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CV and Publications, Leitgeb Hannes (July 2021) Curriculum Vitae and List of Publications Hannes Leitgeb July 2021 Department Address Chair of Logic and Philosophy of Language, Alexander von Humboldt Professor, and Founder/Co-Director of the Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy Faculty of Philosophy, Philosophy of Science and the Study of Religion Ludwig-Maximilians-University Munich Ludwigstr. 31 D-80539 Munich Germany Phone: (+49)(0)89 2180 6171 Email: [email protected] Personal Information Date of birth: 26/06/72.1 Nationality: Austrian. Married (to Conny). Two children (Sebastian and Victoria). 1All dates are stated in dd/mm/yy format. 1 Areas of Specialization Logic, Epistemology, Philosophy of Language, Philosophy of Science, Philosophy of Mathematics, Metaphysics, Cognitive Science. Areas of Competence History of Logical Empiricism, Carnap, Quine. Education Ph.D. (with distinction), Philosophy, University of Salzburg, 02/07/01 Dissertation: Inference on the Low Level Committee: Gerhard Schurz (D¨usseldorf/Salzburg),Georg Dorn (Salzburg). Ph.D. (with distinction), Mathematics, University of Salzburg, 09/07/98 Dissertation: Truth as Translation Committee: Johannes Czermak (Salzburg), Peter Woodruff (UC Irvine). M.Sc. (with distinction), Mathematics, University of Salzburg, 20/02/97 Thesis: Another Approach to Many-Valued Logic Supervisor: Johannes Czermak (Salzburg). Academic Positions and Offers Offers from the Department of Philosophy, Rutgers University, and from the Department of Philosophy, University of California at Davis, November 2017. Declined. Chair of Logic and Philosophy of Language, and Alexander von Humboldt Professor, Faculty of Philosophy, Ludwig-Maximilians University Munich. Founder & (Co-)Director of Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy (01/10/10{). Offers from the Department of Philosophy, Stanford University, and from the Faculty of Philosophy, University of Groningen, (both Full Professorships), November 2009. Declined. Offer from the Logic and Philosophy of Science Department, University of California at Irvine (Full Professorship), February 2009. Declined. Professor, Departments of Philosophy & Mathematics, Univ. of Bristol (01/08/07{30/09/10). Reader, Departments of Philosophy & Mathematics, University of Bristol (01/09/05{31/07/07). Offers from Stanford University (tenure-track Associate Professorship), declined, and the University of Bristol (tenured Readership), March 2005. 2 Assistant Professor, Department of Philosophy, University of Salzburg (13/10/02{31/08/05). Post-doctoral scholar, Department of Philosophy, University of Salzburg. Project: Logic and Cognitive Science (May 1999{August 2002). Post-doctoral scholar, Department of Mathematics, University of Salzburg. Project: Formal Theories of Truth (February 1999{April 1999). Research Assistant, Department of Forensic Neuropsychiatry, University of Salzburg. Project: Logical Methods in Biocybernetic Brain Research (1995{1997). Visiting Appointments Visiting Professor, Department of Philosophy, University of D¨usseldorf (February 2009{July 2009). Visiting scholar, Department of Philosophy & CSLI, Stanford University (September 2004{August 2005). Honors and Awards Philosophy Students' Award for Excellence in Teaching, Faculty of Philosophy, Philosophy of Science and Study of Religion, LMU Munich, July 2020. Philosophy Students' Award for Excellence in Teaching, Faculty of Philosophy, Philosophy of Science and Study of Religion, LMU Munich, July 2018. Member of Leopoldina, Deutsche Akademie der Naturforscher, 2016. Philosophy Students' Award for Excellence in Teaching, Faculty of Philosophy, Philosophy of Science and Study of Religion, LMU Munich, July 2015. Article \A Lottery Paradox for Counterfactuals Without Agglomeration" chosen for The Philosopher's Annual Vol. 34, 2014. Member of Academia Europaea, 2014. Philosophy Students' Award for Excellence in Teaching, Faculty of Philosophy, Philosophy of Science and Study of Religion, LMU Munich, July 2012. Member of Acad´emieInternationale de Philosophie des Sciences, 2011. 3 Article \An Objective Justification of Bayesianism II" (with R. Pettigrew) chosen for The Philosopher's Annual Vol. 30, 2010. Alexander von Humboldt Professorship (EUR 3,500,000), Alexander von Humboldt Foundation, Germany, February 2010. Friedrich Wilhelm Bessel Research Award (EUR 45,000), Alexander von Humboldt Foundation, Germany, November 2007. Philip Leverhulme Prize ($ 70,000), Leverhulme Trust, UK, October 2007. University of Bristol candidate for the Leverhulme Research Leadership Award Competition 2007, Leverhulme Trust, UK. Finalist of the G¨odelCentenary Young Scholars Competition (organized and sponsored by the Kurt G¨odelSociety and the John Templeton Foun- dation), Vienna, April 2006. Erwin Schr¨odingerFellowship ($ 36,200), Project: \Carnap's Logischer Aufbau Revived", Austrian Research Fund (J2344-G03), September 2004{August 2005. Austrian Research Fund Post-Doctoral Fellowship, in the Special Re- search Project \Theorien- und Paradigmenpluralismus" (SFB F012), May 1999{August 2002. Austrian Research Fund Post-Doctoral Fellowship (P13431-MAT), February 1999{April 1999. Research Scholarship of the Medical Research Society Salzburg, 1995{1997. M.Sc. Thesis Research Prize (“F¨orderungspreis"), Department of Mathematics, University of Salzburg, December 1994. Publications Books: 1. In preparation: Reviving Logical Empiricism. 2. In preparation: Logik f¨urPhilosophen: Eine Einf¨uhrungin die klassi- sche Aussagen- und Pr¨adikatenlogik (with A. Hieke). 334 pp. I use the draft for my Logic 1 lecture in Munich. 4 3. The Stability of Belief. How Rational Belief Coheres with Probability. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017, 384 pp. 4. Reduction { Abstraction { Analysis (edited, with A. Hieke), Frankfurt a. M.: Ontos Press, 2009, 414 pp. 5. Reduction. Between the Mind and the Brain (edited, with A. Hieke), Frankfurt a. M.: Ontos Press, 2009, 216 pp. 6. Philosophy of Mathematics: 5 Questions (edited, with V. Hendricks), Automatic Press, 2007, 342 pp. 7. Inference on the Low Level. An Investigation into Deduction, Non- monotonic Reasoning, and the Philosophy of Cognition, Dordrecht: Kluwer, Applied Logic Series, 2004, 384 pp. 8. Logik und Grundlagen der Mathematik, Salzburg: Osterreichische¨ Hoch- sch¨ulerschaft, 2004, 83 pp. (based on lectures given to the Department of Mathematics, University of Salzburg, in the summer semester 2002). Journal Articles: 1. \On Non-Eliminative Structuralism. Unlabeled Graphs as a Case Study (Part B)", to appear in Philosophia Mathematica, 31 pages. 2. \A Structural Justification of Probabilism: From Partition Invariance to Subjective Probability", Philosophy of Science 88/2 (2021), 341{365. 3. \On Non-Eliminative Structuralism. Unlabeled Graphs as a Case Study (Part A)", Philosophia Mathematica 28/3 (2020), 317{346. 4. \Why Pure Mathematical Truths Are Metaphysically Necessary: A Set-theoretic Explanation", textitSynthese 197 (2020), 3113{3120. 5. \HYPE: A System of Hyperintensional Logic (With an Application to Semantic Paradoxes)", Journal of Philosophical Logic 48/2 (2019), 305{405. 6. \Probability for the Revision Theory of Truth" (with C. Campbell- Moore and L. Horsten), Journal of Philosophical Logic 48 (2019), 87{ 112. 5 7. \Imaging All the People", Episteme 14/4 (2017), 463{479. 8. \The Humean Thesis on Belief", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society of Philosophy 89/1 (2015), 143{185. 9. \A Lottery Paradox for Counterfactuals Without Agglomeration", Phi- losophy and Phenomenological Research 89/3 (2014), 605{636. 10. \The Review Paradox. A Note on the Diachronic Costs of Not Closing Rational Belief Under Conjunction", Nous 48/4 (2014), 781{793. 11. \A Way Out of the Preface Paradox?", Analysis 74/1 (2014), 11{15. 12. \The Stability Theory of Belief", The Philosophical Review 123/2 (2014), 131{171. 13. \Reducing Belief Simpliciter to Degrees of Belief", Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 164 (2013), 1338{1389. 14. \Scientific Philosophy, Mathematical Philosophy, and All That", Metaphi- losophy 44/3 (2013), 267{275. 15. \Criteria of Identity, Strong and Wrong", British Journal for the Phi- losophy of Science 64/1 (2013), 61{68. 16. \Revision Revisited" (with L. Horsten, G. Leigh, P. Welch), Review of Symbolic Logic 5/4 (2012), 642{664. 17. \How Serious is the Paradox of Serious Possibility?" (with S. Duca), Mind 121/481 (2012), 1{36. 18. \A Probabilistic Semantics for Counterfactuals. Part B", Review of Symbolic Logic 5 (2012), 85{121. 19. \A Probabilistic Semantics for Counterfactuals. Part A", Review of Symbolic Logic 5 (2012), 16{84. 20. \God − Moore = Ramsey. (A Reply to Chalmers and H´ajek)", Topoi 30/1 (2011), 47{51. 21. \New Life for Carnap's Aufbau?", Synthese 180/2 (2011), 265{299. 6 22. \Logic in General Philosophy of Science: Old Things and New Things", Synthese (2011) 179/2, 339{350. (The paper will also appear in: V. Hendricks et al. (eds.), PHIBOOK, Yearbook of Philosophical Logic, Copenhagen: Automatic Press.) 23. \On the Ramsey Test Without Triviality", Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 51/1 (2010), 21{54. 24. \Logic and Philosophy of Mathematics", Journal of the Indian Coun- cil of Philosophical Research 27/2 (2010), special issue on Logic and Philosophy Today, A. Gupta and J. van Benthem (eds.), 129{154. 25. \Sleeping Beauty and Eternal Recurrence", Analysis 70/2 (2010), 203{ 205. 26. \An Objective Justification of Bayesianism II: The Consequences of Minimizing Inaccuracy" (with R. Pettigrew), Philosophy of Science 77/2 (2010), 236{272. 27. \An Objective Justification of Bayesianism I: Measuring
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