Operation Sophia: Tackling the Refugee Crisis with Military Means

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30 2015 © European External Action Service Action External © European Operation Sophia Tackling the refugee crisis with military means by Thierry Tardy

The EU anti-migrant smuggling operation in the one component of the Comprehensive Approach Mediterranean sea – known as ‘EUNAVFOR Med’ towards both the refugee crisis and restoring sta- or ‘Operation Sophia’ – is now entering its opera- bility in Libya. tional phase, aimed at boarding and seizing on the high seas vessels suspected of being used for A phased mandate human smuggling and trafficking. This follows a first phase of intelligence gathering on smuggling Operation Sophia was established by the EU networks and is intended to precede operations Council on 18 May 2015 to respond to the surge due to take place within the territorial waters of of migrants crossing the Mediterranean Sea from Libya as well as coercive actions against the smug- Libya. It came after a series of mass drownings glers – including on Libyan soil. and the ‘strong commitment to act’ pledged by the Council following the death of 800 migrants This military component of the EU response to after a boat capsized off the Libyan coast on 19 the migrant and refugee crisis is innovative in dif- April. The operation’s mandate is to contribute ferent ways. Following the anti-piracy operation to the ‘disruption of the business model of hu- in the Gulf of Aden (Atalanta), EUNAVFOR Med man smuggling and trafficking networks in the confirms the maritime dimension of CSDP in the Southern Central Mediterranean’ by ‘efforts to management of new types of security threats. identify, capture and dispose of vessels used or The operation also brings CSDP closer to the suspected of being used by smugglers.’ The op- EU internal security portfolio and its Freedom, eration focuses on smugglers rather than on the Security and Justice (FSJ) agenda. rescue of the migrants themselves, even though actions to prevent further loss of life at sea are a Finally, EUNAVFOR Med is the first CSDP op- visible part of the mandate. eration with a potential openly coercive mandate which, if implemented, would lead the EU The objective is less to stop migration flows than to engage in ‘peace enforcement’-type activities. to disrupt smuggling routes and capabilities This said, just like all other CSDP operations, and, hence, reduce the flows originating from EUNAVFOR Med needs to be seen as one ele- the Libyan coast, which has been (together with ment of a broader multidimensional response, as the eastern route) the main point of departure

European Union Institute for Security Studies September 2015 1 of migrants coming to Europe. During the first to last one year after having reached its full op- half of 2015, according to the International erational capability, i.e. until July 2016, and Organisation for Migration (IOM), 67,600 mi- is composed of less than ten vessels, together grants took the Central Mediterranean route with air and intelligence gathering assets. The to Italy. Tragically, this itinerary has been the coercive phase of the mandate will also require deadliest one, with at least 1,820 fatalities in ‘boarding teams’ with special force units. the same period. Twenty-one countries have participated in The Crisis Management Concept for the op- the first phase of the operation, and Belgium, eration draws on the analysis provided by the Germany, France, Spain and the United Kingdom EEAS planning document called the Political have each committed a frigate for the second Framework for Crisis Approach (PFCA) that one. As the lead nation, Italy has provided its was carried out for Libya in April 2015 and aircraft-carrier Cavour as well as a submarine which deals with the broader Libyan chal- and other maritime assets. Maritime patrol air- lenges. In this sense it is supposed to be part craft are provided by Spain, Luxembourg and of the EU Comprehensive Approach towards France. The common costs of the operation, fi- the Southern Mediterranean but also part of a nanced by the Athena mechanism, amount to broader reaction to the migrant crisis. €11.82 million for the one-year mandate. EUNAVFOR Med reached its full operational The internal/external security nexus capability on 27 July 2015 but the operation will be conducted in three sequential phases. CSDP was initially designed as a tool for cri- The first phase consisted of gathering informa- sis management outside of the EU. As such it tion on the human trafficking networks; the was conceptually and operationally distinct second phase involves conducting boarding, from the range of policy responses that aim at search, seizure and diversion on the high seas tackling internal security issues such as terror- of vessels used for human smuggling, and then ism, organised crime or illegal migration. The doing the same in the territorial and internal Lisbon Treaty stated that CSDP ‘may contrib- waters of Libya, provided that the EU obtains a ute to the fight against terrorism, including by mandate from the UN Security Council or the supporting third countries in combating ter- consent of the Libyan authorities (the Council rorism in their territories’ (art.43.1), and a few decision does not ex- operations – especially plicitly mention Libya in the Balkans – have but refers to the ‘coast- ‘Twenty-one countries have participated indeed implicitly es- al State concerned’). in the first phase of the operation, tablished a bridge be- According to the EU, tween external and in- the information col- and Belgium, Germany, France, Spain ternal security. Efforts lected during the first have also been made phase has shown that and the United Kingdom have each to strengthen ties be- on about twenty oc- committed a frigate for the second one.’ tween CSDP and FSJ casions in the past affairs (the ‘CSDP-FSJ few weeks, traffickers Roadmap’), but the could have been arrested. two domains have remained operationally distinct. In the third phase, still under a UNSC resolution or conditional on Libyan consent, the op- Operation Sophia is the first operation that ex- eration can take ‘all necessary measures against plicitly brings together the internal and external a vessel and related assets, including through security agendas, in the sense that an internal disposing of them or rendering them inoper- security and societal challenge is partly han- able’ in the territory of Libya. Transition be- dled – in terms of prevention and mitigation tween phases is to be decided by the Political – through an action that takes place outside of and Security Committee following a request by the EU. Practically, this nexus also implies closer the Operation Commander. cooperation between the military operation and FSJ agencies such as EUROPOL or FRONTEX The Operational Headquarters – in charge of (including the latter’s own operation Triton both planning and command – are located in which is active off the Italian coast). In other Rome, under the lead of Italian Rear Admiral words, the internal/external security nexus also Enrico Credendino. The operation is supposed generates civilian-military interaction.

European Union Institute for Security Studies September 2015 2 What peace enforcement? main international powers, within the Security Council and beyond. This could be challenged One potentially innovative feature of were EU operations to shift to more coercive EUNAVFOR Med is its option to apply coercion. activities. The operation’s mandate provides for the possibility of resorting to What legal basis? force against ‘spoilers’ in a way that had nev- ‘...the remit of EU crisis management CSDP military op- er been contemplated operations has traditionally been the erations are legally in previous CSDP launched on the ba- military operations. object of a broad consensus among sis of a combination More precisely, the au- of an EU Council de- thorisation to ‘take all the main international powers, within cision and either an necessary measures’ the Security Council and beyond. This invitation by the host against a vessel and state or a UNSC reso- related assets, includ- could be challenged were EU operations lution under Chapter ing through ‘disposing to shift to more coercive activities.’ VII of the UN Charter. of them or rendering Ongoing operations them inoperable’, and Althea in Bosnia and this after a phase of intelligence gathering, im- Atalanta in the Gulf of Aden as well as in the past plies that the operation will proactively chase EUFOR RCA, the two operations in the DRC the smugglers and possibly resort to force (2003 and 2006) and the one in Chad (2008- against them in cases other than self-defence. 09) were created on the basis of a Chapter VII UNSC resolution. Other military operations, like Atalanta or EUFOR RCA, contain a coercive dimension – The two EUTMs in Somalia and Mali and to defeat pirates in the case of Atalanta and as EUMAM RCA were established at the request part of the civilian protection mandate in the of the host states. In all these cases, however, case of EUFOR RCA. Yet these operations do the host government has consented to the EU (or did) not proactively target groups that do deployment – not a sine qua non condition in not constitute threats to local actors or the op- the case of EUNAVFOR Med, since a UNSC eration itself. Also, EUNAVFOR Med’s mandate Resolution is said to be legally sufficient for the envisions deploying assets on the territory of a most robust phase of the operation. Politically, sovereign state without its consent (if the UN though, the combination of Libya’s consent and Security Council so allows), which has never UNSC backing is still sought. been the case in previous military operations. As of late September 2015, neither the consent In other words, while the EU had so far ad- of a still unformed Libyan government of na- hered to the crisis management principles of tional unity nor a UNSC resolution had been consent, limited coercion and relative imparti- obtained. Libya’s internationally recognised ality for its own CSDP operations, EUNAVFOR government (based in Tobruk) has so far re- Med’s mandate contains the possibility of the fused the deployment of the EU operation in EU going beyond these principles and coming its internal waters and, a fortiori, on land. close to a peace enforcement situation. In and by itself, this constitutes a qualitative shift in At the UN Security Council, EU member states the EU’s security and defence posture. have faced the opposition of Russia, so far still hiding behind Libya’s position but also unwilling As a matter of fact, the ‘peace enforcement’ di- to repeat the ‘blank cheque’ experience resulting mension of EUNAVFOR Med helps explain the from the March 2011 UNSC Resolution, which difficulty in securing a UN Security Council authorised ‘all necessary measures’ to protect (UNSC) resolution authorising the mission, civilians under threat of attack by the Libyan and more specifically Russia’s opposition to the armed forces but which was, from Russia’s per- EU plan. In the past, existing tensions within spective, abused by Western countries intent on the UNSC never prevented the EU from ob- overthrowing Qaddafi. Discussions in Europe taining a resolution endorsing its various mili- have partly focused on the most strategically tary operations. Indeed the remit of EU crisis opportune moment to approach the Russians management operations has traditionally been and on the price that securing their support the object of a broad consensus among the could entail.

European Union Institute for Security Studies September 2015 3 In the event that UN-led negotiations on the for- is contending that it could. If the mission is suc- mation of a government of national unity were cessful, networks would be disrupted and their to be successful, a broad agreement between ability to bring refugees into international wa- Libya and the EU on various cooperation pro- ters severely curtailed, at least from the Libyan grammes could well include the deployment coast and for a certain period. Yet this does not of EUNAVFOR Med in all its dimensions. In mean that the migrants would disappear or that such circumstances, it is likely that the consent all smugglers would be neutralised. A successful of Libya would trump Russia’s opposition and operation may result in a reduction in the flows therefore allow for the adoption of a well-drafted but also lead to a shift in the routes of migrants. UNSC resolution. Indeed the developments of the past few weeks Risks, challenges and achievements have shown how migration itineraries can change and adapt over time depending on a se- Operation Sophia has so far benefited from broad ries of more or less rational factors, including support from EU member states. This will be all weather, safety conditions or the policy respons- the more important as the operation is likely to es that are put in place. Insofar as the objective face a series of challenges that could call into of the operation is to ‘prevent further loss of life question its very relevance. First, there is real at sea’ rather than to stop the migration flows, uncertainty on whether the operation will ever however, it is arguable that a shift from southern be able – for either legal or political reasons – to Mediterranean to continental routes can at least get to the core of its mandate, i.e. neutralising make the journey relatively safer. The operation the smuggling networks through deterrence or is already said to have ‘contributed to saving open coercion, both off the Libyan coast and on- some 1,500 lives at sea.’ shore. But what then is the envisaged end-state for the The non-consent of Libya’s authorities, the ab- operation and how does it relate to longer-term sence of an UNSC Resolution, the non-permis- transition strategies? This is where the resolu- sive nature of the environment and the general tion of the internal situation of Libya comes into reluctance to engage in coercive action on the play as a prerequisite for the eventual success of part of most EU member states are all reasons EUNAVFOR Med. The UN-facilitated political that – individually or collectively – would make dialogue aims to put an end to the civil war and the full implementation of the operation’s man- to allow for the establishment of a national unity date difficult or simply impossible. government. Even with the consent of the Libyan authorities This could then lead to the deployment of a se- and the backing of the Security Council, how- ries of EU-led programmes and operations aimed ever, the mission would still be operationally at backing the intra-Libyan agreement. The po- challenging: only a very few EU member states tential coercive phase of Operation Sophia could are likely to have the skills and experience for only be considered in light of this new situation such missions, let alone the will. Furthermore, and of its possible impact on other future EU the operation could face threats well beyond activities. Needless to say, it would be far better the smugglers alone, especially if its remit is ex- if the traffickers’ networks were disrupted by the tended onshore. For member states to militarily Libyans themselves – although even this would confront those actors – with the related risks of not offer a durable solution to the refugee crisis. incurring casualties and provoking collateral damage – would require solid determination and Finally, the increasingly prominent nexus be- present a significant risk of mission creep, as the tween EU internal and external security poten- smugglers could adapt to the new situation and/ tially brings the scope of the Comprehensive or retaliate. Approach to a new level – no longer only external action-focused but even more wide-ranging. Second, the narrowness of the operation’s mandate How central this will be in the forthcoming EU – i.e. only targeting the traffickers – leaves open Global Strategy remains to be seen. the question of the migrants, the itineraries they take, and how the disruption of the smugglers’ networks can shape their choices to migrate. Thierry Tardy is a Senior Analyst at the EUISS. In and by itself, the operation cannot be a solution to the migrant crisis, and no one in Brussels

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