17. THE SOCIAL PROBLEM, AND THE CAUSES OF THE FOURTH MACEDONIAN WAR (206-199)

The conclusion of peace between Rome and its allies and Macedon and the Greek Symmachy (the Peace of Phoenike) 1 followed Aitolia's separate peace with Macedon by less than a year, thereby demon• strating Aitolian good sense: Rome could only continue the war in the east by the use of Greek soldiers, specifically Aitolians, who were defeated by the Macedonians with depressing regularity. Rome had committed a new army and a new commander, P. Sempronius Tudi• tanus, to Illyria at the start of the campaigning season of 205, but he could made no progress; at the same time he was too strongly placed for Philip to dislodge him2• Without Aitolian troops to assist, and without the accessibility to Aitolian territory which would provide a new means of attacking Philip's own lands, and without that Aitolian territory being available for Philip to attack, neither side could make any progress. Aitolia, if nothing else, had proved that the league's participation was essential for the war to continue. The Epeirotes, dangerously close to the fighting, brokered a con• ference at their main city, Phoenike, which produced the peace settle• ment3. The terms which were agreed ensured that it would be little more than a truce, and that when either side felt strong enough and undistracted enough, the war would resume. No-one seems to have expressed any appreciation of the actions of the Aitolians, whose decision for peace the year before was the essential preliminary to this wider agreement. The essentially temporary nature of this peace agreement will not have been lost on the rest of . If the speech recorded by Poly• bios under the name of Agelaos of Naupaktos in 21 7 bears any rela• tion to what he actually said4, then the enormous conflict between Rome and in the west will have been watched with anxiety in political circles in Greece, at least when they could spare attention

1 Schmitt, Staatsvertrdge III S43. 2 29.12.1-6; Walbank, Philip V, I 02-I03; Hammond, Hist. Mac, 3.408-409. 1 Livy 29.12.11; App. Mac 3. 4 Pol. S.l04.1-10. THE CAUSES OF FOURTH MACEDONIAN WAR (206-199) 339 from their own affairs5 • There was still no real sign of it ending when the Peace of Phoenike was agreed, but when it did end then the Romano-Macedonian conflict would surely be reignited. If Rome lost the greater war, then Philip would attempt to gain at her expense, either at the peace conference or soon after; if Rome won, then Philip would be expected to suffer an attack so that Rome would recover her losses in Illyria. Philip's martial and naval activities in the next five years are thus best seen as attempts to build a stronger political and military position in preparation for the future and expected con• flict. The Aitolians will have had to be especially alert to these nuances of international politics, since they had managed to gain the ill-will of both principals, by intervening to prevent Philip from achieving a quick victory, as he might have claimed, and then by making a sepa• rate peace, so leaving Rome to fight on alone. At the same time they had shown themselves to be the essential key to victory for both. Rome had found it impossible to penetrate seriously into Macedon from the west and so would need Aitolian assistance; Philip had been seriously distracted by the danger to his position in Central Greece and by Aitolian enmity. Any war which recommenced would thus in the end involve Aitolia; even maintaining neutrality would need constant effort and vigour, for there would be constant pressure, both from outside and from internal sources, to join in. Yet involvement in the war on either side was a daunting prospect. In the last two wars against Macedon, it had been the enemy which had been victorious; and the Aitolians had also seen how well the Romans could fight, so joining Macedon against Rome, if it was ever consid• ered, was just as unpleasant an idea. The disparity between the Aitol• ians' power and that of either of its potential enemies was immeasur• able. The Aitolian military performance in the last war (211-206) had been much poorer than in the one before (220-21 7). The general levy may have been called out in 211 to invade Akarnania, and the army which was beaten twice, with casualties, in the battles near Lamia in 209 may also have been the full levy, though this is not certain. But

5 Polybios records that Philip received private information by courier of the defeat of the Romans at Lake Trasimene in 21 7 (Pol. 5.101.6); one would imagine other leaders had access to similar sources; W. L. Adams, 'Philip V, Hannibal, and the Origins of the ', Ancient 5, 1990, 41-50.