Volume 5, Number 4 April 2011

www.thereasoner.org ISSN 1757-0522

also kindly accepted to fill in a short questionnaire to Contents introduce themselves. This, overall, gives quite a good impression of the exciting social and scientific environ- §1 Editorial 48 ment that is now being created in Munich. Looking forward to seeing you there! §2 Features 48 Olivier Roy §3 News 57 Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy

§4 What’s Hot in . . . 61

§5 Events 61 §2 §6 Courses and Programmes 65 Features

§7 Jobs and Studentships 66 Interview with the Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy Thanks to Barbara Pohlmann¨ for her help. For more in- §1 formation about the MCMP, including announcements Editorial of positions currently open at the Center, please have a look at the website. There’s a new guy in town, or I should say a new player in the field of mathematical philosophy: the Munich Interview with Hannes Leitgeb Center for Mathematical Philosophy, aka MCMP. You probably heard rumors about it, saw some announce- Olivier Roy: Thanks so much for giving us this inter- ments for positions being sent around, or met some of view for The Reasoner. Let us start with basic facts: its concrete instantiations (viz. its new members). Now what is the Munich Center of Mathematical Philoso- it’s time for a proper introduction. phy? The MCMP is first and foremost under the auspices Hannes Leitgeb: It is a new Center based at LMU of Hannes Leitgeb. His Alexander von Humboldt Pro- Munich which is funded primarily by the German fessorship Grant created the Center. It was thus natural Alexander von Humboldt Foundation and which is con- to give him the first words, resulting in the short inter- cerned with applications of logical and mathematical view below. The members of the MCMP’s initial team methods in philosophy. Obviously it is not in any sense

48 about reducing philosophy to mathematics, just as it is terms of conditional probabilities. We have fellows in not the case that physics gets reduced to mathematics the Center doing formal theories of truth and semantic if mathematical methods paradoxes, obviously, but there are also people who are are applied in physics. It working, amongst others, on formal aesthetics—e.g., is just that, when you recently there has been a talk given by Norbert Gratzl try to address philosoph- on an ontological theory for aesthetic objects for which ical questions and prob- abstraction principles which are formulated in the lan- lems, sometimes it is guage of second order logic play a crucial role. So this very useful to involve pretty much shows that there is no particular philosoph- logical and mathemati- ical area which we think can’t be an area in which for- cal methods in order to mal methods are used. But that doesn’t mean that at this solve the problems, or point of time we know for each and every philosophical just to understand more problem how to use mathematical methods in order to properly what the prob- solve that problem. And of course none of us thinks that lems are all about, to logical and mathematical methods necessarily exhaust build, in the ideal case, a our philosophical methodology. philosophical theory in which philosophical questions OR: This sounds like a very broad array of topics. get answered. So in the Center we want to do research What are your main goals and/or aims for the Center? in philosophy in which we use methods that get used in HL: First of all, the Center will simply host research. sciences, namely mathematical methods. In particular, we are funding postdoctoral and doctoral OR: Could you describe the Center in terms of its fellows. The doctoral fellowships should be advertised people, orientation, field of research? very soon, and they are to be taken up by the successful HL: I sort of come from a tradition that is very much applicants by September 2011. We have already hired related to logical empiricism, to the Vienna Circle, and six postdoctoral fellows, and further postdoctoral fel- of course you find this idea of applying especially logic, lows are on their way who are supported by sources and to a lesser extent also mathematics, to philoso- other than the Center itself. All of these fellows are phy already there. What is distinctive of the Center based in the Center, they have their rooms and research in Munich—and this is a difference compared to the facilities, they join all the activities, and they do re- Vienna Circle—is that none of traditional philosophi- search. We also have a visiting fellowship scheme that’s cal questions are being dismissed. Rather, in the Cen- going to start from April, so e.g. Steve Awodey from ter, in principle we are interested in all classical ques- Carnegie Mellon, Branden Fitelson from Rutgers, Ed tions of philosophy, in whatever area of philosophy, but Zalta from Stanford, and other people will be visiting these questions are being addressed using logical and the Center, for a couple of weeks to a couple of months, mathematical methods. Accordingly, in the Center— and obviously there will be lectures held by the visi- already in the starting team that will be complete from tors, workshops about their work, and they will collab- April 2011—we cover more or less all areas of philos- orate with people in the Center. We will have a weekly ophy. So there are people here who actually do philo- colloquium in mathematical philosophy with speakers sophical logic, of course, like epistemic logic, dynamic from elsewhere, an internal work-in-progress seminar, epistemic logic, conditional logic, deontic logic, and so reading groups, tutorials given by fellows for fellows, on. We have people doing philosophy of mathematics, and the like. And then we are going to host a lot of such as structuralism or nominalism about maths. But workshops and larger conferences, including the For- over and above these areas in which formal methods mal Epistemology Workshop next year and the Formal are naturally being applied or studied, we have fellows Ethics Workshop the year after. In September of this doing epistemology, that is then formal epistemology, year there will also be the big conference of the German and philosophy of science: so there are members of the Society for Philosophy and within that big conference Center who come from the Bayesian tradition and who we will have a two-day workshop on mathematical phi- thus apply probabilistic methods within their theories losophy, which will we also use to introduce the Center of confirmation or causality, but we also have people to German philosophers. here who take up the more deductive or semantic con- OR: You mentioned the relation of the Center with ceptions of scientific theories and who try to develop the Vienna Circle, but how about more contemporary them using formal means. Some members of the Cen- research centers? In recent years quite a few new re- ter do philosophy of language with the help of logical, search groups have been created that use mathematical mathematical, and even experimental means. For exam- methods to address philosophical problems. How does ple, some are interested in logical inferentialism, where the Munich Center relate to them? the meaning of logic constants is constituted by logical HL: Generally speaking, I don’t think formal or rules, others analyze the acceptability of conditionals in mathematical philosophy is a new thing at all. A long

49 time before the Vienna Circle, Aristotle invented logic, thing that I’m claiming, and I think this is pretty uncon- Leibniz was doing formal metaphysics, and so on. The troversial, is that sometimes logical and mathematical Vienna Circle carried on with that tradition but using the methods can help to clarify theses—that’s what in the new formal methods at the time, that is, mathematical tradition is called logical analysis, and there is no doubt logic. And now what young philosophers are currently that this is sometimes of big help—and secondly some- fascinated by is doing philosophical work again by us- times there might be arguments from philosophical as- ing formal methods that are even more recent to philos- sumptions to philosophical conclusions which get so ophy. So, e.g., there are new or relatively new formal complex that you actually need mathematics to bridge methods like nonmonotonic reasoning, dynamic epis- the gap between the premises and the conclusions. As temic logic, probability theory, and game theory, and far as that part is concerned, traditionally, philosophers many young philosophers these days are attracted by have put forward arguments for which it was pretty easy them. Accordingly, there are centers dealing with as- to see that the premises logically entail, or inductively pects of this way of doing philosophy elsewhere, and support, the conclusion. The only thing we are chang- obviously we want to relate to all of them. So in the ing is that we want to build arguments with the help of U.S. there is the wonderful Formal Epistemology Work- mathematics where it is in fact the case that the conclu- shop series, and I already said that we are getting the sion is contained implicitly in the premises, but where workshop here next year, and Branden Fitelson, who is it is not so easy to see that this is so. The role of logical one of its two originators, will be one of our visiting and mathematical methods in philosophy will then very fellows. In the UK there are centers like ours, too: One much be like the role of mathematical methods in the of the hotspots of formal philosophy actually is Bris- sciences. tol, where I’m coming from, and there will be annual OR: Many thanks. We’ll keep an eye on the Center! Bristol-Munich workshops in the future, the first one HL: Please do. Thanks very much. taking place in September in Munich. The Netherlands is very strong in that area, e.g., Amsterdam and Gronin- Five Questions to the Center’s Initial Team gen, and both of them will be cooperation partners and with both of them we are planning to have joint events. Jeffrey Ketland There will definitely be joint activities with the excel- lent centers in Tilburg and Konstanz. The new Formal 1. Who you are: Epistemology Center at Carnegie Mellon is already one Dr Jeffrey Ketland (PhD from LSE (1999): logic, of our cooperation partners: I’ll give two talks there in applicability of mathematics, truth). Assistant March, and then they will come over to Munich in the Professor in Mathemat- future and give talks here. We want to do something ical Philosophy; Asso- like that also with Stanford and with an excellent group ciate Director of the Mu- of young logicians and philosophers in Paris including nich Center for Mathe- Paul Egre,´ Denis Bonnay and Brian Hill, and so on. If matical Philosophy (and there is any difference at all between our Center and Senior Lecturer in Phi- these cooperation partners it is that many of them are losophy at Edinburgh). devoted to the application of mathematical methods in 2. Motivations: one particular area of philosophy, typically, epistemol- First, the research ogy. The Center here in Munich is slightly larger in its areas associated with the scope and maybe also in personnel and resources. Munich Center overlap OR: A more general question. How do you see the re- considerably with my lation between this formal work in philosophy and more own research interests. traditional, non-formal approaches? Second, the method- HL: I don’t really believe in a substantial division into ological approach of the something like mainstream philosophy on the one hand Director of the Center, Hannes Leitgeb, is one that I and formal or mathematical philosophy on the other. have long shared: formulate philosophical problems as Rather I would say that there are the traditional philo- precisely as possible and then utilize relevant logical sophical questions: “What is truth?”, “What kinds of and mathematical methods in attempting to understand objects are there?”, “What is knowledge?”, “How do we these problems. Third, the academic staff already know about these objects?”, “What should we do?”, and present in the Center are world-class researchers in so on. And then philosophers address these questions by the fields of logic, foundations of mathematics, formal putting forward theses and arguments for these theses. epistemology, etc. It is therefore a wonderful opportu- And, if it is good philosophy, they try to make the theses nity to work in Munich with such a talented group of clear, and they take care that the arguments are logically researchers. valid or maybe strong in some weaker sense. The only 3. Current research:

50 I am currently working on the nominalization of sci- 4. Scientific Network: entific theories; the “speed-up” of more powerful theo- Katya Tentori, experimental psychology, University ries over weaker ones; some topics connected to space of Trento, Roberto Festa, philosophy of science, Uni- and time (“Leibniz equivalence” of spacetime models; versity of Trieste. In the Center: The closest connection Leibnizian “shift arguments”); the concepts of identity is probably with Niki (Pfeifer)’s research interests. and indiscerniblity. I have some work on some technical 5. Future: issues related to expressivism in meta-ethics (for exam- The underlying general issue of my ongoing projects ple, using a 3-valued logic for the semantics). I am also is human rationality, with a particular interest in the working on two monographs, one on theories of truth relationships between formal theories of reasoning and and another on mathematical methods in philosophy. the empirical study of human cognition. In the near 4. Scientific network: future, I plan to exploit this approach in the analysis of I interact with many philosophers and logicians information search behavior. In essence, how people working in logic, the foundations of mathematics, phi- should (and how they do) selectively look for evidence losophy of language and philosophy of science, and in view of future inference and action. have organised a conference (in 2006, on the work of Kurt Godel)¨ and workshop (in 2009, on realism in math- Paul Dicken ematics, modality and morality) in some of these areas. I’ve written a short paper with Panu Raatikainen, dis- 1. Who you are: cussing arguments given by Lucas and Redhead about Paul Dicken, PhD in History and Philosophy of Godel’s¨ theorems. The Center itself is now the heart Science (2004–2007), of a network of researchers in the relevant areas and I from the Department of look forward to working with the other members of the History and Philosophy Center. of Science, University 5. Future: of Cambridge, UK. I Aside from the specific topics mentioned above, am currently a Junior my medium-term research aim is to complete a single Research Fellow in piece of work bringing together the main body of Philosophy at Churchill mathematical methods in philosophy (basic set the- College, University of ory, arithmetic, abstract algebra, probability theory, Cambridge, and a Visit- geometry, model theory, non-classical logic, reduction ing Fellow (2010–2011) methods, nominalization, etc.). at the Center. Vincenzo Crupi 2. Motivations: Beginning a new 1. Who you are: project on logical pos- Vincenzo Crupi, PhD Philosophy, Uni- itivism/logical empiricism, with a particular interest versity of Turin, 2004 MSc Philosophy and in Ernst Mach (hence Munich, for the Deutsches History of Science, LSE, Museum), and Carnap (hence Professor Leitgeb). Also 2002. Function at the interested in the application of new methods in formal Center: Postdoctoral Fel- philosophy with respect to these areas (hence the low. Center). 2. Motivations: 3. Current research: MCMP is the perfect I am currently working on questions of scientific on- place to pursue the re- tology in the light of the logical structure of scientific search interests in which theories—questions concerning the reduction, defini- I’ve been engaged re- tion and elimination of certain fragments of our scien- cently: formal analyses of reasoning (especially proba- tific vocabulary. I am attempting to resurrect the view bilistic and inductive inference) in connection with em- that our scientific theories do not make propositional pirical investigation of human rationality and its limita- claims about the external world at all, and how this re- tions. lates to the contemporary scientific realism debate. I 3. Current research: also have some broader interests in the application of Formal explication of epistemological concepts logical methods to traditional problems in the philoso- within the Bayesian framework (especially confirma- phy of science, and have been working on various non- tion) and its potential as a source of theorizing in the classical (relevant and/or paraconsistent) logics of con- psychology of reasoning. I also cherish an interest in firmation. reasoning and decision-making in medicine. 4. Scientific Network:

51 I have already worked with Florian Steinberger at techniques and very open minded. . . . last but not least: Cambridge, and will continue to do so in Munich. I Munich is quite a fine city. also collaborate with Nick Tosh (NUI Galway) and Axel 3. Current research: Gelfert (National University of Singapore). I completed At the moment I do research on definite and indefinite a large portion of my recent book in Singapore. descriptions. 5. Future: 4. Future: What are the absolutely minimum ontological and I recently started working on the use of Hilbert’s epistemology commitments of our most successful epsilon-calculus in scientific practices? What does this show us about our analyzing theoretical place in nature? terms;thereby I try to answer the question of Martin Fischer whether a logical recon- struction of theoretical 1. Who you are: terms—as suggested by Martin Fischer, PhD in Philosophy, Munich Carnap—allows for a 2007; Function at the structuralist interpreta- Center: Visiting Fellow. tion of scientific theories. 2. Motivations: Furthermore, I am quite The excellent research interested in the ontology conditions and the new of aesthetic objects. possibilities of collabora- tion. Ole Thomassen Hjortland 3. Current research: At the moment I am 1. Who you are: working on a philosoph- Ole Thomassen Hjortland, PhD in Philosophy, Arche´ ical motivation for weak Research Centre, Uni- axiomatic theories of versity of St Andrews, truth. 2009. Function at the 4. Scientific Net- Center: Postdoctoral Re- work: search Fellow. Leon Horsten; Volker Halbach; Johannes Stern. 2. Motivations: Within the Center, I would like to work with Hannes I was attracted by the Leitgeb, Jeffrey Ketland, Julien Murzi, Ole Hjortland. idea of a research center 5. Future: dedicated to mathemati- The main theme of research will be the interaction of cal methods in philosophy. Even better, the Munich modalities treated as predicates. Although syntactical center will offer a great framework for collaborative treatments of modalities are attractive because of its work between researchers with interests in formal meth- greater generality than the mainstream approach there ods, both locally and with the international community. are only few proposals. I want to focus on the question 3. Current research: of interaction of two or more modalities exemplified I am currently working on the semantic paradoxes, by the knowability principle. The phenomenon of and in particular solutions involving substructural log- interaction has not been investigated systematically for ics. I’ll give a paper on the topic at the 5th Founda- the syntactical approach. A special focus will be on tions of Logical Consequence workshop in St Andrews new paradoxes created by the interaction and possible in early April. I’m also editing a volume on logical con- solutions for them. sequence with Colin Caret (Arche´/St Andrews). 4. Scientific Network: Norbert Gratzl Up until now my closest collaborators have been my colleagues in my old research fellowship in the Univer- 1. Who you are: sity of St Andrews. I’ve worked closely with Stephen Norbert Gratzl. PhD.: Salzburg, 2002, Proof-theory Read and Colin Caret over the last few years. In Mu- of Free Logic. Function at the Center: Postdoctoral Fel- nich I already have a very good friend and colleague in low. my co-author Julien Murzi, but I hope to get the chance 2. Motivations: to work with many others in the near future. The MCMP is a great opportunity to carry out logical 5. Future: investigations in philosophy. The working environment I’m hoping to branch out to work more with formal is simply great: colleagues are highly trained in formal epistemology, and especially connections to logical

52 consequence. I’ve also started working on the connec- to logic. Function at the Center: Post-doctoral Research tion between philosophy of logic and experimental data Fellow. from the psychology of reasoning. In Munich I’ll have 2. Motivations: the chance to learn from people with lots of experience MCMP, and the department at LMU, offer a from both fields. wonderful research environment. Here Christopher Menzel in Munich I have the opportunity to work 1. Who you are: closely with outstanding Christopher Menzel. PhD. 1984, University of Notre researchers—both junior Dame, Philosophy (dis- and senior—whose in- sertation on the philoso- terests are very close to phy of set theory). Func- mine. I also have the tion at the Center: Visit- chance to learn more ing Fellow. about a host of issues 2. Motivations: and methodologies, and I will be on sabbatical thus widen my research leave from Texas A&M interests. I should also University for the 2011- mention that Munich is a 12 academic year, so I wonderful city, and that the Alps are very close. began seeking a stimulat- 3. Current research: ing research environment I am currently working on three main topics: (i) se- set in an enjoyable location—preferably in Germany, as mantic paradoxes, in particular validity paradoxes, (ii) my wife and I have been spending large portions of our the inferentialist approach to logic, and (iii) some topics summers there in recent years. I learned of the Center on the realism/anti-realism debate (e.g. whether Dum- through Edward Zalta, who had been collaborating with mett’s manifestability requirement is, or can be made, Prof Leitgeb. Given the Center’s mission and location consistent with the existence of blindspots for knowa- at LMU, I could hardly have designed a more ideal set- bility). I am convinced that validity paradoxes effec- ting! tively restrict the range of admissible revisionary ap- 3. Current research: proaches to semantic paradox. In fact, they tell us that, At the moment I am working on a paper on math- if paradoxes are to be solved via logical revision, one ematical structuralism and another on an extension of should give up, or restrict, some of the structural rules first-order logic with variably polyadic predicates, but of the logic. Revising the logic of connectives such as the main focus of my work is the logic and metaphysics negation and the conditional doesn’t get to the heart of of modality, particularly the implications of a strong the matter: paradoxes still loom. I also think that valid- form of actualism on the semantics of quantified modal ity paradoxes can teach us a great deal about the nature logic. of validity; in particular, they suggest that validity is an 4. Scientific Network: indefinitely extensible notion, or at least so I wish to ar- I have just completed a paper with Dr Edward Zalta gue in my future work. Concerning the inferentialist ap- of Stanford University and I am working on the logic proach to logic, I am currently turning into papers some paper noted above with Dr Fabian Neuhaus (PhD parts of my thesis. Among other things, I am working Humboldt Universitat)¨ of the National Institutes for on a harmonious formalization of full classical logic— Standards and Technology. My interests overlap with one that doesn’t resort to proof-theoretic ‘tricks’, such those of both Prof Leitgeb and Prof Jeffrey Ketland at as multiple conclusions or rules for denying complex the Center, but at the moment I am simply anticipating statements. As I show, the formalization is not only har- the opportunity to meet all of the researchers there and monious, but also separable, i.e. the inferential role of learn about the work they are doing. any single logical operator is fully determined by its in- troduction and elimination rules. If there are reasons to Julien Murzi question the validity of some classical rules, we should not expect these reasons to be proof-theoretic, pace au- 1. Who you are thors such as Dummett, Prawitz and Tennant. Julien Murzi, First PhD in Philosophy, University of 4. Scientific Network: Rome “La Sapienza”; second PhD in Philosophy, Uni- I am currently working on joint projects with JC Beall versity of Sheffield. The topic of my first PhD thesis (University of Connecticut) and with my inferentialist was Fitch’s Paradox of Knowability; the second thesis colleagues here in Munich, Ole Hjortland and Florian was on logical revision and the inferentialist approach Steinberger. I am also editing (and contributing to) a

53 volume on logical consequence, together with Massi- evaluate it by a series of psychological experiments. miliano Carrara (University of Padova). Here in Mu- nich I would also be very happy to work with the truth- Roland Poellinger theorists of our research group, especially Hannes (Leit- geb), Jeff (Ketland) and Martin (Fischer). I am in the final phase of writing my PhD thesis in 5. Future: logic/formal epistemology right now—my topic: causal I would like to work on absolute generality (or lack modelling between deter- thereof)—so-called generality relativism, I think, is minism and probabilism, the price to pay (if it is a price at all!) for keeping based on frame-relative classical logic and solving the semantic paradoxes and subjective principles without typing our language. In time, I would love to of knowledge organi- start doing research on Bayesianism, rationality, and zation within Bayes causality. net methods. Future work will centre around Niki Pfeifer cognitive foundations of model evocation/revision 1. Who you are: and formal representa- I received my PhD in psychology from tions thereof.Currently, I the University of am assistant at the LMU chair for logic and philosophy Salzburg in 2006. of language, and have as such been teaching at the Function at the Center: institute (formerly: chair for philosophy, logic, and Postdoctoral Fellow. philosophy of science) since 2009, focusing on formal logic, computability, and algorithmic aspects of classi- 2. Motivations: cal logic. I decided to take a position at the Center Olivier Roy because it gives me the opportunity to ideally 1. Who you are: combine my philosoph- Olivier Roy, PhD (2008) at the Institute for Logic, ical and psychological Language and Computa- research on reasoning, tion in Amsterdam. For the rich intellectual my thesis I worked on the environment, and full interplay between philos- intellectual freedom. Last but not least, my wife—who ophy of action, and es- is an outstanding intellectual—accepted a job offer by pecially theories of inten- the Technical University of Munich. tions, philosophical logic 3. Current research: and game theory. At the Currently, I am working on conditionals, Aristotle’s center I am assistant pro- thesis, foundations of experimental philosophy, argu- fessor in logic and phi- mentation under uncertainty, and on probability seman- losophy of language. tics of Aristotelian syllogisms. 2. Motivations: 4. Scientific Network: Since my master de- My most recent collaborations include one with Igor gree in Quebec,´ I some- Douven on conditionals and experimental philosophy, how kept ending up us- and another one with Angelo Gilio and Giuseppe San- ing formal methods to work on philosophical questions: filippo on probability semantics of Aristotelian syllo- first in Amsterdam and then during the three years I gisms. Hannes Leitgeb and I are planning to collaborate spent as postdoc in Groningen (NL). The MCMP just on counterfactual conditionals. Moreover, I am looking seemed like the place to be for a guy like me. Plus the forward to fruitful collaborations with other members thought of being part of a brand new project, helping to of the Center. set up things, was very attractive. Finally, this seemed 5. Future: like a great opportunity to broaden my horizon on what The main goal of my research in the coming years formal philosophy is, and can be. When I saw at the will be the further development of a theory of reasoning initial team of the MCMP, this impression surely got under uncertainty. The construction of the theory will confirmed! be guided by various rationality norms proposed in 3. Current research: philosophy, AI and psychology. I will empirically In the last years I got more and more interested in

54 so-called epistemic game theory—from my point of metaphysics of logic. Recently I have also begun work- view a natural meeting point between game theory, ing on a number of problems in the philosophy of lan- logic, philosophy of action, meta-ethics and epistemol- guage. In particular, I am trying to formulate an account ogy. I’m working on a monograph with Eric Pacuit of the speech act of supposition. (TiLPS, Tilburg, NL) on the topic. Not independently 4. Scientific Network: of that, I also started to look at theories of public de- Closest research collaborators nowadays: Julien liberation, both from a formal and philosophical—even Murzi and Neil Tennant. Within the Center: I am al- continental!—perspective. ready collaborating with Julien Murzi, but I am sure 4. Scientific Network: that further opportunities for fruitful collaboration will Eric Pacuit has been my main companion d’armes in present themselves. Can’t wait to get there (in April the last years. Recent collaborators also include Johan 2011)! van Benthem, Cedric´ Degremont,´ Patrick Girard, Vin- 5. Future: cent Hendricks, Fenrong Liu and Mathieu Marion. Ob- I aim to pursue my work on foundational issues in vious potential collaborators at and around the MCMP: the philosophy of logic. Also, I plan to intensify my en- Hannes, Norbert, Martin (Rechenauer), Niki, Julien and gagement with the philosophy of language. I hope es- Roman. But having met most of the initial team mem- pecially to contribute to current debates on the nature of bers already, I’m quite sure that interesting, and unex- propositions, the semantics/pragmatics distinction and pected combinations will arise! philosophical implications of generative grammar. 5. Future: I think social interaction opens genuinely new Liars, Divine Liars, and Semantics revisited philosophical perspectives, especially for action theory and epistemology, and that a lot of progress can be Divine Liar arguments aim to show that there’s no om- made there by using formal tools. That’s definitely niscient being—that no one knows all that’s true—in the line I want to keep exploring in the coming years. the following way. Suppose I say “No omniscient be- But, again, I’m quite convinced that the MCMP will ing knows that what I’m now saying is true.” If (as I be a hotbed for new, unorthodox directions for formal believe) no one is omniscient, then no omniscient be- philosophy, and I’m very willing to jump in! ing exists, to know anything. So in that case, what I said was true. What I said was therefore an assertion, Florian Steinberger whether it was true or not. And if it wasn’t true—if it’s not the case that no omniscient being knows that what I 1. Who you are: said was true—then some omniscient being knows that Florian Steinberger, PhD. Cambridge what I said was true, despite it not being true, which is University in 2009 in impossible (knowledge being of truths). So I asserted philosophy. Assistant a truth; and so either that was a truth that some omni- professor in logic and scient being doesn’t know, which is also impossible, or philosophy of language. else there’s no such being. 2. Motivations: However, resolutions of the Liar Paradox might show When I heard that that such arguments are invalid, e.g. according to Daniel Hannes would be taking J. Hill (2007: The Divine Liar Resurfaces, The Rea- up a chair in Munich and soner 1(5), 11–12) and my earlier article (2008: Liars, setting up a research cen- Divine Liars and Semantics, The Reasoner 2(12), 4–5). ter around him, I knew he So, suppose I say “What I’m now saying isn’t true.” If would create something what I said was true then, as I said, what I said wasn’t truly terrific. For me go- true. Does it follow that what I said wasn’t true? The ing to Munich presented paradox is that if so, then since that’s what I seem to a unique opportunity to have said, I seem to have said something true. The res- be part of a vibrant research community of very gifted olution defended earlier by me (2008) takes my utter- people with similar research interests, and to contribute ance to have been meaningless, so that I didn’t really (however modestly) to shaping the Center from the say anything. But we may then wonder how it was ground on up—a very enticing prospect indeed! that it seemed so clear what my utterance would have 3. Current research: meant had it been true; and my Divine Liar utterance I am currently working on various projects related was even more obviously meaningful. Another popular to logical inferentialism, including a monograph (with resolution would regard my Liar utterance as equivo- Julien Murzi) and an edited volume (with Neil Tennant). cal, with the word ‘true’ naming many different pred- I am also wrestling with a number of different foun- icates in Hill’s (2007) Tarskian hierarchy. But formal dational questions concerning the normativity and the languages can only be defined via natural language; and

55 my informal Divine Liar utterance wasn’t obviously that Similarly, the best answer to the question “Is this equivocal. colour blue or not?” could be to say that it’s vaguely Questions of truth are essentially questions of how bluish. Ordinary objects are almost always either blue well our words are describing the world. So insofar or not, but colours don’t really divide into those that are as my Liar utterance wasn’t meaningless, it was assert- blue and those that aren’t. On the two sides of any such ing that it wasn’t describing itself very well, not well line, between the blue and the other colours of some enough for it to have been true. And since it was noth- spectrum, would be colours that were indistinguishable. ing if not self-contradictory, it certainly wasn’t describ- So there’s no such division; and so there’s some colour ing itself very well. But therefore, in view of what it of which, rather than saying that it’s blue, or that it isn’t, was asserting, it seems to have been describing itself we ought to say that it’s bluish. Note that such a colour quite well after all. Was it describing itself well enough might look blue against a background of colours that for it to count as true? I’m reluctant to call it ‘true’ as weren’t blue, or even if you just wondered whether it follows. If it was true because it wasn’t, then it was true belonged to that class of colours, and so postulated it and not true, but surely something’s only not some way amongst them (cf. what we find paradoxical about the if it’s not the case that it is. Nor do I want to say that Liar Paradox). Incidentally, some formal work on ‘true’ it was neither true nor not true, as that’s just to say that as a vague predicate is well described by Petr Hajek it was not true and also true. Nevertheless, my utter- (2010: Fuzzy Logic, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Phi- ance wasn’t describing itself very well, and was there- losophy). fore describing itself quite well; so perhaps it was only partially true. If so then calling it either ‘true’ or ‘not Martin Cooke true’ would both be inaccurate, would both be only par- tially true. We naturally focus upon whatever truth we can find Deduction and Novelty in what people say, or upon an obvious untruth. And things are usually described accurately enough for some The interesting interview with Alan Musgrave (The obvious purpose, or not accurately enough. But would it Reasoner, 5.1) contained much that is worthy of dis- be unrealistic to think of truth (descriptive accuracy) as cussion. Here I want to comment only on Musgrave’s a matter of degree? The classic example is that of Vann claim that “the conclusion of a valid deductive argu- McGee (1991: Truth, Vagueness, and Paradox, Hack- ment is contained in its premises and says nothing new” ett, 217): If “Harry is bald” is true insofar as Harry is (p. 2). The claim has been a commonplace in discus- bald, ‘true’ should be at least as vague as ‘bald’. And sions of deduction for centuries. An alternative way of quite generally, why should we believe that our words making the claim is to say that every deductively valid are much better defined than our purposes have required argument is a petitio principii. This is a formulation them to be? Maybe natural language has a ubiquitous— which Musgrave himself echoes when he says: “Non- since usually unobtrusive—vagueness. (That would ex- circular valid deductive arguments for P simply beg the plain why the discovery of a contradiction so naturally question in a less obvious way [than do blatantly circu- triggers an attempt to clarify our terminology.) And in lar ones]” (p. 2). However, notwithstanding its general particular, the Liar Paradox might be revealing this ordi- acceptance, this hoary claim about deductive validity is narily obscure vagueness of ‘true’. That’s because if my false. Ironically, it was Musgrave’s teacher, Karl Pop- Liar utterance was only partially true, then it would fol- per, who refuted it. low from what I said only that it was also partially not The hoary claim about deductive validity is associ- true, which clearly coheres with it being only partially ated with an equally hoary theory of deductive reason- true. There’s no inconsistency—no more paradox—and ing, which is found more or less explicitly in both em- it seems that much the same could be said of any Liar piricist and rationalist philosophers of the modern pe- sentences. riod and which is still popular today. The hoary theory And if that is how the Liar Paradox should be re- says that a deductive reasoner arrives at a conclusion of solved, then my Divine Liar utterance would have been an argument by analysing the content of its premises. only partially true if there is an omniscient being. My This content is supposed to be accessible to the rea- Divine Liar argument was therefore fallacious, because soner, at least upon reflection; indeed, it is often sup- arguments should have premises that are unequivocally posed to be made up of ideas in his mind, or concepts true enough to count as true under all relevant hypothe- grasped by him, so that the ideas or concepts contained ses. But if you asked an omniscient being whether my in the conclusion are extracted from those that make up Divine Liar utterance was true, she might say that it the premises. This hoary theory of deductive reasoning contained an element of truth. That might be a more may seem to entail the hoary claim about deductive va- informative—more true and less misleading—answer lidity: for if the reasoner arrives at a valid conclusion by than a simple ‘yes’ or ‘no’. unfurling the content of a set of premises, it may seem

56 that, in a valid argument, the conclusion must already be Given this distinction between the objective content discoverable in the premises and thus say nothing new. of a theory and the part of that content available to a But we will see that this apparent entailment does not particular thinker in a particular situation, we could con- hold. sistently retain the hoary theory of deductive reasoning Popper refuted the hoary claim about deductive va- while rejecting the hoary claim about deductive validity. lidity in the following way (Unended Quest, Glasgow, For we could maintain that: Fontana, 1976, pp. 25-28). Let N stand for Newton’s theory of gravitation and let E stand for Einstein’s the- (i) any deductively valid conclusion from a set of ory of gravitation. Since N is incompatible with E, the premises to which we can reason deductively must following argument is deductively valid: be contained in that part of the content of the premises that is already available to us; N (ii) there are many important deductively valid con- clusions from those premises to which we are cur- Therefore, not-E. rently (and, in some cases, perhaps forever) unable to reason deductively. But the conclusion of this argument would certainly have said something new in Newton’s time. Newton On this view, every piece of deductively valid reason- could not foresee Einstein’s theory; and none of his ing, but not every deductively valid argument, would contemporaries could have arrived at a statement of the merely unfurl things that we already know, explicitly or negation of Einstein’s theory simply by unfurling the implicitly. implicitly known content of Newton’s theory. However, the falsity of the hoary claim about deduc- Watkins offers a recipe for constructing somewhat tive validity casts doubt on the hoary theory of deduc- similar examples. “Take some powerful new scientific tive reasoning. Indeed, I think that the hoary theory theory which has recently led to a striking new predic- of deductive reasoning can also be shown to be false, tion. Formulate all the premises used in the derivation and for Popperian reasons, though I cannot explain that of this prediction. Among these there will almost cer- here. tainly be a truism known long before the new theory Danny Frederick was invented. Call this a, call the theory together with all the other premises b, and call the prediction c. Then an impressive implication of the truism a is: if b then c” (Hobbes’s System of Ideas, second edition, London, Hutchinson, 1973, p. 9). But if we go back to a time before the powerful new scientific theory had been in- §3 vented, anyone announcing the deductively valid con- News clusion, if b then c, from the premise, a, would certainly have been saying something new. 9th Mexican International Conference on Popper distinguishes between the objective content Artificial Intelligence, 8–13 November of a theory and the part of that content that is available to a particular reasoner in a particular situation. The ob- One of the many possible definitions of Artificial Intelli- jective content includes each of those propositions that gence (AI) is that it is a branch of computer science that would be a deductively valid conclusion from the theory models human reasoning, usage of human language and as premise. A great deal of this content will be inacces- organization of knowledge, solving problems and prac- sible to someone who has learned the theory: it can be- tically all other human intellectual abilities. Usually it come available to him only piecemeal as new theories is characterized by application of heuristic methods be- are discovered. For example, the negation of E is part cause in the majority of cases there is no exact solution of the objective content of N, even though it is not part to these kinds of problems. of the content of N that was accessible to anyone before The Mexican International Conference on Artificial Einstein came up with E. Thus, Newton did not, and Intelligence (MICAI), a yearly international conference could not, know the complete objective content of his series organized by the Mexican Society for Artificial own theory. Popper says, ironically, “we never know Intelligence (SMIA), is a major international AI forum what we are talking about” (op. cit., p. 27). This is a and the main event in the academic life of the country’s kind of incompleteness: at every time there are some de- growing AI community. ductively valid consequences of a theory that cannot be MICAI conferences traditionally publish high- formulated, and thus cannot be formally derived from quality papers in all areas of Artificial Intelligence and the theory, by reasoners at that time. We could call this its applications. The proceedings of the MICAI events ‘Popper-incompleteness’ (to coin a term). have been published by Springer in its Lecture Notes in

57 Artificial Intelligence (LNAI) series since 2002. This Witold Pedrycz (Alberta, Canada) presented a talk year the general acceptance rate was 27.2%. We re- where he discussed the main concepts of fuzzy mod- ceived 301 submissions from 34 countries, from which eling and specifically the problem of granularity in this 82 papers were accepted. modeling. Usually, the structure of a conference book allows un- Raul´ Monroy (Mexico City, Mexico) in his talk derstanding of the current tendencies of the research in “Some Encounters on the Productive Use of a Failed the field. In our case, the conference book is structured Proof Attempt or a Counterexample” presented his en- into two volumes that contain 5 thematic areas each. counters with the productive use of failure in the context The first volume is representative of the main current of some theories, natural numbers and (higher-order) topics of interest for AI community and their applica- lists, and in the context of security protocols. tions: Boris Stilman (Denver, USA) delivered a talk “Dis- covering Role of Linguistic Geometry” where he spoke ◦ Natural language processing (10 papers); about the history of the development of linguistic ge- ◦ Robotics, planning and scheduling (12); ometry primarily related to the game of chess (in col- laboration with the world chess champion M. Botvin- ◦ Computer vision and image processing (7); nik) and its recent developments related to assistance in real world warfare (very successful cooperation with ◦ Logic and distributed systems (5); US government in real war situations). In fact, the term ◦ AI-based medical applications (6). linguistic geometry is somewhat misleading; the de- scribed theory is about a no-search approach, i.e., the The second volume contains the papers related to sev- major theoretical result is showing that it generates op- eral areas of soft computing (i.e., the development of the timal solutions for a class of Abstract Board Games. algorithms when the exact computing solution does not Claudia Manfredi (Firenze, Italy) talked about the ad- exist): vances of the Interdisciplinary Laboratory of Biomedi- cal Acoustics related to development of new voice anal- ◦ Machine learning and pattern recognition (12); ysis tools, for example, applicable to newborn infant ◦ Automatic learning for natural language process- crying, monitoring and detection of obstructive sleep ing (4); apnea, etc. De-Shuang Huang (China) presented a talk “Man- ◦ Evolutionary algorithms and other naturally- ifold Learning Based Feature Extraction Methods” inspired algorithms (8); where he described an efficient dimensionality reduc- tion method for nonlinear distributing data, and spoke ◦ Hybrid intelligent systems and neural networks about its evaluation and applications. (9); Alexander Gelbukh ◦ Fuzzy logic (9). National Polytechnic Institute, Mexico The relative difference reflected in the distinction be- Grigori Sidorov tween volumes is that the first volume is centered on the National Polytechnic Institute, Mexico tasks and applications, while the second one is centered on the typical AI methods. Causality, Inference and Science, 4–5 The conference also had a Poster session where about March 40 works were presented, and during which a real size three-wheel mobile robot was moving among the at- The international workshop “Causality, Inference and tendants of the conference successfully avoiding the Science” took place at Complutense University of persons, demonstrating the state of the art in mobile Madrid on the 4th and 5th of March. The workshop robotics. was organised by the Methods of Causal Inference and Finally, the conference had six invited talks that we Scientific Representation (MCISR) research group, and will present briefly. brought together researchers working on different as- Hector´ Garc´ıa Molina (Stanford, USA) spoke about pects of causality, from metaphysical to methodological the interesting system “CourseRank: A Social Site for issues. Causation is in itself a many-faced topic and the Academic Course Planning and Evaluation” that is in diversity of proposals in the workshop represented that use in 40 universities in the USA. The system allows well. Plurality was also one of the main features in dis- one to see the evaluations given by professors to stu- cussions, and it allowed for an interesting interchange dents, and the opinion of students about the courses, and of opinions on interrelated issues about causation. allows (also suggests) one to choose the course that is The workshop had three well differentiated sections. best for the particular student given a set of constraints. It opened with Stephen Mumford (University of Not-

58 tingham) and Rani Lill Anjum (Norwegian University There are several reasons to think this is not so. of Life Sciences), who presented a jointly developed ac- In the closing lecture, Miklos´ Redei´ (London School count of causation based on dispositions. In this view, of Economics) discussed the idea of causal complete- causation is taken to be a primitive notion, grounded on ness of a theory. Casual completeness requires that all our very perception of it, and is to be understood as a correlations in a theory have a causal explanation. In the single process rather than as the usual two-event rela- particular case of Quantum Field Theory, where distant tion. In this account, dispositions also explain proba- correlations are present, common cause completeness bilistic causation, and they detach causation from deter- is to be achieved by means of common causes. And minism. whether the theory can be taken to be causally com- In a second block the workshop focused on general plete or not depends crucially on the space-time struc- methodological issues of causation and causal infer- ture of the postulated common causes, and in particular ence. Federica Russo (University of Kent) discussed on where are they located. the issue of how to make sense (causally) of correla- tional data in causal modelling. This is a difficult task, Inaki˜ San Pedro specially in the special sciences, where one deals with Department of Logic and Philosophy of Science, large amounts of bulk data and no initial clues as to Complutense University Madrid what the underlying causal relations might be. Russo suggested we should look at the issue from the point Southern Society for Philosophy and Psy- of view of the validity of the specific models, and ar- chology, 10–12 March gued that while a strategy based on modelling causal structures that can later be tested can achieve the task, a The Southern Society for Philosophy and Psychology strategy based on ‘interventionist’ accounts of causation held its annual meeting in New Orleans on March 10- will fail. The various difficulties as regards epistemic 12. Highlights of the Philosophy Program included in- justification around the idea of ’intervention’ came out vited talks by Jonathan Weinberg (Indiana University), as well in the paper presented by Isabelle Drouet (IH- Terry Horgan (University of Arizona), and Michael PST, Paris), which assessed the (causal) assumptions Lynch (University of Connecticut). Speakers for joint needed when both interventionist accounts of causation sessions included SSPP President Thomas Polger (Uni- and Bayesian networks are put to work as tools of causal versity of Cincinnati) and Elliot Sober (University of inference and causal discovery. Wisconsin-Madison). Topics of invited symposia and A paper by Joseph Berkovitz (University of Toronto) conference sessions included mental state attribution, best represented the plural—eclectic, in his words— neuroscience and the virtues, reasons and explanation, nature of the main topic of the workshop. Berkovitz action theory, extended cognition, natural kinds, free suggested that, contrary to the spirit of the usual at- will and conscious experience. tempts to characterise causation with a single concept, Weinberg (“Out of the Armchair, and Beyond the recognising the eclectic nature of the notion is a much Clipboard: Prospects for the Second Decade of Ex- more productive an approach. The problem with eclec- perimental Philosophy”) assessed experimental philos- ticism, though, is that it makes it difficult to identify ophys (“X-Phi”) first decade and its near-term future. In genuine causal explanations in some cases. Weinberg’s view, X-Phi is now an established subfield Causal inference and explanation in physics was the that has helped establish an empirically valid basis for main topic of the third block of the workshop. Adan´ the use of intuitions as data in philosophical debates, Sus (University of Wuppertal) presented an account of especially those regarding free will, knowledge attribu- how, and to what extent, ‘inertial motion’ is explained in tion, and moral responsibility and judgment. X-Phi-ers General Relativity. In Sus’ view it is the theory itself— now seek new methods for probing intuitions and have its formal structure, in particular, which provides such begun thinking about causal models to explain the pat- an explanation. But this leaves us with new questions terns of intuitions. Weinberg recommended developing related, once more, to what can count as scientific, or meaningful effect size measures and seeking more ro- causal, explanation. bust results by eliminating “noise”. The need to take into consideration metaphysical is- Horgan (“Agentive Phenomenology to Cognitive sues when applying some methods of causal inference Phenomenology: A Guide for the Perplexed”) remained came out as well in a paper presented by Inaki˜ San Pe- firmly in the armchair in his defense of the idea that cog- dro (Complutense University). San Pedro assessed the nitive states have a phenomenological aspect—a “what- relation between free will and certain causal influences, it’s-like” to believe that P or understand that Q. To this in the context of the EPR correlations. Here free will end, Horgan used the conceptual device of a series of is usually taken as warrant for certain conditions—’no- “partial zombies” (Andy1, etc.) who by hypothesis are conspiracy’ conditions—which help deriving Bell’s the- in all ways identical to a normal subject but intuitively orem. But does free will really justify such conditions? have certain experiential deficits, in particular the ex-

59 perience of agency (of “self as source”). For example, defended the reliabilist’s definition of knowledge as the Andy3 doesn’t experience speech as speech but expe- most satisfying one. riences spontaneous desires that cause him to behave Igor Douven (Groningen) reminded that we lack ac- appropriately when certain strings of sounds occur. counts which give meaning to the probability of a condi- Polger (“Multiple Realization and Variability”) de- tional. Hence, extant theories of acceptability, asserta- fended the Identity Theory by arguing that there is no bility, and belief change do not apply to conditionals. Heraclitean shortcut (“All is flux”) to the truth of multi- Klemens Kappel (Copenhagen) suggested that, when ple realization. While individuals within and across tax- trying to spell out the Gettier condition, one may not onomies differ qualitatively, not every variation makes reach acceptable solutions, because the assumptions in- a difference for determining whether multiple realiza- curred may be incompatible with fallibilism. tion is true. Polger proposed examining more closely Based on examples from classical and modern liter- the impact of idealization and abstraction in science on ature, Pascal Engel (Geneva) addressed stupidity—both the debate. in a na¨ıve and a reflected version—as that which the Sober (“Parsimony and Theory of Mind”) criticized proper, if currently neglected, account of wisdom will, Morgan’s evolutionary argument against ascribing hu- and should, save us from. man characteristics to other species and De Waal’s argu- Rene van Woudenberg (Amsterdam) inquired into the ment that explanatory parsimony favors anthropomor- metaphysics of degrees (as in the “degrees of belief”), phism. He considered a non-evolutionary argument in claiming that no such thing exists. Clearly, even a weak- which an explanation of non-human behavior that uni- ened version (e.g., “Degrees need not be assumed”) fies the phenomena but posits a capacity to have mental won’t sit well with everybody. states about conspecifics’ mental states may be better Finally, Stephan Hartman (Tilburg) presented a than one that does not posit such second-order mental Bayesian model of rational deliberation. Under as- states but does not unify. sumptions on, amongst others, the reliability of discus- Lynch (“Three Questions About Truth”) asked: How sants, it demonstrates that deliberation is to be episte- do we identify a property in virtue of which proposi- mologically preferred over voting procedures. tions are true? (Answer: by functional role.) Could We refer to the abstract booklet for information on there be more than one such property? (Answer: Sure.) the sessions, available at the conference website. Gen- What does any such property have to do with truth? erally, also in epistemology, specialization is key. More- (Answer: it is truth—even if there are more than one.) over, as the high standard of the Q&A, and the lively interaction during breaks evidenced, discussions bene- Carrie Figdor fit from shared background on a narrow focus, a com- Department of Philosophy, University of Iowa petitive selection process, and—last but not least—one- page handouts. The location of the 2013 EEN Meeting European Epistemology Network, 17–19 remains to be announced. March Frank Zenker Unlike philosophy conferences that are broad in scope, Department of Philosophy, Lund University the 2011 European Epistemology Network Meeting fo- cused narrowly on issues in the study of knowledge. In Calls for Papers addition to eight plenary talks, over three days, 27 pre- sentations (selected from 52 submissions) were given in Advanced Methodologies for Bayesian Networks: three parallel sessions. Predominantly coming from Eu- special issue of New Generation Computing, deadline rope, the meeting included speakers from Canada, and 1 April. the USA. Recurrent themes were the Gettier problem Philosophical Issues in Medicine: special issue of the and transmission of warrant, amongst others. Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice, deadline 1 Allan Hazlett (Edinburgh) argued for a Gricean ap- April. proach to the Gettier problem, according to which sub- Hilary Putnam International Young Scholars Con- jects in Gettier cases have knowledge, although it would test: to the best two essays on any aspect of of Hilary be misleading to attribute knowledge to them. Putnam’s latest views, deadline 15 April. Annalisa Coliva (Modena & Reggio Emilia) rejected Experimental Philosophy: special issue of The Monist, Martin Davies’s alternative account to Crispin Wright’s deadline 30 April. failure of warrant transmission, then defended a third Types for Proofs and Programs: special issue of Logi- (“moderatism”) in relation to Moore’s proof. cal Methods in Computer Science, deadline 2 May. Building on Carnap’s notion of explication, and com- Quantum Correlations:Entanglement and Beyond: paring extant accounts on the problems of generality, special issue of International Journal of Quantum In- value, easy knowledge and Gettier, Erik Olsson (Lund) formation, deadline 15 May.

60 Reasoning with Context in the Semantic Web: special LORIWEB welcomes contributions on topics rele- issue of the Journal of Web Semantics, deadline 15 June. vant to the area of Logic and Rational Interaction— C. L. Hamblin and Argumentation Theory: special is- including announcements about recent publications and sue of Informal Logic, deadline 30 June. upcoming events. Please submit your news items to The Problem of the Criterion: special issue of Philo- Rasmus Rendsvig, our web manager, or to the loriweb sophical Papers, deadline 30 June. address. Modalities:Semantics &Epistemology: special issue Ben Rodenhauser¨ of Philosophia Scientiae, deadline 1 July. Philosophy, Groningen Philosophy of Information: book symposium published by Etica&Politica on ‘Philosophy of Information’ by Luciano Floridi, deadline 1 July. Composition,Counterfactuals and Causation: special . . . Argumentation Theory issue of Humana.Mente, deadline 30 July. Over the past few years, several research groups in the Deontic Logic: special issue of Journal of Logic and field of argumentation theory have started to refine and Computation, deadline 1 September. extend their theoretical frameworks in such a way that Extended Cognition and Epistemic Action: special is- they can be applied to specific communicative contexts. sue of Philosophical Exploration, deadline 15 Septem- The urge to do so is related to the fact that in the ana- ber. lytical and evaluative tools developed so far, the various The Alan Turing Year: special issue of Philosophia institutional conventions that may apply to the different Scientiæ, deadline 1 November. argumentative practices have not been accounted for. Between Two Images.The Manifest and the Scientific A few examples of comprehensive research projects Understanding of Man, 50 Years On: special issue of pertaining to argumentation in context are the follow- Humana.Mente, deadline 30 November. ing. In Switzerland, scholars working at the Univer- Formal and Intentional Semantics: special issue of The sita` della Svizzera italiana focus on the development of Monist, deadline 30 April 2012. tools for the analysis and evaluation of argumentation in the medical context and the financial context. Schol- ars from the Universite´ de Neuchatelˆ concentrate on the §4 analysis of argumentation in the educational context. In the Netherlands, scholars of the University of Amster- What’s Hot in ... dam have developed a theoretical framework that en- ables the analysis and evaluation of “strategic maneu- . . . Logic and Rational Interaction vering” in a number of contexts. In their research, they concentrate on argumentation in the legal, the political, The LORIweb site was particularly active this month; the medical, and the academic context. here’s a sample of “what’s hot”: new entries on Social Following on these developments, a new journal Norms and on Abduction were added to the Stanford called the Journal of Argumentation in Context will be Encyclopedia of Philosophy; also, a substantial revision launched later this year. of the entry on Turing Machines went online. The book Dynamic Formal Epistemology, edited by Patrick Gi- Jean H.M. Wagemans rard, Olivier Roy and Mathieu Marion, has appeared, University of Amsterdam collecting a number of “original contributions from the key actors of a new trend in the contemporary theory of knowledge and belief”, dubbed “dynamic epistemi- cology” by the editors. The Ohio-based Center for the §5 Study of Mind and Nature (CSMN) has a number of vents new philosophy podcasts available for download, in- E cluding, among others, audio recordings of recent talks April by Robert Stalnaker, Richard Moran and Fred Dretske. Lorenz Demey and Jonas De Vuyst have attended the Epistemology of Modeling &Simulation:Building Re- conference PhDs in Logic III in Brussels and report search Bridges Between the Philosophical and Mod- on the talks and tutorials given there. Finally, Rasmus eling Communities: University of Pittsburgh, 1–3 April. Rendsvig conducted an interview with Vincent Hen- Paradox and Logical Revision Workshop: Arche´ Re- dricks looking back on how formal epistemology devel- search Centre, St Andrews, Scotland, 2–3 April. oped in the last decade—actually, as Hendricks argues, AISB: UK Society for the Study of Artificial Intelli- it came into being as a “proper field of interdisciplinary gence and Simulation of Behaviour, University of York, epistemological inquiry”. York, 4–7 April.

61 Computing and Philosophy: University of York, UK, 4– PhiLang: 2nd International Conference on Philoso- 7 April. phy of Language and Linguistics, University of Lodz, Research Student Conference in Probability and Poland, 12–14 May. Statistics: Cambridge, 4–7 April. Metaphysics & the Philosophy of Science: University SpringSim: Spring Simulation Multi-conference, of Toronto, 13–15 May. Boston, MA, USA, 4–9 April. Philosophy of Mind,Language, and Cognitive Science: Biology and Subjectivity: University of Navarra, Pam- University of Western Ontario, Canada, 14–15 May. plona, Spain, 6–8 April. LPNMR: 11th International Conference on Logic Pro- Comparative Epistemology of Information &Commu- gramming and Nonmonotonic Reasoning, Vancouver, nication in Scientific Disciplines: Jean Moulin Univer- BC, Canada, 16–19 May. sity, Lyon, France, 8 April. Argumentation:Cognition &Community: Ontario So- ICNCS: International Conference on Network and ciety for the Study of Argumentation (OSSA), Univer- Computer Science, Kanyakumari, India, 8–10 April. sity of Windsor, 18–21 May. The Authority of Science: University of Sydney, Aus- WoLLIC: 18th Workshop on Logic, Language, Infor- tralia, 8–10 April. mation and Computation, University of Pennsylvania, AIML: ICGST International Conference on Artificial Philadelphia, USA, 18–21 May. Intelligence and Machine Learning, Dubai United Arab Philosophy and Ordinary Language: Louvain, 19–20 Emirates, 11–14 April. May. YSM: Young Statisticians Meeting, University of Recent Advances in Statistics and Probability: Hasselt Southampton, 12–14 April. University, Diepenbeek, Belgium, 19–20 May. ICANNGA: International Conference on Adaptive and FEW: 8th annual Formal Epistemology Workshop, Uni- Natural Computing Algorithms, Ljubljana, Slovenia, versity of Southern California, 19–21 May. 14–16 April. Systematicity and the Post-connectionist Era:Taking ICKD: International Conference on Knowledge Discov- Stock of the Architecture of Cognition: San Jose, An- ery, Chengdu, Sichuan, China, 15–17 April. dalucia, Spain, 19–21 May. MAICS: 22nd Midwest Artificial Intelligence and Cog- PALMYR X: Logic and the Use of Language: Paris- nitive Science Conference, Cincinnati, Ohio, USA, 16– Amsterdam Logic Meetings of Young Researchers, 17 April. Paris, 20–21 May. Experimental philosophy and the Origins of Empiri- ICNCI: International Conference on Network and Com- cism: University of Otago, Dunedin, New Zealand, 18– putational Intelligence, Zhengzhou, China, 21–22 May. 19 April. European Conference on Cognitive Science: Sophia, NFM: 3rd NASA Formal Methods Symposium, Bulgaria, 21–24 May. Pasadena, California, USA, 18–20 April. SLACRR: St. Louis Annual Conference on Reasons BCTCS: 27th British Colloquium for Theoretical Com- and Rationality, St. Louis, MO, 22–24 May. puter Science, University of Birmingham, 18–21 April. TAMC: 8th Annual Conference on Theory and Applica- ICI: 23nd International Conference on Informatics, tions of Models of Computation, Tokyo, Japan, 23–25 Canakkale, Canakkale, Turkey, 27–29 April. May. IGCC: 3rd annual Interdisciplinary Graduate Con- ference on Consciousness, Boston University, 29–30 PAKDD: 15th Pacific-Asia Conference on Knowledge April. Discovery and Data Mining, Shenzhen, China, 24–27 May. AI: 24th Canadian Conference on Artificial Intel- May ligence, Saint John’s, Newfoundland and Labrador, AAMAS: 10th International Conference on Au- Canada, 25–27 May. tonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, Taipei, Tai- Normativity of Meaning:Sellersian Perspectives: De- wan, 2–6 May. partment of Logic, Institute of Philosophy, Prague, ABC: Approximate Bayesian Computation, Imperial Czech Republic, 25–27 May. College, London, 5 May. SEP: Society for Exact Philosophy, University of Man- EBL: 16th Brazilian Logic Conference, Laboratorio´ itoba, Winnipeg, Canada, 26–28 May. Nacional de Computac¸ao˜ Cient´ıfica, Petropolis´ (RJ), Kant on Method as a Demarcation of the Sciences: Brazil, 9–13 May. Faculty of Philosophy, University of Groningen, The ICCS: 4th International Conference of Cognitive Sci- Netherlands, 30–31 May. ence, Tehran, Iran, 10–12 May. Agnotology:Ways of Producing,Preserving, and Metaphor and Communication: Faculty of Education Dealing with Ignorance: ZiF, Bielefeld University, 30 Sciences Department of Pedagogical and Philosophical May–1 June. Sciences, University of Cagliari, 12–14 May. Greek Stochastics: Crete, Greece, 30 May–1 June.

62 LATA: 5th International Conference on Language and Emergence and Panpsychism: International Conference Automata Theory and Applications, Tarragona, Spain, on the Metaphysics of Consciousness, Munich, Ger- 30 May–3 June. many, 20–24 June. Meaning,Context and Implicit Content: Chateauˆ de LOGICA: Institute of Philosophy, Academy of Sci- Cerisy-la-Salle, Normandy, France, 31 May–7 June. ences of the Czech Republic, Hejnice, Northern Bo- hemia, 20–24 June. LICS: Logic in Computer Science, Toronto, Canada, June 21–24 June. TICTTL: 3rd International Congress on Tools for ASC: 14th International Conference on Artificial In- Teaching Logic, Salamanca, Spain, 1–4 June. telligence and Soft Computing, Crete, Greece, 22–24 Perception,Action, and Time: Department of Philoso- June. phy, Universitat Autonoma` de Barcelona, 2–3 June. George Berkeley:Mind,Perception and Knowledge: XPRAG: Experimental Pragmatics, Barcelona, 2–4 University of Zurich,¨ Switzerland, 22-24 June. June. SPSP: Society for Philosophy of Science in Practice, Philosophy and Model Theory: Paris, 2–5 June. University of Exeter, Exeter, UK, 22–24 June. Church’s Thesis:Logic,Mind and Nature: Krakow, Ordinary Language,Linguistics, and Philosophy: Poland, 3–5 June. Arche´ Research Centre, University of St Andrews, 23– ICFCC: 3rd International Conference on Future Com- 25 June. puter and Communication, Iasi, Romania, 3–5 June. Metaphysics of Mind: Centre for the Study of Percep- UC: 10th International Conference on Unconventional tual Experience, University of Glasgow, 24–25 June. Computation, Turku, Finland, 6–10 June. EPISTEME: Social Epistemology Meets Formal Epis- Contexts,Perspectives, and Relative Truth: Univer- temology: Recent Developments and New Trends, Cen- sity of Bonn, 9–11 June. ter for Formal Epistemology, Department of Philoso- ASSC: Association for the Scientific Study of Con- phy, Carnegie Mellon University, 24–26 June. sciousness, Kyoto, Japan, 9–12 June. CMMSE: Computational and Mathematical Methods in Science and Engineering, Benidorm, Alicante, Neuroscience and Pragmatism: Potomac Institute for Spain.26–30 June Policy Studies, Arlington, VA, 10 June. Extended cognition: Amsterdam, 27–28 June. ICCSIT: 4th IEEE International Conference on Com- Evolution,Cooperation and Rationality:Philosophi- puter Science and Information Technology, Chengdu, cal Perspectives: University of Bristol, 27–29 June. China, 10–12 June. QI: 5th International Symposium on Quantum Interac- WSOM: 8th Workshop on Self-organizing Maps, Es- tion, Aberdeen, UK, 27–29 June. poo, Finland, 13–15 June. Ershov Informatics Conference: Novosibirsk, The Epistemology of Philosophy: University of Akademgorodok, Russia, 27 June–1 July. Cologne, 13–17 June. Journees´ Arithmetiques´ : Vilnius, Lithuania, 27 June–1 BW7: 7th Barcelona Workshop on Issues in the Theory July. of Reference, Special Topic: Paradoxes of Truth and Models of Computation in Context: Sofia, Bulgaria, 27 Denotation, 14–16 June. June–2 July. ICANN: International Conference on Artificial Neural ICML: 28th International Conference on Machine Networks, Espoo, Finland, 14–17 June. Learning, Bellevue, WA, USA, 28 June–2 July. ogicism oday L T : Besse-en-Chandesse, France, 14–17 Models and Mechanisms in Cognitive Science: School June. of Philosophy, Psychology, and Language Sciences, CSR: 6th International Computer Science Symposium University of Edinburgh, 29 June. in Russia, St. Petersburg, 14–18 June. ECSQARU: 11th European Conference on Symbolic Another World is Possible: Conference on David and Quantitative Approaches to Reasoning with Uncer- Lewis, University of Urbino, Italy, 16–18 June. tainty, Belfast, Northern Ireland, UK, 29 June–1 July. Knowing and Understanding Through Computer Simu- lations: IHPST, Paris, 16–18 June. July Conceptual Analysis and 2-D Semantics: University of Cologne, 18–19 June. AAHPSSS: Australasian Association for the History, PNSE: International Workshop on Petri Nets and Soft- Philosophy and Social Studies of Science, Christchurch, ware Engineering, Kanazawa, Japan, 20–21 June. New Zealand, 1–3 July. EEIC: International Conference on Electric and Elec- Perceiving Others’Minds: University of Manchester, 1 tronics, Nanchang, China, 20–22 June. July. Defending Realism:Ontological and Epistemological Cognitio.Nonhuman Minds:Animal,Artificial or Investigations: University of Urbino, Italy, 20–23 June. Other Minds: Montreal, Qc., Canada, 3–5 July.

63 Bayesian Capture-Recapture: Centre for Research into Thailand, 21–23 July. Ecological and Environmental Modelling (CREEM), IADIS: International Conference Intelligent Systems University of St Andrews, 4–6 July. and Agents, Rome, Italy, 24–26 July. ICMC: 2nd International Choice Modelling Confer- ISIPTA: 7th International Symposium on Imprecise ence, Leeds, UK, 4–6 July. Probability: Theories and Applications, University of The Computational Turn:Past,Presents,Futures?: Innsbruck, Austria, 25–28 July. International Association for Computing and Philoso- ICCS: 19th International Conference on Conceptual phy, Aarhus University, 4–6 July. Structures, Derby, England, UK, 25–29 July. Panhellenic Logic Symposium: Ioannina, Greece, 4–8 ICBO: International Conference on Biomedical Ontol- July. ogy, University at Buffalo, NY, 26–30 July. TABLEAUX: Automated Reasoning with Analytic Beyond the Possible: in Memoriam of Richard Sylvan: Tableaux and Related Methods, Bern, Switzerland, 4– The University of Melbourne, 27–29 July. 8 July. IJCNN: International joint Conference on Neural Net- LGS7: 7th International Conference on “Logic, Games works, San Jose, California, 31 July 31–5 August. Theory and Social Choice”, National School of Political CADE: 23nd International Conference on Automated Studies and Administration, Bucharest, Romania, 6–9 Deduction, Wroclaw, Poland, 31 July–5 August. July. ICLP: 27th International Conference on Logic Pro- gramming, Lexington, Kentucky, USA, 6–10 July. August Society for Philosophy and Psychology: Universite´ du Quebec´ a` Montreal,´ Montreal, Canada, 6–10 July. The Classical Model of Science II: The Axiomatic DGL: 5th Workshop in Decisions, Games & Logic, Method, the Order of Concepts and the Hierarchy of Maastricht University, The Netherlands, 7–9 July. Sciences from Leibniz to Tarski, Vrije Universiteit Am- IWSM: 26th International Workshop on Statistical sterdam, The Netherlands, 2–5 August. Modelling, Valencia, 11–15 July. ICFOCS: International Conference on Frontiers of TARK: Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowl- Computer Science, Bangalore, Karnataka, India, 7–9 edge, Groningen, the Netherlands, 11–15 July. August. Logic Colloquium: Barcelona, Catalonia, Spain, 11–16 ECAL: European Conference on Artificial Life, Paris, July. France, 8–12 August. Australasian Applied Statistics Conference: Palm Logical Constants: Ljubljana, Slovenia, 8–12 August. Cove, Tropical North Queensland, Australia, 12–15 Epistemic Inclusiveness and Trust: 3rd Copenhagen July. Conference in Epistemology, University of Copen- UAI: 27th Conference on Uncertainty in Artificial Intel- hagen, 15–17 August. ligence, Barcelona, Spain, 14–17 July. ECAI: 19th European Conference on Artificial Intelli- ARCOE: Automated Reasoning about Context and On- gence, Lisbon, Portugal, 16–20 August. tology Evolution, Barcelona, Spain, 17–18 July. Conventional Principles in Science: Department of CLIMA: 12th International Workshop on Computa- Philosophy, University of Bristol, 18–19 August. tional Logic in Multi-Agent Systems, Barcelona, Spain, YSI: Young Statisticians Meeting, Dublin, Ireland, 19– 17–18 July. 21 August. SING: 7th Spain-Italy-Netherlands Meeting on Game ISI: 58th Congress of the International Statistical Insti- Theory, Paris, 18–20 July. tute, Dublin, Ireland, 21–26 August. David Lewis on Language and Mind: 3rd Graduate In- ternational Summer School in Cognitive Sciences and KDD: 17th ACM SIGKDD Conference on Knowledge Semantics, University of Latvia, Riga, 18–21 July. Discovery and Data Mining, San Diego, CA, 21–24 Au- WORLDCOMP: World Congress in Computer Science, gust. Computer Engineering, and Applied Computing, Las FCT: 18th International Symposium on Fundamentals Vegas, Nevada, USA, 18–21 July. of Computer Theory, Oslo, Norway, 22–25 August. ICIAM: 7th International Congress on Industrial and AiML: 8th International Conference on Advances in Applied Mathematics, Vancouver, British Columbia, Modal Logic, Moscow, 24–27 August. Canada, 18–22 July. ICDL-EPIROB: IEEE Conference on Development and IJCAI: 22nd International Joint Conference on Artificial Learning, and Epigenetic Robotics, Frankfurt am Main, Intelligence, Barcelona, Spain, 19–22 July. Germany, 24–27 August. CLMPS: 14th Congress of Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of the Social Sciences: University of Philosophy of Science, Nancy, France, 19–26 July. Copenhagen, 25–26 August. ICMSA: 7th IMT-GT International Conference on Uncertainty Modeling in Knowledge Engineering and Mathematics, Statistics and its Applications, Bangkok, Decision Making: Istanbul, Turkey, 27–29 August.

64 September Formal Epistemology Meets Experimental Philoso- phy: Tilburg Center for Logic and Philosophy of Sci- BISP: 7th workshop in Bayesian Inference for Stochas- ence, 29–30 September. tic Processes, Getafe, Spain, 1–3 September. ECAP: 7th European Conference in Analytic Philoso- phy, Milan, Italy, 1–6 September. §6 DOMAINS: Swansea University, Wales, UK, 5–7 September. Courses and Programmes ECML PKDD: European Conference on Machine Learning and Principles and Practice of Knowledge Courses Discovery in Databases, Athens, Greece, 5–9 Septem- Psychophysical,Computational and Neuroscience ber. Models of Time Perception: Groningen, 4–8 April. WPMSIIP: Workshop on Principles and Methods of Spring School on Belief Functions Theory and Appli- Statistical Inference, University of Ljubljana, Slovenia, cations: Autrans, France, 4–8 April. 5–10 September. COST-ADT: Doctoral School on Computational Social Perceptual Memory and Perceptual Imagination: Uni- Choice, Estoril, Portugal, 9–14 April. versity of Glasgow, 6–9 September. Logic School: Instituto de Matematica´ /UFF, Niteroi´ Progic (RJ), Brazil, 7–8 May. Reasoning and Argument:Computer and Cognitive The fifth workshop on Combining Probability and Science Perspectives: 2nd Summer Institute on Argu- Logic, Columbia University, New York, 10–11 mentation, Centre for Research on Reasoning, Argu- September mentation and Rhetoric, University of Windsor, On- CSL: 20th Annual Conference of the European Asso- tario, Canada, 9–27 May. ciation for Computer Science Logic, Bergen, Norway, Carnegie Mellon Summer School in Logic and Formal 12–15 September. Epistemology: Department of Philosophy, Carnegie CP: 17th International Conference on Principles and Mellon University, Pittsburgh, 6–23 June. Practice of Constraint Programming, Perugia, Italy, 12– MLSS Singapore: Machine Learning Summer School, 16 September. Biopolis, Singapore, 13–17 June. urdue EANN/AIAI: Engineering Applications of Neural Net- MLSS @ P : Machine Learning Summer School, works and Artificial Intelligence Applications and Inno- Departments of Statistics and Computer Science, Pur- vations, Corfu, Greece, 15–18 September. due University, 13–24 June. Relativism and Disagreement,Fallibilism and Infalli- PLM: Philosophy of Language and Mind, Stockholm biism,Truth and Paradox: Northern Institute of Phi- University, 16–18 September. losophy Summer School, University of Aberdeen, 28 ICSC: International Conference on Semantic Com- June–30 June. puting, Palo Alto, California, United States, 18–21 EASSS: 13th European Agent Systems Summer September. School, Girona, Catalonia, Spain, 11–15 July. Causality and Explanation in the Sciences David Lewis on Language and Mind: University of Faculty of Arts and Philosophy, Ghent University, Latvia, Riga, 18–28 July. x 19–21 September L MLS: Lisbon Machine Learning Summer School, In- stituto Superior Tecnico´ (IST), Lisbon, Portugal, 20–25 FedCSIS: Federated Conference on Computer Science July. and Information Systems, Szczecin, Poland, 19–21 Experiments in Economics,Experiments in Philosophy: September. Summer school on Economics and Philosophy, San Se- Statistical Computational &Complex Systems: Uni- bastian, 27–29 July. versity of Padua, 19–21 September. Interactivist Summer Institute: University of the Computer Simulations and the Changing Face of Sci- Aegean, Syros, Greece, 29 July 29–1 August. entific Experimentation: Stuttgart, Germany, 21–23 Set Theory and Higher-Order Logic:Foundational Is- September. sues and Mathematical Developments: Institute of Phi- Social Ontology:Metaphysical and Empirical Per- losophy, London, 1–6 August. spectives: Workshop of the European Network on So- ESSLLI: European Summer School in Logic, Language cial Ontology (ENSO), Luiss Guido Carli, University, and Information, Ljubljana, Slovenia, 1–12 August. Rome, Italy, 21–23 September. Network Dynamics: Groningen, the Netherlands, 29 SYNASC: 13th International Symposium on Symbolic August–6 September. and Numeric Algorithms for Scientific Computing, Analysis Methods for Cross-national Comparisons: Timisoara, Timis, Romania, 26–29 September. Leuven, Belgium, 28 August–4 September.

65 MLSS France: Machine Learning Summer School, MSc in Cognitive Science: University of Osnabruck,¨ Bordeaux, France, 4–17 September. Germany. Relying on Others.New Perspectives in Social Episte- MSc in Cognitive Psychology/Neuropsychology: mology: University of Cologne, 7–10 September. School of Psychology, University of Kent. MSc in Logic: Institute for Logic, Language and Com- Programmes putation, University of Amsterdam. MSc in Mathematical Logic and the Theory of Compu- APhil: MA/PhD in Analytic Philosophy, University of tation: Mathematics, University of Manchester. Barcelona. MSc in Mind,Language &Embodied Cognition: Doctoral Programme in Philosophy: Language, Mind School of Philosophy, Psychology and Language Sci- and Practice, Department of Philosophy, University of ences, University of Edinburgh. Zurich, Switzerland. MSc in Philosophy of Science,Technology and Soci- HPSM: MA in the History and Philosophy of Science ety: University of Twente, The Netherlands. and Medicine, Durham University. MRes in Cognitive Science and Humanities:Language, Master Programme: Philosophy and Economics, Insti- Communication and Organization: Institute for Logic, tute of Philosophy, University of Bayreuth. Cognition, Language, and Information, University of Master Programme: Philosophy of Science, Technol- the Basque Country (Donostia San Sebastian). ogy and Society, Enschede, the Netherlands. MA in Cognitive Science: School of Politics, Inter- national Studies and Philosophy, Queen’s University §7 Belfast. Jobs and Studentships MA in Logic and the Philosophy of Mathematics: De- partment of Philosophy, University of Bristol. MA in Metaphysics,Language, and Mind: Department Jobs of Philosophy, University of Liverpool. Assistant Professor: AOS: possibly one among His- MA in Mind,Brain and Learning: Westminster Insti- tory of Philosophy, Metaphysics, Philosophy of Mind, tute of Education, Oxford Brookes University. Philosophy of Science, and Philosophy of Language, MA in Philosophy: by research, Tilburg University. Department of Philosophy, Western Michigan Univer- MA in Philosophy of Biological and Cognitive Sci- sity, Kalamazoo, MI, until filled. ences: Department of Philosophy, University of Bristol. Post-doc position: in the area of developmental robotics MA in Rhetoric: School of Journalism, Media and and robot learning, INRIA, Bordeaux, until filled. Communication, University of Central Lancashire. Two Post-doc positions: in Machine Learning, in the MA programmes: in Philosophy of Language and Lin- project “Composing Learning for Artificial Cognitive guistics, and Philosophy of Mind and Psychology, Uni- Systems”, INRIA Lille, until filled. versity of Birmingham. One-year Lectureship: AOS: Metaphysics or Epis- MRes in Cognitive Science and Humanities:Language, temology or Philosophy of Language or Metaethics; Communication and Organization: Institute for Logic, AOC: Logic; Department of Philosophy, Brandeis Uni- Cognition, Language, and Information, University of verisity, Waltham, MA, deadline 1 April. the Basque Country, Donostia, San Sebastian. Research Associate: in Machine Learning, Gatsby MRes in Methods and Practices of Philosophical Re- Computational Neuroscience Unit, UCL, deadline 8 search: Northern Institute of Philosophy, University of April. Aberdeen. One-year Postdoctoral Fellowship: AOS: logic or MSc in Applied Statistics and Datamining: School of philosophy of science, Department of Philosophy, Uni- Mathematics and Statistics, University of St Andrews. versity of Calgary, Alberta, Canada, deadline 15 April MSc in Artificial Intelligence: Faculty of Engineer- or until filled. ing, University of Leeds. Lectureship: in Statistical Inference and Machine MA in Reasoning Learning, School of Computing Science, University of Glasgow, deadline 15 April. An interdisciplinary programme at the Post-doc position: in Natural Logic and Natural Rea- University of Kent, Canterbury, UK. soning, Tilburg Center for Logic and Philosophy of Sci- Core modules provided by Philosophy and further ence (TiLPS), deadline 15 April. modules from Psychology, Computing, Statistics, Four-year Post-doc Research Fellowship: in philoso- Social Policy, Law, Biosciences and History. phy of neuroscience, Werner Reichardt Centre for Inte- MSc in Cognitive &Decision Sciences: Psychology, grative Neuroscience, Tubingen, Germany, deadline 17 University College London. April.

66 One-year Lectureship: in the History of Science, AOS: history of biology or physics or both, University of Pennsylvania, deadline 18 April.

Studentships PhDScholarship: “Rating and ranking sports players and teams using Minimum Message Length”, Clayton School of Information Technology, Monash University, to be filled asap. PhD position: in the area of developmental robotics and robot learning, INRIA, Bordeaux, until filled. PhDStudentship: “Hyper-heuristics for Grouping Problems”, School of Computer Science, University of Nottingham, until filled. Two PhD positions: in a research project on the notion of chance and its connection to statistical method, Fac- ulty of Philosophy, University of Groningen, deadline 1 April. PhDScholarship: in the History of Modality, Depart- ment of Philosophy, Victoria University of Wellington, New Zealand, deadline 4 April. Postgraduate Studentships: under the Research Project Award “The Emergence of a Scientific Culture”, His- tory and Philosophy of Science, Technology and Medicine, University of Aberdeen, UK, deadline 8 April. Analysis Studentship: to a candidate with or very close to completion of a PhD, pursuing research on a subject which falls under the traditional concerns of Analysis, deadline 15 April. ESRC-funded PhD studentships: Statistics, University of Warwick, deadline 15 April. PhD position: in Natural Logic and Linguistic Seman- tics, Tilburg Center for Logic and Philosophy of Science (TiLPS), deadline 15 April. PhD position: in Computational Logic and Natural Rea- soning, Tilburg Center for Logic and Philosophy of Sci- ence (TiLPS), deadline 15 April. PhDScholarship: in the project “Normativity and the Mind”, Philosophy, University of Southampton, UK, deadline 20 April.

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