the most

extensive documentation. It received over five thousand

Q defense exhibits and over four thousand prosecution exhibits,

including revealing documents of crimes against the Jews--

documents which were not accessible at the time of the IMT,

The chronological position of the Ministries trial gave its

prosecutors, defense lawyers, and judges the advantage of

using the arguments and findings of earlier Nuremberg trials.

There were actually thirteen war crimes trials held

at Nuremberg, including the International Military Tribunal.

The Americans, British, French, and Russians jointly conducted

the IMT. It held its first regular session on 20 November 1945 a and rendered its verdicts on 30 September and 1 October 1946.

Q John Mendelsohn, "Trial by Document; The Use of Seized Records in the United States Proceedings at Nuremberg" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Maryland, 1974), (appendix X), p. 208. 9 For a detailed chronology of the IMT, see Trial of the Major War Criminals before the International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg 14 November 1945 - 1 October 1946, 42 vols. (Nuremberg: Secretariat of the International Military

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 9

The twelve trials which the Americans administered followed

the IMT and thus are often referred to as the subsequent

trials.

The American-conducted Nuremberg trials got under

way on 24 and 25 October 1946. On the twenty-fourth,

American military headquarters in Europe established the

Office of Chief of Counsel for War Crimes (or OCCWC), headed

by Brigadier General Telford Taylor, to prosecute these

trials.10 The day after the establishment of OCCWC, an indict­

ment was filed in United States of America vs. Karl Brandt,

et al., more commonly referred to as the Medical case or

case 1. The October 1946 indictment in the Medical case was

quickly followed by other indictments, and by the end of

November 1947 the last of twelve indictments had been filed.

The other eleven cases received the following numbers and

names: ^

Tribunal, 1947-49), 23:1-70. (This reference will hereafter be cited as IMT.) The defendants and their counsel are listed in IMT, 1:6-7. The names of the judges can be found in ibid., p. 1. The names of the prosecutors are in ibid., pp. 3-5.

•*-®The order establishing OCCWC is reproduced in Tel­ ford Taylor, Final Report to the Secretary of the Army on the Nuernberg War Crime Trials under Control Council Law No. 10 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1949),(appendix N), p. 294. This order may also be found in Trials of War Criminals before the Nuernberg Military Tribunals under Control Council Law No. 10. Nuernberg October 1946 - April 1949 (hereafter cited as TWC), vol. 12: Case 11, U.S. v. von' Weizsaecker, "The Ministries Case" (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1951), pp. xxiii-xxiv.

■^See TWC, vol. 7: Case 6, U.S. v. Krauch, "The I.G. Farben Case" (Washington, D.C,: U,S. Government Printing Office, 1953), p. iv. This dissertation will refer to the subsequent cases by their popular names.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. IQ

Case No. United States of America Against Popular Name

2 Erhard Milch Milch case 3 Josef Altstoetter, et al. Justice case 4 Oswald Pohl, et al. Pohl case 5 Friedrich Flick, et al. Flick case 6 Carl Krauch, et al. I. G. Farben case 7 Wilhelm List, et a l . Hostage case 8 Ulrich Greifelt, et al. RuSHA case 9 Otto Ohlendorf, et al. Einsatzgruppen case 10 Alfried Krupp, et al. Krupp case 11 Ernst von Weizsaecker, et al. * Ministries case 12 Wilhelm von Leeb, et a l . High Command case

All twelve cases were tried under the same law, were prosecuted

by the OCCWC, utilized to a large extent the same defense 12 counsel, and even occasionally used the same judges; never­

theless, in some aspects they were quite diversified. For

example, the number of defendants tried varied from twenty- 13 three in the Medical and Farben cases to one in the Milch case.

12 For pertinent, although incomplete, data on the defense counsel who participated in the subsequent trials, see Taylor, Final Report (appendix Q), pp. 297-344, 13 Telford Taylor presents a schedule of data on all twelve of the subsequent trials on pp. 118-19 (appendix A) of ibid.; however, since Taylor's appendix A is actually his interim report of May 1948, the information in this schedule is incomplete. TWC has an introduction to each case which provides pertinent data on that case. These introductions are located in the following volumes at the following page numbers: Medical case TWC, vol. 1: Case 1, U.S. v. Brandt, "The Medical Case" (Washington, D.C,: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1949), pp. 3-4. Milch case -- TWC, vol. 2: Case 1, U.S. v. Brandt, "The Medical Case71!- Case 2, U.S. v. Milch, ''The Milch Case" (Washington, D .C .: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1949), p. 355. Justice case -- TWC, vol. 3: Case 3, U.S. v. Altstoetter, "The Justice Case" (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1951), pp. 3-5. Pohl case -- TWC, vol. 5: Case 8, U.S. v. Greifelt, "The RuSHA Case"; Case 4, U.S. v. Pohl, "The Pohl Case*1 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1950), pp. 195-96. Flick case -- TWC, vol. 6: Case 5. U.S. v. Flick, "The Flick Case" (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Uttice, 19527, pp. 3-4.

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In addition to the eight defendants from the Foreign

Office, thirteen other people were indicted in the Ministries

case. Six of these individuals (Hans Heinrich Lammers,

Wilhelm Stuckart, Richard Walther Darre, Otto Meissner, Lutz

Schwerin von Krosigk, and Otto Dietrich) had been bureau­

crats in other agencies of the Third Reich. Two defendants

(Walter Schellenberg and Gottlob Berger) had held bureau­

cratic positions in the SS. Three of the accused (Hans

Kehrl, Paul Koerner, and Paul Pleiger) had served in the

economic bureaucracy of Hitler's government. Two men (Emil

Puhl and Karl Rasche) had been bankers with ties to the

Nazi regime. A study of the eight diplomatic defendants is

thus concerned with only one segment of the Ministries case.

Nuremberg Law

Two documents served as the legal foundation for the

Nuremberg trials. The first was the Charter of the Inter­

national Military Tribunal (or London Charter),^ a product of the

Farben case — TWC, 7:1-3. Hostage case -- TWC, vol. 11: Case 12, U.S. v. von Leeb, "The High Command Case"; Case 7, U.S. v. List, "The Hostage Case" (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 195151, pp. 759-60. RuSHA case -- TWC, vol. 4: Case 9. U.S. v. Ohlendorf. "The Einsatzgruppen Case": Case 8. U.S. v. Greifelt. "The RuSHA Case" (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1950), pp. 599-600. Einsatzgruppen case -- ibid., pp. 3-4. Krupp case -- TWC, vol. 9: Case 10, U.S. v. Krupp, "The Krupp Case" (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1950), pp. 1-2. Ministries case -- TWC, 12:1-4. High Command case -- TWC, vol. 10: Case 12, U.S. v. von Leeb, "The High Command Case" (Washington, D .C .: U.S. Government Printing Office, T951), pp. 3-4.

^The Charter of the International Military Tribunal (or

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London Conference (attended by representatives of the United

States, France, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union) of

26 June - 8 August 1945. The London Charter was the

authority by which the IMT conducted its trial. The second 15 document was Control Council Law No. 10, enacted by the

Allied Control Council (comprised of representatives of the

same four nations in their role as occupiers of Germany) on

20 December 1945. Law No. 10 was the authority by which any

of the four occupying powers of Germany could try alleged war

criminals within their zones of occupation, and thus it formed

the legal basis of the twelve subsequent trials, Some of the

judges in the subsequent trials considered Control Council 16 Law No. 10 equal in importance to the London Charter.

Other judges believed that the Charter took precedence over

Law No. 10 in the event of any apparent discrepancies. The

latter group supported their viewpoint by the unexplained

statement in Article I of Control Council Law No. 10 that the 17 London Agreement was an integral part of Law No. 10.

London Charter) may be found, among other places, in TWC, 12:xiv-xviii.

■^Control Council Law No. 10 can be located, among other places, in ibid., pp. xix-xxii.

^See Justice case judgment in TWC, 3:959-74. 17 See Farben case judgment in TWC, vol. 8: Case 6, U.S. v. Krauch, "The I.G. Farben Case'1 (Washington, D .C . : U.S. Government Printing Office, 1952), p. 1098. For a discussion of the relationship between the London Charter and Control Council Law No. 10, see Taylor, Final Report, pp. 7-9, 31.

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Four categories of crimes were adjudicated by the

Nuremberg legal system. In addition to crimes against peace,

there were war crimes, crimes against humanity, and criminal

conspiracy. War crimes were crimes committed against combatants,

or against enemy civilians, in time of war. Crimes against

humanity, broadly interpreted, comprised crimes against both

enemy and non-enemy civilians in both wartime and peacetime.

The London Charter, Article 6 (a), and Control Council Law

No. 10, Article II-l (a), both included in their definition

of crimes against peace the "planning, preparation, initiation,

or waging of a war of aggression, or a war in violation of

international treaties, agreements or assurances." The

conspiracy charge was incorporated into the London Charter

and Control Council Law No. 10 in two forms. Individuals

were accused of having participated in "a common plan or

conspiracy" to carry out the other enumerated crimes. Articles

9 through 11 of the London Charter dealt with the criminality

of organizations. The Charter gave the IMT the authority

to declare that an organization or group was criminal.

Individuals would then be tried by other tribunals for having

participated "in the criminal activities of such group or

organization." Control Council Law No. 10, in its Article

II-l (d), said that "membership in categories of a criminal

group or organization declared criminal by the International

Military Tribunal" was a crime.

The mistreatment and murder of the European Jews

might have been considered as war crimes or as crimes against

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humanity. The category of crimes against peace was divorced

from the actions against the Jews, despite the effort of the 18 Ministries prosecution to link the two. Crimes against

peace nonetheless had a multifarious, if indirect, effect on

the trial of the Foreign Office defendants for crimes against

the Jews. As an example, the prosecution forced the defense

to divert much of its attention to the peace charge, since

about one-half of the prosecution documents introduced

against the Foreign Office defendants dealt with crimes 19 against peace. Accusations that a person had participated

in a conspiracy or held membership in a criminal organization

could implicate that person indirectly in criminal activities

against the Jews if the specified conspiracy or organization

was involved in such conduct.

Of the four categories of crimes, only war crimes had 20 been firmly established in international jurisprudence.

We can, in fact, trace the concept of war crimes back to the 21 ancient Greeks. The critics of Nuremberg law

18 See paragraphs 23 and 25 of the Ministries case indict­ ment, dated 15 November 1947, in TWC, 12:34. 19 Motion of seven Foreign Office defendants (requesting access to documents and either a six-month recess or a separate trial), dated 22 March 1948, in TWC, vol. 15: Procedure, Practice and Administration (Washington, D .C . : U.S. Government Printing Office, 1952), p . 511. 20 George A. Finch, "The Nuremberg Trial and International Law," American Journal of International Law 41 (January 1947): 20- 2 1 . 21 Robert K. Woetzel, The Nuremberg Trials in Inter­ national Law with a Postlude cn the Eichmann Case (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962), p . 123.

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have contended that the other charges had not previously been

considered international crimes. They have argued further

that even if these charges were crimes, sanctions for

international wrongdoing have customarily been applied 22 against the state and not against the individual. In

either case, Nuremberg law was said to be ex post facto.

That is, Nuremberg held individuals legally accountable for

actions which were not considered judicable at the time they

were committed. The supporters of Nuremberg, on the other

hand, have argued either that Nuremberg law represented law 23 already in existence, or that the Nuremberg code might have

been retroactive, but there was no prohibition against

retroactive law in international jurisprudence such as there 0 / is in the United States constitutional law. Nevertheless,

the ex post facto issue remains troublesome. As one legal

analyst writes:

The feeling against a law evolved after the commission of an offense is deeply rooted. . . . The antagonism to ex post facto laws is not based on a lawyer's prejudice encased in a Latin maxim. It rests on the

22 The argument that international law was not applicable is forcefully presented by Hans Kelsen, "Collective and Individual Responsibility in International Law with Particular Regard to the Punishment of War Criminals," California Law Review 31 (December 1943): 533-36, 538-41. A contrary view is expressed by Sheldon Glueck, "The Nuernberg Trial and Aggressive War," Harvard Law Review 59 (February 1946): 430-35. 23 Henry L. Stimson, "The Nuremberg Trial: Landmark in Law," Foreign Affairs 25 (January 1947): 182, 184-85. o / Leo Gross, "The Criminality of Aggressive War," The American Political Science Review 41 (April 1947): 209-20, 222-2 5"’------

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political truth that if a law can be created after an offense, then power is to that extent absolute and arbitrary.*5

Whether Nuremberg law rested on existing precepts of

international law is a complicated issue. Two steps should

be taken in order to reach an informed opinion on this

controversy, First, we should understand that experts on

international law have viewed their subject from different

philosophical perspectives. Secondly, we must survey the

development of international law applicable to the World

War II crimes against the Jews,

Traditionally there have been two philosophies of

international law, as represented by the legal positivists 26 and the proponents of natural law or the legal pragmatists.

Legal positivists have generally maintained that interna­

tional law must be statutory; that is, written down in the

form of a bilateral or multilateral treaty or convention,

The legal positivists have seen the Nuremberg trials as a

threat to the integrity of international law. While few of

them would deny that the most notorious of the Nuremberg

defendants deserved punishment, the positivists would have liked

such punishment to be carried out by political or administrative,

25 Charles E. Wyzanski, Jr,, "Nuremberg - A Fair Trial?" The Atlantic Monthly 177 (April 1946): 67. 2 6 See the following sources for lucid discussions of the different legal philosophies: Quincy Wright, "Legal Positivism and the Nuremberg Judgment," American Journal of International Law 42 (April 1948): 405-8"! William J. Bosch, Judgment of Nuremberg: American Attitudes toward the Major German War-Crime Trials (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1970), pp. 41-66, 235.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 17 27 rather than judicial, means. Proponents of natural law

originally maintained that international law was based on

universal principles of equity or justice. They perceived

these principles as either ordained by God or deduced by

human reason. In the mid-twentieth century, however, few saw

the law in such absolute terms. Nevertheless, many continued

to believe that international law need not be statutory in

order to be valid. This contemporary group, called legal

pragmatists, argued that international law could be derived

from a consensus of opinion, from customary practice, or by

analogizing it to English common law. Legal pragmatists

thus have had little or no trouble accepting the validity 28 of Nuremberg law.

There was some international discussion in the period

between the two world wars of the idea of crimes against

humanity, but this concept remained unformulated. The Paris

27 The following articles express the legal positivist point of view: Nathan April, "An Inquiry into the Juridical Basis for the Nuernberg War Crimes Trial," Minnesota Law Review 30 (April 1946): 313-31. Kelsen, "Collective and Individual Responsibility in International Law," pp. 530-71. Schick, "The Nuremberg Trial and the International Law of the Future," pp. 770-94. Wyzanski, "Nuremberg - A Fair Trial?" pp. 66-70. 28 The following sources exemplify the legal pragmatist philosophy: Wright, "Legal Positivism and the Nuremberg Judgment," pp. 405-14. Glueck, "The Nuernberg Trial and Aggressive War," pp. 396-456. Woetzel, Nuremberg Trials in International Law. James T. Brand, "Crimes against Humanity and the Nilrnberg Trials," Oregon Law Review 28 (February 1949): 93-119. Brand served as a judge in the Justice case.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 18 Peace Conference appointed a commission, informally known

as the Commission on Responsibility. This commission urged

that an international tribunal composed of members of the

victor nations be established by the peace treaty to try

former leaders of the Central Powers for violations of the

laws and customs of war. The commission's report also added

the wording of "offenses against . . . the laws of humanity" 29 to that of "offenses against the laws and customs of war."

Ironically, the Americans on the commission demurred, saying

that there was no precedent in international law for the

tribunal proposed by the majority report, and that there was

no uniform idea in the international community as to what 30 constituted laws of humanity. The recommendations of the

commission led to Articles 228-30 of the Versailles Treaty,

which unsuccessfully called for the Allies to try German 31 leaders for war crimes. There was, however, no mention of

the "laws of humanity" in these articles, nor was there any

mention of this term in the corresponding articles of the

29 "Commission on the Responsibility of the Authors of the War and on Enforcement of Penalties. Report Presented to the Preliminary Peace Conference," American Journal of International Law 14 (1920): 121-24. 30 For the American representatives' dissent, see ibid., pp. 127-51; particularly, pp. 128-29, 134-36.

"^Articles 228-30 of the Versailles Treaty can be found in British and Foreign State Papers. 1919, vol. 112, comp, and ed. Edward Parkes et al. (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1922), pp. 103-4. For a discussion of Articles 228-30, see Woetzel, Nuremberg Trials in International Law, pp. 30-36.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 19 32 treaties with Bulgaria, Austria, and Hungary. There was

no further attempt in the interwar period to define or develop

the concept of laws of humanity, so cryptically mentioned

by the Commission on Responsibility in its report to the 33 Paris Peace Conference.

The outbreak of World War II quickened interest in

the legal issues pertaining to war and warfare. In 1942-43

the Allied governments warned that German leaders would be

tried for wartime crimes. The Allied warnings culminated in

the Moscow Declaration of 30 October 1943. This joint British,

American, and Soviet declaration pledged that perpetrators

of wartime crimes would be returned after the close of the

war to the scenes of their misdeeds to stand trial in the

national courts of their victims. The declaration also said

that the Allied governments would jointly try those major

war criminals whose wrongdoings overlapped specific geographical 34 areas.

32 History of the United Nations War Crimes Commission and the Development of the Laws of War, comp. the United Nations War Crimes Commission (London: His Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1948), p. 43. (This reference will hereafter be cited as UN War Crimes Commission.)

■^See ibid., pp. 188-91.

■^The Moscow Declaration of 30 October 1943 may be found, among other places, in T W C , 12:xi. For other warnings to the Germans, see the following sources: UN War Crimes Commission, pp. 87-90, 92-94. U.S., Department of State, International Conference on Military Trials. London, 1945, Department of State Publication 3080 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1949), pp. 9-11.

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In January 1944 a United Nations War Crimes Commission

formally convened, having been simultaneously proposed

fifteen months earlier by the British House of Lords and the

president of the United States. The commission was manned

by chosen representatives of the various Allied nations.

(The Soviet Union was conspicuously absent.) The commission

was to investigate, record and disseminate reports of war

crimes and criminals. The commission had no authority to

determine legal principles, but it could advise its various

governments in regard to these principles. The commission,

in fact, had a legal committee whose function was to analyze

the legal questions connected with war crimes trials. The

legal committee was in clear accord that the World War I

delineation of war crimes did not sufficiently cover the

criminal behavior of the Nazi government. The legal committee

thus proposed a definition of crimes against humanity. This

definition was never endorsed by the commission as a whole,

but it was nonetheless basically incorporated into the 35 Nuremberg law.

Crimes against humanity were not fully established

principles of international law in 1945, but at least they

had been intermittently proposed as such ever since World War I.

This was not the case with the conspiracy category of crimes.

This category was interjected into the international legal

^ UN War Crimes Commission, pp. 3, 109-13, 118-19, 126, 170-76. President Franklin D. Roosevelt's statement in support of the establishment of the United Nations War Crimes Com­ mission is reproduced in U.S., Department of State, Interna­ tional Conference on Military Trials, p . 9.

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picture by Henry L. Stimson, the American secretary of war,

as late as 1944. In September of that year, Stimson instructed

members of his department to study the possibilities of

trying major Nazi war criminals. A team of war department

lawyers headed by Colonel Murray C. Bernays, reported back

in a few weeks with a plan to prosecute German war crimes

within the framework of a conspiracy, beginning no later

than 1933, to wage aggressive war. This scheme appealed to

Stimson and others because it made accountable to international

law conduct which ordinarily would not be, such as the

peacetime persecution of one's own citizens. It was also

appealing because it would implicate persons who while

supporting the brutal Nazi regime could not be linked to 36 specific illegalities. Stimson's efforts to promote this

War Department plan climaxed in January 1945, on the eve of

the Yalta Conference, when he joined forces with Attorney-

General Francis Biddle and Secretary of State Edward R.

Stettinius, Jr., and presented a joint memorandum advocating

a "war crimes program" to President Roosevelt. This document

subsequently became known as the Yalta Memorandum. Its

characteristic feature is that Nazi criminality was a

conspiracy, that it "represents the result of a systematic

and planned reign of terror .... [which] goes back at

3^Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, On Active Service in War and Peace (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1948), pp. 584-87. Murray C. Bernays, "Legal Basis of the Nuremberg Trials," Survey Graphic 35 (January 1946): 5. Also see Stimson, "The Nuremberg Trial: Landmark in Law," p. 181.

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least as far as 1933." An essential part of the conspiracy

concept was the intention of having "groups and organizations

charged with complicity in the basic criminal plan" through 37 the persons of representative leaders.

The Yalta Memorandum never received a formal reply

from President Roosevelt; however, at the San Francisco

Conference to organize the United Nations held during the

first month of the Truman administration, a draft proposal

similar to the Yalta Memorandum was presented by American

representatives to the foreign ministers of France, Great

Britain and the Soviet Union. This American draft was accepted

as the reference point for further negotiations concerning

O O international war crimes trials. On 2 May 1945, also

during the first month of his presidency, Harry S. Truman

appointed Supreme Court Associate Justice Robert H. Jackson

as the American representative to prepare and prosecute, in

cooperation with representatives of Allied governments, 39 trials against the major German war criminals. In this

capacity, Jackson led the American delegation to the London

Conference of 26 June - 8 August 1945, which drew up the

London Charter. The ideas of conspiracy and criminal

07 For the Yalta Memorandum (dated 22 January 1945), see U.S., Department of State, International Conference on Military Trials, pp. 3-9. 38 The American draft presented at San Francisco is discussed in ibid., p. 22. The draft itself is reproduced in ibid., pp. 23-27. 39 Jackson's appointment, Executive Order 9547, can be found in ibid., p. 21; and in TWC, 12:xii.

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organization formulated by Stimson and his staff in the

United States War Department thus found their way into

Nuremberg law.4^*

I believe that the conspiracy charge was the least

valid of the categories of Nuremberg law which could be

related to crimes against the Jews. Defense lawyers argued--

with justification, we might add--that such an indictment

was unknown in German law and had never before been used in

international law. Even the Nuremberg judges James Morris

(from the Farben case) and Edward F. Carter (.from the Hostage

case) were critical of the conspiracy charge as it applied

to the concept of criminal organizations. Carter writes:

"The holding that the Nazi party or the SS is a criminal

organization and that membership in either was criminal, is

not based on any source of international law known to the ; 2 writer, existing prior to the London Charter."

I would describe crimes against humanity as a valid

category of Nuremberg law despite the lack of a document which

expressed the international community's inclination to hold

4^For a critical evaluation of the part played by the United States in the formulation of the Nuremberg conspiracy charges, see Jesse J. Silverglate, "The Role of the Conspiracy Doctrine in the Nuremberg War Crimes Trials" (Ph.D. disserta­ tion, University of Wisconsin, 1969), pp. 255-57.

41Ibid., p. 120. / 0 James Morris, "Major War Crimes Trials in Nurnberg," North Dakota Bar Briefs 25 (April 1949): 99-100, Edward F. Carter, "The Nurnberg Trials: A Turning Point in the Enforcement of International Law," Nebraska Law Review 28 (March 1949): 373-74.

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a nation responsible for the treatment of its citizens (in

peace as well as in war) or for the treatment of the citizens

of an allied nation. First of all, the Allies did specify

during the war that German accountability would extend beyond

Germany’s treatment of her enemies. For example, five days

after German troops occupied their ally Hungary, President

Roosevelt declared publicly:

As a result of the events of the last few days hundreds of thousands of Jews, who while living under persecution have at least found a haven from death in Hungary . . . , are now threatened with annihilation as Hitler's forces descend more heavily upon these lands. . . . It is therefore fitting that we should again proclaim our determination that none who participate in these acts of savagery shall go unpunished. . . . That warning applies not only to the leaders but also to their functionaries and subordinates in Germany and in the satellite countries.43

This was only one of a number of specific warnings to the

German government. Secondly, one could cite natural law as

a justification for trying persons for crimes against humanity.

Certain crimes were so blatantly contrary to basic principles

of humanity that they should be tried despite technical

loopholes in the positive law.^

Statement by President Franklin D. Roosevelt, 24 March 1944, in U.S., Department of State, International Conference on Military Trials, pp. 12-13.

^Such a position is taken by the defense lawyer Carl Haensel in his closing statement of 11 November 1948 in behalf of Steengracht. (See p. 142 below.) For Haensel's remarks, see the following source: Transcripts (English), pp. 27284-87, Official Record, United States Military Tribunals, Nurnberg, Case No. 11, Tribunal IV (IV A), United States vs. Ernst von Weizsaecker et al., vol. 62; Microfilm Publication M897, Records of the United States Nuernberg War Crimes Trials, United States of America v.

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It can be safely said that war crimes comprised the

strongest category of Nuremberg law. The Hague Conventions

of 1907^ and the Geneva Conventions of 1929^ had strength­

ened this area of law in general. Furthermore, specific

articles (46, 50, and 52) annexed to the Fourth Hague Con­

vention of 1907 plus the preamble to that convention pro­

hibited the types of abuse which the Nazis had inflicted on

the Jews and other civilians. Host pertinent was Article 46,

which says: "Family honor and rights, the lives of persons,

and private property, as well as religious convictions and

practice, must be respected," A pretext might exist for

challenging the Hague Convention as a justification for

the prosecution of war crimes, Article 2 of the Fourth

Hague Convention says: "The provisions . . . do not

apply except between Contracting Parties, and then

Ernst von Weizsaecker et al., December 20, 1947 - April 14, 1949 (hereafter cited as M897), roll 23; Record Group 238, World War II War Crimes Records (hereafter cited as RG 238); National Archives and Records Service, Washington, D.C. (hereafter cited as National Archives). All citations from the Transcripts will be from the English Transcripts of the Official Record of Case No. 11 and can be found in M897 at the National Archives. Additional citations from the Transcripts will thus merely provide a description of the event cited and give the Transcript page number and the M897 roll number.

^ F o r the Hague Conventions of 1907, see U.S., Statutes at Large, vol. 36, pt. 2 (March 1909--March 1911), ppTTT99'-i^J7

^For the Geneva "Convention of July 27, 1929, Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War," see U.S., Statutes at Large, vol. 47, pt. 2 (December 1931--March 1933), pp.2021-73. For the "Convention of Geneva of July 27, 1929, for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick of Armies in the Field," see ibid., pp. 2074-2101.

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only if all the belligerents are parties to the Convention."

Germany had signed the Hague Convention, but some of the

World War II participants had not.^ Such an interpretation

would apparently be nullified, however, by the wording of the

preamble to the Fourth Hague Convention of 1907:

Until a more complete code of the laws of war has been issued, the High Contracting Parties deem it expedient to declare that, in cases not included in the Regulations adopted by them, the inhabitants and the belligerents remain under the protection and the rule of the principles of the law of nations, as they result from the usages established among civilized peoples, from the laws of humanity, and the dictates of the public conscience. They declare that it is in this sense especially that Articles 1 and 2 of the Regulations adopted must be understood.48

Regarding the categories of war crimes and crimes

against humanity, I believe there was sufficient basis in

international law to try the Foreign Office defendants for

the more heinous Nazi crimes against the Jews. It was not

valid, however, to try these defendants for these same crimes

under the conspiracy category--a category which had no

foundation in international law.

Even valid law, however, did not guarantee a successful

trial. The American judges had to gain an understanding of

the German Foreign Office as it existed under the Nazi regime.

Dina G. McIntyre mentions this point in "The Nuremberg Trials," University of Pittsburgh Law Review 24 (October 1962): 86.

AO For portions of the 1907 Hague Convention referred to in this discussion, see U.S., Statutes at Large, vol. 36, pt. 2 (March 1909— March 1911), pp. 2279-80, 2290, 2306-8.

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They had to ascertain the key issues involved in the

voluminous evidence which was thrust upon them. They had to

conduct the trial in a manner which would be fair to both

the prosecution and the defense, and which would facilitate

the search for truth. Once these obstacles were met, there

was still the arduous task of evaluating the evidence. In

the end, there was no consensus on the guilt or innocence

of the defendants, or on the value of the trial itself.

The Ministries trial, however, has bequeathed a wealth of

information on the Foreign Office defendants and on the

Nuremberg process itself. From this information, we can

reach our own conclusions on the accountability of diplomatic

officials to international law.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. CHAPTER II

CHARACTERISTICS OF THE THIRD REICH FOREIGN OFFICE

RELEVANT TO THE MINISTRIES TRIAL

There were four issues pertinent to the trial of the

Foreign Office defendants for participation in the deporta­

tion of the Jews. First of all, there was the subject of

knowledge. Did the defendants know enough about the fate

of the deportees that they could be convicted as accomplices

to murder? A second topic was bureaucratic competency or

authority. Did the Foreign Office defendants have the power

under the Nazi system to thwart the fatal deportations?

If not, did their positions in the government nonetheless

bestow upon them the responsibility to try to stop such

crimes? A third problem was coercion. Did personal safety

and the safety of their families compel the diplomats to go

along with the Nazi program against the Jews? A fourth

question was what significance should be attached to a

defendant's efforts to assist the victims of Nazi persecution.

Historians have also debated these issues in the context of

the general history of the Third Reich. A study of the

Ministries trial can thus make a contribution to the larger

debate on these specific points.

28

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The extent of the German diplomats' knowledge of Nazi

crimes, particularly the crime of genocide, is a question

that has been raised with regard to the entire German

society. The eminent German historian Hans Mommsen believes

that recent research indicates that even officials who were

involved in the deportation of Jews often did not know that

the deportations would lead to the extermination of their

victims.^" Hans-Adolf Jacobsen, in his study of the first

years of the Nazi regime, supports the theory that Hitler

imparted to his officials only a limited knowledge of his

intentions. Jacobsen adds that it is difficult to know who o knew exactly what. Marlis G. Steinert's impressive study

of German public opinion in the Nazi era tends to agree with

Mommsen and Jacobsen, except that Steinert distinguishes

between the ignorance of the German masses and the knowledge

of two specific groups. The first group— into which the

Foreign Office would fall--consisted of those whose official

duties brought them into closer contact with the regime's

atrocities. The second group comprised intellectuals

and clergymen who were more perceptive of moral issues than

^Hans Mommsen, "The Historiography of the Nuernberg Trials," paper presented to the Conference Group on German Politics at the National Archives in Washington, D.C., 13 March 1975. o Hans-Adolf Jacobsen, Nationalsozialistische Aussenpolitik, 1933-1938 (Frankfurt am Main: Alfred Metzner Verlag, 1968), p p . 353-54, 614.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 30 3 was the average German. A basically different estimation

emerges from Lawrence D. Stokes’ article in Central European

History. Stokes concludes that the German people, to say

nothing of German officialdom, had a general, if not total,

idea of what was happening.^ Karl Dietrich Bracher takes

a middle position. He says that the Germans should have

perceived what was taking place, as there were enough clues,

but they dismissed substance as mere rhetorical form,^

In a similar vein, Uwe Dietrich Adam and Rudolph Binion

remark that Hitler at various times broadly hinted at his £ intention to commit genocide. The present study of the

Ministries trial reveals that a distinction should be made

between probable knowledge and legal knowledge. The evidence

offered at the trial suggests that the Foreign Office

defendants and many of their colleagues probably had a general

idea of what was happening. A careful analysis of the

evidence is needed nonetheless to determine what could be

proved, in legal terms, that the individual defendant knew,

3 Marlis G. Steinert, Hitlers Krieg und die Deutschen: Stimmung und Haltung der deutschen Bevblkerung in Zweiten Weltkrieg (Otisseldorf: Econ Verlag, 1970) , pp. 100, 242, 252, 255-58, 261-62, 594-95.

^Lawrence D. Stokes, "The German People and the Destruction of the European Jews," Central European History 6 (June 1973): 190-91. 5 Karl Dietrich Bracher, The German Dictatorship: The Origins, Structure, and Effects of National Socialism, trans. Jean Steinberg (New York: Praeger, 1970), pp. 366, 369.

ff Uwe Dietrich Adam, Judenpolitik im Dritten Reich (Dusseldorf: Droste Verlag"] 1972), pp. 315-16. Rudolph Binion, "Foam on the Hitler Wave," Journal of Modern History 46 (September 1974): 526.

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How much authority did the German Foreign Office

officials have in the making and implementation of Nazi

policy? Did the officials perform an influential or

necessary role? Or were they ignored by Hitler and his

cohorts? The German Foreign Office has not been accused

of planning the policy of the Third Reich, but it has been

blamed for implementing Hitler's decisions, something which

he and his close associates could not have done on their own.

This is the viewpoint of scholars such as Sir Lewis B. Namier,

Frederic S. Burin and D. C. Watt.^ Other historians depict

the Foreign Office as having no influence in the implementing

of decisions, much less in the making of them. Some, such

as W. H. C. Frend and Paul Seabury, attribute the impotence

of the diplomatic bureaucracy to the totalitarian nature

of the Nazi regime.** On the other hand, Gordon A. Craig

sees a reduction of the role and influence of the European 9 diplomat regardless of the nature of his government.

Lewis B. Namier, In the Nazi Era (London: Macmillan, 1952), p. 63. Frederic S" Burin, "The Rule of Law in German Constitutional Thought: A Study in Comparative Jurisprudence" (Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University, 1952), (Appendix entitled "Bureaucracy and National Socialism"), p. 261. D. C. Watt, "German Diplomats and Nazi Leaders, 1933-1939," Journal of Central European Affairs 15 (July 1955): 153-58.

**W. H. C. Frend, "Hitler and His Foreign Ministry, 1937-1939," History 42 (1957): 118-19, 122, 127. Seabury, Wilhelmstrasse, p. 169. Q Gordon A. Craig, "The Professional Diplomat and His Problems, 1919-1939," World Politics 4 (January 1952): 145-46. Craig, "The British Foreign Office from Grey to Austen Chamberlain," in The Diplomats: 1919-1939, ed. Gordon A. Craig and Felix Gilbert (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1953) pp. 16-17, 22-23, 45-48.

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Karl Dietrich Bracher offers a third perspective. He

describes the German Foreign Office as surrendering its

ability to affect policy in the first years of Hitler's

regime and then being unable to regain such leverage.

The Ministries trial devoted a great deal of attention to

the alleged contribution of the Foreign Office officials to

the carrying out of the Third Reich's criminal program. A

careful study of the testimony, documents, and decisions of

this trial provides an insight as to what degree of influence

the officials did have, or might have had, on Nazi policy.

The third and fourth issues--coercion of the

defendants during the Third Reich, and the defendants'

efforts to aid the sufferers of Nazi persecution--relate to

the historiographical discussion of Foreign Office resistance

to Nazism. What amount of recalcitrance could have been

expected, given the factors of national loyalty and personal

safety? Did the German diplomats offer reasonable resistance?

Namier, Watt, Bracher, and John W. Wheeler-Bennett all

describe the Wilhelmstrasse's opposition to Hitlerism as

having been woefully insufficient.^ E. A. Bayne,

Harold C. Deutsch, Peter Hoffmann, and Hans Rothfels

sympathetically depict the efforts of members of the Foreign

^Bracher, German Dictatorship, pp. 319-20, 322, 327-28. 11 Namier, In the Nazi Era, pp. 9-10. Watt, "German Diplomats and Nazi Leaders," p. 160. Bracher, German Dictatorship, pp. 320, 327. John W. Wheeler-Bennett, The Nemesis of Power: The German Army in Politics 1918-1945, 2d ed. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1964), p . 416.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 33 12 Office to resist Nazism. The Foreign Office defendants

had the opportunity during the pre-trial interrogations and

the trial itself to disclose whatever acts of opposition

they might have performed. They also had the opportunity

to explain why they did not offer greater resistance, or

did not resist at all. Since this discussion extended to

other former members of the Foreign Office, the Ministries

trial provides information on the compliance and the

resistance of the Foreign Office in general.

An understanding of the environment of the Third Reich

Foreign Office is necessary to comprehend the issues of

knowledge, authority, coercion, and resistance. Hitler did

not destroy the institutions of Weimar Germany. He attempted

to superimpose his Nazi establishment upon the already

existing entities. This was as true of the German Foreign

Office as it was of other German institutions. This attempt

to build a revolutionary superstructure on the foundation of

the existing bureaucracy was conducted by means of intimida­

tion, humiliation, and the creation of rival organizations.

The professional civil servants in the Foreign Office resisted

this attempt in a persistent, if floundering, fashion. The

result was neither a wholly new institution nor a substantive

■^E. A. Bayne, "Resistance in the German Foreign Office," Human Events, 3 April 1946, p. 8. Harold C. Deutsch, The Conspiracy against Hitler in the Twilight War (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1968), p. IF! Peter Hoffmann, Widerstand, Staatsstreich, Attentat: Per Kampf der Opposition gegen Hitler (.Munich: K. Piper, L'Jb'J) , p. 74. Hans Rothfels, The German Opposition to Hitler: An Assessment, trans. Lawrence Wilson, 3d ed. (London: Oswald Wolff, 1961), pp. 53-56, 58-62.

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continuation of the old one. Instead, the outcome was a

Foreign Office bifurcated into the traditional conservatives

and the revolutionary National Socialists. This split was

altered somewhat, to the advantage of the traditionalists,

by Ribbentrop's general unpopularity within the Wilhelm-

strasse. A dilemma arose for the Foreign Office officials

when it became obvious that the bureaucratic machine was

being diverted into questionable, if not illegal, activities.

The traditionalist Foreign Office personnel basically had

three ways of coping with this problem: to resign, to ignore

it, or to plot against their own government. The first

choice was extremely difficult for men who desperately

wanted to serve their fatherland and their institution, and

whose egos were considerably linked with their positions in

the foreign service. The second choice had the most to

offer from the viewpoint of personal safety. The third

choice, however, presented the best chance of preserving

what the traditionalists cherished in German foreign policy

and in the Foreign Office itself. These people were thus

put in the anomalous position of having to adopt revolu­

tionary tactics in order to protect conservative values.

Moreover, with the passage of time, events necessitated

increasingly radical behavior if resistance to the regime

was to meet with success.

The personnel of the Foreign Office in 1933 were

basically a homogeneous group. The Foreign Office's members—

as most diplomats elsewhere--were very nationalistic but extremely

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cautious, favoring the solution of international problems 13 through cooperation rather than through confrontation. As

of January 1933, Nazi principles and, in some cases, Nazi

officials began to infiltrate the German Foreign Office.

The Nazi Party was able to encroach upon the bureaucracy in

several ways. One method was to appoint party members to

key positions, including the heads of ministries. An

example of this was the replacement of Neurath with Ribbentrop

as foreign minister in 1938. A second method was to convert

bureaucrats into loyal party members. Despite the extensive

admission of diplomats into the party, there was no illusion

on the part of the Nazi hierarchy that such a formality was

creating genuine converts. A third method was to establish

party organizations either within, or parallel to, the

traditional bureaucracy.^ Two entities which would fit

this description, and whose histories were significant to

the Ministries trial, were the Abteilung Deutschland and the

Reichssicherheitshauptamt (or RSHA).

The Abteilung Deutschland, established on 7 May 1940,

was an amalgamation of two previous bureaucratic divisions,

the Sonderreferat Partei and the Sonderreferat Deutschland.^

13 See Jacobsen, Nationalsozialistische Aussenpolitik, p. 391.

^For a discussion of ways by which the party could impose itself upon the bureaucracy, see Burin, "Rule of Law in German Constitutional Thought" (Appendix entitled "Bureaucracy and National Socialism"), pp. 272-75. Also see Jacobsen, Nationalsozialistische Aussenpo1it ik, p. 18.

^Foreign Office internal decree, 7 May 19.40; Woermann exhibit 4; M897, roll 120, frames 0059-60; RG 238; National

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The latter division had served in the Weimar period as

a liaison between the Wilhelmstrasse and the Reichstag.

In the 1930s, the Sonderreferat Deutschland had been

assigned diplomatic matters which touched upon Germany's 16 policies toward the Jews. The head of the new Abteilung

Deutschland was named, incongruously, Martin Luther. Luther

was an alumnus of the Dienststelle Ribbentrop (a bureau run

by Ribbentrop from 1934 to 1938, which did diplomatic business

for Hitler outside of official channels) and a favorite of

that organization's namesake. Ribbentrop had brought Luther

into the Foreign Office in 1938 as head of the Sonderreferat

Partei. The ambitious Luther used the Abteilung Deutschland

to create a position of power foi himself within the Foreign

Office. Referat D III, a subdivision of the Abteilung

Deutschland, had inherited the Sonderreferat Deutschland's

concern with Jewish affairs. Luther thus interjected his

department into Jewish policy as much as possible. He also

extended his bureau into more traditional Foreign Office

Archives. Additional citations from M897, other than from the Official Record, will merely provide a description of the source cited, give the exhibit number (if applicable), and give the microfilm publication number and the roll and frame location in the following manner: M897/120/0059-60. lfi See Browning, "Referat Deutschland, Jewish Policy and the German Foreign Office (1933-1940)," pp. 37-73. In regard to the Sonderreferat Deutschland in the Weimar era, see WeizsUcker testimony of 14 June 1948 in T W C , vol. 13: Case 11, U.S. v. von Weizsaecker, "The Ministries Case" (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1952), p. 439.

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activities, such as personnel selection and the granting

of visas. Finally, Luther took advantage of his relationship

with Ribbentrop to frequently ignore the channels of

communication within the Foreign Office and deal directly

with the foreign minister. Luther’s ascendancy, however,

proved to be temporary. He became estranged from Ribbentrop

in the summer of 1942, and eventually tried to conspire with

the RSHA against his former patron. The attempt backfired,

and in March 1943 the Abteilung Deutschland was disbanded.

The Foreign Office's dealings with Jewish affairs was

delegated to a new department known as Inland II. Luther

found himself in a concentration camp, where he was fairly

well treated. He survived the war only to die of a heart 17 attack shortly thereafter.

The RSHA came into being on 27 September 1939 when

a Himmler decree merged the security policy or SIPO (of which

the infamous Gestapo formed the political branch) with the

SD, the intelligence apparatus of the SS. The SS, which had

originated before the Nazi seizure of power as a protective

guard for Nazi leaders, had grown by 1939 into the powerful

party bailiwick of Heinrich Himmler. The merger of state and

party security forces as represented by the formation of

RSHA was reflected in Himmler's heading the state police as

17 For a concise discussion of Martin Luther and his career, see the following article: Christopher R. Browning, "Unterstaatssekretar Martin Luther and the Ribbentrop Foreign Office," Journal of Contemporary History, 12 (April 1977): 313-40. Also see the assessment of Luther by Leonidas E. Hill

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 38 1 ft well as the SS. The structure of the RSHA tended to

parallel the regular government, Its Amt VI, under the

direction of Walter Schellenberg (who was to be a defendant

in the Ministries case), mirrored the Foreign Office.

Amt VI attempted to make foreign policy recommendations to

Hitler through Himmler. Most significantly, the influence

of Himmler and his subordinates increased as the Third 19 Reich progressed to its infamous end.

The Foreign Office did not lose its identity and become 20 merely an adjunct of the Nazi Party. The Wilhelmstrasse

nonetheless suffered a substantial loss of influence. Hitler's

aversion for professionals in general was particularly marked

in Die Weizsacker Papiere 1933-1950. ed. Leonidas E. Hill (Berlin: Propylaen Verlag, 1974), p. 38. 18 Dawidowicz, War against the Jews, pp. 73-79. 19 German diplomatic intelligence under the Nazis," report of 3 November 1945, based on October 1945 interroga­ tions of Andor Hencke (a member of the German Foreign Office from 1922 to 1945, who finished his diplomatic career as head of the Political Department) and Hans von Herwarth (a former member of the German Foreign Office, who had served prior to the German invasion of the Soviet Union as a political secretary at the German embassy in Moscow); interrogator - DeWitt C. Poole; Microfilm Publication M679, Records of the Department of State Special Interrogation Mission to Germany, 1945-46 (hereafter cited as M679), roll 2, frames 0025-26, 0028-29; Record Group 59, General Records of the Department of State; National Archives. Additional citations from M679 will merely provide relevant data on the interrogation cited, and give the microfilm publication number and the roll and frame location in the following manner: M679/2/0025-26, 0028-29.

20It is the conclusion of Dietrich Orlow in The History of the Nazi Party: 1933-1945 (Pittsburgh: University or .... Pittsburgh Press, 1973) that the party was able to exercise a considerable degree of control over German institutions, but was never able to reshape these institutions as it desired. See Orlow, pp. 486, 488,491-92. While limiting

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 39 21 when it came to professional diplomats. He tended to

view with skepticism the information collected and submitted 22 by his diplomatic representatives abroad. High-ranking

officials of the foreign service, such as the state secre­

tary and the head of the Political Department, were not 23 adequately included in the policy-making process nor kept 24 adequately informed of conversations between heads of state. .

Not only was the influence of Foreign Office officials

reduced under the Nazis, but these people were subjected to

indignities that tended to remind them of their loss of

power. For example, the activities of ambassadors and

ministers abroad were deliberately omitted from the

government-controlled press. German newspapers instead

his assessment to the period 1933-38, Jacobsen (National- sozialistische Aussenpolitik, p. 614) remarks that the Foreign Office was able to maintain its professionalism despite party incursions. 21 Deutsch, Conspiracy against Hitler, remarks (p. 16, n. 14) that only jurists were held in lower esteem than diplomats in Hitler's overall contemptuous view of professionals. 22 "German diplomatic intelligence under the Nazis," report of 3 November 1945, based on October 1945 inter­ rogations of Hencke and Herwarth; interrogator - Poole; M679/2/0026-27, 0040. ^Steengracht testimony of 23 June 1948 in TWC, 13:25. Hencke affidavit of 13 May 1948; Woermann exhibit 19; M897/120/0141-42. Hencke affidavit of 13 May 1948; Woermann exhibit 22; M897/120/0152-53.

^Bernd Gottfriedsen (a former member of the German Foreign Office, who served from 1942 to 1945 as an admin­ istrative officer on Ribbentrop's personal staff) interroga­ tion of 10 and 11 September 1945, as reported on 2 October 1945; M679/1/0727. Paul Otto Schmidt (the German Foreign Office's chief interpreter from 1923 to 1945) affidavit of 31 May 1948; Woermann exhibit 31; M897/120/0187.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 40 25 reported the successful endeavors of party representatives.

The pressures upon the Foreign Office led to a split

among its personnel, After the war, one former member of

the Wilhelmstrasse, Werner von Schmieden, referred to the two

groups which developed as "the traditional - conservative and

the revolutionary - National Socialist." This separation was

never complete. Revolutionaries sometimes accepted

cooperative traditionalists as part of the National Socialist

group. Furthermore, those who originally saw themselves as

National Socialist diplomats often came to identify with the

traditionalists. One reason for the latter switch was the

leadership of Ribbentrop, whose distrustful and demeaning

treatment of his employees alienated even those who had once

been his proteges. 9 f i In a postwar interview Margarete Blank,

Ribbentrop*s loyal secretary, described her former boss as

alienating his employees by excluding them from meaningful

decision-making and by insisting that they follow his instruc­

tions precisely. ^ One could thus speak of a second division

within the Foreign Office, between Ribbentrop and the others.

Why did so few traditional diplomats resign in reaction

to the Nazis? A variety of motives, some more honorable than

25 Ernst Eisenlohr (a member of the Foreign Office from 1911 to 1942) affidavit of 15 April 1948; Weizsacker exhibit 338; M897/119/0515.

^Schmieden affidavit of 31 January 1948; Steengracht exhibit 1; M897/115/1003-4. Jacobsen, Nationalsozial- istische Aussenpolitik, p. 476.

2^See Douglas M. Kelley, 22 Cells in Nuremberg: A Psychiatrist Examines the Nazi Criminals (New York:

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others, simultaneously came into play. These inducements

can be listed but it is difficult, if not impossible, to

give a precise weight to each reason within the mind of

each individual. Undoubtedly ambition or opportunism played

a role. Some men were either at, or approaching, the peak

of their careers when the Nazis came to power. In such

circumstances, it was easy for an individual to rationalize 28 accepting, or staying in, office. Furthermore, while

disdaining Nazi methods of diplomacy, the traditionalists

could look with favor on many of Hitler's goals, particularly 29 that of a strong Germany free of the shackles of Versailles.

A sense of duty may have induced many diplomats to

remain in office. Although from the beginning some negative

aspects of the Nazi government were apparent, the professional

civil servants reflected that no one but themselves could

save Germany and Europe from the disastrous course of a radical

Nazi foreign policy. If they should resign, they certainly

could not place any hope in their successors, who would be

hand-picked by the party. These arguments for continued

Greenberg, 1947), pp. 106-7. 2 8 Both Bracher, German Dictatorship (p. 320), and Jacobsen, Nationalsozialistische Aussenpolitik (pp. 37-38), say that opportunism must be considered as one of the reasons why officials stayed on under the Nazis. Both historians also imply that it is difficult to gauge the degree of opportunism in such a decision. 29 it See, for example, Weizsacker's Memoirs (trans. John Andrews [pseud.], [London: Victor Gollancz, 1951], pp. 123-24) for his comment on Germany's absorption of Austria in March 1938. Also see the following secondary sources: Bracher, German Dictatorship, p. 329. Steinert, Hitlers Krieg und die Deutschen, p. 9T!

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service were used by many, including such highly respected On persons as former Chancellor Heinrich Bruning (who nonethe­

less felt compelled to go into exile) and State Secretary OT Bernhard Wilhelm von Bulow. The beginning of the war in

September 1939 created new and ominous arguments against

resignation. The hierarchy, be it Hitler or Ribbentrop or

others, viewed with great disfavor a bureaucrat who

relinquished his post at such a time. (For a further dis­

cussion of "fear" as a reason for staying in office, see

pp. 203-4 below.) There was also the inner coercion that,

regardless of the other circumstances, an official did not

give up his post when his nation was engaged in a war of

major proportions.

The professional diplomats did not remain in office

merely to serve Germany and Europe. They also remained in

order to preserve their esteemed institution, the Foreign

Office of Bismarck and Stresemann, from its would-be Nazi

despoilers. Even in the gloomiest period from 1942 on, when

it was apparent to the non-Nazi diplomats that they could do

little as officeholders to divert or ameliorate the regime's

madness, they looked to the day when the nightmare would end

o n Bruning affidavit of 22 December 1947; Weizsacker exhibit 330; M897/119/0478-79. 31 Karl Max Du Moulin (a member of the Foreign Office from 1919 to 1939) affidavit of 3 April 1948; Woermann exhibit 28^ M897/120/0177. Bulow's thinking is analyzed by Peter Kruger and Erich J. C. Hahn, "Der Loyalitatskonflikt des Staatssekretars Bernhard Wilhelm von Bulow im Fruhjahr 1933," Vierteljahrshefte fur Zeitgeschichte 20 (October 1972): 393-94, 397-400.

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and they would be able to pass on the traditions of a sane

German Foreign Office to a new generation of bureaucrats.

WeizsHcker implied in his testimony before the Ministries

Tribunal that the maintenance of the pre-Nazi Foreign Office

cadre would be ranked as the number two reason for staying

in office, behind the much more important reason of preserving 32 peace. The former German diplomat Ernst Eisenlohr said

that Weizsacker's decision not to resign would benefit the 33 German Foreign Office when it was restored someday.

An alternative to resignation was to hide behind the

word Zustandigkeit, which may be translated as "bureaucratic

competency," "responsibility," or "jurisdiction." The Third

Reich diplomat could rationalize that to perform his job well

and honorably he need only concern himself with matters within

his own area of competency. Other matters need not be in­

vestigated. Ritter, the future Foreign Office defendant, thus

repeatedly instructed his subordinates not to show him tele­

grams and documents which were not directly related to his A / work. His adjutant Wilhelm Mackeben consequently intercepted

such papers as dealt with the Jewish question and with slave

labor requisitions. The adjutant also asked that his superior be

■^Weizsacker testimony of 8 June 1948 in TWC, 12:930.

■^Eisenlohr affidavit of 15 April 1948; Weizsacker exhibit 338; M897/119/0518.

Karl Schnurre (who worked under Ritter in 1936-37, and whose assignments in the summers of 1942 and 1943 again brought him into close contact with Ritter) affidavit of 20 April 1948; Ritter exhibit 10; M897/114/0446. Eisenlohr (who served as a deputy to Ritter in the years 1926-31 and 1939-42) affidavit of 26 May 1948; Ritter exhibit 46; M897/114/0701.

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taken off the distribution list of topics for which he had 35 no responsibility. Wearing such blinders made it easier

for an official to continue in the service of his nation,

government, and bureaucratic institution as if it were still

1932.

A third alternative for the Foreign Office official

was to participate in the German resistance movement. From

1938 on, primary concerns of this movement were preventing

war and, later on, ending it. These objectives required

members of the resistance to be present in the Foreign

Office, where they could report on the government’s intended 3fi diplomatic moves. An active resistance clique within the

Wilhelmstrasse offered its people not only a chance to work

for peace, but also the opportunity to defend their institu­

tion against the inroads of Nazism. An example of the

latter opportunity is the appointment in 1940 of Hans-Bemd von

Haeften, a Foreign Office oppositionist, to Luther's

Abteilung Deutschland. The appointment was made by a Foreign

Office Personnel Department director, by the name of Helmut 37 Bergmann, who was himself a member of the resistance.

35 Mackeben testimony of 12 July 1948; Transcripts, pp. 11707-8, 11710-12, 11716-17, 11724; M897, roll 11. 3fi Hoffmann, Widerstand, Staatsstreich, Attentat, p. 54. Bayne, "Resistance in the German Foreign Office,1' p. 4. 37 Wilhelm Melchers (who was employed in the Foreign Office's Political Department from 1939 to 1945) affidavit of 22 January 1948; Weizsacker exhibit 260; M897/119/0234-35. Barbara von Haeften (the widow of Hans-Bernd von Haeften, who was executed for his resistance activities) affidavit of 13 April 1948; Weizsacker exhibit 261; M897/119/0237.

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An individual's participation in the German resistance

movement was a possible argument for his having remained in

the German foreign service during the Third Reich. WeizsHcker,

for example, was urged by members of the resistance movement

to retain his post of state secretary in the Foreign Office, 38 in order to help them to oppose the regime. In evaluating

such opposition, one should ask whether the Foreign Office

official intelligently appraised the chances and timing

of a successful action. Was the official committed to use

whatever means were necessary to achieve his goals? The

chances of successful opposition certainly did not remain

constant. For example, a civil servant could have readily

argued in 1938 that he was justified in staying in office

to work against the potential evils of the regime. By 1943,

however, many of these evils had already occurred or were

occurring. In 1938 a German diplomat could have envisioned

waiting for the opportunity for a bloodless coup or for the

support of Germany's adversaries. By 1943, on the other

hand, meaningful resistance entailed the willingness to resort

to assassination and to act alone without help from Germany's

enemies.

"^Klothilde Brucklmeier (xtfidow of Eduard Brucklmeier, a member of the Foreign Office who was executed for his resistance activities) affidavit of 7 April 1948; Weizsacker exhibit 264; M897/119/0247. Erika Canaris (widow of Admiral Wilhelm Canaris, who was executed for his resistance activities) affidavit of 13 April 1948; Weizsacker exhibit 273; M897/119/0282.

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The evidence and testimony of the Ministries trial

provide information about the German Foreign Office during

the Nazi regime. This information, in turn, wac necessary

for any sound legal judgment of the Foreign Office officials.

Channels of communication and authority were altered during

the Third Reich, and pressures to conform with the Nazi

philosophy were applied. Certainly the Foreign Office

defendants cannot be judged as if the Wilhelmstrasse had

remained the same as in the Weimar era. On the other hand,

the changes and the pressures were not so great as to have

deprived these officials of all choice.

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THE FOREIGN OFFICE DEFENDANTS

The eight Foreign Office defendants did not form a

homogeneous group. They had little in common other than

their involvement in the Ministries case and their prior

connection with the Foreign Office. Furthermore, the Foreign

Office did not really represent a common experience as some

in the group had tenuous ties with the diplomatic service.

The eight men can be divided into two categories. The

first grouping of four individuals--Weizsacker, Woermann,

Erdmannsdorff, and Ritter--were professional diplomats prior

to the Nazi assumption of power. The second set--Bohle,

Keppler, Steengracht, and Veesenmayer--began their diplomatic

careers after January 1933 and were active in the Nazi Party

before joining the Wilhelmstrasse. The Foreign Office

defendants were thus evenly divided between the two segments

of the Third Reich Foreign Ministry, the traditionalist civil

"^This is my classification, but it is not original. Margret Boveri (a German journalist who observed part of the Ministries trial) classified Weizs'dcker, Woermann, Ritter, and Erdmannsdorff as traditional bureaucrats. She used the term "the old school." She also identified Bohle, Keppler, Steengracht, and Veesenmayer as party members. In regard to the diversity of the eight defendants, she wrote: "They could mix as little as water and oil." Margret Boveri, Per Diplomat vor Gericht (Berlin: Minerva Verlag, 1948), _ 2^q— 1

47

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servants and the revolutionary National Socialists.

Ernst von Weizsacker tried to lead the anti-Nazi

element in the Foreign Office, but his leadership qualities—

although abundant--were insufficient for this momentous task.

Weizsacker, who held the highest office among the four

careerist Foreign Office defendants, was the most important

individual among the group of eight defendants. He also 2 arouses the most controversy among historians. He was born

into a distinguished Swabian family in 1882. His father,

Carl (1853-1926), served as prime minister of the German

state of Wurttemberg from 1906 to 1918. His paternal grand­

father, Carl Heinrich (1822-99), was an eminent professor of

the history of Christianity, teaching at the University of

Tubingen. At eighteen, Ernst chose a military career in the

German imperial navy. The defeat of Germany in World War I

and the subsequent limitation of its military forces made

2 The following works are examples of negative evaluations of Weizsacker: Wheeler-Bennett, Nemesis of Power, p. 417. Watt, "German Diplomats and Nazi Leaders," pp. T53, 157-58. Namier, In the Nazi Era, pp. 63, 69. Seabury, Wilhelmstrasse, pp. 164, 168-69. The following citations are examples of positive appraisals of Weizsacker: Deutsch, Conspiracy against Hitler, pp. 17-25. Hoffmanr\ Widerstand, Staatsstreich, Attentat, p. 689, n. 81. Frend, "Hitler and His Foreign Ministry," p. 123. The opinion of Leonidas E. Hill is the most significant. In the early years (1955-63) of his study of WeizsMcker, Hill agreed with Namier's unfavorable descrip­ tion of the former state secretary. Hill, however, reversed his judgment after he obtained access to Weizsacker's personal papers at Lindau, Germany. See Weizsacker Papiere, pp. 12-14. For a summation of Hill's matured and highly favorable judgment of Weizsacker, see ibid., pp. 49, 51.

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the naval profession unpromising. At the relatively late

age of thirty-eight, Weizsacker began a second career in

the German diplomatic service. Employed first in the German

consulate at Basle, Switzerland, he progressed by 1931 to

the position of minister to Norway. He still held this post 3 in January 1933 when Hitler came to power.

WeizsKcker was unreceptive to Nazism. Although both

he and the Nazi Party were strongly nationalistic, his

nationalism^ was tempered by a healthy fear of war. His

pacifism was partially derived from personal experience, as

he had lost a brother and brother-in-law in World War I.

A possibly more important reason for his dread of war was

that he foresaw that another major conflict would endanger

politically and socially the Europe he knew. Weizsacker

was a conservative who preferred the restoration of a

monarchy;^ the Nazi Party was a radical movement which looked

O For the background and early career of Weizs'acker, see one of the following sources: Weizsacker, Memoirs, pp. 11-85. Hill, Weizsacker Papiere, pp. 14-26. Weizsacker affidavit of 21 November 1947; prosecution exhibit 4; M897/25/0027-28.

^For examples of Weizsacker's nationalist sentiments, see his Memoirs, pp. 63, 163, 195.

^See ibid., pp. 27, 37. £ See Carl J. Burckhardt, Meine Danziger Mission, 1937-1939 (Munich: G. D. W. Callwey, 1960), P- 145.

^Weizsacker wrote (p. 85) in his Memoirs of his preference for "a constitutional monarchy with a wise prince."

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forward to the creation of a new political society. o Weizsacker was a reserved, cautious man. The Nazi movement

proved in the long run to be neither cautious nor reserved.

Weizsacker was not as sensitive to the plight of his Jewish

c o u n t r y m e n as he might have been, but he did disapprove of o the Nazis' anti-Semitism. At his trial, he said: "Hitler's

persecution of the Jews was considered by me from its very

inception to be a violation of all the rules and laws of

Christianity.

WeizsMcker was aware in 1933 "of the many danger signs" 11 of the new regime. He nonetheless hoped that his decency

and conservatism would have a beneficial effect upon Germany's

Q j | The words "vorsichtig" (cautious) and "zuruckhaltend" (reserved) appear frequentlyin descriptions of Weizshcker. See the following examples: Ernst Kruger (a German consular official in Copenhagen from the Weimar period through the Nazi occupation) affidavit of 10 March 1948; Weizsacker exhibit 318^^897/119/0419. Guenther von Bismarck (a friend of the Weizsacker family and a frequent visitor in their home) affidavit of 22 March 1948; Weizsacker exhibit 278; M897/119/ 0299. Leonidas E. Hill writes in "Three Crises, 1938-39" (Journal of Contemporary History 3 [January 1968]: 142) that the "chief characteristic'' of WeizsScker was that "he was a very quiet, self-effacing man." Q Browning ("Referat Deutschland, Jewish Policy and the German Foreign Office [1933-1940]," p. 38) has accused Weizsacker of "indifference," which I think is too harsh a judgment. For comments by Weizsacker which depict his attitude somewhat unfavorably, see his letter to his mother, dated 22 April 1933, in Weizsacker Papiere, ed. Hill, p. 71. Also see Hill's explanations (ibid., p^ 479, nn. 76-77) of this letter.

"^Weizsacker testimony of 14 June 1948 in TWC, 13:432-33.

■^Hill, Weizsacker Papiere, p. 26.

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new political leaders, and in this he was encouraged by those 12 he respected. He thus chose to continue his promising

diplomatic career. New assignments and promotions followed

in due course: minister to Switzerland (1933-37), acting head

of the Political Department (1936-37), head of the Political

Department (1937-38), and state secretary (1938-43).^

11 Weizsacker perceived by the end of 1938 that, despite

his high office, he would have little or no direct impact on

either Hitler or Ribbentrop. Hitler looked upon him "as a

kind of foreign body," and Ribbentrop treated him with "open 14 11 hostility." Weizsacker nevertheless continued to try to

influence German policy. He tried to make himself more

palatable to his bosses by accepting honorary party and SS 15 membership. He tried to draft more persuasive documents

by adapting his language and his reasoning to the 16 sensibilities of Hitler and Ribbentrop. Finally, he tried

12 ,, See Robert Boehringer (a Swiss national who had known Weizsacker since the early 1920s and who was associated with the International Red Cross during World War II) affidavit of 30 March 1948; Weizsacker exhibit 336; M897/119/0506-7. 13 f 1 Weizsacker affidavit of 21 November 1947; prosecu­ tion exhibit 4; M897/25/0028. 14 " The quotation regarding Hitler is from Weizsacker, Memoirs, p. 163. The quotation regarding Ribbentrop is from WeizsMcker testimony of 8 June 1948 in TWC, 12:929. 15 M " Weizsacker, Memoirs, pp. 125, 167. Weizsacker affidavit of 21 November 1947; prosecution exhibit 4; M897/25/0028.

■^Weizsacker testimony of 17 June 1948 in TWC, 12:1112.

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to convey his messages to his superiors via foreign ambassa­

dors accredited to Berlin or foreign dignitaries who were

visiting Germany.^

Weizsacker did not limit his attempts to influence his

government to normal methods. He also participated in the

German opposition movement. He placed in strategic posts,

encouraged, and protected Foreign Office employees who

were actively engaged in resistance to the regime. He

passed along information to circles of opposition within

the military. He advised the British government in 1938-39 IQ f | as to how it should deal with Hitler's threats. Weizsacker

was exposed to a considerable amount of danger by his 19 involvement in the resistance; however, as in other areas

of his life, he exercised caution and moderation as an

oppositionist. His cautiousness is illustrated by his

1 Weizsacker, Memoirs, pp. 25, 148, 165. Defense Counsel Hellmut Becker's closing statement in behalf of Weizsacker, 10 November 1948, in TWC, vol. 14: Case 11, U.S. v. von Weizsaecker, "The Ministries Case" (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1952), p. 106. 18 There are substantial referencesnin published sources, both primary and secondary, as to Weizsacker's involvement in the German resistance movement. See the following examples: Burckhardt, Meine Danziger Mission, pp. 181-83, 187. Erich Kordt, Nicht aus den Akten . . . Die Wilhelm- strasse in Frieden und Krieg: Erlebnisse. Begeenungen und Eindrtlcke, 1928-1945 (Stuttgart: Union Deutsche Verlags- gesellschaft, 1950), pp. 250, 252, 279-80, 282, 312-13, 315-16, 323, 336-38. Weizsacker, Memoirs, pp. 141-43, 145. Deutsch, Conspiracy against Hitler, pp. T8-20, 24, 43-46, 85-86. Hoffmann, Widerstand, Staatsstreich, Attentat, pp. 87-90, 141-43. 19 Hasso von Etzdorf (a former Foreign Office official, who was active in the German resistance as a liaison between the Wilhelmstrasse and the Army chief of staff) affidavit of 5 April 1948; Weizsacker exhibit 269; M897/119/0268-69.

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altercation with Ulrich von Hassell (29 April 1942), a former

German ambassador to Rome (1932-38) and a colleague in the

resistance movement. According to Hassell, Weizsacker

harshly accused him and his wife of being indiscreet and

20 it thereby endangering others in the opposition. Weizsacker,

in his version of this exchange, said that he was trying to

warn Hassell in a friendly manner about committing indiscre­

tions, but that his "act of friendship" apparently was not ) 1 "understood as such." The moderate Weizsacker differentiated

between actions which would have jeopardized the leaders of

the regime and actions which would have endangered his

fellow countrymen. After the war, he testified at his trial:

"I did not want to get my country defeated. What I did want

was peace, and for that purpose, elimination of Hitler.

But I did not desire the defeat of Germany in order to do 22 away with Hitler." A year earlier, while being interrogated,

Weizsacker had said: "I would not have approved of the

passing on of military intentions [to Germany's prospective

enemies]; for this could have cost lives. I did approve of

the passing on of political intentions; for this pursued

peaceful purposes." He elaborated: "I would not have, for

^Ulrich von Hassell, The Von Hassell Diaries, 1938- 1944: The Story of the Forces against Hitler inside Germany as Recorded by Ambassador Ulrich von Hassell, a Leader of the Movement, trans. and ed. Hugh Gibson (London: IL Hamilton, 1948), pp. 231-33.

^Weizsacker, Memoirs, p. 275. 22 Weizs'dcker testimony, 9 June 1948; Transcripts, p. 7900; M897, roll 8.

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example, revealed to foreign sources the timing, the manner, 23 and the methods of the German attack against the West."

Another postwar incident also demonstrates the emotional and

intellectual limitations of the state secretary's resistance.

He refused to believe that his good friend Colonel Hans

Oster, one of the martyrs of the German resistance, had

tried to alert the Danish and Dutch governments as to the 24 exact dates of German invasions of their territories.

The year 1943 saw a diminishing of Weizsacker's

importance as a diplomatic figure. A general shake-up of

the Foreign Ministry followed the disclosure of Luther's

plot against Ribbentrop. Weizsacker was replaced as state

secretary and given the position of German ambassador to

the Vatican, an assignment he had requested as early as 25 September 1941. He served in this post from the spring

Q Q Weizsacker interrogation 1841, 1 April 1947; interrogator - Robert M. W. Kempner; Microfilm Publication M1019, Records of the United States Nuernberg War Crimes Trials Interrogations, 1946-1949 (hereafter cited as M1019), roll 78, frame 0465; RG 238; National Archives. Additional citations from M1019 will merely provide relevant data on the interrogation cited, and give the microfilm publication number and the roll and frame location in the following manner: M1019/78/0465.

^Weizsacker testimony of 9 June 1948 in TWC, 12:1170. An excellent article on Oster's deliberate leak of critical military information is Hermann Graml's "Der Fall Oster," Vierteljahrshefte fur Zeitgeschichte 14 (January 1966): 26-39. See in particular pp. 37-39 which analyze Oster's motives for warning Denmark and the Netherlands of an impending German invasion. 25 n Weizsacker, Memoirs, p. 258.

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of 1943 to the end of the war. He thought he could assist

the German opposition movement from Rome by establishing

contact with the Allies about peace negotiations with a 2fi post-Hitler Germany, but he was unsuccessful. He never­

theless accomplished limited measures on behalf of decency

and civilization. For example, he secured sanctuaries

within the Vatican for numerous Roman Jews. He also persuaded

Field Marshal Albert Kesselring to withdraw from Rome and 2 7 spare the city from becoming a battle site. WeizsMcker's

presence in the Allied-encircled Vatican may have saved

him from recall and Nazi vengeance during the bloodbath that

followed the abortive plot of 20 July 1 9 4 4 . At the close

of the war, Weizsacker lingered in the Vatican for a year

before returning to his home in Lindau in the French occupied

zone of Germany. In July 1947, he agreed to travel to

26Ibid., pp. 285-86, 293-94. 27 Leonidas E. Hill provides in "The Vatican Embassy of Ernst von WeizsHcker, 1943-1945" (Journal of Modern History 39 [June 1967]: 138-59) a /judicious but favorable account of the Vatican phase of Weizsdcker's career. 28 Georg Viktor Bruns (who was employed in the office of Foreign Minister Ribbentrop from 1938 on, and who for several years served as Weizsacker's confidant there) affidavit of 5 March 1948; Weizsacker exhibit 258; M897/119/ 0226-28. Gustav Adolf Sonnenhol (a former member of the Foreign Office who claimed to have seen a transcript of a post-July 20th Gestapo interrogation in which Weizs'dcker was implicated in the resistance movement) affidavit of 24 March 1948; Weizsacker exhibit 266; M897/119/0255-56. Hans Schroeder (who served as head of the Foreign Office's Personnel Department) affidavit of 20 April 1948; Weizs'dcker exhibit 279; M897/119/0302.

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Nuremberg to put himself in the hands of American authorities, 29 who wished to try him for war crimes.

Ernst Woermann, the second highest official among

the four civil servant defendants, was a talented bureaucrat

who was devoid of political leadership abilities. His

career prior to the Nazi regime reveals his talents; his 30 career under the Nazis displays his lack of leadership.

Woermann, born in Dresden in 1888, was the son of an art

history professor. His education, superior to Weizsacker's,

culminated with a doctorate in law. In World War I Woermann

experienced extensive combat and was wounded twice.

Although qualified to serve as a judge, the young veteran

was attracted by the Foreign Office, which was recruiting

members of the middle class who had an aptitude for economics.

Woermann thus joined the Foreign Office in February 1919.

His first specific task, in the autumn of that year, was to

be part of a delegation which negotiated the details of the

return of Alsace-Lorraine to France. There followed

^Weizsacker, Memoirs, pp. 301-9. Hill, Weizsacker Papiere, pp. 43-44. OQ In contrast to Weizsacker, Woermann has received little attention in secondary works. An exception is John Dexter Marble, "Weizsacker, Woermann, and the Reduction of Czechoslovakia" (Ph.D. dissertation, Texas Christian University, 1974). Marble's negative appraisal of Woermann is largely derived from a study of documents written by Woermann in 1938-39. Marble, however, fails to probe Woermann adequately. Woermann's character, personality, and motivation--other than being "a perfect bureaucrat (p. 189)"--are not revealed by Marble's work.

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assignments to Paris and Vienna as well as to the home

office in Berlin. Much of his work dealt with issues in

international economics, such as trade relations and the

question of reparations. By 1933, when the Nazis came to

power, Woermann was the advisor on international law in the 31 Legal Department of the Foreign Office. He was highly

respected by his colleagues and associates for his intelligence,

his particular expertise in international law and economics,

and the breadth of his overall knowledge. He also had the

reputation of setting high standards for himself and his 32 subordinates. At age forty-five, his future in the foreign

service was definitely promising.

Woermann could not translate his intelligence into

political perceptiveness. Although he never liked the Nazis,

in early 1933 he reassured himself that Hitler's new govern­

ment was a coalition of parties, that it had come to power

by constitutional means, and that President Paul von Hindenburg

had reserved the appointment of foreign ministers to himself.

31 Woermann testified before the Ministries Tribunal on 2 July 1948 about his pre-1933 life and career. Excerpts of this testimony can be found in TWC, 12:1242-43. The entire testimony is located in Transcripts, pp. 10844-47; M897, roll 10.

Steengracht interrogation 938e, 25 March 1947; interrogator - Rudolph L. Pins; M1019/71/0362. Weizs'dcker testimony, 15 June 1948; Transcripts, pp. 8644-45; M897, roll 9. Paul Otto Schmidt affidavit of 31 May 1948; Woermann exhibit 31; M897/120/0188. Georg Vogel, Diplomat unter Hitler und Adenauer (Dlisseldorf: Econ Verlag, 1969), pp. TT, 39-40. Vogel worked under Woermann both in 1934-36, in the Foreign Office's Legal Department, and in 1937-38, in the German embassy in London.

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Woermann reasoned that the future held one of three outcomes,

of which the first two alternatives would be satisfactory.

First, the Hitler government might become more moderate

with the responsibility of power. Second, its radical

policies might lead to its quick demise. Third, it might

pursue its radical policies while entrenching its power.

"At any rate," Woermann testified at his trial, "I was of

the opinion [in 1933] that one should give it a chance."

But Woermann's assessment of the new regime depended mainly

on one criterion, the sensibleness of its foreign policy.

He said in regard to a speech by Hitler on 17 May 1933,

in which the Fuehrer moderately acknowledged the legality

of the Versailles Treaty while calling for its revision:

"If the [foreign] policy had gone on that way we [the

traditionalists in the Foreign Office] would have been 33 pleased to go on serving the cause." By that date, the

German constitution had already been subverted and the cruel

persecution of German Jews and German trade unionists had

begun. By the time Hitler had ruled for nineteen months, the

coalition government that Woermann found reassuring had

long ceased to exist and the ancient Hindenburg had died.

On the other hand, Woermann did have some awareness of the

malevolence of the Nazi regime. The burning of the Reichstag

33 Woermann testimony, 2 July 1948; Transcripts, pp. 10854-59; M897, roll 10. The first quotation from Woermann's testimony is from p. 10854; the second quotation is from p. 10855.

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on 27 February 1933 caused him to suspect the true nature

of the new government. This suspicion was strongly reinforced

<5 / by the political murders of 30 June 1934. Woermann,

nevertheless, continued to be optimistic in the period

1934-36, as he believed that he and his professional colleagues

could impart to the Nazis a sober and realistic sense of 35 international politics.

Woermann eventually realized that Nazi foreign policy

could not be diverted into sensible channels and that, in

fact, the regime was using the Foreign Office to further its

nefarious schemes. He nonetheless chose to remain in office

rather than resign. His explanation indicates his inclination

to follow rather than to lead:

After the outbreak of war I thought it more than ever my duty to stick to my post. The way I felt and acted agrees with the thoughts and actions of the vast majority of Germans, and in our Foreign Office all the men of whose judgment and attitude I had the highest opinion thought and acted in the same w a y . 36

The resistance movement did not affect Woermann's decision to

continue his diplomatic c.-.reer. He never approached resistance 37 elements in the Foreign Office; nor did they approach him.

■^Woermann interrogation 3295, 11 August 1947; interrogator - Kempner; M1019/80/0718.

■^Vogel affidavit of 12 February 1948; Woermann exhibit 29; M897/120/0180.

Woermann testimony, 9 July 1948; Transcripts, p. 11482; M897, roll 11. 37 Weizsacker testimony, 15 June 1948; Transcripts, pp. 8645-46; M897, roll 9.

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Despite his political passivity, Woermann retained

his self-assurance as a bureaucrat. His sense of professional

pride precluded servility before Nazi notables for the sake

of promotions. His reputation among oldtime colleagues also

made it unnecessary for him to curry favor with the Nazis.

In 1936-38 he received three prestigious appointments in

the following sequence: director of the European section in

the Political Department; counselor of embassy, or second in

command, at the German embassy in London; and the head of 38 the Political Department. While stationed in London,

Woermann complied with invitations to become first a party

member and then an honorary member of the SS. He rationalized 39 that other career diplomats were doing the same thing. On

the other hand, Woermann was not reluctant to offer professional

advice, and criticism to Ribbentrop, his superior in London

and a favorite of Hitler. Ribbentrop at first was willing to

hear advice. In fact, he had requested Woermann as his

counselor at the London embassy because of Woermann's out­

spokenness in their first professional encounter. But by

1938, with both men back in Berlin, Woermann1s independence

had become obnoxious to the newly appointed foreign minister.

38 Paul Barandon (who worked with Woermann in the Legal Department of the Foreign Office in 1933-36) affidavit of 11 May 1948; Woermann exhibit 11; M897/120/0109. Woermann affidavit of 27 May 1947; prosecution exhibit 7; M897/25/0042-43. 39 Woermann testimony, 2 July 1948; Transcripts, pp. 10859-60; M897, roll 10.

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From then on Ribbentrop displayed open hostility toward

Woermann.^ This did not prevent Woermann from being

steadfast on matters of bureaucratic principle. For example,

he dared in May 1940 to stand up for a subordinate, Gottfried

von Nostitz. Without first notifying Ribbentrop, Nostitz

had relayed to the German military command an urgent American

request to save Brussels from destruction; for this action,

Ribbentrop wanted to dismiss Nostitz from the diplomatic

service. Woermann helped to dissuade the foreign minister

by threatening to resign himself. Woermann took a strong

stand partially because he had himself advised Nostitz to

pass on the message without taking the time to contact 41 Ribbentrop.

The year 1943 was a turning point in Woermann's career

as well as in Weizsacker*s career. In the aftermath of the

Luther incident, he was demoted to the rather ludicrous

position of German ambassador to Japanese-occupied China.

He reached his new post by means of a risky two-month submarine

^®Ibid,, pp. 10866-72. Woermann testimony, 6 July 1948; ibid., pp. 11052-57. Vogel affidavit of 12 February 1948; Woermann exhibit 12; M897/120/0112-13. Alexander von Dornberg (chief of protocol of the Foreign Office in 1938-43) affidavit of 25 May 1948; Woermann exhibit 17; M897/120/0132-33.

^Gottfried von Nostitz (who was employed from the autumn of 1938 to May 1940 in Referat Pol I M, a subdivision of the Foreign Office's Political Department; also became involved in the German resistance movement) affidavit of 7 January 1948; Woermann exhibit 27; M897/120/0174-75. Woermann testimony, 6 July 1948; Transcripts, pp. 11058, 11060; M897, roll 10.

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trip through enemy-controlled seas. Woermann was still in

China two years later when the war ended, first in Europe

and then in the Pacific. The Chinese interned him in a

detention camp when American troops arrived in China in

October 1945. Ten months later he was turned over to American

authorities there, who tried him for having allegedly aided

the Japanese following the unconditional German surrender of

May 1945. Woermann was acquitted, but next found himself

being transported back to Germany in a ship's brig. He

arrived in Germany in March 1947 and continued to be incar- 42 cerated. A month later he was in the Nuremberg jail.

Otto von Erdmannsdorff, the third civil servant

defendant, exhibited competence plus the ability to survive

in tumultuous political times. Although he was highly capable,

he did not possess either Weizsacker's force of character

or Woermann's power of intellect. For whatever reason, he

did not advance as far in the Foreign Office as the other

two men. Nor was Erdmannsdorff the rare individual who,

regardless of his position, exercised initiative and leadership

in matters of a moral nature.

/ 0 For this account of Woermann's life in the years 1943-47, see his testimony of 2 and 6 July 1948; Transcripts, pp. 10848-53, 11062; M897, roll 10. A small excerpt of this testimony is published in TWC, 12:1244. Rear-Admiral Eberhard Godt, former chief of the operations division of the German submarine command staff, estimated that Woermann had a 60 percent chance of a safe submarine trip from Europe to China in the early summer of 1943. See Godt affidavit of 16 January 1948; Woermann exhibit 32; M897/120/0191.

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Erdmannsdorff's early life was quite similar to

Woermann's. He was also b o m in Dresden in 1888, studied

law, and received a doctorate degree in it. He also served

in the military during World War I and at the end of the

war joined the Foreign Office. Although he advanced in his

new career, Erdmannsdorff did not always receive the

prestigious European assignments. He found himself shunted

off to Mexico in 1920-23 and to China in 1928. The latter

assignment was not unwelcome, though, as he had spent some

time in China during his earlier legal career and was soon

able to develop a special expertise in Far Eastern affairs.

Erdmannsdorff was to stay in the Orient five years, first in

China and then in Japan. He was serving as counselor of / Q embassy in Tokyo when Hitler came to power. It would be

logical to suggest that Erdmannsdorff was less informed than

his colleagues in Berlin as to the nature of this new regime;

however, given his character, it seems unlikely that more

information would have altered his behavior. Specifically,

Erdmannsdorff had a marked inclination to adjust his actions 44 and his attitudes to suit his superiors. He also had a

/ Q For data on Erdmannsdorff's early life and early career, see Erdmannsdorff affidavit of 21 November 1947; prosecution exhibit 9; M897/25/0050-51. Erdmannsdorff described himself as an "East Asian specialist" in his interrogation of 9 October 1947; interrogator - Kempner; M1019/16/0419.

^See Bohle letter of May 1937, quoted by Jacobsen in Nationalsozialistische Aussenpolitik, p. 473. Also see Erdmannsdorff interrogation of 20 June 1947; interrogator - Kempner; M1019/16/0386.

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reputation among his associates for lacking a sincere commitment

to principle.. •, 45

The advent of Nazism, therefore, did not impede

Erdmannsdorff's career. He returned to Berlin in the latter

part of 1933 and headed the Wilhelmstrasse's East Asian

division for two years. Following a structural reorganization

of the Foreign Office in 1936, he was put in charge of the

non-European sections of the Political Department. In May

1937, he was asked to join the Nazi party and to become Germany's

minister to Hungary. Both invitations were accepted. The

ministerial position, Erdmannsdorff's first, was important

because Hungary was one of Nazi Germany's few constant friends

in an increasingly polarized Europe. Erdmannsdorff's

assignment in Budapest lasted until June 1941, just prior to

Hungary's joining Germany in war against the Soviet Union.

Upon his return to Berlin, Erdmannsdorff became the director

of the Political Department, the second highest position

in that department. He held that post from 1941 to 1943

under Woermann and from 1943 to 1945 under Hencke, who was 46 Woermann's successor.

^Both Bohle and Hans Schroeder described Erdmannsdorff as one whose commitment to principle could not be trusted. For Bohle's comment, see Bohle interrogation of 16 July 1947; interrogator - Kempner; M1019/8/0363. For a reference to Schroeder's comment, see Erdmannsdorff interrogation of 9 October 1947; interrogator - Kempner; M1019/16/0418. 46 For information on the post-1933 development of Erdmannsdorff's career, see the following sources: Erdmannsdorff affidavit of 21 November 1947; prosecution exhibit 9; M897/25/0051. Erdmannsdorff interrogation 1481, 23 June 1947; interrogator - Peter Beauvais; M1019/16/0392. Erdmannsdorff interrogation of 9 October 1947; interrogator - Kempner; M1019/16/0419.

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The abnormal and unpleasant events of those years

touched Erdmannsdorff in his role as a Political Department

director. In a situation where his department head was not

consulted by the foreign minister, Erdmannsdorff was far

removed from the policy-making level of government; ^ but

exclusion from the decision-making process did not mean

isolation from the decisions themselves. Erdmannsdorff,

consequently, faced the same problem that higher officials did.

By staying in office, he either had to reject or tacitly

accept the questionable activities of the Nazi government.

He claimed that his outspoken criticism of the Nazis' Jewish 48 policies led to his dismissal in 1941 as minister to Hungary.

He did not claim, however, that as a director he objected

to documents which revealed to him the deportation of Jews AQ to the East.

The ability to survive characterized Erdmannsdorff1s

career also in the years immediately preceding the Ministries

trial. He continued as director of the Political Department

^Erdmannsdorff said that he was not received officially even once by Ribbentrop during his four years as director of the Political Department. Erdmannsdorff interrogation of. 9 October 1947; interrogator - Kempner: M1019/16/0422.

^Erdmannsdorff interrogation 1481, 23 June 1947; interrogator - Beauvais; M1019/16/0399-0400. Reinhard Henschel, who had worked under Erdmannsdorff in Budapest, partially corroborated this claim in his testimony of 17 February 1948. See Transcripts, p. 2011; M897, roll 3. 49 Erdmannsdorff interrogation of 20 June 1947; interrogator - Kempner; M1019/16/0384-86. Erdmannsdorff interrogation of 9 October 1947; interrogator - Kempner; M1019/16/0418-19.

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until late March 1945, just weeks before the final collapse

of the Third Reich. Despite the chaos that enveloped Germany

in the immediate postwar period, he soon became suitably

employed. He obtained the job of public prosecutor in Hamburg.

The British occupation authorities in that city apparently

found nothing in his past to disqualify him for that position.

In the late spring of 1947, Erdmannsdorff traveled to Nuremberg

to be interrogated by the American authorities and was

subsequently detained by them as a war criminal.

Karl Ritter, among the four careerist Foreign Office

defendants, possessed the greatest expertise as well as the

largest ego. His egotism enabled him to interact with the

Nazis in an amoral fashion. Ritter was born in 1883 in

the Upper Franconian town of Doerflass. He was approximately

the same age as Weizsacker, Woermann, and Erdmannsdorff.

However, his Foreign Office career, unlike theirs, had already

peaked by the time the Nazis came to power. He established

before the age of forty a reputation as a preeminent civil

servant economist. He was so highly esteemed that the highest

government leaders in 1922 specifically requested his transfer

from the Finance Ministry to the Foreign Office, so that the

latter bureau might utilize his talents in dealing with the 51 reparations question. Although economics had been Ritter's

"'‘' Q Erdmannsdorff interrogation of 20 June 1947; interrogator - Kempner; M1019/16/0381. 51 Friedrich Gaus (who served as head of the Foreign Office's Legal Department from 1923 to 1943, and who had a longtime friendship with Ritter) affidavit of 6 May 1948;

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vocation since his completion in 1905 of his basic university

curriculum, he had pursued this discipline in varied circum­

stances. First, from 1905 to 1907, he was an economic

journalist for a Cologne newspaper, the Koelnische Zeitung.

The attainment of a doctoral degree followed. From 1910 to

1914 he developed his economic expertise within the German

Colonial Ministry. He spent three of those years in West

Africa in the Cameroons. Military participation in World

War I was abruptly terminated after one year because of

recurrent malaria, a malady he had contracted while in Africa.

From 1915 to 1922 Ritter was an economist in the government

bureaucracy in Berlin, working sequentially for the Ministry

of the Interior, the Economics Office, and the Finance Ministry.

Once he became a member of the Foreign Office, Ritter directed

economic policy as it impinged upon German diplomacy. In

1929 he was appointed the head of the Foreign Office's newly

established Department of Economic Policy, a position he was 52 to retain until 1937. The reparations issue made economics

a central concern of the Weimar Wilhelmstrasse. As Ritter

later described himself with accuracy, if not with modesty,

he was one of "the most influential officials in the formulation

Ritter exhibit 3; M897/114/0423. Ritter interrogation 1811, 9 April 1947; interrogator - Kempner; M1019/58/0663. 52 For data on Ritter's life and career before 1933, see the following sources: Ritter testimony of 12 July 1948 in TWC, 13:17-18. Ritter affidavit of 25 November 1947; prosecution exhibit 8; M897/25/0045-46. Ritter affidavit of 6 May 1947; M1019/58/0684.

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Intellectual snobbery limited Ritter's development

of personal ties."^ The brilliant Friedrich Gaus was one of

his few friends in the Foreign Office. In general, Ritter

tended to cultivate relationships with government officials--

such as Josef Wirth, Gustav Stresemann, and Julius Curtius-- 55 who were capable as well as influential. On the other hand,

Ritter was inclined to be rude and imperious with colleagues

and subordinates who did not particularly impress him.

Furthermore, he resented being accountable to people who 56 were his intellectual inferiors. He preferred functioning

Report of Ritter interrogation of 10 October 1945; interrogators - DeWitt C. Poole and Harold C. Deutsch; M679/3/0185. Others also attested to the importance of Ritter in the Weimar Foreign Office. See the following examples: Hans Kroll (who worked under Ritter in the Department of Economic Policy from 1929 to 1936) affidavit of 3 October 1946; Ritter exhibit 7; M897/114/0434. Eisenlohr affidavit of 26 May 1948; Ritter exhibit 46; M897/114/0699. The historian D. C. Watt writes ("German Diplomats and Nazi Leaders," p. 160): "Ritter . . . must be counted among the ablest diplomats of the twentieth century."

■^See the following references to Ritter's aloofness: Eisenlohr affidavit of 26 May 1948; Ritter exhibit 46; M897/114/ 0699-0700. Steengracht interrogation 938c, 21 March 1947; interrogator - Pins; M1019/71/0334. Mackeben testimony, 12 July 1948; Transcripts, pp. 11694, 11696-99; M897, roll 11. 55 See Hermann Pttnder (employed during the Weimar era in first the Reich Finance Ministry and then as a state secretary in the Reich Chancellery) affidavit of 11 May 1948; Ritter exhibit 2; M897/114/0420. C £ Vogel, Diplomat Unter Hitler und Adenauer, pp. 102-3. Vogel served as a receptionist-secretary for Ritter from late October 1943 to late May 1944. Ritter himself admitted to "the rudeness for which I was known in the Foreign Office when I didn't like somebody." Ritter testimony, 15 July 1948; Transcripts, p. 12201; M897, roll 12.

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at a high level of independence and influence, a preference

which was gratified during the Weimar era.

Ritter did not exhibit a perceptive grasp of political

realities whenever he went beyond his area of economic know­

ledge.^^ He was basically apolitical. The Nazi assumption of

government may have surprised him, but it did not unduly

disturb him. His first assessments of the Hitlerite government

were optimistic, despite his disdain for its policy of anti-

Semitism. In any case, he had no doubts in 1933 about remaining 58 in office. In 1938 he accepted party membership when 59 invited to do so. In the intervening time it had become

apparent to Ritter that the Department of Economic Policy

would no longer be able to exert the influence that it had

enjoyed under the Weimar government. With the best years of

his career obviously behind him, he was thinking of an early

retirement.^

Circumstances and pride, however, made Ritter an active

member of the Foreign Office until the last year of the Third

"^See Vogel, Diplomat unter Hitler und Adenauer, p. 102.

■^Ritter testimony, 12 July 1948; Transcripts, pp. 11749-51; M897, roll 11. Report of Ritter interrogation of 3 September 1945; interrogator - A. W. Klieforth: M679/3/0181. 59 Ritter affidavit of 25 Novmeber 1947; prosecution exhibit 8; M897/25/0047.

^Report of Ritter interrogation of 10 October 1945; interrogators - Poole and Deutsch; M679/3/0185. Ritter interrogation 1291a, 21 July 1947; interrogator - Beauvais; M1019/58/0735-36.

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Reich. In 1937 he was appointed the German ambassador to

Brazil. Although this new assignment was considered a 61 demotion, he pursued his government's ideologically tainted

instructions so energetically and so tactlessly that the 62 Brazilian government declared him persona non grata in 1938.

He returned to Germany and to a Foreign Office headed by

Ribbentrop, who would not honor his predecessor's implied

promise that Ritter could retire after his tour in Brazil.

Instead Ritter found himself in a state of limbo with ad hoc 6 ? assignments separated by lengthy leaves. It would seem,

however, that his professed desire to retire was somewhat

insincere, and that his primary concern was to obtain once

again a position of influence within the Foreign Office. An

indication of this concern was his comment, made at his trial,

regarding his acceptance in 1940 of his liaison assignment:

"I thought that it might possibly be a springboard for me in

order to again have an influence on foreign political decisions fiA as I had before 1933." In any case, Ritter admitted at

61 Rudolf Rahn (a member of the German Foreign Office from 1928 to 1945; he knew Ritter since 1928) affidavit of 6 December 1946; Ritter exhibit 5; M897/114/0430. Kroll affidavit of 3 October 1946; Ritter exhibit 7; M897/114/0435.

^Jacobsen, Nationalsozialistische Aussenpolitik, pp. 558-61.

^ R i t t e r interrogation 1291a, 21 July 1947; interrogator - Beauvais; M1019/58/0736. Ritter testimony, 12 July 1948; Transcripts, pp. 11758-59, 11761-62; M897, roll 11. 64 Ritter testimony, 12 July 1948; Transcripts, p. 11771; M897, roll 11.

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his trial that a renewed request for retirement at the out­

break of World War II was merely a formality. He expected

and wanted to continue serving his nation now that it was

embroiled in a war. He nevertheless did not want to be

pigeon-holed in the bureaucratic hierarchy, or be forced to

take orders from a former subordinate. He consequently

arranged with Ribbentrop that, whatever his future tasks might

be, he would always be directly responsible to Ribbentrop.^

One of Ritter's first wartime assignments was very

felicitous. He negotiated the details of German-Russian

economic cooperation with high-ranking Soviet officials

including, at times, Joseph Stalin. This work was completed

by the autumn of 1940,^6 and it was then that Ritter for the

first time since his return from Brazil received a regular

appointment. He was selected as a liaison between Foreign

Minister Ribbentrop and Field Marshal Wilhelm Keitel, the fi 7 Armed Forces chief of staff. Ritter tried to cultivate a

^Ritter interrogation 1291a, 21 July 1947; interrogator - Beauvais; M1019/58/0732. Ritter testimony, 12 July 1948; Transcripts, pp. 11769, 11772; M897, roll 11.

^ R i t t e r interrogation of 24 April 1946, pp. 1-2; interrogators - John Rogge and Paul Ertzinger; filed with interrogations conducted by the IMT Interrogation Division under the direction of Colonel John H. Amen, 1945-46; RG 238; National Archives. Report of Ritter interrogation of 3 September 1945; interrogator - Klieforth; M679/3/0180. Ritter affidavit of 25 November 1947; prosecution exhibit 8; M897/25/0047.

6?For Ritter's appointment to this liaison position, see Akten zur deutschen auswHrtigen Politik 1918-1945: aus dem Archiv des Auswgrtigen Amts. Series E : 1941-1945 (hereafter cited as ADAP, E), ed. Hans Rothfels et al. , vol. 1: 12. Dezember 1941 bis 28, Februar 1942 (Gottingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1969), p. 566, n. 3~.

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good working relationship with Ribbentrop. However, his

objections, in the spring of 1941, to the preparations for

war against the Soviet Union chilled his relations with CQ the foreign minister. Ritter could no longer hope that his

liaison position would lead to renewed influence in the

Foreign Office. On the other hand, there were opportunities

during the war years for satisfying work. Despite claims to

the contrary,^ he still occasionally used his economic

expertise. For example, he participated in the economic

aspects of a discussion between Foreign Minister Ribbentrop

and the Japanese ambassador to Berlin, Hiroshi Oshima.^

In the late summer of 1944 a combination of factors--a bombed

out office, the party's increased distrust of former Weimar

bureaucrats, a recurrence of chronic malaria--made Ritter 72 virtually inactive. At the end of the war he was arrested

^ R i t t e r testimony, 13 July 1948; Transcripts, pp. 11849-53; M897, roll 11.

^ R i t t e r testimony, 12 and 13 July 1948; ibid., pp. 11771, 11877.

^Mackeben testimony, 12 July 1948; ibid., p. 11695. Erich Schmidt-Leichner's opening statement in behalf of Ritter, 9 July 1948, in TWC, 12:288.

^Undated note by Bernd Gottfriedsen regarding the conversation between Foreign Minister Ribbentrop and Ambassador Oshima on 31 August and 1 September 1942, document 255 in ADAP, E, vol. 3: 16. Juni bis 30. September 1942 (Gottingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1974), pp. 438, 440.

^Schroeder affidavit of 4 June 1948; Ritter exhibit 45; M897/114/0696. Ritter testimony, 14 July 1948; Transcripts, pp. 11998-99; M897, roll 11.

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by Allied authorities. There followed more than two years

of intermittent interrogations before his indictment as a

war criminal.

Ritter was characteristically contemptuous of both

the Nazi regime and those Germans who actively opposed it.

In the first years of the Third Reich, while still head of

the Department of Economic Policy, he continued to pick new

subordinates solely on the basis of talent, thereby acquiring

employees who were politically tainted in the eyes of the 70 party. At one conference, he could not refrain from telling

Hitler that Hitler's plans for the development of commerce

were unworkable. Fortunately for his well-being, Ritter soon

became more discreet.^ Conversely, he was devoid of sympathy

for the German resistance movement. Even after the war,

while under cross-examination, he could label the German

opposition's wartime contacts with the Allied Powers as

"high treason" and the opposition's intentions to kill Hitler

as "nonsensical."^

The emotional need to belong, to serve a cause, propelled

Ernst Wilhelm Bohle into prominence in the Third Reich. He

was the first of the four party functionaries among the

^Schroeder affidavit of 4 June 1948; Ritter exhibit 45; M897/114/0696.

^Eisenlohr affidavit of 26 May 1948; Ritter exhibit 46; M897/114/0700.

^Rit t e r testimony, 16 July 1948; Transcripts, p. 12459; M897, roll 12.

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Foreign Office defendants to obtain an important position in

the Wilhelmstrasse. He did so at a relatively early age.

He had been b o m in 1903 in Bradford, England of German

parentage. His father had emigrated to England and at the

time of Bohle's birth was teaching electrical engineering at

the local college. The family moved three years later to

Capetown, South Africa, where the father worked as a professor

of electrical engineering. Ernst Bohle grew up in South

Africa, receiving his primary and secondary education there.

In 1920, young Bohle opted to pursue his higher education in

Germany, despite an opportunity to study either at Oxford or

Cambridge. Upon completing a university curriculum in

political science and commerce in December 1923, he worked

for several export-import firms in Cologne and Hamburg. In

1931, he started his own automobile accessories business in 7fi Hamburg. He responded in December of the same year to a

Nazi newspaper notice which invited people who were familiar

with South Africa to work in the African section of the

Auslandsabteilung (overseas division) of the National Socialist

Party. The first involvement with the party was merely an

evening activity. Three months later, in March 1932, Bohle

became an official party member. What had started as an

7fi For Bohle's early life, see the following document: Bohle affidavit of 7 November 1947; prosecution exhibit 5; M897/25/0032-33. For information regarding Bohle's father, see Bohle testimony of 23 July 1948 in TWC, 13:1196. Bohle's decision to forego an Oxford or Cambridge education was also mentioned in his testimony of 23 July 1948. See Transcripts, p. 13479; M897, roll 13.

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avocation became a profession when he was appointed in May

1933 to head the Auslandsabteilung. This rapid rise to a

position of eminence in the party was due largely to the

support of the then influential Rudolf Hess. Less than four

years later, in January 1937, Bohle became a member of the

Foreign Office. He was designated chief of the Auslands-

organisation (the new name given the Auslandsabteilung in

1934) in the Foreign Office. He received the courtesy title

of state secretary in December 1937.^

The purpose of Bohle's appointment to the Foreign

Office was to coordinate the Wilhelmstrasse's involvement

with Germans abroad with the programs of the Auslandsorganisa-

tion (or AO). Nevertheless, the AO's interference with

Foreign Office activities was negligible, with the exception

of one area--the area of personnel policies. Bohle's repre­

sentatives abroad sent reports to Berlin on the ideological

reliability of German consular and diplomatic officials.

Bohle himself attempted to influence appointments and promo­

tions within the Foreign Office. Even in the sphere of personnel

relations, however, the AO's power was not as great as either 78 its adversaries feared or its proponents desired. Furthermore,

^Bohle affidavit of 7 November 1947; prosecution exhibit 5; M897/25/0033, 0035. Bohle testimony of 23 July 1948, which can be found in the following two places: TWC, 13:1197-1200. Transcripts, p. 13480; M897, roll 13. For the document appointing Bohle to the Foreign Office, see Hitler and Neurath decree of 30 January 1937; prosecution exhibit 663; M897/29/0941-42. An English translation is in TWC, 12:801-2. 78 Jacobsen mentions (NationaIsozia1istische Aussenpoli- tik, p. 155) that the AO could not affect foreign policy, but could

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in 1938, Ribbentrop--who disliked the AO leader--was appointed

foreign minister, and a gradual decline of the AO's and

Bohle's standing within the Foreign Office began. The May

1941 flight to England of Rudolf Hess, who was Bohle's main

benefactor, brought about a virtual elimination of the influence 79 of the AO and its leader. In November 1941, Bohle was

officially informed that he was no longer a member of the

Foreign Office, although this dismissal would not be made

public until the end of the war and he could, in the meantime, 80 continue to use the title of state secretary. The AO as an

organization, with Bohle as its chief, did continue until the

end of the Third Reich.^

Bohle was fairly similar in background, outlook, and

temperament to the non-Nazi Foreign Office defendants. He

was not an aristocrat--as was Weizsacker--but he came from a

solid middle class background. He did not possess a doctoral

degree--as did Woermann, Erdmannsdorff, and Ritter--but he

had received a university education. The attribute of

affect foreign service careers. He delineates the AO's attempt to influence personnel (pp. 467-76) and concludes (pp. 476-77) that the Foreign Office on the whole successfully withstood this attempt.

79Ibid., pp. 106, 117-18, 222. 80 Hans-Heinrich Lammers (Reich minister and chief of Reich Chancellery) to Bohle, 14 November 1941; Bohle exhibit 73; M897/101/0742. 81 Bohle affidavit of 7 November 1947; prosecution exhibit 5; M897/25/0033.

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patriotism, which led Bohle into the Nazi Party, was an

attribute he shared with the other four men, although he

possessed it more intensely. The belief that Hitler's

organization could strengthen Germany internally and

externally persuaded Bohle in 1931-32 to join the Nazi Party.

He ignored or rationalized the unsavory racist ideas of the 82 movement.

Bohle’s approach to politics can be explained by his

childhood and adolescence. He grew up in a dominion of the

British Empire among British subjects, but with a father so

fervently German that it was forbidden to speak English at

home. This situation was exacerbated by two circumstances.

First, World War I made Bohle, at the time between the ages

of eleven and fifteen, an object of antagonism to his British

schoolmates. Secondly, Bohle and his siblings were denied

religious training by his ardently Christian parents because

one parent was Protestant and the other was Catholic. Bohle's

need to have spiritual roots in what was for him an unusually 83 alien world was thus channeled into German patriotism.

The mature Bohle expanded his love of fatherland to loyalty

to the Nazi Party without adopting the rigid dogmatism

^ B o h l e testimony, 23 July 1948; Transcripts, pp. 13480-82, 13488, 13516-17; M897, roll 13. Bohle interrogation of 7 August 1947; interrogator - John Lewis; M1019/8/0427. 8 3 These facts regarding Bohle's youth can be found in his testimony of 23 July 1948. See Transcripts, pp. 13477-79, 13488-89; M897, roll 13. The conclusion derived from this information is my own.

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characteristic of so many in the movement. He has thus

been labeled a liberal Nazi. Bohle the Nazi functionary

paralleled Bohle the schoolboy. In both stages of his life

he was intensely loyal to his principles, but his fidelity

in terms of people encompassed only a small portion of his

associates. As a boy his circle of compatriots could include

his family but not his friends. As a man his affinity

extended to those Nazis, such as Rudolf Hess, who had ties

abroad, but not to the majority of his party colleagues.

Fiercely ambitious for his organization, the Auslandsorganisa-

tion, Bohle did not seek personal material gain from his

position within the party. His charm and his idealism earned 84 him the devotion of his subordinates. He was characterized

by the often critical Steengracht as being "an honest

fanatic."85

Bohle became involved only twice in actions which could

possibly be labeled disloyal to the regime. One incident

Jacobsen, Nationalsozialistische Aussenpolitik, pp. 117-18. Karlfried von Duerckheim-Montmartin (a non-Nazi professor who had known Bohle since 1934) affidavit of 20 April 1948; Bohle exhibit 34; M897/101/0577. Vicco von Bulow-Schwante (a member of the Foreign Office who had known Bohle since 1933) affidavit of 21 April 1948; Bohle exhibit 35; M897/101/0583-84. Emil Ehrich (worked as Bohle's adjutant from 1933 to 1937) affidavit of 21 May 1948; Bohle exhibit 36; M897/101/0586-87. Brigitta Reich (who was a secretary in Bohle's office) affidavit of 30 April 1948; Bohle exhibit 39; M897/101/0596-98. Bohle's remarks on his relations with other party members may be located as follows: Bohle testimony, 23 July 1948; Transcripts, pp. 13494-95; M897, roll 13. Bohle testimony of 23 July 1948 in TWC, 13:1203. 85 Report on Steengracht dated 12 September 1945, based on interrogations of 4 and 5 September 1945; interrogator - Deutsch; M679/3/0522.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. characteristically involved Hess. In late 1940, he agreed

to help his patron draft a letter to the Duke of Hamilton.

This communication supposedly was to pave the way for Hess

to meet Hamilton or some other Englishman in Switzerland.

The purpose of the encounter was to discuss a peace between

Germany and Great Britain. Bohle thought that his friend

had Hitler's approval, and told the Fuehrer so when, several

months later, Hess— much to Bohle's surprise--flew to Scotland.

The other incident involved Ribbentrop. The AO leader was

so displeased with Ribbentrop's foreign policy that he tried

to express his dissatisfaction to Hitler, using Himmler as 87 an intermediary.

Bohle's concern with loyalty and principle, however

myopic, apparently did not desert him with the collapse of

the Nazi movement. He realized that no "decent German

could . . . [any longer] be a believer of National Socialism

after all the things that were done in the name of National 88 Socialism," but he still had a sense of doing the proper

thing vis-lt-vis himself and his followers. Consequently, he

surrendered himself to American authorities rather than wait

86 Bohle interrogation of 7 August 1947; interrogator - Lewis; M1019/8/0427-29. Bohle testimony, 23 July 1948; Transcripts, pp. 13497-98; M897, roll 13. 87 Bohle interrogation of 7 August 1947; interrogator - Lewis; M1019/8/0448-49. Bohle testimony of 23 July 1948 in TWC, 13:1202. 88 Bohle interrogation of 6 August 1947; interrogator - Lewis; M1019/8/0379.

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to be arrested, or take the other alternatives of concealment

or suicide. When asked by his trial counsel why he had taken

this action, Bohle replied: "I did not want subordinates of 89 mine held responsible for the AO, of which I was the chief.”

Wilhelm Keppler was a sophisticated businessman who

became a naive politician. In the latter role, he was the

second non-professional Foreign Office defendant to become

significantly involved with German diplomatic activities.

Keppler was born in Heidelberg in 1882, the son of a tailor

and clothing merchant. He used an engineering education to

achieve, before the age of forty, a successful business

career as the manager of an aged relative's gelatin (a photo­

graphic chemical) manufacturing concern. A result of his

initial success was a partnership with the American firm

Eastman Kodak to create a second gelatin factory in the town 90 of Eberbach, situated near Heidelberg. Keppler's business

affairs led to his involvement in local Eberbach politics and

to his election to the city council. Once immersed in politics,

he developed an interest in the programs of the relatively

new Nazi Party. In 1927 Keppler became a party member. He

^ B o h l e testimony, 23 July 1948; Transcripts, p. 13530; M897, roll 13.

^Keppler testimony of 16 July 1948 in TWC, 12:623-24. Summary (no. 27) of Keppler interrogation of 13 August 1946; interrogator - Norbert G. Barr; M1019/34/0744. Heinrich Fremerey (a director of a Heidelberg bank which had lent credit to Keppler's businesses) affidavit of 26 January 1948; Keppler exhibit 5; M897/105/0014.

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believed that Germany's problems would be solved by the

fascist doctrine of social and political solidarity between 91 workers and capitalists. This doctrine corresponded with 92 his own practice as a businessman. On the basis of his

trial testimony, we can assume that Keppler was neither

4 attracted nor repelled by the party's anti-Semitism. He

believed that "the Jews had penetrated too deeply into some

parts of German life," but he favored moderation on this 93 issue.

Keppler's entry into the party quickly attracted its

leader's attention as there were few prominent industrialists

among the Nazi ranks in 1927. Hitler could be a consummate

charmer when he chose, and in the politically inexperienced

Eberbach businessman he found a susceptible subject. The

early relationship between them led Keppler, after several

requests, to agree to be Hitler's personal economic adviser.

In the first part of 1932, Keppler left his lucrative position 94 in Eberbach and went to Munich. Thus began a phase of his

^Keppler testimony of 16 July 1948 in TWC, 12:624-26. Keppler affidavit of 27 May 1947; prosecution exhibit 6; M897/25/0038. 92 Keppler testimony, 16 July 1948; Transcripts, pp. 12541-42; M897, roll 12. Ludwig Hechler (who was employed as a foreman in one of Keppler's plants) affidavit of 30 January 1948; Keppler exhibit 3; M897/105/0008. 93 Keppler testimony, 2 September 1948; Transcripts, pp. 19607-8; M897, roll 17. 94 Summary (no. 27) of Keppler interrogation of 13 August 1946; interrogator - Barr; M1019/34/0745. Report on Keppler dated 23 October 1945 (based on interrogations of 4, 5, 7 September and 9, 10, 12 October 1945); interrogation by

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life which was to lead eventually to the prisoner's dock

in Nuremberg.

Keppler's personality explains how he, a highly

intelligent person in technical subjects, could become a

permanently loyal follower of Hitler. Keppler was described

in his defense affidavits as "unpretentious," "modest,"

"reserved," devoid of fanaticism, and motivated by idealism.95

However, there existed behind those laudatory adjectives a

b l a n d , ^ self-important, an£j emotionally stunted individual.

Harold C, Vedeler with Peter Harnden as interpreter; M679/2/0339. Keppler testimony of 16 July 1948 in TWC, 12:626-28, Hugo E. Busch (a friend of Keppler since their college days) affidavit of 29 January 1948; Keppler exhibit 6; M897/105/0018. For a reference to Hitler's ability to charm, see Alan Bullock, Hitler: A Study in Tyranny, 2d ed. (New York: Harper 6c Row” 1962), p p . 376-77.

^^The following is a sampling of these affidavits: Karl Ludwig Frank (a former mayor of Eberbach) affidavit of 4 May 1948; Keppler exhibit 1; M897/105/0002. Paul Schneider (a colleague of Keppler in the years 1937-45) affidavit of 12 May 1948; Keppler exhibit 10; M897/105/0030-31. Felix Wankel (an inventor who had known Keppler since 1928) affidavit of 16 April 1948; Keppler exhibit 15; M897/105/0048-49. Qfi In the autumn of 1945, Keppler's captors described him as follows: "Whatever success he may have attained in business and in practical research in the economic field, Keppler appeared to be a colorless personality without force." Report on Keppler dated 2.3 October 1945 (based on interrogations of 4, 5, 7 September and 9, 10, 12 October 1945); interrogation of Vedeler with Harnden as interpreter; M679/2/0339.

^Keppler's self-importance is apparent when one reads his testimony on the witness stand. See the following examples: Keppler testimony, 20 July 1948; Transcripts, p. 12945; M897, roll 12. Keppler testimony, 1 September 1948; Transcripts, pp. 19297-98; M897, roll 17. Also see p. 130 below.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 83 Keppler was a lifelong bachelor, and in his mid-forties he

still lived with his elderly mother while avoiding "social

obligations." One explanation for his quiet private life

was that he had suffered a severe cardiac illness while still

in his late twenties. Whatever the reason for his social

seclusion, he used first his work and then the Nazi movement 98 to fill the void in his life. Furthermore, once committed

to a cause, Keppler's fidelity was extremely tenacious as

witnessed by his postwar refusal to denounce the Nazis'

"social-political program.

Keppler may have been personally innocuous, but his

activities were not. In December 1931, Hitler not only asked

Keppler to become his personal economic adviser but also

suggested that he organize a group of businessmen who were

not necessarily National Socialists, in order to obtain a

wide spectrum of economic counsel. This was part of the

Nazi leader's strategy to enlist conservative and moneyed

supporters in his final push for governmental control. The

subsequent gathering of bankers and industrialists became

known as the Keppler Circle, and did help to move Nazi

economic and social policy in a conservative direction.

^Keppler testimony of 16 July 1948 in TWC, 12:623, 627. Karl Friedrich Koch (a former member of the Eberbach city council) affidavit of 28 April 1948; Keppler exhibit 4; M897/105/0012. 99 Keppler interrogation of 13 October 1947; interrogator - Max Mandellaub; M1019/34/0850.

worthwhile secondary work on the Keppler Circle is Reinhard Vogelsang, Per Freundeskreis Himmler (Gottingen: Musterschmidt, 1972)" See pp. 22-34 for the formation and

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More importantly, Keppler and his colleagues played a

significant role in the political maneuvering in the months

preceding Hitler's selection as chancellor. One notable

contribution to this politicking was the drafting of a

businessmen's letter to President Paul von Hindenburg, which

urged the appointment of the Nazi leader to the chancellorship.

More consequential was the meeting between Hitler and

Franz von Papen on 4 January 1933 at the home of Kurt von

Schroeder. Keppler was employed in the arrangement of this

meeting. The Hitler-Papen conference led to an alliance

between these two men, which in turn was instrumental in

persuading President Hindenburg to accept the idea of a Hitler

chancellorship.

early activities of the circle. Keppler's group was fre­ quently referred to, after 1935 or 1936, as the Circle of Himmler's Friends because of the interest which Himmler showed toward it. Arthur Schweitzer (Big Business in the Third Reich [Bloomington: Indiana University Press,.1964]) also contains (pp. 34, 101-2) some pertinent remarks regarding the circle. See the following primary and unpublished sources for references to the origins and early activities of the Keppler Circle: Keppler testimony of 16 July 1948 in TWC, 12:628-29. Summary (no. 27) of Keppler interrogation of 13 August 1946; interrogator - Barr; M1019/34/0748-50 (which frames include a list of members of the circle). Kurt von Schroeder (a Cologne banker and original member of the Keppler Circle) affidavit of 9 April 1948; Keppler exhibit 185; M897/105/0903-5.

^^See the following secondary accounts of these events: Bullock, Hitler: A Study in Tyranny, pp. 243-45. Schweitzer, Big Business in the Third Reich, pp. 103-5, 591. Vogelsang, Freundeskreis Himmler, pp. 39-44, 129-30. The businessmen's letter to Hindenburg is published as prosecution document 3901-PS in IMT, 33:531-33. For Schroeder's account of the meeting at his home, see Kurt von Schroeder affidavit of 21 July 1947; document NI-7790; Microfilm Publication T301, Records of the U.S. Nuernberg War Crimes Trials, NI Series, 1933-1948, roll 66, frames 000676-78; RG 238; National Archives.

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The Nazis' assumption of power brought Keppler into

governmental service. He was at first the Fuehrer's economic

deputy in the Reich Chancellery. In this capacity and later

as a participant in Germany's economic Four Year Plan, Keppler

was involved in the acquisition of raw materials such as

oil, synthetic fats, and synthetic textile materials. Hitler

had enough confidence in Keppler that, in 1937, he entrusted

him with a purely political task. The Fuehrer made him

his personal representative to the Austrian Nazi Party.

While Keppler kept the Wilhelmstrasse informed of his new

activities, this assignment was independent of the German

diplomatic establishment. When the Austrian situation became

acute in early 1938, Ribbentrop, the newly appointed foreign

minister, requested that Keppler also act for the Foreign

Office in Austrian affairs. Hitler obliged, and in March of

1938 the former Eberbach businessman was designated state

secretary for special assignments. He was to retain this

title until the end of the Third Reich.From March 1938

to September 1939 Keppler served as a high-level emissary and

troubleshooter, reporting directly to Hitler or Gdring in

For Keppler's verification of his role in the Hitler-Papen meeting, see summary (no. 33) of Keppler interrogation of 16 August 1946; interrogator - Barr; M1019/34/0753. 109 Keppler affidavit of 27 May 1947; prosecution exhibit 6; M897/25/0038. Keppler testimony of 16 July 1948 in TWC, 12:629-30. Summary (no. 27) of Keppler inter- rogation of 13 August 1946; interrogator - Barr; M1019/34/ 0746. Keppler testimony, 20 July 1948; Transcripts, pp. 12881-82; M897, roll 12.

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such crises as the Austrian Anschluss, the final (March 1939) 103 partition of Czechoslovakia, and the Danzig controversy.

After September 1939 Keppler's diplomatic assignments were

trivial or, at best, not a matter of top-level governmental

urgency. For example, in the period 1940-43, he became the

Foreign Office's guardian for Subash Chandra Bose, an anti-

British Indian nationalist who had organized a "Free Indian

Legion" among Indian prisoners of war of the Third Reich.

As a liaison between Bose and the German government, Keppler

was primarily concerned with ensuring Bose's monthly receipt

of an allowance of thirty thousand reichsmarks.

Keppler did not feel at ease in the Foreign Office.

Upon his return from Austria in May 1938, he tried to resign

from his diplomatic position. He was unsuccessful, because

Ribbentrop was reluctant to let go of someone with his party

credentials. Keppler testified after the war that he had

never fully understood the intricacies of foreign policy,

that he had often felt inadequate in his conversations with

Frend ("Hitler and His Foreign Ministry," p. 127) describes Keppler and his codefendant Veesenmayer as "birds of ill-omen [who] foreshadow every crisis during 1937-9." Also see Jacobsen, Nationalsozialistische Aussenpolitik, p. 361.

^\joermann interrogation 2230, 22 October 1947; interrogator - Joseph Tancos; M1019/80/0731-32. A. C. N. Nambiar (an associate of Bose) affidavit of 8 May 1948; Keppler exhibit 128; M897/105/0650-51. Ludwig Alsdorf (an India expert who was on wartime duty in the German Foreign Office) affidavit of 18 May 1948; Keppler exhibit 129; M897/105/0653-55. Summary (no. 2455) of Keppler interrogation of 5 May 1947; interrogator - Pins; M1019/34/ 0822.

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foreign diplomats, and that he had lacked a common bond of

interests with all but one of his Wilhelmstrasse colleagues.

The one exception had been Emil Wiehl, the successor to

Ritter as the head of the Department of Economic Policy.

Keppler's discomfort was alleviated by his continuing to be

employed in the government's economic administration as

well as in its diplomatic bureaucracy. Among other things,

he served from April 1938 to the end of the war as president

of the Reich Office for Soil Research. In this capacity,

he maintained his involvement in the acquisition of mineral

and oil resources .

Keppler's fidelity to the regime was unshakeable. His

one brush with the German resistance movement was an unwitting

one. For a while, Adam von Trott zu Solz (a young diplomat

who was an active member of the resistance) was assigned

to him and repeatedly requested duplicate copies of sensitive

materials. Keppler proudly testified at his trial that,

though unaware of Trott's motives, he had been astute enough

to reject such requests.The collapse of the Third Reich

“^Ke p p l e r testimony, 20 July 1948; Transcripts, pp. 12931-32, 12934-35; M897, roll 12. Wiehl affidavit of 17 June 1948; Keppler exhibit 144; M897/105/0707-8.

^^Keppler affidavit of 27 May 1947; prosecution exhibit 6; M897/25/0038. Keppler testimony of 16 July 1948 in TWC, 12:630. Summary (no. 33) of Keppler interrogation of 16 August 1946; interrogator - Barr; M1019/34/0755.

^^Keppler testimony, 20 July 1948; Transcripts, pp. 12934-35; M897, roll 12.

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and his subsequent arrest strongly upset the neophyte- 108 politician Keppler, who apparently had kept his political

naivete intact throughout his eighteen-year association with

Nazism.

Gustav Adolph Steengracht von Moyland was a chameleon,

who at times appeared to be a Nazi functionary but at other

times exhibited the characteristics of the traditional

civil servant. His advancement through the Foreign Office

hierarchy was connected with his party associations. In

this sense, he was the third party member among the Foreign

Office defendants to acquire a notable position in the

diplomatic bureaucracy. Once having obtained high office,

however, he basically identified himself with the foreign

service careerists. In background and training, he also had

more in common with pre-Nazi members of the Wilhelmstrasse

than with the diplomats recruited from the ranks of the party.

Steengracht was born in 1902 into a family of landed

aristocrats, of Dutch descent, whose estate of Moyland was

located in the upper Rhineland near Cleve. He pursued his

108 "Wilhelm Keppler, dressed in unkempt clothes and apparently indifferent as to his appearance, presented the picture of a broken-down man." Report on Keppler dated 23 October 1945 (based on interrogations of 4, 5, 7 September and 9, 10, 12 October 1945); interrogation by Vedeler with Harnden as interpreter; M679/2/0339. 109 "There is considerable dignity in the disillusionment of this (probably honest) believer [Keppler]." Memo entitled "Keppler, Wilhelm - Secretary of State in the Office of the Four-Year Plan" and dated 21 July 1945; M679/2/0363.

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higher education at the University of Cologne among other

places. His subjects included political economy, agricultural

science, and legal philosophy. Finishing his basic university

education in 1926, Steengracht, in the following ten years,

used his varied curriculum to manage his family's estates

and to serve as a legal administrator in local government.

He began his diplomatic career in 1936 when he was appointed

an agricultural attache to the German embassy in London. In

addition to his socially acceptable vocations, Steengracht

involved himself in right wing politics. As a student in the

early 1920s he was a member of a paramilitary organization

and participated in its battles against Communists. Conse­

quently, he was eligible to join (in the late 1920s) the

Stahlhelm, a conservative, extremely patriotic organization

of war veterans. Steengracht became a member of the Nazi

Party within four months of the establishment of the Hitlerite

government. In September 1933 he was inducted involuntarily

into the SA (the paramilitary arm of the party) with the

rest of his Stahlhelm unit. In the period up to 1936 he

was active as a leader in the local Nazi hierarchy.

Steengracht's attitude toward Nazism was not straight­

forward as were the attitudes of Bohle and Keppler. The

latter two were honest but misguided men who did not deny

^■■^For data on Steengracht's early life, see the following sources: Steengracht affidavit of 15 May 1947; M1019/71/0384. Steengracht affidavit of 20 November 1947; prosecution exhibit 1189; M897/33/1050-51. Steengracht testimony, 23 June 1948; Transcripts, p. 9755; M897, roll 9. Steengracht testimony, 29 June 1948; Transcripts, pp. 10342-46; M897, roll 10.

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their loyalty to the Nazi movement. Steengracht, on the

other hand, portrayed himself as one who always had strong

misgivings about the party, including its anti-Semitism.

He claimed that he had associated with the party in order

to express more effectively his opposition to its evils.

He used this rationale to explain his 1933 entry into the

party and his decision in 1936 to join the German embassy

in London. He also said that he had considered remaining

in England in 1938, when he was reassigned to Berlin, but

the desire to work against the regime's illegal measures

compelled him to reject that idea.^^ This claim of a

longstanding aversion to Nazism is belied by his political

activities before 1933 plus his lack of concrete acts of

resistance prior to his assumption of the state secretaryship

in 1943. Furthermore, his earlier testimony at Nuremberg

shows that he was, at least at times, a person of dubious 112 credibility. Basically, Steengracht was an opportunist,

seeking egotistical gratification rather than material

^^See Steengracht interrogation of 20 February 1947, pp. 1-3; interrogator - Iwan E. De Vries; RG 238; National Archives. This interrogation is not on microfilm since its folder was misplaced prior to the filming of M1019. 112 See Steengracht testimony before the IMT, 26 and 27 March 1946, in IMT, 10:106-57. Gustave M. Gilbert, an American psychologist who was assigned to the IMT defendants, describes (Nuremberg Diary [New York: Farrar, Straus, 1947], p. 222) Steengracht's appearance before the IMT as a defense witness as "a very sorry spectacle."

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 91 113 satisfaction. He nevertheless was not without conscience,

and his lack of ideological commitment allowed him to side

eventually with the traditional bureaucracy in a way that

the more principled Bohle or Keppler could never have done.^^^

This, however, did not correspond to Steengracht1s vain and

mendacious depiction of himself as a virtuous adversary of

the regime from the beginning.

Steengracht's uncommonly rapid rise through the

diplomatic hierarchy was marked by his constant professional

contact with Ribbentrop. He was selected for his first

assignment in London by Ribbentrop, who was then the German

ambassador to Great Britain. Steengracht's job proximity

to Ribbentrop was continuous after the latter was appointed

foreign minister. From 1938 to 1940 Steengracht served in

the Protocol Department in Berlin where he had such duties

113 According to Philipp August von Bethmann-Hollweg, a friend of Steengracht since both were university students, Steengracht's ego or ambition was prodded by his wife. Bethmann-Hollweg interrogation of 14 October 1947; interrogator - Kempner; document NG-3747; Microfilm Publication T1139, Records of the U.S. Nuernberg War Crimes Trials, NG Series, 1933-1948 (hereafter cited as T1139), roll 38, frame 1104; RG 238; National Archives. Additional citations from T1139 will merely provide a description of the source cited, give the document number, and give the microfilm publication number and the roll and frame location in the following manner: T1139/38/1104.

^■■^1 would disagree with the interpretation of the following historians that Steengracht was weak or submissive: Seabury, Wilhelmstrasse, pp. 134, 139-40, 197 - n. 63. Hill, Weizsacker Papiere, p. 40. I would agree with Margret Boveri's description of Steengracht as a figure who straddled the cleavage in the Foreign Office between the party functionaries and the traditional careerists. See Boveri, Diplomat vor Gericht, pp. 40, 44.

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as arranging the details for visits of state. From 1940

to 1943 he was assigned to Ribbentrop's field headquarters

with the responsibility to see that transportation, meals,

appointments, and other details of the foreign minister's

routine were arranged smoothly. Steengracht was also

associated with the Dienststelle Ribbentrop, which in fact

funded his London assignment. All of this characterized 115 him as a member of Ribbentrop's circle. This characteriza­

tion notwithstanding, Steengracht as state secretary from

1943 to 1945 had strained relations with the foreign minister,

according to his testimony and the testimony of others.

Ribbentrop had picked his new state secretary as one who

would obediently carry out his orders and who would loyally

support him in the struggles over jurisdiction that permeated

the combined party-state bureaucracy. Steengracht claimed

that he had received his appointment to the state secretary­

ship reluctantly and ungracefully, requesting first a

transfer to military service and then forewarning Ribbentrop

that he would not sacrifice his principles to governmental

^"^See the following sources on Steengracht' s career from 1936 to 1943: Steengracht affidavit of 15 May 1947; M1019/71/0384. Steengracht interrogation of 20 February 1947, p. 3; interrogator - De Vries; RG 238; National Archives. Steengracht affidavit of 20 November 1947; prosecution exhibit 1189; M897/33/1051. Gottfriedsen interrogation of 10 and 11 September 1945, as reported on 2 October 1945; M679/1/0728. Steengracht statement of 6 August 1945 (annex C of report on Steengracht dated 12 September 1945); M679/3/0530. Steengracht testimony, 29 June 1948; Transcripts, p. 10347; M897, roll 10.

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policy.

Steengracht's description of his reaction to his

nomination as state secretary may have been postwar hyperbole,

but while in this post he reacted more critically toward

Nazism than previously. Steengracht had less opportunity

as a state secretary to bring about change than Weizs&cker

had when he assumed that position five years earlier.

Steengracht nevertheless, within limits, tried to be an

active and independent secretary rather than a totally

compliant one. In the aftermath of the aborted July 20th

coup d'€tat, he worked energetically and quite successfully

to delay and thwart summary dismissals of the professional I 1 O bureaucrats in the Wilhelmstrasse. He also vainly attempted

to intercede on behalf of both Foreign Office and non-Foreign

Office personnel who had been condemned as members of the

llfi Steengracht testimony of 23 June 1948; Transcripts, pp. 9769-72; M897, roll 9. Steengracht's remarks on pp. 9769, 9771-72 may also be found in TWO, 13:25. Hencke affidavit of 9 June 1948; Steengracht exhibit 119; M897/116/ 0261, 0265-66. Margarete Blank affidavit of 10 May 1948; Steengracht exhibit 5; M897/115/1023-24. Schmieden affidavit of 31 January 1948; Steengracht exhibit 1; M897/115/1007. 117 For a good analysis of the severe limitations of Steengracht's influence as state secretary, see Hencke affidavit of 10 June 1948; Steengracht exhibit 120; M897/116/ 0271-74. Also see Schroeder affidavit of 10 June 1948; Steengracht exhibit 118; M897/116/0255^-57. 118 Steengracht described his post-July 20th efforts to protect the jobs of Foreign Office officials in his testimony of 24 June 1948. See Transcripts, pp. 9869-72; M897, roll 10. Hencke supported this testimony with his affidavit of 9 June 1948; Steengracht exhibit 119; M897/116/0266.

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German resistance. In doing this, he was ignoring Hitler's

order which forbade officials to make appeals on behalf of

others. Those whom he unsuccessfully tried to save included

Helmuth James von Moltke (the leader of a group of intellec­

tuals, known as the Kreisau Circle, who opposed the Nazi

regime), Peter York von Wartenburg (associated with Moltke

in the Kreisau Circle), Adam von Trott zu Solz (whose commit­

ment to the resistance preceded his 1939 entry into the

Foreign Office), and Friedrich Werner von der Schulenburg

(the former German ambassador to the Soviet Union). Steengracht

openly conferred with Frau Moltke and Frau York on the plight

of their husbands, although it was considered dangerous to

associate with these people. By his silence, he also

protected others in the Foreign Office whom he knew to be

conspirators, such as Albrecht von Kessel (who joined the

foreign service in 1927, and who described his association

with the resistance movement as dating back to 1936-37)

and Hasso von Etzdorf. Steengracht, in addition, transferred

Etzdorf (whose assignment as a liaison officer to the Army

chief of staff made him vulnerable to arrest) to the safety 11 Q of Genoa, Italy.

■'■^Etzdorf affidavit of 20 February 1947; Steengracht exhibit 7; M897/115/1030-31. Nostitz affidavit of 3 March 1948; Steengracht exhibit 9; M897/115/1038. Kessel affidavit of 27 April 1948; Steengracht exhibit 18; M897/115/1073. Freya von Moltke (the widow of Helmuth James von Moltke) affidavit of 20 May 1947; Steengracht exhibit 42; M897/115/ 1217-18. Marion York von Wartenburg (the widow of Peter York von Wartenburg) affidavit of 3 April 1948; Steengracht exhibit 43; M897/115/1220-21. Hencke affidavit of 10 June 1948; Steengracht exhibit 120; M897/116/0277-78.

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Despite such sympathetic acts, Steengracht stopped

short of any unequivocal commitment to the resistance move­

ment. On the witness stand, Steengracht gave somewhat

contradictory and unconvincing testimony as to why he had

not committed himself to the German resistance. First,

he said that practicality and decency had dictated that he

openly protest to his superiors any objectionable measures.

Direct participation in the resistance movement would have 120 undermined such a position. The following day Steengracht

testified that he had concealed his disagreement with his

superiors' policies in order to be given more authority and 121 to be better able to ameliorate undesirable instructions.

A more credible explanation is that, while he was not in

favor of the atrocious policies of his government, the last

state secretary of the Third Reich was too opportunistic

to risk his career blatantly--to say nothing of his life--

for moral misgivings. He confined himself to safe acts of

opposition, although not so safe that he escaped the 122 suspicion of the Gestapo. Steengracht not only survived

120 Steengracht testimony, 23 June 1948; Transcripts, pp. 9774-75; M897, roll 9. 121 Steengracht testimony, 24 June 1948; Transcripts, pp. 9866-67; M897, roll 10. 122 See the following defense documents regarding Steengracht and the Gestapo: Franz Alfred Six (who became the director of the Cultural-Political Department of the Foreign Office in early 1943 and who had a confidant in the Gestapo bureaucracy) affidavit of 16 September 1947; Steengracht exhibit 11; M897/115/1044. Freya von Moltke affidavit of 20 May 1947; Steengracht exhibit 42;

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physically but retained his government position until the

very end. In response to an order from Admiral Karl Doenitz,

Hitler’s successor, Steengracht flew from Salzburg to

Flensburg on 2 May 1945 and stayed with the Doenitz govern- 1 o r> ment until his arrest on 23 May 1945.

Edmund Veesenmayer, the youngest of the eight Foreign

Office defendants, was a prototype of what the Nazi leaders

hoped their diplomats would be. He was born in 1904 in

Bad Kissingen in northwestern Bavaria or Franconia, and was

raised in the Allghu mountain region of southwestern Bavaria.

Ambitious and intelligent, Veesenmayer had earned a doctorate

in economics from the University of Munich by the time he

was twenty-four. In accomplishing this, he had essentially

supported himself from the age of fifteen with a series of

odd jobs. A doctoral degree did not bring him any instant

material success. From April 1928 to October 1933, he labored

as an assistant teacher, in political economy and political

science, and as an archivist at the Technical University

in Munich. In 1933 he was promoted to the position of TO/ lecturer.

M897/115/1217-18. Etzdorf affidavit of 20 February 1947; Steengracht exhibit 7; M897/115/1030.

^ ^ Hencke curriculum vitae, 31 August 1945; M679/2/0009.

^^Veesenmayer testimony of 21 July 1948 in TWC, 13:487-88. Veesenmayer1 s handwritten note entitled ‘'Life History" in his party, SS, and RuSHA file; prosecution exhibit 2565; M897/45/0766. An English translation of this note can be found in M897/69/1217.

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Personal ambition induced Veesenmayer to join the

Nazi Party in February 1932. He explained this decision

after the war by saying that he had been convinced that

National Socialism was the answer to Germany's economic

problems. He personalized these economic problems by speaking

of his own material deprivation during his efforts to further 125 his career. In addition, Veesenmayer met Keppler, who

became his longtime patron in Nazi and government circles,

in 1931, prior to his entry into the party. Veesenmayer

undoubtedly saw Keppler and Nazism as vehicles for personal

advancement, as indicated by his admission that in his

early years as Keppler's assistant in the Reich Chancellery

he was considering a return to academic life or employment 126 in the private economic sector. Veesenmayer's inclination

to leave this position could be explained by the circumstance 127 that Keppler's office was poorly funded at that time.

Veesenmayer's path to Nazism, like Steengracht's , was

125 Veesenmayer testimony of 21 July 1948 in TWC, 13:489. Veesenmayer interrogation of 1 November 1947; interrogator - Kempner; M1019/75/0346. Veesenmayer interroga­ tion 771, 18 March 1947; interrogator - De Vries; M1019/75/ 0121. The merging of personal concerns with concern for the nation was not uncommon among those in Veesenmayer's generation who were attracted to Nazism. See Theodore F. Abel, Why Hitler Came into Power: An Answer Based on the Original Life Stories of Six Hundred of His Followers (New York: Prentice-Hall, 193S), pp. 121-22, 146. 126 Veesenmayer interrogation of 1 November 1947; interrogator - Kempner; M1019/75/0345. Veesenmayer testimony, 21 July 1948; Transcripts, p. 13065; M897, roll 12. 127 See Keppler testimony of 16 July 1948 in TWC, 12:628.

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characterized by opportunism; but he was seeking material

benefits, while Steengracht was concerned with prestige.

Veesenmayer's self-interest did not prevent him

from being an ideal Nazi functionary. While he believed

that the movement would help him personally, he also believed

that he must be loyal to it. He repeatedly said in his

postwar statements that he had an oath to fulfill and a duty 128 to perform. Such a commitment required a suspension of

personal moral judgment. To suspend judgment — to believe

regardless of facts that one was serving a logical and

positive cause--necessitated an act of faith. On the witness

stand at the Ministries trial, Veesenmayer said: "As long

as I was fighting, I believed, and continued to believe even 129 if I had doubts, because I wanted to believe." Veesenmayer,

who considered himself a lifelong "faithful member of the

[Catholic] church," analogized between faith in Catholicism

and faith in Nazism:

There is in each movement something reasonably believable. One must either believe . . . or not. One can believe in the teaching of the Church and not conform to something therein. . . . One cannot condemn something because of a segment of it.^-^O

128 Veesenmayer interrogation 929a, 8 July 1947; interrogator - Curt Ponger; M1019/75/0296. Veesenmayer interrogation of 1 November 1947; interrogator - Kempner; M1019/75/0347. 129 Veesenmayer testimony, 22 July 1948; Transcripts, p. 13307; M897, roll 13. 130 Veesenmayer interrogation of 1 November 1947; interrogator - Kempner; M1019/75/0346. For Veesenmayer1s profession of his loyalty to the Catholic Church, see his testimony of 21 July 1948 in TWC, 13:489.

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Veesenmayer's path to a prominent diplomatic assign­

ment was long and somewhat circuitous. He was also the

last party functionary among the Foreign Office defendants

to receive an important diplomatic job. He entered the

government bureaucracy in 1933 as one of five or six assis­

tants to Keppler, the Fuehrer's economic deputy in the

Reich Chancellery. Veesenmayer's initial uncertainty about

remaining in government service was dissipated by a growing 131 sense of personal loyalty to Keppler. When his patron

shifted into diplomatic activities, Veesenmayer shifted

with him. Veesenmayer served as Keppler's right-hand man

in the Austrian assignment in 1938 and in the Slovakian 132 and Danzig commissions in 1939. The conscientious former

economics teacher performed these tasks well enough that,

following the attack upon Poland, he was assigned on a

wartime emergency basis to the Foreign Office's newly

created Propaganda Department. Disliking both the work and

its proximity to Ribbentrop, Veesenmayer soon managed to

be reinstated as Keppler's special adviser. Unlike his

boss, whose significant diplomatic assignments ended with

the coming of the war, Veesenmayer continued to go on special

missions to areas of critical concern to Germany. Most

131 Veesenmayer interrogation 771, 18 March 1947; interrogator - De Vries; M1019/75/0121. Veesenmayer testi­ mony, 21 July 1948; Transcripts, pp. 13065-66; M897, roll 12. 132 Veesenmayer testimony, 22 July 1948; Transcripts, p. 13308; M897, roll 13. Also see Frend's comment, p. 86, n. 103 above.

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notable were his trips to Zagreb and Belgrade in Yugoslavia

in 1941, and two visits to Hungary in 1943. Veesenmayer' s

career reached its culmination in March 1944 when he was 133 appointed German minister and plenipotentiary to Hungary.

Veesenmayer1s tenure in Budapest coincided with the

infamous roundup of Hungarian Jews, bringing him into closer

physical proximity with the Nazis' crimes against the Jews

than any of his codefendants from the Foreign Office. He

nonetheless remained at his post in Hungary "right up to

the very bitter end." He was initially detained in that

country upon its occupation by Soviet forces, and then on 1 Q / 14 May 1945 was extradited to American authorities.

Veesenmayer's anesthetization of his personal moral

judgment continued to shield him from self-reproach once the

war was over. He, as a loyal opportunist, could not claim

acts of resistance as a defense, as did the flexible

opportunist Steengracht. Veesenmayer, in fact, justified

his lack of resistance by citing the opinion of a Jesuit

priest that the absence of resistance could not be considered

^■^Veesenmayer testimony of 21 July 194S in TWC, 13:489-91. Veesenmayer interrogation 771, 18 March 1947; interrogator - De Vries; M1019/75/0123-25. For a compendium of Veesenmayer's career under the Nazis, see Veesenmayer affidavit of 27 May 1947; prosecution exhibit 10; M897/25/0054. 1 A / For Veesenmayer's references to his circumstances at the end of the war, see the following sources: Veesenmayer interrogation of 1 November 1947; interrogator - Kempner; M1019/75/0345. Veesenmayer testimony of 21 July 1948 in TWC, 13:489 (which includes the statement about "the . . . bitter end").

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 101 135 criminal. But Veesenmayer did not defend the Nazi move­

ment to the extent that Keppler did. Veesenmayer did argue

in favor of the German attempt to establish a European

hegemony. He insisted that Europe could prosper only under

the strong leadership of one nation and of one person. He

said that with Hitler and Germany defeated some other person 136 and some other nation would assume their roles. The main

thrust of Veesenmayer's postwar position was that he "had

conducted a fair, decent, and honorable battle." Others had, 137 unbeknown to him at the time, "betrayed" the movement. 138 Even Hitler had engaged in criminal methods.

None of the eight Foreign Office defendants repre­

sented either the best or the worst of German officials in

the 1930s and 1940s. The most appealing in the group,

Weizsacker, was too cautious and too conservative to be a

fully respected figure. The least appealing in the lot,

1 35 Max Pribilla, S.J., "Moraltheologisches Gutachten zum Verhalten der deutschen Untemehmer im Dritten Reich," 26 January 1948; Veesenmayer exhibit 176; M897/118/0484. 1 36 Veesenmayer interrogation of 26 May 1947; inter­ rogator - Kempner; M1019/75/0245. Veesenmayer interrogation of 1 November 1947; interrogator - Kempner; M1019/75/0346-47. 137 For Veesenmayer's comment about his wartime ignorance and decency, see his testimony of 23 July 1948; Transcripts, p. 13459; M897, roll 13. For his reference to the betrayal of the Nazi movement by others, see his testimony of 22 July 1948; ibid., pp. 13287-88. 138 Veesenmayer interrogation of 26 May 1947; interrogator - Kempner; M1019/75/0245.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Veesenmayer, had traits--intelligence, ambition, lovalty,

conscientiousness— which would have been estimable if they

had been applied to a worthy cause. The same can be said

of the other six men. All had flaws in their personality

and character. All had admirable qualities. Furthermore,

it should never be forgotten that it took extraordinary

courage and character in the Nazi era to remain steadfast

to ordinary principles of humanity and decency. Many officials

who had displayed such courage and character were no longer

alive in 1947. Survival, however, also demanded its price.

In the case of the eight Foreign Office defendants, this

price was varying degrees of moral culpability for aiding

and condoning, either willingly or unwillingly, the Nazi

regime.

Moral failure, however, is not the same as legal guilt.

Whether these men could justifiably be considered lawbreakers

was a matter which the Ministries Tribunal had to determine.

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THE TRIAL: PROCEDURES AND PROCEEDINGS

The time-honored principle of justice is that an

accused person, whatever the degree of his moral or legal

culpability, must receive a trial that is procedurally fair.

Critics of Nuremberg procedures have contended that the

prosecution had unfair advantages over the defense, such as

greater resources and mobility for the collection of evidence.*-

Advocates of Nuremberg procedures have pointed to the high

quality of defense lawyers at the trials and the painstaking o review of the evidence by the judges. The proceedings and

procedures used in the specific cases of the Foreign Office

defendants should be assessed in the light of these differing

views.

Procedures

In order to evaluate Nuremberg procedural rules, one

must understand the marked procedural differences between

*"Kirchheimer, Political Justice, pp. 341-42. Knieriem, Nuremberg Trials, p p . x i , 176-81, 184-86. 2 William A. Zeck, "Nuremberg: Proceedings Subsequent to Goering et al.,M North Carolina Law Review 26 (June 1948): 364-66, 368-70. Benjamin B. Ferencz, "Numberg Trial Procedure and the Rights of the Accused," Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 39 (July-August 1948): 144-51.

103

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continental law, to which the Germans adhere, and Anglo-Saxon

law. Although both systems presume the innocence of the

accused, Anglo-Saxon procedural law is based on the adversary

concept. In criminal trials two contending lawyers attempt

to persuade a non-professional jury of the defendants'

guilt or innocence by arranging and interpreting the facts.

Cross-examination, redirect examination, and rebuttal evidence

are crucial tools in the trial. The judge assumes a relatively

passive role. His duty is to see that the courtroom pro­

ceedings are conducted according to the rules, and is more a

referee than a direct participant. Most important are the

rules regarding admission of evidence, since the jurors who

weigh the evidence are not trained in the law. The theory

behind Anglo-Saxon criminal trial practice is that given two

sides of a story, however subjective both may be, the person

of average intelligence can arrive at a fair conclusion.

Continental law, on the other hand, assumes that in a

criminal proceeding the state has a responsibility to conduct

an objective investigation and arrive at an equitable solution.

The prosecuting attorney in his pre-trial inquiry is expected

to ferret out facts that exonerate as well as incriminate the

defendant. The prosecutor's goal is to contribute to a proper

disposition of the case, rather than to obtain a conviction.

Once the trial begins, the judges (or judge) take an active

role in the proceedings. To a large extent, they determine

the direction which the examination of evidence takes. The

prosecutor is less aggressive in a continental criminal

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proceeding than in an Anglo-Saxon one, and the same is true

of the defense lawyer. Defense counsel, in fact, is not

even mandatory. The search for the truth also precludes

the choice of the defendant to remain silent. He is expected

to answer questions directed to him by the court. He can,

however, make a final statement in his own behalf without

being subjected to cross-examination. He also has the right,

as does the Anglo-Saxon defendant, to present— or have his

lawyer present--his own witnesses and evidence. In the contin­

ental case, the judges, rather than a jury, render the verdict.

The judges' decision is customarily accompanied by a detailed

and carefully constructed explanation.

To summarize: in an Anglo-Saxon criminal proceeding,

the defendant's interests are basically safeguarded by a

trained, professional advocate; in a continental proceeding,

his interests are basically protected by the impartial 3 investigation of the magistrate or magistrates.

The problem of which procedure to adopt for the war

crimes trials was first confronted by the London Conference

of 1945. Justice Robert H. Jackson, the head of the American

delegation, was partial to the Anglo-Saxon approach, although

he feared that the defendants would use the technical nature

of that system's rules of evidence to delay and perplex the

3 Wolfgang A. Mommsen, "Die Akten der Nuernberger Kriegsverbrecherprozesse und die Moeglichkeit ihrer historischen Auswertung," Per Archivar 3 (January 1950): 21-22. Knieriem, The Nuremberg Trials, pp. 115-22, 161. Opening statement of Egon Kubuschok in behalf of the defendants in the Justice case, 23 June 1947, in TWC, 15:308-10.

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trial proceedings. The fact that judges, and not a jury,

would render the verdict was another argument, in his thinking,

for uncomplicated rules of evidence.^ The London Charter

followed Jackson's wishes by working out a compromise between

the systems. The articles of the Charter dealing with

procedural matters (Articles 16-26) established a basically

Anglo-Saxon design--with emphasis on the adversary method--

but with the interjection of continental elements, such as

an active, inquisitive role for the judges. The International

Military Tribunal was instructed to conduct "an expeditious

hearing of the issues" (Article 18) and to "admit any evidence

which it deems to have probative value" (Article 19).^

The subsequent Nuremberg trials followed the precedent

of the International Military Tribunal in procedural matters

as they did in other areas. Control Council Law No. 10

relegated (in Article III-2) the drafting of procedural C. rules to "each Zone Commander for his respective Zone." The

American military government in its drafting (18 October 1946)

and amending (17 February 1947) of Ordinance No. 7 also adopted

the adversary system, modified by a larger role for the judges

in the procuring of evidence and in the questioning of

witnesses. The judges were again instructed to conduct "an

^U.S. Department of State, International Conference on Military Trials, pp. xi, 80, 113. T W C , 15:289..

^For the procedural portions of the London Charter, see U.S., Department of State, International Conference on Military Trials, pp. 426-28.

^See Control Council Law No. 10 in TWC, 12:xxi.

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expeditious hearing of the issues” (Article VI) and to

"admit any evidence which they deem to have probative value"

(Article VII). Article VII's liberality regarding the

admission of evidence meant that the judges would be

entrusted with the evaluation of hearsay evidence, a type of

proof normally excluded from an American courtroom with its

jury-system,^ Articles V(f) and XIV(c) envisioned the

adoption by the subsequent tribunals of further uniform rules g of procedure, consistent with Ordinance No. 7. There was a

gradual development, over a year, of such a set of principles.

The final result, which virtually coincided with the

beginning of the Ministries trial, embodied twenty-six rules

and was entitled "Uniform Rules of Procedure, Military o Tribunals, Nuernberg, Revised to 8 January 1948."

Procedural rules must be supported by administrative

means to carry them out. Articles XII-XIV of Ordinance No. 7

therefore established an administrative branch, known as the

Central Secretariat. The Central Secretariat was headed by

a secretary general, who was selected by the military governor

of Germany. The members of the tribunals were authorized to

supervise the secretary general. However, when several

tribunals were sitting at once, this arrangement could become

^See Ferencz, "Numberg Trial Procedure," p. 149. O Ordinance No. 7 and Ordinance No. 11 (the amendment of Ordinance No. 7 which was dated 17 February 1947) can be found in TWC, 12:xxiv-xxx. Q Uniform Rules of Procedure, Military Tribunals, Nuernberg, Revised to 8 January 1948" can be found in TWC, 15:70-78.

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unwieldy. Article XIII of Ordinance No. 7 therefore established

a Committee of Presiding Judges to oversee the secretary

general, among other functions, whenever three or more tribunals

were concurrently in session.

The American military government soon perceived that

the protections established for procedural fairness might

prove inadequate. Article II of Ordinance No. 11 consequently

provided for a joint session of all military tribunals in

order to discuss and rule on any procedural or substantive

inconsistency in either a significant interlocutory decision

or a final judgment. A joint session could be summoned by

a presiding judge, or by either a prosecution or a defense

motion, if a judge approved the motion. A quorum for a joint

session would comprise "a majority of the members of each

Military Tribunal then constituted." A majority vote (the

presiding judge breaking any ties) on any issue would be

binding upon each tribunal. Although this mechanism was

requested several times during the subsequent trials by counsel

for the defense, it was used only once, and then upon the

initiative of the Committee of Presiding Judges.^

The discretionary powers of the judges, as well as

procedural rules and administrative structure, help to create

a fair trial. Article II of Ordinance No. 7 specified that

each tribunal would contain three or more judges and, when

desired, an alternate judge. All regular and alternate

10Ibid., pp. 1060-63.

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members of the tribunals were to "be lawyers who have been

admitted to practice, for at least five years, in the highest

courts of one of the United States or its territories or

of the District of Columbia, or who have been admitted to

practice in the United States Supreme Court." William C.

Christianson, Robert F. Maguire, and Leon W. Powers were the

three judges who tried the Ministries case. Christianson,

who served as the presiding judge, had previous experience at

Nuremberg as a judge in the Flick case.'*''*' Prior to that, in

1946-47, he had been a member of the Minnesota State Supreme 12 Court. Powers was also a former state supreme court justice,

having been a member of the Supreme Court of Iowa from 1934 1 3 to 1936. Maguire was a prominent member of the Oregon State

Bar,"*"^ whose intellect impressed both the prosecution and 15 the defense.

The selection of defendants is another factor to consider

in evaluating the equity of the Ministries trial. The chief

prosecutor, Telford Taylor, was responsible for determining

^Taylor, Final Report (appendix A), p. 118.

^ Who's Who in the Midwest, vol. 9: 1965/66 (.Chicago: The A. N. Marquis Company, 1964), p. 178.

~*~^Who was Who in America, vol. 3: 1951-1960 (Chicago: The A. N. Marquis Company, I960), p. 697.

^ Who's Who in America, vol. 26: 1950-1951 (Chicago: The A. N. Marquis Company, T950), p. 1718.

'*''’Interview with Hellmut Becker, Berlin, 16 July 1979.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 110 16 who would stand trial. The actual selection process was

carried out by Deputy Chief Prosecutor Robert M. W. Kempner

and his staff, who then obtained Taylor’s approval of their 17 decisions. The choice of defendants was influenced by the

hierarchical structure of Nazi Germany. The decision to use

hierarchical structure as a guide was not made by the prosecu­

tion, though; it was made at high levels of the American

government, such as by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, prior to 18 the end of the war. The result was that the Foreign Office

defendants, to a large extent, represented the Foreign Office

table of organization. WeizsHcker and Steengracht, as

successive state secretaries, had been Ribbentrop's chief

assistants. Woermann, as head of the Political Department,

had been Weizsacker's top subordinate. Erdmannsdorff, as

director of the Political Department, had been Woermann's

right-hand man. In comparison, Inland II would have been

much less important than the political department in the

Foreign Office organizational chart. However, in the last

years of the war Inland II had handled the diplomatic

aspects of the deportation of the Jews. Two of its key

functionaries, Horst Wagner and Eberhard von Thadden,

appeared at the Ministries trial on 3 March 1948 as prosecu­

tion witnesses on another issue, the treatment of prisoners

■^See Article III (a) of Ordinance No. 7 in TWC, 1 2 :xxv. 17 Conversation with Robert M. W. Kempner, Frankfurt am Main, 13 July 1979.

"^Taylor, Final Report, pp. 51-52, 54, 73-76.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Ill 19 of war. The following remark by Judge Powers at the con­

clusion of the trial appears to relate to Wagner and Thadden:

"The men who seem to have actually committed war crimes by

their own testimony appear in this case, not in the dock, 20 but as witnesses for the prosecution."

In regard to crimes against the Jews and the choice of

diplomatic defendants, I would agree with Judge Powers'

criticism. A defendant cannot, however, demand an acquittal

on the premise that a person more guilty than he remains at

liberty. Furthermore, there were several factors that

explain the prosecution's selection, including limitations of

time and money, and--most importantly--a reaffirmation of the

idea that an individual's accountability should be based on

his official position in the Nazi hierarchy. Originally, the

OCCWC had envisioned sixteen trials under Control Council Law

No. 10, one of which would have consisted solely of defendants

from the Foreign Office. By the summer of 1947 interest in

the Nuremberg proceedings had diminished in the United 21 States, and there was the danger that funds would not be

available for all these trials. It seemed prudent to con­

clude these judicial proceedings as expeditiously as

"^Wagner testimony, 3 March 1948; Transcripts, pp. 2585-2637; M897, roll 4. Thadden testimony, 3 March 1948; ibid., pp. 2638-64. 20 Dissenting opinion of Judge Powers in TWC, 14:874. 21 "A year ago this week the first Nuremberg war crimes trials culminated. . . . Since then Nuremberg has figured only rarely in the news." New York Times, 28 September 1947, sec. 6, p. 12.

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possible. With ten cases already tinder way or completed, the

OCCWC consolidated the remaining six proposed trials into two. 22 Defendants from the Foreign Office were reduced to eight.

Last minute eliminations included Wagner, Thadden, and Franz

Rademacher who, while working in the Abteilung Deutschland, 23 had played a crucial role in the deportations. Given the

limited number of possible defendants, the prosecution made

the philosophical choice to hold responsible for the deporta­

tions of the Jews those people in positions of authority,

rather than to indict lesser officials who appeared to be more

directly involved in this crime. The prosecution was also

concerned with obtaining convictions for crimes against peace,

and the higher an official was in the diplomatic bureaucracy,

the more likely that he would be found guilty of this charge.

The IMT, in fact, had implied that an individual had to have

a certain level of responsibility--without specifying that 24 level--before he could be held guilty of crimes against peace.

Finally, the prosecution could console itself that if those

diplomats who were less important but still unsavory escaped

trial at Nuremberg, they still were liable for legal action

oo Taylor, Final Report, pp. 80-82, 94. General Lucius D. Clay (the American military governor of Germany) to Major General Daniel Noce (of the Civil Affairs Division, War Department), 8 September 1947, in The Papers of General Lucius D. Clay: Germany, 1945-1949, ed~ Jean Edward Smith, 2 vols. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1974), 1:420-21. 23 Conversation with Robert M. W. Kempner, Frankfurt am Main, 13 July 1979.

24See IMT judgment in IMT, 1:302, 309-10, 315-16.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 113 25 in other jurisdictions.

Once indicted, a Nuremberg defendant's hopes for fair

treatment centered on his defense counsel. The American

military government in drawing up the procedural rules for

the subsequent trials was sensitive to this fact. Article IV(c)

of Ordinance No. 7 emphasized two points: First, the selection

of defense counsel was to be as much as possible the defendant's

choice; second, those chosen were to be lawyers who were

qualified to represent a client in a court of law. There

were no stipulations as to the political background of 26 prospective defense counsel. The following people served

as main counsel for the eight Foreign Office defendants:

Hellmut Becker (Weizs&cker), Karl Doetzer (Veesenmayer),

Elisabeth Gombel (Bohle), Carl Haensel (Steengracht),

Alfred Schilf (Woermann), Erich Schmidt-Leichner (Ritter),

Werner Schubert (Keppler), and Bernhard Vorwerk (Erdmannsdorff).

The records of the Ministries trial indicate that all were

capable attorneys. With the exception of Becker and Gombel,

each had represented clients at an earlier Nuremberg trial

conducted by the Americans. Haensel and Schilf, in addition,

had been employed at the IMT. All but Gombel and Haensel

had been members of the Nazi Party at one time. However,

none received a denazification classification more unfavorable

9 5 Taylor, Final Report, p. 94. Also see the motion of seven Foreign Office defendants (requesting access to documents and either a six-month recess or a separate trial), dated 22 March 1948, in TWC, 15:514. 9 6 See Taylor, Final Report, pp. 47-48.

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than "follower,

Every chief counsel for the Foreign Office defendants

had at least one associate or assistant. The most interesting

staff of defense lawyers was the one which represented

Weizshcker. It included the American Warren E. Magee (one 28 of the subsequent trials' three non-German defense lawyers),

who served as Becker's co-counsel. Becker requested Magee

ostensibly to help in applying American procedural law, a 29 need which the Court disputed despite granting the request.

In reality, Weizs&cker's defense staff wanted an American

colleague because its strategy depended on the use of testimony

from non-Germans, and German defense lawyers could not travel

to other nations without the special permission of the United

States military government. Magee was an American citizen,

and was not subject to such restrictions. He went to the

Vatican in April 1948, for example, to obtain an expression of

support for Weizs&cker from Pope Pius XII, whose esteem

WeizsMcker had acquired while serving as the German ambassador

to the Vatican. In a private audience, Magee persuaded the

pontiff, who had qualms about offending the American government,

27 The following two references provide data on the Foreign Office defendants' attorneys: "List of Defense Counsel in the Twelve Nuernberg Trials Under Control Council Law No. 10" in ibid. (appendix Q), pp. 297, 303, 306-8, 313-14, 336-41. IMT, 1:6-7. 28 In regard to other non-German defense lawyers in the subsequent trials, see Taylor, Final Report, p. 47. 29 Becker motion of 20 December 1947 and the subsequent Court Order of 29 December 1947 in TWC, 15:323-26.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 115 30 to write a message to WeizsScker's wife. The pope's

letter to Frau Weizs&cker was then offered as a Weizs&cker

“31 defense exhibit.

An unusual matter which affected the equity of the

Nuremberg trials was the language problem. Both Article

IV(a) and (b) of Ordinance No. 7 and Rules 2 and 13(b) of

the Uniform Rules of Procedure guaranteed that the proceedings,

exhibits, and rulings of the subsequent trials would be

translated, if necessary, into a language which the defendants

understood. Detailed arrangements were made in order to

resolve the language situation. Most of the witnesses and

defendants in the Ministries case testified in German (an 32 exception was Bohle ). This necessitated an immediate

translation into English for the judges and others who were

not proficient in the defendants' language. Similarly,

English used in the courtroom had to be quickly translated

into German. Every participant in the trial was equipped with 33 ear phones to pick up the translations. Care was taken to

ensure that the written record would be accurate in both German

and English; however, there were inevitable discrepancies or

30 Interview with Warren E. Magee, Washington, D.C., 23 January 1979. 31 Letter from Pope Pius XII to Marianne von WeizsHcker, 2 May 1948; WeizsHcker exhibit 413; M897/119/0799.

■^See proceedings of 23 July 1948; Transcripts, p. 13474; M897, roll 13.

■^Winfield B. Hale, "Nurenberg War Crimes Tribunals," Tennessee Law Review 21 (December 1949): 13.

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ambiguities between an original document or testimony

and its written translation. Early in the Ministries trial,

the Tribunal directed the prosecution and defense counsel

A / to resolve these problems among themselves. It thus

became the Court’s practice to approve any stipulation

between the prosecution and the defense to change the transla­

tion of a document or testimony. If the two parties could

not agree on a change, the Court left the translation as it O c O £ was. This, however, was a rare occurrence. Finally, a

lawyer could authorize a change in translation in those items--

an opening statement, a brief, or a final argument--which he 37 or his associates had written themselves.

Station by Hans von Zwehl, and subsequent answer and reply, regarding translation discrepancies in document books (filed 19 February 1948); Official Court File, document 167, pp. 957-62; Official Record, United States Military Tribunals, Nurnberg, Case No. 11, Tribunal IV (IV A), United States vs. Ernst von Weizsaecker et al., vol. 70; M897, roll 163; RG 238; National Archives. All citations from the Official Court File will be from the Official Record of Case No. 11 and can be found in M897 at the National Archives. Additional citations from the document section of the Official Court File will merely provide a description of the document cited, and give the Official Court File document number and page number plus the M897 roll number.

33See, for example, Court Order of 28 December 1948; Official Court File, document 11.93, p. 5038; M897, roll 166.

36TWC, 15:143, n. 2.

Judge William C. Christianson to Office of the Secretary General, 3 March 1949; Official Court File, document 1217a, p. 5229; M897, roll 166.

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Proceedings

The chronology of a trial is yet another criterion of

its fairness. Article XI of Ordinance No. 7 as amended by

Article III of Ordinance No. 11 established the basic sequence,

following the indictment, of the proceedings. The order

consisted of the following steps: the arraignment, the

prosecution opening statement, the prosecution case-in-chief

(that is, the presentation of its evidence), the opening

statement of the defense, the defense case-in-chief, the

submission of rebuttal evidence by the prosecution and

defense, the final arguments of counsel for both sides, the

defendants' final statements, the Tribunal's pronouncement

of judgment and sentences. The time span of the trials,

however, could not be prearranged. The Ministries case consumed

almost sixteen months between the arraignment on 20 December

1947 and the sentencing on 14 April 1949. The trial lasted

for almost two years, if one takes into account the Tribunal's

review of its own judgment on 12 December 1949. This pro­

traction was not, however, detrimental to the defendants.

First of all, the defense appropriated approximately two-thirds O Q of the trial sessions. Secondly, changing attitudes in

international politics promoted a more lenient assessment

of the defendants' alleged crimes than they might have

received earlier.

38See TWC, 15:451-52, 506-7.

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Portions of the proceedings may nevertheless have been

disadvantageous to the Foreign Office defendants. The inter­

rogations which preceded the indictment could be considered

the first part of these proceedings. There are valid argu­

ments that the rights of the interrogees were not fully 39 protected. First of all, the interrogee did not have

defense counsel, since lawyers were not provided for interned 40 Germans until they were indicted. Secondly, the person

being questioned was kept in suspense as to whether he would 41 become a defendant or remain merely a material witness.

Thirdly, there was the matter of coercion. The prosecution

maintained that the interrogees were not coerced into giving

evidence,' and, in regard to the Foreign Office defendants,

this was true as far as physical force or mental torture was

concerned. The Foreign Office interrogees were, however, sub­

jected to various subtle psychological pressures: occasional

solitary confinement, which appears to have been initiated

not by the prosecution, but by military guards; the

39 See Knieriem’s succinct discussion of this matter in Nuremberg Trials, pp. 142-44, 146-47.

^TWC, 15:367. Taylor, Final Report, p. 56.

^Woermann interrogation 2166, 24 April 1947; interrogator - Kempner; M1019/80/0631. Ritter interrogation 1291b, 24 July 1947; interrogator - Beauvais; M1019/58/0740.

^Taylor, Final Report, p. 62. / Q Erdmannsdorff interrogation of 9 October 1947; interrogator - Kempner; M1019/16/0424. Kempner expressed surprise, when Erdmannsdorff complained that he virtually had been confined to his cell by himself for three weeks.

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accusation that the interrogee was lying when he denied

having been involved in mass murder;44 the interrogee's

dependence on the interrogator for such favors as prison

employment,4"* Pre-trial interrogations were commonly accepted

as evidence in other Nuremberg trials, despite objections by

i l - f i defense counsel. The same practice was established early

in the Ministries case.4^ The bulk of the prosecution case

against the Foreign Office defendants nevertheless consisted

of Third Reich documents.4** Thus, although the rights of

the Foreign Office defendants were not adequately safeguarded

during pre-trial interrogations, this fact had little or

no bearing on the outcome of their trials.

The indictment represented the first step in the trial

itself. Originally an indictment dated 1 November 1947

was filed in the Ministries case. Two weeks later, on the

fifteenth of November, this indictment was amended, but the

changes were of minor significance to the Foreign Office

defendants. The eight counts of the amended indictment, which

44Ritter interrogation 1835, 1 April 1947; interrogator - Kempner; M1019/58/0655. Woermann interrogation 2349, 9 May 1947; interrogator - Kempner; M1019/80/0660. 45 Bohle interrogation of 16 July 1947; interrogator - Kempner; M1019/8/0366.

46TWC, 15:841-46.

^Proceedings of 13 January 1948; Transcripts, pp. 586-90; M897, roll 2.

4**See Official Court File, Appendix - Prosecution Exhibit Index; M897/166/0514-0732. All citations from the Official Court File other than from its document section will use the microfilm publication, roll, and frame numbers.

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ran to seventy-five paragraphs, were labeled as follows:

Count One - Planning, Preparation, Initiation, and Waging of Wars of Aggression and Invasions of Other Countries Count Two - Common Plan and Conspiracy Count Three - War Crimes: Murder and Ill-Treatment of Belligerents and Prisoners of War Count Four - Crimes against Humanity: Atrocities and Offenses Committed against German Nationals on Political, Racial, and Religious Grounds from 1933 to 1939 Count Five - War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity: Atrocities and Offenses Committed against Civilian Populations Count Six - War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity: Plunder and Spoliation Count Seven - War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity: Slave Labor aq Count Eight - Membership in Criminal Organizations

The multiplicity of counts and the variety of defendants

were largely responsible for the length and complexity of

the Ministries trial, a fact which did not go unnoticed by

the defense. Weizsacker's counsel remarked: "The misjoinder

of offenses and defendants has cast an unnecessary, undue

and unfair burden upon this defendant and has deprived him

of his right to a separate, speedy and fair trial.This

rhetoric does contain a core of truth. The complexity of

the Ministries case made it difficult for the judges to

arrive at a universally judicious verdict.

The first session of the Ministries trial was the

arraignment on 20 December 1947, when each defendant pleaded

49 For the original indictment, dated 1 November 1947, see Official Court File, document 1, pp. 1-71; M897, roll 162. For the amended indictment, dated 15 November 1947, see TWC, 12:13-63.

"^Weizsacker motion to have the indictment dismissed, 10 May 1948; Official Court File, document 648, p. 2245; M897, roll 164.

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not guilty.The Court then adjourned until 6 January 1948,

when the prosecution delivered its opening statement,

depicting the Foreign Office defendants as willing accomplices 52 of the Nazi regime. The prosecution then presented its

evidence. It took twelve weeks to do so, after some prodding 53 from the Tribunal to expedite the presentation.

The American prosecutor at the International Military

Tribunal, Justice Robert H. Jackson, had decided to base

his case mainly on captured German documents.^ The prosecu­

tion staff for the Ministries case followed this precedent,

buttressed by the knowledge that numerous additional documents 55 had been located and processed since the close of the IMT.

51 The arraignment of the Ministries case defendants has been published in TWC, 12:64-69. 52 The portions of the prosecution's opening statement which dealt directly with the Foreign Office defendants can be located in ibid., pp. 147-66, 220-30. 5 3 See the following examples of directives to the pros­ ecution to be expeditious: Proceedings of 27 January 1948; Transcripts, p. 859; M897, roll 2. Proceedings of 5 March 1948; Transcripts, pp. 2797-99; M897, roll 4. 54 Telford Taylor, "The Use of Captured German and Related Records in the Nilrnberg War Crimes Trials," in Captured German and Related Records: A National Archives Conference, ecT Robert Wolfe, National Archives Conferences, vol. 3 (Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 1974), p. 96. 55 Prosecution's closing statement, 9 November 1948, in TWC, 14:3. For the procedures followed in processing captured German documents, see the William H. Coogan and Fred Niebergall affidavits in TWC, 15:124-29. Major Coogan was chief of the Documentation Division, Office of the United States Chief of Counsel, relative to the IMT case. Mr. Niebergall was chief of the Document Control Branch, Evidence Division, OCCWC.

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The emphasis on documentary evidence increased the importance

of the Ministries Tribunal's evaluation of these documents.

The prosecution, the defense, and the judges discussed,

early in the trial, the German Foreign Office's handling of

documents. The trial participants particularly explored

this issue in questioning prosecution witness Erich Albrecht,

who had been a member of the Foreign Office's Legal Department.

From these discussions and from Albrecht's testimony, there

emerged a picture of Foreign Office procedures regarding

documents. Incoming material was commonly stamped with a

rubber stamp bearing the names of various officials. A check

mark by an official's stamped name indicated that the document

had been sent to the official. One could not assume, however,

that the official had looked at the item unless he had

initialed it.^ The state secretary's office was responsible

for distributing documents to other sections of the Foreign

Office. Thus, the state secretary's name did not usually

appear on the distribution list. Since some documents were

handled entirely by subordinates, the only conclusive evidence

that the state secretary had seen a document was his initial

on it.*^ Outgoing material could not be attributed definitely

to an individual unless it contained his handwritten signature.

C £ Proceedings of 23 and 26 January 1948; Transcripts, pp. 798-99, 816-19; M897, roll 2. Albrecht testimony, 15 and 16 March 1948; Transcripts, pp. 3275-77, 3329-^30; M897, roll 4.

"^Proceedings of 24 February 1948; Transcripts, pp. 2268-69; M897, roll 3. Albrecht testimony, 15 March 19.48; Transcripts, pp. 3283-84; M897, roll 4.

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Duplicates of a document bore a typewritten signature. These

copies theoretically were to bear a note of certification

that the original had been signed, but this extra bureaucratic

burden was frequently ignored. Often typewritten signatures

were put on before the original was signed. Sometimes the

original was never signed, but copies were nonetheless

dispersed. Consequently, a document possibly could be

CO circulated without its putative author having examined it. °

Thus, in regard to both an incoming and an outgoing document,

a signature or an initial was the evidence needed to connect

an individual conclusively to that document.

On the preceding points, all parties could agree.

The Tribunal nevertheless was willing to admit into evidence

documents which merely bore a typewritten signature or

checked-off name. Such exhibits, however, would carry less

weight than those with signatures or initials.

While the prosecution was introducing its evidence to

the Tribunal, the defense was preoccupied with gathering

witnesses and documents for the introduction of its case. In

contrast to the prosecution, the defense relied heavily on

the individual's testimony, written and oral,8^ The attorneys

for the Foreign Office defendants were nevertheless concerned

58Proceedings of 13 January 1948; Transcripts, pp. 551- 56; M897, roll 2. Later in the trial, Weizs£cker gave an example of a telegram which he had never seen but which bore his name. See Weizsdcker testimony, 9 June 1948; Transcripts, pp. 7926-27; M897, roll 8.

59John Mendelsohn, "Trial by Document: The Problem of Due Process for War Criminals at Nuernberg," Prologue 7 (Winter 1975): 228.

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its pre-trial analysis of documents. Thus, in January 1948

WeizsScker and several other Foreign Office defendants asked

for defense access to the captured Foreign Office files at

the Berlin Document Center. This motion was granted by the

Court on 2 February 1948.^ The Tribunal a few days later

asked the defense to choose a lawyer capable of rapidly

surveying the material in the Berlin Document Center. The

Foreign Office defendants accordingly requested the appoint­

ment of Werner von Schmieden, who had worked with these

documents as a member of the Foreign Office. The Tribunal,

on 27 February 1948, granted the appointment for two months 61 and periodically renewed it through 27 September 1948.

Schmieden's appointment notwithstanding, seven of the

Foreign Office defendants (all except Bohle) petitioned on

22 March 1948 for a six-month recess between the presentations

of the prosecution and defense cases. The motion argued

that Schmieden needed at least that much time to examine the

massive material in the Berlin Document Center. To further

facilitate the diplomats' defense, the petition asked that

fin Weizs&cker motion of 13 January 1948 and the sub­ sequent Court Order and Memorandum of 2 February 1948 in TWC, 15:413-15. fil Defense applications of 12 and 17 February 1948 to employ Werner von Schmieden as counsel; Official Court File, document 197, pp. 1041, 1043-44, 1046; M897, roll 163. Court Order of 27 February 1948, approving Schmieden's employment; Official Court File, document 201, p. 1070; ibid. As an example of Schmieden's reappointments, see the Court Order of 23 August 1948 (which renewed his employment for the final time) Official Court File, document 934, p. 3655; M897, roll 165.

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all documents now in the prosecution's hands in Nuremberg

be made available to the defense. An alternative request,

should a six-month recess prove infeasible, was to sever

the Foreign Office defendants1 cases from the Ministries 62 trial. All the other Ministries case defendants, with

the exception of Bohle and Meissner, joined in the request for

a six-month recess. The non-Foreign Office defendants

opposed separation of the diplomats from the trial. They

argued that the prosecution's presentation interlinked all

the defendants, and the removal of the Foreign Office people

would place an added burden on the defense of the remaining

defendants.^ In an order dated 29 March 1948, the Tribunal

declared that all documents in Nuremberg as of that date

would be accessible to the defense. The judges thereby

acknowledged that the defense had previously been at a dis­

advantage in obtaining documentary sources. The Tribunal also

granted a five-week recess until the opening of the defense

case, a period considerably shorter than the defense had

requested. The Court denied the Foreign Office defendants'

petition for severance, agreeing with the other defendants

that such a move would be detrimental to them. ^ The same

62 Motion of seven Foreign Office defendants (requesting access to documents and either a six-month recess or a separate trial), dated 22 March 1948, in T W C , 15:508-15.

6 *3 Kubuschok motion in behalf of the non-Foreign Office defendants, dated 25 March 1948, in ibid., pp. 520-22. 64 Court Order and Memorandum of 29 March 1948 (regarding access to documents, a six-month recess, and a separate trial of the Foreign Office defendants) in ibid., pp. 420-21.

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day the Tribunal issued another order which listed the

sequence of the defendants' testimony. This order also said

that the defense should complete its case by 1 July 1948-- 6 R complete it within two months of beginning it. This comment

brought forth a defense motion that no time limits should be

applied to the presentation of its case. In rejecting this

defense motion, the Court explained that its time schedule

was meant to be flexible. It had no intention of arbitrarily 66 cutting off the defense's presentation on the first of July.

The Tribunal did not grant every defense petition

regarding preparation, but did approve many of them. The

Ministries case judges have, in fact, been cited as having 6 7 been extremely liberal in their handling of such matters.

The defense lawyers nevertheless were not satisfied. Becker,

in his closing statement, said in regard to the Foreign Office

documents at the Berlin Document Center: "In terms of months

per person, the prosecution was able to put in 160 working

months as compared with 5 working months of the defense in 68 the Document Center."

6 5 Court Order of 29 March 1948, providing a schedule for the defense presentation of evidence, in ibid., pp. 282-84. 66 Defense motion of 8 April 1948 and the subsequent Court Order and Memorandum of 22 April 1948; Official Court File, document 441a, pp. 1733, 1735-36; M897, roll 163. 67 Mendelsohn, "Trial by Document: The Problem of Due Process," pp. 233-34. 68 Becker's closing statement in behalf of WeizsHcker, 10 November 1948, in TWC, 14:101.

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The judges1 remark that the defense case should take

about two months proved to be wishful thinking. While the

first defendant (Meissner) began his case on schedule on

May 4th, the last defendant (Stuckart) did not conclude his

presentation until October 8th. The Foreign Office defendants

took up most of June and July offering their testimony.

Their time on the witness stand varied from eleven days for

WeizsMcker to one day for Bohle. Erdmannsdorff did not testify

at all, choosing to rest his case instead. From that day

(July 16th) on, no new evidence could be presented either

for or against him. This decision was based on his lawyer's

assumption that the prosecution had failed, up to that point, 69 to establish a valid case against him. Keppler, in

compliance with the Tribunal's instruction of 8 June 1948,

actually testified twicein July, regarding his diplomatic

involvement, and in September, regarding his economic activities..

An opening statement by defense counsel preceded the

testimony of each of the seven Foreign Office defendants

who testified. The statements introduced the following major

themes of the defense case: (1) the prosecution, obsessed

with an individual's governmental position or party affiliation,

had overlooked the fact that guilt must be personal; (2) the

prosecution had built its case on a faulty interpretation

of the German Foreign Office documents; (3) the prosecution

69 Vorwerk statement in behalf of Erdmannsdorff, 16 July 1948, in TWC, 12:294-95.

^Court Order of 8 June 1948 in TWC, 15:284-85.

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had ignored or underestimated the defendants' lack of influence

in the Nazi diplomatic bureaucracy; (4) to judge the conduct

of the defendants, one must first understand the intentions

behind their actions.^

While the judges would obviously decide the cases on

their interpretations of the facts and the law, these inter­

pretations could be subtly influenced by their opinions of

the defendants. The defendants1 demeanor on the witness

stand could crucially affect their fate. WeizsMcker, whose

career and character provided him with a plausible defense,

did not help himself by his bearing in the courtroom. One

explanation for WeizsMcker's apparent indifferent or negative

attitude is that he despaired of convincing the American 72 judges of the reality of his situation under the Nazis.

A further explanation, given by his son, is that WeizsMcker

was so reticent that he had "difficulty," in private as well

as professional life, "explaining himself to people who

didn't understand his position." He adopted the philosophy

that "if you are an honest man, other honest people will 73 recognize that; and if they don't, you can't help them."

This thinking was ill-suited to WeizsMcker's situation at

^The opening statements in behalf of the Foreign Office defendants can be found in TWC, 12:234-94, 295-301.

^See Hill, WeizsMcker Papiere, pp. 44-45. 73 Interview with Carl Friedrich von WeizsMcker, Sticking bei Starnberg, 11 July 1979.

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Nuremberg. American observers at the trial were left with

the impression that he was callous and cynical.Even a

friendly spectator, the German journalist Margret Boveri,

remarked that the former state secretary sat in the defendants'

dock with a look of scorn on his face, an expression "which

would have scarcely produced additional sympathy for him

in the courtroom. "7** Weizs&cker attempted to be calm and 76 detached while under direct examination on the witness stand.

However, his self-righteous anger occasionally flared up,

as the following statement illustrates: "The prosecution

has called me a perfect liar in connection with the church

question. It is the first time in my life that anybody has

spoken of me in these terms. "77 In cross-examination,

Weizsflcker's irritation sometimes assumed the form of didac­

ticism. When Prosecutor H. William Caming was quizzing him

about his attitude toward the Anglo-French overtures to the

Soviet Union in the spring of 1939, he replied:

It is obvious that you don't quite under stand the position that I was in, and therefore I am willing to describe it to you. In direct examination I really stated the most essential portions on the subject, and

Interview with Lucille Petterson, Washington, D.C., 11 December 1974. Ms. Petterson worked for OCCWC as a research analyst, and participated in the selection of documents as possible evidence for the Nuremberg trials.

^Boveri, Diplomat vor Gericht, p. 29.

76Ibid.

77WeizsMcker testimony, 11 June 1948; Transcripts, p. 8304; M897, roll 8.

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actually it seems almost superfluous to repeat it again here. But I am willing to give you a short outline.78

While he was a less estimable individual than

Weizsacker, Keppler had an attribute which was capable of

evoking sympathy. A combination of ailments— chronic gastro­

intestinal infection, a slipped disc in the lower back,

emphysema, and cardiovascular deterioration--shuffled him

back and forth between the hospital and the courtroom 79 throughout the trial. But Keppler was another defendant

who may have damaged his cause by his behavior. He did not

enhance his stature with the American judges by his descrip­

tion of Hitler as "an extremely good man" who had been driven

into mental illness, sometime around the onset of World 80 War II, by the pressures of office. The officious Keppler

also seemed more intent on enjoying his moment in the spot­

light than on striving for an acquittal. On one occasion

during his cross-examination, his defense counsel, Werner

Schubert, approached the bench to object to the prosecution's

line of questioning. Before Schubert could raise his objec- 81 tion, Keppler snapped, "I wish you would let me answer."

^Weizsacker testimony, 17 June 1948; Transcripts, pp. 9027-28; M897, roll 9. 79 For a detailed analysis of Keppler1s health problems, see the following document: medical certificate by Dr. Jahn, dated 22 April 1949, which was attached as enclosure 5 to Keppler motion of 12 May 1949 to amend the judgment; Official Court File, Defense Memoranda re Alleged Errors in Judgment; M897/167/0093-95. ^ K e p p l e r testimony of 16 July 1948 in TWC, 12:627. Keppler testimony, 2 September 1948; Transcripts, pp. 19598-99, 19610; M897, roll 17. The quotation is from p. 19599. 81Ibid., p. 19611.

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Bohle was one Foreign Office defendant who probably-

transmitted a positive image of himself to the judges, but

in doing so he paid a price. On 27 March 1948, in an action 82 unique among all the Nuremberg defendants, he changed his

plea on two specifics of count five (atrocities against

civilian populations) and on count eight (membership in

criminal organizations) to guilty and simultaneously asked

the Court to have counts one (crimes against peace), two

(common plan and conspiracy), and six (plunder and spolia­

tion) withdrawn against him. On 1 June 1948 he once again

changed his plea on count five, this time back to not guilty.

The prosecution, while not admitting that it was plea

bargaining, nonetheless did not contest the withdrawals on

counts one, two, and six. In an order dated 4 June 1948,

the Tribunal accepted the former AO leader's motion as 83 amended on June 1st. Bohle in pleading guilty to count

eight merely admitted a knowledge of the unlawful activities

of the Nazi Leadership Corps and the SS, organizations to

which he had continued to belong after 1 September 1939. He

denied any participation in such criminal activities. The

82TWC, 15:262. 8 3 Bohle motion of 27 March 1948, prosecution answer (dated 27 May 1948), Bohle reply (dated 1 June 1948), and the subsequent Court Order of 4 June 1948 in ibid., pp. 264-68.

8^Bohle reply of 15 June 1948 to prosecution answer to Bohle motion of 1 June 1948 to withdraw count five against Bohle; Official Court File, document 761, p. 2932; M897, roll 164.

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objective of his testimony, as outlined in his lawyer's

opening statement, was to convince the Tribunal of this lack

of participation, and thus win an acquittal on count five and 85 a mitigated sentence on count eight. On the witness stand,

Bohle tried to depict himself as an honorable individual

whose sense of loyalty to his beleaguered nation had com­

pelled him to retain his party associations, and whose sense

of responsibility now prompted him to admit a share of guilt 86 for the crimes committed by other Nazi leaders. The

credibility of his contrition was accepted by the prosecutors, 87 who chose not to cross-examine him and who commented

favorably in their closing statement about his willingness to 88 accept a measure of responsibility.

In choosing to testify, the defendants also left them­

selves open to the probing of cross-examination. In several

instances, points scored by the cross-examiner may have

decreased a defendant's chances for acquittal or a lesser

sentence. Steengracht, for example, depicted himself in

direct examination as "a professional civil servant" whose

85 Gombel's opening statement in behalf of Bohle, 23 July 1948, in TWC, 12:269-77.

^Bohle testimony, 23 July 1948; Transcripts, pp. 13529-31; M897, roll 13. Bohle's comments about loyalty to his nation can also be found in TWC, 13:1204. 8 7 See proceedings of 26 July 1948; Transcripts, p. 13611; M897, roll 13. 88 Prosecution's closing statement, 9 November 1948, in TWC, 14:80-81.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 133 89 career had progressed independently of any Nazi Party ties.

The prosecutors Caming and Kempner effectively attacked

this representation in their cross-examination. Caming brought

out that Steengracht had earned the favor of the party,

while jeopardizing his legal administrative career in the

Weimar period, when he supported the right of a Nazi to speak

at a meeting which he chaired. Kempner emphasized that

Steengracht1s diplomatic career had been closely associated

with Ribbentrop, thus implying that the defendant’s swift 90 advancement was the result of Ribbentrop's support.

The judges were generally reluctant to assess the

Foreign Office defendants' performances on the witness stand.

However, there was one exception. Both during the trial and in

their verdict, the judges openly criticized the reluctance or

inability of some of the defendants to recall diplomatic 91 documents introduced during cross-examination. One defendant,

Ritter, had an excuse. He had suffered from malaria for over

thirty years and claimed, with corroboration from others, that 92 the prolonged use of quinine had caused his memory to lapse.

89 Steengracht testimony, 23 June 1948; Transcripts, pp. 9773-74; M897, roll 9. 90 Steengracht testimony of 29 June, 30 June, and 1 July 1948; Transcripts, pp. 10343, 10577-79, 10627-29; M897, roll 10.

^Proceedings of 17 June 1948 in TWC, 12:960, n. Ministries case judgment in TWC, 14:341, 477.

^ R i t t e r testimony of 14 July 1948 in T W C , 13:21. In regard to the corroboration of Ritter's statement, see the following affidavits: Ingeborg Zinn (the daughter of the physician, deceased since 1943, who had treated Ritter) affidavit of 30 March 1948; Ritter exhibit 12; M897/114/0451-52.

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Others took offense at the judges' criticism. Becker and

Schilf, the attorneys for Weizsacker and Woermann, complained

in their post-trial appeals that the Court in its judgment

had unfairly held the hesitancy of Weizsacker and Woermann

against them. Both lawyers added that they had advised their

clients to exercise caution before commenting on documents 93 presented to them by the prosecution. The historian

Leonidas E. Hill remarks that the Tribunal was mistaken in

perceiving Weizsacker's cautiousness and genuine lack of

memory as a delaying tactic,^ This comment highlights a

crucial factor in the defendants' testimony and in the trial

itself. The judges' perceptions of a defendant could help

them weigh the evidence for and against the defendant and

arrive at a sound conclusion, but these perceptions could

also rest on faulty premises and lead to an unwarranted verdict.

The next phase of the trial of the Foreign Office

defendants, following their testimony (excluding Keppler1s

later economic testimony), was the prosecution's cros s - examination

of the defendants' affiants. It was not always possible to

produce these affiants at Nuremberg. In some instances, a

compromise was reached: the defense withdrew certain affidavits

Schnurre affidavit of 20 April 1948; Ritter exhibit 13; M897/114/0454-55. Gaus affidavit of 6 May 1948; Ritter exhibit 14; M897/114/0457. 93 it Weizsacker motion of 10 May 1949 to amend the judg­ ment; Official Court File, Defense Memoranda re Alleged Errors in Judgment; M897/168/0146-47. Woermann motion of 10 May 1949 to amend the judgment; ibid., frames 0309-11.

^Hill, Weizsacker Papiere, p. 45.

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and the prosecution refrained from cross-examining the 95 authors of other affidavits. In other instances, the Court

allowed written interrogatories to be substituted for courtroom

testimony or dispensed with cross-examination altogether.

In the second cirexamstance, the Tribunal, when evaluating

the involved affidavit, would bear in mind that the affiant 96 had not been cross-examined. The same procedure applied to

prosecution affiants whom the defense wanted to cross-examine 9 7 and who were not available.

The purpose of cross-examining affiants, whether for

the prosecution or for the defense, was to evaluate their

credibility. Affiants were seldom disinterested and objective

parties. There was a sentiment among former members of the

German Foreign Office that loyalty dictated their testifying

in favor of colleagues now on trial. There was also an

element of reciprocity involved, as the non-defendant was

95 The following document exemplifies such a compromise: Stipulation between the prosecution and Bohle defense counsel, 13 September 1948; Official Court File, docxoment 973, pp. 3771-72; M897, roll 165. 96 Court Order of 7 September 1948 and the preceding Weizsacker motion, prosecution answer, and WeizsMcker reply; Official Court File, docxoment 957, pp. 3714-17; ibid. Court Order and Memorandxom of 29 October 1948; Official Court File, document 1066, pp. 4404-5; ibid. 97 Veesenmayer motion of 15 September 1948 to strike specific prosecution exhibits, and the subsequent Court Order and Memorandxom of 12 October 1948; Official Court File, docxoment 1041, pp. 4233-34, 4237-38; ibid.

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often subject to a denazification proceeding and could hope

for testimony in his behalf from the defendant. The prosecu­

tion referred to such exchanges of affidavits as "a mutual 9 8 insurance society." Affidavits were also customarily

written in response to cues from the defense counsel. For

example, Haensel, in soliciting Hencke's affidavits in behalf

of Steengracht, suggested eight topics, including the

circumstances of Steengracht's appointment as state secretary,

and Steengracht's relations with the martyrs of the July 20th 99 coup. In at least one instance the defense counsel apparently

dictated to his affiants. Franz von Sonnleithner and

Margarete Blank in their affidavits in behalf of Veesenmayer

described the former German minister to Hungary in identical

words.Nevertheless a leading question did not guarantee

that the respondent would answer as the defense counsel

wished. For example, Keppler's lawyer asked Paul Rykens

(a Dutch national who had frequent business contact with

98 Dietrich von Mirbach (who served.as an assistant to State Secretary Steengracht) testimony, 25 June 1948; Transcripts, pp. 10130-31; M897, roll 10. Kroll testimony before Commission II, 14 September 1948; Transcripts, p. 21334; M897, roll 18. Prosecution's closing statement, 9 November 1948, in TWC, 14:81.

^ H e n c k e affidavit of 9 June 1948; Steengracht exhibit 119; M897/116/0259. Hencke affidavit of 10 June 1948; Steengracht exhibit 120; M897/116/0270. Also see proceedings of 6 May 1948; Transcripts, pp. 4670-71; M897, roll 5.

"^^Franz von Sonnleithner (an Austrian Nazi prior to the German takeover of Austria; became a member of Ribbentrop's staff in 1939) affidavit of 22 May 1948; Veesenmayer exhibit 159; M897/118/0389. Blank affidavit of 20 May 1948; Veesenmayer exhibit 162; M897/118/0397.

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Keppler in the pre-war years of the Third Reich) if he could

confirm that Keppler had intervened with Himmler in behalf

of the arrested daughter of a Mr. Hendriks, a business

associate of Rykens. Rykens remembered the circumstances

of Miss Hendriks' arrest, but did not recall Keppler's 101 name being mentioned in regard to that incident. There

was also another practice which damaged the reliability of

affidavits. Affiants would occasionally pass along their

affidavits to other prospective affiants, thus creating the 102 possibility of connivance.

The process of cross-examining the Foreign Office

defendants' affiants extended from August into September and--

in a few situations--October. These witnesses appeared

before commissions instead of before the Tribunal itself,

where the non-diplomatic defendants were pleading their

cases. Article V(e) of Ordinance No. 7 had empowered the

subsequent tribunals "to appoint officers for the carrying

out of any task designated by the tribunal including the

taking of evidence on commission." The Ministries Tribunal

used commissions more extensively than any of the other 103 tribunals operating under Ordinance No. 7. It also used

^^Rykens affidavit of 23 April 1948; Keppler exhibit 12; M897/105/0039-40. 102 Nostitz testimony before Commission II, 26 August 1948; Transcripts, pp. 18438-41; M897, roll 16. Kurt Selchow (a former communications specialist in the Foreign Office, who was cross-examined as a Weizsacker affiant) testimony before Commission II, 8 September 1948; Transcripts, pp. 20472-76; M897, roll 18.

103TWC, 15:590.

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commissions in varied ways, including dispatching commis­

sioners to other cities to hear the testimony of affiants

unable to travel to Nuremberg.But the most common

use was to employ commissioners in Nuremberg concurrently

with tribunal proceedings, thus extending the amount of

testimony that could be taken in a single day. At first there

was only one commission which heard evidence regularly,

but the Tribunal soon established a second commission.

Consequently, on many days of the trial, there were not one

but two commissions meeting simultaneously with the Tribunal.

The extensive use of commissions was a contentious

issue at the Ministries trial. The defense objected

unsuccessfully to the Tribunal's early, and limited, 105 employment of commissions to expedite the trial. As

the proceedings fell further behind schedule, the Tribunal

increased the use of commissions. The Court Order of

23 July 1948 directed that all oral defense testimony,

except the testimony of the defendants themselves, be

As an example of the use of a commission for such a purpose, see the following document: Petition of 10 September 1948 to appoint a commissioner to hear testimony (of Werner Best, Richard Otto Bovensiepen, and Otto Schwerdt) in Copenhagen, and the subsequent Court Order of 15 September 1948; Official Court File, document 974, pp. 3773-75; M897, roll 165. The Danes were holding the former German officials Best, Bovensiepen, and Schwerdt as war criminals.

regard to this controversy at an early stage in the trial, see the following sources: Court Order of 29 March 1948, providing a schedule for the defense presenta­ tion of evidence, in TWC, 15:283. Defense motion of 8 April 1948 and the subsequent Court Order of 22 April 1948; Official Court File, document 441a, pp. 1733, 1736; M897, roll 163.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 139 106 introduced before a commission. Defense counsel argued

vehemently against this new order. Their spokesman com­

plained that the evidence would be presented to one individ­

ual, the commissioner, and would be evaluated by other

individuals, the tribunal judges. The Tribunal dismissed

this argument, its thinking expressed by Judge Powers: "We

don't remember all this testimony [presented before the

judges themselves]. We are going to have to read it, and it

reads just as well whether taken before the commissioner or 108 taken before the Court." The defense also objected that

the use of commissions violated Article IV(d) of Ordinance

No. 7, which guaranteed the defendant's right "to be present

at his trial," because meetings of a commission and the

Tribunal were simultaneous. Judge Powers replied: "It has

been the practice, and will continue to be, that hearings

before the commissioner will be arranged so as not to

conflict with hearings before the Tribunal, and a little

cooperation in that respect will avoid any question on that 109 account." A conflict was unlikely to plague the Foreign

■^^Court Order of 23 July 1948, regarding the hearing of testimony by a commission, in TWC, 15:620.

■^^The defense arguments against the Court Order of 23 July 1948 were presented by Egon Kubuschok during the court proceedings of 29 July 1948. Excerpts from Kubuschok's statement can be found in ibid., pp. 621-22. For Kubuschok's entire argument, see Transcripts, pp. 14018-22; M897, roll 13. ^^Comment by Judge Powers, 29 July 1948, in TWC, 15:623. 1 OQ Comment by Judge Powers, 29 July 1948; Transcripts, p. 14044; M897, roll 13.

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Office defendants, with the possible exception of Keppler,

because by the end of July the testimony in the main court­

room had passed from its diplomatic phase to its economic and

administrative aspects. Potential problems could also be

alleviated by the presence of assistant defense counsel at a

concurrent hearing. As far as the Foreign Office defendants

were concerned, I would agree with the judges that the

taking of evidence before a commission was not detrimental

to the defendants ' cases.

The closing weeks of the trial, in September and

October 1948, also involved the offering of cross-examination,

rebuttal, and surrebuttal documents. The defense counsel

objected strenuously to much of the prosecution rebuttal

evidence. The defense attorneys said that this material

did net rebut any specific defense statement and thus should

have been either included in the prosecution's case-in-chief 110 or omitted altogether. The Court, however, frequently

rejected the defense objections. In doing so, it cited its

prior liberalness in admitting evidence, and implied that

it would review all the admitted evidence with great dis-

c e m m e n4 t- .1 1 1

^■■^See, for example, proceedings before Commission II, 3 September 1948; Transcripts, pp. 19892-97, 19902-3, 19912-13, 19921-22, 19927; M897, roll 17.

■^^For an example of the Tribunal's rejection of such a defense objection, see the following document: Weizsacker motion of 16 September 1948 to reject prosecution document books 97a-c and 99b, and the subsequent Court Order of

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In the last phase of the proceedings prior to the

judges' deliberations, the prosecution and defense counsel

submitted their briefs and presented their closing statements.

The defendants were also allowed to make a final unsworn

statement before the Court, though only three of the eight

Foreign Office defendants availed themselves of this continental 112 practice. These events took place between mid-October 113 and mid-November 1948. The prosecution's closing statement

included a strenuous attack on the credibility of the

defendants and their witnesses. The closing defense

statements repeated the themes of the opening statements,

but with some notable elaborations. The concept of the

individual's lack of responsibility was carried a step further

in the speeches of Schmidt-Leichner, who described World War 115 II as an impersonal disaster, and Doetzer, who remarked

11 October 1948; Official Court File, document 1031, pp. 4114, 4120; M897, roll 165. For an example of the Court upholding a similar objection, see the following document: Keppler motion of 21 October 1948 to reject certain exhibits in prosecution document books 169, 170, and 170a--and the sub­ sequent Court Order and Memorandum of 3 November 1948; Official Court File, document 1083, pp. 4481-83, 4488-92; ibid. 112 See Weizscicker, Steengracht, and Veesenmayer final statements of 18 November 1948 in TWC, 14:272-75. 11 O Court Order of 11 October 1948 regarding deadlines; Official Court File, document 1023, pp. 4067a, 4068; M897, roll 165. ^■^The prosecution's closing statement, delivered 9 November 1948, can be found in TWC, 14:2-92. For the portion which disparaged the credibility of the defense, see ibid., pp. 78-83.

^Schmidt-Leichner' s closing statement in behalf of Ritter, 11 and 12 November 1948; Transcripts, pp. 27352-53, 27399-27400; M897, roll 23.

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that the totality of modern war demanded "unquestioning

obedience" and eliminated the "free will of decision.

Haensel, in an intellectually profound and judicious presenta­

tion, focused his attention on the legality of the trial.

He said that the only justification for Nuremberg was that

the unusual circumstances of 1945 called for the application

of natural law. Given this situation, his client, Steengracht,

should be acquitted, as only the most obvious criminals

should suffer punishment under "this emergency law."-'-^

Becker, in his closing statement, emphasized the high esteem

which Weizshcker enjoyed among the international community.

In doing so, he challenged the prosecution's attack upon the 118 credibility of defense witnesses. Becker--as well as

Schilf--referred to remarks made by Winston Churchill in the

House of Commons the previous month, in which the former

prime minister deplored what he called the folly of America's 119 continued conduct of war crimes trials. Churchill's

1 1 fi Doetzer's closing statement in behalf of Veesenmayer, 12 November 1948; ibid., pp. 27515-16. 117 Haensel's closing statement in behalf of Steengracht, 11 November 1948; ibid., pp. 27265-93, 27303-4. 118 Becker's closing statement in behalf of Weizs&cker, 10 and 11 November 1948, in TWC, 14:98-99, 105, 112. Becker's closing statement in behalf of WeizsScker, 11 November 1948; Transcripts, pp. 27221-26; M897, roll 23. 119 Becker's closing statement in behalf of Weizsdcker, 11 November 1948, in TWC, 14:125-26. Schilf's closing statement in behalf of Woermann, 11 November 1948; Transcripts, p. 27351, n. 5; M897, roll 23.

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remarks were not a coincidence. As prime minister he had

become privy to Weizs&cker's clandestine contacts with the

British government prior to and immediately following the

outbreak of the war, and Magee, during a trip to England, had

asked Churchill for an affidavit in behalf of his client.

Churchill had replied that this was not feasible, but that

he would speak in the House of Commons and then forward his 120 remarks to WeizsMcker's defense staff.

Following the closing statements and remarks, the

trial recessed for almost five months while the judges

prepared their verdicts. For most of the Foreign Office

defendants this protracted wait was alleviated by a few

days spent at home or with relatives. The requirements for

leaves of absence were that the prisoner be accompanied by

an officer of the Court, usually one of his defense counsel,

and that the request be prompted by some necessity, such

as a family health problem or a financial matter. The Court

did not have the authority actually to parole prisoners

(this belonged to the jurisdiction of the military government).

But the judges' advice was influential, and they were disposed

to grant prisoners a trip home as long as the favor could

not be attributed to kindness alone. In one instance the

Court made no attempt to disguise its benevolence: it

recommended that Woermann be paroled for two weeks in the

custody of his assistant counsel, Marta Unger, so that they

120 Interview with Warren E. Magee, Washington, D.C., 23 January 1979.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 144 121 might marry. All the Foreign Office defendants except

Keppler received a leave of absence between late November

1948 and early January 1949. Keppler did not request a

Temporary respites from prison, no matter how satisfying

at the moment, could not dissipate for long the tedium and

anxiety that undoubtedly accompanied the months of waiting

for a verdict. The defendants' indefinite wait came to an

end when they learned on Wednesday 6 April 1949 that they

were to be in court the following Monday (April 11th) for 123 the reading of the judgment. The judges' long delibera­

tion had produced a correspondingly lengthy judgment. It

took three days to read it in court. After some preliminary

remarks on general legal principles, the judgment discussed

each individual's guilt or innocence count by count. This

commentary was written in a somewhat rambling fashion, unlike

the carefully constructed verdicts customary among continental

121 Unger and Woermann request of 3 December 1948 for Woermann's leave of absence, and the subsequent Court Order and Memorandum of 9 December 1948; Official Court File, document 1173, pp. 4967-68; M897, roll 166. The Court Order and Memorandum can also be located in TWC, 15:341-42. 122 In regard to the leaves of absence of the other Foreign Office defendants, see the following documents from the Official Court File in M897, roll 166: Ritter leave, document 1151, pp. 4888-91; Steengracht leave, document 1171, pp. 4960-62; Weizsdcker leave, document 1172, pp. 4963-66; Bohle leave, document 1178, pp. 4978-81; Erdmannsdorff leave, document 1192, pp. 5035-37; Veesenmayer leave, document 1195, pp. 5074, 5076. 123 Court Notice of 6 April 1949; Official Court File, document 1225, p. 5263; ibid.

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was acquitted of all charges. The others received their 12 A- sentences on the fourteenth of April.

The most dramatic event in this four-day proceeding,

exclusive of the disclosure of the individual fates, was

the announcement that Judge Powers was filing a dissenting 125 opinion. Powers, in his dissent, explained that he had

no disagreement with his two colleagues regarding the juris­

diction of the Tribunal to try individuals in accordance

with Control Council Law No. 10 and the Hague and Geneva

Conventions. Nor did he disagree on the facts of the case.

His dissent involved "the interpretation of the evidence . . .

and the degree of proof" necessary to establish guilt.

Guilt must be individual, he believed. It must be based on

a person's action or inaction in a situation where the person

had some control or responsibility, and in which there was

"a causal connection with the crime charged." Guilt could

not be determined merely by the defendant's position within

the German government, he felt. In doubtful situations, 126 the judgment must be "in favor of the accused." Powers

^ ^ T h e judgment of the Ministries case can be found, in its entirety, in TWC, 14:308-865. A complete account of the sentencing follows in ibid., pp. 866-70. 12 5 Carl Haensel, "The Conclusion of the Nuremberg Trials," trans. Georg Grimm, in Nuremberg: German Views of the War Trials, ed. Wilbourn E. Benton and Georg Grimm (Dallas Southern Methodist University Press, 1955), p. 197.

■^^Dissenting opinion of Judge Powers in T W C , 14:872, 874, 877-78.

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then applied his principles to specific verdicts. In doing

so, he found himself in disagreement with almost all of the 127 convictions of the Foreign Office defendants.

Powers' dissent did not invalidate the Tribunal's

judgement, as Article 11(h) of Ordinance No. 7 decreed that

"decisions and judgments, including convictions and sentences,

shall be by majority vote of the members [of a tribunal]."

The dissent was nevertheless a boon for defense counsel,

because on April 6th, and again on April 14th, the Tribunal

had authorized the defense to file appeals regarding any

alleged errors in the judgment. The Tribunal would review

these appeals and make any necessary corrections in the

verdict. The Tribunal offered an explanation for its

unique gesture: all the other tribunals had disbanded, and

thus the Ministries defendants could not request a joint

session of the military tribunals (as permitted by Article II

of Ordinance No. 11) to review any alleged inconsistencies 128 between the Ministries judgment and other judgments.

127 The entire dissenting opinion of Judge Powers may be found in ibid., pp. 871-942. His comments on individual verdicts will be discussed in the later chapters of this paper.

^®The Court Orders of 6 April 1949 and 14 April 1949 may be found in TWC, 15:1213-15. The two orders were identical, except that the first order provided a fifteen day period following the judgment to file an appeal while the second order provided a twenty-five day period. The Ministries Tribunal was the only Nuremberg tribunal to initiate a review of its own judgment. See ibid., pp. 1143- 44.

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Hellmut Becker recalled another reason why the Tribunal

offered to review its own decisions. The judges informally

acknowledged that even five months had not been enough time

to read the entire record of the trial. They had delegated

some of the reading to assistants. They thought it only 129 fair, therefore, to open their findings to further scrutiny.

Six of the seven convicted Foreign Office defendants took 130 advantage of this appeal process.

The appeals produced a reduction in the sentences

of three of the Foreign Office defendants. Judge Maguire

changed his mind in regard to three specific issues and

joined Judge Powers in a vote of not guilty. This did not

lead to the acquittal of the individuals involved (Weizsdcker,

Woermann, and Steengracht) as their convictions on other

charges were upheld. Judge Christianson noted in separate

memorandums that he disagreed with his colleagues and had

voted to maintain the original verdicts. Judge Powers also

remained steadfast to his original opinions. In his separate

memorandum regarding the appeals, he said that he favored

relief for the other petitioners and additional relief for

129 Interview with Hellmut Becker, Berlin, 16 July 1979.

1 Of) The seventh defendant, Bohle, initially filed an appeal but then withdrew it. See Bohle motion of 10 May 1949 to reduce his sentence, and the subsequent withdrawal (dated 23 June 1949) of said motion; Official Court File, Defense Memoranda re Alleged Errors in Judgment; M897/166/ 1136-44.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 148 131 Weizsdcker, Woermann, and Steengracht. The Ministries

case judges thus maintained their lack of unanimity until

the end.

The judges' lack of agreement indicates a conscientious

effort to be fair. Not one of them sacrificed his independent

thinking for the expediency of uniformity. This concern

for the legal needs and rights of the defendants permeated

the trial. The proceedings and procedures were not perfect,

but there were no procedural errors which precluded a just

verdict.

There was, however, a procedural flaw which could

burden the judges' evaluation of the deportation issue:

the lax rules of evidence. While Article VII of Ordinance

No. 7 instructed that non-technical rules of evidence be

applied, it left a certain leeway to the tribunals. The

Ministries judges chose to be generous in the admission of

evidence. They refused to reject automatically documents

which did not bear a defendant's initials, and affidavits

whose authors had not been cross-examined. The judges promised

to give less weight to deficient evidence, but this promise

merely left the matter to their discretion. Given the great

volume of the evidence and the variety of the charges, their

i q-i The Court Orders and Memorandums, dated 12 December 1949, pertaining to the appeals of six of the Foreign Office defendants can be found in TWC, 14:950-72. For Judge Powers' Memorandum, dated 24 December 1949, see ibid., pp. 1001-2.

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task would have been easier if they had adopted more stringent

rules for themselves. The deportation question was already

difficult, because, in general, these defendants were linked

with this crime through their positions of authority rather

than through their activities. The lax rules of evidence

increased the likelihood that the judges would err on the

deportation issue.

Ultimately, even perfect judicial procedures cannot

guarantee justice. Christianson and Maguire recognized this

in a general order which accompanied the individual orders

on the appeal motions. They said: "There are no mathe­

matical, mechanical, or scientific formulae which can be 132 applied in determining where the truth lies." The

ultimate fairness of the trial depended upon the insight of

the judges in rendering their judgment.

132 Court Order of 12 December 1949, containing general comments on the appeals of the Ministries case defendants, in ibid., p. 949.

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WEIZSACKER, WOERMANN, AND ERDMANNSDORFF AND THE

DEPORTATION OF THE JEWS, 1942-43

The crimes cited in count five (atrocities against

civilian populations) included the deportation of the Jews.^

Paragraph 48 of the indictment, one of the paragraphs which

delineated count five, specifically mentioned all eight

Foreign Office defendants in connection with the deportations.

In actuality, this program did not impinge upon the activities

of Bohle and Keppler. Bohle was acquitted of all charges

under count five. Keppler's only conviction under this

count concerned his association with the Deutsche Umsiedlungs-

Treuhandgesellschaft (DUT), an institution involved with

the resettlement of ethnic Germans. His activities with the 3 DUT, furthermore, were part of his economic career.

(The matter of deportations need not be discussed further

in regard to Bohle and Keppler except for their indictment

under count eight, membership in criminal organizations.

i Other activities covered by count five include the forced Germanization of racial or ethnic Germans who were citizens of conquered or satellite nations, judicial terrorism, the shooting of hostages, and forced recruitment for the SS. See paragraphs 38 - 50 of the indictment in TWC, 12:43-50.

^Ministries case judgment in TWC, 14:552-54.

^Ministries case judgment in ibid., pp. 578-86. 150

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Under Nuremberg law, to be convicted of membership in a

criminal organization it was necessary to have had knowledge

of that organization's participation in a criminal act.^)

The discussion of the remaining six Foreign Office defendants

can be divided into two chronological periods set apart

by the personnel changes in the spring of 1943. The remainder

of this chapter will be concerned with the first chronological

period, while the following chapter will examine the later

time span. The evidence pertaining to the deportations up

to May 1943 would be most relevant to WeizsScker and

Woermann, while the evidence relating to the later deporta­

tions would be applicable to Steengracht and Veesenmayer.

Neither Erdmannsdorff nor Ritter received a change in

assignments in the 1943 reshuffling of personnel. The

evidence and circumstances of the deportation question,

however, link Erdmannsdorff with Weizshcker and Woermann

and link Ritter with Steengracht and Veesenmayer.

There are two dates that have special significance in

regard to the deportations of 1942-43. The first noteworthy

date is July 1941, at which time the Nazi regime began its

policy of extermination. In that month, the Einsatzgruppen,

special military units, started systematically shooting

Russian Jews who resided behind the advancing German lines

in the Soviet Union; and Hermann Gdring instructed

Reinhard Heydrich, the head of the RSHA, to extend the

^See the IMT judgment in IMT, 1:256, and the Ministries case judgment in TWC, 14:855.

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planning of "a total solution of the Jewish question"

(eine Gesamtlflsung der Judenfrage) so as to include all

competent organizations.^ The Foreign Office was given no

notice at the time of this momentous turn of events. However,

within months, Einsatzgruppen reports were circulated to

various individuals within the Wilhelmstrasse. The second

significant date is January 1942, when the Wannsee conference

took place. This event grew out of Gdring's July 1941

directive to Heydrich.

The Wannsee conference was a meeting, chaired by

Heydrich, of representatives of the SS and officials from

several ministries of the German government. The Foreign

Office was represented by Under State Secretary Martin Luther.

The purpose of the meeting was to coordinate the roles of

the various governmental agencies in "the final solution of

the European Jewish question" (die Endlflsung der europMischen

Judenfrage). The conference's directive to the Foreign

Office was to have its "competent officials . . . confer

with the competent specialists of the Security Police and

the SD" in "regard to the handling of the final solution in g the European areas occupied and influenced" by Germany.

This meant that the Foreign Office would provide advice

^Gdring to Heydrich, 31 July 1941; prosecution exhibit 1448; M897/35/0634. An English translation of prosecution exhibit 1448 is in TWC, 13:169-70. 0 Minutes of the Wannsee conference, 20 January 1942; prosecution exhibit 1452; M897/35/0657-71. For an English translation of excerpts from the Wannsee minutes, see TWC, 13:210-17.

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regarding the possibility of diplomatic repercussions from

the deportations. In addition, the RSHA and the Foreign

Office would cooperate on resolving ticklish diplomatic

situations, such as the arrest and deportation of Jews

residing in France who held Hungarian citizenship. The RSHA

would refrain from such arrests until the Foreign Office

had obtained the approval of Germany's ally Hungary. The

directive also meant that the Foreign Office would exert

diplomatic pressure on Germany's allies and satellites to

extend the final solution to the Jewish population within

their territories. Unlike the Einsatzgruppen killings

where the Foreign Office was informed of German misdeeds

after they had occurred, the Wannsee conference intended to

inject the Wilhelmstrasse into the preparation of such

actions against the Jews.

Several deportation drives occurred between February

1942 and March 1943, a period in which Weizs^cker and Woermann

still held their high-ranking positions in Berlin. In

February and March 1942, the RSHA arranged the movements

eastward of a limited number of Jews from Slovakia and France.

This was followed by the initiation of more comprehensive

deportations from Slovakia in April and from France, Belgium,

and the Netherlands in July. In March 1943, Jews from Greece

and from Bulgaria' s newly acquired provinces of Thrace and

Macedonia were sent to death camps. In accordance with the

Wannsee agreement, the Foreign Office was consulted on the

diplomatic aspects of these deportations prior to, or

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during, their occurrence.^

Four countries--France, Belgium, the Netherlands,

and Greece--of the six touched by these deportations were

occupied, or partially occupied, by Germany as a result of

the war. German activities in these countries were thus

subject to the Hague Convention rules of war. The fifth

country, Slovakia, was allegedly an independent state; however,

an argument could be made that, as an entity carved out of

Czechoslovakia (which in turn was occupied by military

force, though not in combat), it too was a German conquest.

Bulgaria was an ally of Germany, but the deportations there

took place in provinces acquired as wartime booty from Greece.

Therefore, the defendants, if proven knowledgeable of and

responsible for these deportations, could be held accountable

under the long-established war crimes category of international

law.

Knowledge

The prosecution attempted to prove that the defendants

used their authority to further the deportation program, and

thereby knowingly took part in murder. This objective

required proof that the defendants knew prior to their

alleged involvement in the deportations that the deportees

^The following work provides a chronological framework for the deportations up to the early months of 1943: Christopher R. Browning, "Referat D III of Abteilung Deutschland and the Jewish Policy of the German Foreign Office 1940-43" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Wisconsin, 1975).

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were going to be--or would likely be— murdered. Various

types of evidence regarding knowledge of the deportees'

fate were presented, such as Weizs&cker's sources of informa­

tion from outside of Germany, Hitler's speeches, and the

use of the term "final solution." The prosecution also

offered documentary evidence on the question of knowledge,

such as the minutes of the Wannsee conference, the

Einsatzgruppen reports, and the Mauthausen documents

(relating to the high mortality rate among Dutch Jews at

the Mauthausen concentration camp). The judges thus had a

variety of clues as to who knew what at which time.

Weizs&cker's ties with the resistance movement had

given him additional access to information. Foreign Office

personnel who were active in the resistance, such as Albrecht

von Kessel., were assigned to Switzerland, where they had

more access to the world press than was possible in Germany.

Kessel testified at the trial as a Weizs&cker defense witness.

According to his testimony, he had a close working relation­

ship with WeizsUcker whom he kept generally informed about

what he knew. In direct examination and at the beginning

of cross-examination, Kessel maintained that he had known

nothing of an extermination program until June 1944, although

as early as 1943 he had deduced that many Jews would die of

mistreatment. Kempner, however, asked Kessel , if he had read

the Swiss newspapers while he was in Switzerland. The reply

being affirmative, Kempner then quoted from Swiss newspapers

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of November and December 1942 that Nazi policies would

lead to the deaths of millions of Jews. Kessel lamely

replied: "I don't remember that any more. I probably O read it though." The testimony of another witness,

Adolf Freudenberg (who appeared as a Weizsdcker affiant for

purposes of cross-examination), confirmed that Switzerland

had been a source of information. Freudenberg had left the

Foreign Office in 1935 to become a Protestant clergyman.

In Geneva from March 1939 to September 1947 he had worked

for the World Council of Churches on refugee problems,

particularly with Christian refugees of Jewish descent.

During the war years he had kept in touch with German diplomats

in Switzerland. Freudenberg testified that news was being

received in that country in the autumn of 1942 that Jews in

Poland were being exterminated. He added, however, that the

Swiss press had treated this subject with timidity until 9 1943. One might conclude that WeizsScker through his ties

with anti-party Germans in Switzerland would have obtained

by the end of 1942 a clear picture of the extent of Nazi

murders. This date, however, was approximately three months

before the last deportation drive conducted during his state

secretaryship and approximately ten months after the first

post-Wannsee deportation.

O Kessel testimony, 21 and 22 June 1948; Transcripts, pp. 9449-51, 9507-8, 9569-70; M897, roll 9. g Freudenberg testimony before Commission II, 1 September 1948; Transcripts, pp. 19428-32, 19437-38, 19442; M897, roll 17.

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The prosecution wanted to prove that the Foreign

Office defendants' knowledge of the purpose of the deporta­

tions predated their initial involvement with that activity.

The prosecution therefore presented as evidence the

Vdlkischer Beobachter*s (the official Nazi newspaper) publica­

tion of Hitler's Reichstag speech of 30 January 1939.

The Fuehrer had said: "If international finance Jewry in

and outside Europe should succeed in plunging the peoples

of Europe into another world war, then the result will not

be the bolshevization of the world and a victory for world

Jewry but the annihilation of the Jewish race in Europe."

The Vd'lkischer Beobachter included in its coverage of Hitler's

speech a photograph taken during his address to the Reichstag.

Discernible in the audience was Ernst Woermann. The prosecu­

tion added to this exhibit later pronouncements by Hitler

which repeated the threat to annihilate the European Jews.^®

Woermann rebutted this evidence with the explanation that

neither he nor anyone else, to his knowledge, had interpreted 11 Hitler's speeches as "a seriously intended program."

■^Extracts from Hitler's speeches; prosecution exhibit 3906; M897/54/1271-73. These photostats of the newspaper pages which contain Hitler's speeches are not clearly labeled as to speaker and date. Moreover, page 1 of the 31 January 1939 Vfllkischer Beobachter, where the photograph of the Reichstag address is printed, is not included among the photostats. It is therefore helpful to look at the translation of prosecution exhibit 3906 in the prosecution's English document books. (See M897/78/0142, 0155, 0158-60.) An English translation of a portion of prosecution exhibit 3906 (from which the above quotation was taken) is also in TWC, 13:131.

^Woermann affidavit of 25 October 1948; Woermann exhibit 196; M897/120/0831.

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Defense Counsel Schilf later reminded the judges that one

should take into consideration Hitler's "exaggerated manner" 12 of speaking.

I believe that Woermann's defense on this point is a

valid one. Although Hitler's fanatical malevolence in regard

to the Jews was well known by 1939, there is no way of proving

that a listener at that time would have accepted literally

his outlandish statement. The fact that Hitler did do what

he had promised is in itself no proof of the auditor's

perceptions. The most one can say is that such rhetoric, if

recalled (and its repetition would have increased the likeli­

hood of its being recalled) , should have made Woermann more

receptive to whatever information came his way regarding a

Nazi program of genocide. I would say that the Tribunal's

majority sacrificed logic to emotion when they wrote: "Those

are not idle words [Hitler's statement of 30 January 1939]

nor, in view of the brutal tactics which he had already

adopted against opponents both real and fancied, could any

of his listeners or readers have any reason to deem them to 13 be mere rhetorical froth."

The expression "final solution," used by the Nazis as

a euphemism for the extermination of the Jews, needed scrutiny

as to its evidential value. The problem was that the Nazis

12 Woermann motion of 10 May 1949 to amend the judgment; Official Court File, Defense Memoranda re Alleged Errors in Judgment; M897/168/0304.

^Ministries case judgment in TWC, 14:491.

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had proposed a succession of solutions for the so-called

Jewish question. On 24 January 1939, GiJring ordered a

policy of forced emigration.^ Following the successful

invasion of Poland, Heydrich directed his subordinates to

concentrate the Polish Jews into cities as a preliminary

measure for the "final aim" (Endziel). Heydrich did not 15 define what he meant by the "final aim." A scheme to move

all the Jews to a vast reservation near Lublin was bruited

around the German bureaucracy at the time, and some scholars Ifi believe that this was what Heydrich had in mind. The

historian Lucy S. Dawidowicz, however, is convinced that

Heydrich had already been informed of Hitler's plan to kill

the Jews and was alluding to this when he spoke of a "final

aim."^ The Lublin plan, whether actual or not, was followed

by still another suggested solution. After the defeat of

France, the Abteilung Deutschland's Franz Rademacher

articulated the Madagascar plan. This called for France

relinquishing the island of Madagascar to Germany, so that the

latter could set up and administer on the island an autonomous

^Giiring to the minister of the interior, 24 January 1939; prosecution exhibit 1443; M897/35/0597-98. An English translation of this document is in TWC, 13:129-30.

^Heydrich to Einsatzgruppen leaders, 21 September 1939; prosecution exhibit 2501; M897/45/0001-4. An English translation of this document is in TWC, 13:133-37. Ifi See, for example, Browning, "Referat Deutschland, Jewish Policy and the German Foreign Office (1933-1940), pp. 66-67.

~^War against the Jews, pp. 115-19.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 160 18 community of resettled European Jews. Rademacher's

suggestion did not lead to any concrete results. The term

"final solution" (Endl6’sung) finally appeared in G'dring's

31 July 1941 letter to Heydrich (see pp. 151-52 above). In

examining the four documents which have just been discussed,

one discovers that the word "final" (End-) occurs only in

Heydrich's directive of 21 September 1939 and Gdring's letter

of 31 July 1941.

Both Weizs&cker and Woermann, however, testified (the

latter implicitly) that the expression "final solution"

had been used in connection with the Nazis' early policies

against the Jews and that they had always interpreted the

"final solution" to be a policy of forced emigration or a 19 territorial solution. It is plausible that Weizsdcker

and Woermann were confused about the meaning of this expression.

The circle of those who were informed of the genocide program

and its phraseology was limited, particularly in the beginning.

Hitler may always have intended to destroy European Jewry,

given the opportunity. He also may have confided his

intentions quite early to such people as Himmler and Gdring.

On the other hand, such party and governmental functionaries

as Adolf Eichmann of the RSHA and Luther and Rademacher of

1 Q Rademacher memorandum of 3 July 1940; prosecution exhibit 1445; M897/35/0620-22. An English translation is in TWC, 13:154-56.

■^Weizs&cker testimony of 14 June 1948 in TWC, 13:444. WeizsHcker testimony, 18 June 1948; Transcripts, pp. 9211-12; M897, roll 9. Woermann testimony, 8 July 1948; Transcripts, pp. 11298-11301; M897, roll 11. Rademacher, in early 1942,

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the Abteilung Deutschland, all of whom were directly involved

in anti-Semitic activities, were not apprised of Hitler's

true intentions until after July 1941, which was relatively

late. Since it was a general policy not to enlighten an

official any more than was necessary for the performance of 20 his assignments, it is conceivable that many who played a

tangential role in the deportation program never understood

its vocabulary. The judgment did not analyze the cognitive

value of the words "final solution." Judge Powers, however,

did address himself to this point. He accepted Weizs&cker's

and Woermann's contention that the phrase "final solution" 21 had been used ambiguously by the Nazi leadership. Whether

or not one agrees with this conclusion, the fact that WeizsMcker

and Woermann had heard these words did not in itself

demonstrate that the two men understood their significance.

The prosecution had more substantial evidence relating

to the question of knowledge than inconclusive references

to the phrase "final solution." It had the minutes of the

Wannsee conference of 20 January 1942 plus several related

documents. The Wannsee minutes or protocol, the single

most revealing document of the Nazi plan of genocide, was not

did refer to the Madagascar plan as having been intended as the final solution (Isee p . 164 below) . 20 In regard to the gradual disclosure of the "final solution," see the following monographs: Dawidowicz, War against the Jews, pp. 129-30, 158-63. Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem, pp. 56-67, 72-79, 83-85. Browning, "Referat D III and Jewish Policy 1940-43," pp. 195-97.

^^Dissenting opinion of Judge Powers in TWC, 14:909.

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2 2 available at the time of the IMT trial, A copy of the

Wannsee minutes was eventually discovered in the files of

the German Foreign Office, and processed for use at the 23 subsequent trials. According to the Wannsee protocol,

there was no straightforward assertion at the conference

that the final solution entailed direct murder. The protocol

nevertheless clearly--if indirectly--states that the physical 0 / destruction of European Jewry was imminent,

There could be no doubt that anyone who had read the

Wannsee minutes would have understood the meaning of the term

"final solution." The following excerpt from the protocol

is informative:

Under proper direction the Jews should now in the course of the final solution be brought to the East in a suitable way for use as labor. In big labor gangs, with separation of the sexes, the Jews capable of work are brought to these areas and employed in road building, in which task undoubtedly a great part will fall out through natural diminution. The remnant that finally is able to survive all this--since this is undoubtedly the part with the strongest resistance--must be treated accordingly since these people, representing a natural selection, are to be regarded as the germ cell of a new Jewish development.25

^There was no mention of the Wannsee conference at the IMT. See "Subject Index" in IMT, 23:716.

^Mendelsohn, "Trial by Document: The Use of Seized Records," pp. 49-50. Also see Wolfe, ed.; Captured German and Related Records, caption to illustration of "Wannsee Protokoll," following p. 172.

^For the comments of Uwe Dietrich Adam regarding the clarity of the euphemisms employed at Wannsee, see Judenpolitik im Dritten Reich, pp. 314-15.

^ M i n u t e s Qf the Wannsee conference, 20 January 1942; prosecution exhibit 1452; M897/35/0663-64. An English trans­ lation (which was used above) can be found in TWC, 13:213.

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If anyone still believed that the final solution was to kill

by indirect means and that genocide was to be accomplished

over the lifetime of the survivors, they could have become

enlightened fully by reading the statement of State Secretary

Biihler from the Office of the Government General (which

administered Nazi-occupied Poland). Biihler asked for "the

initiation of the final solution . . . in the Government

General" and the removal of the Jews

as quickly as possible from the territory of the Government General because . . . here the Jew constitutes an eminent danger as a bearer of diseases.. . . Further­ more, of the approximately two and one half million Jews here in question, the majority of cases are reported to be unfit for work.

Biihler also explained that transportation problems should 26 not impede his request.

The prosecution had to prove, however, that Weizs&cker,

Woermann, and Erdmannsdorff were among those who had read

the minutes of the conference. The prosecution introduced

exhibit 1455: a lengthy report, dated 21 August 1942, from

Luther to Ribbentrop in which the former reviewed the Foreign

Office's involvement in Jewish affairs. In this report,

Luther mentioned the Wannsee conference and said: "State 27 Secretary von Weizsacker has been informed about the meeting."

26 Minutes of the Wannsee conference, 20 January 1942; prosecution exhibit 1452; M897/35/0669-71. An English translation (from which the above quotations were taken) can be found in TWC, 13:216-17. 27 Luther report to Ribbentrop, 21 August 1942; prosecution exhibit 1455; M897/35/0701-19. (The quotation is from frame 0705.) For an English translation of excerpts of this document, see TWC, 13:243-49. (A translation of the

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The prosecution linked Woermann to the protocol through

the following two pieces of evidence. On 10 February 1942,

Rademacher sent a memo to a subordinate of Woermann which

said that the locale for the final solution had been shifted

from Madagascar to Eastern Europe. Four days later, Woermann

requested more information about this decision. Rademacher,

on February 24th, referred Woermann's request to Luther

and asked that Woermann be informed of Luther's conversation

with Heydrich. The prosecution undoubtedly intended that

the Tribunal should interpret this Luther-Heydrich conversa- 28 tion as having been the Wannsee conference. On 23 March

1942, a member of the German embassy in Paris by the name

of Zeitschel wrote to Hans Heinrich Strack, the specialist

for Western Europe in the Political Department, asking if

Woermann (who was Strack's superior) could send a copy of 29 the Wannsee minutes to the Paris embassy. The prosecution

concluded that "this letter shows clearly that for members

of the Foreign Service Woermann was the proper channel . . . 30 [for information] on German policy against the Jews."

quotation is on p. 245.) For the introduction of prosecution exhibit 1455 to the Tribunal, see proceedings of 9 March 1948; Transcripts, pp. 2970, 2977; M897, roll 4. Browning ("Referat D III and Jewish Policy 1940-43," pp. 322-30) discusses the background of Luther's report of 21 August 1942. 28 Rademacher memo to Bielfeld dated 10 February 1942, Woermann memo to Rademacher dated 14 February 1942, Rademacher note to Luther dated 24 February 1942; prosecution exhibit C-233; M897/56/0341-43. 29 Zeitschel to Strack, 23 March 1942; prosecution exhibit 1703; M897/37/0944. 30 Prosecution final brief (15 November 1948) against Weizsdcker, Steengracht, and Woermann concerning the murder of

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The prosecution accused Erdmannsdorff of implementing the

Wannsee conference's directives, but it offered no proof

that he had ever read the Wannsee protocol or had been 31 informed of its deliberations in any other manner.

In response to Luther's report of 21 August 1942,

Weizsacker testified:

If he [Luther] writes seven months afterward that I had been informed about the conference, then he does not say when I was informed, by whom I was informed, and how I was informed. Perhaps he did impart to me the informa­ tion at some time that a conference had taken place at which the Jewish question was discussed. About the so- called plan of the "final solution," however, he certainly did not inform me. The document which the prosecution has submitted as the so-called Wannsee transcript, I certainly did not know when it was shown to me here in Nuremberg.32

Weizsacker also, in effect, denied that he had read Luther's

August 21st report to Ribbentrop. This denial involved the

episode of the brown pencil. During Weizsacker's cross-

examination, Prosecutor Dorothea Minskoff introduced as

prosecution exhibit 3601 a second copy of Luther's August 21st

report, which, according to her allegation, the state secre­

tary had underlined with a brown pencil.The prosecution

the Jews; M897/139/1288.

^Prosecution final brief (30 October 1948) on Erdmannsdorff's responsibility regarding the deportations; M897/138/0501-2.

■^Weizsacker testimony of 14 June 1948 in TWC, 13:437-38. The quotation is from p. 438.

33see proceedings of 18 June 1948; Transcripts, pp. 9212-14, 9223-24, 9231-32; M897, roll 9. Also see Luther report to Ribbentrop, 21 August 1942; prosecution exhibit 3601; M897/53/0166-77. The underlined portion of this document can be found in frame 0173.

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supported this assertion with an affidavit by Hans Schroeder,

the former personnel director of the Foreign Office.

Schroeder attested that it had been a rule in the Wilhelm-

strasse that the foreign minister would mark documents with

a green pencil, the state secretary would use a brown pencil,

and other officials would not use either of these colored Q / pencils. WeizsHcker countered with an affidavit of his own

which maintained that this rule on colored pencils had

pertained only to signatures and handwritten remarks and had 35 not extended to underlinings. WeizsHcker then offered an

affidavit by Josef Schwager, who had been responsible for

Foreign Office procurement and who testified that no Foreign

Office official had been restricted from ordering any or colored pencil of his choice. Becker, in a motion which

objected to prosecution exhibit 3601, said that there was

no way of knowing who had underlined the document, or when.

He added the pertinent point that "the copy does not show

any initials in addition to Luther's and Rademacher1s . . .

initials. Therefore, it is not suited to serve as any proof 37 whatsoever against Weizsacker.'

Q / Schroeder affidavit of 18 June 1948; prosecution exhibit C-289; M897/56/0827.

■^WeizsHcker affidavit of 26 October 1948; WeizsHcker exhibit 482; M897/119/1088.

^Schwager affidavit of 25 October 1948 (English translation); WeizsHcker exhibit 483 in WeizsHcker document book 11; M897/136/0797. 37 WeizsHcker motion to reject prosecution document books 97a-c and 99b, 16 September 1948; Official Court File, document 1031, p. 4137; M897, roll 165.

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Woermann also denied having seen the Wannsee protocol 38 prior to his imprisonment at Nuremberg. He said that he

could not recall a conversation he allegedly had with Luther

on 26 February 1942. Woermann, furthermore, implied that

if Luther had spoken to him at that time about a final

solution, he must have described it merely as a transporting

of all the European Jews to the East. Woermann also main­

tained that when he had inquired about Rademacher's memo of

February 10th he had only been seeking knowledge about the

cancellation of the Madagascar plan. He had not been seeking

knowledge about the Wannsee conference. Woermann also

contended that the Luther-Heydrich conversation referred

to by Rademacher in his note of February 24th was not the 39 Wannsee conference. Woermann responded to the prosecution's

submission of the Zeitschel letter with an affidavit by

Strack, the letter's recipient. Strack testified that

Zeitschel had been an inexperienced bureaucrat who was mistaken

in asking Woermann for a copy of the Wannsee protocol.

Zeitschel should have addressed his inquiry to Luther's

38 Woermann testimony, 8 July 1948; Transcripts, p. 11308; M 897, roll 11. 39 Woermann testimony of 9 July 1948; Transcripts, p. 11495; M897, roll 11. Woermann motion of 10 May 1949 to amend the judgment; Official Court File, Defense Memoranda re Alleged Errors in Judgment; M897/168/0300-0304. Woermann submitted the documents of prosecution exhibit C-233 (see n. 28 on p . 164 above) as his own exhibit 113 (M897/120/ 0480-82) for the purpose of showing that he had merely been inquiring about the Madagascar plan.

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Abteilung Deutschland. Strack added that, to the best of

his knowledge, Woermann had known nothing about the Wannsee

conference.^"® The Zeitschel letter from Paris proves that

an awareness permeated the Foreign Office that an important

conference had taken place; however, there is no firm evidence—

such as initialed documents--which reveals what, if anything,

Woermann knew about the Wannsee conference.

The prosecution also tried to connect both WeizsScker

and Woermann to knowledge of the Wannsee discussion through

the Mischlinge issue. "Mischlinge" was the Nazi term for

people who had Christian as well as Jewish parentage. It

was proposed at Wannsee that some of these people would be

offered the choice of sterilization in place of deportation.

It was also suggested that marriages between Jews and

Christians would be dissolved by legislative edict.^ These

proposals created administrative and legal difficulties.

Additional conferences were thus held to discuss further the

Mischlinge and mixed marriages. The first of these conferences

took place on 6 March 1942, with Rademacher representing / o the Foreign Office. The following day he wrote a memo about

^®Strack affidavit of 23 October 1948; Woermann exhibit 197; M897/120/0834-35.

^Minutes of the Wannsee conference, 20 January 1942; prosecution exhibit 1452; M897/35/0666-70. For the English translation of a portion of this discussion, see TWC, 13:214-16. / 0 See minutes of conference of 6 March 1942; prosecution exhibit 1453; M897/35/0674-82. For an English translation of an extract from the minutes of this conference, see TWC, 13:219-20.

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this conference. Rademacher's March 7th memo, which was

initialed by Woermann, makes references to sections of the

Wannsee protocol which are concerned with the Mischlinge

and mixed marriages. Rademacher later gathered material on

the Mischlinge topic. This material included an outline of

various proposals on the Mischlinge which had been made at

the Wannsee and March 6th meetings, some correspondence on

the Mischlinge issue, and a copy of Rademacher's March 7th

memo. This presentation was accompanied by a memorandum

dated 11 June 1942, which was addressed to Woermann and

Weizsacker among others; however, the copy of this memorandum

introduced at the Ministries trial bears no initials. In

his courtroom testimony, WeizsHcker admitted that he had

received Rademacher's memo of June 11th, but denied having

known about Rademacher's memorandum of March 7th. The June

11th memo and attached material were designated prosecution

exhibit 1454 by the Tribunal.^ This exhibit, with its focus

on the Mischlinge, does not disclose the Wannsee protocol's

broadest hints that genocide was taking place. The most

revealing entry in exhibit 1454 is a summary of a statement

/ ^ Rademacher memorandum of 11 June 1942 and attach­ ments; prosecution exhibit 1454; M897/35/0685-98. For an English translation of portions of this exhibit, see TWC, 13:221-22, 228-29. (Pp. 221-22 contain Rademacher's memo of March 7th, which in this instance is designated as prosecution exhibit 1544.) In regard to WeizsHcker's comments on the memorandums of March 7th and June 11th, see WeizsHcker testimony of 14 June 1948 in TWC, 13:438.

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attributed to an SS group leader by the name of Hofmann:

"Most extensive sterilization; a Mischling will prefer

sterilization to evacuation."44 This entry should certainly

have raised suspicions as to the horrors of evacuation (or

deportation). Rademacher's June 11th presentation also

suggests that its recipients were familiar with, or at least

had access to, the Wannsee protocol. Prosecution exhibit

1454 thus increases the probability that Weizsacker or

Woermann at one time or another might have seen the protocol, 45 but it does not conclusively prove that they saw it.

Judges Christianson and Maguire were imprecise in

their analysis of the evidence relating to the Wannsee protocol.

After mentioning Weizsacker's assertions in regard to pros­

ecution exhibit 3601 (the brown-pencil-underlined copy of

Luther's report of 21 August 1942), they said: "His statement

44M897/35/0686.

4"*The historians Leonidas E. Hill and Christopher R. Browning agree that there is no concrete evidence that WeizsMcker either read or received a full accounting of the Wannsee protocol. Browning reaches the same conclusion in regard to Woermann. WeizsHcker Papiere, n. 6 on p. 635, n. 42 on pp. 639-40. Browning, "Referat D III and Jewish Policy 1940-43," pp. 225-26. Reitlinger (Final Solution, pp. 79, 96, 99) asserts that both Woermann and Weizsacker were informed of the Wannsee protocol. He says that the latter initialed the protocol, although no such initial can be found on the photostats of the Wannsee minutes (see prosecution exhibit 1452; M897/35/0657-71) and no claim of SUCh. GXi initialing was made at the trial. Reitlinger's assertion in regard to Woermann rests merely on the material which Rademacher submitted on June 11th. Reitlinger, further­ more, cites this material as Luther's report of 21 August 1942. (See p. 550, n. 8. The Luther report is cited by its document number, NG-2586-J.)

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regarding the brown pencil is contradicted by the affidavit

of Hans Schroeder. We believe that the defendant is in

error in his statement that he never saw this document."

The judges, in other words, ignored the absence of Weizshcker's

initials on Luther's report. The two judges then commented

on Woermann's request of February 1942 for more information

on the change in the government's Jewish policy:

Woermann had the right to know precisely what was involved and to examine the [Wannsee] minutes .... Unless we are to believe that an under secretary of state was unable to fulfill intelligently the functions of his office, we must assume that his request for information was complied with and that he actually obtained it.

The key word here is "assume." The judges were making a

logical assumption, but a logical assumption should not have

been substituted for proof in a court of law. Having already

decided that Woermann had been informed about the Wannsee

protocol, the judges did not refer to the Zeitschel letter.

The two judges also mentioned Rademacher's memo of March 7th

and his presentation of June 11th. They merely summarized

the March 7th memo. They did not analyze whether or not

it indicated the extent of Woermann's knowledge of the

Wannsee conference. In regard to the June 11th material

(prosecution exhibit 1454), they said; "Rademacher . . .

submitted a resume of the results of the conference of

20 January 1942 and that of 6 March to the defendant von

Weizsacker via Luther, Gaus, and Woermann." This statement

produces the misleading impression that prosecution exhibit

1454 divulged the entire Wannsee conference when, in fact,

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it was basically limited to those portions of the conference

which were concerned with the Mischlinge^

The prosecution was able to submit more conclusive

evidence than the Wannsee documents. The week after the

introduction of the main body of those documents, Prosecutor

Minskoff introduced eleven exhibits which included ten out

of a series of eleven reports on Einsatzgruppen activities

in Russia from July 1941 through March 1942.^ The first

five reports, whose chronological coverage extended through

the month of September, were sent by the RSHA to Ribbentrop

on 30 October 1941. A sixth report covering the month of

October was sent to Ribbentrop's office on 25 November 1941.

On December 8th, Georg Viktor Bruns of the foreign minister's

office asked that a summary of these reports be drawn up.

Luther on December 10th wrote a summary of the sixth report.

On the same day his subordinate, Fritz-Gebhardt von Hahn,

wrote a summary of the first five reports. Weizsacker

initialed Luther's summary two days later, and in late Decem­

ber Woermann and Erdmannsdorff initialed a distribution list

attached to Luther's summary. On 8 January 1942, a Foreign

Office official by the name of Werner Picot resubmitted

Luther's summary to Weizsacker. Picot at the same time

4-6 For the discussion of the Wannsee conference in the Ministries case judgment, see TWC, 14:478-87= The three quotations from that discussion can be found on pp. 485, 486, and 483 respectively.

^Proceedings of 18 March 1948; Transcripts, pp. 3547-51; M897, roll 4.

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sent Hahn's summary plus the six reports themselves to

Weizsacker. The state secretary initialed Picot's memorandum

which accompanied all of this material, and sent everything

on to Woermann, who initialed Picot’s memorandum on the ninth.

Thus, a little less than two weeks before the Wannsee

conference, Weizsacker and Woermann had been given access

to the first six Einsatzgruppen reports and Erdmannsdorff

had been given access to an explicit summary of the sixth

report.

It is a startling experience today to read the first

six Einsatzgruppen reports. What astonishes today's reader

is not the well-known crimes themselves, horrible as they

were, but the fact that these reports which were circulated

in the German Foreign Office in 1941-42 were so revealing.

The reports, furthermore, were so well organized that even

the busiest of officials could have followed the grisly

tale of murder with a minimum of effort and time. The first

48 This reconstruction of the circulation of the Einsatzgruppen reports has depended upon--in addition to Minskoff's comments cited in the preceding footnote— the following sources: Transmittal letters (dated 30 October 1941 and 8 January 1942) for the first six Einsatzgruppen reports; prosecution exhibit 1731; M897/38/0123, 0125; English translation in TWC, 13:177, 207-8. Hahn summary of first five Einsatzgruppen reports, 10 December 1941; prosecu­ tion exhibit 1731; M897/38/0129-35. Transmittal letter (dated 25 November 1941) for the sixth Einsatzgruppen report; prosecution exhibit 1736; M897/38/0348; English translation in TWC, 13:185. Luther summary of sixth Einsatzgruppen report (dated 10 December 1941), Bruns memorandum of 8 December 1941, and distribution list of 23 December 1941 attached to Luther summary of sixth Einsatzgruppen report; prosecution exhibit 1737; M897/38/0392-98; English translation of excerpts in TWC, 13:199-200. Browning, "Referat D III and Jewish Policy 15^0-43,M pp. 211-15.

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two or three Einsatzgruppen reports make a shallow attempt

to disguise the fact that a policy of genocide was being

conducted against the Russian Jews. Killings are linked

to alleged crimes of the Jews (such as arson, stealing,

murder, or partisan activity), but the number killed--600

in one city and 400 in another; 8,000 in one region and 3,106 49 in another— reveal that such linkage is a shabby pretense.

A Foreign Office official still might have interpreted

these events as arbitrary, random murders rather than as

part of a systematic plan to kill all Russian Jews. Since

the first reports contain no mention of the age or sex of

the victims, this same official might have hoped that these

atrocities were limited to male adults. The attempt to

disguise genocide as something else was, however, quickly

abandoned as the reports continued. The fourth report

speaks of the shooting of ten Jewish families who were

caught fleeing with the Russian troops and with German army

rations in their possession.^® The fifth report specifies

four districts in which a total of eighty-five thousand

people were executed and ends with the chilling conclusion

that "the mentioned districts are free of Jews" Cdie genannten

49 Einsatzgruppen report no. 1; prosecution exhibit 1731; M897/38/0146; English translation in T W C , 13:179. Einsatzgruppen report no. 2; prosecution exhibit 1732; M897/38/0188-89, 0192. Einsatzgruppen report no. 3; prosecution exhibit 1733; M897/38/0231.

^^Einsatzgruppen report no. 4; prosecution exhibit 1734; M897/38/0279.

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Kreise sind judenfrei) .^ The sixth report mentions that

in Estonia, whose population contained approximately two

thousand Jews, "all male Jews above sixteen years of age

were [to be] killed, with the exception of doctors and Jewish

elders." In White Ruthenia, 28 Jewish women were shot in

one town and 337 Jewish women in another town for "displaying

a particularly disobedient attitude." This report also

reveals the infamous Kiev massacre. "As a measure of

retribution for the arson at Kiev, all Jews were arrested

and on 29 and 30 September altogether 33,771 Jews shot."

The above is just a sampling of some of the most dramatic

atrocities disclosed in these documents.

Some of the remaining Einsatzgruppen reports were also

initialed by the Foreign Office defendants. On 14 March

1942, Luther attached a summary to Einsatzgruppen report

no. 10, which covered the month of February 1942. A

distribution list dated March 18th indicates that this summary

and report were circulated at that time. The summary was

initialed by Weizsacker and submitted to Ribbentrop on the

20th. Luther, in his summary of March 14th, quoted the

tenth Einsatzgruppen report:

As the Jewish question in the Baltic states must be considered as almost solved and settled, the clarifica­ tion of this problem in the remaining occupied Eastern

■^Einsatzgruppen report no. 5; prosecution exhibit 1735; M897/38/0320. 52 Einsatzgruppen report no. 6; prosecution exhibit 1736; M897/38/0361-62, 0367, 0372. For an English translation (from which the above quotations were taken), see TWC, 13:186-88.

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regions proceeds further. The ghettoization is generally accomplished.

If Weizsacker had the gumption to read further, he could

have flipped to the report itself and continued where

Luther's quote ended:

Again and again the Jews, who do not submit to the official directives, are apprehended and shot. In order to avoid the further spread of dangerous epidemics, repeated shootings of Jews have become necessary. 53

This information came into Weizsacker's possession during

the very week he was asked to assess diplomatically the

proposed deportation of six thousand Jews from France to

Auschwitz (see pp. 194-97 below). Einsatzgruppen report

no. 11, pertaining to March 1942, was passed along to

members of the Foreign Office in late April 1942. The dis­

tribution list for the report bears the initials of

Erdmannsdorff and Woermann. The eleventh report provided

another brazen acknowledgment that the Einsatzgruppen were

carrying out a policy of genocide. The report said: "The

Baltic area is for the most part free of Jews and the few

still existing Jews, who are required for the most pressing

labor needs, are ghettoized.

What defense did the defendants offer in this situation?

53 Luther summary of 14 March 1942, distribution list of 18 March 1942, and Einsatzgruppen report no. 10; prosecution exhibit 1740; M897/38/0469-70, 0473, 0488.

"^Distribution list of 28 April 1942 and Einsatzgruppen report no. 11; prosecution exhibit 1741; M897/38/0501, 0517.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Weizsacker said in his direct testimony that he had first

learned in the autumn of 1941 of the Einsatzgruppen

atrocities, when he was orally informed of these activities

by Admiral Wilhelm Canaris (the head of German military

intelligence, and a member of the resistance). Weizsacker

further said that his reaction had been to travel to

Ribbentrop*s headquarters in East Prussia, where he implored I the foreign minister to do something about this monstrosity.'

Clearly Weizsacker had been informed of the Einsatzgruppen

activities, and had reacted to them, before the reports were

circulated in the Foreign Office. In cross-examination,

the prosecutor H. William Caming asked Weizsacker if he had

seen the actual Einsatzgruppen reports. Weizsacker

surprisingly replied: "I can’t remember whether I actually

read these Einsatzgruppen reports myself."55 In a note

which he wrote to his lawyers for the preparation of his

case, Weizsacker was more positive that he had not examined

the Einsatzgruppen reports previously.5^ In contrast,

Woermann acknowledged in his testimony that he had read the

reports. Furthermore, he had been approached by

Erdmannsdorff and another subordinate, who asked if

something could be done. Woermann, consequently, had

discussed the reports with Weizsacker (a point which had

^Weizsacker testimony of 14 June 1948 in TWC, 13:443.

55Weizsacker testimony, 15 June 1948; Transcripts, p. 8654; M897, roll 9.

5^Weizsacker undated note, in Weizsacker Papiere, ed. Hill, p. 427.

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I I C O already been confirmed by Weizsacker °), who told him

either that he had spoken or soon would speak (Woermann

could not remember which) to Ribbentrop about the matter.

Woermann ended his direct testimony on the Einsatzgruppen

activities with the comment: "I was . . . fully aware of CQ the terrible character of this whole affair.” The basic

defense of both Woermann and Weizsacker was that they had

thought that the events in Russia had no bearing on the

deportations of the other European Jews. They had believed

that the other Jews were being shipped eastward for purposes

of labor and, though knowing that the deportees' lot in the

East would be extremely difficult, they had never suspected

that these people were being deported in order to meet the

same fate as the Einsatzgruppen victims.^0 Erdmannsdorff,

through his lawyer's final brief, admitted that he had been

exposed to the contents of the sixth and eleventh

Einsatzgruppen reports. Erdmannsdorff repeated Woermann's

statement that he had asked Woermann to intercede against

CO 1t °Weizsacker testimony, 15 June 1948; Transcripts, p. 8646; M897, roll 9.

-^Woermann testimony, 8 July 1948; Transcripts, pp. 11349-53; M897, roll 11.

^^Woermann testimony, 9 July 1948; Transcripts, pp. 11496-97; M897, roll 11. Schilf's closing statement in behalf of Woermann, 11 November 1948; Transcripts, pp. 27341-43; M897, roll 23. Weizsacker undated note, in Weizsacker Papiere, ed. Hill, p. 427. Becker's closing statement in behalf of Weizsacker, 11 November 1948, in T W C , 14:118-19.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 179

these activities. Erdmannsdorff then remarked that the

Foreign Office had been helpless to do anything other than

express its disapproval. Erdmannsdorff's final brief did

not discuss the issue of whether or not there was a connection

between knowledge of the Einsatzgruppen killings and knowledge 61 of the deportations.

Weizshcker's assertion that he did not read the 62 Einsatzgruppen reports in 1941-42, even if accepted, does

not place him in a better legal or moral position. In

initialing a document, Weizs&cker assumed the legal respon­

sibility of having read it. He had been informed by Canaris

of the general tenor of the Einsatzgruppen activities

before the first report crossed his desk. Woermann then

discussed the matter with him, most likely long before the

last of these reports was initialed by him. Under these

circumstances to have chosen not to read this material

suggests an unwillingness to face the extent of the regime's

criminality; an assumption which does not enhance Weizsacker's

moral stature.

^Erdmannsdorff final brief of 20 October 1948; M897/152/0884-86. 62 Leonidas E. Hill, WeizsMcker's biographer, apparently accepts this assertion. Hill writes (Weizsacker Papiere, p . 639, n. 41): "He [Weizsacker] appears . . . to have . . . believed the propaganda, according to which the activities of the Einsatzgruppen were partially directed against saboteurs and partisans behind the German lines. The German army in Russia pleaded security reasons as justification for mass executions."

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The argument that there was no obvious connection

between the Einsatzgruppen killings and the deportations 63 did not impress two of the judges, nor does it impress me.

Anyone who had read the Einsatzgruppen reports should have

suspected that a policy to deliberately kill a large number

of Jews had been sanctioned. The former foreign ministry

official Bruns, while under cross-examination as a Weizshcker

affiant, gave significant support to the thesis that one

should have linked the Einsatzgruppen murders to the

deportations. Bruns testified that he had read the

Einsatzgruppen documents and then had seen deportation

orders which spoke only of labor needs. When Kempner asked

Bruns if he had thought that the deported Jews would some­

day return, Bruns replied: "I anticipated the possibility

£ A that the majority of these people would perish." The

prosecution, in a final brief, pointed out the illogic of

the disconnection theory of the defendants: if a Nazi

objective had been to use Jewish slave labor in the East,

it made no sense to kill off the indigenous Jewish population

and then transport hundreds of thousands of other Jews to

the East.

fi 3 Browning would concur with my opinion. See his conclusion to his detailed account of the Einsatzgruppen reports: "Referat D III and Jewish Policy 1940-43," pp. 217-18.

fill Bruns testimony before Commission II, 26 August 1948; Transcripts, pp. 18465-72; M897, roll 16.

^Prosecution final brief (15 November 1948) against Weizsacker, Steengracht, and Woermann concerning the murder of the Jews; M897/139/1241-42.

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The majority judgment agreed with the prosecution and

persuasively dismissed the defendants' disconnection theory

with the following words:

What is of importance [in regard to the Einsatz­ gruppen reports] . . . , is that the facts disclosed by the records of these crimes disposes of the claim of ignorance of final solution and of the purpose of the deportation of the Jews to the East. Knowing as they did what happened to the Jews when they came under the control of the SS, Gestapo, and police, we find ourselves unable to believe that these defendants had any idea that these deportations ended in anything but the death of these deportees through exhaustion from overwork, starvation, or mistreatment, and by mass murder. The defendants are not men of only ordinary intelligence and understanding. They are educated and trained to official life and experienced in the evaluation of policy, and the motives and acts of parties, officialdom, and of nations, and wholly accustomed to read between the lines of restrained or apparently innocuous language, and from it extract the meaning lying behind the words.^6

Judge Powers, as usual, disagreed with this assessment

of his colleagues, but his dissent was based on chronological

errors. He wrote: "Strange as it may seem, the incidents on

which von Weizsacker and Woermann are convicted are events

which happened in June or July 1942, before they are shown

to have had notice of those horrible things [the Einsatz­

gruppen killings] having happened, so that obviously,

von Weizsacker and Woermann could not be charged with having

acted with knowledge of such events. As we discussed

above, WeizsHcker and woermann received the first six

^See Ministries case judgment in TWC, 14:472-73. The quotation is from p. 473.

ft 7 Dissenting opinion of Judge Powers in ibid., p. 911.

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Einsatzgruppen reports in January 1942. This was prior to

the deportations of March 1942 for which they were convicted

(see pp. 194, 200 below).

The Einsatzgruppen reports undermined WeizsMcker1s,

Woermann's and Erdmannsdorff’s claims to ignorance of the 68 fate of the deportees. Nevertheless, one could still

say that these reports had produced only a deductive knowledge

of the concentration camps. The Mauthausen documents,

however, showed that one of these defendants had received

some direct knowledge of the camps. The assassination of

a Nazi official in the Netherlands had led in February and

June 1941 to the deporation of 660 Jewish Dutchmen to the

Mauthausen concentration camp. By mid-October of that year

more than four hundred of these men, most of whom were

young, had died. These deaths, moreover, had taken place on

a few specific days. This information was discussed in 69 Foreign Office documents which were initialed by WeizsMcker,

establishing that as early as October 1941 he had knowledge

68 For a summarization of WeizsMcker1s and Woermann1s persistent claims of ignorance, see their appeals: WeizsMcker motion of 10 May 1949 to amend the judgment; Official Court File, Defense Memoranda re Alleged Errors in Judgment; M897/168/0112-24. Woermann motion of 10 May 1949 to amend the judgment; ibid., frames 0297-0309. Erdmannsdorff^ admission of knowledge did not go beyond the Einsatzgruppen reports. See, for example, his lawyer^ remarks on the Wannsee conference in Erdmannsdorff final brief of 20 October 1948; M897/152/0875. 69 Albrecht note of 13 October 1941; prosecution exhibit 1678; M897/37/0762. Luther to the RSHA, 5 November 1941; prosecution exhibit 1679; M897/37/0765-66.

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of such occurrences in at least one concentration camp.

Woermann's involvement in this affair consisted of two

notes which he had written in February 1941, which explained

the purported reasons for the Mauthausen deportations. The

first of these notes contains the odd statement "four

hundred Jews would be brought from the Tv'therlands to

Germany, who would be obliged 'to work' here." The oddity

is the quotation marks around "to work.”^ The judgment

interpreted this as meaning that Woermann had known that

the deportees would face a worse fate than forced labor;

however, this was merely a conjecture on the part of the

judges. The Mauthausen incident conclusively shows cognizance

only in regard to Weizsd'cker. The judgment nevertheless

considered both Weizs&'cker and Woermann to have been aware

of what had occurred at Mauthausen.^

The Issue of Bureaucratic Competency

The issue of competency was even more difficult

to determine than that of knowledge. Whether an official

had been competent to deal with a particular matter was

determined by one's interpretation of the law as well as by

^Woermann notes of 25 and 26 February 1941; prosecution exhibit 1677; M897/37/0757-58.

^Ministries case judgment in TWC, 14:499-500. Christianson and Maguire repeated their analysis of the Mauthausen documents in their appellate judgment. See Court Memorandum of 12 December 1949, pertaining to Weizs&cker’s appeal, in ibid., pp. 957-58.

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the evidence. The judges had to consider the powers and

legal responsibilities of the Foreign Office officials in

normal times, and then decide to what degree, if any, the

Nazi regime had altered these powers and responsibilities.

In doing so, the judges also had to weigh the significance

of a defendant's initials on a document relating to the

conduct of policy. (Such a document must be differentiated

from documents which were concerned with the dissemination of

information.)

The prosecution and the defense each produced an

expert witness on the topic of bureaucratic responsibility.

The prosecution witness was Hans Peters, a professor of

public, constitutional, and administrative law. He testified

that in a legal sense the position of the civil servants

in the Foreign Office was the same in the Third Reich as in

the Weimar Republic. The state secretary, for instance,

remained subordinate to the foreign minister and retained

authority over the rest of the department's officials.

Peters did admit that, in the Nazi regime, party and other

agencies circumvented the functions of the diplomatic

bureaucracy. He insisted, nonetheless, that de facto

circumstances did not change the de jure situation. Peters

also pointed out that the 1937 German Civil Servants Law

specified that "the civil servant may not obey instructions,

the execution of which is clearly contrary to criminal law."

When Becker referred to the 1937 Law as a "camouflage [of]

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. political reality," Peters replied: "What you, counsel, are

calling constitutional realities were actually violations

of law." 7 9 The defense countered with Erich Kaufmann.

He was a professor of international and constitutional law,

who also served as a regular consultant to the Foreign

Office during the Weimar era. Kaufmann testified that even

in the pre-Nazi governments the responsibilities of the

permanent civil servant in the Foreign Office were limited

to providing expert advice to the foreign minister and to

carrying out the minister's decisions. The civil servant

was not responsible for the foreign minister's decisions.

In the Third Reich, the permanent official's advice was not

usually solicited; however, it was (in Kaufmannrs opinion)

still the duty of the official to keep his expertise at the

disposal of the state. Kaufmann agreed with Becker's

earlier suggestion that the Civil Servants Law of 1937,

with its admonition that civil servants disregard illegal

orders, was merely camouflage and could not be taken

seriously. Kaufmann, however, retreated from this

position when questioned by Judge Maguire. The judge asked

him if he considered that officials in Nazi Germany were

"free from legal responsibility" in collaborating on a

Hitler order, even when that order violated international

law. Kaufmann replied:

^Peters testimony, 8 and 9 January 1948; Transcripts, pp. 311-12, 319, 339-42, 347; M897, roll 2. The quotations are from pp. 341-42 and 347.

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That would depend on the nature of their collabora­ tion. If they had directly committed crimes or violated the law they would in that case, of course, be respon­ sible, unless there were certain reasons to exonerate them such as duress, state of emergency, or other elements.73

The testimony of these two expert witnesses can be

focused on the following areas of agreement: (1) a former

official of the Third Reich could be held legally responsible

for his actions if he had in fact acted; (2) it could not

be assumed that such an official had performed a particular

function in the Third Reich just because he would have done

so in the Weimar Republic.

Weizsacker and Woermann asserted that their ability

to act had been curtailed by two particular situations.

There was Luther who had made Jewish matters within the

Foreign Office an exclusive possession of his department,

the Abteilung Deutschland. Luther’s eager advocacy of the

radical Nazi position regarding the Jews had gained him the

support of both Ribbentrop and the RSHA. Therefore, he was

able to shape the Foreign Office's participation in Jewish

matters without control from either Weizsacker or Woermann,

even though he was still nominally subordinate to the

state secretary and on an equal footing with the head of

the Political Department.^ Secondly, Ribbentrop had

7^Kaufmann testimony, 3 June 1948; Transcripts, pp. 7238-42, 7248-52, 7257-59, 7305-6, 7311; M897, roll 7. The exchange between Judge Maguire and Kaufmann is on p. 7311.

7^WeizsMcker testimony of 14 June 1948 in TWC, 13:439-42. Woermann testimony of 6 and 8 July 1948; Tran­ scripts, pp. 11043, 11305; M897, rolls 10 and 11. Both

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allowed Weizsacker and Woermann to object to actions

against the Jews only for reasons of diplomatic expediency.

An action which fit this description was the arrest in the

latter half of 1941 of American Jews in France. Weizsacker

pointed out that these arrests might cause repercussions

for German citizens residing or doing business in the neutral

United States. WeizsHcker and Woermann were not allowed to

repeat objections of this nature once Hitler had overruled

them.^ Most, but not all, of Ribbentrop's alleged restric­

tions upon the defendants would have been novel. To restrict

the advice of the head of the Political Department to

political matters would not be a departure from Weimar

Weizsacker and Woermann supported their testimony with defense exhibits, of which the following are examples: Melchers affidavit of 22 January 1948; WeizsHcker exhibit 295; M897/119/0355-56. Luther to Steengracht, 26 May 1942; WeizsHcker exhibit 447; M897/119/0932. Hencke affidavit of 5 June 1948; Woermann exhibit 111; M897/120/0473-74. Anneliese Bockmann (Woermann1s secretary from 1938 to 1943) affidavit of 1 April 1948; Woermann exhibit 23; M897/120/0155.

^^Kempner interrogation of Weizsacker, 23 August 1947, in Robert M. W. Kempner, Das Dritte Reich im KreuzverhUr: Aus den unverbffentlichten Vemehmungsprotokollen des Anklagers (Munich: Bechtle Verlag, 1969), pp. 216-17. WeizsHcker testimony of 14 June 1948 in TWC, 13:431-32. Bruns affidavit of 11 August 1948; WeizsHcker exhibit 433; M897/119/0879-80. Curt Heinburg (a subordinate of Woermann in the Political Department) affidavit of 30 May 1948; Woermann exhibit 67; M897/120/0304. For the example of WeizsHcker's objection to the arrest of the American Jews in France, see WeizsHcker to Ribbentrop, 31 October 1941; prosecution exhibit 3599; M897/53/0157-59. An English translation of this document is in TWC, 13:175-77.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 188 7 fi practice. To forbid an official to repeat his advice

would be such a departure. Furthermore, it would be contrary

to the principles of the Weimar bureaucracy to restrict the

nature of the state secretary's objectives. As the superior

of the various department heads, the Weimar state secretary

had been entitled to express an opinion in the specialized

areas of his subordinates.^

The prosecution not only refused to believe that

WeizsMcker and Woermann had been muzzled by Ribbentrop or

outmaneuvered by Luther, but insisted on depicting the two

defendants as a dominant force in the formulation of Germany's

Jewish policy. The prosecution's attitude can be epitomized

by the following excerpt from its final brief:

The Division Deutschland [sic] played also a very important role in the extermination program of the German Foreign Office. This Division was especially active in the operational field, in its function as the liaison office with the . . . (RSHA) and the SS, that is, to the agencies which enforced the policy and rulings made by the Foreign Office [which could be translated as WeizsAcker and Woermann] and its representatives for carrying out the annihilation program. 78

7 fi See Hermann Davidsen (a member of the Foreign Office from 1920 to 1945) affidavit of 18 April 1948; WeizsAcker exhibit 287; M897/119/0329. 77 Erich Kordt (a member of the Foreign Office from 1928 to 1945; active in the German resistance) testimony, 7 June 1948; Transcripts, p. 7515; M897, roll 8. 7 8 Prosecution final brief (15 November 1948) against WeizsAcker, Steengracht, and Woermann concerning the murder of the Jews; M897/139/1150. For similar remarks in this final brief, see frames 1117-18, 1147, 1151, 1187-88, 1197, 1234, 1236. Also see Minskoff's cross-examination of WeizsAcker, 18 June 1948; Transcripts, pp. 9184-9204; M897, roll 9.

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The prosecution's pursuit of Erdmannsdorff was less aggres­

sive than its pursuit of his superiors. Even during

Erdmannsdorff's pre-trial interrogations, the prosecution

at times seemed more intent on getting the former Political

Department director to incriminate Woermann than himself.^

Nor did the prosecution ever build a strong case as to

Erdmannsdorff having held a position of responsibility in

Jewish affairs.^® The prosecution was neither greatly 81 89 surprised nor disappointed 1 when the Tribunal agreed

with Bernhard Vorwerk's closing statement in behalf of

his client: "The prosecution evidence introduced especially

against Erdmannsdorff proves . . . no more than that

Erdmannsdorff officially received knowledge of various

measures against J e w s . "83

^Erdmannsdorff interrogation 1481, 23 June 1947; interrogator - Beauvais; M1019/16/0395-99, 0401-2. Erdmannsdorff interrogation 1481a, 1 July 1947; interrogator - Beauvais; M1019/16/0406-10.

^Compare the relevant sections of the prosecution and defense briefs on Erdmannsdorff. Prosecution final brief (30 October 1948) on Erdmannsdorff1s responsibility regarding the deportations; M897/138/0497-0512. Erdmanns­ dorff final brief of 20 October 1948; M897/152/0873-84, 0886-93. Erdmannsdorff reply brief of 18 November 1948; M897/152/0911-17.

Interview with Robert M. W. Kempner, Frankfurt am Main, 13 July 1979.

^Ministries case judgment in TWC, 14:577-78. 83 Vorwerk's closing statement in behalf of Erdmannsdorff, 12 November 1948; Transcripts, p. 27479; M897, roll 23.

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The judgment did not extensively discuss as a separate

issue Weizs&cker's and Woermann's competency under the

Nazi system. At one point it briefly referred to "Luther's

alleged independence of action," remarking that— according

to WeizsHcker himself--Ribbentrop in August 1942 had chided

Luther for not informing WeizsScker of intended Jewish 84 deportations and had ordered him to do so in the future.

This statement by the tribunal majority acknowledges that

Luther did, at least on some occasions, ignore WeizsScker.

In regard to the defendants' overall freedom of action,

the judgment said: "It is immaterial whether they originated

or executed them [the deportations], or merely implemented

them, justified them to the world, or gave aid and comfort 85 to their perpetrators." The implication of this last

statement is that Weizs&cker and Woermann neither had been

as powerless as they indicated, nor had been as much in 8fi command of things as the prosecution would have us believe.

Judge Powers again interpreted things more favorably for

the defendants. Citing Ribbentrop's testimony at the IMT,

84 Ministries case judgment in TWC, 14:495. In regard to the directive to Luther to consult Weizs&cker on Jewish deportations, see: Luther note to WeizsScker, 24 September 1942; prosecution exhibit 1457; M897/35/0727. For an English translation of this note, see TWC, 13:255.

^Ministries case judgment in TWC, 14:472.

®^For other remarks made by the judgment on this issue, see ibid., pp. 477, 577.

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Powers said that the Abteilung Deutschland had been

directly answerable to the foreign minister. The judge

added: "Neither von WeizsHcker nor Woermann had anything to

do with it." Powers also accepted the contention that

their objections to the deportations had been limited to

pointing out instances where complications with another 87 sovereign power might ensue.

While disagreeing on the extent of the limitations,

the three judges did implicitly agree that Luther and the

Nazi regime had limited the ability of WeizsHcker and

Woermann to direct the Foreign Office's response to Jewish

matters. This assessment is shared by the two historians, 88 Hill and Browning, who have most closely examined

WeizsHcker's and Woermann's careers in the years 1940-43.

Browning, however, points out that the relation between

Luther and WeizsHcker was a somewhat fluid one, and that

the state secretary did not try to impede Luther's growing

influence as energetically as he might have. Nor did

WeizsHcker act with any vigor to reassert himself when the

falling out between Ribbentrop and Luther afforded him some

opportunity to do so.^9 The view that WeizsHcker's reactions

87 Dissenting opinion of Judge Powers in ibid., pp. 911-13. The quotation is from p. 911. WeizsHcker had submitted an excerpt of Ribbentrop's testimony at the IMT as a defense exhibit. See WeizsHcker exhibit 288; M897/119/0333. ^Hill, WeizsHcker Papiere, n. 6 on pp. 632-33, nn. 28-29 on p. 637, n. 35 on p. 638. ^Browning, "Referat D III and Jewish Policy 1940-43," pp. 158, 209-10, 352-53.

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to the situation were feeble is given tentative support

by his own son. Carl Friedrich von WeizsHcker in defending

his father's innocence commented: "He was perhaps too weak 90 in those times.1 WeizsHcker's failure to resist Luther

courageously or energetically was in itself not a crime,

but it substantiates the opinion of the tribunal majority

that the power of Luther and others had not totally relieved

WeizsHcker and Woermann of responsibility.

Could the defendants' initialing of documents which

asked for an opinion on an intended deportation be interpreted

as the exercise of their remaining responsibility? The

prosecution naturally said yes. The defense argued that the

initialing of this type of document did not indicate approval

of the policies discussed therein. The defendants said

that, in fact, they had strongly disapproved of the deporta­

tions and similar actions. Their initials merely indicated

that within the small area of competency left to them they

were unable to raise any objections to the proposed measures.

According to the defense affiant Werner von Bargen, WeizsHcker

had believed that a gesture of opposition to Hitler's

proposals, such as the refusal to sign a document, would

only have provoked the Nazi leader into taking harsher

steps. WeizsH'cker used the additional argument that he had

to sign repugnant documents in order to keep use of his

official position available to the German resistance and to

90 Interview with Carl Friedrich von WeizsA'cker, Sticking bei Starnberg, 11 July 1979.

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any peace efforts, and so that he could offer resistance 91 himself whenever possible. The defense also presented

Johann Georg Lohmann as an expert witness on the initialing

and signing of Foreign Office documents. Lohmann's creden­

tials consisted of twenty-one years (1924-45) in the foreign

service, including eleven years in which his primary duty

was dealing with technical bureaucratic matters. He

testified in direct examination that the initialing of a

document might merely signify cognizance. Furthermore,

if an initial did lean approval, such an endorsement was 92 limited to the area of one's expertise. In cross-examina­

tion, Kempner pressed Lohmann to acknowledge reluctantly

that an initial on an outgoing document indicated approval,

regardless of what inner reservations the initialer might 93 have had vis-a-vis the document. This acknowledgment

conflicted with the defendants' assertion that their

91 Woermann testimony, 8 July 1948; Transcripts, p. 11315; M897, roll 11. WeizsHcker testimony, 14 June 1948; Transcripts, p. 8546; M897, roll 8. WeizsHcker testimony of 14 June 1948 in TWC, 13:432-35, 445, 448-50. See the following examples of supportive statements from defense witnesses: Bargen (the Foreign Office representative in occupied Belgium from 1940 to 1943) affidavit of 22 April 1948; WeizsHcker exhibit 298; M897/119/0365-66. Kessel testimony, 21 June 1948; Transcripts, pp. 9510-11; M897, roll 9. Fabian von Schlabrendorff (was an active member of the German resistance; appeared at the trial as a WeizsHcker witness) testimony of 30 June 1948 in TWC, 13:396. go Lohmann testimony, 22 and 23 June 1948; Transcripts, pp. 9632-34, 9685-87, 9698; M897, roll 9.

^ L o h m a n n testimony, 23 June 1948; ibid., pp. 9701-3.

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signature did not connote approval. Lohmann's response

also contradicted his own statement that initials could

be interpreted merely as cognizance. It did not contradict

his other statement that approval was limited to the area

of the initialer's jurisdiction.

The initialed document which led to the conviction

of WeizsHcker and Woermann for crimes against the Jews is

prosecution exhibit 1698. Rademacher informed the RSHA

in this document, which is dated 20 March 1942, that the

Foreign Office raised no objections against deporting six

thousand French and stateless (people from German controlled

territory whose citizenship had been revoked) Jews from

France to the Auschwitz concentration camp. Luther, 94 Weizsd'cker, and Woermann initialed this communication.

From the beginning of the trial, the prosecutors saw this 95 event as an important element of their case. They later

introduced ten exhibits, dating back to August 1940, which

trace the development of German persecution of Jews in

France prior to this deportation of March 1942. These 96 exhibits provided the judges with background information

for the three exhibits which followed.

94 Rademacher to Eichmann, 20 March 1942; prosecution exhibit 1698; M897/37/0921. 9 5 See Telford Taylor's opening statement in behalf of the prosecution, 6 January 1948, in T W C , 12:229. 96 Documents (from 3 August 1940 to 7 November 1941) relating to German measures against the Jews in France; prosecution exhibits 1686-95; M897/37/0846-99. An English translation of prosecution exhibit 1688 can be found in TWC,

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Prosecution exhibit 1696 reveals the initiation of

events which led to the Foreign Office's memorandum of

March 20th on the proposed deportation. On 12 December 1941,

General Otto von Stlilpnagel, the German military commander

in France, noted the recent attacks on German military

personnel and agreed to the inauguration of reprisal

measures. These measures would include the deportation to

the East of one thousand Jews and the shooting of one hundred

hostages. An attached report from the German embassy in

Paris implied that the hostages would be largely comprised

of Jews. This information, plus Hitler’s approval, was

relayed to Ribbentrop the following day.^

Prosecution exhibit 1697 discloses the further

sequence of events. On 9 March 1942 Eichmann wrote the

Foreign Office: "It is intended to deport to the concentra­

tion camp Auschwitz (Upper Silesia) one thousand Jews, who

were seized on the occasion of the 12 December 1941 repri­

sals conducted in Paris for the attacks on members of the

German armed forces." Eichmann added that the deportees

would consist of French Jews and stateless Jews, and that the

deportation would take place on March 23rd. He asked "for

a notification, that there are no misgivings . , , against

13:156-64. Portions of prosecution exhibit 1695 are a duplication of prosecution exhibit 3599 (see p, 187, n. 75 above).

^Documents '(dated 7, 12, and 13 December 1941) relating to reprisal measures for attacks against German military personnel in France; prosecution exhibit 1696; M897/37/0903-8.

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the carrying out of the procedure.*' The following day

Luther, in a document initialed by WeizsScker and Woermann,

passed on Eichmann*s note to the German embassy in Paris.

The embassy replied on the thirteenth that they had "no

misgivings." Meanwhile, on the eleventh, Eichmann sent

another note to the Foreign Office that the RSHA intended

to deport an additional five thousand Jews around the

twenty-third of March, and asked for the Foreign Office's

agreement (Zustimmung). Luther on the thirteenth, in a memo

again initialed by Weizs&cker and Woermann, passed on this

Eichmann message to the embassy in Paris. The reply again 9 8 came back that there were "no misgivings."

The next document in this series of communications

is the fateful Rademacher letter, or memorandum, of March

20th. Originally, the memo said, that "on the part of the

Foreign Office, there are no misgivings against the planned

deportation." Weizs&cker crossed out the words "there are

no misgivings" and substituted "no objection is raised."

There is no mention in this memo (or in the preceding ones)

that the deportees would be used as laborers. In fact,

nothing is said as to what these people would do, or what

would happen to them, once they arrived at Auschwitz. Nor

is there any mention, or are questions asked, about the sex

QQ Documents (dated 9-11, 13-14 March 1942) relating to the deportation of Jews from France; prosecution exhibit 1697; M897/37/0912-17.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 197 99 or age of the six thousand deportees.

According to Bruns, whose testimony seems more reliable

than most (see p. 180 above), WeizsHcker, in a visit to

Ribbentrop's field headquarters, had advised the foreign

minister against carrying out deportations. The state

secretary had warned Ribbentrop that the intended deportations

would have dangerous repercussions on Germany's image abroad."^®

In his testimony on the March 20th memorandum, WeizsHcker

repeated the general argument that the regime had limited

his ability to protest, and that was why he had changed

"there are no misgivings" to "no objection is raised." If

he had protested, it would have been a futile gesture.

Weizs&'cker also raised the argument that he had believed the

Jews might be in greater peril in France than at Auschwitz,

since hostages had been shot in France in reprisal for

attacks upon German military personnel. In not raising

an objection against the deportations, he believed that he

99 In addition to the initialed and dated copy of Rademacher's March 20th memorandum (prosecution exhibit 1698; M897/37/0921), there is an undated copy without initials and with different notations in prosecution exhibit 1698 (M897/37/0922) and an undated copy with initials in prosecution exhibit 1697 (M897/37/0918). A copy of Rademacher's March 20th memo has been published as document no. 56 in ADAP, E, vol. 2: 1. M#rz bis 15. Juni 1942 (Gb'ttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht" 1972), p. 9T! This reproduction does not contain Weizs&'cker' s, Woermann's, or Luther's initials. Also see Hill's comments on the Rademacher memorandum in WeizsA'cker Papiere, p. 641, n. 48.

^^Bruns affidavit of 11 August 1948; WeizsHcker exhibit 433; M897/119/0878-79.

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was supporting the lesser of two evils.It is very

plausible that Weizshcker feared for the safety of the

Jews if they remained in France, for he had learned of a

similar attack on Jews in Serbia the previous autumn. At

that time Luther and Rademacher had discussed with the SS

and the army the fate of approximately four thousand male

Jews interned in Serbia. The question was whether these

people should be shot or be deported to Rumania. The first 102 alternative was carried out.

There are two flaws in this "hostage argument." If

WeizsHcker had the legal obligation to object to an illegal

deportation, he should not be relieved of it because the

deportation prevented the possibility of a more serious

illegal act, the shooting of hostages. The commission of a

crime in order to avoid a worse crime should merely mitigate

the guilt of the perpetrator. Secondly, if WeizsHcker had

carefully and honestly analyzed the various pieces of information

WeizsHcker testimony, 14 June 1948; Transcripts, pp. 8578-81; M897, roll 8. The testimony on transcript pages 8578-79 may also be found in TWC, 13:444. As evidence of the shootings of hostages in France, see Kramarz (an official in the Foreign Office's Political Department) notes to WeizsHcker, dated 27 October and 18 December 1941; prosecution exhibit C—286; M897/56/0772, 0808. 109 Documents (from 8 September 1941 to 12 December 1941) relating to the shooting of Serbian Jewish hostages; prosecu­ tion exhibit 1714; M897/38/0010-25, 0030-34. WeizsHcker discussed the killings in Serbia in his testimony of 14 June 1948; Transcripts, pp. 8583-84; M897, roll 8. The Serbian incident is discussed in detail by Browning, "Referat D III and Jewish Policy 1940-43," pp. 175-95.

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to which he had been exposed, he would have had to conclude

that the relative safety of deportation to a camp in the

East might be of short duration.

Woermann's testimony on this matter added little to

Weizshcker's comments. To the pat argument that his initials

had indicated that he could offer no objection on political

grounds, Woermann added: "I had much less possibility for

such opposition in view of the fact that an inquiry already

had been sent to the German embassy in Paris, and the

embassy on its own part had not found any reasons in the 103 field of foreign policy either." This was a rather

meaningless explanation, when one reflects that normally the

head of the Political Department would have been expected to

supply directives to an embassy and not vice versa. When

Kempner suggested to Woermann in cross-examination that the

German commission of a crime against humanity in France would

have political repercussions for Germany, Woermann agreed

but referred to his statement of the day before. At that

time, the former head of the Political Department had said:

"From the foreign political point of view this entire policy

was sheer madness. But one could not voice this objection,

principally to Ribbentrop.

1 o o Woermann testimony, 8 July 1948; Transcripts, p. 11338; M897, roll 11.

^■^^Woermann testimony of 8 and 9 July 1948; ibid., pp. 11320, 11498.

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The judgment said that Weizs&cker and Woermann each

had the obligation to protest this deportation on both

legal and political grounds. I would question this supposed

duty of Woermann, as head of the Political Department, to

offer legal advice. Even in the Weimar Foreign Office, the

responsibility of offering legal advice primarily belonged--

as far as the department heads were concerned--to the head

of the Legal Department, not to the head of the Political

Department. In any case, the dispensing of political advice

was a basic function of the Political Department. The

judgment, reflecting Kempner's earlier suggestion, mentioned

a bona fide political objection which had existed: "Even

from the viewpoint of German foreign policy its [the depor­

tation's] execution would be a catastrophic mistake in that

it would not only alienate public sentiment in France, but

would arouse a wave of horror and resentment throughout the

world." One could add that undoubtedly the announcement by

the Allies in January 1943 of a policy of unconditional 106 surrender, which WeizsHcker bitterly resented, was

influenced by the Allied awareness of Nazi crimes. WeizsHcker

and Woermann could not have advised the Fuehrer to desist

from deportations and killings so that Germany could more

^ ^ F o r the comments of the Ministries case judgment on the deportation of the six thousand French and stateless Jews, see T W C , 14:496-98. i nfi WeizsHcker testimony, 9 June 1948; Transcripts, pp. 7916-17; M897, roll 8.

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easily sue for peace; however, they might have tried the

argument that the proper treatment of the conquered

peoples— the Jews included— should hasten the willingness

of Germany’s enemies to seek peace.

It is a questionable assumption that WeizsHcker and

Woermann could have stopped this deportation. The judgment

describes WeizsHcker*s argument that the Foreign Office had

lacked the ability to prevent this action as "hardly tenable,

in view of the fact that Eichmann . . . made specific

inquiries as to whether the Foreign Office had objections."

While Eichmann's use of the word "Zustimmung" may be trans­

lated as "consent," it may also be translated as "agreement"

or "concurrence." The latter words lack the connotation of

"seeking permission." It seems unlikely that the RSHA would

have given its plan to deport these Jews if WeizsHcker or

Woermann had raised an objection in the memorandum of

March 20th, although such a protest might have caused delays.

On the other hand, there were later instances, such as in

Bulgaria and Denmark, where resistance on the part of offi­

cials --German as well as Bulgarian and Danish officials--

resulted in the abandonment or failure of planned deporta­

tions.^ Ultimately, it is impossible to know if opposition

to the deportation of the six thousand Jews on the part of

WeizsHcker and Woermann would have had any effect, because the

two officials never offered resistance to this measure. In their

-^7gee Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem, pp. 171-75, 185-88.

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appellate decision, Christianson and Maguire made the

additional point that the defendants had the obligation to

give the proper advice whether or not they thought that 108 such advice would be accepted.

I agree with the judgment that WeizsHcker and Woermann

retained competency in regard to the deportation of the

six thousand French and stateless Jews. The defendants'

denial of competency rests on their acquiescence in the

improper restrictions upon their authority by Hitler and

Ribbentrop. If an office entails a responsibility and an

official carries out that responsibility in a certain manner

in order to please his superior, the official is still per­

forming that responsibility. The official loses his authority

only when it is taken away from his office (as happened in

the case of Luther's usurpations of some of the defendants'

functions), or when his office is taken away from him. Hill's

statement that WeizsHcker lacked the authority to express

disapproval of the deportation of the six thousand French 109 and stateless Jews is imprecise. WeizsHcker acquiesced

in the Nazi definition of his authority.

The Issue of Coercion

WeizsHcker never spoke of fear as a justification for

his behavior, but some of his affiants raised this point.

108 Court Memorandum of 12 December 1949, pertaining to WeizsHcker's appeal, in TWC, 14:958-59. 109 Hill, WeizsHcker Papiere, pp. 46-47, n. 48 on pp. 641-42.

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Wilhelm Melchers, a former specialist in the Political

Department, wrote that the refusal to sign a document would

have been viewed as an act of resistance to the regime and

would have endangered others in the Foreign Office as well

as the person involved. Such boldness would have been futile,

too, in that it would not have stopped the Nazi crimes.

Melchers himself had at one time used his ingenuity to save

Turkish Jews who were endangered in France. Ernst

Eisenlohr attested that a voluntary resignation of a high-

level official during wartime "would be considered a

demonstration against the 'regime1 and sooner or later one

would unquestionably be punished with death or perhaps in

addition with the infliction of revenge upon one's rela­

tives. "112 Eisenlohr himself had voluntarily resigned from

the German Foreign Office in mid-1942. He, however, had not

been as high an official as WeizsHcker or Woermann, the zenith of his career having been his assignments as German 113 minister to Athens and Prague from 1931 to 1938. Despite

WeizsHcker's personal silence on the subject of fear, his conduct, according to his son, had been affected by anxiety

1-^Melchers affidavit of 22 January 1948; WeizsHcker exhibit 295; M897/119/0357.

^•■^Browning, "Referat D III and Jewish Policy 1940-43," pp. 413-14.

^Eisenlohr affidavit of 15 April 1948; WeizsHcker exhibit 338; M897/119/0516. 113 Eisenlohr testimony before Commission I, 17 August 1948; Transcripts, p. 16497; M897, roll 15. Eisenlohr affi­ davit of 22 April 1948; WeizsHcker exhibit 300; M897/119/0372.

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for the safety of his family.

In his testimony before the Ministries Tribunal,

Woermann did not speak of his fears as an official under the

Nazis. In his pre-trial interrogations, however, he was

very open about this matter. He informed Kempner that as

early as 1939 Ribbentrop had threatened that if his conduct

was displeasing he would "disappear." He also told Kempner

that the milieu of terror created by the Nazis had inhibited

opposition from Foreign Office personnel. Woermann had

earlier told the interrogator Peter Beauvais that an official

had risked being "shot on the next day" if he refused to

endorse an anti-Jewish action without having a reason acceptable 115 to the Nazis. There was also other evidence of Woermann's

apprehensions. The affiant Peter Reinhold related how

Woermann had confided to him around the autumn of 1942 that lift he feared being arrested by the Gestapo.

Defense lawyers were aware that the issue of fear

could help their clients. Steengracht's attorney, Carl Haensel,

made a cogent argument regarding the legal ramifications of

coercion:

^^Interview with Carl Friedrich von Weizs&cker, Sticking bei Starnberg, 11 July 1979.

^^Woermann interrogation 3295, 11 August 1947; interrogator - Kempner; M1019/80/0718, 0722. Woermann interrogation 1526a, 9 July 1947; interrogator - Beauvais; M1019/80/0701. 1X6 Reinhold (a Weimar politician and lifelong friend of Woermann) affidavit of 22 April 1948; Woermann exhibit 30; M897/120/0184.

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An obligation to act can exist only where it is recognized as being such. . . . A paralytic or one impeded by violence cannot "omit" to do an action .... There is no moral difference, nor, on closer investigation, a legal one, between a paralytic . . . and another whose will has been rendered impotent by a binding order under pain of death.117 On both legal and factual grounds, the prosecution

challenged the assertion of compulsion. Drexel Sprecher gave

the prosecution's legal interpretation of the issue of coercion,

referring to American, English, and German law:

Certain fundamental concepts . . . must be established by . . . a defense of necessity. Some of these concepts . . . are . . . : the presence of "irresistible force"; a "present danger for life and limb"; a "fear of instant death"; the absence of any opportunity for escape; the imminent injury to the accused must be shown not to be disproportionate to the evil which he furthers under duress. There is no compulsion . . . where the alleged coercion was spread out through months and even years. There is no compulsion where the alleged overriding compulsion was a force to which the accused attached his energy for any substantial period of time, even though his attachment was abhorrent to him.118

In its final brief the prosecution cited the affidavit of

Werner-Otto von Hentig, submitted in behalf of WeizsHcker, as

evidence that an official could have protested Nazi atrocities

with minimal risk. Hentig, a former Foreign Office liaison

to the German Eleventh Army in Russia, had intended to make

the point that he had been threatened by Ribbentrop not to

repeat his protests about the Einsatzgruppen activities.

Hentig unwittingly aided the prosecution by adding that,

■^^Haensei’s closing statement in behalf of Steengracht, 11 November 1948; Transcripts, p. 27292; M897, roll 23. 118 Prosecution's closing statement of 9 November 1948 in TWC, 14:88.

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nevertheless, he had continued to agitate against the

Einsatzgruppen and had been relieved of his position in 119 the Foreign Office. The prosecution also offered as

evidence the memorandum of 10 February 1944 by A. E. Frauenfeld,

in which this party official criticized the Nazi atrocities

in Eastern Europe. The regime did not inflict any severe 120 penalty upon Frauenfeld. Kempner also pointedly asked

the defense witness Wilhelm Mackeben if he knew of any

example where the resignation of a Foreign Office official

had led to that official's incarceration in a concentration 121 camp. Mackeben replied no.

The judgment refused to accept the argument of coercion.

It did not acknowledge the possibility of any greater punish- 122 ment for insubordinate officials than the loss of their jobs.

119 Prosecution final brief (15 November 1948) against Weizs&cker, Steengracht, and Woermann concerning the murder of the Jews; M897/139/1179. Hentig affidavit of 7 August 1948; Weizshcker exhibit 470; M897/119/1028. 120 Fraunfeld memorandum of 10 February 1944; prosecution exhibit C-272; M897/56/0597-0634. A particularly significant statement in this memorandum is on frame 0601. An English translation of excerpts (including the statement just referred to) of Frauenfeld's memo are in TWC, 13:330-35. For the prosecution's comments, see prosecution final brief (15 November 1948) against WeizsScker, Steengracht, and Woermann concerning the murder of the Jews; M897/139/1232-33. For an explanation of the circumstances surrounding Frauenfeld's memorandum, read Gottlob Berger's affidavit of 26 October 1948; Weizs&'cker exhibit 485; M897/119/1095-96. 121 Mackeben testimony, 12 July 1948; Transcripts, p. 11732; M897, roll 11. 122 Ministries case judgment in TWC, 14:339.

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The issue of duress cannot be so easily resolved. On

the one hand, Sprecher's analysis seems correct. He

agreed with Haensel that a person could be legally absolved

of responsibility for acts committed under severe duress,

but he also implied that the necessary threat did not exist

in the defendants' case. There had been no absolute

certainty that an uncooperative official would be shot the

next day, or even arrested. Another valid point made by

Sprecher is that one could only claim coercion for a limited

period of time. At a given moment a person might have felt

compelled to act in a certain way, but when that moment

was past that person should have tried to extricate himself

from the dilemma of wrongdoing versus personal safety. On

the other hand, a nonconforming official in the Third Reich

incurred definite, if not always immediate, risks. An

example would be Prince Phillipp von Hesse, the provincial

governor of Hesse-Nassau from 1933 to 1943, whose detention

in a concentration camp and loss of his wife was preceded by

his efforts, going back several years, to intercede in 123 behalf of arrested Jews from his province. The regime

could also be capricious. Prior to the judgment, the

Tribunal had recognized this when it explained its temporary

rejection of prosecution exhibit C-272 (Frauenfeld's

memorandum of 10 February 1944): "The Tribunal was of the

opinion that, in fact, when one official made criticism

123 Hesse testimony, 4 March 1948; Transcripts, pp. 2688, 2690, 2699; M897, roll 4.

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of atrocities without adverse consequences to himself it

was not proof that the defendants in question could do

so."-*-^ It seems probable that an expression of displeasure

with the regime by WeizsHcker or Woermann would have been

more odious to Hitler and Ribbentrop than a similar expres­

sion by a lesser official, such as Hentig or Eisenlohr. I

would conclude that the Tribunal was correct in rejecting

coercion as grounds for acquittal, but it should have

explicitly acknowledged coercion as an extenuating factor.

Aid to the Victims as a Reason for Mitigation

A mitigating factor would be the defendants' use of

their position to help potential or actual victims of Nazi

crimes. A major point of WeizsHcker's defense was that he 125 had rendered such assistance. Numerous exhibits were

offered as evidence that he had tried to help individual 12 fi Jews when the possibility presented itself. ° A person

Court Order of 29 November 1948; Official Court File, document 1162, p. 4943; M897, roll 166. The Court Order also made clear that prosecution exhibit C-272 was being readmitted into evidence because it related to economic affairs in the German-occupied Eastern territories as well as to atrocities there. The Court Order of 29 November 1948 erroneously designated prosecution exhibit C-272 as prosecution exhibit C-212. The error was corrected by the Court Order of 22 December 1948; Official Court File, document 1189, p. 5029; ibid. 12 5 JSee Becker's closing statement in behalf of Weiz­ sHcker, 11 November 1948, in TWC, 14:115-16, 120-21. 126-rhe following documents are relevant to WeizsHcker1 s efforts to help those who were racially persecuted: WeizsHcker exhibits 139, 172; M897/118/1185-86, 1315. WeizsHcker exhibits 219, 297, 301-12, 314-26, 370; M897/119/0072-73, 0362-63, 0376-0405, 0410-57, 0629-30.

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could hypothesize that in 1945 the total number of survivors

from Nazi persecution was greater than it would have been

if WeizsHcker had objected to those 1942 deportations of

French and stateless Jews; however, the proving of this

unprovable hypothesis would be irrelevant. The fact that

WeizsHcker did save some people, and tried to save others,

calls for mitigation, but it does not absolve him of culpable

conduct. This point was poignantly brought out in the

following exchange between Kempner and the defense witness

Fabian von Schlabrendorff on the related issue of resistance

activities. Kempner said: "As an expert on the resistance

movement, I shall now ask you . . . , how many Jews is it

permissible to murder if one's final goal is to do away with

Hitler?" Schlabrendorff replied: "I would say nobody."127

The judgment cited Schlabrendorff's statement in its

conviction of WeizsHcker. The judgment also recognized that

WeizsHcker1s links with the German resistance and his intended

efforts toward peace were genuine motives for his staying in

office, and said that "this . . . should be considered in

TOO mitigation." ° There was no mention of WeizsHcker's policy

of assisting, where possible, the victims or would-be victims

of Nazi persecution. This omission may be attributed to the

disorganized style of the judgment. One might interpret

what the judges were saying as follows: We recognize

■^^Schlabrendorff testimony of 30 June 1948 in TWC, 13:402. ■'"^Ministries case judgment in TWC, 14:497-98.

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that WeizsHcker had some good intentions and did use his

office for some good purposes. We will merely mention the

examples of his ties to the resistance and his concern for

peace, but the totality of his good works has led us to

moderate his sentence.

To interpret the judgment in this manner was unsatis­

factory as far as WeizsHcker*s attorneys were concerned. In

a matter which favored their client, they wanted explicit

statements from the judges. WeizsHcker's defense staff

complained in their appeal that "the Court has completely

ignored it [WeizsHcker*s aid to the persecuted] and not even

mentioned it as mitigating circumstance. "^-29 whatever the

judgment did or did not say, WeizsHcker's sentence of five

years-^0 for his involvement in the deaths of approximately

six thousand people was a light punishment. In fact, the

prosecutor Kempner and the defense lawyer Becker agreed, in

retrospect, that the penalty was mild given the conviction.

Kempner said: "The Court was very lenient with him. . . .

You cannot be more lenient, if somebody gave the green light

129weizsHcker motion of 10 May 1949 to amend the judgment; Official Court File, Defense Memoranda re Alleged Errors in Judgment; M897/168/0134-41. The quotation is from frame 0140.

•*--^WeizsHcker had originally been sentenced to seven years, but his conviction in regard to Germany's invasion of Czechoslovakia in March 1939 was overturned by the appellate judgment. The appellate judgment reduced WeizsHcker's sentence to five years for his sole remaining conviction— his conviction regarding the deportations. See Court Order of 12 December 1949, pertaining to WeizsHcker's appeal, in TWC, 14:950.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 211 131 to murder people." Becker commented:

If WeizsHcker really was guilty of killing the thousands of . . . Jews, I think five years was not the necessary punishment. There should have been much more. The whole doubt the judges had against their own judgment they put in the measurement of punishment. 132

WeizsHcker himself, as indicated by his thoughts during the .

trial, obtained little or no satisfaction from the Court's 133 pronouncement of mitigation in his case.

Woermann's attorneys did not argue that he tried to

rescue people from the Nazis, although his lawyers may have

intended to make that point when they offered as evidence

a memorandum of his, dated 4 April 1941. In this memo,

Woermann described his conversation with a Soviet diplomat

regarding the repatriation to the Soviet Union of Jewish

Soviet citizens in the Warsaw ghetto. The memo indicates,

however, that Ribbentrop had directed Woermann to undertake

the conversation. Furthermore, Woermann's memo reveals no

enthusiasm on his part for advancing this idea of repatria- 1 Q/ tion. As a defense exhibit the document is not impressive

if its purpose was to establish mitigating circumstances.

Woermann's attitude toward helping Nazi victims is

1 Ol Interview with Robert M. W. Kempner, Frankfurt am Main, 13 July 1979.

^^Interview with Hellmut Becker, Berlin, 16 July 1979. 133 See WeizsHcker note to Becker, 29 July 1948, in WeizsHcker Papiere, ed. Hill, pp. 438-39.

^ W o e r m a n n memorandum of 4 April 1941; Woermann exhibit 80; M897/120/0352-53.

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illustrated by another espisode, not brought up at the

trial but discussed in Browning's study of the Abteilung

Deutschland. In February 1943, the Swedish ambassador in

Berlin asked Luther for the transfer to Sweden of two

brothers, imprisoned at Theresienstadt in Czechoslovakia,

whose mother had married a Swedish citizen. Luther

uncharacteristically agreed to the release of the children,

whose name was Bondy, but an RSHA official in Czechoslovakia

(who also served as a Foreign Office representative there)

objected. This official sent Woermann a telegram on the

Bondy affair. Woermann sided with the RSHA. against the

Abteilung Deutschland by advising delay. The outcome was that

the Bondy brothers were not released until the end of the 135 war. What is of interest here is that Woermann had a

chance to promote a humanitarian deed and chose not to.

On the basis of Woermann's character as revealed by the

Ministries trial record, I would conclude that Woermann did

not act in the Bondy matter out of maliciousness, but out

of fear. Luther's fall from power had taken place between

the beginning of this incident and Woermann's involvement

with it, and the RSHA was always to be dreaded. This

analysis of Woermann is supported by the recollections of

Hellmut Becker, who described Woermann as "never in favor

of the National Socialists" but as "more a survivor . . .

^'^Browning, "Referat D III and Jewish Policy 1940-43," pp. 417-21.

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1 3 6 than a man who risks something."

Since the Tribunal found mitigating circumstances in

WeizsHcker's case which did not exist in Woermann's case, why

did it sentence each to five years for his part in the depor­

tation?^? No reason was given. The only logical explana­

tion would be that the Tribunal assigned a greater portion

of guilt to WeizsHcker because of his higher office. One

could say that Woermann, despite his lesser position, was

also the beneficiary of a mitigated sentence, justified on

the basis of duress. Kempner recalled how Woermann's wife

and assistant defense counsel, Marta Unger Woermann, had con­

fided to him with relief that her husband's sentence was

lenient.13$

"Like Instances"

Another factor to be considered in evaluating the

punishments is how many times the defendants may have been

implicated in deportations. There is only one pronouncement

of guilt against WeizsHcker and Woermann in regard to those

activities--the pronouncement involving the six thousand

French and stateless Jews deported in March 1942. There were

several similar undertakings in 1942-43. Did Christianson

1 ^ Interview with Hellmut Becker, Berlin, 16 July 1979.

1 3 7 m regard to Woermann's sentence, see Court Order of 12 December 1949, pertaining to Woermann's appeal, in TWC, 14:965. 133xnterview with Robert M. W. Kempner, Frankfurt am Main, 13 July 1979. The same anecdote is related in Kempner, Dritte Reich im KreuzverhUr, pp. 249-50. However, there Frau Woermann is merely identified as "a personal friend."

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and Maguire believe that WeizsHcker and Woermann had acted

illegally only in regard to the March 1942 incident? The judges' wording in their verdict concerning the March 1942

deportation obscures, rather than clarifies, their thinking

on the issue of repeated illegalities: "As to these and

like instances, we find the defendants . . . guilty."^9

In the absence of other explicit convictions, what was meant

by "like instances"?

An example of a would-be "like instance" is the planned

deportation of approximately ninety thousand Jews from France

and the Lowlands in the summer of 1942. On June 22nd of that

year, the RSHA asked the Foreign Office if it had any objec­

tions to the intended deportation, and once again Luther

(on June 28th) circulated this request to the Foreign Office

officials in the countries which were involved. The replies

came back that it would be more prudent to deport stateless

Jews residing in France and the Lowlands before deporting

the citizens of those countries. This position was referred

back to the RSHA on July 29th in a document drafted by

Luther and initialed by WeizsHcker and Woermann.

The judgment at first glance seems to hav^. acquitted

■^•^Ministries case judgment in TWC, 14:498.

•^^Documents (from 22 June 1942 to 29 July 1942) relating to the deportation of Jews from France, Belgium, and the Netherlands; prosecution exhibit 1680; M897/37/0771-77. For an English translation of excerpts of this exhibit, see TWC, 13:233-36. Documents from this deportation proceeding are also published (as document nos. 26, 58, 74, 141) in ADAP, E, 3:43-44, 96, 125, 240-41, ADAP document no. 74, the July 9th reply of Werner von Bargen (the Foreign

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Weizs£cker and Woermann of criminal liability in this

affair, despite its apparent qualification as a "like

instance" to the deportation of March 1942. A second reading

of this section of the judgment suggests, however, that the

tribunal majority was not contradicting itself. Immediately

after discussing the Foreign Office's July 29th reply to the

RSHA, the judgment shifted its commentary to an RSHA suggestion

that Dutch Jews be divested of their citizenship so that as

deportees they would not benefit from Sweden's role as the

protective power for Dutch citizens incarcerated abroad.

The judgment described the circulation of this suggestion

through the various departments of the Foreign Office, and its

eventual rejection by WeizsMcker (in a document which was

also initialed by Woermann). Only then did the judgment

*1/1 pronounce its verdict of acquittal. One can thus interpret

this acquittal of Weizs&cker and Woermann as applicable only

to the attempt to deprive Dutch Jews of their citizenship,

Office representative in Brussels) to Luther's communication of June 28th, is not part of prosecution exhibit 1680. Luther's memorandum of "July 29th" actually bears no date, although some of its endorsers placed a date after their initials. The prosecution's certification (frame 0770) of this memo dates it as July 27th. In the judgment and in ADAP, this Luther memo has been given the date of July 29th (a date which appears next to WeizsMcker's initial). 141 Ministries case judgment in TWC, 14:500-503. Also see documents (from 17 July 1942 to 10 August 1942) relating to the deprivation of citizenship of Dutch Jews; prosecution exhibits 1681-83; M897/37/0781-92. In his testimony of 14 June 1948, WeizsScker described his role in thwarting the proposal to deprive Dutch Jews of their citizenship. See Transcripts, pp. 8565-66; M897, roll 8.

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and not applicable to the initialing of the document of

July 29th which was one of the "like instances."

Not surprisingly, the defense lawyers maintained that

WeizsA’cker and Woermann had been convicted of only one

deportation. Schilf wrote in his appeal on behalf of

Woermann:

That [the March 1942 deportation], however, is the only case where a verdict of guilty is pronounced. For this reason it is impossible to determine what supposedly "like" instances . . . the judgment had in mind.142

In their appellate judgment, the judges ignored Schilf's

complaint and offered no elucidation as to the meaning of

"like instances." Becker said in his reminiscences of the

trial:

They [the majority judges] finally decided that from all the points of indictment, they left only one. . . . they followed the main argument of the defense with one exception.143

When asked about the meaning of "like instances,"

Kempner said that Judge Maguire had told him after the trial

that the expression was meant to cover other acts of deporta­

tion. There is a logic to this position, in that the

circumstances which implicated and mitigated WeizsMcker's

and Woermann's behavior in regard to the March deportation

T / 0 4 Woermann motion of 10 May 1949 to amend the judgment; Official Court File, Defense Memoranda re Alleged Errors in Judgment; M897/168/0282.

^•^Interview with Hellmut Becker, Berlin, 16 July 1979.

^^Interview with Robert M. W. Kempner, Frankfurt am Main, 13 July 1979.

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also applied to their involvement with any other deportation.

Multiple deportations could be seen as one crime, despite

the fact that each incident increased the number of victims.

If this was the judges' point of view, it would have been

helpful if they had clearly said so.

The judgment can be criticized for a lack of clarity,

for possible inconsistencies, for using inconclusive evidence

(such as the evidence linking the defendants to the Wannsee

protocol). However, in the end, the two majority judges

arrived at a sound verdict. Although much of the evidence

was inconclusive, there was sufficient proof that the

defendants had realized that the deportations could lead to

the death of the deportees. The defendants also had known

that the deportations themselves were contrary to the Hague

Convention and therefore illegal.^** This knowledge alone

would be enough to held them accountable for deaths which

ensued from deportations in which they participated. A

person who knowingly commits an unlawful act which leads to

a more serious offense is also held responsible for the

latter crime. The defendants' situation might be compared to

that of a person who takes part in a bank robbery in which

another participant commits a murder. To WeizsMcker's and

Woermann's credit, the trial provided evidence that--contrary

to the prosecution's contentions--they had not been instigators

145 WeizsMcker virtually admitted this during his testimony of 14 June 1948. See TWC, 13:447.

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or willing accomplices. The trial also revealed that

WeizsHcker and Woermann had been responsible for providing

professional advice with regard to the deportations. They

also retained the power to disapprove of the deportations,

although not without personal risk.

The matter of personal risk evokes sympathy for the

defendants. Who can say that he would have acted with

greater courage if he had been in their position? The

judges, however, could not base their verdict on how one

might act in such a situation. They had to base their

verdict on how an official should have acted. The two

majority judges did fail to delineate the circumstances

which must temper any condemnation of Weizs&cker's and

Woermann's behavior. The sentences, however, reflected

those circumstances.

Although Erdmannsdorff was acquitted, his conduct

cannot be differentiated morally from the conduct of

WeizsHcker and Woermann. He knew as much as they did. He

was subjected to the same pressures that they were. His

acquittal was due to his lesser position and to his not

having been asked to initial the incriminating documents

which they initialed.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. CHAPTER VI

VEESENMAYER, STEENGRACHT, AND RITTER AND THE

DEPORTATION OF THE HUNGARIAN JEWS, 1944

The history of the Jewish deportations in the last

two years of the war (1943-45) reflected Germany's changing

relations with its allies. Italy's withdrawal from the

war in September 1943 opened that country and its wartime

possessions to German occupation; thus, the Jews in Italy

and in the formerly Italian administered areas of Croatia

and Greece became vulnerable to deportation by the Germans.

As the military situation turned against Germany, its allies

Rumania and Bulgaria adopted a more lenient policy toward

their Jewish subjects despite obvious German displeasure.

(Rumania had exercised extreme brutality toward its Jews

in the earlier years of the war, while Bulgaria had already

protected its pre-war Jewish population from deportation.)

In 1943-44 the Rumanian and Bulgarian governments even

discussed the possible emigration of their Jews to Palestine.

Denmark had never been a German ally, but Hitler had

initially treated this occupied country with leniency in

the hope that it would serve as a model of the benefits of

his New Order in Europe. Danish resentment nonetheless

had turned to open resistance by August 1943, and in the

219

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following month Germany initiated plans to deport the Danish

Jews. This scheme aborted when the Danes smuggled most of

their Jewish countrymen to Sweden. In a mid-March 1944

meeting with Hitler (at Klessheim Castle near Salzburg,

Austria), Nicholas Horthy, the regent of Hungary, agreed

under pressure that his country be occupied by his German

ally. The entry of German troops into Hungary on 19 March

1944 led in the following months to the deportation of

hundreds of thousands of Hungarian Jews.'*'

The Ministries trial's concern with crimes against

the Jews in the chronological period 1943-45 focused primarily

on the Hungarian deportations. Veesenmayer, Steengracht,

and Ritter were all charged with participation in this

atrocity. The first, as German minister and plenipotentiary

to Hungary, had been the most directly involved. The prosecu­

tion linked Steengracht to Hungary through his role as

state secretary. The presence of German forces on the

territory of one of its allies had necessitated cooperation

between the German Foreign Office and the German military.

Ritter had been brought into the Hungarian affair as the liaison

between Ribbentrop and Field Marshal Keitel.

The German occupation of Hungary was prompted to some

extent by the fear that Hungary would react to the deteriorating

^For a synopsis of deportations in the countries mentioned above, see Dawidowicz, War against the Jews (appendix A, "The Fate of the Jews in Hitler's Europe: By Country"), pp. 368-71, 372-74, 379-90, 392-94.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. military situation by contacting the Allied Powers and 9 negotiating its withdrawal from the war. The Germans then

took advantage of their military presence in Hungary to

persuade Horthy to appoint a government amenable to them,

and to pressure that government to deport Hungary's Jews.

In late March 1944 Horthy chose as his new prime minister

Dome Sztojay, who at the time was his nation's diplomatic

representative in Berlin and who was acceptable to the Germans.

On April 7th, the Hungarian minister of the interior ordered

the deportation of the Hungarian Jews. In July 1944, Horthy

suddenly suspended these deportations. At that time,

approximately 400,000 Jews, mainly from the provinces, had

been transported out of Hungary. In August Horthy, in another

display of independence, replaced the Sztojay government

with a more moderate cabinet headed by General Geza Lakatos.

Events took a turn in favor of the Germans on 15 October 1944,

when they engineered another political change in Hungary.

Ferenc Szalasi, the head of the Arrow Cross Party (the

Hungarian version of the Nazi Party), became the new prime

minister. Efforts were now resumed to deport the remaining

Jews, most of whom were in Budapest. This infamy finally

ceased in late November 1944, as Russian troops approached

SD report of 9 February 1944; Veesenmayer exhibit 88; M897/118/0068-69. 3 In regard to Sztojay's appointment, see Veesenmayer testimony of 21 July 1948 in TWC, 13:497-98.

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that city. According to Dawidowicz,^ approximately 450,000

Hungarian Jews of an estimated population of 650,000

perished, most of them at Auschwitz ,■*

Knowledge

The prosecution had to present new evidence to prove

that Veesenmayer, Steengracht, and Ritter had knowledge of

the fate of the Hungarian Jews. There was no indication that

these three had seen the Wannsee protocol or the Einsatz-

gruppen reports, documents important in attempting to show

that Weizs&cker, Woermann, and Erdmannsdorff had knowledge.

But it is reasonable to assume that by 1944 an official

would more likely be aware of the Jews' fate than in 1942.

Reszo Kastner, the wartime head of the (Jewish) Relief

Committee in Budapest, poignantly made this point when he

appeared as a prosecution witness at the Ministries trial:

In Budapest [prior to 19 March 1944] we had a unique opportunity to follow the fate of European Jewry. We had seen how they had been disappearing one after the other from the map of Europe. . . . We knew very well about the work of the Einsatzgruppen. fiWe knew more than it was necessary about Auschwitz.

In order for such a statement to be meaningful for the trial,

the prosecution had to prove that this knowledge had in fact

extended to the defendants in 1944. The prosecution also

^War against the Jews (appendix B, "The Final Solution in Figures")7 p. 403.

^A good secondary source for the travail of the Hun­ garian Jews is Mario D. Fenyo, Hitler, Horthy, and Hungary: German-Hungarian Relations, 1941-1944 (New Haven: Yale University Jfress, iyI'l) . See in particular, pp. 183-86, 191-92, 202-5, 238. ^Kastner testimony, 19 March 1948; Transcripts, p. 3620;

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needed to establish the additional, or alternative, proof

that the defendants had known what awaited the deportees

from Hungary.

Veesenmayer maintained that he had not known that the 7 deported Jews were being murdered. He had believed that

there were two reasons for these deportations. First, these

people provided a needed labor force for the German war O effort. Secondly, they were removed from Hungary for

security reasons. The Hungarian Jews were so anti-German that

there was a risk that they would rise up in revolt if the

Russians accomplished a breakthrough on the Hungarian front.^

According to Veesenmayer, the first time that anyone suggested

to him that deportees were being murdered was in June or

July 1944, when Horthy told him that foreign sources had

reported that Mbad things were occurring to the Jews.

Veesenmayer also testified that Sztojay had handed him--

possibly in July of 1944--an article from a Swiss newspaper,

which discussed the atrocities being committed against the

European Jews. Sztojay had said that this was undoubtedly

M897, roll 5.

^Veesenmayer testimony, 22 July 1948; Transcripts, p. 13251; M897, roll 13.

^Veesenmayer interrogation 1023a, 2 April 1947; interrogator - Pins; M1019/75/0154-55.

^Veesenmayer testimony of 22 July 1948 in TWC, 13:502-3. ■^Veesenmayer interrogation 1023a, 2 April 1947; interrogator - Pins; M1019/75/0155.

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enemy propaganda, but nonetheless it would be beneficial

for Hungarian investigators to check on the living conditions

of Hungarian Jews in the German labor camps. The ensuing

report could then be used as counter-propaganda. Veesenmayer

had agreed to this, but nothing came of it because Sztojay 11 subsequently became ill.

Veesenmayer supported his claim of ignorance with

several defense exhibits. He offered an excerpt from

Eugen Kogon's book Per SS-Staat, which said that the activities

in the concentration camps were so secret that many of the

Gestapo officials lacked knowledge of what happened to the 12 people they sent there. Whatever the merits of that

evidence, it was of no help to Veesenmayer, since the Tribunal

ruled that postwar books and publications would not be 13 accepted as evidence unless accompanied by an affidavit.

Veesenmayer also had two affiants, Adolf Hezinger and

Horst Grell, attest to his ignorance (as well as their own)

of the extermination camps. Both of these witnesses, however,

lacked credibility. Hezinger had been a member of the Foreign

^Veesenmayer testimony, 22 July 1948; Transcripts, p. 13284; M897, roll 13. 12 Excerpt from Eugen Kogon's Der SS-Staat; Veesenmayer exhibit 177; M897/118/0487. 13 See Court Order of 27 July 1948, regarding (among other things) the admissibility of books as evidence, in TWC, 15:680-81. For the Tribunal's specific rejection of Veesenmayer exhibit 177, see the following document: Court order of 29 July 1948 on objections to Veesenmayer exhibits; Official Court File, document 874, p. 3347; M897, roll 164.

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Office’s infamous Inland II, which took over the Abteilung

Deutschland's nasty work on Jewish affairs when the latter

was dissolved. Hezinger was temporarily assigned to Veesen-

mayer's legation in Budapest to oversee the exemption of

foreign Jews (particularly from neutral states) from the

Hungarian deportations, in order to avoid diplomatic compli­

cations and embarrassment for his government. Grell

succeeded Hezinger in this assignment.^

Veesenmayer1s professions of ignorance did not stand

up to scrutiny. The evidence disproved his statement that

no one had informed him of rumors of serious crimes until

June or July 1944. The prosecutors presented a report from

Veesenmayer to the Foreign Office dated 8 May 1944, in which

Veesenmayer said that he had been told that Count Bela Bethlen,

an Hungarian official, had objected to the measures against

the Jews, Veesenmayer elaborated: "Count. Bethlen declared

that he does not want to become a mass murderer and would

rather resign." Veesenmayer's only comment, in his report,

about Bethlen's startling statement was that the Hungarian

should be relieved of his duties,^ Veesenmayer maintained,

in direct examination, that Prime Minister Sztojay had

•^Hezinger affidavit of 2 June 1948; Veesenmayer exhibit 134; M897/118/0282-83, 0286. Grell affidavit of 31 May 1948; Veesenmayer exhibit 135; M897/118/0290, 0294-95. Grell did not explicitly say that Veesenmayer was ignorant, but he implied as much. Hezinger--who also wrote other affidavits for Veesenmayer, Steengracht, and Bohle--was summoned to Nuremberg for cross-examination. The prosecutors Lewis and Kempner expressed strong disbelief in regard to his affirmation of igno-r ranee. See Hezinger testimony before Commission II, 26 August 1948; Transcripts, pp. 18509, 18513-14, 18518-20, 18524; M897, roll 16. ■^Veesenmayer to the Foreign Office via Ritter, 8 May

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subsequently arranged for him to meet with Bethlen and that

at this meeting the latter denied having made the remarks

attributed to him. This, according to Veesenmayer, had 16 ended the incident and Bethlen returned to his duties.

Kempner disputed this story in his cross-examination of the

defendant. The prosecutor mentioned a second Hungarian

official, by the name of Janos Schilling, who had voiced

sentiments against becoming a mass murderer. Kempner then

submitted a telegram from Veesenmayer, dated 14 May 1944,

which reported that Schilling would probably soon be divested

of his office, as had already been done with Bethlen.

Veesenmayer lamely remarked that he had no recollection of

such a telegram.^

Other documents also belied Veesenmayer's assertion

that he had understood that the deportations served either

labor or security needs. In a telegram dated 13 November 1944,

Veesenmayer spoke of further deportations (once transportation

was available) of Budapest Jews, including children, who were

incapable of working. The prosecution, which had to select

exhibits from thousands of documents, did not offer this 18 telling document as evidence. On 23 November 1944,

1944; prosecution exhibit 3677; M897/53/1063. 16 Veesenmayer testimony, 21 July 1948; Transcripts, pp. 13107-8; M897, roll 12.

■^Veesenmayer testimony, 23 July 1948; Transcripts, pp. 13441-44; M897, roll 13. Veesenmayer to the Foreign Office, 14 May 1944; prosecution exhibit 3707; M897/54/0085. 18 Veesenmayer to Foreign Office, 13 November 1944; document NG-5570; T1139/55/0537.

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Veesenmayer reported to Ribbentrop regarding the latter's

request for the resumption of the deportations. Veesenmayer

commented that Szalasi had described the remaining Jews as

incapable of labor and no longer a security problem, but

"he [Szalasi] will nevertheless see to it that the wish of

the foreign minister is extensively taken into account 19 through a continuous mopping up."

The majority of the Tribunal concluded without difficulty

that Veesenmayer "knew what their [the Hungarian Jews'] 20 fate would be." Judge Powers dissented on this issue and

commented as follows: "There is no evidence that I can find

that Veesenmayer even heard a rumor of exterminations until

Horthy claimed to have had it reported to him from some message 21 of a foreign government which had been monitored," In making

this statement, Judge Powers either forgot or chose to

ignore the Bethlen - Schilling incident.

Steengracht was somewhat inconsistent about his

general knowledge of the Nazi program of genocide when pressed

by Kempner in cross-examination. In his direct testimony,

Steengracht said that he had received information about the

concentration camps from unofficial sources. He specified

these sources as being the foreign press, foreign diplomats,

19 Veesenmayer to Ribbentrop, 23 November 1944; prosecution exhibit 3717; M897/54/0136. on Ministries case judgment in TWC, 14:660. 21 Dissenting opinion of Judge Powers in ibid. , p. 926.

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members of the German resistance, and Germans who had been

inmates of the camps. He added that he had been unable to 22 distinguish truth from propaganda in the foreign press.

Kempner, in cross-examination, got Steengracht to repeat

that he had several sources of information, including foreign

press reports. The former state secretary nonetheless

blurted out: "But in any case I did not know that these

people were being sent to their death." Steengracht then

added that the first time he had heard of a policy of exter­

mination was when Russian troops captured the Maidanek

concentration camp in January 1945. The skeptical Kempner

immediately retorted: "Isn't it right that already in 1943

you had press reports submitted to you, in which President

Roosevelt, Governor Dewey, Mayor LaGuardia, and Rabbi

Stephen Wise, publicly spoke, in New York, of the extermination

of Jews?" Steengracht answered: "I am sure that I heard

of such things." Kempner then asked if Steengracht recalled

that President Roosevelt had warned that "the perpetrators

of these crimes" would be held accountable. Steengracht

replied affirmatively, and said that such information had

only convinced him that he must remain at his post in order 23 to help people. In its final brief, in a section entitled

"Admissions of the Defense in Open Court," the prosecution

9 9 Steengracht (direct) testimony, 24 June 1948; Transcripts, pp. 9872^-75; M897, roll 10.

^Steengracht testimony, 1 July 1948; ibid., pp. 10640-43.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 229 0 / cited this exchange between Kempner and Steengracht.

Some evidence showed Steengracht knew about the fate

of the Hungarian Jews. His attorney, Haensel, argued that

Steengracht, contrary to the prosecution's assertion, had

never received Veesenmayer's report about Count Bethlen's

reference to mass murder. Haensel emphasized that 25 Steengracht's initial was absent from this document.

However, Steengracht did initial a report by Thadden on the

evacuation of the Hungarian Jews, in which the Inland II

official made the telling comment that only one-third of 9 fi the deportees were suitable as laborers.

The judgment cited the Thadden report in regard to

Veesenmayer, but not Steengracht. Veesenmayer ironically did

not initial the report, nor was he mentioned by it. The

judgment assumed, however, that Thadden's information was

derived from conferences held in Budapest with Veesenmayer 27 and others. The judgment linked Steengracht to knowledge

of the Jews' fate through a series of communications regarding

the proposal that a number of Jewish children be allowed to

o / Prosecution final brief (15 November 1948) against Weizsiicker, Steengracht, and Woermann concerning the murder of the Jews; M897/139/1243-44. 25 Proceedings before Commission II, 11 October 1948; Transcripts, p. 25376; M897, roll 21. Haensel is correct about the absence of Steengracht's initial. See prosecution exhibit 3677; M897/53/1062-63. 9 fi Thadden report of 26 May 1944; prosecution exhibit 1818; M897/38/1021-25. 27 Ministries case judgment in TWC, 14:655.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 230 28 emigrate to Palestine. Only two of these documents

are revealing. In May 1943, Thadden wrote that it would

soon be impossible to find five thousand Jewish children in

the Eastern territories because "of our Jewish measures."

A year later, Thadden had noted the intended, imminent

liquidation of the Litzmannstadt ghetto, the only ghetto

which still contained a large number of children who were

potential emigrants. Steengracht initialed several of the

documents in this series, and he was actively involved in

the discussion regarding the proposed emigration of the

children; however, he did not initial the two indicative 29 memorandums by Thadden. Christianson and Maguire wrote:

"How any one reading this correspondence . . . could have had

any doubt that the Jews, as a race, were being exterminated, 30 is beyond our comprehension." The judges added that

Steengracht "knew what Veesenmayer's mission was and he knew 31 of the terrible mass deportations which took place." I

would agree with the two judges' conclusion that Steengracht

was aware of the destiny of the Hungarian Jews, but I would

disagree with the judges' choice of evidence in support of

their conclusion.

28Ibid., pp. 512-17. oq Documents (from 7 May 1943 to 27 May 1944) relating to the proposed emigration of Jewish children from Axis- dominated Europe; prosecution exhibit 3643; M897/53/0640-82. The two Thadden memorandums are located as follows: Thadden memorandum of 14 May 1943; M897/53/0643. Thadden memorandum of 5 May 1944; M897/53/0680-81. 30 Ministries case judgment in TWC, 14:517.

31Ibid., p. 519.

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Ritter denied that he had any general knowledge of the

Nazi policy of genocide. The "final solution," the Wannsee

protocol, Auschwitz, extermination camps--none of this

officially had been brought to his attention. Ritter did 32 admit to an awareness that something was wrong; however,

when he asked Wagner about the fate of the incarcerated

Jews, the Inland II official had told him that they were 33 being used as industrial workers. Ritter's profession of

ignorance was weakened by the testimony of his defense

witness and former assistant Wilhelm Mackeben. The latter

testified that Ritter, after business hours, had been willing

to be orally briefed on Jewish matters, as this "interested

him from a human point of view." Mackeben further acknow­

ledged that in 1942 he had learned of the Einsatzgruppen

killings and had passed on this information to his boss

during their discussions. Mackeben insisted, however, that

he himself had never connected these killings with the Q / deportations. Kempner brought up Mackeben's testimony in

his cross-examination of Ritter. The defendant could not

recall having discussed the Einsatzgruppen reports with

32 Ritter testimony, 15 July 1948; Transcripts, pp. 12199-12200, 12202; M897, roll 12. 33 Ritter interrogation 1811, 9 April 1947; interrogator- Kempner; M1019/58/0666.

^^Mackeben testimony, 12 July 1948; Transcripts, pp. 11718, 11724, 11737-39; M897, roll 11.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 232 or Mackeben. Ritter's forgetfulness may have been genuine,

assuming that his memory was affected by his sustained

use of quinine. However, not to remember is not the same

as not having known in the first place.

The prosecution asserted that Ritter had been aware

of the fate of the Hungarian Jews because many of Veesenmayer1s

communications to the Foreign Office had been sent through

him. Kempner, in his cross-examination of Ritter, partic­

ularly emphasized two Veesenmayer reports: one dated 8 May

1944, regarding Count Bethlen's statement, and another

dated 13 July 1944, which mentioned appeals by Pope Pius XII

and King Gustavus V of Sweden to the Hungarian government

in behalf of the Hungarian Jews. In response to Kempner's

questions, Ritter said that he may have read these reports,

but he could not remember. Ritter's signature or initial

is not on the report of May 8th or the report of July 13th.

On the second document, after Ritter's name on the distribu­

tion list there is a check mark, but that could have been 37 made by anyone. The evidence is therefore inconclusive

as to whether Ritter read these revealing documents. To

35 Ritter testimony, 16 July 1948; Transcripts, pp. 12464-65; M897, roll 12.

■^Ibid. , pp. 12466-68. 37 Veesenmayer to the Foreign Office via Ritter, 8 May 1944; prosecution exhibit 3677; M897/53/1062-63. Veesenmayer to the Foreign Office, 13 July 1944; prosecution exhibit 3702; M897/54/0067.

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make this point, Schmidt-Leichner, Ritter's lawyer, submitted

Judge M. A. Musmanno's separate opinion in the Milch case

as an exhibit. Musmanno had written that "depositions that

'the accused must have known' or 'to the best of my knowledge

he knew' . . . are not . . . strong enough to carry the 38 weight of a conviction." Schmidt-Leichner nevertheless

may have believed that he had failed to convince the Tribunal

of Ritter's ignorance, as he submitted excerpts from

several of the other Nuremberg judgments--excerpts which 39 stated that mere knowledge could not be a basis of guilt.

The Ministries case judgment discussed the reports

which Veesenmayer had sent to the Foreign Office through

Ritter. The judgment concluded, with some tentativeness,

that Ritter was knowledgeable: "Ritter's knowledge of the

situation,from the receipt of Veesenmayer's reports, may

be reasonably inferred.In my opinion, any conclusion

that Ritter knew what was happening to the Hungarian Jews

is weakened by the absence of his initials on the

Veesenmayer reports. Mackeben's testimony would preclude

the assumption that Ritter was totally ignorant of the

killings of Jews in general.

38 Excerpt from the separate opinion of Judge Musmanno in the Milch case; Ritter exhibit 59; M897/114/0759. 39 For Schmidt-Leichner's introduction of these exhibits, see the proceedings before Commission I, 8 July 1948; Transcripts, p. 11446; M897, roll 11, An example of these exhibits is an excerpt from the Hostage case judgment; Ritter exhibit 57; M897/114/0741-46.

^Ministries case judgment in TWC, 14:626-31.

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The Question of Authority

What the defendants did was more important in the end

than what they knew. The defendants had to convince the

Tribunal that their actions in regard to Hungary were not

punishable under the existing international law. There were

two approaches to such a task. The accused could argue from

a legal perspective--the perspective that whatever they had

done the law itself protected them from prosecution. The

defendants could also construct a bureaucratic argument—

the argument that they had lacked the authority to do anything

about the deportations.

Veesenmayer employed both tactics in his defense.

He used legal arguments based on his (or his lawyer’s)

understanding of international and Nuremberg law. The

actions in Hungary did not correspond to the Nuremberg

description of crimes against humanity. He, moreover, could

not be prosecuted for anything he had done in Hungary because,

as an ambassador there, he enjoyed the protection of

diplomatic immunity. Veesenmayer1s more extensive bureau­

cratic argument could be described as threefold. First of

all, while admitting that his assignment in Budapest had

brought him into contact with Jewish matters, he maintained

he had merely served as a communication vehicle between

Berlin and Budapest. He certainly had not exercised any

initiative regarding the Jews. Secondly, the sovereign

nation of Hungary must bear the responsibility for the tragedy

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of its Jewish population. Thirdly, it had been

Otto Winkelmann (the German SS representative in Hungary) ,

not Veesenmayer, who had applied whatever German pres store

was exerted on Hungary to deport its Jews.

Karl Doetzer, Veesenmayer1s attorney, argued that an

action could only be considered a crime against humanity if

it was "committed in pursuit of a plan of aggression.

In doing so, he was referring to the IMT’s restrictive

interpretation of crimes against humanity, which in turn

was based on the wording of Article 6 (c) of the London

Charter. That article first specified various acts which

would be crimes against humanity and then added the words

"in execution of or in connection with any crime within the

jurisdiction of the Tribunal.The IMT judgment interpreted

that wording to mean that a crime against humanity could be

punished only if it was related to a war crime or a crime / Q against peace. In rejecting Doetzer's argument, the

Ministries case judgment said that the deportation of the

Hungarian Jews "was carried on as a part and in aid of German

^Doetzer*s opening statement in behalf of Veesenmayer, 21 July 1948, in TWC, 12:300. / 0 Charter of the International Military Tribunal (or London Charter) in ibid., p. xv. The punctuation in the French and English versions of Article 6 (c) originally differed from the punctuation in the Russian version and left its intent unclear. This was corrected by a Protocol to the London Agreement and Charter, dated 6 October 1945. See ibid., pp. xviii-xix.

^IMT judgment in IMT, 1:254-55.

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aggressions and crimes against peace. I would conclude

that this was a dubious statement. The German entry into

Hungary in the fifth year of the war can hardly be called a

violation of peace in the sense that the invasions of

1939-41 were violations. The German dispatch of troops to

Hungary can be described more appropriately as a defensive

move--a move to bolster the threatened eastern front--than

as a fresh aggression. Furthermore, Control Council Law No.

10's Article II-l (c) , which defined crimes against humanity

for the subsequent tribunals, omitted the words "in execution

of or in connection with any crime within the jurisdiction 45 of the Tribunal. Unless one believes that Control Council

Law No. 10 could not extend the London Charter one iota,

which the majority of the Ministries Tribunal implicitly

hft did not believe, there was no need to link crimes against

humanity in Hungary to crimes against peace. I would agree

with the Tribunal’s decision to dismiss Doetzer's argument

regarding crimes against humanity, but 1 would fault the

Tribunal's reasoning on this matter. Its reasoning indicates

the pervasive influence that crimes against peace had on

other aspects of the Ministries trial.

^Slinistries case judgment in TWC, 14:654.

^Control Council Law No. 10 in TWC, 12:xx. AC The Ministries case judgment in defining the bloodless invasions of Austria and Czechoslovakia as criminal acts (see TWC, 14:330-31) assumed the position that Control Council Law No. 10 could add to the London Charter. Judge Powers, in his dissent, disagreed with this position. See ibid.,

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 237

Doetzer also contended that neither time nor place

gave the Tribunal the right to deprive Veesenmayer of the

diplomatic immunity which he had possessed as an accredited

ambassador to Hungary. The defense lawyer elaborated that

the privilege of immunity extends to all jurisdictions once

a person has diplomatic accreditation in a single country. ^

Doetzer supported his argument with citations from American, 48 English, and German sources of international law. The

Ministries Tribunal did not accept Doetzer's interpretation

of the law. Citing German, American, and English sources,

the Tribunal said that diplomatic immunity protects a diplomat

from the courts of the host government as long as he is

accredited to that government and for a reasonable time

thereafter, in order to enable him to leave that country.

In other words, Veesenmayer's person had been protected for

a limited period in a particular place. His deeds did not 49 enjoy immunity once he left Hungary.

Veesenmayer testified that he had always considered

that his main function in Hungary was quasi-military, to do

pp. 880-81. For additional remarks on the relationship between the London Charter and Control Council Law No. 10, see pp. 11-12 above.

^Doetzer's closing statement in behalf of Veesenmayer, 12 November 1948; Transcripts, pp. 27498-27504; M897, roll 23.

^Veesenmayer exhibits 96-103, 106-7; M897/118/0109-29, 0138-51. AO Ministries case judgment in TWC, 14:660-62.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 238

everything possible "to maintain the eastern front.

Ribbentrop had told him, upon his departure for Budapest to

assume his ministerial position there, that he was to help

execute the agreement just concluded between Horthy and

Hitler. However, the foreign minister did not inform him

of the details of that agreement. Veesenmayer said that he

had received no directives regarding Jewish matters,

although Ernst Kaltenbrunner, the head of RSHA, accompanied

him on the train trip to Budapest and discussed this topic 51 with him. Veesenmayer further testified that later he had

been ordered, in specific instances, to assist in measures

pertaining to the Hungarian Jews. Such an instance had

occurred in July 1944 when Ribbentrop transmitted to him

Hitler's order to persuade the Hungarian government to 52 resume the recently suspended deportations.

Veesenmayer in effect was saying: Yes, I had a limited

hand in this unfortunate business, but I merely conveyed

my government's requests--requests which I considered

legitimate from a military point of view--to the Hungarian

government. The documentary record showed, however, that

■^Veesenmayer testimony, 22 July 1948; Transcripts, p. 13282; M897, roll 13.

■^Veesenmayer testimony of 21 July 1948 in T W C , 13:493. Veesenmayer interrogation 1023a, 2 April 1947; interrogator - Pins; M1019/75/0154. 52 Veesenmayer testimony, 22 July 1948; Transcripts, pp. 13238-39; M897, roll 13. Ribbentrop to Veesenmayer, 16 July 1944; prosecution exhibit 1824; M897/38/1059.

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Veesenmayer had done more than pass on Berlin's wishes. He

had several times made, or passed on to Berlin, suggestions

regarding the Hungarian Jews. Fifteen days after his appoint­

ment as minister to Hungary, he wrote his foreign minister:

The reaction of the population of Budapest to the two air raids led , . . to an intensified anti-Semitic attitude. Yesterday leaflets were distributed, asking the life of 100 Jews for each Hungarian killed. Even if this cannot actually be carried out, . . . the idea of revenge creates an effective propaganda possibility and perhaps also a warning example. At the next attack I would have no scruples against having 10 suitable Jews shot for every Hungarian killed. In view of a conference which I had last night with the [Hungarian] Ministers Ratz and Kunder, I have the impression that the government would be willing to carry out such a measure on its own. On the other hand such an action once begun should be carried out consistently. In view of the suggestions made to the Fuehrer by the Reich Foreign Minister, offering all Jews as a present to Roosevelt and Churchill, I would like to be informed , . , whether after the next attack I may start with retaliatory measures described a bove.53

The prosecution introduced the above document on 19 March

1948,^^ before Veesenmayer took the witness stand.■*■* In

case the Tribunal might have thought that Veesenmayer’s

■^Veesenmayer to Ribbentrop, 3 April 1944; prosecution exhibit 1807; M897/38/0951, An English translation (from which the above quotation was taken) is in TWC, 13:347,

Minute Book, p. 132; Official Record, United States Military Tribunals, Nurnberg, Case No. 11, Tribunal IV (IV A), United States vs. Ernst von Weizsaecker et al., vol. 66; M897, roll 162; RG 238; National Archives.

■^See Veesenmayer's testimony of 22 July 1948 (Tran­ scripts, pp. 13248-49; M897, roll 13) in which he blamed the Hungarian ministers for suggesting the ten to one reprisals, Veesenmayer added that his own misgivings about this proposal had led him to mention the suggested transfer of the Jews to Churchill and Roosevelt,

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initiative as displayed by that document, was an aberration,

the prosecution introduced in cross-examination several other

examples of similar conduct. In April 1944, Veesenmayer

asked the government in Berlin to dispatch railroad cars Sfi to Hungary in order to expedite the deportations. On

June eighth, the defendant informed the German Foreign Office

that a Viennese newspaper article, entitled "The Removal of

the Budapest Jews," could alarm those Jews in the Hungarian

capital who were still to be evacuated. The discussion of

this topic was to be avoided and German editors were to be 57 so informed. Six days later, Veesenmayer suggested that

he go to Pressburg in Slovakia to confer with the German

Foreign Office representative there about measures to stop 58 the flight of Jews from Hungary to Slovakia.

The argument that Veesenmayer had not exercised a

controlling influence on Jewish policy in Hungary was more

central to his defense than the degree of his participation

in, or enthusiasm for, that policy. Veesenmayer asserted

c r Veesenmayer to Ribbentrop, 19 April 1944; prosecution exhibit 3704; M897/54/0075. Also see Veesenmayer testimony, 23 July 1948; Transcripts, pp. 13438-39; M897, roll.13. 5 7 Veesenmayer to the Foreign Office, 8 June 1944; prosecution exhibit 3709; M897/54/0092. Also see Veesenmayer testimony, 23 July 1948; Transcripts, p. 13446; M897, roll 13. 5 8 Veesenmayer to the Foreign Office, 14 June 1944; prosecution exhibit 3710; M897/54/0095. Also see Veesenmayer testimony, 23 July 1948; Transcripts, pp. 13446-47; M897, roll 13. Part of this testimony is reproduced in TWC, 13:506.

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that Hungarian sovereignty had remained intact after

March 19th. While he could explain his government's wishes 59 to the Hungarians, he could not dictate to them. Further­

more, the Hungarians were inveterate anti-Semites, which fin explained why Jewish affairs had taken the course they did.

The prosecution not only challenged this analysis with

documentary evidence, but also with a notable witness.

Nicholas Horthy, the former regent of Hungary, was

three months short of his eightieth birthday when he appeared

as a prosecution witness on 4 March 1948. Horthy said in

regard to the post-March political situation in Hungary:

"We maintained the farce of sovereignty," He related how

Veesenmayer and Winkelmann had tried to pressure him into

resuming the deportations when, in July 1944, he ordered them

suspended. "It was my impression," he said, "that I was , , .

told that I was interfering in things which were none of my

business." Doetzer, in cross-examination, vigorously tried

to discredit the former Hungarian head of state. Doetzer did

not shake the witness1 contention that true self-determination

ceased in Hungary in March 1944. The defense lawyer was more

successful in challenging Horthy's account of his meeting

with Veesenmayer and Winkelmann, which the lawyer said had

not even taken place. The elderly Horthy finally admitted

•^Veesenmayer testimony, 22 July 1948; Transcripts, pp. 13217-18, 13220, 13229-30; M897, roll 13.

^®See Veesenmayer testimony of 21 and 22 July 1948; Transcripts, pp. 13101, 13233-37; M897, rolls 12 and 13.

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that "the years have not improved my memory." Doetzer also

attacked the integrity of the witness. The post-war Hungarian 61 government had described him as a "number one" war criminal.

Veesenmayer in his own testimony continued to disparage

Horthy. The defendant self-righteously said:

I may mention Professor Kempner as a witness that in all preliminary investigations I refused to testify about Horthy. For some reason it went against the grain . . . to say anything against an aged statesman, and in this case I would have had to give incriminating testimony. . . . but since the Prosecution has now called Horthy as a witness against me, . . . 1 will state the facts as they really were. . . . Horthy . . . was interested only in protecting . . . the economically valuable Jews in Budapest, those who were well off. However, as to the remaining Jewry--and he used a very ugly term there— he had no interest in them and he was quite prepared to have them go to the Reich or elsewhere for labor. . . . The fact has been proved that . . . at first he moderated the deportations, and then later stopped them. Somebody who forbids something later on, must have given permission for it earlier.62

As he had done in regard to other matters, Powers

disagreed with Christianson and Maguire in evaluating Horthy

and his testimony. The attempt to shift the blame for crimes

against the Hungarian Jews to the former Hungarian regent

did not convince the latter two judges, who said:

Nor are we impressed by the insinuations, which he [Veesenmayer] made while on the witness stand . . . that Horthy was in fact sympathetic with the German program of the deportation of Jews and their subsequent extermina­ tion. . . . We recognize that there may be some inaccuracies in Horthy's recollection and testimony, but we find that in the main it states the fact.63

^ Horthy testimony, 4 March 1948; Transcripts, pp. 2702, 2706, 2713-14, 2720-21, 2733, 2747; M897, roll 4. The three quotations of Horthy can be found on pp. 2706, 2714, and 2733 respectively.

^Veesenmayer testimony of 22 July 1948 in TWC, 13:501.

^Ministries case judgment in TWC, 14:652-53.

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Noting that Horthy did stop the deportations in July 1944,

Powers commented: "This should end all argument as to where

the power of government in Hungary lay during this period."

The dissenting judge had a negative appraisal of Horthy

himself: "He was an enthusiastic ally of Hitler, and pursued

the same program until the Russian troops came so close to

the Hungarian border that he decided that it was the better fill part of discretion to take another line."

Without necessarily accepting his conclusions, one can

agree with Judge Powers that Horthy was not a detached witness.

The prosecution's documents, however, clearly indicated that

Veesenmayer--although not always successful--had energetically

carried out his government's instructions to pressure and

fi S manipulate the Hungarian government. This is exemplified

by the following excerpt from Veesenmayer1s report of one of

his first meetings with Horthy, in which the appointment of a

new Hungarian prime minister was discussed: "I stated in

conclusion that I had to . . . request new instruction first,

but that I much regretted his uncompromising attitude and that

I felt compelled even now to voice my anxiety lest it entail fifi grave consequences." A second example, directly related to

fill Dissenting opinion of Judge Powers in ibid., pp. 924-25. fi *5 For an example of such an instruction, see the following document: Foreign Office to Veesenmayer, 2 April 1944; prosecu­ tion exhibit 3701; M897/54/0064. An English translation is in TWC, 13:341-42. fifi Veesenmayer to Ribbentrop, 20 March 1944; prosecution exhibit C-438; M897/57/0818. An English translation (.from which the above quotation was taken) is in TWC, 13:338-39.

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the crimes against the Jews, is the following excerpt from a

Veesenmayer report dated April 23rd: "It appears advisable

to delay somewhat the transport of the 50,000 Jewish workers

from the Budapest area, whose shipment has been demanded by me 67 [italics mine] and has been agreed on by the government."

When Veesenmayer discussed this second document in his direct

examination, he said that Horthy in April 1944 had actually 68 been in favor of the deportations.

The next line of defense for Veesenmayer, beyond the

Hungarian government, was the German SS. Hitler's directive

which outlined Veesenmayer's powers as the German plenipotentiary

to Hungary mentioned that an SS leader would be involved with

Jewish matters in Hungary, but this SS leader would be

attached to Veesenmayer's staff and would act "in accordance

with his [Veesenmayer's] political instructions."®® In his

appearance on the witness stand, Veesenmayer argued that this

directive had immediately become a dead letter as far as his

relation with Winkelmann (the SS leader in Hungary) was

concerned, because Heinrich Himmler had objected to his repre­

sentative in Hungary being subordinate to Ribbentrop's repre­

sentative there. New instructions were to have been issued, but

never were. Ribbentrop told Veesenmayer, in response to his

67 Veesenmayer to the Foreign Office, 23 April 1944; prosecution exhibit 1811; M897/38/0972. An English translation of a portion of prosecution exhibit 1811 (from which the above quotation was taken) is in TWC, 13:348-49.

®®Veesenmayer testimony of 22 July 1948 in TWC, 13:500-501.

®®Hitler's instructions to Veesenmayer, 19 March 1944; prosecution exhibit 1806; M897/38/0947-48. An English translation is in TWC, 13:336-37.

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inquiry on this matter, that he must conduct his relationship

with Winkelmann as best he could. ^

Veesenmayer also testified that there had been constant

friction between Winkelmann and himself--npt that he personally

disliked the man, but Winkelmann's superior (Himmler) had 71 made such a relationship inevitable. According to Veesenmayer,

Winkelmann had controlled German interaction with Hungary

on the Jewish issue. The SS leader even "had his own liaison

officer stationed with the Hungarian Ministry of the Interior."

When Veesenmayer had tried to replace this liaison with one of

his own people from the German legation, he was rebuffed.

Doetzer asked his client why he had said in his dispatches

to Berlin that the SS leader "reports to me," if Winkelmann

had been so independent of him. Veesenmayer dutifully replied

that this had been merely a matter of phraseology, and that a

reading of the material would show that Winkelmann's reports

to him were often outdated and that Winkelmann acted without 72 consulting him.

Veesenmayer allocated numerous defense exhibits to

his endeavors to shift blame onto Winkelmann and the Hungarian

government. I would conclude, however, that this evidence,

if carefully analyzed by the judges, should have done little

^Veesenmayer testimony of 21 July 1948 in TWC, 13:498-99. 71 Veesenmayer testimony, 21 July 1948; Transcripts, p. 13122; M897, roll 12. 72 Veesenmayer testimony, 22 July 1948; Transcripts, pp. 13226-28, 13257-59; M897, roll 13.

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to improve Veesenmayer's case. Some of these exhibits were

affidavits by such people as Barbara Hacke and Kurt Haller--

people whose objectivity was suspect by the nature of their 73 relation to the defendant. Hacke and Haller had both worked

for Veesenmayer in Budapest, the former as his secretary and

the latter as his information attache. The prosecution called

both affiants to Nuremberg for cross-examination. In response

to Kempner's questioning, Haller professed: "I personally

met in Dr. Veesenmayer a man who I would consider more or

less my tutor. . . . I esteemed him very much as a decent human

being.Kempner obtained similar sentiments about Veesenmayer

from the witness Hacke.^ Another Veesenmayer ploy was to

use excerpts of affidavits from previous Nuremberg trials.

The edited depositions contained passages which incriminated

Winkelmann, the SS, or Hungarian officials. The excised 76 portions would have compromised the defendant.

Veesenmayer's account of his relationship with the SS

^ H a c k e affidavit of 26 May 1948; Veesenmayer exhibit 129; M897/118/0235-47. Haller affidavit of 27 May 1948; Veesenmayer exhibit 132; M897/118/0256-73.

^Haller testimony before Commission II, 8 September 1948; Transcripts, pp. 20448-49; M897, roll 18.

^Hacke testimony before Commission II, 8 September 1948; ibid. , p. 20424. 7fi The following exhibit is an example of this stratagem: Excerpts from Kastner affidavit of 13 September 1945; Veesenmayer exhibit 151; M897/118/0357-62. This affidavit, with the document number 2605-PS, had been submitted to the IMT. For the complete affidavit, see IMT, 31:1-15.

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did not go unchallenged by those whom he impugned. Former

SS representatives in Hungary had the chance to tell the

Tribunal their version of the story. Ernst Kienast, who

had been a member of Winkelmann's staff in 1944, executed an

affidavit for the prosecution. In this declaration, Kienast

said that Winkelmann had kept Veesenmayer completely informed

on developments regarding the Hungarian Jews.^ Veesenmayer's

defense staff successfully requested that Kienast be brought

to Nuremberg for cross-examination. He testified that Hitler

had dictated the broad outline of Jewish policy at the

Klessheim conference, but "the form . . . [and] extent of

this program" was subsequently negotiated by Veesenmayer and

Sztojay. Then, the witness added, Winkelmann and the Hungarian

minister of the interior worked out the technical plans

necessary for the execution of the policy. When Doetzer

retorted that Sztojay's trial in Hungary had revealed a different

story, Kienast said: "My statement . . . is . . . what

7 0 Winkelmann told me."

• More dramatic was the appearance of Winkelmann as a

prosecution rebuttal witness. Doetzer objected strenuously

to that turn of events. He complained that Winkelmann had

been brought to Nuremberg as a defense witness. According to

^Kienast affidavit of 14 August 1947; prosecution exhibit 1832; M897/39/0006-7. 78 Kienast testimony before the Commission, 2 June 1948; Transcripts, pp. 7148-50; M897, roll 7.

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Winkelmann, however, Doetzer had never interrogated him.

It would seem that Doetzer's real concern was to keep 79 Winkelmann off the witness stand in any capacity. The

former SS leader was not a credible witness, but his testimony

was nonetheless prejudicial to Veesenmayer. Winkelmann

divorced himself from all responsibility for the deportations.

According to him, the various SS agencies in Hungary had

received direct orders from the top echelons of the SS hierarchy.

Winkelmann said that he had not been accountable for the

carrying out of these orders, but had only been responsible

for the general behavior of the SS people in Hungary. He also

said that the reports of deportations which he allegedly

wrote, and which Veesenmayer transmitted to Berlin, had actually

been written by another SS official. According to Winkelmann,

Veesenmayer had negotiated the Hungarian government's general

approval of the deportations, and Eichmann had negotiated the

technical aspects with Lazio Endry, a state secretary of the

Hungarian Ministry of the Interior. Winkelmann's testimony

was basically the same as Kienast's testimony, except that

Winkelmann removed himself from the incriminating situation.

Doetzer was quick to point out this discrepancy to the witness.

The incredibility of Winkelmann's statements about himself did

not necessarily invalidate his statements about Veesenmayer.

79 Proceedings of 18 October 1948; Transcripts, pp. 26153-55; M897, roll 22. For Winkelmann's comment, see his testimony before Commission II, 18 October 1948; ibid., p. 26186.

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In response to the prosecutor's question, Winkelmann said that

he never heard of Veesenmayer trying to stop a deportation.

At another point in his testimony, Winkelmann said that

Horthy and Sztojay had told him that Veesenmayer had pressured 80 them in regard to the Jewish deportations.

It would seem that Veesenmayer did more mischief to

his own story than did his opponents from the SS. During

cross-examination, Kempner had asked the defendant: "Did

you report to Berlin that your collaboration with . . .

Winkelmann was functioning beautifully and that his subordination

to you had been carried in every respect?" Veesenmayer's

reply was an admission, perhaps unknowingly, that at least

he had helped Winkelmann get started with his nefarious task:

Whether that was the actual text, I can't say. . . . In reply to the drum fire of telephone calls from Ribbentrop, I gave him that sedative pill, and I could do that with a good conscience. . . . at the beginning Winkelmann himself was still not at home in the subject and was quite happy to shift the whole weight of responsibility which afterwards he did have to bear for all intents and purp o s e s .81

Christianson and Maguire acknowledged in their judgment

that there may have been friction between Veesenmayer and

Winkelmann. They believed, however, that such dissension

had net been due to disapproval of the Nazi policy toward

the Jews, because--the judges implied--neither one of them

had ever shown such disapproval. The two judges suggested

S0Ibid., pp. 26158-61, 26163, 26170-73, 26183-85, 26189. 81 Veesenmayer testimony, 22 July 1948; Transcripts, p. 13327; M897, roll 13.

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the following explanations for the ill feeling between

Veesenmayer and Winkelmann: Personal ambition; an extension

of the rivalry between Ribbentrop and Himmler; and a difference

in tactics, as opposed to policy. The divergence in tactics

was again a reflection of Veesenmayer's and Winkelmann's

respective bureaucracies. The Foreign Office had wished

to conduct Germany's role in the deportation of the Hungarian

Jews in such a way that the undertaking would appear to be the

policy of the Hungarian government. The more direct SS had

no interest in such political niceties. The two judges

concluded that Veesenmayer "was a willing, zealous, and leading 82 participant" in the deportation of the Hungarian Jews.

Judge Powers was not particularly concerned with either

the relationship between Veesenmayer and Winkelmann or their

contacts with the Hungarian government, because he maintained

that an official in Veesenmayer's position did not have the

capability to influence the Hungarian government. If German

pressure had caused the Hungarians to behave the way they

did toward their Jewish citizens, that pressure had emanated

from Hitler at Klessheim. "Veesenmayer was little more

than a postman delivering messages." Powers then discussed

his legal philosophy regarding this matter: "The person who

is responsible for the issuance of an order that requires the

commission of a crime, and the person who executes such an

order, is liable, but the messenger who carries it . . . or

^Ministries case judgement in TWC, 14:656, 658, 660.

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the diplomatic representative who delivers it, commits no 83 crime so far as I am able to see."

Veesenmayer1s case exemplifies the element of subjectivity

involved in the rendering of justice. The three judges were

in agreement that Veesenmayer had served as a liaison between

his government and the Hungarian government on the issue of

deportations. They differed in interpreting the import of his

role. Judge Powers correctly pointed out that Veesenmayer

had neither initiated nor concluded the process of deportations.

I would conclude, however, that the dissenting judge was too

cautious about imputing guilt. Veesenmayer may have been

only a cog in the administrative machinery, but he was none­

theless a necessary cog if that machinery was to function

smoothly. One can hypothesize that with a less diligent

German minister in Budapest, Horthy might have been even more

reluctant to give his cooperation as promised at Klessheim.

The result could have been the saving of human life.

Steengracht repeated Weizshcker's argument that the

state secretary had lacked jurisdiction in issues affecting

the Jews. Steengracht added that, for several reasons, the

subject impinged less on his activities than it had on his

predecessor's. First of all, the general direction of Jewish

policy had long been determined when he became state secretary.

Secondly, said Steengracht: "What I did was to make it quite

O O Dissenting opinion of Judge Powers in ibid., pp. 925-26. Powers' brief references to the SS may be found in ibid., pp. 923, 926-27.

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clear to him [Ribbentrop] on becoming state secretary that

I was not going to go along with the anti-Jewish policy

of Hitler . . . , and in general I stated that all measures

which conflicted with my sense of what was legal and right

would not be accepted by me." Thirdly, the situation that

had existed in the days of the Abteilung Deutschland, where

a department of the Foreign Office independently injected

the parent organization into the Jewish question, no longer

existed. Inland II had been reduced to a mere liaison

agency between the Foreign Office and the RSHA. Inland II

did submit reports on Jewish measures to his office, "but

there is enormous difference between knowing what is going

on and actual activity. "8^

In regard to the Hungarian deportations, Steengracht

asserted that his office was even more removed from Jewish

affairs than usual. The former state secretary cited an

order which Ribbentrop had issued on the nineteenth of March,

when the foreign minister said that he would directly super­

vise any matters which linked the Foreign Office to the O C Jewish question in Hungary. Steengracht also cleverly

attempted to turn the prosecution's argument regarding

Hungarian independence to his advantage:

If one takes the prosecution standpoint that after 19 March 1944 the Hungarian government acts are limited under international law then you come to accept the

^Steengracht testimony of 24 and 28 June 1948; Transcripts, pp. 9864-66, 9922, 10184-88; M897, roll 10. The quotations are from pp. 10186 and 10187. 85Ibid., pp. 9939, 10218-19.

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concept of a quasi-occupied country. The competency of the Foreign Office was, therefore, . . . no longer in existence, but had passed to the competent home agencies and these acted in conjunction with the Hungarian agencies.

The prosecution conceded that the Foreign Office's

policy regarding the Nazis' criminal conduct toward the Jews

had been molded prior to Steengracht's appointment as state

secretary. The prosecution asserted, however, that Steengracht

had the opportunity to give sound advice. Proof of this was

an incident in which Steengracht and his chief subordinate,

Hencke, cautioned against the further deportation of Greek

Jews as it would foster anti-German feeling in the Balkans.

In most cases Steengracht had continued the ill-advised 87 policy of his predecessor. The prosecution also argued

that the state secretary as well as the foreign minister had

been responsible for the conduct of German ambassadors and

plenipotentiaries abroad. Steengracht thus had the authority 88 to restrain Veesenmayer from taking a criminal action.

The prosecution also attempted to prove that Steengracht,

Inland II, and the SS had worked together to further the

- deportation of the Hungarian Jews.

Of the several documents submitted against Steengracht

^Steengracht testimony, 24 June 1948; ibid., p. 9937. 8 7 Prosecution final brief (15 November 1948) against Weizsdcker, Steengracht, and Woermann concerning the murder of the Jews; M897/139/1244, 1246. 88 Cross-examination of Steengracht, 1 July 1948; Transcripts, p. 10639; M897, roll 10.

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in regard to Hungary, two were to assume particular signifi­

cance as they were to be cited by the judgment. The first

document was a 27 May 1944 memorandum, addressed to Steengracht,

by Paul Karl Schmidt, the head of the Foreign Office's press

division. Schmidt proposed that measures be undertaken which

would justify to the outside world the deportation of Budapest

Jews, planned for the following month. Schmidt suggested

measures such as "the discovery of explosives in Jewish

clubs and synagogues, the unearthing of sabotage organizations,

revolutionary plots, attacks on the police, illegal currency

transactions . . . aimed at undermining the Hungarian monetary

system." Steengracht reacted to this proposal by forwarding 89 it to Veesenmayer for his advice. In his testimony Steengracht

explained that if he had negated the plan, he would have been

quickly overruled by Ribbentrop; therefore, he had sent the

memorandum to Veesenmayer as a delaying tactic. Steengracht 90 added that he "was successful . . . as nothing was done."

Christianson and Maguire found Steengracht's explanation

unsatisfactory:

That the proposed deportation [of the Jews of Budapest] finally took place is well known. There was nothing in Steengracht von Moyland's action to show disapproval or any attempt to stop, hamper, or mitigate any operation. He consciously participated in the program.

The two judges added: "We find him guilty with respect to the

89 Schmidt to Steengracht, 27 May 1944; prosecution exhibit 1754; M897/38/0607. An English translation (from which the above quotation was taken) is in TWC, 13:352-53. 90 Steengracht testimony, 28 June 1948; Transcripts, p. 10287; M897, roll 10.

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Hungarian deportation program." 91

The second document cited by the judgment was a

6July 1944 memorandum by Wagner of Inland II, regarding

American and Swiss proposals to the Hungarian government that

it allow Jewish-Hungarian children to leave for Palestine.

Wagner's memo, presented to Steengracht, suggested that

Veesenmayer advise the Hungarians to reject the proposals as

they would lead to the displacement of Arabs living in Palestine.

Wagner further said that such advice by Veesenmayer at least

would cause Hungary to delay for two to three weeks its reply

to the American and Swiss propositions, and by then the 92 planned evacuation of Hungarian Jews could be completed.

Steengracht testified that although he initialed the document,

the markings on it indicated that he had never passed it on

to Ribbentrop. Steengracht added that he had later discussed

the matter over the phone with Ribbentrop and had counseled

him not to interefere with Hungary's wish to let the children 9 3 go. The judgment introduced its discussion of this incident

as follows:

Veesenmayer [in Hungary] was acting partly under von Ribbentrop's orders and, except insofar as Steengracht von Moyland took an affirmative part in the matter, he [Steengracht] should not be held responsible. There is, however, at least one instance where this occurred.

^Ministries case judgment in TWC, 14:510. 92 Wagner memorandum of 6 July 1944; prosecution exhibit 1823; M897/38/1051-53. 9 3 Steengracht testimony, 28 June 1948; Transcripts, pp. 10251-56; M897, roll 10.

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The judgment ended its discussion of the incident by again

pronouncing Steengracht culpable:

Inland II was subordinated to Steengracht von Moyland. . . . He is responsible, therefore, for its actions which implemented the deportation and extermina­ tion of the Hungarian Jews, . . . and is found guilty.°4

Once again Judge Powers disagreed with his two col­

leagues, He accepted the defendant's explanation that his

transferal of Schmidt's proposal to Veesenmayer had been a

dilatory act, Powers also remarked that the eventual deporta­

tion of some Budapest Jews in the autumn of 1944 was so

removed in time from Schmidt's memorandum that Steengracht,

whatever his actions, could not be held accountable. In

regard to the proposals to allow emigration to Palestine,

Powers said that Steengracht had no authority to express an

opinion. This was a policy matter which had been decided

in the highest levels of the German government. ^5

Haensel pleaded against his client's conviction in a 96 skillfully written appeal. Haensel's references to the Schmidt

memorandum repeated the points made by Judge Powers. In regard

to Steengracht's conviction for thwarting foreign requests

that Hungarian children be allowed to emigrate, Haensel noted

that this condemnation had focused on Steengracht's

^Ministries case judgment in TWC, 14:519-20.

^Dissenting opinion of Judge Powers in ibid., p. 915.

^Kempner recently commented: "He [Steengracht] had the good fortune to have one of the most excellent lawyers, Carl Haensel." Interview with Robert M. W. Kempner, Frankfurt am Main, 13 July 1979.

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initialing of Wagner’s negative suggestion of July 6th.

Citing several reasons, Haensel argued that Wagner's memo

had no effect on the course of events. First, Horthy suspended

the deportations on July 7th. Second, Ribbentrop on July 3rd

had already instructed Veesenmayer to advise the Hungarians

against expatriation of the Jewish children to Palestine,

Third, the foreign minister on July 10th, after having talked

with Steengracht, reversed himself and approved the idea of 97 the emigration of Hungarian children. The appellate

judgment praised Haensel's appeal, calling it "ingenious and

earnest"; however, the two convicting judges refused to

address themselves to Haensel's arguments, saying that they 98 had already "gone as far as human credulity would permit."

The documents do not support Haensel's contention that

Steengracht played a beneficent role in this incident.

A scrutiny of Ribbentrop's telegram of July 10th reveals that

the foreign minister's approval of the emigration of the

Hungarian children was based on certain conditions, including

^Steengracht motion, filed 20 May 1949, to amend the judgment; Official Court File, Defense Memoranda re Alleged Errors in Judgment; M897/167/1200-1210. For the pertinent documents, which Haensel referred to in his dis­ cussion, see the following Steengracht exhibits: Veesenmayer telegram number 1826, dated 29 June 1944; Steengracht exhibit 75; M897/115/1341-42. Ribbentrop to Veesenmayer, 3 July 1944; Steengracht exhibit 87; M897/116/0006. Ribbentrop to Veesenmayer, 10 July 1944; Steengracht exhibit 76; M897/115/ 1345-46. 98 Court Memorandum of 12 December 1949, pertaining to Steengracht's appeal, in TWC, 14:961-62.

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Hungarian resumption of the deportations. Furthermore,

there is no indication in Ribbentrop's telegram that Steengracht

had advised him to be lenient. Steengracht's testimony is

the only evidence we have that he had given advice to the

foreign minister. However, the documents do support Haensel's

argument that the Wagner memo of July 6th and Steengracht's

handling of it did not influence events to the detriment of

the Hungarian children.

Must we conclude, therefore, that Steengracht was

wrongly convicted of criminal participation in the Hungarian

deportations? The answer is not necessarily yes, for we have

a repetition of the "like instances" syndrome, which occurred

in the conviction of Weizs&cker and Woermann. Haensel assumed

in his appeal that Steengracht had been condemned in connection

with two specific incidents (relating to the Schmidt and

Wagner memorandums). Such wording in the judgment as "at

least one instance" would make it seem, however, that the

judges convicted Steengracht because of his overall conduct

in regard to the Hungarian deportation program, and that the

mention of those two incidents was merely illustrative. If

so, the examples were ill-chosen. In any event, a better

written judgment might have explained clearly the basis of

Steengracht's conviction.

Ritter testified that as a liaison officer his name

had appeared on many documents whose content he had nothing to

do with. His involvement with the documents themselves

had consisted of distributing them to the proper channels in

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 259 99 the Foreign Office. Ritter’s defense described his

connection with Hungary as follows. The existence of a large

number of German military units in that country in March

and April 1944 had affected Ritter in his role as a liaison

between Ribbentrop and Keitel. Ribbentrop had wanted

Ritter immediately informed of all events which directly or

indirectly involved the German military presence in Hungary.

Veesenmayer had thus been instructed to include Ritter on the

distribution list of all the reports he sent to the Foreign

Office. During the six to eight week period of the German

military occupation of Hungary, Ritter had concerned himself

with military, military-political, and--on occasion--economic

aspects of Hungarian affairs. However, he had not paid attention

to the topics of Hungarian Jewry and Hungarian labor requisi­

tions. When telegrams arrived in his office on these topics,

they were merely filed away.^^^

The prosecution submitted one document relating to 101 Hungary which had been sent by Ritter to Veesenmayer. In

direct examination Ritter explained why he had written this

^Ritter testimony, 15 July 1948; Transcripts, pp. 12168-70; M897, roll 12.

■^^See the following sources: Ibid., pp. 12224-34. Schmidt-Leichner's closing statement in behalf of Ritter, 12 November 1948; Transcripts, pp. 27394-95, 27397; M897, roll 23. Sonnleithner affidavit of 25 June 1948; Ritter exhibit 53; M897/114/0728-29. Vogel affidavit of 10 August 1948; Ritter exhibit 63; M897/114/0773-74.

^^■Ritter to Veesenmayer, 27 April 1944; prosecution exhibit 1812; M897/38/0978.

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document. Ribbentrop, in a rage, had called him to complain

that Veesenmayer had fouled up the deportations in Hungary.

The foreign minister then employed Ritter as an intermediary

between himself and Veesenmayer. The problem turned out

to be that the SS, because of a lack of proper facilities,

had caused a delay in the deportations. Ribbentrop was

mollified, but in order to avoid any further altercations,

Ritter volunteered to write Veesenmayer. In the ensuing

telegram, Ritter had advised the younger man how to avoid 102 Ribbentrop"s ire in similar circumstances in the future.

The Tribunal accepted Ritter's account of his relation­

ship to the Hungarian deportations, noting that no evidence

had been presented which challenged his explanation. The

Tribunal therefore acquitted Ritter of crimes against the

Hungarian Jews.^®^ He was, however, convicted on two charges

of participation in war crimes against Allied prisoners

of war--with Judge Powers dissenting--and sentenced to four

years' imprisonment. Since all the convicted defendants

were given credit for time already spent in prison, and since

Ritter had been arrested on 15 May 1945, he had to serve only

one more month to complete his sentence.

^^Ritter testimony, 15 July 1948; Transcripts, pp. 12245-52; M897, roll 12.

■^^Ministries case judgment in TWC, 14:630-31.

■^^For Ritter's convictions of war crimes against prisoners of war, see ibid., pp. 438-41, 455-61. For the dissenting opinion of Judge Powers, see ibid., pp. 896-905. For Ritter's sentencing, see ibid., p. 866.

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The Question of Mitigating Circumstances

With a few exceptions, such as Haensel's closing

remarks (see pp. 204-5/abov.e), neither Veesenmayer's nor

Steengracht's defense counsel developed the argument that

their client had functioned under duress. The lawyers of

both defendants made an effort, however, to show that their

clients had tried to help the victims of Nazism.

Steengracht, according to his defense, had realized that

he could not stop the Hungarian deportations, but had decided

to do whatever he could to alleviate the situation.As an

example of his good deeds Steengracht testified that he had

instructed Hezinger to work diligently to get Jews from enemy

and neutral states exempted from deportation. Steengracht

corroborated his testimony with a Veesenmayer report which 106 had been submitted as a prosecution exhibit. It is

plausible that Steengracht may have supported the exemption of

non-Hungarian Jews, as this measure could be justified to

supporters of the deportations on the grounds of diplomatic

expediency. Whether he supported this measure as forcefully as

he claimed remains questionable. The Veesenmayer report cited

by Steengracht does not reveal Steengracht's attitude toward

^■*Hencke affidavit of 10 June 1948; Steengracht exhibit 120; M897/116/0275. TOfi Steengracht testimony, 28 June 1948; Transcripts, p. 10229; M897, roll 10.

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the exemption of Jews from enemy and neutral states. The

document shows that steps were being taken to exempt these

people., but there is no mention that a directive had come

from Steengracht. Horst Grell, Hezinger's successor,

testified in an affidavit that Steengracht had instructed him

to pursue energetically these exemptions. But Grell, who

attempted to shift the blame for the deportations onto the 108 Hungarian government and the SS, was not a credible witness.

The act which Steengracht took the most pride in was

the issuance of protective passports to Jews residing in

Hungary. According to his account, he had been instrumental

in convincing Hitler, through Ribbentrop, that a few hundred

Jews in Hungary be allowed to emigrate from there to neutral

countries. When the documents of approval, passed through his

office, he had customarily added a zero to the figures, thus

increasing the number of exempted Jews from the hundreds to

the thousands. Diplomats (such as the now legendary Raoul 109 Wallenberg ), who represented neutral states in Hungary, had

then issued passports through their Budapest legations to

both foreign and Hungarian Jews. When Himmler became suspicious,

Ribbentrop thought of starting an investigation, but Steengracht

^Veesenmayer to the Foreign Office, 4 May 1944; prose­ cution exhibit 1815; M897/38/1007. I no See Grell affidavit of 26 May 1948; Steengracht exhibit 80; M897/115/1359-61, 1363-64.

^"^See The Washington Post, 11 August 1979, p. A16. Steengracht did not mention the Swedish diplomat Wallenberg in his testimony.

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told him that the records on the protective passports had

been destroyed in an air raid. Steengracht testified that

most of those who had received such passports never emigrated

during the war, but they nonetheless had remained protected

from deportation. The former state secretary estimated that

forty-five thousand people were saved by this scheme. 111 His lawyer later raised the figure to sixty thousand.

Steengracht and Haensel referred to several prosecution

and defense exhibits in support of their account of Steengracht

and the protective passes. The prosecution exhibits included

two reports by Veesenmayer which show some confusion among

officials about the number of Jews to be covered by these

passes, and some suspicion that the figures had been increased

without proper authorization. However, there is no indication

in Veesenmayer's reports that Steengracht was suspected of

altering the figures. In fact, the reports contain no mention 112 of the state secretary. Grell said in his affidavit that

Steengracht had sent a directive to Budapest which specified 113 that protective passes were to be honored. Another and

Steengracht testimony, 28 June 1948; Transcripts, pp. 10246-48, 10258-64; M897, roll 10.

^^Steengracht motion, filed 20 May 1949, to amend the judgment; Official Court File, Defense Memoranda re Alleged Errors in Judgment; M897/167/1179. ii p Veesenmayer to the Foreign Office, 25 July 1944; prosecution exhibit 1826; M897/38/1093-95. Veesenmayer to Ribbentrop, 24 October 1944; prosecution exhibit 1828; M897/38/1103-7.

■^^Grell affidavit of 26 May 1948; Steengracht exhibit 80; M897/115/1361-62.

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more credible affiant was Ernst M&thd, a Hungarian diplomat

who was assigned to Berlin during Steengracht1s state

secretaryship. Mathe testified that Steengracht and other

Foreign Office officials aided him and his colleagues in

protecting one thousand or more Jews from the Gestapo. M&thfe

added that additional thousands of Hungarian Jews received

protective passes, but he did not indicate what role

Steengracht played in regard to the passes. Mathe's affidavit

thus leaves unanswered exactly what and how much Steengracht

did for the Hungarian Jews.^^ Finally, at the trial no

document was produced showing an altered number regarding

passes. I would surmise that Steengracht did aid the Hungarian

Jews, but that he characteristically dramatized and exaggerated

his assistance.

The judgment made no mention of Steengracht's good

deeds. This miffed Haensel, who cited not only his client's

aid to Hungarian Jews but also his helpfulness to prisoners

of war and others. Haensel additionally complained that

other defendants, such as Gottlob Berger, had received recogni- 115 tion for their courageous acts of assistance.

Veesenmayer also testified that he had shown compassion

toward the Jews. He said that at one point he had even gotten

into trouble because of his attitude. Ribbentrop accused him

■^^Mathd affidavit of 15 September 1946; Steengracht exhibit 135; M897/116/0327-28.

^^Steengracht motion, filed 20 May 1949, to amend the judgment; Official Court File, Defense Memoranda re Alleged Errors in Judgment; M897/167/1217-19.

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of accepting bribes and subsequently sabotaging the deporta­

tion of the Hungarian Jews. Ribbentrop also threatened to 116 have him shot if he continued to disregard instructions.

Veesenmayer, in fact, was repeating the story told by Ritter

in connection with his April 27th telegram to Veesenmayer.

What the former minister to Hungary did not mention in his

rendition was that the whole incident had been a misunder­

standing. In reality, SS logistical problems had caused a

delay in the deportations, and Ribbentrop had falsely blamed

his minister. A second Veesenmayer claim that he had been

compassionate is also dubious. In the autumn of 1944, the

German transportation system had broken down to such an

extent that Hungarian Jews were being forced to go to the

camps on foot rather than by train. Veesenmayer testified

that he had protested against this cruel method of evacua­

tion, In support of his claim, Veesenmayer presented two 118 affidavits; however, the reports he filed at the time do 11 Q not reveal any disapproval of these forced marches, y with

one exception. The exception is a telegram he wrote six

^•^Veesenmayer testimony, 22 July 1948; Transcripts, p. 13252; M897, roll 13.

li7Ibid., p. 13255. 118 Helmut Triska (a subordinate of Veesenmayer at the German ministry in Budapest) affidavit of 10 June 1948; Veesenmayer exhibit 148; M897/118/0345. Grell affidavit of 15 June 1948; Veesenmayer exhibit 149; M897/118/0348-49. 119 Veesenmayer to the Foreign Office, 18 October, 26 October, and 13 November 1944; document NG-5570; T1139/55/0533, 0536-37. Veesenmayer to the Foreign Office, 21 November 1944; document NG-4987; T1139/50/0675.

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months before the forced marches began, in which he com­

mented: "Transport by marching is not practicable, since it

entails great difficulties in the questions of feeding, 120 shoes, and guarding." Veesenmayer's silence on this issue

six months later leads me to conclude that all the long he

was motivated by practicality rather than by humanitarianism.

The judgment convicted both Steengracht and Veesen­

mayer on other charges in addition to their involvement with

the Hungarian deportations. Steengracht received two addi­

tional guilty verdicts. One of these pertained to the

cover-up of the execution of British airmen who had escaped

from the Sagan prisoner of war camp. The other guilty

verdict involved the unsuccessful proposals to have Jewish

children emigrate from Axis Europe (from areas other than 1 21 Hungary) to Palestine. Steengracht received a seven-year

sentence, but the appellate judgment reversed the Sagan 122 conviction and reduced his sentence to five years. The

judgment pronounced Veesenmayer guilty under count seven

(the slave labor count) and count eight (the criminal

organization count). -^3 The former conviction was really a

120 Veesenmayer to the Foreign Office, 23 April 1944; prosecution exhibit 1811; M897/38/0972. For an English translation, which is quoted above, see TWC, 13:349. 121^inistries case judgment in TWC, 14:455-61, 512-17. l ^ C o u r t Order and Memorandum of 12 December 1949, pertaining to Steengracht1s appeal, in ibid., pp. 960-61. For Steengracht1s original sentence, see ibid., p. 869. 123^inistries case judgment in ibid., pp. 812-17, 858-59.

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redundant punishment, as much of the evidence used in regard

to the death camp deportations was also used in connection

with the slave labor charge. The count eight conviction

would be vulnerable to the criticisms of the conspiracy

aspect of Nuremberg law. Veesenmayer was sentenced to

prison for twenty years, the most severe penalty administered

to any of the Foreign Office defendants. He also failed to

gain from the appellate judgment a reversal of any of his TO/ convictions. Judge Powers again dissented in regard to TOC all these verdicts of guilt. J

As in the case with Weizs&cker and Woermann, the five

years given Steengracht can be interpreted as an acknowl­

edgement of extenuating circumstances. Even the sentence of

twenty years meted out to Veesenmayer can be seen as

representing the belief that he had only an indirect and

contributory role in the Hungarian murders. If Christianson

and Maguire had believed that Veesenmayer had been a primary

cause of these murders, a death sentence--or at least life

in prison--would have been called for. Once again the

judges’ pronouncement of their punishment revealed more

vividly than their written judgment their efforts to be

just.

■^^Court Order and Memorandum of 12 December 1949, pertaining to Veesenmayer1s appeal, in ibid., pp. 970-72. For the sentencing of Veesenmayer, see ibid., pp. 866-67. 125 Dissenting opinion of Judge Powers in ibid., pp. 905, 917, 927.

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CONCLUSION: EVALUATIONS OF THE DEFENDANTS

AND THE TRIAL

The historian can evaluate the defendants on three

different levels: the legal, the moral, and the personal

or psychological. Was there sufficient proof by accepted

legal standards to punish individuals? Even if defendants

did participate in an illegal activity, did they do so for

morally plausible reasons? Or, on the other hand, did some

defendants break no law, but behave in morally repugnant

ways? Finally, how did the defendants see themselves?

The question may be irrelevant from a legal standpoint, but

it has a bearing on our understanding of the Foreign Office

officials and the Foreign Office itself.

In analyzing the trial, I have associated legal guilt

with signed documents or open admissions in court- The

discussion in court and the testimony of Erich Albrecht, the

former head of the Foreign Office's Legal Department,

suggested that an initial or signature was conclusive evidence

that an official had seen an incoming or outgoing document.

This seems, from a legal perspective, a valid criterion for

determining the defendants' knowledge. However, the two

268

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majority judges did not stick to this standard, citing as

proof of knowledge evidence which lacked initials. I would

generally agree with their findings even though I would

often disagree with their choice of evidence. I would agree

with their findings because conclusive proof exists which

they sometimes also cited and sometimes failed to cite.

WeizsMcker, Woermann, Erdmannsdorff, and Steengracht--

four of the six defendants implicated in the deportations--

initialed documents which either revealed mass killings out­

side the concentration camps or hinted broadly at murderous

conditions within the camps. These documents, plus the fact

that the deportations violated the spirit of the Hague

Convention of 1907,^ prevented the defendants from credibly

pleading ignorance as a cause for acquittal. The fifth

defendant, Ritter, did not initial the several revealing

documents directed to the Foreign Office through him. It is

plausible that he read these documents, but in the absence

of his initial this remains unproven. However, Mackeben, a

credible witness, testified in court that in 1942 he discussed

1-See the specific language of article 52 annexed to the Fourth Hague Convention of 1907, in U.S., Statutes at Large, vol. 36, pt. 2 (March 1909--March 1911), p. 2308: "Requisitions in kind and services shall not be demanded from municipalities or inhabitants except for the needs of the army of occupation. They shall be in proportion to the resources of the country. . . . "Such requisitions and services shall only be demanded on the authority of the commander in the locality occupied."

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the Einsatzgruppen killings with Ritter. The sixth

defendant, Veesenmayer, dispatched from Budapest telegrams

which belied the official reasons for the Hungarian deporta­

tions— reasons of security and labor needs. He also sent

reports of rumors among Hungarian officials (Bethlen and

Schilling) that mass murder was taking place. While the

copies of the key Veesenmayer documents presented in court

only bore his typed signature, he did not deny his author­

ship. His defense rested on his interpretation of his

telegrams. For example, he asserted that the rumors of mass

killings were unconvincing and were, in fact, disavowed by

their reputed source. Veesenmayer's defense convinced

Judge Powers, but it did not convince Judges Maguire and

Christianson, nor does it convince me.

Guidelines to determine legal responsibility were

provided by the oral or written testimony of the expert

witnesses Hans Peters, Erich Kaufmann, Johann Georg Lohmann,

and Hermann Davidsen. The state secretary, if asked his

opinion on the deportations, had the obligation to give

advice according to the standards of international law. The

head of the Political Department had the obligation, at least,

to give sound political advice. Weizs&cker's and Woermann's

initialing of a document which requested approval of a

deportation made them accountable for that approval. Veesen­

mayer was also legally responsible for his promotion of the

deportation program in Hungary, as revealed in his documents.

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Steengracht1s conviction for his participation in the

Hungarian deportations was less convincing. The Tribunal

cited documents in which Steengracht failed to disapprove

of the general deportation program, rather than citing

documents which endorsed or furthered a specific deportation.

Erdmannsdorff and Ritter were acquitted because of lack of

evidence of direct participation in the deportations. Their

positions in the government allowed them to avoid involve­

ment. Unlike the state secretary or the head of the

Political Department, they were not asked to endorse govern­

ment policy. Nor did their assignments involve them

directly in the deportations, as did Veesenmayer's.

Bohle and Keppler were indirectly punished for

atrocities against the Jews. They were both convicted of

membership in the SS,^ an organization declared criminal by

the IMT. The SS was actively involved in the deportation of

Jews, but there was no evidence presented that either Bohle

or Keppler participated in this facet of the SS program.

This guilt by association was fabricated by Nuremberg law in

order to punish people like Bohle and Keppler--people who

allegedly supported Nazi policies, but whose individual con­

tributions to these policies could not easily be proved. No

one can quarrel with a denunciation of the SS, but to punish

its members for its crimes, rather than for their individual

crimes, is contrary to Western standards of justice. For

these convictions, one must blame the framers of Nuremberg

^Ministries case judgment in TWC, 14:856, 858,

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To sum up my evaluation of the legal treatment of the

Foreign Office defendants on the deportation issue:

Weizsficker, Woermann, and Veesenmayer were justifiably

convicted. The same can be said about Steengracht, but

with some hesitation. Erdmannsdorff and Ritter were right­

fully acquitted. Bohle and Keppler were punished for the

deportations indirectly and unjustly.

A moral judgment of these individuals can be quite

different from a legal judgment of them. My moral evalua­

tion of the defendants follows, beginning with the most

worthy individual and proceeding in a descending order.

Weizs&cker appears as a tarnished hero. He sincerely

wanted to serve his country and promote peace by remaining

in office, but deluded himself on what he could accomplish.

At his trial Weizs&cker displayed mental inflexibility, a

trait which may have been his most serious flaw. The former

state secretary believed that he had done the best he could

during the Nazi regime. An example of this attitude is the

following comment from his redirect examination: "I may have

made mistakes in individual political questions, but on the

whole I would have to act exactly in the same way again

today." A statement made by Weizsacker moments earlier

creates the impression, whether true or not, that he thought

that the Holocaust, horrible as it was, was less horrible

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than a Etirope dominated by communism. Becker had asked him:

"So you did not wish for Germany's defeat in order to get

rid of Hitler?" Weizs&cker replied: "I never wished that

because that would have meant bringing about a catastrophe

artificially and just this would have been treachery to

Europe." Weizshcker's rigidity and his unwillingness to be

judged by others^ makes him a less sympathetic figure than

he otherwise would have been, given his resistance efforts.

Even Kempner, who remains one of Weizshcker's staunchest

critics, implied at one point in a recent interview that a

more contrite WeizsHcker might have gained some sympathy

from him. Kempner remarked: "I always thought if he would

come out and say I was under this regime, these things

happened, here I am, I am terribly sorry, . . ."^

The three other career diplomats can be lumped together.

Erdmannsdorff, Ritter, and Woermann were bureaucrats who

basically did their jobs and looked the other way. They were

neither heroes nor villains. They behaved as many people

would have under similar circumstances.

3 Weizshcker testimony, 21 June 1948; Transcripts, pp. 9443-44; M897, roll 9.

^An example of this attitude is the following undated note written by WeizsA'cker during his trial: "Whether I at any given time went to the limit of the possible, that is of my possibility to be effective, only I myself can judge." In Weizsd'cker Papiere, ed. Hill, p. 434.

^Interview with Robert M. W. Kempner, Frankfurt am Main, 13 July 1979.

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Steengracht seems less estimable than Woermann and

the others, if only because he sought high office under the

Nazis, while they merely tried to preserve already established

careers. Steengracht does seem to have done more to oppose

the Nazis than any other defendant except Weizs&cker. There

are, however, varying degrees of corroboration of his claims.

Furthermore, he impresses me as a crafty, boastful individual.

His story about trying to help the conspirators of 20 July

1944 is credible, for it is supported by the widows of some

of the conspirators. However, he seems to have exaggerated

his role in the issuance of protective passes to Hungarian

Jews. His claim to have added zeros to numbers, and thereby

saved thousands rather than hundreds, ultimately rests on

his testimony alone.

The three remaining defendants remained loyal to the

Nazi movement until the end of the regime. Bohle was the

most appealing individual of this group. Although he was

a visible Nazi leader in the 1930s, because of his relative

youth and the prestige of the AO, he became less obtrusive

and more innocuous with the passage of time. He appeared

at the trial as the one remorseful defendant, pleading,

guilty to membership in a criminal organization. Although

his guilty plea was based on his knowledge of criminal g activities by the SS and the Nazi Leadership Corps, he

Gombel's closing statement in behalf of Bohle, 15 November 1948; Transcripts, pp. 27555, 27557; M897, roll 23.

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denied explicit knowledge of the death camps.^ There is

a measure of plausibility to Bohle's claim. His removal in

1941 from an active role in the bureaucracy suggests that

his exposure to Nazi crimes may have been less than the

exposure of his codefendants. Keppler impresses me as an

unsavory but relatively harmless individual. Whatever signi­

ficance he may have had as Hitler's diplomatic messenger

to Vienna and Bratislava, this was dissipated by the time the

deportations began. Yet, Keppler heard one of the more

candid wartime revelations of the "final solution." He was

present at Himmler's infamous Poznan speech to the SS

generals, in which the SS leader spoke of "the extermination

of the Jewish race," of "100 corpses . . . lying side by O side, or 500, or 1,000." Keppler denied that Himmler had

ever said such a thing, despite the fact that a recording of

Q Himmler's speech was played in court. While Keppler faded

into the background during the war years, the career of his

protegd Veesenmayer flourished. As German minister to

Hungary in 1944, Veesenmayer became an unequivocally villainous

figure.

^Bohle testimony, 23 July 1948; Transcripts, pp. 13523-25; M897, roll 13. A portion of this testimony is in TWC, 13:1203-4. Q Himmler speech at Poznan, 4 October 1943; prosecution exhibit 2368; M897/43/0926. For an English translation, which is quoted above, see TWC, 13:323. Q Keppler testimony, 2 September 1948; Transcripts, pp. 19592-93; M897, roll 17.

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In making moral evaluations of the defendants, it is

easy to presume that they knew more about the regime's

atrocities than could be legally proved. For example, it

is probable that Weizs&cker and Woermann were informed by

one means or another of the Wannsee protocol. On the other

hand, it is possible that the defendants knew less than they

should have known, and even less than the law said they knew.

They may have known less because psychologically they refused

to recognize the obvious. Thus Keppler may have mentally

blocked out Himmler's words at Poznan. Keppler would have

less trouble with the recording at the trial, since that day

he was not in court and could console himself with the belief

that the record was not geiiuine.^ Earlier, in 1945, Keppler

had impressed his captors as a person who had emerged from

the war ignorant of Nazi crimes. The following comment was

made after he was interrogated: "One would say that he

[Keppler] had been genuinely distressed by later revelations

[of the concentration camps] and is at a loss to place the 11 responsibility on any particular individual." Selective

amnesia may also explain WeizsHcker's comment to his lawyers

that he had not read the Einsatzgruppen reports, or his

inability in court to remember whether he had read them.

■^Keppler testimony, 3 September 1948; ibid., pp. 19696-97.

■^Merno entitled "Keppler, Wilhelm - Secretary of State in the Office of the Four-Year Plan" and dated 21 July 1945; M679/2/0363.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 277

All this is speculation, but there are examples of

individuals' psychological inability to remember or recognize

the existence of mass murder. The historian Louis de Jong

relates an incident of this nature. Three Dutch doctors

"were visibly shaken" in 1944 when they received a detailed

account of Auschwitz, but two of the doctors could not recall 12 the event after the war. The psychiatrist Robert Jay

Lifton, in doing research on German doctors who were involved

in Nazi crimes, found that the doctors adopted defense

mechanisms against recognition of their association with

those crimes.

The defendants did not need lapses of memory to perceive

themselves as innocent and wronged men. If the purpose of

the trial was to create remorse among the defendants, it

failed to achieve this with any of them, with the apparent

exception of Bohle. Veesenmayer, appearing as a witness

at a hearing sometime after his imprisonment, said that he

did not know why he had been convicted at Nuremberg.^

Weizs&'cker ’ s strong belief in his own innocence is expressed

in his Memoirs: "How could a case be brought against me

because I had remained in office in order to prevent war

breaking out and afterwards to shorten the war?"'*'3 In

12 Louis de Jong, "The Netherlands and Auschwitz," Yad Vashem Studies 7 (1968): 46-47.

13Time, 25 June 1979, p. 68.

■^Conversation with Robert M. W. Kempner, Frankfurt am Main, 13 July 1979.

■^WeizsMcker, Memoirs, p. 309.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 278

Landsberg prison, Weizs£cker reflected that the injustice

of his trial (as he perceived it) extended to others:

Most of his [Weizs&cker was writing in the third person] fellow inmates are upright men, obviously guiltless and quite unfairly punished. . . . most of the cases are simpler and clearer than the case of W. [Weizs&cker] , in which one must fathom somewhat deeper, in order to •understand him.^6

The trial did give the defendants the opportunity to

explain, through their own testimony and through affidavits,

why they had done what they did. The result may not absolve

them of guilt, but it makes the majority of them more than

one-dimensional figures who coldly carried out orders with

total indifference to the fate of the victims of Nazism.

The defendants emerge as more human--more human in the sense

that they were trying to cope with an extraordinary situation

without sacrificing either their safety or their desire to

serve their country.

If the trial record softens the picture of individual

Foreign Office defendants without condoning their behavior,

the same can be said about the Foreign Office as an institution.

When one synthesizes the diverse elements of the German

Foreign Office into a composite, one does not see the transfor­

mation of a legitimate institution into a criminal one.

Instead one sees a governmental department which valiantly

attempted to perform its traditional functions amidst revolu­

tionary circumstances. This persistent pursuit of normality

16 WeizsMcker undated note (probably from July 1949), in Weizsgcker Papiere, ed. Hill, p. 456.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 279

and respectability was, however, the quintessential intel­

lectual and moral failing of the Wilhelmstrasse, and the

path to legal accusations against some of its members. The

Foreign Office as a whole failed to see that vastly changed

circumstances altered the rules, priorities, and

responsibilities by which it functioned. ^

There is another perspective, other than that of the

Foreign Office or the Foreign Office defendant, from which

to evaluate the Ministries trial. This is the perspective

of the hundreds of thousands of Jews whose deportations and

deaths implicated the Foreign Office, The justice due the

victims of this unprecedented crime necessitated that

individual bureaucrats be called to account for their part

in the crime, regardless of the fact that any attempt to

judge the bureaucrats would ultimately have its flaws.

The Ministries trial certainly was an imperfect

vehicle to pursue justice in the matter of the deportations.

The trial was conducted by human beings, all of whom had

their own prejudices and their own weaknesses in dealing with

an unparalleled situation. The Tribunal was compelled to

■^A similar view is expressed by Margret Boveri, the German journalist who observed part of the Ministries trial. M s . Boveri writes: "What one could perhaps really reproach Weizs&cker and his circle with--not legally, but politically-- is the fact that they neither had the imagination nor the cynicism to employ the coarse methods of their time for the achievement of their decent goals." Boveri, Diplomat vor Gericht, p. 21.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 280

apply a substantive law and a procedural law, which at

times obstructed rather than facilitated the pursuit of

truth. In the end, the Ministries trial, despite its

mistakes and imperfections, served a beneficial function.

It made the point that, in matters of fundamental morality,

diplomatic officials should not only be responsible to

their own governments but also to the international

community.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. APPENDIX

GUIDE TO IDENTIFICATION OF SELECTED INDIVIDUALS

WHO ARE MENTIONED MORE THAN ONCE

I have provided some facts on each person when he or

she is first mentioned in the dissertation. The information

usually has not been repeated when there is a second

reference to a person. If the individual is relatively

obscure and there is a substantial interval between the

first and second references, the reader might want to take

another look at the information. This appendix lists the

page, or page and foot number, where the information can

be found.

Albrecht, Erich, p. 122 Berger, Gottlob, p. 11 Bethlen, Bela, p. 225 Blank, Margarete, p. 40 Boveri, Margret, p. 47, n. 1 Bruns, Georg Viktor, p. 55, n. 28 Davidsen, Hermann, p. 188, n. 76 Eisenlohr, Ernst, p. 40, n. 25; p. 43, n. 34 Etzdorf, Hasso von, p. 52, n. 19 Gaus, Friedrich, p. 66, n. 51 Gottfriedsen, Bernd, p. 39, n. 24 Grell, Horst, pp. 224-25 Hencke, Andor, p. 38, n. 19 Herwarth, Hans von, p. 38, n. 19 Hezinger, Adolf, pp. 224-25 Kastner, Reszo, p. 222 Kaufmann, Erich, p. 185 Kessel, Albrecht von, p. 94 Kroll, Hans, p. 68, n. 53 Lohmann, Johann Georg, p. 193

281

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Mackeben, Wilhelm, p. 43 Melchers, Wilhelm, p. 44, n. 37 Minskoff, Dorothea, p. 165 Nostitz, Gottfried von, p. 61, n, 41 Peters, Hans, p. 184 Schilling, Janos, p. 226 Schlabrendorff, Fabian von, p. 193, n. 91 Schmidt, Paul Otto, p. 39, n. 24 Schmieden, Werner von, p. 40; p. 124 Schnurre, Karl, p. 43, n. 34 Schroeder, Hans, p. 55, n. 28 Sztojay, Dome, p. 221 Thadden, Eberhard von, p. 110 Vogel, Georg, p. 57, n. 32; p. 68, n. 56 Wagner, Horst, p. 110 Winkelmann, Otto, p. 235

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

A. UNPUBLISHED SOURCES

National Archives, Washington, D.C.

Microfilm Publication M897

The vast majority of my research is from Microfilm

Publication M897 entitled "Records of the United States

Nuernberg War Crimes Trials, United States of America v.

Ernst von Weizsaecker et al., December 20, 1947 - April 14,

1949." There is generally an English and a German version

of each segment of the trial records. I have ordinarily

used the_ German version of the prosecution and defense

exhibits, since German was usually che original language of

these documents. In regard to the Transcripts of the trial,

I have used the English version. I have worked with the

following contents of M897.

The Transcripts of the Ministries trial, part of its

Official Record, are contained in sixty-five volumes which

have been microfilmed on rolls 2-24 of M897. Useful items

in the Transcripts include the testimony of key witnesses,

the testimony of the Foreign Office defendants, and closing

arguments.

283

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 284

The prosecution exhibits, mainly documents from the

time of the Third Reich, are arranged by exhibit number in

rolls 25-57. A large percentage of the documents submitted

against the Foreign Office defendants are from the German

Foreign Office.

The defense documents consist of a variety of material,

but a majority of the documents are affidavits. The documents

are arranged on the M897 rolls alphabetically by defendant

and numerically by exhibit number. The exhibits of the

Foreign Office defendants can be found on rolls 101, 103,

105, 114-20.

The prosecution and the defense briefs sum up--sometimes

in a pertinent manner, at other times in a distorted manner--

the evidence presented at the trial. The prosecution

briefs (in English) relevant to the Foreign Office defendants

are on rolls 137-39. The defense briefs (in German) relating

to the diplomatic defendants are on rolls 152-53, 156-59.

The Official Record of the Ministries case contains

forty volumes in addition to the sixty-five volumes of the

Transcripts. The Minute. Book and the Official Court File

are part of this additional material. The Minute Book

(volumes 66-67 of the Official Record, located in roll 162

of M897) is a day-by-day chronology of the Ministries trial.

The Official Court File (volumes 68-87 of the Official

Record, rolls 162-68 of M897) can be subdivided further.

There are the trial motions and the subsequent orders of the

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 286

Court (volumes 68-80, rolls 162-66). This incorporates

useful information on procedural matters, such as the

cross-examination of affiants. There are also the post-trial

arguments regarding alleged errors in the judgment (volumes

82-87, rolls 166-68).

In this dissertation I have identified the prosecution

and defense exhibits by their exhibit numbers, as the trial

records have been arranged by exhibit number. But both

sets of exhibits also have document numbers, and historians

have frequently cited Nuremberg prosecution documents by

their document number. Should anyone want to find the

document number of any prosecution or defense exhibit from

the Ministries trial, he can consult the Prosecution Exhibit

Index or the Defense Exhibit Index. Both indexes are

located in volume 81 of the Official Record. The microfilm

of volume 81 is on roll 166 of M897.

Microfilm Publication M1019

Microfilm Publication M1019, entitled "Records of the

United States Nuernberg War Crimes Trials Interrogations,

1946-1949," includes the pre-trial interrogations of the

Foreign Office defendants. The interrogations in M1019 are

arranged alphabetically by the name of the individual who

was interrogated. The interrogations of the Foreign Office

defendants can be found in rolls 8, 16, 34, 58, 71, 75,

78, and 80 of M1019.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 286

Microfilm Publication T1139

The prosecution selected its 4,380 exhibits from a

wider body of documents, organized into several series.

The series most pertinent to the Foreign Office defendants

if the NG (Nuremberg - government) series. It consists of

5,890 items which have been reproduced on Microfilm

Publication T1139. A few documents from T1139, which were

not used as exhibits in the Ministries trial, have been

cited in this dissertation.

Microfilm Publication T301

Microfilm Publication T301 contains the NI

(Nuremberg - industrial) series of prosecution documents.

I have consulted the NI series in regard to my biographical

sketch of Wilhelm Keppler.

All of the material discussed up to now is part of

the National Archives' World War II War Crimes Records, which

is designated Record Group 238.

Microfilm Publication T120

The thousands of documents collected by the prosecution

at Nuremberg is a small percentage of German Foreign Office

documents in existence. A broader collection of Foreign

Office documents than the Nuremberg compilation is Microfilm

Publication T120, which is entitled "Records of the German

Foreign Office Received by the Department of State." For a

bibliographical guide to T120, see George 0. Kent,

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 287

A Catalogue of Files and Microfilms of the German Foreign

Ministry Archives 1920-1945, 4 vols. (Stanford: The Hoover

Institution, 1962-72). T120 is part of the National Archives'

Collection of Seized Enemy Records, 1941-, Record Group

242.

Microfilm Publication M679

Microfilm Publication M679 is entitled "Records of

the Department of State Special Interrogation Mission to

Germany, 1945-1946." It includes interrogations of several

of the Foreign Office defendants as well as interrogations

of other Foreign Office personnel. M679 belongs to the

National Archives' General Records of the Department of

State, which is Record Group 59.

Interviews

My research has included interviews with the following

people:

1. Hellmut Becker (chief counsel for the defendant

Weizsacker), Berlin, 16 July 1979

2. Robert M. W. Kempner (deputy chief prosecutor),

Frankfurt am Main, 13 July 1979

3. Warren E. Magee (co-counsel for Weizsacker),

Washington, D.C., 23 January 1979

4. Lucille Petterson (research analyst for the

Office of Chief of Counsel for War Crimes), Washington, D.C.,

11 December 1974

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 288

5. Carl Friedrich von Weizsacker (son of the

defendant Weizsacker), Socking bei Stamberg, 11 July 1979

I have tape recordings of all of these interviews

except Ms. Petterson's, and she later confirmed my notes

of the interview with her. I have also occasionally cited

statements made by Dr. Kempner during a long conversation

which preceded my taped interview with him. In my footnotes

I have labeled Dr. Kempner's unrecorded statements as a

"conversation," thereby distinguishing them from taped or

confirmed statements which are designated as an "interview."

B. PRIMARY SOURCES

Akten zur deutschen auswartigen Politik 1918-1945: aus dem

Archiv des Auswartigen Amts. Series E: 1941-1945.

6 vols. Edited by Hans Rothfels et al. Gottingen:

Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1969-79.

Additional volumes are planned for this series. In this dissertation, second or later references to this work are abbreviated as ADAP, E.

Benton, Wilbourn E., and Grimm, Georg, eds. Nuremberg:

German Views of the War Trials. Dallas: Southern

Methodist University Press, 1955.

Boveri, Margret. Per Diplomat vor Gericht. Berlin:

Minerva-Verlag, 1948.

Burckhardt, Carl J. Meine Danziger Mission, 1937-1939.

Munich: G. D. W. Callwey, 1960.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 289

"Commission on the Responsibility of the Authors of the War

and on Enforcement of Penalties. Report Presented to

the Preliminary Peace Conference.” In American Journal

of International Law, 14 (1920): 95-154.

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ambassades, 1936-1939. Paris: Hachette, 1950.

Davignon, Jacques. Berlin 1936-1940: souvenirs d'une mission.

Paris: Editions universitaires, 1951.

Documents on German Foreign Policy. 1918-1945, from the Archives

of the German Foreign Ministry. Series C. 5 vols.

Edited by Paul R. Sweet et al. Washington, D.C.:

U.S. Government Printing Office, 1957-66. Series D.

13 vols. Edited by Raymond J. Sontag et al. Washington,

D.C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1949-64.

Series C covers the years 1933-36 and Series D basically covers the years 1937-41.

Franqois-Poncet, Andre. The Fateful Years: Memoirs of a

French Ambassador in Berlin, 1931-1938. Translated

by Jacques Le Clercq. New York: Harcourt, Brace,

1949.

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Straus, 1947.

Hassell, Ulrich von. The Von Hassell Diaries, 1938-1944:

The Story of the Forces against Hitler inside Germany

as Recorded by Ambassador Ulrich von Hassell, a Leader

of the Movement. Translated and edited by Hugh Gibson.

London: H. Hamilton, 1948.

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Henderson, Nevile. Failure of a Mission: Berlin 1937-1939.

New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1940.

Hilberg, Raul, ed. Documents of Destruction: Germany and

Jewry, 1933-1945. Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1971.

Hill, Leonidas E., ed. Die Weizsacker Papiere 1933-1950.

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History of the United Nations War Crimes Commission. Compiled

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chairman of the Commission. London: His Majesty's

Stationery Office, 1948.

Hitler, Adolf. Mein Kampf. New York: Reynal & Hitchcock,

1939 edition.

Kelley, Douglas M. 22 Cells in Nuremberg: A Psychiatrist

Examines the Nazi Criminals. New York: Greenberg, 1947.

Kempner, Robert M. W. Das Dritte Reich im Kreuzverhor. Aus

den unveroffentlichen Vernehmungsprotokollen des

Anklagers Robert M. W. Kempner. Munich: Bechtle Verlag,

1969.

______. Eichmann und Komplicen. Zurich: Europa Verlag, 1961.

Kordt, Erich. Nicht aus den Akten . . . Die Wilhelmstrasse

in Frieden und Krieg: Erlebnisse, Begegnungen und

Eindrttcke, 1928-1945. Stuttgart: Union Deutsche

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Germany, 1945-1949. 2 vols. Bloomington: Indiana

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Stimson, Henry L., and Bundy, McGeorge. On Active Service

In Peace and War. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1948.

Taylor, Telford. Final Report to the Secretary of the Army

on the Nuernberg War Crime Trials under Control

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1 October 1946. 42 vols. Nuremberg: Secretariat of

the International Military Tribunal, 1947-49.

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Das Urteil im Wilhelmstrassen-Prozess: Per amtliche Wortlaut der

ft Entscheidung im Fall Nr. 11 des Nurnberger

M If Militartribunals gegen von Weizsacker und andere, mit

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abweichender Urteilsbegrundung, Berichtigungsbeschlussen,

den grundlegenden Gesetzesbestimmungen, einem Verzeichnis

der Gerichtspersonen und Zeugen. Einfuhrungen von

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Gmund: A. Burger, 1950.

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University Press, 1972.

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D. ARTICLES

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