DOCSLIB.ORG

The Other Edge of Asymmetry: South Africa's Bush War Strategy

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
The Other Edge of Asymmetry: South Africa's Bush War Strategy THE OTHER EDGE OF ASYMMETRY: SOUTH AFRICA’S BUSH WAR STRATEGY Helmoed Römer Heitman1 There is much talk today of “asymmetric warfare”, with scant regard for the fact that it is nothing new Guerrilla wars and terrorism have been around since the beginning of armed conflict. Also, few seem to consider that “asymmetry” works both ways There is nothing that is quite as “asymmetric” as a tank driving over an infantryman. It is this latter aspect of “asymmetric warfare” that this article will explore in the context of the “Bush War”. 1. THE SWAPO INTENT SWAPO’s intention would seem to have been to conduct a classic insurgency, opening with “agitprop” and moving through terrorism to guerrilla operations to, if necessary, conventional war. SWAPO operations through the 1970s and 1980s did not, however, at any time progress much beyond the agitprop/terrorism stage, with only a few sporadic efforts to launch actual guerrilla attacks. The initial failure to advance its campaign can be ascribed in large part to its inability to win any real measure of support in Caprivi, to which it had direct access from bases in Zambia, or Kavango, which it could, with some luck, infiltrate through Caprivi or via the southeast of Angola. That inability was, in its turn, largely a function of local dislike and distrust, rather than the result of any good counter- insurgency strategy on the part of the South African Police or, later, Army. SWAPO’s failure to advance to guerrilla warfare after it had gained indirect access to its ethnic home base in Owambo courtesy of UNITA, can be explained away as a result of the logistic difficulty of mounting operations in Owambo from bases in Zambia. Its continued failure to do so after having gained direct access to Owambo from southern Angola after 1976, is more difficult to explain other than as an outcome of successful operations on the part of the South African security forces. Over a period of twelve years (1976 to 1988) SWAPO was unable to conduct a guerrilla campaign in Owambo: • despite Owambo being its ethnic home base; • despite enjoying strong support from the Soviet Union and others; • despite having direct access across a friendly border; • despite terrain that was exceptionally favourable for hit-and-run type guerrilla attacks – no natural border obstacles, no canalising terrain, no high 1 Defence anylist and author. E-mail: [email protected] 1 JOERNAAL/JOURNAL 34(1) Feb. 2009 ground for OPs, ample bush cover, ample surface water during the rainy season; and • despite a rural population living in scattered kraals, easy to access for agitprop or terrorism, and impossible for the security forces to control or protect. That is to say in spite of having everything in its favour, SWAPO’s failure to advance its campaign into the guerrilla warfare stage is, therefore, remarkable. That suggests that the opposing strategy is worthy of study. 2. THE SOUTH AFRICAN RESPONSE The initial South African response was essentially one of standard counter-insurgency strategies and tactics, mainly executed by the Police. That proved effective against the SWAPO efforts in Caprivi and against its initial effort to begin operations in Owambo. Even after SWAPO’s alliance with the newly active UNITA facilitated its access through southern Angola into Owambo, all that really changed was that the Army took over responsibility for security from the Police, primarily because the latter lacked both the strength and the equipment for a more extended campaign. The strategy and tactics did not change noticeably. The focus of operations throughout those years was on routine patrolling, protection of key points and following up, as best possible, attacks by SWAPO groups. The one additional aspect was that the South Africans were able to conduct some operations to the north of the border from almost the beginning: The Police carried out some small-scale raids against SWAPO bases in south-western Zambia, and the Air Force deployed a number of Alouette III helicopters to support the Portuguese forces operating in the south of Angola, thereby also being able to interdict SWAPO movement to some extent. There was also co-operation between the South African and Portuguese intelligence agencies. The overall tenor of South African operations can, however, be characterised as small groups of infantry walking through the bush carrying heavy packs, looking for SWAPO and, more often than not, not finding them. That pedestrian approach was adequate, if not particularly successful, until the MPLA seized power in Angola in 1976. That changed the strategic picture entirely as a result of the new government allowing SWAPO to establish bases in southern Angola. At a stroke SWAPO’s problems of long approach marches and difficult logistic support were solved: Guerrillas could now dash across the border for an agitprop session, to burn a kraal or to lay some mines, and be back in the safety of a properly defended base in Angola long before the opposing infantry could react. The combination of proximity, favourable terrain and an accessible population faced the South African security forces with an almost impossible operational situation. 2 Heitman • The other edge of asymmetry: South Africa’s Bush War strategy The result was an escalation of attacks in Owambo and sufficient optimism on the part of SWAPO by 1978 to plan a very large-scale incursion into the then South- West Africa with the intention of disrupting the elections scheduled for December of that year, on which South Africa had staked much of its strategy for ridding itself of the SWA albatross in a reasonable period of time and in an acceptable manner. The South Africans had already begun to reconsider their approach to dealing with the SWAPO insurgency, mainly focussed on “winning hearts and minds” on one hand and on improving response times on the other, albeit without too much imagination being shown in that respect. Thoughts of building a “Morice Line” along the 450 km or so of open land border were rejected as being far too costly and requiring too many troops to be effective. There was, thus, clearly a need to come up with a better idea. The key impetus for a new strategy was provided by intelligence of SWAPO’s plans for a large-scale incursion during 1978. 3. A NEW STRATEGY: OFFENCE IS THE BEST DEFENCE The basis for the new offensive strategy had been laid by shallow area reconnaissance and disruption operations, some of which saw the light infantry of 32 Battalion carry out what amounted to guerrilla operations against SWAPO in its supposed safe areas. A further building block was the establishment of the Army’s first true mechanised force – Combat Group Juliet – as a counter to any Angolan Army adventures in the border area. Juliet saw its first action when it carried out a follow-up operation in the wake of one of SWAPO’s few successful guerrilla attacks, during which the guerrillas captured a Sapper who had been stationed at an outlying water point. This was in itself an example that the South African Army was not yet fully “up to speed” in its conduct of the war. 3.1 Pre-emption The impending large-scale incursion into Owambo gave the South Africans pause for thought. Given the nature of the terrain, it would be impossible to stop SWAPO at the border. There could also be no question of allowing them to rampage in Owambo. The one remaining option was to pre-empt the incursion. That pre-emption took the form of Operation Reindeer, which stands out for a number of reasons: • It was the first major cross-border or “external” operation against SWAPO. • It was the first operation against a SWAPO base deep inside Angola. • It saw the first air assault operation ever launched by the SADF. • Reindeer had four main elements: 3 JOERNAAL/JOURNAL 34(1) Feb. 2009 • An air assault against the main headquarters, logistic and training centre of the Peoples Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN) at Cassinga, some 250 km inside Angola, carried out by a reinforced composite parachute battalion. • An attack by a mechanised infantry battalion group (Combat Group Juliet – the later 61 Mechanised Battalion Group) against a complex of forward SWAPO bases in the vicinity of Chetequera, some 30 km inside Angola. • Attacks by two infantry battalions with armoured car and artillery support against forward SWAPO bases in the vicinity of Chatua and Dombondala, some 10 to 15 km inside Angola. • An attack by 32 Battalion (light infantry) with artillery support against SWAPO forward bases in the vicinity of Henhombe, some 15 to 20 km inside Angola. None of Reindeer went quite as planned. The air assault suffered near disaster, as such operations tend to, and the ground attacks suffered their share of delays that enabled some guerrillas to escape, although their bases were razed and quantities of weapons, equipment and stores were lost. The overall effect, however, was shattering: Some 859 guerrillas killed, 202 captured and at least 340 wounded, and valuable intelligence was gained from the documents captured at Cassinga. Also, many of the killed were experienced guerrillas who could not quickly or easily be replaced. The effect of that became visible over the course of the year, when SWAPO’s casualty rate increased as a result of having to employ larger groups of mainly inexperienced guerrillas with a few experienced ones to hold them together. The attacking forces lost six soldiers killed, four of them at Cassinga. The planned large-scale guerrilla incursion never took place. By 1979, however, SWAPO had recovered to a considerable extent, and was preparing for large-scale infiltration of Owambo, as well as having concentrated large numbers of guerrillas for a new attempt to open Caprivi as an active front.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report: Volume 2
    VOLUME TWO Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report The report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission was presented to President Nelson Mandela on 29 October 1998. Archbishop Desmond Tutu Ms Hlengiwe Mkhize Chairperson Dr Alex Boraine Mr Dumisa Ntsebeza Vice-Chairperson Ms Mary Burton Dr Wendy Orr Revd Bongani Finca Adv Denzil Potgieter Ms Sisi Khampepe Dr Fazel Randera Mr Richard Lyster Ms Yasmin Sooka Mr Wynand Malan* Ms Glenda Wildschut Dr Khoza Mgojo * Subject to minority position. See volume 5. Chief Executive Officer: Dr Biki Minyuku I CONTENTS Chapter 1 Chapter 6 National Overview .......................................... 1 Special Investigation The Death of President Samora Machel ................................................ 488 Chapter 2 The State outside Special Investigation South Africa (1960-1990).......................... 42 Helderberg Crash ........................................... 497 Special Investigation Chemical and Biological Warfare........ 504 Chapter 3 The State inside South Africa (1960-1990).......................... 165 Special Investigation Appendix: State Security Forces: Directory Secret State Funding................................... 518 of Organisations and Structures........................ 313 Special Investigation Exhumations....................................................... 537 Chapter 4 The Liberation Movements from 1960 to 1990 ..................................................... 325 Special Investigation Appendix: Organisational structures and The Mandela United
    [Show full text]
  • SADF Military Operations
    SADF Military Operations 1975 -1989 Contents 1 List of operations of the South African Border War 1 2 Operation Savannah (Angola) 3 2.1 Background .............................................. 3 2.2 Military intervention .......................................... 4 2.2.1 Support for UNITA and FNLA ................................ 5 2.2.2 Ruacana-Calueque occupation ................................ 5 2.2.3 Task Force Zulu ........................................ 5 2.2.4 Cuban intervention ...................................... 6 2.2.5 South African reinforcements ................................. 6 2.2.6 End of South African advance ................................ 6 2.3 Major battles and incidents ...................................... 6 2.3.1 Battle of Quifangondo .................................... 7 2.3.2 Battle of Ebo ......................................... 7 2.3.3 “Bridge 14” .......................................... 7 2.3.4 Battle of Luso ......................................... 7 2.3.5 Battles involving Battlegroup Zulu in the west ........................ 8 2.3.6 Ambrizete incident ...................................... 8 2.4 Aftermath ............................................... 8 2.5 South African order of battle ..................................... 9 2.6 Association .............................................. 9 2.7 Further reading ............................................ 9 2.8 References ............................................... 9 3 Operation Bruilof 13 3.1 Background .............................................
    [Show full text]
  • The Controversy of the Battle of Cassinga. Does the Media Provide the Final Answer?
    JOERNAAL/JOURNAL BARNARD THE CONTROVERSY OF THE BATTLE OF CASSINGA. DOES THE MEDIA PROVIDE THE FINAL ANSWER? Leo Barnard* The military hostilities during the years 1966 to 1989 between the military forces of South Africa, the former South West Africa and Unita on the one hand, and Cuba, the Angolese forces and PLAN (People's Liberation Army for Namibia), the military wing of SWAPO, on the other hand, were popularly known as the Border or Bush War. Other authors referred to it as the battle for the independence of Namibia. During these hostilities, the Battle of Cassinga was one of the most decisive battles, especially in respect of military, political and social aspects. Twenty-five years after this battle, it is still of the utmost importance that it is seen in the right perspective. The controversy of the events will, despite the media's efforts to get to the truth, still for years hold the attention of historical researchers. The Battle of Cassinga took place against the above-mentioned background on 4 May 1978 between elements of the South African Air Force as well as a parachute force and elements of PLAN. Cassinga, formerly a mining village, was used by SWAPO as a basis and was situated about 300 km north of the Namibian border. In this paper the focus will mainly be on three principal moments: The controversy over the Battle of Cassinga, its interpretation by the media as well as probable reasons for the way in which the media handled it. From the moment that the Battle of Cassinga took place, it was shrouded in contro- versy.
    [Show full text]
  • The Battle for Cassinga: Conflicting Narratives and Contested Meanings
    The Battle for Cassinga: Conflicting Narratives and Contested Meanings Gary Baines1 Introduction Nearly thirty years ago the name Cassinga (or Kassinga) came to the attention of the world. At the time the name evoked a range of responses, from outrage to grief to the celebration of military bravado. It still does so. And Cassinga will continue to elicit such responses as long as participants and witnesses are alive and the events remain part of living memory. Obviously perpetrators and survivors remember the events of 4 May 1978 differently. Memory is, after all, selective. The recollections of participants and witnesses are framed by personal and political agendas. This much is abundantly clear from the conflicting accounts of Cassinga that appear in the media and literature, especially the exchanges that take place between parties with a stake in how the events are remembered. Thus a report headlined “Battle of Cassinga still rages” published on the 29th anniversary suggested that the events are still shrouded in controversy and that there is no agreement about what transpired in the southern Angolan town.2 The title of this paper reflects my concern with the battle for rather than of Cassinga. The choice of preposition is intended to signify the ongoing contestation over the meaning of Cassinga. The name ‘Cassinga’ is a floating signifier (in the Barthesian sense) that attaches itself to a chain of meanings. Meanings are partly determined by other words with which it is associated. So when Cassinga is used in conjunction with ‘battle’ as in the ‘battle of Cassinga’, it suggests an engagement between two armed forces although war had not actually been declared.
    [Show full text]
  • Half a Century of South African “Border War'' Literature: a Historiographical Exploration
    André Wessels Senior Professor, HALF A CENTURY Department of History, OF SOUTH AFRICAN Faculty of the Humanities, University of the “BORDER WAR’’ LITERATURE: Free State and a Visiting Professor, University of A HISTORIOGRAPHICAL New South Wales at the Australian Defence Force EXPLORATION Academy, Canberra. E-mail: wesselsa@ufs. ac.za Abstract Half a century ago, in 1966, the so-called “Border War” broke out in DOI: https://dx.doi. what was then called South-West Africa (SWA) – known as Namibia org/10.18820/24150509/ after gaining independence in 1990. It was the most comprehensive, JCH42.v2.2 costly and traumatic of all the apartheid wars, and although it focused on SWA/Namibia, the conflict spilled over into Angola and Zambia, ISSN 0258-2422 (Print) and should also be viewed in relation to the role played by the then ISSN 2415-0509 (Online) South African Defence Force (SADF) in Rhodesia/Zimbabwe and in Journal for Contemporary Mozambique. While the War for Southern Africa (1966-1989) was History being fought, a number of books on the conflict were published. In the 2017 42(2):24-47 1990s, while South Africa experienced a decade of dramatic political © UV/UFS changes and concomitant transformation, not many books on the war “up north” and “on the border” were published, but from about the dawn of the new millennium, there has been a steady stream of publications (mostly in South Africa) that deal with the above- mentioned conflict. Why this renewed interest? Who are the authors? What do they write about? This article endeavours to provide answers to these and related questions by analysing half a century of “Border War” literature, primarily focusing on books published in South Africa.
    [Show full text]
  • The History of the Joint Monitoring Commission from the South African Perspective
    Platform for peace: the history of the Joint Monitoring Commission from the South African perspective http://www.aluka.org/action/showMetadata?doi=10.5555/AL.SFF.DOCUMENT.rep19850000.035.017.d1.18 Use of the Aluka digital library is subject to Aluka’s Terms and Conditions, available at http://www.aluka.org/page/about/termsConditions.jsp. By using Aluka, you agree that you have read and will abide by the Terms and Conditions. Among other things, the Terms and Conditions provide that the content in the Aluka digital library is only for personal, non-commercial use by authorized users of Aluka in connection with research, scholarship, and education. The content in the Aluka digital library is subject to copyright, with the exception of certain governmental works and very old materials that may be in the public domain under applicable law. Permission must be sought from Aluka and/or the applicable copyright holder in connection with any duplication or distribution of these materials where required by applicable law. Aluka is a not-for-profit initiative dedicated to creating and preserving a digital archive of materials about and from the developing world. For more information about Aluka, please see http://www.aluka.org Platform for peace: the history of the Joint Monitoring Commission from the South African perspective Author/Creator Military Information Bureau; South African Defence Force Date 1985-00-00 Resource type Reports Language English Subject Coverage (spatial) South Africa, Angola, Namibia, Southern Africa (region), Southern Africa
    [Show full text]
  • Cunene River Bridge, Xangongo Winner
    PROJECT AWARDS: WINNERS AND FINALISTS SAICE – MURRAY & ROBERTS STEEL CATEGORY: INTERNATIONAL PROJECTS XangongoCunene River Bridge, INTRODUCTION 1 The new Cunene River Bridge is an excellent feat of engineering achieved under extremely challenging conditions. The bridge links the major cities of Lubango and Ondjiva in south-western Angola, and replaces a host of tempo- rary structures that were used to span the Cunene River after the last perma- nent structure had been destroyed early in the Angolan conflict. The strategic location of the old bridge as the main link between Angola and other southern African countries made it a prime target during the civil war. The Angolan Roads Agency (INEA) appointed Aurecon, together with its joint venture partners Gabeng and BKS, for the design and preparation of bid documents. This joint venture was also responsible for site supervision. CUNENE RIVER BRIDGE, XANGONGO The Angolan Government invested ap- proximately US$49 million in the project. Construction on the 880 m long bridge WINNER – International Projects category began in January 2007, and its inaugura- tion took place on 14 September 2009. KEY PLAYERS 1 Construction of the new bridge over the Client Institudo de Estradas de Angola Cunene River at Xangongo in Angola – view Professional Team Aurecon in joint venture with BKS and Gabeng of completed concrete substructure Main contractor China Road and Bridges Corporation Civil Engineering | December 2010 89 2 3 Logistical and natural challenges on Hydrology and hydraulics N Reduced construction period required this project included landmines, floods The Cunene River at this location has for launching of structural steel box during the rainy seasons, the width of the a catchment area of 52 400 m2.
    [Show full text]
  • Concerned Governments Angola - Mainly Complaints by Angola Against South Africa's Military Attacks
    UN Secretariat Item Scan - Barcode - Record Title Page 113 Date 06/06/2006 Time 11:29:25 AM S-0902-0005-01-00001 Expanded Number S-0902-0005-01 -00001 Title items-in-Africa - Question of Namibia - concerned governments Angola - mainly complaints by Angola against South Africa's military attacks Date Created 26/02/1979 Record Type Archival Item Container S-0902-0005: Peacekeeping - Africa 1963-1981 Print Name of Person Submit Image Signature of Person Submit / , jl 1 V t L/ •iOV •• .; 138'i No. 134/1981 November 11, 1981 H.E. Dr. Kurt Waldheim Secretary General United Nations, New York Excellency, Attached please find a copy of my communication to the President of the Security Council, which has relevance not only to the sixth anniversary of the independence of the People's Republic of Angola, but also to the aggression Angola continues to face at the hands of the racist apartheid regime in South Africa. The situation poses as serious threat to the peace stability of southern Africa. Accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration. .Isio de Figueiredo 5SADOR PERMANEIS7T REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF ANGOLA TO THE UNITED NATIONS Permanent Mission of The People's Republic of Angola to the United Nations 747 Third Avenue (18th floor) New York, N.Y. 10017 (212)752-4612 No. 133/1981 November 11, 1981 H.E. Mr. Taieb Slim President of the Security Council United Nations New York Excellency, Today, 11 November 1981, the Government and people of the People's Republic of Angola, guided by the Central Commit- tee of the MPLA-Workers Party, are commemorating the sixth an- niversary of their declaration of independence and their free- dom from the oppression and exploitation of five hundred years of colonial domination.
    [Show full text]
  • Angola Water Treatment Plant, Cunene - Water Technology 10/30/15, 11:40 AM
    Angola Water Treatment Plant, Cunene - Water Technology 10/30/15, 11:40 AM Water Technology Market & Customer Insight Log In Request Demo About Market & Customer Insight Missing Plug-in Missing Plug-in Missing Plug-in News, views and contacts from the global Water industry Enter Keyword Search Home Products & Services Company A - Z Projects Features Videos White Papers News Events Advertise With Us Report Store Angola Water Treatment Plant, Cunene, Angola 9 Key Data The Angola Water Treatment Plant (WTP), which started operations in February 2014, supplies water from Xangongo to Ondjiva, located in the province of Cunene in southern Angola. The WTP was built to meet the water needs of the Ondjiva region, which has been facing a major drought for the past two years. The plant runs throughout the year and has a capacity to treat 24.4 million litres of water per day. The project was undertaken by the Ministry of Energy and Water, to provide fresh http://www.water-technology.net/projects/angola-water-treatment-plant-cunene/ Page 1 of 4 Angola Water Treatment Plant, Cunene - Water Technology 10/30/15, 11:40 AM drinking water to approximately 250,000 people of the Cunene province. A joint-venture (JV) between Befesa, the environmental services subsidiary of Abengoa, and Riogersa, a subsidiary of Eurofinsa, was the main contractor for the construction of the plant. The JV was awarded the contract for building a treatment plant and a production system by the Ministry of Energy and Water through its National Water Directorate (NWD). Total cost of the project was estimated at $101m, which was financed by Deutsche Bank as per the arrangement with the Ministry of Finance.
    [Show full text]
  • Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report
    VOLUME THREE Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report The report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission was presented to President Nelson Mandela on 29 October 1998. Archbishop Desmond Tutu Ms Hlengiwe Mkhize Chairperson Dr Alex Boraine Mr Dumisa Ntsebeza Vice-Chairperson Ms Mary Burton Dr Wendy Orr Revd Bongani Finca Adv Denzil Potgieter Ms Sisi Khampepe Dr Fazel Randera Mr Richard Lyster Ms Yasmin Sooka Mr Wynand Malan* Ms Glenda Wildschut Dr Khoza Mgojo * Subject to minority position. See volume 5. Chief Executive Officer: Dr Biki Minyuku I CONTENTS Chapter 1 Introduction to Regional Profiles ........ 1 Appendix: National Chronology......................... 12 Chapter 2 REGIONAL PROFILE: Eastern Cape ..................................................... 34 Appendix: Statistics on Violations in the Eastern Cape........................................................... 150 Chapter 3 REGIONAL PROFILE: Natal and KwaZulu ........................................ 155 Appendix: Statistics on Violations in Natal, KwaZulu and the Orange Free State... 324 Chapter 4 REGIONAL PROFILE: Orange Free State.......................................... 329 Chapter 5 REGIONAL PROFILE: Western Cape.................................................... 390 Appendix: Statistics on Violations in the Western Cape ......................................................... 523 Chapter 6 REGIONAL PROFILE: Transvaal .............................................................. 528 Appendix: Statistics on Violations in the Transvaal ......................................................
    [Show full text]
  • The Saga of South African Pows in Angola, 1975-82
    102 THE SAGA OF SOUTH AFRICAN POWS IN ANGOLA, 1975–82 Gary Baines History Department, Rhodes University Abstract This article narrates the story of nine soldiers captured during and shortly after Operation Savannah, the codename for the South African Defence Force invasion of Angola in 1975–6. Eight of these soldiers were captured in Angola in three separate incidents by Angolan and/or Cuban forces, whereas the last was abducted from northern Namibia by SWAPO (the South West Africa Peoples’ Organisation). The article then provides a chronological account of the sequels to this story that interweaves a number of threads: first, the account relates the South African government’s attempts to suppress press coverage of these stories for fear of the political ‘fall-out’ that the matter might cause amongst the white electorate and in case it jeopardised secret negotiations to secure the release of the prisoners; and second, it uncovers the role played by intermediaries, especially the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), in the sensitive and fraught negotiation process. It will be shown that the South African authorities adopted divergent approaches when dealing with SWAPO and the Angolans/Cubans to secure the release of prisoners of war (POWs). This is because the South African authorities regarded the former as involved in an internal insurrection whereas the latter were members of the military forces of sovereign states. Accordingly, they paid lip service to the Geneva Conventions in the case of Angolan and Cuban POWs but treated captured SWAPO cadres as ‘terrorists’ or ‘criminals’. Introduction Military and diplomatic historians have paid scant attention to the stories of South African Defence Force (SADF) soldiers captured during the war waged in Namibia/Angola.1 Those captured during Operation Savannah (1975–6) warrant a passing mention in a few texts,2 and are Scientia Militaria, South African alluded to in a recently produced documentary Journal of Military Studies, Vol video series.3 Still, the details of their 29 40, Nr 2, 2012, pp.
    [Show full text]
  • A South African Diary: Contested Identity, My Family - Our Story
    How many bones must you bury before you can call yourself an African? Updated February 2012 A South African Diary: Contested Identity, My Family - Our Story Part F: 1975 - 1986 Compiled by: Dr. Anthony Turton [email protected] Caution in the use and interpretation of these data This document consists of events data presented in chronological order. It is designed to give the reader an insight into the complex drivers at work over time, by showing how many events were occurring simultaneously. It is also designed to guide future research by serious scholars, who would verify all data independently as a matter of sound scholarship and never accept this as being valid in its own right. Read together, they indicate a trend, whereas read in isolation, they become sterile facts devoid of much meaning. Given that they are “facts”, their origin is generally not cited, as a fact belongs to nobody. On occasion where an interpretation is made, then the commentator’s name is cited as appropriate. Where similar information is shown for different dates, it is because some confusion exists on the exact detail of that event, so the reader must use caution when interpreting it, because a “fact” is something over which no alternate interpretation can be given. These events data are considered by the author to be relevant, based on his professional experience as a trained researcher. Own judgement must be used at all times . All users are urged to verify these data independently. The individual selection of data also represents the author’s bias, so the dataset must not be regarded as being complete.
    [Show full text]