Paul M. Pulé, B.Sc

Schumacher College The Old Postern, Dartington, Totnes.

Us and Them:

Primate Science and the Union of the Rational Self with the Intuitive Self

Cover Picture by James Balog, 1993, p. 13

Submitted in Partial Completion of:

Masters In Holistic Science

Department of Environmental Studies The University of Plymouth September 15th, 2003.

DEDICATION:

For Nunna Jeannie Pulé … who wanted so much for me to be Whole

2 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS:

Before sitting to write these acknowledgements, I visited with my parents – Mimi and Gerry Pule. It’s been the rare opportunity throughout my adult life when I could simply arrive at their table, eat my fill of home cooking, and ponder the happenings in my life with them lending an ear in person. They have patiently accepted many, many years of - at best - a sporadic phone call to fill the mind’s eye with a vision of a prodigal son. Much of what follows is a reflection of the lesson I learned from these two tireless human beings long before I flew their coop. They bring special meaning to the quality of caring and for that I am eternally grateful.

My Grandmother Jeannie Pulé has been a voice for the heart for as long as I can remember. And my dear Uncle Leslie Pulé has been an inspiration, a guide, a friend, and champion of the third way for my entire life. It is through him that I have confronted my own dualistic tendencies and have responded to the indomitable either this or that dilemmas of life with a resounding Yes! The essence of this dissertation is very much a product of his wise counsel.

I owe much thanks to my tutor and friend Dr. Stephan Harding, Resident Ecologist at Schumacher College. When I thought I had lost my direction, it was he who threw a rope that led me across the waves to a stimulating year in a sleepy little nook nestled between the hedgerows of Devon in South West England. Most of this work was galvanised on the grounds of Schumacher College. Every word carries with it the blessings of many hours spent with a kind-hearted man whose love for Gaia and whose youthful energy are irrepressibly infectious.

Dr. Hayley Randle from the University of Plymouth has been a rock of encouragement from the time we first met. Her enthusiasm and hopefulness charged my weary writing bones. Her eyes combed the pages that follow with prompt thoroughness. Her gentle spirit left much latitude for me to flourish through the process of researching and writing on my own terms. And as much as I have heeded her many thoughtful suggestions I hold myself entirely responsible for any stumbles that follow. She has been the very best Dissertation supervisor I could have hoped for, bringing to our conversations her ethological experience and her curiosity for the philosophical leanings that peeped through a Primate Science.

Drs. Michael Booth and Patsy Hallen of ISTP at Murdoch University have been steadfast aides over the past two years. They have ‘hung in there’ through my many whims and transcontinental wanderings all the while believing in my abilities and choices as a post-graduate student with eternal optimism. They have held out the notion of life’s limitless possibilities manifest in the process of sculpting one’s self as a scholar. They have also intently observed the evolution of my thinking and have pointed me in the direction of useful resources some of which have become central in this work. I am pleased that we will have many more opportunities to banter in the coming years.

Throughout my year at Schumacher College, Ly Vaillancourt became so much more than a colleague. She has been my yoga bubby shaking me awake to the stillness of dawn, an ear when my mind wandered and my heart ached, a sister when I needed the comfort of family away from home and a dedicated friend. From her I owe the lesson of ‘not forcing’ that will stay with me for all the days of my life. James Murray-White has been the English brother I never had, helping me to stay on task and accosting the procrastinator in me with poignant poetry, fine food, a warm bed, wheels to get about, and a general helping hand.

Annie Galloway showed me the vital importance of noticing the Earth with a gentle heart and helped me practice letting go of cherished outcomes. Tani Garde gave me cause to confront the walls of my rationality through the skip in her step and her joyous spirit that is intuition embodied. And Zane Loza graced me with the gift of quieting my busy mind by allowing me to love deeply and fully from the heart. In their own ways, all three of these women awakened the hopeful romantic within me that put my persistent pragmatist in check.

I offer my sincere thanks to Kathy Doherty (Senior Chimpanzee Keeper) and David Field (Curator) of the Zoological Society of London’s Whipsnade Wildlife Park. My observations of the Whipsnade chimpanzee colony enabled me to apply ethology in this study as an essential conclusion to my theorising. These observations have also become a new beginning for my future work in primatology wedded with Environmental Philosophy. Finally, I extend my deepest gratitude to Primrose, Nikki, Wally, Bonnie-Lewise, Zephyr, Grant, Phil, and Elvis for tolerating my curious gazes at their chimpanzee life from the people side of the fence. Along with the occasional and very well aimed clump of faeces or rock, these chimps showed me that there is so much more to them than the human eye first sees.

P. M. P. 8th September 2003 ISTP, Murdoch University Perth, Western Australia

3 TABLE OF CONTENTS:

PREFACE: ZANE LOZA ...... 6

INTRODUCTION: A CONDUIT FOR WHOLE LIVING ...... 10 0.1: Are We This, or That? Yes! ...... 11 0.2: A Masculinized Hubris ...... 15 0.3: Mixing Drinks Gives One A Headache ...... 20 04: Our Primateness...... 23 0.5: This Work...... 25

CHAPTER 1: STEPPING FORWARD INTO THE PAST...... 28 1.1: The Not So Good News For Modern Times...... 29 1.2: Taxonomy of the Miind ...... 35 1.3: The Chosen Species? ...... 39 1.4: Teasing Out the Details ...... 42 1.5: How Ape Are Humans? How Human are Apes? ...... 46 1.6: A Naturalistic Fallacy Come True ...... 49

CHAPTER 2: AN APE IS AN APE IS A … ...... 54 2.1: Gnashing Teeth and Warm Smiles...... 55 2.2: The 98% Human...... 62 2.3: A Pan Full of Pan troglodytes ...... 65 2.4: A Pan Full of Pan paniscus...... 71 2.5: Culture This! ...... 74

CHAPTER 3: A WHOLE SUM OF THE PARTS ...... 79 3.1: Seriously Compromised Astigmatism ...... 80 3.2: Politics of the Mind...... 86

4 CHAPTER 4: PRIMATE SCIENCE AS PRIMAL SCIENCE...... 93 4.1: Science of the Esoteric ...... 94 4.2: The Synergistic Whole...... 98 4.3: A Third Way ...... 105 4.4: A Very Good Eye ...... 108

CHAPTER 5: THE KIND OF KINDNESS OF APE-KIND ...... 114 5.1 A Science of Caring ...... 115 5.2: The Altricial Self...... 119 5.3: Nature of the Human Primate ...... 124 5.4: The Best Kind of Empathy ...... 126

CONCLUSION: FINISHING UP IN THREE DIMENSIONS ...... 129

BIBLIOGRAPHY: ...... 135

APPENDIX 1: ...... 147 APPENDIX 2: ...... 148 APPENDIX 3: ...... 149 APPENDIX 4: ...... 150

5

PREFACE: ZANE LOZA

 For thus all things must begin, with an act of love.

Donna Haraway 1989, quoting Marias, p. 1

6 On Thursday, June 12th, 2003, at 1:45pm, I was tapped on the shoulder and my life changed forever. I was standing beneath the vaulted ceiling of the dining hall at Schumacher College – an international centre for Ecological Studies– where I have been working towards a Masters in Holistic Science. The filtered light of a Devon summer beamed in through the skylight and gave cause for the row of ferns that line the walls above me to smile. It is not often that their fronds are bathed in the direct warmness of such rays – the skylight is small and the Devon sun a mere tease of brightness for much of the year; they had serious reason to celebrate. A breeze silently seeped in through the building’s opened doors and windows, bringing with it the smell of yawning wheat fields. There, in the dining hall, the outdoors blended with the lingering aroma of freshly baked bread that plumed up and outward from the kitchen at the back of the building. This meeting of outer and the inner air was a perfect metaphor for the union between my outer and inner worlds that would unfold in the coming days. It was so apropos that she would find me there.

Lunch was over and I paused to chat absent-mindedly with a colleague after placing my soiled plate in the wash-up area. My body felt a little lethargic as I began to digest the creamy Broccoli-Stilton soup and Greek Gods’ salad that was the day’s fare. For almost two months I had been diligently researching the emergence of humans from our primate past. I was deliberately dragging out my midday break as respite from the throws of writing Chapter 1 of the following dissertation. As the conversation trailed, my mind began to drift forlornly back towards my books. I wasn’t even looking her way.

Zane Loza was one of seventeen folks that had freshly arrived at the College a few days prior. Artist Joan Hanley and her husband, author and theologian Thomas Moore were leading a three-week art-therapy course. Still fresh from her arrival, Zane was confused by the campus computer facilities and decided to ask for help. Rather than struggle on her own, she decided to ask me out of the myriad people ambling about in the dining hall. Latvian, a ballerina for most of her life, an architect, and hauntingly beautiful, she wore a light blue cashmere sweater and khaki skirt that clung to her slender but strong body. Her gently wavy, shoulder length auburn-blonde hair was tied back haphazardly with strands hanging loosely about the slight features of her clear face. In turning to meet her I was received by a polite and quiet patience. And yet, this was a woman who 7 was in no way meek. Zane was comfortable, sure of herself, forthrightly determined to claim a full life and exuded kindness through softly blinking aquamarine eyes. Without any effort, her touch to my shoulder seemed to shatter thirty-three years of armour that my intellect had sworn to live and die by. I guess I was primed for a change.

That first touch was the beginning of my mind’s surrendering. The rational me agreed to take a break and I became cocooned in an etherealness that metamorphosed my heart. It was as if I had eaten a lunch whose recipe could only gain purchase on the lips of the Gods - how appropriate that I had just partaken in one of their salads in the realm of mere mortals. I was blessed to have known such moments – the rationality of my ego yielding to a sense of embodied knowing where I could tell that I stood with someone who would become very special to me.

For three more days, we bathed in a grace only trees have words for; their rustling leaves whispering “ … Paul, life really can be this good.” We shared effortless conversations along with several more meals and walks before she departed – nothing else. A dear friend’s father died tragically in a car crash and she felt a strong urge to go home. The irony of her leaving was that this expression of genuine empathy towards another was more cause for my noticing her. What’s more, I could tell that my feelings were not coming from some desperate vestige of hopeful longing. I felt as if I had met an equal; someone who was open to the gifts of life and comfortable enough with themselves to let things unfold as they would. The shackles of my rational self dissolved to let my intuitive self take the lead – something I had never consciously experienced before.

Zane Loza pirouetted into and out of my life rather suddenly. I still do not know if I will ever see her again. At the very least she gifted my muse with the Preface to this Dissertation and wedded my heart with the work that follows, making my attempt to understand what it means to be a whole man very personal. The only certainty I can state is that I have now experienced a sense of joy that my rationality had until then resisted. Meeting Zane Loza put my mind in its rightful place along side and equal to the intuition of my body.

8 I hope that the following work will have a similar impact of blending the rational with the intuitive in the field of science. Modernity has encouraged a squaring off of the rational self against the intuitive self. In the Western world, each has become the other’s rival, vying for the cup of life – and I am of the opinion that this has happened for long enough. Through this dissertation, I aim to show that a holistic study of chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes spp.) can help bring an end to humanities ideological tournament where the rational mind and embodied intuition dual. My hope is to offer some assistance in mending the human/Nature divide.1 And rather than throw the baby out with the bath water, I attempt to show both the validity and the limitation of a Reductionist approach to science, suggesting that holism is not an antipathy to reduction but rather an umbrella which includes reduction and pushes beyond its boundaries to offer humanity the possibility of a wider view of Nature than reduction alone can offer. What I encourage here is an ideological epiphany through an alternative science I call a Primate Science. My hope is that through this alternative way of viewing the world, I will help rebuild a bridge between human’s and Nature where the reader will become more sympathetic to a sensualised understanding of our existence on this beautiful planet; even if such insights come through the following words less intensely than falling in love.

1 Darwin (1859) enters a crucial disclaimer that dethrones things natural in his seminal text The Origin of Species. He states that “ …it is difficult to avoid personifying the word Nature; but I mean by Nature, only the aggregate action and product of many natural laws, and by laws the sequence of events as ascertained by us.” (p. 99). I make no such disclaimer in this work. Conversely, I take the Gaian approach to Nature, viewing all things natural (including humanity) as intricate, and embedded individually within a living breathing whole organism that we call Planet Earth. For further information on Gaia Theory see: Lovelock (1988, 1991 & 1995). 9

INTRODUCTION: A CONDUIT FOR WHOLE LIVING

 “The Schism between humanity and nature is found at the small and particular level within individual humans: it is the Gap between the mind and the body, and it is caused by the simple act of thinking.”

James Balog, 1993, p. 34.

10 0.1: Are We This, or That? Yes!

 “The body is not the self. If the body were the self, it would not be subject to sickness. The feelings are not the self. Perceptions are not the self. Impulses are not the self. Consciousness is not the self.”

Geoffrey Parrinder, 1991, p. 21, quoting Samyutta 3, 66.

Western human knowledge is wedded to a way of seeing the world that reduces complexity to absolutes, thereby making reality easier to conceptualize. 2 Reductionism is at the heart of our perception of our surroundings and through it, we have created a world rife with dualities: good and bad, right and wrong, white and black, young and old, artificial and organic, pragmatic and ethereal, scientific and artistic, cultured and natural, human and (non-human) animal, male and female, mind and body, thoughts and feelings.3 Humanity’s rational mind seems to work well at processing something when it is examined relative to something else. René Descartes (1596 – 1650 A.D.) championed this concept - commonly summarized as ‘I am thinking, therefore I exist’ - in the early 1600’s when the Scientific Revolution was in its infancy.4 The Cartesian incorporeality of the mind renders though within an individual as an entity unto itself, separated from the body and the surrounding environment through which the body moves. Descartes aspired to justify humanity as masters and possessors of Nature through a mind ‘in-here’ as separate from a body ‘out-there.’5 Through this rationale, the fact that the self exists in the physical sense came to be seen as entirely relative to the fact that the self is capable of thinking. Such a ‘Separational Philosophy’ was a

2 In using the term ‘Western’ throughout this dissertation, I specifically refer to capitalist societies around the world that employ socio-political systems modelled on the formulations of Adam Smith. Such societies tend to be Western European or are derived from Western European origin and harbour a socio- cultural ethic reflected in the following passage: “It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer and the baker that we expect our dinner, but from regard to their own self-interest. We address ourselves not to their humanity but to their self-love and never talk to them of our own necessities but of their advantages. Nobody but a beggar chooses to depend chiefly on the benevolence of his fellow citizen.” (Dugatkin, L. 1999, p. 10, quoting Adam Smith, 1776, p. 13) 3 Plumwood, 2002, pp. 51 – 52. See also Plumwood, 1993, pp. 2 – 3. Morris Berman (1989) conveys a similar idea in Coming to Our Senses: Body and Spirit in the Hidden History of the West, p. 54. I discovered an extremely similar passage in deWaal, 2001, p. 7 more than two months after I wrote this opening paragraph. 4 For details see Chapter 2. Williams, 1996, pp. xxviii – xxix. 5 Berman, 1981, pp. 25 & 35. 11 relative statement that divided the world into ‘us humans, and them animals.’6 Consequently, the self became constrained where humans were only able to experience a relationship with Nature through the rational mind. Humanity was disembodied and disengaged things natural and the expression of the self came to reflect more of our emerging, manufactured cultures than the environment that sustained them. As a result of the scientific revolution, dualising the human/Nature divide where each was expressed in diametric opposition to the other became the order of the day.

Plumwood (1993) quotes Derrida in defining dualism as:

“ … the process by which contrasting concepts … are formed by domination and subordination … [and construe] … difference in terms of the logic of hierarchy”7

Dualising a relationship between two components of any relationship creates an ‘us and them-ness’ that encourages a sense of belonging – and with that comes the oppositional force in that being something means that one is clearly not something else. Specifically in reference to the human/Nature divide, becoming a cultured human meant one was definitely not a natural animal – which defines the separational qualities of speciesism where hierarchies of domination determine humans as more important relative to the non-human world. Hierarchies of domination and subordination create mechanisms that permit the funnelling of resources in a particular direction towards particular recipients. In other words, hierarchical structures are designed to permit maximize control over one’s survival. I suggest that attempting to control one’s survival is an addictive quality of our humanity that has emerged most intensely in Western, post-modern societies. We crave control. So much so that we fastidiously innovate and manufacture infrastructures to obtain it through everything from the development of allopathic drugs that dissuade stubborn microscopic diseases from causing illness or killing us to international systems of governance that siphon social functioning in carefully orchestrated directions. These are not terrible achievements in and of themselves. Pharmaceuticals and democratized systems of international governance help to keep us alive, and our societies functioning with a vision of fairness. The problem with such systems is that a select few individuals come to benefit over many others who become

6 Kumar, 2002, pp. 10 & 175 – 176. See also deWaal, op. cit., p. 7. 7 Plumwood, 1993, pp. 31- 32. 12 their subordinates and so the idealism of fairness is easily and often back grounded to make way for unfettered proliferation of a select few individuals.

Take me for instance. I am human, male, white, in my early thirties, and was raised and educated in the middle class of a Western society. This means that I am not a (non- human) animal, a female, a person of colour, a child nor an elder, nor am I poverty stricken or illiterate. Who I am defines me ‘over here’ as separate from them ‘over there.’ And in the ways that I gain privilege through my human, male, white, literate, young adultness, I garner more access to resources than those I subordinate. My privileges are defined by who I am; I gain advantages over others simply because of the definitions that are imposed upon me by the society within which I live. And I find such inequity in access and distribution to resource wealth troubling. It is one thing to have an analysis of such a paradox; it is another to assume the responsibility that such a realization presupposes. To me, that responsibility requires an earnest effort at dissolving inequitable privileges resulting from the logic of hierarchy. I extend this responsibility beyond human societies to include a critical analysis of the relationship between humans and Nature as this relationship currently functions. And I focus through out this dissertation on the closest point of contact between humans and Nature by studying the behavioural qualities of chimpanzees and bonobos (Pan troglodytes spp.). This dissertation is therefore first and foremost an attempt at ending speciesism and I begin by deconstructing the division between the rational and the intuitive self as guided by coming to a closer understanding of our species’ primate past through an exploration of the scientific method and a study of the two species of chimpanzee that survive today. My hope is that this work will in some way contribute to revalidating the intuitive in a world where rationality reigns supreme.

Throughout Modernity, our want to flourish has been fuelled by the rational mind and formalized through Reductionist Science. Human cultural systems have been driven by mechanisms of domination and subordination resulting in a small number of ‘haves’ that are able to sustain privileges at the expense of the much larger number of the often- voiceless ‘have-nots.’ I suggest that on a bodily level, most of us would intuit that this is not ‘fair’ or ‘right’ but such qualitative assessments are seen as too subjective to gain any credibility within the parameters of the scientific and rational realms of human existence. On the most basic level, modern Western human societies sustain the logic 13 of hierarchy from the premise that first and foremost, our species controls and subordinates Nature. Likewise, such human societies are able to justify the fact that some gain more access to resources than others. By necessity, an ethic of control backgrounds the voice of the intuitive self and does so through the dualising of reality which permits the mainstreaming of domination and subordination. This strategy is counter-intuitive, non-participatory and negates the feelings of the observer by obscuring a vision of holistic Nature in order to rationally examine the particulars of nature in reduction.8 What I mean here is that the Westernised human habit of attempting to control Nature tends to chop it up into component parts which camouflages a vision of the whole living system and transitions us from active participant into passive observer.

At the very core of this transition is the nature versus nurture debate. Buried in the psyche and the mystique of Westernism is the latent question: Are we human or animal? We are of course both but we go to inordinate lengths to substantiate what Frans deWaal (2001) calls anthropodenial which he defines as:

“ … the a priori rejection of shared characteristics between humans and animals when in fact they … exist.”9

And doing so is driven primarily by a very masculinised hubris.

8 Harding, 2001., pp. 230 quoting Goodwin, 1999. 9 deWaal, op. cit., pp. 68 – 71. 14 0.2: A Masculinised Hubris

 That old lemon, that mystical dichotomy, the nature-nurture problem, needs to be reconsidered. It seems to have more reality in the minds of men than in the world they see around them.

Glen McBride, in Eisenberg, J. F. et al (eds.), 1971, p.37.

 “He had left the true way when he was deep in sleep, and he cannot say how he came there.”

Susan Griffin, 1978, p. 136.

Just as was found through deWaal’s study of male common chimpanzee expressions of dominance, coalition building and empathy in captive chimpanzee societies, Plumwood notes that human societies possess a masculinised hubris.10 As a species, we see ourselves entitled to excessive resource consumption and seek material comforts through the violation of Nature through violence, aggression, domination and competitiveness. Such qualities are characteristic of the stereotypical Western male and seem to set a tone for the way our entire species interacts with the natural world.

Descartes’ contemporary Francis Bacon (1561 – 1626 A.D.) brought duality and the habit of reductionism to a scientific exploration of Nature through his ‘new ethics for modern research.’11 Harbouring arguably good intentions to better humanity’s lot, Bacon steered the emerging Western scientific method towards investigations of Nature that transformed the pagan mystic who was holistically immersed in a feminised natural world into the masculinism of a scientific surgeon that dissected things natural into its ‘component parts.’ The alchemy of Nature was enslaved, transitioned from teacher to “common harlot,” and was treated accordingly.12 Throughout this dissertation, I suggest that our drift away from Nature, indeed our masculinised ways of existing, forged a distinction that we call ‘human culture’ not long after we took to bipedalism, developed small teeth, began to produce severely altricial offspring, gained an enlarged brain,

10 Plumwood, 2002, p. 2 - 3. See also Warren, 2000, pp. 23 – 24 & deWaal (1982, 1988, 2001). Hubris is defined as: “ … excessive pride or self-confidence.” Pearsall (ed.), 2001, p. 891. 11 Merchant, 1980, pp. 164 – 165. See also Harding, op. cite., p. 228. 12 Merchant, op. cite., p. 171. 15 became innovative enough to make and use tools and harnessed the power of fire. I therefore argue that our masculinised hubris began when we descended from the trees, assumed a neotenous evolutionary course and began to drift away from our primate ancestry.

Bear in mind that the gender specific terminology I use here is entirely a human construct based on gender-stereotypic personality traits where things masculine are instrumental or agentic (meaning independent, assertive, dominant, and in the lead) and things feminine are expressive and communal (meaning warm, sympathetic, compassionate, sensitive and intuitive).13 Stanford psychologist, Sandra Bem (1974) developed the Bem Sex Role Inventory (BSRI) to assess the construction of masculinity and femininity in modern humans. She found that:

“People with high M[asculinity] scores but low F[emininity] scores were considered to be stereotypically masculine. These people report that they are ‘independent’ and ‘dominant,’ for example, but not ‘kind’ or ‘compassionate.’ People with high F[emininity] but low M[asculinity] scores were considered to be stereotypically feminine (e.g. ‘kind’ and ‘compassionate’ but not ‘independent’ or ‘dominant’).14 (my emphasis added).

This delineation adequately suits a description of the general human approach to Nature that has existed for Millennia before the days of Descartes and Bacon. As a species, we tend to interact with Nature from a position of independence and domination, placing limits on gestures of kindness and compassion towards the non-human world because they are deemed a threat to the individual’s or their immediate kin’s survival. Bem’s test of gender identity in humanity is telling because it highlights not only the qualities of stereotypical masculinity and femininity in human society. We also gain insight into the qualities of human speciesism where Nature is treated as separate from and subordinate to us in the same way stereotypical masculine behaviour is isolated from and subordinates the feminine in human societies. In denying expression of the feminine when interacting with Nature, we behave much less kindly or compassionately than we are capable of. Throughout this dissertation, I support the opinion that popular expressions of human speciesism are socialized, contrary to our long-term sustainability and the health of the entire biosphere and are therefore problematic. And I assume the

13 Lippa, 2002, p. 45. In this dissertation, I examine the male chimpanzee’s relationship with self, other community members, and surroundings as an alternative model to the habit of masculinisation of humanity when interacting with Nature. 14 Ibid., pp.46 – 47. 16 position that humanity is not only capable of great gestures of kindness and compassion towards Nature. Throughout dissertation I argue that to behave so is in fact as natural as our will to survive at any cost – that humanity’s masculinised hubris needs to revamped to welcome more feminized qualities that are conducive to forging more sustainable human cultural traditions and societies.

It is important to note that masculinised patterns of behaviour are not an exclusively male human phenomenon. Humans of both genders tend to distil a dualistic approach to the natural world. It is usual that the masculinised qualities of rationalism, aggression and assertiveness gain more airtime over the feminized qualities of sensuality, emotion, nurturing and intuition.15 In my pending Ph.D. thesis, I will address the question: Who is the human male self in the context of the natural world and what ways can one express both full maleness and full immersion in Nature simultaneously? In the pending Ph.D. work, I will deconstruct the logic of hierarchy within human societies with particular reference to men’s interactions with other men, community and surroundings. I will ground such a deconstruction in a field study of male – male bonobo (pygmy chimpanzee – Pan troglodytes paniscus) interactions by studying their capacity to empathize along with the formulation of coalitions through nurturing (as opposed to acts of violence). I will also introduce the emergence of the ‘Good Green Guy’ who expresses his full-primateness and his full-humanness as a man concurrently – where full primateness is the reclamation of an intuitive … dare I say it … more feminized relationship with Nature that transcends gender boundaries to facilitate a more holistic existence. The Good Green Guy is not only modelled on humanities fuller primateness as revealed through a biological field study of male bonobos. The Good Green Guy is also modelled on Donna Haraway’s ‘cyborg’ that transcends the limited gender qualities of maleness or femaleness, and operates in ‘deeper unity’ with Nature, expressing things natural as wedded with things crafted in human society.16 Further, the Good Green Guy is modelled on Frans deWaal’s more obvious qualities of our primate past, the qualities of which are revealed through the study of our nearest living relatives - chimpanzees.17 The Good Green Guy has emerged from a past that is wrought with social manipulation, power and control, conflict and reconciliation, along

15 Warren, op. cite., pp. 3 – 5. 16 Haraway, 1991, pp. 149 - 155. 17 See deWaal’s (1982) Chimpanzee Politics: Power and Sex Among Apes. 17 with forthrightness and subtly – qualities that are illuminated through the “more obvious” politics of chimpanzees.18 The Good Green Guy is therefore both fully animal and fully human, embodying a democracy of fairness that extends deep into the realm of Nature. A comprehensive exploration of the Good Green Guy, the plight of maleness in Western capitalist societies and the relationship between men and Nature within the context of men’s primateness will be forthcoming. But I leave the details of such a discourse for that particular work.

Throughout this Masters dissertation, I focus on the human-culture/animal-Nature divide by closely exploring the relationship between humans and our primateness relative to a study of chimpanzees. The insights gleaned from such a study imply or assume teleology in chimpanzees, a degree of subjectivity from the researcher, and therefore easily becomes marred by the pitfalls of anthropomorphism. Interestingly, such accusations “… are heard mainly when a ray of light hits a species other than our own.”19 It is true that chimpanzees and humans are closely related but are not the same species. Both share remarkable similarities in morphology, cognition, physiology, ethology, and psychology. Both possess many examples of severe ‘unkindness’ - being capable of outbursts of violence, infanticide, cannibalism and war. And both show remarkable differences, for example in revealed versus concealed oestrous, serial polygamy (generally the case in chimpanzees) versus serial monogamy (generally the case in humans), and differing levels of communication, cognition and innovation.20 But it is precisely because humans and chimpanzees are so closely related that we have much to learn from our sibling species about how we came to be as we are and why the human/Nature relationship is in such a crisis today. DeWaal (2001) cogently states that in a study of chimpanzees:

“ … anthropomorphism is not only inevitable, it is a powerful tool …”21

18 deWaal, op. cit., p. 212. 19 I define anthropomorphism as the natural tendency to intuitively recognize the sentience of non-human life. Such a perspective implies a degree of closeness that permits an understanding of the whole being. (See deWaal, op. cit., p. 40 & 65). Ibid., p. 65. 20 Goodall, 1999, pp. 111 – 149. 21 deWaal, op. cit., p. 40. 18 … that can give validity to the intuitive knowledge a researcher gains through time spent observing another being.22 I therefore make no attempt to conceal or deny the anthropomorphism inherent in the following work. Instead, I embrace the possibility that acknowledging my own subjectivity, and assuming sentience in the observed phenomenon will give me a deeper and richer insight into the chimpanzee as a whole animal, the qualities of their species and therefore also myself and qualities of my own species.

Having said this, I recognize that we have much to learn about chimpanzees’ relationship with their surroundings, for their own sake. Is their relationship with Nature less and masculinised than ours? And if so, why? To address such questions, this study attempts to transcend the masculinised dualism of the modern scientific method by employing non-invasive and subjective observations of captive chimpanzees while also noting the responses and reactions of the humans that observe them as an exhibit, an anomaly. Therefore, in addition to a summary of the existing literature on the biology of chimpanzees, I will also discuss the findings of a holistic field study of the chimpanzee colony at the Zoological Society of London’s Whipsnade Wildlife Park.23 I will observe the colony and record examples of cooperation and competition using ethological field techniques, combined with journaling, and giving credit to my own subjective experience while observing these animals, taking a particular interest in how the keepers and the general public respond to and are responded to by the chimpanzees I observe.

22 Ibid., p. 42. 23 I recognize a fundamental flaw here in that the study would be more substantiated with a review of chimpanzee socio-biology in a wild setting where interactions with Nature are unfettered. Logistical difficulties prevented this deeper study. A focused study of the cooperation and competition dynamic of male pygmy chimpanzees in the wild will formulate a central component of my Ph.D. field research. 19 0.3: Mixing Drinks Gives One A Headache

 We suck our sustenance from the rest of nature in a way never before seen in the world, reducing its bounty as ours grow.

Richard Leakey and Roger Lewin, 1996, p. 233.

The combination of a ‘Separational Philosophy’ mixed with a masculinised hubris has charted our current collision course with ecocide. We have now threatened with extermination not only vast numbers of non-human lives; we have eroded our own health and brought into question our species very survival also. Leakey and Lewin (1993) refer to this - one of the most severe consequences of human ecocide - as the ‘Sixth Extinction.’24 The creation of hierarchies provides infrastructure for the human want to flourish even if other species face eradication in the process. The alarming predictions vary between 17,000 to 100,000 species lost each year as a consequence of environmental degradation caused by our schismatic and hubristic perception of ourselves.25 While these figures offer huge disparity, at best, our tendency to dualise and masculinise have already caused a major decline in global biodiversity as the nearly six billion Homo sapien sapiens on the planet eek out an existence from our surrounding environments to the demise of other species that rely on the same resources for their survival.26 Case in point in reference to Order: Primata, almost half of all 233 primate species alive today are threatened with extinction due to direct exploitation, biological manipulation of ecosystems and habitat loss caused by humans.27 The obvious exception is the human primate whose flourishing has run parallel with our ability to instigate technological growth particularly in the last 350 years to such an extent that today, our species alone consumes more than half of all the energy available to sustain life on Earth.28

24 For further details on the Sixth Extinction see Leakey and Lewin, 1995, pp. 232 – 245. 25 Leakey and Lewin, op. cit., p. 236. 26 For a recent cover story on the threat of lost biodiversity and climate change in the Brazilian Rainforest as a result of increasing demand for soya products in Europe, see McCarthy, 2003, p. 1. See also Woolf, 2003, p. 1. 27 Starke, 1997, pp. 100 – 101. See also Leakey and Lewin, 1995, p. 234. 28 Leakey and Lewin, op. cit., p. 239. 20 Humanity’s engagement with the natural world is based entirely on how we distinguish the ‘out there’ from ‘in here.’ Placing Nature ‘out-there’ makes it difficult for us to engage with our surroundings on mutually respectful terms. It is thereby easier to take this as permission to manufacture and manipulate raw materials for our benefit with minimal or no consultation or concern for the impacts of such actions on non-humans. This pattern runs the gamut from cutting down rainforests because we need farmland to grow soy beans or eradicating wolves from entire ecosystems because they are very efficient at eating our sheep, to creating plastics and metals that enable us to write on word processors as I am doing now. We have become experts at creating what we need, but our ability to innovate has pushed us past the point of balance with Nature. As Haraway (1983) states:

“Our system of production has transcended us; we need quality control.”29

Agreeing with Haraway’s proclamation, and borrowing the term from Harding (2001), the kind of quality control I espouse through this study is one of ‘participatory holism.’30 I argue that the need to reign in our systems of production is crucial and comes from a union between the rational and the intuitive self as opposed to the negation of one at the expense of the other. I am not anti-Reductionist in this premise. Rather, I show that reductionism is useful to a point, and limited. A Reductionist inquiry is included a part of a participatory holism that “ … involves a trans-disciplinary understanding of emergent phenomena…”31

I do not shun Reductionist methodologies entirely. Reduction has its place, as does the mind in relationship to the body. Instead, I am sceptical of pure scientific reduction, deconstruct it on the basis of its masculinised overtones, and attempt to widen the debate to validate the immersion of the observer in the observed by giving credit to the more subjective experiences that a participatory study reveals. This dissertation is therefore an exemplar of Harding’s ‘inclusive participatory holism.’32 Through this study, I aim to wed the rational with the intuitive to gain a whole-being view of

29 Haraway, 1991, p. 35. 30 Harding, op. cite., p. 230. 31 Ibid. 32 For an exploration of a holistic worldview as distinct from an ecological worldview see Capra, 1996, pp. 6 – 8. 21 chimpanzees – guided theoretically as a trained Holistic Scientist and intuitively by my own subjectivity as an observer-participant where the form of the animal and how it interacts with self, others and environment are crucially revealing of “ … what goes on in [a chimpanzees head] even though we fully realize that the answer can only be approximated.33 My hope is that such an approach will promote the application of holistic science where the polarity between cold, hard research and the realness of perception unite; polarities that have traditionally limited science’s ability to accurately gauge reality.

Haraway makes a prediction that:

“It is perhaps now historically possible to craft a nature not structured by principles of dominance and practices of domination, to know something other than the natural order of command-control systems.”34

I believe that we are historically ready for an alternative to command-control systems that result from our ‘Separational Philosophy’ and that such a shift is urgently required for the sake of ecological health, the world over. Given we had the intelligence to get ourselves and all other species on the planet into the environmental crisis, it seems entirely reasonable that we are equally capable of crafting creative solutions which will ease if not eradicate the challenges now facing all of Nature as a result of our speciesism. Unfortunately, it seems most likely that mainstream humanity will make such a shift only as the threat of our own demise becomes more imminent.

Haraway (1983) makes a crucial point that lends some wisdom to a study of chimpanzees. Since the late 1800’s, primates have played a central role of ‘guinea pig’ for human engineering; the chimpanzee in particular has been sought as the exemplar for human life.35 This species has been systematically and strategically anthropomorphized for the betterment of humanity since soon after Darwin proclaimed Pan troglodytes spp. our next of kin. Building his entire career around research on chimpanzees as models for humanity, Robert M. Yerkes (1876 – 1956) is quoted by Haraway as proclaiming:

33 Kranich, 1999, pp. 55 - 57. 34 Haraway, 1983, p. 197. For citation relating to the quoted text see deWaal, op. cit., p. 40. 35 Ibid., p. 132. 22

“It has always been a feature of our plan for the use of the chimpanzee as an experimental animal to shape it intelligently to [an experimental] specification instead of trying to preserve its natural characteristics. We believe it is important to convert the animal into as nearly ideal a subject for biological research as is practicable. And with this intent has been associated the hope that eventual success might serve as an effective demonstration of the possibility of re-creating man himself in the image of a generally acceptable ideal.”36

Not only have we accepted the closeness of chimpanzees to ourselves, but we have (perhaps due to our own bewilderment about their similarity with us) also subjugated the entire species to invasive experimentation, destroyed their natural habitats, captured them, bred them in captivity across traditionally isolated subspecies, and manipulated select individuals to be as human-like as possible. The chimpanzee has been summarily used to make our lives better. All the while, chimpanzees have remained clearly not human with their habitats ravaged and their numbers dwindling towards extinction.37

0.4: Our Primateness

 “The balance of power is tested daily and if it proves too weak, it is challenged and a new balance is established. Consequently chimpanzee politics are … constructive. Human beings should regard it as an honour to be classed as political animals.”

Frans deWaal, 1982, p. 213.

Human politics is at the root of the ecological crisis. The pursuit for control has sent our culture awry and demands the establishment of a new balance. One possible path towards this change is the admission that humans are much more chimpanzee and therefore more animal than we care to admit. Primatology as a science “ … built around the problems of integration, coordination and control [of primates]…” is inescapably holistic because it examines species that are cousin to humanity and irremovably imbedded in our psyches.38 The similarity in form and function between humans and chimpanzees makes an in-depth study of the latter crucial in unpacking the

36 Ibid. 37 Goodall, 1994, pp. 397 – 398. 38 Ibid., p. 134. 23 basic forces of humanity’s social infrastructure (particularly in reference to early humans) as well as revealing much about chimpanzee socio-biology in its own right. I believe that whether we care to admit it or not, the chimpanzee is an inescapable conduit connecting us with our animal origins. We at first respond with lightness towards our apeness by conjuring up images of ‘buffoon-ness’ and permissive violence with comments like: “… you silly monkey,” “… stop monkeying about,” “ … he is such a gorilla,” “ … the man was a real ape.” Frans deWaal’s opening remarks in Chimpanzee Politics (1982) are poignant where he states that our curiosity is superficially driven by humour but is actually “ … caused by the marked resemblance between human beings and chimpanzees. It is said that apes hold up a mirror to us, but we seem to find it hard to remain serious when confronted with the image we see reflected.”39 By their very nature, all the apes - chimpanzees in particular - insist that we pay greater attention to our own primateness. We are at once allured and repulsed by this fact. Hence the chimpanzee and the great apes generally have become the primary subordinated subjects of the logic of hierarchy and are groomed by a human classification system that places them as members of the animal kingdom in a location relative to us that assures our specialness as a species.

Humanity’s masculinised, dualistic approach towards understanding and interacting with Nature is at the root of our success. This habit may also be at the very root of our demise (as well as the ongoing devastation of countless other species – some still yet unknown). I could give scientific and rational evidence for sustaining biodiversity in answer to why we need the aforementioned shift from a habit of dualism and masculinised hubris towards recognition of Nature’s intrinsic value. There are many statements to proclaim; like the significant role of plants in balancing the atmospheric

O2/CO2 budgets, the crucial contribution of ocean faring coccolithophores (Emiliania huxleyi) in seeding clouds that cool the Earth’s atmosphere, or the close coupling between species numbers and the Earth’s atmospheric stability.40 But I am steered back towards the seldom spoken reality that flowers are simply beautiful to touch, look-at and smell; the snort of a deer is startling and sends a ripple down one’s spine; mornings filled with bird song sound right and beacon one awake and alive; the silence before a

39 deWaal, 1982, p. 18. 40 Lovelock, 1988, pp. 214 – 216 & 222 – 223. See also Lovelock 1991, pp. 113, 124 – 126, 156 - 159. and Lovelock, 1995, pp. 64 – 65, 87 – 90, 102. 24 storm leaves a pit in one’s stomach as a bodily warning of possible furore; and catching the gaze of a contemplating chimpanzee can leave one speechless. There is something cellular about recognizing the majesty of all life, and knowing this is all the reason I need to complete the project that follows. I have therefore written a dissertation that follows a trajectory that combines both theory with practice and where philosophy with biology together offer a broad view not only of humanity, not only of chimpanzees, but also of they way these two taxa affect and are affected by each other.

0.5: This Work

 “Primate studies took root in an ecology of physiological communities, for which the chief question was the coordinated action of parts to maintain an organismic whole.”

Donna Haraway, 1983, p. 145, quoting Robert P. McIntosh

In Chapter 1 of this dissertation, I examine humanity’s evolutionary relationship with chimpanzees and bonobos. I trace the journey of becoming human back to our common primate ancestor, showing where the separation between human and non-human animals began. I give evidence to support the taxonomic location of human beings (Homo sapien sapiens) and chimpanzees/bonobos (Pan troglodyte spp.) as immediate cousins thereby reaffirming our ‘animality.’ I show that a study of chimpanzees/bonobos sheds much light on the general animal nature of hominoids (all the Great Apes including humans) as well as the hominids (the human evolutionary lineage). I also show how closely related chimpanzees and humans are genetically. My intention in following human evolution back to our common primate ancestor is to examine human primateness and the way chimpanzees and bonobos are important teachers for our species’ relationship with Nature.

Chapter 2 explores the socio-biology of chimpanzees and bonobos, illuminating the behavioural similarities and differences between them and humans. I give a more detailed description of the variations within the chimpanzee taxon with particular reference to morphology, habitat, culture and politics, highlighting the similarities and differences between the two species of Pan and the three subspecies of common

25 chimpanzee. I also illuminate the general political qualities of the various populations of chimpanzee and bonobo cultures.

In Chapter 3, I examine Dawkinian Selfish Gene theory as a convenient proto-capitalist expression of neo-Darwinism. My intention here is to show how an individualist approach to Nature entrenches the human/Nature divide. I then expose the historical foundations of humanities speciesism, beginning with the twin pillars of the Greek Academy, namely Plato and Aristotle. A Reductionist paradigm has backgrounded the more indigenous holism of humanity’s primate ancestry since the works of the Platonists and throughout Modernity. I introduce the idea that reduction is but one component of a broader and all encompassing holism that supports a central tenet of caring along with the existence of competition. My intention in this chapter is to create a foundation for an inclusionary holistic science that I call a Primate Science.

Chapter 4 is an exposé of the key influences on a Primate Science. Here I discuss the clairvoyance of Rudolf Steiner’s Esoteric Science as an antidote to scientific reduction and highlight its limitations. I show the connection between Esoteric Science and Johann Wolfgang von Goethe’s study of the whole being, where Goethe was seen as the pioneer of holistic biology. Chapter 4 is fundamentally aimed at strengthening the case for the presence of the intuitive along side the rational in an investigation of Nature as done the Primate Science way, a science that is influenced by Deep Ethology and Consensus methodology.

In Chapter 5, I explore Primate Science as a feminised science. I review Kin Selection theory and other nuances of altricial behaviour. I examine the cooperation/competition dynamic with reference to gestures of altruism that chimpanzees and bonobos extend towards unrelated conspecifics. I also give evidence to contradict the Dawkinian hypothesis of genetic selfishness showing that hominids are as equally capable of expressing more feminised qualities of sympathy and empathy beyond reciprocity for and from their own family group.41 I extrapolate my research on chimpanzees/bonobos to show that ‘kindness’ is common and an integral element in the socio-biology of both Pan and Homo despite humanity’s masculinised approach to Nature that tends to

41 See Hamilton, 1964 & 1971 and Dawkins, 1989 & 1993. 26 obscure kindness as a quality of no genetic benefit to the individual or their immediate kin.

Chapter 6 is a journalistic conclusion to this dissertation and is based on a three-day observation of captive chimpanzees at the Zoological Society of London’s Whipsnade Wildlife Park. A combination of interview s with the lead keeper, members of the public and fellow research students, along with three days of enclosure observations of zoo chimpanzees brings 3-dimensions to the obvious interactions amongst a captive population of our next-to nearest relatives. I also, juxtapose my observations of the chimpanzees with their reactions (if any) towards me, and members of the public who come to observe these animals. I conclude with a final theme for a Primate Science that was gleaned through my time observing the Whipsnade chimpanzee colony.

Throughout this journey, I support the premise that we Homo sapien sapiens are as much primate as we are human. Further, I show that our next nearest relatives are subject to our curiosity, our affections and our derision not only because of the similarity of our morphologies, nor the close proximity of our evolutionary paths, but also because of our species tendency to dualise humanity as ‘over here’ and animal as ‘over there’ which is a very masculinised world view. I suggest the ideological hatchet that split humanity from Nature fell directly and most severely between Homo sapien sapiens and Pan troglodytes spp. This separation was entirely a human construct, aimed at shunning the unavoidable similarities between us, and them and my hope is that this work will in some way help mend this particular schism and in the broader sense assist with the long process of reuniting the split between humanity and all of Nature.

27

CHAPTER 1: STEPPING FORWARD INTO THE PAST

 “And because the primates eventually came into the world, Australopithecus eventually came into being. And because Australopithecus belonged to the world, man eventually came into being. And for three million years man belonged to the world – and because he belonged to the world, he grew and developed and became brighter and more dexterous until one day he was so bright and dexterous that we had to call him Homo sapien sapiens, which means he was us … And thatʼs how we came into being.”

Daniel Quinn, 1993, pp.239 – 240.

28 1.1: The Not-So Good News For Modern Times

 “ ʻProdigious havocʼ had been wreaked through the tendency not only to ʻcut down, but utterly to extirpate, demolish, and raze … all those many goodly woods and forests, which our more prudent ancestors left standing,ʼ a devastation that ha[s] now reached epidemic proportions.”

Carolyn Merchant, 1980, quoting John Evelyn, p. 236.

Humanity considers itself a special species.42 We nonchalantly stand at the pinnacle of the tree of life conveniently lauding ourselves as cultured, separate, above and removed from the rest of Nature. Perhaps there is no great mystery to such a self-image; after all, we humans have a habit of being at the beck and call of our egos. Jung (1959) points out that the ego is a “ … complex factor to which all conscious contents are related … and forms … the centre of the field of consciousness … which comprises the empirical personality.”43 He goes on to make the point that the identification of the human personality as a self can only manifest in reference to the physical world beyond the mind and he implies that this habit of transcending the anima mundi is uniquely human.44 Somehow, the self is comforted by the belief that in the kingdom of Nature, our species reigns supreme. Our heads meet the pillow at night knowing full well that lofty trips to Mars, dives to exhume sunken treasures from the ocean depths, fusing atoms to annihilate entire cities and then splitting them to examine the basic units of matter are all achievements that no other being on Earth can muster. Despite our remarkable ability to innovate and our burgeoning intellect, we have instigated a multitude of environmental disasters that now seriously threaten all life on Earth.

No longer can we turn a blind eye to the accumulation of polychlorinated biphenyls (PCB’s) in rivers that then fly in the flesh of birds to the Antipodes. No longer can we assume that the scorching heat of an Indian summer or the torrential flooding of a fertile

42 Dobzhansky, 1975, pp. 197 – 200. See also Lewin, 1999, p. 2. 43 Jung, 1959, p. 3. 44 Ibid., p. 24, 198 & 204. Jung suggests that the ‘Original Man’ possessed and expressed the anima mundi or Gnostic being whose soul was holistically immersed in the physical world, split into the separate identities of husband and wife, or opposites, that gave birth to nascent consciousness which would grow into the ego self. By this argument, the act of splitting to produce the ego self is a process that Jung considered a unique human quality where the rest of Nature continues to dwell in the same Gnostic sphere of the physical world as the anima mundi. 29 watershed is a passing anomaly. No longer can we dump sewage in the ocean trusting that our waste will simply be washed away. We have now entered an era of unavoidable blowback where pre- and post-natal deformities in artic ducks are heard of, where El Ninò slips between “… pass me the peas…” at the dinner table, and everybody’s neighbour has a story to tell about fending off a bobbing clump of faeces on a bright summer’s swim in the sea.45

With such alarmist tones aloft, it is perhaps understandable that a generation of whistle blowers has now reached maturity. One might argue that they were conceived amidst the emergent wisdom of 1960’s social and environmental radicalism. But, I hazard a guess that much of the greening of the mainstream Western human mind has occurred out of necessity because the malevolent consequences of our material wants are now too obvious to avoid. Anywhere you go in today’s world, wallowing in human specialness also means seeing, smelling, feeling, hearing and tasting the environmental calamities that our self-indulgence has caused. In the words of Joni Seager (1993), “Nature is clearly in trouble, and we with it.”46 As our species has proliferated, we have brought much suffering to the environment and to ourselves. The question is what changes must be made to shift this tide?

Even your average middleclass suburban yuppie can be moved to low level ‘green-ness’ by a loss of personal conveniences. Curbside recycling is now commonplace in many industrialized communities and in the less-industrialized world, recycling of domestic refuse is the livelihood of millions. It is now standard for curricula in School Districts to weave some form of Environmental Education into their science programs

45 For further information on PCB contamination and pre- and post-natal deformities and reproductive failure of fish-eating birds see Dempsey (2000). For popular media coverage of the impact of PCB’s on riparian ecosystems and animal reproduction see Revkin A.C. (1997). For popular media coverage of the impact of PCB’s on human development see Hertsgaard, M. (1996). Starke (1997, 1999/2000 & 2001) edits the Bibles of eco-cide whistle blowing published by the World Watch Institute based in Washington, D.C. This editorial called Vital Signs, is an excellent series of annual papers that track the trends in food production, consumption and agri-business, the impact of energy production on climatic change, economic pressures and fluctuations relative to resource exploitation, transportation concerns, affects of the military–industrial complex and armed conflict on global socio-environmental trends, shifts in human needs, and the ways all these issues affect non-human nature. The underlying message communicated is that “ Today, we live in a world that is economically richer than could have been hoped for … but one that is ecologically poorer than hardly anyone could have imagined.” (Starke ed., 2001, p. 11). Put bluntly, we are at crucial moment in the history of our species; either we adopt an ethic of sustainability or we perish along with much of the non-human biodiversity with which we share the Earth. 46 Seager, 1993, p.1.

30 throughout the industrialized world. And the hybrid car has more than debuted on the streets of Los Angeles and other major metropolises the world over. The problem with such ‘band aiding’ is that domestic refuse recycling merely pays lip service to the broader problem of excessive consumption and toxic commercial pollution in the industrialized West. Careers in the Environmental Sciences are valued about as much as raising a child unless you lend a hand to producing genetically modified organisms. And patents for renewable energy production have been shelved for years to ensure that markets get saturated with baseline automotive technologies that are obsolete before they even reach production. It may not feel right intuitively because of the environmental destruction that results, but more money is made and greater comforts assured (particularly for a select few Westerners) when societies adhere to the voice of the rational mind.

Mainstream socio-cultural ideology is easily swung into periods of neo-conservative reactionism in response to looming environmental catastrophe. This can rapidly counter even superficial attempts at green-friendly social change. We witnessed such a shift during the Reagan/Thatcher years that built the ideological foundations for the Pentecostalism that currently grips the White House as it whispers condescending directives towards Whitehall’s New Labour. We are at war not with Terrorism but with poverty – the poor wanting to improve their lot placing increasing demands on energy and resources to the extent that the West has launched a pre-emptive strike against the people of Iraq to secure their oil. But ‘specialness’ is not exclusively an inter-human phenomenon. The specialness of human culture has now been hybridized with nationalism to the point where we will not only kill others of our own species in large numbers but we will completely negate the environmental impact of armed conflict on the environmental commons to ensure an inflated standard of living. Notably in the past 20 years, the centre left (arguably the traditional bulwark against unfettered human diasporas into natural areas) has shifted centre right and our march towards environmental catastrophe is proceeding uninterrupted by political checks and balances that once offered hope for preventing a neo-Conservative runaway effect. We have reached a point of environmental urgency that demands our attention. Desperate times require desperate measures.

31 To avert the epidemic of environmental devastation that humanity has brought upon the world, we need to institute a profound shift in the way we perceive of ourselves in the context of our environment. The edict of ‘might makes right’ has ruled the Western human experience for the best part of a millennium. How did we get to this place and what is needed for our species to treat our planet with more care? My basic response to these questions is: kindness. I believe that our drift from Nature has been caused primarily by a self-indulgent obsession with the rational self at the expense of the intuitive self – and I apply this response to the woes of human society and the impact we have on other species. Obsession with the rational and pragmatic has encouraged an increasing sense of competition within our species and towards the other facets of Nature from humanity generally to the point where war becomes a forgone conclusion when resource wealth declines. Consequently, as we have evolved, we have backgrounded an obvious expression of kindness, justifying an accentuated sense of competition by arguing that there is not enough wealth to distribute evenly through all of humanity.

In my opinion, there is enough to go around, but humanity closely manages resource wealth and accessibility not only for the sake of survival, but also for the sake of comfort. The unavoidable fact is that unless we alter business as usual towards ethics of sustainability, where kindness towards self is extended to include kindness towards others – in particular our surroundings - we are likely to continue to extinguish the planet’s rich biodiversity along with ourselves (and not necessarily in that order). I therefore argue that this period of environmental blowback where Nature moans and politicians climb deeper into the hip pocket of the wealthy elite is actually a gift. The environmental crisis is now severe enough that it takes effort to not notice the problems we have created and in this sense the time is ripe for a fundamental shift in ‘business as usual.’ We have reached a saturation point where the implementation of practices that are kinder to the Earth are no longer ‘kitsch’ but are an essential part of our survival and Nature writ-large. Sad as it is that we have come to a point of crisis - sustainability will emerge from necessity and the business of being human as we have come to take it for granted, must change. The question of course is how? And to this I can only respond with hope and the contribution of this dissertation – since fine-tuning infrastructural systems pales in comparison to the need for widespread and comprehensive shift in

32 human ideology towards more kindness. From such a shift sustainability can become mainstreamed.

A growing number of voices are carrying the message of sustainability to the forefront of our social development. I am emboldened by this even if the initial motivation is due to the loss of personal conveniences. Fact is that an anthropomorphic motivation that brings human society closer to ‘convenience eco-friendliness’ as a first stage in reclaiming environmental kindness is the rational beginnings of a much broader and unstoppable swing towards the normalization of policies and practices that are kinder towards Nature on a deeper, more intuitive level. In today’s world, not only is the case for sustainability being argued for the sake of our own survival. The multitudes of living beings that wear the unfortunate label of “non-human” are increasingly gaining airtime in the forum of human discourse for their own sake. I predict that the superficial greening of the Western mind can and will eventually remind us as a species of the intuitive sensibility that acknowledges the intrinsic value of all things in Nature.

I lend my voice to the voiceless many species that live in a globalising world where things natural have been increasingly shunned. My deepest intention through this work is to deconstruct the fabricated separation between humans and Nature and reconstruct a vision of the human ego self where intrinsic value of all Nature is not dismissed as some marginalized leftist greenie eco-babble but is unarguably viewed as common sense; where gestures of kindness towards self and others in the context of Nature become routine.

In keeping with Daniel Quinn’s monumental book Ishmael, it seems entirely likely that our close primate relatives are capable of teaching us much about how to tread more lightly on this planet.47 The key is for us to find ways to listen – to ‘get the message.’ And this is precisely what I have attempted to do in this study of chimpanzees. The connection between the environmental crisis, people, and our primate relatives is captured through Donna Haraway's (1983) punchy phrase: “people are primates; people

47 See Daniel Quinn’s (1993) excellent non-fiction dialog between a hapless writer and a talking Gorilla who assumes the role of his eco-guru and instructs him about a non-human primate vision for saving the world from human ecocide. 33 named this fact.”48 The ecological crisis exists because of the egocentric identity crisis of Homo sapien sapiens. Making an earnest effort to feel special leaves us separate from our actual origins within the anima mundi, in denial of our primateness and therefore at odds with our surroundings. This delineation of human-culture/animal-Nature is most notably cleaved between those organisms that are most like us but are not one of us. I suggest that the great apes generally and chimpanzees (Pan paniscus and Pan troglodytes) in particular are gateway species that stand at the cusp between humans and Nature; they are clearly animal but they are also almost human in ways that we see ourselves as clearly human and more evolved than animal.

Marks (2002) states poignantly that:

“ … it is clear …chimpanzees are not just chimpanzees. They are symbolic of a past life and of a simpler existence. They are us, minus something. They are supposed to be our pure biology, unfettered by the trappings of civilization and its discontents. They are human without humanity. They are nature without culture.”49

I argue that it is equally likely we are them, minus something, or they are us, expressing something we have neglected. Acknowledging the humanness of chimpanzees and the animality of us requires our stepping back into Nature’s fold and this presents the threat of eroding our self-identity. Likewise, we resist elevating Nature to our level of specialness because we would cease to be special. A study of chimpanzees offers humanity an opportunity to put the rational self in balance with the intuitive self and may serve as a conduit for our much-needed reconciliation with Nature. If observed closely and holistically, chimpanzees might assist in reawakening in humanity the Jungian ‘Original Man’ – our anima mundi. Further, a deeper and whole-being understanding of chimpanzees - including their expressions of benevolence - might offer remedies for the ecological crisis that we have created by giving us cause to acknowledge our full animalness as an integral part of being fully human.

My belief is that humanity’s current identity crisis and the ways we wreak havoc on Nature have very old roots – much older in fact than the Cartesian/Baconian influence on modern science. What follows is not only an expansion of our understanding of humanity’s animality from a phylogenetic, evolutionary and molecular level. This

48 Haraway, 1983, p. 196. 49 Marks, 2002, p. 165. 34 study is also a reminder of the naturalness of expressing kindness as a member of the Superfamily: Hominoidea. Expressions of kindness in chimpanzees tell us much about the capacity for kindness that has existed in the human lineage since we first descended from the trees some seven million years ago.

1.2: Taxonomy of the Mind

 “I demand of you, and of the whole world, that you show me a generic character … by which to distinguish between Man and Ape. I myself most assuredly know of none. I wish somebody would indicate one to me. But, if I had called man an ape, or vice versa, I would have fallen under the ban of all the ecclesiastics. It may be that as a naturalist I ought to have done so.”

Carl Sagan, 1977, quoting Carl Linnaeus, p. 106.

Taxonomy is an arbitrary science created by humans to classify organisms into groups or taxa based on similar anatomical and morphological features.50 Closer consideration of this definition enables us to recognize that the commonly agreed separation between animals and humans is more a matter of semantics than scientific fact. Place a human next to a chimpanzee and even the lay observer can tell from their extremely similar phenotypes that the two species are closely related. But taxonomic tradition has placed humans consistently on a separate evolutionary branch from other apes. This was a choice based on morphological evidence – particularly brain size, innovative and cognitive ability, bipedality, organized hunting, language, tool use and differences in dentition. Modern Humans on average have a 1350cm3 braincase where as the average brain case for gorillas is 506cm3, 411 cm3 for orang-utans, 394 cm3 for chimpanzees and 95 cm3 for gibbons.51 Humans where thought to be the only tool makers until Jane Goodall’s landmark discoveries that chimpanzees used carefully prepared branches for termite dipping and some groups had elaborate nut cracking strategies using rocks as

50 Clugston, 1998, p. 752. 51 Data on brain capacities of hominoids was downloaded from the World Wide Web: http://www.uvm.edu/~jdecher/Lecture18.html and was compiled from Nowak (1981). 35 hammer and anvil.52 Acts of organized hunting as well as infanticide and cannibalism are now well documented.53 While all three groups of hominid consume soft foods, only humans have thick enamelled teeth. This is thought to be a vestigially primitive trait. Additionally, and rightly so, only humans are classified as permanently bipedal, but chimpanzees in particular are able to amble considerable distances on their hind limbs when their hands are otherwise preoccupied.54 Despite these factors, locating human evolutionary trajectory on a unique path from the other great apes was primarily swayed by our tendency to see ourselves as separate and special, as better than a lowly animal. And our cladistics has depicted our relationship with the other Great Apes accordingly (See Figure 1).

Cladistics is a classification method within Taxonomy based on “ … evolutionary relationships [which assumes] … organisms that exhibit homologous structures are derived from a common ancestor and are therefore related by genealogy.”55 Yet when it comes to locating humans within Hominoidea, the rules of cladistics seem to have become skewed.56 One of the main reason Homo sapiens came out as a separate species is because the classification technique employed is one we humans invented.57 Classifying Homo sapien sapiens apart from the Great Apes (and thereby all of Nature) in the taxonomic hierarchy was an arbitrary construct of the human mind driven more by a need to justify our uniqueness than sound biology.

52 van Lawick-Goodall, 1968, pp. 204 – 211. 53 See Goodall (1968, 1988, 1989, 1991, 1993, 1999, 2002). See also Suzuki (1971) and Sugiyama (1973). 54 For a comprehensive article on chimpanzee ethology, addressing pioneering discoveries that dispel many traditionally held difference between humans and the other Great Apes, see van Lawick-Goodall, 1968, pp. 188, 190, 194. See also Heltne et al, 1989, pp. 2 – 3. 55 Ibid. 56 Had classifications that link like with like and similar with similar been invented by chimpanzees, and were we to agree that chimpanzees possess an ability to self-identify through an ego self, they might have placed their own species at the pinnacle of the tree of life instead of us. One might say the same about an oak tree with an ego self or for that matter a slime mould; but all of them except humanity failed to accumulate the neurological prerequisites to take the poll position in articulating sentience. 57 This is known as the ‘weak anthropic principle’ where humans describe a phenomena because they are able to observe it and do so in terms that are reflective of our particular conscious observation. For a more detailed explanation see Lenton, 2001, p. 13. Also see Watson, A. J. (1999) Coevolution of the Earth’s environment and life: Goldilocks, Gaia and the anthropic principle. James Hutton – Present and Future G. Y. Craig and J. H. Hull, 75 –88. Geological Society, London. 36

Figure 1: Traditional taxonomy of the Superfamily: Hominoidea organizing the Old World Monkeys (OWM), the lesser apes comprised of eight species of gibbons and the siamang (Hylobates spp.), and the three species of Great Apes - the orang-utan (Pongo pygmaeus), the gorilla (Gorilla gorilla) with three distinct subspecies, the common chimpanzee (Pan troglodytes) and the pygmy chimpanzee or bonobo (Pan paniscus) according to morphological similarities and fossil evidence. This form of taxonomic classification places humans on a separate evolutionary branch from the Great Apes (from Andrews, 1993, p.4).

Due to the relatively small number of reliable hominid fossil discoveries, many mysterious gaps appeared in the fossil record of human evolution throughout the late- nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries. While this is still the case today, new discoveries are formulating a more continuous image of our primate heritage. But gaps in the fossil record remain to this day, particularly between 10 and 7 million years ago. The hunt for the prodigious ‘Missing Link’ between humans and apes began with more than a hint of ulterior motive to confirm or disprove our apeness, and where on the planet the first humans arose. A direct relationship between humanity and the other Great Apes implied that the earliest Homo sapiens were most likely dark skinned and African – a notion that assaulted white-European sensibilities. In the quest to discover the true origins of humanity, racism and ethnocentrism reared their ugly heads.58

Further to racism, the classifications that placed humans at the most advanced branch of the taxonomic tree were at times based on misinformed research or just plain lies. In a first instance, Seventeenth Century British anatomist E. Tyson conducted a study of pygmies and did so by comparing their skeletal features with that of a monkey, gorilla and a Caucasian human. The pygmy skeleton that Tyson examined turned out to be that of a chimpanzee but the book was still published and taken as scientific fact for some

58 For a discussion of the inherent racist overtones implicit in early anthropology see Lewin, op. cit., p. 3 – 4. 37 time.59 A second example of premeditated inaccuracy emerged in 1912 when amateur geologist Charles Dawson claimed he found an almost intact ancient hominid skull and jaw near Piltdown Common in Sussex, Britain. The cranium fragment was small but domed much like that of Homo sapiens, and the jaw was remarkably ape-like. This find was examined by the then leading palaeontologist in Britain - Arthur Smith Woodward - who, with the assistance of theologian and palaeontologist Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, suggested that the fossil was a genuine example of the ‘Missing Link’ in the saga of human evolution. Based on the geology of the surrounding sediments, these two authorities placed the fossil’s age to be of early Pleistocene or late Pliocene origins (meaning it was thought to be 2 – 1.8 million years old). The Piltdown discovery gave credibility to the significance of the British Isles and northern-European phenotypes in the saga of human origins and humanity’s separation from nature.60 Notably, the find came at a time when other nations (France, Germany and Indonesia) had already verified important human fossil remains in a world when the prestige of such discoveries mattered greatly to nationalistic identities.61 The find supported a hypothesis that humanity emerged from an ancestor whose brain swelled first and then moved into bipedal locomotion later which provided a perfect argument for the emergence of the ego self (which Descartes considered dwelled in the basal cranium) as the first step towards humanity as indicated by the expansion of the cranium. The fossil also turned out to be a near perfect hoax – a 600-year-old Feugian or Neolithic skull combined with jaw fragments from an orang-utan. The find maintained centre stage for some 40 years as the best evidence of the evolutionary connections between humans and other primates, but was proven a fraud through fluoride dating techniques by Kenneth Oakley in 1950 and Czech-born American physical anthropologist Ales Hrdlicka in 1953.62 Clearly, some respected members of Western society were driven to extreme measures by the desire to validate our species uniqueness, which had the affect of advancing our separation from Nature.

59 Cavalli-Sforza and Cavalli-Sforza, 1993, p. 34. 60 McKie, 2000, pp. 54- 55. See also Tattersall, 1995, pp. 48 – 51, Gribbin and Cherfas, 2001, pp. 60 & 170, and Tudge, 1996, p. 182 & 187 – 188. 61 McKie, op. cit., p. 54. 62 Jolly, 1999, p. 353. See also Tattersall, 1995, p. 50. The orang-utan jaw was contemporary and the human skull was - at best - of medieval in origin. 38 1.3: The Chosen Species?

 “By my count … most of the action of human prehistory took place in Africa.”

Richard Leakey (1994), p. 21.

Come the beginning of the Twentieth Century, Charles Darwin’s 1859 theories on natural selection had taken biology by storm. Evolution through natural selection instigated an enthusiastic inquiry into the trajectory of the human shift away from the animal kingdom. Based on scattered fossil finds and his own intuition, Darwin made a remarkably accurate statement in his 1871 companion text to The Origin of Species called The Descent of Man and Selection in Relation to Sex when he said “ … chimpanzees and gorillas … are now man’s nearest allies, it is somewhat more probable that our early progenitors lived on the African continent than anywhere else.”63 Despite flinching at the anticipated theological and xenophobic backlash particularly from his British colleagues, the fossil evidence would later prove Darwin’s conjecture to be correct - at least in part. Darwin also inferred that from Africa, our ancestors spread throughout the world leaving a fossilized trail for contemporary palaeoanthropologists to reconstruct our past.64 It was from this assertion that the search began to explain how and why early humans spread throughout every continent on Earth.

Most likely a consequence of genetic fluke, proto-humans went through a bottleneck of morphological variations around the time we shared a common ancestor with the Great Apes.65 The new set of innovations driven by an enlarged brain drastically increased proto-human hominid survivability, thereby permitting propagation with astonishing success. This occurred despite the proto-human phenotype being physically vulnerable – our ancestors had abandoned full-time arboreality for the open savannas, were comparatively slow runners, had no claws, their teeth had reduced in size to accommodate for a more varied diet and their children required longer periods of post-

63 Andrews 1993, p. 3, quoting Darwin, C. (1871) The Descent of Man and Selection in Relation to Sex, London: Murray. 64 Jolly, op. cite., p. 352. 65 Wolpoff, 1989, pp. 74 – 76. See also Wolpoff, 1993, pp. 476 - 477. The evolutionary ‘bottleneck’ refers to a series of extinctions of proto-humans that coexisted in Africa between 7 and 3 million years ago that resulted in a Diaspora into Eurasia of a narrowed group of taxa from the hominid clade. 39 natal care. Yet these were precisely the changes that encouraged the rise of humanity as the “chosen species.” Further, and as a consequence of increasing cognition, we began to emphasize qualities that were less kind, namely: organized acts of aggression and violence. We literally stepped away from our animal past on ‘all twos.’

Three main theories explaining humanity’s colonization of much of the planet have emerged. There has been considerable debate about Allan C. Wilson’s Out of Africa hypothesis, Milford H. Wolpoff’s Multiregional or Candelabra hypothesis and Erik Trinkaus’s and Fred H. Smith’s Gene Flow or Hybridization hypothesis.66 The accuracy of each hypothesis remains contentious but may be summarized as follows:

1. The Out of Africa hypothesis - states that the archaic Homo sapiens evolved in sub-Saharan Africa no more than 200,000 and perhaps as recently as 100,000 years ago and spread throughout the world from there.67 There is also some evidence to speculate that as early as 1.5 – 2 million years ago populations of Homo erectus spread from Africa to populate parts of Asia and Europe (See Figure 2). This hypothesis goes further to suggest that all humans are in fact descended from a single female individual – the African Eve.68 2. The Multiregional or Candelabra hypothesis gained considerable recognition suggesting that around 400,000 years ago our early hominid ancestor (Homo erectus) walked bipedally out of Africa and by 2 million years ago this Diaspora gave rise to the different races of Homo sapien in several locations around the world relatively simultaneously as a consequence of similar but isolated niche conditions.69 3. The Gene Flow or Hybridization hypothesis states that as in the

66 For further information on these three models of human evolution see Stringer, 1990, p. 68 – 74 and Stringer, 2003, pp. 692 - 695. See also Cavalli-Sforza and Cavalli-Sforza, op. cit., p. 56 – 57; Lewin, op. cit., pp. 164 – 175; Thorne and Wolpoff, 1992, pp. 28 – 33; Tudge, 1996, pp. 220 – 230; Wolpoff, op. cit., pp. 476 – 497. See also Leakey, 1994, pp. 86 – 89. 67 Wilson and Cann, 1992, pp. 22 – 27. See also Wolpoff, op. cit., p. 491. See also Stringer, op. cit., pp. 71- 72. 68 Wilson and Cann, op. cit., p. 22. The African Eve hypothesis traces all human ancestry back to a single female individual through mitochondrial DNA analysis that shows that gene mutation occurred in a proto- hominid female individual that was also closely related to chimpanzees, gorillas and an ape that would form the human lineage. For more information on mtDNA analysis of human origins see Cann, Stoneking and Wilson, 1993, pp. 461 – 467 and also Stoneking and Cann, op. cit., pp. 17 -30. 69 Wolpoff, op. cit., pp. 62 – 108. 40 Multiregional scenario, a number of similarly related proto-human species emerged in many regions throughout the world and upon contact, interbred to eventually form modern Homo sapien sapiens.70

Figure 2: Worldwide map locating the significant fossil remains of Homo erectus and archaic Homo sapiens found by palaeoanthropologist s since 1924 (Cavalli-Sforza and Cavalli-Sforza, 1993, p. 46).

Darwin based his assertion that humans and apes diverged during the Miocene (between 25 and 5million years ago) almost entirely on conjecture, and the extremely sparse fossil evidence available during the latter part of the nineteenth century. Significant fossils discoveries in southern Africa since 1924 and eastern Africa since 1959 have verified that early hominids did evolve in Africa despite the fact that the fossil record is still too speculative to support the out of Africa hypothesis conclusively (or for that matter either of the other two theories mentioned).

I am most convinced by Colin Tudge’s complex reconciliation of the vagaries of the human Diaspora. Tudge (1997) infers that human or proto-human colonization of the terrestrial biota may have assumed elements of all three hypotheses – that the earliest

70 Ibid, p. 448. 41 Homo ancestors did originate in Africa, that several waves of H. erectus were followed by multiple migrations of H. sapien neandethalensis who might also have emerged in Europe or Asia from the earlier Homo erectus stock, and that several populations of H. sapien sapiens might have emerged in the same way both in Africa and possibly elsewhere later and independently from each other. 71 The migrations might well have been multiregional and multidirectional and could have resulted in the extinction of similar proto-hominids in much the same way humanity is threatening hundreds of species of non-human primates with extinction today – in particular the Great Apes. That said, I do feel a particular sympathy for the Out of Africa hypothesis because it provides an ideological opportunity for humanity to transcend xenophobia and offers the possibility of a profound shift towards deeper social along with environmental justice; we are most likely all of African descent as much as we are all likely to have descended from apes. Agreeing with Darwin’s inference about the humanity originating in Africa, I consider that the Out of Africa and African Eve hypotheses contribute significantly to a less egocentric view of human evolution because they both compliment each other in stressing all of humanity’s relatedness with each other and suggest a more direct link between humans and our primate ancestry and thereby our animality.

1.4: Teasing Out the Details

 What were the selective forces acting on manʼs ancestors? The evidence bearing upon this problem is of two kinds. The direct evidence is founded upon the fossil record in an attempt to identify fossil sequences. The indirect evidence comes from consideration of the features exhibited by related living primates … and entails arguments by analogy from them.

Michael R. A. Chance and Allan P. Mead, 1988, p. 34.

While much debate has raged about the details of becoming human from ape, a degree of educated speculation coupled with recent fossil finds has revealed a general story. Considerable dissent exists in the literature about the precise taxonomy of each proto-

71 Tudge, 1997, p. 228. 42 human species, but there are some overall common denominators72. As Tattersall states the emergence of the human species likely:

“ … consisted of large numbers of [variable] individuals, but each individual was thought to conform more or less to a basic archetype.”73

For the purposes of this dissertation, the overview of human evolution provided by Diamond (1991) offers an adequate generalist benchmark that gave rise to the archetypal form of Homo sapien sapiens.74

*

Figure 3: The bush-like evolutionary path of the Homo lineage indicating the species identified through the fossil record between modern Homo sapien sapiens () and the common primate ancestor (*) that humans shared with apes - known as Dryopithecus (from Diamond, 1992, p. 30).

72 Tattersall, op. cit., p. 94. 73 Ibid. 74 Diamond, 1991, pp. 27 – 48. 43 If we trace the trajectory of human evolution back into the past, we see that the emergence of our species was much more bush-like than linear, a realization that supports Tudge’s all-inclusive Diaspora hypothesis. Several species of proto-hominoids emerged, coexisted, spread and became geographically isolated from each other and all went extinct except the one lineage that gave rise to us. Therefore, it is likely that competitive pressures placed different migrating Homo groups in direct contact in ways that could have presented the possibility of cooperative interbreeding or direct competitive confrontation resulting in the extinction of some proto-hominoid groups. Such contacts could have accelerated further migrations throughout geographical regions due to competitive pressure for resources, thereby increasing still more contact with other groups. And so on …

Figure 3 illustrates that modern humans (Homo sapien sapiens) are the direct descendants of Cro-Magnons (Homo sapiens). Approximately 100,000 years ago Cro- Magnons are thought to have out-competed and possibly encouraged the extinction of the Neanderthals also known as Homo sapien neandethalensis (with fossil remains found throughout Europe and the Middle East) and their Asian contemporary Homo sapien heidelbergensis (with fossils found in Dali, China, as well as Zambia, Ethiopia, France, and Greece).75 Around 500,00 years ago all three lineages of the Homo line descended from Homo erectus who palaeontologists believe show the first evidence of extensive use of fire.76 Homo erectus emerged from the more ape-like Homo habilis approximately 1.7 million years ago.

Homo habilis or ‘handy man’ shows significant, albeit rudimentary, tool use with degrees of intentional manufacture. Around 1.9 million years ago, Homo habilis emerged from Australopithecus africanus or the gracile Australopithecine as did the‘Third Man’ - Homo rudolfensis - whose skeletal remains may have also resulted from sexual dimorphism in the habaline fossilized skeletons found thus far.77 Both Australopithecus africanus and A. robustus emerged approximately three million years ago; where A. africanus continued to give rise to the human lineage while A. robustus -

75 Tattersall, op. cit., p. 243. See also Tattersall, 1998, pp. 146 – 150. 76 I will discuss the significant contribution of fire in driving a wedge between humanity and Nature in Chapter 6. 77 Tattersall, 1995, pp. 193 – 194. Some, including Tattersall, consider that the evolutionary path from Homo habilis to Homo erectus was linked by an intermediary species called Homo ergaster. See Jolly, op. cite., pp. 356. 44 with the more brawny morphology - became extinct approximately 1.5 million years ago possibly due to direct contact and competition with A. africanus, H. habilis and/or H. rudolfensis.78 Winding the clock back further, along the human evolutionary line to approximately 6 - 8 million years ago we see a much closer resemblance in the hominid clade. Humanity’s earliest primate ancestors were very chimpanzee looking apes (see Figure 4).

Figure 4: The Fossils and ecus. Note the apparent Old World Monkey form with a remarkably chimpanzee-like appearance. It must be noted that the fleshed sketch represented here is an artist’s impression based on conjecture (from McKie, 2000, p. 21).

78 Diamond, op. cit., pp. 28 – 31. See also Leakey, op. cit., pp.21 – 41. 45 1.5: How Ape Are Humans? How Human are Apes?

 “The living hominoids are human, the two species of chimpanzee, gorilla, orang-utan, and nine species of gibbons.”

Charles G. Sibley and Jon E. Ahlquist, 1987, p. 99.

 “To classify is to be human: mythical Adamʼs first task was to classify.”

Jonathan Marks, 2002, p. 50.

An exploration of the accumulated human fossil remains has shed considerable light on just how ape we are. But the fossil record leaves many blank spots in the story of human relatedness with the other great apes and lays open intense debates about human origins from our primate past that have carried on into the new millennium.79 Despite the controversies that still exist – particularly between 7 and 3 million years ago, it is now generally accepted that humans share most recent ancestry with the gorilla (Gorilla gorilla), the common chimpanzee (Pan troglodytes) and the pygmy chimpanzee or bonobo (Pan paniscus), and are more distantly descended from the orang-utans (Pongo pygmaeus) and the Gibbon (Hylobates spp.), with conventional wisdom claiming that all of these primates are directly descended from the common arboreal primate ancestor – Dryopithecus (See Appendix 1).80 This evidence supports the appropriateness of placing humans within the Order: Primata; the Sub Order: Anthropoidea; the Infra Order: Catarrhini; and the Superfamily: Hominoidea. But from here, phylogenetics and

79 For excellent reviews of the contemporary debates raging around the questions of proto-human and early human evolution see: Began, 2001, pp. 231 – 253. Also see Pilbeam and Young, 2001, pp. 349 – 364. 80 Augustí, Cabrera and Garcés, 2001, pp. 2 – 12, particularly pp. 10 - 11. Several early hominoid genera have been identified from the period between 16.5 and 7 million years ago. They are the thick tooth- enamelled g: Griphopithecus, g: Sivapithecus, g: Ankarapithecus,, g: Ouranopithecus (or Graecopithecus) along with the thin tooth enamelled Dryopithecines however it is only the latter that is thought to have a direct evolutionary link between hominoids (proto-humans and early humans) and the other hominids (gibbons, orang-utans, gorillas and chimpanzees). The former two genera contributed to lineages that either died out along the early hominid line or gave rise to the gibbon (g: Hylobates) most closely related to g: Griphopithecus, and the orang-utan (g: Pongo) most closely related to g: Sivapithecus. There is not current consensus about the location of g: Ankarapithecus in the hominid line which was at one time thought to be synonymous with g: Sivapithecus. G: Ouranopithecus (or Graecopithecus) is thought to have shared direct common lineage with the Dryopithicines but became extinct. The exact phylogeny of the entire hominid clade is still extremely nebulous. See Begun, 2001, p. 235 (Figure 10.1). 46 the fossil record diverge. Gibbons and siamangs are located taxonomically within Family: Hylobatidae while orang-utans, gorillas, chimpanzees and bonobos are currently placed within the Family: Pongidae. Both of these non-human great ape families are located in the Super Family: Hominoidea. Humans are also classified within sf: Hominoidea but are traditionally located in our own family classification as Hominidea (see Appendix 2).81 Phylogenetic classifications along the hominid line are guided by morphological and cultural factors and are subject to controversy about which genera of great apes are more closely related to each other.82 I suggest that the fundamental flaw with this phylogenetic classification is the definitive separation between sf: Hominidea and sf: Pongidae. In fact, such a separation is not consistent with the consensus cladogram compiled by Augustí et al (2001) who charted the course of early hominid evolution. 83 Consensus on the origins of gorillas, chimpanzees and proto-humans based on fossil evidence alone suggests that all three taxa are descended from Dryopithecus, while the orang-utans and gibbons branched off much earlier and separately along the hominid line.

To my reckoning, separating humans from the pongids (orang-utans, gorillas and chimpanzees) on the basis of extinct and extant morphology does not make sense. There is certainly enough anatomical, physiological and fossil evidence now available to show that g: Pongo diverged from the hominid line earlier than the other great apes, is more directly related to g: Sivapithecus and therefore is rightly placed by Wrangham et al (1994) in the unique classification f: Ponginae.84 The thin enamelled dentition of g: Pan and g: Gorilla coupled with the knuckle walking habit prevalent in both genera has been the basis for assuming their close kinship in the past. Orang-utans were grouped similarly with the pongids in part because they share the knuckle walking habit that chimpanzees and gorillas (but not humans) exhibit even though they have thick enamelled teeth and eat hard foods as well as soft.85 But, gorillas (the lowland, western

81 See URL:http://www.umanitoba.ca/anthropology/course/121/primatology/taxonomy.html 82 This is due largely to the whims of the human ego, and ever changing conjecture about the narrative of human evolution, as new hominid fossils are uncovered. To review arguments for and against the separation of Hominidea from Pongidea see Sibley and Ahlquist (1984, 1987 & 1993); Miyamoto, Slightom and Goodman (1987); Caccone and Powell (1989) and Sibley, Comstock and Ahlquist (1990); as compared with Marks, Schmid and Sarich (1988); Sarich, Schmid and Marks (1989) and Marks (2002), respectively. 83 Begun, op. cite., p. 235. 84 Wrangham, de Waal and McGrew, 1994, in Wrangham et al (eds.), pp. 3 – 6. 85 Recall that thick enamelled dentition is viewed as the more primitive condition. 47 and eastern subspecies), chimpanzees (both common and pygmy) and humans, (and specifically not orang-utans) all show direct fossilized links with Dryopithecus on account of the group’s common consumption of soft foods as reflected in the dentition of tooth fossils.86 The Superfamily: Hominoidea is therefore worthy of reclassification to rename f: Hominidea with the abridged term f: Homininae as suggested by Wrangham et al (1994) (see Figure 5).

Figure 5: The revised evolutionary cladogram for Superfamily: Hominoidea showing the grouping of humans (H), chimpanzees (C), bonobos (B) and gorillas (GO) into the one Family: Homininae. Orang-utans (O) are classified in the Family: Ponginae separate from gibbons (G) (from Wrangham, de Waal and McGrew, 1994, in Wrangham et al (eds.), p. 4)

86 Begun, op. cite., p. 240. Note that humans possess thick enamelled teeth even though we have soft food diet. This is thought to be a surviving primitive trait. 48 1.6: A Naturalistic Fallacy Come True

 There “ … is no guarantee, short of detailed physiological and genetic data and analyses, that anything chimpanzees do is directly relevant to understanding anything that humans do.”

Jonathan Marks, 2002, p. 160.

I support the reclassification of f: Hominidea to f: Homininae. To remedy this, I acknowledge the humanness of the great apes and the ‘apeness’ of humanity, being fully aware that this position is viewed by some as a central symptom of what is un- affectionately referred to as ‘the naturalistic fallacy’ where unsubstantiated morphological similarities between the species do not necessarily justify their closer relatedness.87 Marks, Schmid and Sarich (1988) Sarich, Schmid and Marks (1989) and Marks (2002) lodge fervent protests against revising sf: Hominoidea to acknowledge closer relatedness between the other great apes with humans. These scholars base their antipathy primarily on the socio-biological differences between f: Hominidea and f: Pongidea. Recent calls to reclassify gorillas as Homo are retorted by Marks’ mentor and distinguished paleobiologist George Gaylord Simpson as “ … just plain dumb!”88 Drawing on his training in molecular anthropology, Marks highlights the differences between human and chimpanzee DNA structure and attributes this as a genetic similarity that merely implies a diagnostic divergence between the species.89 Assessing the socio-biological differences between humans and chimpanzees, Marks states that there:

“The fact that bonobos and chimpanzees are each other’s closest relatives should attest to the breadth of inferred natures possible in these animals and the speciousness of taking any one of them as natural for humans.”90

Marks suggests that our ‘apeness’ is more a function of the phylogenetic construct of the cladogram for o: Primata than a physical reality.91 Marks et al agree that based on morphological and phylogenetic similarities it is reasonable to consider that g: Homo, g:

87 Marks, 2002, p. 161. 88 Ibid., p. 43. 89 Ibid., pp. 39- 42. 90 Ibid., p. 174. 91 Ibid., pp. 45 – 46. 49 Pan and g: Gorilla (with g: Pongo as the outsider) are related somewhat but suggest that the degrees of relatedness amongst these taxa are inconclusive. 92 They therefore challenge the idea that one genera of great ape is more closely related to humans than the others.

However, new insights into primate evolutionary biology coupled with recent discoveries of socio-biological similarities and differences amongst the pongids do not preclude their relatedness to humans. In addition to intuitive lay-observations of the commonalities exhibited in the primate fossil record and those seen in extant species of hominid, there is also a host of molecular data now available that support the reclassification of sf: Hominoidea.93

Originally developed to assess the phylogeny of birds, the molecular procedure gleans a numerical percentage for the relatedness of different organisms and also determines the approximate dates of their divergence. Sibley and Ahlquist (1984, 1987 & 1990), Miyamoto, Slightom and Goodman (1987), Caccone and Powell (1989) and Sibley, Comstock and Ahlquist (1990) developed and extended a molecular procedure called DNA-DNA Hybridization that provides sufficient evidence to locate humans along with gorillas and chimpanzees in sf: Hominidea.94 The molecular analysis procedure tests blood serum from all the great apes – including humans – by melting strands of DNA from different hominid species and then hybridizing them to assess the percentage of re- naturing of the nucleotides that occurs.95 To clarify the molecular biology briefly, the DNA extracted from the blood serum of two closely related hominids is heated to separate the genomes. They are then combined and allowed to form stable duplexes at 60oC whereupon the genomes sequence each other. The median re-melting point of these hybridized molecules indicates the degree of mismatch between the two genomes and therefore reveals the numerical percentage relatedness between the organisms that

92 Marks, Schmid and Sarich, 1988., pp. 782 – 783. 93 See Sibley and Ahlquist ( 1984, 1987 & 1993); Miyamoto, Slightom and Goodman (1987); Caccone and Powell (1989) and Sibley, Comstock and Ahlquist (1990). 94 The technique was originally employed to decipher the relatedness of bird. When researching the hominid clade, Sibley and Ahlquist analysed sf: Ceropithecoidea (the Old World Monkeys - specifically: baboons, macaques, columbines) as the sister ‘out-group’ for comparison. 95 Sibley and Ahlquist, 1984, pp. 2 – 3. See also, Sibley and Ahlquist, 1987, pp. 106 – 110; Sibley, Comstock and Ahlquist, 1990, pp. 204 – 212. For verification of the DNA-DNA Hybridization procedure see Miyamoto, Slightom and Goodman, 1987, p. 369. 50 the serums were derived from.96 Figure 5 summarizes Sibley and Ahlquist’s (1984 & 1987) findings that resonate with Diamond’s (1992) review of hominid relatedness based on the fossil evidence.97

The DNA-DNA hybridization procedure therefore shows that pygmy chimpanzees and common chimpanzees differ by 0.7% of their DNA. This is called the Delta value for DNA divergence or (∆). Bonobos and humans differ by 1.4% while chimpanzees and humans differ by (∆) 1.6%. Gorillas possess (∆) 2.3% difference from humans, (∆) 2.4% from pygmy chimpanzees, and (∆) 2.21% from common chimpanzees (see Figure 6 for a cladogram that charts the DNA-DNA Hybridization data. Also see Appendix 3 for a summary of ∆ values for the great apes compared with an ‘out-lyer’ taxa, from Sibley and Ahlquist - 1984 & 1987).

Based on this molecular data, the closest extant ape relative to humans are pygmy chimpanzees (Pan paniscus), followed by common chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) and then gorillas (Gorilla gorilla). This molecular evidence is concurrent with fossil, socio- biological and morphological evidence that Wrangham et al used to draw the revised evolutionary cladogram for sf: Hominoidea, as shown in Figure 5. I therefore take the position that Pan paniscus and Pan troglodytes are our closest living relatives and have been justifiably re-classified and incorporated into f: Homininae along with our second nearest relative Gorilla gorilla.98

96 Sibley and Ahlquist, 1987, p. 105. The difference in exact nucleotide bases between the two species that are being compared is not disclosed through this procedure. 97 Ibid., p. 106. 98 It is worth noting here that Carl Linnaeus’ (1758) original classification of chimpanzees placed them in the same genus as humans – namely, the species first appeared taxonomically as Homo troglodytes or Homo nocturnus (See Marks, op. cite., p.21). But some 20 years later English zoologist Thomas Pennant and German biologist Johann Friedrich Blumenbach both stroingly advocated for the separation of humanity into our own unique genera. The debate raged until 1945 when George Gaylord Simpson officially classified all mammals and located humans in Superfamily: Hominoidea with the pongids but placed us clearly separate and alone in the Family: Hominidae. 51

Figure 6: A Cladogram resulting from DNA-DNA Hybridization procedures testing the relatedness within Infraorder: Catarrhini (Old World Monkeys are included as the sister out-lying group for reference). Delta (∆) represents the percentage divergence of DNA between each of the most closely related taxa (adapted from Sibley and Ahlquist, 1987, p. 111).

Further, individual species possess unique rates of DNA sequencing. They therefore go through evolution variably and emerge with new acquired characteristics that ultimately give rise to new species. The DNA-DNA Hybridization procedure can also be used to assess DNA sequence evolution in organisms to determine when taxa diverged from each other. More precisely, sequencing evolution, or the degree of mutation in a DNA strand over time, varies individually amongst species. Different but related species possess similar sequences that evolve at different rates, and each population’s evolutionary rate is also affected by local environmental conditions along with the fecundity of the individual.99 But the average evolutionary rate of all the genomes being considered for a particular clade tends to be constant for billions of nucleotides over millions of years. This is known as the uniform average rate (UAR) and may be used to reliably map the cladistic divergence between species.100

Sibley and Ahlquist (1984 & 1987) found that the rate of evolution of hominoids nearly matched that of birds. This corresponding data confirmed the existence of the UAR across different related clades over the last 16 – 80 million years.101 The UAR based on

99 Ibid., p. 116. 100 Sibley and Ahlquist, 1984, pp. 3 – 4. 101 Ibid., pp. 110 – 112. 52 Pilbeam’s (1984) estimates for orang-utan divergence from the hominid line (13 – 16 million years ago) was used as a benchmark in assessing the evolutionary rates of all hominids and has been determined as 0.8%/Myr. This is compared with the cercopithecoids that evolved at a rate of 0.16%/Myr.102 Hence, assessing the DNA sequencing evolution of various species can be used as an evolutionary ‘molecular clock’ making it possible to calculate when different taxa branched off from each other and how the rates of evolution compare to other clades.

Genetic evidence combined with physiological evidence lubricates my rationale for studying chimpanzees. They are quite simply our species closest living relatives. I suspect that studying chimpanzees will shed much light on the hominid and early human experience and thereby give valuable insight into a narrative of humanity’s separation from Nature. Reclaiming full humanness requires remembering how to be kind. Living full primateness embodies a degree of kindness towards self and others (particularly with the surrounding environment) that is essential for survival. It is entirely possible that our species can express such qualities. Chimpanzees do so, naturally and tell us much about the ancestral hominoid from which we arose.

102 Sibley and Ahlquist, 1987, p. 118. 53

CHAPTER 2: AN APE IS AN APE IS A …

 “ … the chimpanzee is not studied to prove that it is the human ancestor but to understand the kind of organization which may have been characteristic of the ancestral forms.”

S. L. Washburn, 1951, p. 76.

 It has, I think, now been shown that man and the higher animals, especially the Primates, have some few instincts in common. All have the same senses, intuitions, and sensations, - similar passions, affections, and emotions, even the more complex ones, such as jealousy, suspicion, emulation, gratitude, and magnanimity; they practice deceit and are revengeful; they are sometimes susceptible to ridicule, and even have a sense of humour; they feel wonder and curiosity, they possess the same faculties of imitation, attention, deliberation, choice, memory, imagination, the association of ideas, and reason, though in very different degrees … [yet] man is divided by an insuperable barrier from all the lower animals in his mental faculties.

Charles Darwin, 1871, p. 81.

54 2.1: Gnashing Teeth and Warm Smiles

 “It is revealed, to be sure, that some men (generic) are nearly animal, some apes nearly human, for instinct survives in man and culture has dawned in chimpanzee.”

Robert M. Yerkes, 1939, p. 133.

Rocked and ravaged as the dust settled after WWII, humanity gained a fresh interest in the origins of our species and our true nature. Industrialized societies the world over had plunged into a mood of misanthropy and despair as the truth behind our capacity to hate and destroy revealed itself with the emerging peace.103 Were we as inherently violent as the piles of dead purported? Were we indeed but one hapless member of Tennyson’s now clichéd ‘nature red in tooth and claw’ in possession of a killer instinct that crowned our species ‘king of the biospheric castle?’104 In our struggle for existence, had we become creatures that were basically selfish; subject to the vagaries of each individual’s compulsions to live well, even if this caused the severe demise of others?105 Or, had we emerged from our ancestral past as a timid, defenceless and insecure species racked by terror and salved only by our cognitive ability to create a cultural base that sculpted us in the image of our Gods who then graced us with a unique moral sense of conscience?106 I believe that these questions are not in fact mutually exclusive; it is possible that there is truth on all counts.

Humanity is as capable of vile acts of aggression as we are of expressing deep and selfless altruism. What distinguishes us from chimpanzees is not our ability to be altricial or violent since chimpanzees have this same capacity. Rather, humanity’s acts of selflessness and selfishness are more extreme than that shown by chimpanzees. We

103 deWaal and Lanting, 1997, p. 2. 104 Dawkins, 1976, p. 2. See also Raymond Dart (1925) for reports of the discovery of Australopithecus and the inference that this was a bloodthirsty proto-human, carnivorous hunter. In his seminal text On Aggression, Konrad Lorenz (1966[1963]) suggested that unlike other full-time carnivores, proto-humans evolved too quickly to develop negative feedbacks that prevented cannibalism, infanticide and genocide towards one’s own species. This therefore supported the hypothesis that Homo sapien sapiens developed a natural level of viciousness to compensate from their poor armour and was accepted as the convention for the best part of the 20th Century. 105 Darwin, 1859, pp. 75 – 96. See also Dawkins, 1976, pp. 6 – 8. 106 Despite his silent agnosticism, Charles Darwin believed that the human intellect had sufficiently progressed beyond that of other animals to the point of manufacturing progressive cultural improvements that thereby justified our superiority as a species. See Darwin, 1871, p. 81. 55 possess a free will that empowers us to transcends the limits of our biology and employ our intelligence and wisdom in a multitude of directions beyond the individual or familial desire to survive at any cost.107 Goodall (1999) summarizes the discourse around the nature versus nurture debate when she states that our species is:

“ … the human ape, half sinner, half saint, with two opposing tendencies inherited from our ancient past pulling us now towards violence, now towards compassion and love.”108

And …

“ … our aggressive tendencies are deeply embedded in our primate heritage. Yet so too are our caring and altruistic ones.”109

Humanity, particularly in the West, has a habitual tendency towards ecocide, rampant xenophobia and ethnocentrism. Such habits emerge through a process Goodall (1999) calls pseudspeciation that she defines as the “… transmission of individually acquired behaviour from one generation to the next within a particular group [that] with time … leads to the collective culture (the customs and traditions) of that group.”110 In other words, acts of unkindness are socialized, and are part of our biology. But for Goodall, so too is our capacity to love and care for each other and our surroundings.

As mentioned in Chapter 1, chimpanzees possess near identical DNA to humans thereby making them our nearest living relatives. They also share with humans’ similar chromosome structure and blood proteins, along with susceptibility to similar diseases, overall morphology, and brain structure and function.111 Indeed the adult human form is actually thought to be that of a neotenous or infantile ape. Chimpanzees possess brains that are around 70% developed at birth, growing to a maximum size within the first six months of life. By comparison, human infants possess a brain that is only 23% mature at birth; experiencing continued rapid growth for the first six years of life that reaches

107 Goodall, 1999, pp. 119 & 121 - 123. 108 Ibid., p. 143. 109 Ibid., p. 146. 110 Ibid., pp. 129 – 135. 111 For an extensive synopsis of the similarities between humans and chimpanzees, see van Lawick- Goodall, 1975, pp. 131 – 132. 56 full development around age 23 years.112 Adult humans maintain an infantile morphology to permit protracted brain development. New born babies possess a larger, less mature and more gradually growing brain encased in a softer and more flexible skull that is able to pass through (the comparatively narrower) hips of the human mother.113

Our larger, slower developing brains facilitate the flourishing of some unique qualities such as sophisticated innovation, imagination, a sense of purpose and an ability to revere our surroundings and also gave rise to our rich socio-cultural qualities as a species. Van Lawick-Goodall (1975) notes that humanity has a capacity:

“… for loving his fellows, for sympathizing with and trying to understand them … is aware of himself, as an individual and as a species. He is aware and becoming ever more aware, of his relationship to the rest of nature, and the part he plays in the world around him. He knows that he can control, to some extent, the events of his life, that he can make crucial decisions that will affect his future … [and has] tended to acknowledge the presence of supernatural forces … Man knows too, that he is finite.” 114

Humanity has an impressive propensity towards abstraction that is not matched by chimpanzees. Chimpanzees have a complex brain with a highly developed cognitive ability that when stretched through captive experimentation shows levels of abstraction more prevalent than in the wild (see Figure 7).115 Chimpanzees show great curiosity towards themselves, each other and their surroundings along with a level of self- awareness expressed in arguably less adulterated ways than do we humans. Chimpanzees also show a rudimentary curiosity around death of family members, carrion or even prey killed for food.116 But collectively, the greater refinement of such qualities exhibited in humanity, made possible by our larger brains has enabled our species to develop rich rituals and cultures that permitted our propagation while other hominoids (including the chimpanzee) have declined. Over the last 6 – 7 millions years, human morphology has changed drastically while our nearest living relatives have clung to a form similar to the Dryopithecines and remained in dwindling

112 Morris, 1967, pp. 32 – 33. 113 van Lawick-Goodall, op. cit., p. 155. 114 Ibid., p. 160. 115 Ibid., p. 161. An excellent example of this is the ability of some captive chimps to recognize themselves in the mirror. 116 Ibid., p. 164. 57 ecosystems (due to climate change and human destruction). Clearly, maintaining an ancestrally infantile morphology into adulthood was an adaptive strategy that yielded great benefits for human beings at the expense of chimpanzees and Nature at large.

Figure 7: A four-year-old common chimpanzee recognizes itself in the mirror, showing signs of cognitive abstraction.

Behaviourally, chimpanzees and humans are dependent on adult care for much the same length of time (around the first 6 – 7 years) that supports a period of extensive social learning in both taxa.117 Adolescence is noted as a period of refining social skills for young chimpanzees as well as young humans prior to full maturity.118 Non-verbal communication through gestures and posturing exhibit remarkable similarities. Van Lawick-Goodall (1975) observed that like humans, chimpanzees “ … derive comfort

117 Ibid., pp. 135 – 136. 118 Ibid., pp. 137 – 139. 58 from physical contact with another during … stressful occasions.”119 Celebratory gestures such as laughing are common as is embracing and kissing to reconcile a conflict in both taxa. Aggression is similarly displayed using raised arms, vigorous body movements, the dispatching of weapons (as in sticks and stones) and loud vocalizations (as in shouting). Conflicts are most intensely motivated over access to food resources, territory, reproductive access, self-defence and social status; both taxa are capable of causing harm towards disputants and even organizing group directed attacks towards neighbouring groups and both taxa possess an ability to choose self restraint.120 Family members tend to assist each other in social negotiations that result in increased status and show a particularly intense protective instinct towards immediate relatives with less frequent but at times cooperative behaviour towards unrelated conspecifics.

Like many humans, chimpanzees display an aversion towards conspecifics in physical distress caused by wounds or disease. Further, both taxa resist copulation between immediate family members though the cultural taboo against incest in human society is not formally applicable to chimpanzee culture – but incest does occur in both species.121 Like humans, chimpanzees are capable of manufacturing and using tools though the obvious difference here is in the degree of sophistication of human tools (such as the Space Shuttle) over the more basic tools made and used by chimpanzees for display, food collection or protection (such as established nut cracking sites, grass stalks for ant/termite dipping, or the use of cans to intimidate rivals in an attempt to take-over alpha position within a population). Hunting is common in both taxa where prey is captured and killed opportunistically either alone or through direct cooperative intention of an interacting (usually male) group. The resource rich habitat of most chimpanzee populations lends itself to reduced pressure to share whereas the spread of proto- humans across harsher environments is thought to have encouraged more direct cooperative behaviour as a better adaptive strategy for survival – thereby implying that humans are more naturally cooperative where chimpanzees are more naturally opportunistic and self motivated. I challenge this inference as too conveniently simplistic. Its seems more probable to me that there is an equally high capacity for the

119 Ibid., p. 140. 120 Ibid., pp. 145 & 148. 121 Ibid., p. 141. 59 expression of a truly cooperative adaptive strategy within both taxa and that some individuals choose cooperative behaviour while others do not (I stress the element of choice deliberately here and will revisit this at more length in chapter 5).

There are of course some marked differences between humans and chimpanzees. Both chimpanzees and humans employ bipedal locomotion. Humans are full-time bipeds while chimpanzees are knuckle-walking quadrupeds capable of bipedalism on special occasions (such as when transporting an infant, wading through water, using both hands to carry objects around or to increase ones stature during a display). The family structures of chimpanzees and humans are less similar. In both taxa, childcare tends to fall heavily upon the female. But male chimpanzees care for infants more casually, since the basic family unit is that of mother and child, where the father is typically one of many sexually mature males present in a single population. Chimpanzees tend to behave with serial polygamy so the identity of an infant’s father is often difficult to confirm. By comparison, humans are generally serially monogamous making their identity as the father of a particular infant easier to discern. 122 Consequently, human males tend to be more actively invested in their own offspring from within their own nuclear family that is typically comprised of a mother and father with their offspring.123

Female chimpanzees have a 35-day menstrual cycle characterized with bleeding during the shedding of the uterine wall and ovulation during which time the buttocks swell, turn bright pink and become enlarged for 8 – 10 days. This signals that the female is reproductively receptive. Both male and female chimpanzees appear to ‘enjoy’ sexual contact (emitting grunts and squeals that imply pleasure) but the act itself is brief – lasting a few seconds to a few minutes. Human females are sexually receptive near constantly, have concealed oestrus and also have developed the clitoral erogenous zone that facilitates pleasure during sex. Further to procreation, sexual contact between human partners is heavily connected to feelings of love and admiration. Sexual contact is a procreative act in common chimpanzees with some affiliation with social bonding and has considerable social bonding overtones similar to human ‘lovemaking’ amongst

122 deWaal and Lanting, op. cit., p. 136. 123 I acknowledge the heterosexist nature of this remark. While many humans choose to couple with a member of the same gender and human coupling is as much if not more about love than procreation, in this instance, I highlight heterosexual relationships from a biological perspective – where the desired outcome is to reproduce. 60 pygmy chimpanzees – where heterosexual, homosexual, familial and trans-generational sex is more common and seems to be more intricately connected with pleasure.

Language exists in chimpanzee culture but to call these exchanges verbal would be erroneous. The larynx of the chimpanzee is not adapted to making the complex sounds possible in the human ‘voice box.’ Even captive chimpanzees trained by humans to speak are capable of uttering a few sounds with somewhat garbled pronunciation that resemble words.124 Consequently, chimpanzee language is restricted to silent facial and body expressions, hand gestures and a series of calls from grunts and screams to the well-known pant-hoot all of which communicate an elaborate array of messages – but lack words.125

Such similarities and differences between humans and chimpanzees render a study of the latter important for the understanding of the nature versus nurture debate about the former. It is therefore useful to dig a little deeper and closely examine the distinguishing features of the two species of chimpanzee: the common chimpanzee (Pan troglodytes spp.) and the pygmy chimpanzee or bonobo (Pan paniscus).

124 See Gardner and Gardner (1978). 125 van Lawick-Goodall, op. cit., p. 165 – 167. 61 2.2: The 98% Human126

 “… humans and chimpanzees are more closely related than chimpanzees and gorillas.”

Jon Marks, Carl W. Schmid and Vincent M. Sarich, 1988, p. 769.

Approximately 2.5 - 3 million years ago, a proto-chimpanzee species diverged from the hominid line and then split into the two separate species that exist today: the common chimpanzee (Pan troglodytes spp.) and the pygmy chimpanzee or bonobo (Pan troglodytes paniscus or Pan paniscus). Both species are considered directly descended from the same Dryopithecines described previously as humanity’s earliest primate ancestor.127 Given they evolved at a much slower rate than humans, all varieties of chimpanzees are thought to possess greater morphological similarities with the common primate ancestors (the Dryopithecines) than those shown by modern Homo sapien sapiens. Put simply: chimpanzees are the nearest extant example of our fuller ‘primateness.’

The distinguishing features of the two species of chimpanzee are notable:

1. The more numerous taxon known collectively as the ‘common’ chimpanzee (Pan troglodytes) is actually divided into three sub species: the West African chimpanzee also known as the Pale-faced chimpanzee: Pan troglodytes versus (Schwarz); the Central African chimpanzee also known as the Black-faced chimpanzee: Pan troglodytes troglodytes (Blumenbach); and the East African chimpanzee also known as the Long-haired chimpanzees: Pan troglodytes

126 Note that this subtitle is inspired by the following reference: Marks, J. (2002). What It Means to Be 98% Chimpanzee. Berkeley: University of California Press. I have deliberately inflected the noun from chimpanzee to human. I have done so here as a way of highlighting the largely human quality of the chimpanzee in the same way that Marks uses the noun chimpanzee to question the ‘primateness’ of humanity. 127 Schultz, 1969, p. 251. See also McGrew, 1992, p. 62. 62 schweinfurthii (Giglioli).128

2. The pygmy chimpanzee is less common and found in lowland rain forest ecosystems where they are and have been isolated from direct contact with neighbouring populations of common chimpanzee by the Zaire River basin for more than 1 million years.129 Cladistical convention originally defined the pygmy chimpanzee as Pan troglodytes paniscus (Schwarz) - a subspecies of chimpanzee. But recent evidence conclusively identifies these animals as a separate and unique species, consequently they are now more commonly referred to as the bonobo: Pan paniscus and will be described thus henceforth.130

Chimpanzees and bonobos do not swim. Therefore, larger bodies of water represent significant barriers that have eliminated cultural and genetic exchanges for millennia, giving rise to the various extant subspecies and the two unique species. The separation between the two species and the subspecies noted resulted from the geographical isolation caused by the swelling of the Niger, Congo and Ubangi Rivers since the Miocene (see Figure 8).131 Common chimpanzees are native to tropical forests, undulating streamed woodlands, bamboo high grounds and savannah ecosystems from southern Senegal to western Tanzania, and bonobos are found only in the equatorial forest of Zaire and the Congo in Central Africa (the combined range of both species is between longitude 15o W to longitude 32o E and latitude 12o N to latitude 8o S - an area

128 Reynolds and Reynolds, op. cit., p. 372. See also deWaal and Lanting, 1997, p. 10. It is worth pointing out the oxymoron here. Recall that chimpanzees (and bonobos, along with more than half of all primates) are facing severe threat as a consequence of deforestation of their natural ranges, hunting for bush meat, the exotic pet trade and scientific research. Human disruptions of existing populations has caused estimated numbers of free-living chimpanzees in equatorial Africa to decline from in the millions during the 19th Century to between 150,000 – 235,000 today – with extremely bleak survivability prognoses for all populations. (see Teleki 1989, pp. 312 – 353; Reynolds and Reynolds, 1965, p. 372; also Goodall, 1994, pp. xxii - xxiii). Of the three subspecies of common chimpanzee, Pan troglodytes schweinfurthii has been most extensively studied on account of the long standing field observations particularly by Goodall at the Gombe Stream National Park in Tanzania and studies by Itani (1979) in the Mahale Mountains Wildlife Research Centre, Tanzania along with Nishida (1989) and Wrangham et al (1992) at the Kibale Forest and the Budongo National Park in Uganda (sources not listed in this work). Pan t. verus was the first subspecies of chimpanzee to be studied and has been the most extensively exploited by humans for various purposes. Pan troglodytes troglodytes and Pan troglodytes paniscus are the least studied groups (see McGrew, 1992, pp. 23 - 28). 129 Malenky et al, 1989, pp. 362 – 365. 130 Reynolds and Reynolds, op. cit., pp. 372 – 374. See also Wrangham, deWaal and McGrew, op. cit., p. 6. 131 Schultz, 1969, p. 251. 63 of approximately 1,000,000 km2).132 Population densities vary according to the ecosystem in question and range

Figure 8: The distribution of Pan spp. throughout equatorial Africa showing the geographical location of the three subspecies of common chimpanzee - Pan troglodytes spp. - and the pygmy chimpanzee or bonobo - Pan paniscus (adapted from Reynolds and Reynolds, 1965 in DeVore (ed.), p. 372 – with diagram originally drawn from Yerkes 1943).

between 0.1 to 6.8 chimpanzees/km2 with an average of 0.1 to 0.3 chimpanzees/km2 across all of equatorial Africa.133 The habitat elevation of the various groups ranges from sea level to 10,000 feet.134

132 Reynolds and Reynolds, op. cit., p. 374. See also Teleki, op. cit., p. 320. 133 Teleki, op. cit., pp. 320 - 321. 134 Ibid. 64 2.3: A Pan Full of Pan troglodytes

 “ … appear to be virtuous - and be so - unless it is necessary to be otherwise.”

Alison Jolly, 1999, quoting Machiavelliʼs The Prince, p. 212.

Free-living common chimpanzees can survive to the age of 40 – 50 years, and may live longer in captivity. The females enter sexual maturity at approximately nine years of age, gestate young for an average of 255 days and are generally reproductively active for 25 years, producing no more than 5 offspring in a lifetime – with not all females successfully reproducing. 135

Twins are rare and when born, it is typical for one to die.136 Infants are altricial for the first five years of life meaning they are entirely dependent upon the attentive care of their mothers for an extended period in order to enter adolescence. Adult males are up to 36% larger than females and play a minimal role in the raising of infants (limited to protection from predators or attack by other chimpanzees while offering some food sharing and grooming).137

Contrary to historically held stereotypes common chimpanzees are not exclusively herbivorous. True enough they consume mostly vegetable matter and fruit, but nuts and small animal prey (such as worms, insects, reptiles, birds, eggs, shrews and squirrels, duikers and young bushbucks (small antelopes), bush pigs, monkeys, baboons and the occasional human infant) that are hunted solo and opportunistically or with cooperative intention are also regular additions to their diet (see Figure 9).138 Primarily males

135 Kuroda, 1989, p. 185. Note that the average gestation period for human females is 266 days. 136 Teleki, op. cit., p. 316. 137 Ghiglieri, 1989, pp. 372 – 373. 138 For dietary profiles of common chimpanzees see Goodall, 1968, pp. 182 & 189 - 191. See also Boesch, 1994, p. 653; Kawabe, 1966, p. 395. For a dietary profile of pygmy chimpanzees, see deWaal, 1997, pp. 65 – 66. 65 perpetrate cannibalism and infanticide, but cases involving females are known.139 Access to highly desired foods (such as bananas, meat and insects) and mating privileges are established through politicking, where grooming plays a key role in establishing social order.140 Mutual male grooming occurs more often than with females or female on female grooming in common chimpanzee populations. 141

Figure 9: A juvenile male common chimpanzee (Pan troglodytes spp.) fishing for termites from a mound using a stick as a tool. Note the shorter coarser hair, the higher profile of the face and narrower nose, the even facial coloring, the pronounced brow, and the more robust limbs in comparison with the pygmy chimpanzee or bonobo (Pan troglodytes paniscus or Pan paniscus.) in Figure 8. (From Dunbar and Barrett, 2000, p.204).

139 For information on chimpanzee cannibalism see Suzuki, 1971, p. 44; and Goodall, 1989, p. 2 - 3. For information on infanticide see Goodall, 1989, p. 4. 140 Muroyama and Sugiyama, 1994, p. 169. 141 Ibid., p. 175. 66 Temporary associations are the common societal profile of free-living common chimpanzees. These groups may last only a few hours or for days.142 The primary family unit of mother and juvenile (up to the age of 5 years) is the only permanent association observed with all other relationships being subject to the ebb and flow of what is described as a fission-fusion society, with adolescent and adult individuals moving into and out of association loosely and at any moment.143 Associations vary from solo time to groups larger than 20 in number with most frequent fusions between 2 and 6 individuals.144 The gender composition of these groups varies greatly, ranging from mother-infant and/or older offspring and all-female maternal groups, mixed and multigenerational groups to all-male bachelor groups; each group blending with others according to multiple social and environmental stimuli such as weather conditions, food sources, grooming and relationship building, sexual attraction to females in oestrus, threats from predators or protection from marauding neighbour groups. Standard ethological analyses of common chimpanzee societies suggest that fission-fusion grouping is primarily affected by the desire to gain social benefits along with access to food – particularly for the males who use bachelor-groupings to forge the coalitions desired to achieve high social status while female groups are limited to collective foraging and the constraints of having infants and young in tow.145 Such studies imply that common chimpanzees are selfish or at-best, reciprocally altruistic with each individually ultimately maintaining self interest as paramount. The fracturing and coalescence of groups of various demographies is localized in that common:

“ … chimpanzees show aggressive, xenophobic, behaviour to individuals who are not members of their community and contrasting behaviour towards group members.”146

Grouping within chimpanzee society is considered strategic and intentional where degrees of pre-emptive desire to rank highly drive the social quality of ‘tactical association.’147 Tactical associations occur in free-living and captive chimpanzee populations where small group associations are formed through politicking – some

142 Goodall, 1968, p. 211. 143 See Malenky, Kuroda, Vineberg and Wrangham, 1994, p. 59. See also Mitani, 1994, p. 196 and Goodall, 1968, p. 211. 144 Goodall, op. cit., p. 211. 145 Newton-Fisher, 1999, pp. 705 & 707. See also Trivers, 1971, p. 35. 146 Ibid., p. 706. 147 Ibid., p. 709. 67 individuals actively seeking out contact in a range of party sizes while others are avoided. The smaller the party size the larger the associations between the individuals, where smaller party size associations are more desirable because of the opportunity for more solid bonding to occur. Additionally, common chimpanzees show a degree of intention about who associates with whom, for how long and in what way – some individuals being notably more desirable than others. Generally, males remain within the broader social group in which they were born and adolescent females are coerced by border patrolling parties to join a new community or spontaneously emigrate shortly after they become reproductively mature.

Common chimpanzee social organization is described as ‘Machiavellian’ in that power struggles and opportunism within groups exhibit remarkable parallels with the socio- economic manipulations of the Medieval Italian aristocracy.148 Anecdotal evidence of deception and lying, as well as at least the appearance of mercifulness, trustworthiness, compassion and loving reconciliation amongst chimpanzees in order to establish or maintain status or gain an advantage over conspecifics is now well documented.149 The basic premise is that individual chimpanzees are thoughtful of others in order to benefit themselves and this is expressed through elaborate – if not devious – cooperation.150 Typically, older, bigger and stronger individuals are dominant over younger, smaller and weaker individuals however, alliances and varying levels of innovative cognitive ability (the art of manipulations) in particular - even junior ranking - individuals prevent ‘might is right’ from ringing true in chimpanzee society carte blanche but male (and to a lesser degree female) common chimpanzee politicking is generally affected by the degree of physical boldness coupled with intellectual astuteness to gain social status.151

Common chimpanzee society is therefore rife with political intrigues similar to the vying for status that we see amongst our own species – where interactions tend to be raw and slightly more volcanic. Common chimpanzees exhibit a sophisticated degree

148 deWaal, op. cit., pp. 19 & 212 – 213. See also Jolly, 1999, pp. 206 – 208. 149 Jolly, op. cit., p. 209. 150 Ibid., p. 212. Such an analysis of grooming as politics is consistent with Hamilton’s (1964) Kin Selection Theory that suggests all gestures of kindness or altruism amongst conspecifics are ultimately motivated by a degree of selfish intent to propagate one’s genes, where cooperation with kin increases an individual’s reproductive success and is therefore advantageous even if the relationship occurs between more distant relatives. I will debate the nuances of this discussion at more length in Chapter 5. 151 Ibid., pp. 208 – 210. 68 of intelligence and thoughtfulness, making choices about grouping associations based on a degree of intention and choice once thought unique to humans.152 Their societies are described as gregarious and hierarchical with established and hotly contested pecking orders that are frequently tested and change readily.153 Chimpanzee societies possess an alpha position for both adult males and females however alpha female roles are more influential in captive populations since individuals or groups are not able to move away from each other when tensions are high as is the case in the wild. Typically, females are subordinate to males but are able to defy errant gestures of domination towards them or other members of the colony either by subtle coercion of the aggressor, creating allegiance with other females, or by seeking out the assistance of high-ranking males as a bulwarks against conflict and instability to facilitate peacemaking.154 De Waal (1982) states:

“ The Great Apes, in particular [chimpanzees and bonobos], behave so flexibly that we get the impression that they know exactly how others will react, and what they can achieve as a result. Their communication looks very much like intelligent social manipulation, as if they have learnt to use their signals as instruments to influence others.”

Male positions of domination are earned through a combination of intelligence, strength, endurance and cunning. However, the accumulation of social power by a male chimpanzee is ultimately bestowed upon him by approving females. In chimpanzee society leaders are decided not only based on their own merits but also through the judgment of those who will become their subordinates. This may offer an unadulterated and rudimentary example of grassroots democracy where the authority of alpha male is tenuously dependent upon the approval of the masses – particularly the females of the population and how they perceive they and their offspring are treated. I stress this point here because in chimpanzee society, an excessively brutal, untrustworthy and disliked male leader does not last long. The kinder the leadership offered the more welcome, the more supported and the longer a male is permitted to serve in the alpha role. Outside of the pivotal role of female coalitions, is the tendency for males to coalesce more commonly in single-gendered groups than do females where grooming and coalition

152 Newton-Fisher, op. cit., p. 727. 153 For more on social ‘pecking-orders’ see Schjelderup-Ebbe, T. 1922, Beitrage zur Sozialpsychologie des Haushuhns. Zeitschrift zur Psychologie, 88: 225 – 52. 154 deWaal, op. cit., pp 37 – 45. 69 amongst the males occur of a population – these relationships are not random but rather are based on preferential relationships that have been established. In common chimpanzee society, the status of relationships from gaining an alpha role in the population through to coalition building on the most rudimentary level are subject to rapid and constant change.155

Figure 10: A juvenile male pygmy chimpanzee or bonobo (Pan paniscus or Pan troglodytes paniscus). Note the characteristic longer, finer hair, the flatter face and broader nose, the red lips, lowbrow and more slender limbs when compared with the common chimpanzee (Pan troglodytes spp.) in Figure 9. (From de Waal and Lanting, 1997, p. 97).

155 Mitani, 1994, in Wrangham et al (eds.), p. 196. 70 2.4: A Pan Full of Pan paniscus

 “ …in everything they do they resemble us.”

Frans de Waal and Frans Lanting, 1997, p. 1

Ernst Schwarz identified the bonobo or pygmy chimpanzee (Pan troglodytes paniscus) as a separate species from the common chimpanzee in 1929.156 The primary physical difference between bonobos and common chimpanzees is that of gracile to robust overall morphology respectively (for a visual comparison between the two species see Figure 9 and Figure 10). At first glance, the distinguishing features arise through elegance of the former, relative to the stockier body of the latter.157

The bonobo tends to have longer legs and shorter arms, along with a smaller head, thicker neck and narrower shoulders than the common chimpanzee.158 When walking bipedally, the bonobo’s spine is more erect and tends to resemble the posture of the Australopithecines.159 Bonobos have denser, longer and finer hair, particularly about the head and face that falls evenly into a part down the middle of the skull. They generally have a broader, more gorilla-like nose and dark brown to black face with lighter (reddish) lips, a flatter face with less pronounced brows and a higher forehead. On closer examination, the face of the bonobo seems remarkably human-like (see Figure 11).

Generally, female bonobos have a body mass that is 85% of the males. The average weight of bonobos is: 43 kg (95lbs) for the males and 37kg (82 lbs) for the females that is slightly heavier than the smallest subspecies of common chimpanzee and slightly

156 deWaal, 1989, p. 154. The noun Pan is also ascribed to the Greek god of flocks, shepherds and woods with the body of a goat and the torso of a man. Troglodytes is a taxonomic name that means ‘cave dweller’ and paniscus means diminutive or extremely small (See deWaal and Lanting, op. cit., p. 6). 157 Ibid., p. 24. 158 Ibid. 159 Ibid., p. 25. 71 lighter than the other two subspecies.160 The degree of sexual dimorphism in bonobos is more restricted than is seen in common chimpanzees and tends to reflect that seen in humans. The males are heavier on account of their greater muscle mass. Despite this, and unlike common chimpanzees, bonobo society is matriarchal. Whether subject to neoteny and copious evolutionary change as was the case throughout human evolution or subject to evolutionary slowing making them the closest extant example of the common primate ancestor (both hypotheses are currently being debated), bonobos are distinguished by a long term relationships between mother and son, émigré daughters, use of sex as a primary tool for social bonding, and a tendency towards female centric social politicking particularly in regards to food sharing – although an alpha male position is sustained and carries significant social influence even if to a much reduced degree than is true of male common chimpanzees. Tool making and use is rudimentary in bonobos but the complexity of social interactions more closely resembles that of humans than common chimpanzees especially in regards to affection and reconciliation.

Figure 11: A close-up portrait of Kanzi, a bonobo that is capable of communicating with humans in American Sign Language and using visual icons (from de Waal and Lanting, 1997, p. 45.)

160 Ibid. 72 What is at the root of the differences between such closely related species? Takayoshi Kano (director of the bonobo project in Wamba, Zaire) and Suehisa Kuroda of Kyoto University suggest that such distinguishing socio-biological traits are caused primarily by the extended altricial phase of infant bonobos who begin venturing from their mothers more than 6 months later than infant common chimpanzees.161 Although developing more slowly than common chimpanzees, upon reaching adulthood, bonobos tend to look larger more slender than common chimpanzees. It is difficult to distinguish the two taxa based on overall size. The term ‘pygmy’ is therefore a misnomer that justifies the more commonly accepted use of ‘bonobo’ as the preferred name.

The bonobo and the common chimpanzee are by far more similar than not, but the distinguishing features of bonobos are worth noting as they highlight two cladistical truths: firstly, all chimpanzees in the ways they are similar to each other are notably similar to humans; and secondly, of the two distinct species of Pan troglodytes, the bonobo is morphologically, ecologically and socio-biologically as well as genetically more similar to humans than are all three common chimpanzee subspecies. Indeed, we might infer that bonobos and humans are more similar in some ways than they are to common chimpanzees – particularly if one gives consideration to the typical features of pygmy chimps today as compared with and the proto-hominids that emerged from Dryopithecus.162

161 Ibid., pp. 59 – 60. 162 deWaal and Lanting, op. cit., p. 25. 73 2.5: Culture This!

 “We are wont to say that culture is what makes us human … What if [apes] have their own culture rather than a superficially imposed human version?”

Frans de Waal, 2001, pp. 5 - 6

The defined subspecies of common chimpanzee and bonobos possess behavioural qualities that distinguish them from each other. These qualities are now commonly viewed as expressions of cultural differences.163 The cultural qualities of common chimpanzee and bonobo societies were given validity on a par with human culture by Japanese primatologist Kinji Imanishi in 1952 when he redefined ‘culture’ as the more inclusive social transmission of adjustable behaviour.164 Therefore, a species’ culture denotes its ability to “ engage in different processes of social learning.”165 Primatologists have now pressed beyond the traditional anthropological definitions that viewed ‘culture’ as a purely human phenomenon and now subscribe to:

“… a more inclusive definition in which the significance of cultural transmission is recognized as one of … two important processes that can generate evolutionary change: inter-generation transmission of behaviour may occur either genetically or through social learning, with processes of variation and selection shaping biological evolution in the first case and cultural evolution in the second.”166

Hence, chimpanzee and bonobo societies are thought to possess ‘culture’ because the behavioural qualities of separate populations are generally transmitted through intergenerational observations that are then incorporated as unique social qualities in

163 Whiten et al, 1999, p. 682 – 683. See also Tomasello, 1994, p. 301. The inclusion of chimpanzee social qualities in the discourse on culture has been brought about by the work of Goodall (1986), Nishida (1987), McGrew (1992) and Boesch (1993) who have been inspired by the broadening of definitions to include non-human animal species by Bonner (1980) and Boyd and Richerson (1985). 164 Wrangham et al, op. cit., p. 1. 165 Tomasello, op. cit., p. 301. 166 Whiten et al, 1999, p. 682. 74 any particular population.167 However, cultural qualities are not only passed on from one generation to the next. Innovation occurs as the needs within a population arise – a process Tomasello (1994) refers to as ‘conventionalisation’ - where a communication signal is invented between two individuals and used to indicate an alteration in their interactions towards with each other towards a desired outcome.168

Tomasello (1994) identified three distinct qualities of culture in human societies that also persist in chimpanzee/bonobo societies. They are:

1. Universality: where particular traditions are practiced across multiple generations to establish societal ‘norms.’ 2. Uniformity: where similar or identical cultural qualities are adopted within and across the generations to the extent that innovation is minimized to permit consistency. 3. History: when innovation does occur, any modification of culture is passed onto the next generation upon the foundation of previous and consistent cultural qualities that had at-first been established as a cultural norm.169

… where the primary difference between human and chimpanzee/bonobo culture is thought to be a function of differing levels of cognitive sophistication. But Tomasello holds firm in his proposition that “ … human and chimpanzee behavioural traditions are only analogous. The social-cognitive adaptations on which human culture and cultural learning depend came only after the differentiation of the two species.”170 I contest the distinction made here, arguing instead that the similarities in behavioural tradition between humans, chimpanzees and bonobos is not only an analogy, but a reflection of shared ancestry of the two taxa. The difference in ‘fidelity of transmission’ of cultural traditions is truly more formalized in human cultures and looser in chimpanzee cultures but both taxa exhibit tenacity towards empowering the next generation with information built on previously established innovations.171 The primary similarity between human, chimpanzee and bonobo cultures is that both taxa rely upon social learning through the

167 Ibid. 168 Tomasello, op. cit., pp. 307 – 309. 169 Ibid., pp. 311 – 312. 170 Ibid., p. 315. 171 Ibid., pp. 313 – 314. 75 three aforementioned qualities – where the former species employ imitative learning along with instruction on a society wide basis while the latter employs imitative learning on the level of the individual based on emulation and ‘conventionalization’ where needed.172 I argue that both taxa draw on an advanced cognition to improve the survivability not only of the self, not only of kin, but also by encouraging the transmission of culture across an entire society regardless of relatedness. From this perspective, one might infer that an awareness of cause and effect is not only a human quality, but possibly exists in chimpanzee and bonobo culture also. In regard to the question as to whether culture exists in chimpanzee and bonobo societies, we are examining the same qualities but from the perspective of varying degrees of expression.

While cultural qualities tend to differ more significantly between bonobos and the three named subspecies of common chimpanzee, the isolation of each population of common chimpanzee has rendered cultural qualities distinct within this species. There are 65 cultural qualities in common chimpanzee societies that are ascribed to the various free- living populations studied over that last 40 years. Of these, 39 qualities have become the custom of some populations and are not at all present in others. Reviewing this list of cultural qualities, we see many supposedly human attributes that are exhibited by chimpanzees, even if at a less sophisticated level. Take for example tool making and use as in the ability to find and use objects as containers, fishing for food with a probe, displaying a particular dance at the commencement of rain, or the community wide use of communication gestures such as the ‘grooming handclasp’ (see Appendix 4).173

Jane Goodall’s 1960 discovery of tool making and use by chimpanzees at the Gombe Stream Research Centre shattered a traditionally held view that Homo habilis was the first hominid ‘handy man.’ This discovery prompted the now famous proclamation by Goodall’s then supervisor, Dr. L. S. B. Leakey that “ … it was necessary to redefine man in a more complex manner …or accept chimpanzees as man.”174 In that same year, Goodall also documented the first case of hunting and meat eating by non-human primates known to Western science and thereby proved conclusively that chimpanzees

172 Ibid. 173 Whiten et al, op. cit., p. 683. 174 Goodall, 1988, pp. 36 – 37. 76 were in fact omnivorous.175 Goodall and her colleagues later showed that chimpanzees were capable of hunting animal prey solitarily or in cooperation with other group members and did so routinely.176 Cooperative attempts to capture and kill animals emerge when the desired prey is larger than a chimpanzee can efficiently manage on their own although there seems to be some debate about whether that cooperation is altruistic or reciprocal.

It is true that gestures of cooperation could have selfish intent, being tit-for-tat motivated more so than an intention towards supporting the collective good of the population. But such a presumption is purely conjectural – as conjectural as the evidence to support selflessness. Ultimately, we may never know the deepest motivations of chimpanzee helping behaviour. But we can reasonably infer that selflessness is as likely a motivator as selfishness in some individuals that have altricial tendencies. For example, once dispatched, a prey item becomes a central component of bonding associations between the successful captor and fellow chimpanzees. This exchange includes those actively involved in the hunt and those who seek a share of the spoils after the kill even if they did not directly participate. Sharing of meat and other desirable food items tends to be most intentional between males and infants within the population.177 Silk (1979) suggests that male meat sharing with infants is governed by some factor other than paternity since males are probably not able to tell which infants they have sired.178 But Silk stops short of proposing that meat sharing is indeed a selflessly altruistic act preferring to speculate on motivations of reciprocity, a lower cost to food sharing than was initially thought to be the case, comparing energy budgets that weigh the cost against the benefit of sharing foods especially for foods such as those that are highly prized like meat, and/or serving as a transaction where one commodity is exchanged for another.179

I suggest that it is equally possible that a male chimpanzee that has hunted successfully is expressing a degree of acculturated empathy. Perhaps the males within a population have an awareness that nutrient rich foods are desirable precisely because they are

175 Ibid., pp. 33 – 34. 176 Miller, 1995, p. 110. See also Boesch, 1994, p. 653; 177 Silk, 1979, pp. 123 & 139. 178 Ibid., p. 139. 179 Ibid.,p. 140. 77 nutrient rich and will when consumed regularly, improve the collective survivability of the population. Such foods will have the longest effect on population health if infants are able to receive a regular share. Agreeing with Silk one might infer that it is possible that such sharing is reciprocally motivated where adult males are tending to the infant as a way of politicizing the youngster to support their status from the time the recipient is very young. And around the debate goes – highlighting how little we know and indeed can truly know about the motivations of another being. Chimpanzee’s capacity for complex socio-cultural interactions is considerably more advanced than was first recognized by science – even if many of the details of these complexities currently remain obscured. The question then remains: How can we shed light on chimpanzee ethology in order to understand such complexities better?

78

CHAPTER 3: A WHOLE SUM OF THE PARTS

 “The classification schemes of modern science, their Linnaean order and precision, purport to arise from the ego alone, to be fully rational-empirical. They thus represent a logical order that is imposed on nature and the human psyche. As a result, they violate something that magic, for all its technological limitations, had the instinctive wisdom to preserve.”

Morris Berman, 1981, p. 132.

79 3.1: Seriously Compromised Astigmatism180

 Among animals, man is uniquely dominated by culture, by influences learned and passed down. Some would say that culture is so important that genes, whether selfish or not, are virtually irrelevant to the understanding of human nature. Others would disagree. It all depends where you stand in the debate over ʻnature versus nurtureʼ as determinants of human attributes … If genes really turn out to be totally irrelevant to the determination of modern human behaviour, if we really are unique in this respect, it is, at the very least, still interesting to inquire about the rule to which we have so recently become the exception. And if our species is not so exceptional as we might like to think, it is even more important that we should study the rule.

Richard Dawkins, 1989, p. 3.

Gleaning a fuller understanding of the motivations of an animal’s behaviour is no easy task. Humans are intensely subjective creatures, our ability to perceive reality is additionally blinded by an observed organism’s ability to conceal its intentions or express them in ways that remain mysterious to us, and human politics tends to generate a bias in the observer that can encourage a particular conclusion that fits with observer’s socio-cultural values even if such conclusions turn out to be an inaccurate representation of the being that is observed. Take for example the captive female Western low-land gorilla, Binti Jua, who was documented rescuing, cradling and gently patting a 3 year-old boy who fell into the moat of the gorilla enclosure at the Brookfield Zoo in Chicago on August 16th, 1996.181 This event captured international media attention that resulted in a lively debate about what motivated such an act of kindness. Through the foray, Binti Jua’s actions were fobbed off as the product of training and displaced maternalism. What remains significant about the incident is that gorillas and humans are clearly different species. Binti Jua stood to gain or lose nothing in the boy’s drowning, but rescued him anyway. Was this 8 year-old gorilla actually expressing a degree of caring that transcends her own kind?

Richard Dawkins does not seem to have much faith in the biological capacity for an organism to care. His landmark book The Selfish Gene (1989) examines the essential

180 Note that this subtitle is borrowed from Hallen, 1989, p. 5. 181 Post et al., 2002, p. 297. 80 nature of life by suggesting that organism’s genes are driven by their own self-interests to survive and replicate.182 Unsurprisingly, his message flew from the shelves as an international best seller, satiating the appetite of a burgeoning capitalist world’s desire to biologically justify rampant individualism. Dawkins spoon-fed lay scientist and professionals alike with accolades for ‘Darwinism’ as genetic Reductionism and ‘sharing’ as (at best) nothing more than the pursuit for personal gains.183 For Dawkins, all information passed from one generation to the next along a genetic highway through a mechanism called gene selectionism. For Dawkins, such benevolence is fundamentally motivated by an individual’s desire to selfishly benefit themselves. Dawkins begins his discourse on selfishness by euphemistically cautioning the reader about an implicit paradox in the rules that govern a Darwinian world-view when he states:

“ Be warned that if you wish, as I do, to build a society in which individuals cooperate generously and unselfishly towards a common good, you can expect little help from biological nature. Let us try to teach generosity and altruism, because we are born selfish.”184

… which suggests that life is governed by an obsession with the self on its most basic level whereby:

“Genes are competing directly with their alleles for survival, since their alleles in the gene pool are rivals for their slot on the chromosomes of future generations. Any gene that behaves in such a way as to increase its own survival chances in the gene pool at the expense of its alleles will, by definition, tautologously, tend to survive. The gene is the basic unit of selfishness.”185

Such statements leave little room for the possibility that life is capable of furnishing a genetic predisposition for caring. Rather, we are told that life is nothing more or less than a ruthlessly competing scramble towards self-proliferation. And modern Western

182 Dawkins, 1989, p. 3. 183 Ibid., pp. 1 – 2. 184 Ibid., p. 36. 185 Ibid. Genes are distinct sequences of nucleotides that form part of the chromosome, and the order of their appearance determines the construction of polypeptide and nucleic acid molecules within cells; alleles are one of two or more genes that arise by mutation in the same location as the genes within a chromosome; and chromosomes are thread-like structures of polypeptides and nucleic acids found in the nucleus of most living cells, and contain genes which transfer genetic information from one generation of cell and organism to the next (See Pearsall (ed.) 2001, pp. 45, 327 & 763). 81 science (of which Dawkins has become one of the leading voices) champions such presumptions with Universalist overtones. Indeed, Dawkins takes Darwinism to its logical conclusion by applying the theory of Natural Selection to extraterrestrial life throughout the cosmos which guided the emergence of a new field of science called ‘evolutionary exobiology.’186 For Dawkins, Darwin’s competitive and selfishly oriented ‘survival of the fittest’ is an irrefutable fact that applies to all existence.

Back on Earth, the ‘chimpanzeeness’ of humans and the ‘humanness’ of chimpanzees delineates Us from Them while also noting our inherent similarities. Dawkins suggests that such delineations are arbitrary human constructs that support the gradualism of Darwinian evolutionary theory.187 In actuality, according to Dawkins, intermediary hominids such as the Australopithecines, Homo habilis and Homo erectus were not distinct species that functioned in isolation from each other. Rather, they were members of an intricately interwoven clade where each group represented a distinct form along a continuum with considerable overlap in time, distribution and ecosystems, all of which spanned (in geological terms) a mere 5 – 7 million years. 188 When we step further into our species past, we see a continuum of forms that Dawkins refers to as ‘ring species’ where chimpanzees and humans merge in the form of a common primate ancestor. Dawkins defines ‘ring species’ as distinct organisms that likely cannot interbreed but are linked by intermediaries who are capable of interbreeding with the populations on either side of them, geographically or evolutionarily speaking. 189

The defining feature of the separation between humans and Nature is that our intermediaries happen to be extinct, so we cannot interbreed with the ring species in our clade-particularly the chimpanzee. But, were an Australopithecine alive today, Dawkins suggests that they might well be able to breed with both chimpanzees and humans producing a hybrid in the same way a horse and donkey produce a mule.190 Such a hybrid would revolutionize our definitions of what it means to be human and would potentially shatter the coveted human/Nature divide. But Dawkins also suggests that the existence of such continuums is managed and manipulated by competitive

186 Dawkins, 1998, p. 15. 187 Ibid., pp. 23 – 30. 188 Dawkins, 1993, pp. 82 – 85. 189 Ibid., p. 84. 190 Ibid., pp. 82 & 86. As far as I am aware, no such organism has been successfully produced - at least sexually. 82 pressure between ring species for survival (indeed, he argues, competition is precisely what drove our intermediaries into extinction in the first place). Assuming such a position adheres to the sensibilities of natural selection where competitiveness is the rule of the day. I take an alternative view and suggest that it is equally likely that ring species and intermediaries such as ancestral Homo sapiens, early Pan troglodytes spp. and Australopithecus afarensis, might well have sought out and embraced the expansion of their clade despite competitive pressures by exhibiting a natural curiosity about those that were similar yet distinct from themselves – a curiosity that may have instigated expressions of interspecies caring and attempted interbreeding that may have contributed to the species of Great Ape that exist today. It is not unusual for a human being to express at least some curiosity towards chimpanzees and bonobos. Likewise, chimpanzees and the other Great Apes are commonly observed expressing curiosity towards humans. This curiosity adds a component of care to the competitiveness these species may have shown each other in the past or show each other today.

I believe that the inherent selfish competitiveness of Dawkinian neo-Darwinism is all too quickly taken as biological bible, thereby making a strong case for our supposed deterministic nature. Darwin’s evolutionary theory by Natural Selection became science’s answer to Aristotle’s permanent forms, and Descartes duality, as well as a rebuff to the theistic speciesism that had emerged through the Dark and Middle Ages.191 Darwin suggested that humanity was not in fact some fixed or divine creation but was in fact one of the many species of biological organism that emerged through the ‘struggle for existence.’ Darwin stated categorically that:

“ … variations, however slight and from what ever cause proceeding, if they be in any degree profitable to the individuals of a species, in their infinitely complex relations to other organic beings and to their physical conditions of life, will tend to the preservation of such individuals, and will generally be inherited by the offspring. The offspring will thus have a better chance of surviving, for, of the many individuals of many species which are periodically born, but a small number can survive. I have called this principle, by which each slight variation, if useful, is preserved, by the term Natural Selection … or Survival of the Fittest … [which is ] a power incessantly ready for action … ”192

191 Darwin, 1874 (reprinted 1998), p. xix. 192 Darwin, 1900, pp. 76 – 77. 83 In his less known but equally significant book published in 1874 - The Descent of Man - Darwin studied human evolution, applying the rules of Natural Selection specifically to the hominoid clade. This work has subsequently become a corner stone for justifying human supremacy over all other life by employing classic Darwinian theory as the rationale behind humanity’s domination of Nature. For Darwin, our internalised sense of superiority when wedded with a vision of life as inherently competitive and selfishness paralleled the first descent of proto-humans from the safety of the trees:

“As soon as some ancient member in a great series of the Primates came to be less arboreal, owing to a change in manner of procuring subsistence, or to some change in the surrounding conditions, its habitual manner of progression would have modified: and thus it would have been rendered more strictly quadrupedal or bipedal … [since] Man alone has become a biped; and we can, I think, partly see how he has come to assume his erect attitude … [and] could not have attained his present dominant position in the world without the use of his hands.”193

… where human evolution from a quadrupedal ‘arbor-ite’ to a bipedal ‘savanna-ite’ represented a critical separation of human from Nature. By Darwin’s logic, the masculinized hubris so prevalent throughout Western modernity was kick-started when our primate forebears began to walk upright. Early humans emerged from the forests of Africa as vulnerable creatures that, despite our liabilities and limitations, also possessed the cognitive ability to manipulate the environment to better suit their survivability. And such incursions were subject to the individual’s ability to choose a course of action according to a desired out come – in other words, our forebears also developed cognitive abstraction which gave rise to socio-culturally expressed ethics and morality. Our primate ancestors learned the importance of caring. Interestingly, and in contrast to the Dawkinian interpretations of evolutionary theory, Darwin noted that the human capacity to express ethics and morality, coupled with our “ … innate or acquired feeling of sympathy … [our] capacity for reasoning out the remote consequences of [our] acts … [and] a fear of the Gods, or Spirits believed in by each man … ” renders humanity able to feel remorse, regret and repentance along with deeply afflicted love – feelings that powerfully guide our choices in day to day life.194 While Dawkins rejected the naturalness of caring, for Darwin, the capacity to care was an innate human quality.

193 Ibid., p. 52. 194 Darwin, op. cite., pp, 117 – 118. 84

I am not anti - Darwinian evolutionary theory per se nor do I view Dawkins Selfish Gene theory as fundamentally wrong. What troubles me is that … “Among the adherents of Darwin’s evolutionary theory [through such proponents as Richard Dawkins] Reductionism rules the day.”195 Biological Reductionism (or the study of life through an examination of its component parts) as purported by a Dawkinian universalist neo-Darwinism, obfuscates the possibility of Nature as a complex interacting system that is capable of (indeed is dependent upon) synergy within the whole living being that is imbedded in the whole living world in order for life to flourish. To my reckoning, Reductionist approaches to an examination of life are fundamentally selfish, and I find this not wrong per se, but an extremely limited view. Presuming selfishness as natural to the exclusion of selflessness and altruism (as at best learned) fits a little too conveniently within the logic of hierarchy that I discussed in the Introduction to this dissertation. Such convenience raises my suspicions as a premise that is more political than biological. Dawkins’ gradualist, neo-Darwinian universalism suffers from a seriously compromised astigmatism that gives credence to ‘struggle’ and ‘competition’ while ignoring the possibility that caring and an acknowledgement of the individual in the context of the whole system of life also plays a significant role in the rise of new species.196 Sadly, such blurred vision has warped humanity’s view of Nature for eons and was formalised (particularly in the West) when Aristotle peeled away from the spiritual mysticism of the Greek Academy to establish a rationalist approach to Natural Philosophy.

195 Kranich, 1999, p. 29. 196 More on how this might be possible in Chapter 5. 85 3.2: Politics of the Mind

 The good, we are told, is happiness, which is an activity of the soul … A government is good when it aims to the good of the whole community, bad when it cares only for itself.

Bertrand Russell, 2002, interpreting Aristotle, pp. 185 & 200.

Aristotle (384 – 322 BC) remains one of Western science’s great icons and is credited with a magnum opus that laid the foundations for Dawkins selfish gene theory. Student of Plato, and tutor of Alexander the Great, Aristotle is accredited as “ … one of the most influential thinkers in the history of Western thought. ”197 Under the cloak of Natural Philosophy, Aristotle pioneered a politics of the mind that postulated a rationalist biology where human-culture was separated from animal-Nature. He was arguably one of the first Reductionists, shattering Plato’s mystic anima mundi or divine soul of the world where God was immersed in nature; replacing it instead with an external God “ … who spins the world round from the outside.”198 Aristotle’s universe was comprised of a fixed earthly phenomenon surrounded by nine spheres containing fifty-four smaller spheres that were used to explain the motion of the seven planets, and encapsulated each other like the layers of an onion.199 The entire system was contained within the sphere of the externalised God that Aristotle referred to as the Prime or Unmoved Mover. Aristotle’s universe was soulless, being governed by an aloof God and managed by humanity. And it was Aristotle’s humanity that possessed souls, was capable of happiness, and was thereby good while animals (who also possessed souls but cared none for happiness) lived from a place of habituated instinct that implied that they were bad.200 From such polarised beginnings, the die were cast and Western thought adopted a dualism of ‘good versus bad’ that Descartes would formalise in his Meditations on First Philosophy in 1641.

197 Pearsall (ed.) 2001, p. 89. 198 Koestler, 1959, p. 61. 199 Ibid. pp. 61 & 67. 200 Tarnas, 1991, p. 67. 86

Aristotle’s tutor believed that “Beasts who go on all fours came from men who were wholly nonconversant with [natural] Philosophy and had never gazed on the heavens.” 201 And it was Plato that inferred a degree of nebulous - albeit divine - unravelling of life that alluded to a type of spiritual evolution. But Aristotle brought an impartial pragmatism to Plato’s natural philosophy and thereby countered a vision of the mystic human soul with the conundrum of the rational mind.202 While Aristotle embraced a Platonic thesis of the soul, he rejected assertions from his tutor that implied inner and flexible mysticism. For Aristotle, the universe harboured a fixed reality devoid of evolution or progress where the spheres about the earthly phenomenon revolved but remained in the same order of concentricity and the qualities of the soul were likewise fixed and reflected in the form of the body.203 Aristotle’s universe was designed to prevent the:

“… Barbarian incursions of Change; a nest of spheres-within-spheres, eternally revolving in themselves, yet remaining in the same place; thus hiding its one shameful secret, that centre of infection, safely isolated in the sub-lunary quarantine [called earth].”204

Aristotle’s world-view introduced abstraction to the perception of the self, and examined reality – including the whole animal - logically through the sum of its parts. Such was the birth of Reductionist Science.

Woven throughout Aristotle’s works was an intention of justifying the distinction between the human self and the animal self where the latter resembled the qualities of the former, but were much less sophisticated.205 Aristotle translated this vision for the Universe from the macro to the micro scale, using the same Reductionist allegory in describing the physical form of animals. In his History of Animals- Book I, Aristotle stated that animal bodies were composed of parts where:

201 Ibid., pp. 57 – 58 quoting Plato’s Timaeus, 90, 91. 202 Ibid., p. 68. 203 Barnes (ed.), 1984, p. 1246 - 1247. It is useful to note that while Aristotle introduced the Prime Immobile to Western thought, Darwin’s evolution by Natural Selection contradicted this thesis by suggesting that evolution and change did in fact occur in living beings. Dawkins grounded Darwin’s laws of Natural Selection in selfishness on the level of the gene. 204 Koestler, op. cit., p. 65. 205 Ibid., p. 788. 87 “ … those parts … while entire in themselves, have within themselves other parts: as for instance, the head, the foot, the hand, the arm as a whole, the chest; for these are all in themselves entire parts, and there are other parts belonging to them.”206

And …

“Animals differ from one another in their modes of subsistence, in their actions, in their habits, and in their parts.”207

The animal body and soul were fixed and instinctive but more resistant to alteration than was true of the human body and soul. Individuals that exist on the earthly plane of such a universe assumed their fixed - ‘natural place’ - in the broad scheme of things.208 The concentricity of the Aristotlean universe was reflected in the arrangement of body parts within body parts within individual animals. Aristotle went further to suggest that the primary distinction between humans and other animals was our ability to deliberate. In other words, humans alone possessed a conscious memory that was capable of intentionally recalling the past where animals had no such quality.209

In History of Animals - Book II, Aristotle compared humanity specifically with other primates, implying that our bodies look and function similarly to monkeys and apes.210 However, later in Book II, Aristotle went to considerable length to qualify the differences between Us and Them; specifying that the body parts of all animals assume distinct male qualities (as in more powerful, vigorous, generous, proud, ambitious yet also gentle, just and affectionate- like free living animals such as the lion) and female qualities (as in more mischievous, tame, weak, small, feeble, tender and gentle - like domesticated animals such as the sheep). For Aristotle, the latter qualities were generally more beast-like than were found in the human form.211 The Aristotlean human possessed a soul separate from a body - both of which interacted sympathetically. Subtle shifts in the soul also caused subtle shifts in the body but only

206 Ibid. 207 Ibid., p. 775. 208 Ibid., p. 64. 209 Ibid., p. 778. 210 Ibid., pp. 798 - 799. 211 Ibid., p. 1243 - 1244. 88 within the confines of our place in the universal hierarchy.212 The animal soul was governed by more fixed norms that exhibited the predictable qualities of organic biology. Collectively, subtle shifts in organic biology occurred within a fixed but non- static earth, permitting growth and development within the individual being whose sole purpose was to strive towards perfection from an assumed initial state of imperfection.213 These subtle shifts were driven by teleology in the pursuit of a fully mature being that expressed the self through a transition from the potentiality of imperfection to the actuality of perfection – the supreme form of which was that of the Unmoved Mover.214 In this sense, Aristotle’s implied evolution echoed the overtones of his teacher – life was striving towards God-likeness and it was humans who were the nearest manifestation of the divine on Earth.

While Aristotle acknowledged similarities between humans and other animals, it was only humanity who possessed the powers of reason (an active intellect called nous). This unique quality rendered us capable of noting our experiences and the experiences of the non-human world which we then cognitively reflected upon, and drew conclusions based on the observed through logic and empiricism that then enabled us to develop knowledge of the world.215 For Aristotle, human rationality reflected elements of the Unmoved Mover that animals lacked. And we were capable of doing so through the sense perceptions of our bodies connected with the intellect of our rational minds that were reflective of a soul in communion with God that animals lacked. Aristotle’s God was the ultimate rationality of the mind and the substance of the earthly realm while Plato’s God was the spiritual intuitiveness of the transcendent and invisible heavens.216 The Aristotlean conceptualisation of earthly existence thereby divorced rational humanity from the intuitive anima. And it was Koestler (1959) who saw such a division as “completely mad.”217

Modern Western thought, from Descartes to Dawkins has therefore been built upon two crucial pillars: a trans-Platonic Aristotleanism and a Darwinian rational evolutionary progression that gained revival through Richard Dawkins. Inherent in these two theses

212 Ibid., p. 1242. See also Koestler, op. cit., p. 64. 213 Tarnas, op. cit., p. 57. 214 Ibid., pp. 58 & 62 - 63. 215 Ibid., p. 59 – 60. 216 Ibid., p. 68. 217 Ibid., p. 68. 89 is an underlying message that selfishness is the natural order of the day; that one ought simply recognize, accept and only consider contradicting (ever so slightly) our genetically encoded love-affair with the self simply because as cognitive, feeling beings it might be a ‘nice’ idea even if unnatural. To perceive humanity as benevolent and immersed in Nature is all too conveniently viewed through rose-coloured glasses.218 This vision of humanity is seen by Sober and Wilson (1998) as ‘psychological egoism’ that is a paradigm where “… every individual’s ultimate goal is to benefit him- or herself.”219 Some of humanities brightest minds have consciously or unconsciously embraced the ‘madness’ of selfishness or worse yet, whole societies have normalised infrastructures and acculturation processes which support the premise that we over here are separate, special and different from them over there, that seeing ourselves in this light is simply the way things are, and that any serious change in such a world view is at best the business of charity to be partaken in order to help one ‘feel better.’ Personally, I find psychological egoism (aka. abject selfishness) psychologically disempowering and at the root of the ecological crisis that our species has perpetrated throughout the world. And it is this very paradigm that drives the mechanism of Reduction in Western science, as we know it today.

The presumptiveness of Western science’s Reductionism would have us believe that all life is naturally selfish. I agree with such a statement on face value – we are indeed driven by the individualist desire to live and prosper and this is most likely a biological urge. But what such a thesis fails to notice is that Reduction has artificially narrowed our vision of reality by only shedding light on the human capacity to flourish through wanton self-gratification and through an examination of the parts that make up the whole. Hiding in the shadows of this discourse are three crucially important considerations that a Reductionist approach to understanding life obscures. I believe that in addition to selfishness and an ability to perceive reality through the sum of its parts, the human condition possesses:

1. A natural capacity towards selflessness. In other words, we are as equally capable of caring as we are of competing.

218 Sober and Wilson, 1998, p. 2. 219 Ibid. 90 Where …

2. Reductionism is handicapped by an a priori view of life that examines a mere fraction of a much broader and diverse reality.

And I am of the opinion that…

3. Holism is not the antithesis of Reductionism but rather offers a synergistic worldview within which Reductionist Science is imbedded and claims a natural place. Studying Nature holistically therefore widens the lens of our ability to perceive its true essence by employing the benefits of a focused Reductionist methodology while also viewing life in context, giving validity to the subjective along with the objective. Holism offers the quality of caring to scientific discovery.

Through these three postulates, the dualized tension between a Reductionist and a holistic study of Nature dispels and validity is given to both methodologies where the former is immersed in the latter. Consequently, gestures of kindness, empathy and care for the subject matter and wider Nature are included rather than marginalised in such a science.

Given that to date, the modern Reductionist scientific method has been so limited, it is no wonder chimpanzees and bonobos - as the primary intermediaries between ‘us humans and them animals’ - have bore the brunt of our separation from Nature. Pan troglodytes spp. has come to represent everything our species would like to think we are not. In our minds, they are the beginning of animal – the brutish, the wild, the non- reasoning, the non-planning, the non-talking, the non-abstract, the non-conceptualising, the non-self aware, the soulless self.220 And it is for this reason that they capture our curiosity and our bemusement while we concurrently vilify them. Further, a holistic primatology offers us an opportunity to ‘do’ science subjectively if only we could give ourselves permission to steep in our surroundings. Note that science is generally defined as “ … the intellectual and practical activity encompassing the structure and

220 Note that I have borrowed and inflected this series of adjectives from a list of unique qualities of humanity that have now been proved redundant by primatology, as summarised by Goodall, 1993, p. 14. 91 behaviour of the physical and natural world through observation and experiment.”221 Such a science is subjective. Our nearest relatives have the capacity to understand the qualities of Nature because they are immersed in their surroundings. Such subjectivity in observing free-living (or even captive) primates permits a vicarious study of Nature through the experiences of the observed.

I aim for such a science to run parallel with (not in opposition against) the compartmentalization that has been the habit of the Western rational mind for the last two millennia. And I believe that reclaiming such a science hinges on how well we listen to the lessons that are shared with us by our nearest living relatives. A study of chimpanzee and bonobo socio-biology coupled with a philosophical discussion of where humanity ends and animality begins raises the following questions:

o Is a Science of Caring possible and if so what does that science look like? o What needs to change about the way we see ourselves for the ‘out- there-ness’ of Nature to be welcomed back within? o Where do we begin reunify ourselves with the rest of the animal kingdom and Nature writ-large?

The kind of science I am suggesting here is a holistic science, a science that weds the mind with the body. I call such a science a Primate Science, as it is a primal union between the rational self with the intuitive self.

221 Pearsall, (ed.), op. cite., p. 1664. 92

CHAPTER 4: PRIMATE SCIENCE AS PRIMAL SCIENCE

 “To know Nature, one ought to be nature itself.”

Jeremy Naydler, 1996, quoting Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, p. 124.

 The evolution of group processes cannot be reduced simply to a study of the nature of separate members. Reductionism is not enough. And this seems to be true of the higher animals as it is obviously true with regard to [humanity].

John H. Cook, in J. F. Eisenberg et al (eds.), 1971, p. 240

93 4.1: Science of the Esoteric

 “All derivations must occur out of inner principle.”

Ernst-Michael Kranich, 1999, quoting Rudolph Steiner, p. 82.

Austrian philosopher Rudolf Steiner (1861 – 1925) re-ignited a holistic and intuitive science of the senses by aiming to integrate the practical with the psychological and the spiritual with the esoteric. His Esoteric Science became a considerable antidote to Aristotlean and Darwinian rationalism by attempting to reunite science and mysticism.222 Giving central recognition to subjective and sensory awareness, Steiner sought the religious elements of natural science, employing the tools of clairvoyance as his primary instrument of scientific investigation.223 Reading between the lines, what Steiner referred to as clairvoyance might also be considered synonymous with intuition.

Mainstream science typically views such an approach to natural inquiry as ungrounded. Intuition tends to bypass the pragmatism of a rationalist Reductionism (sometimes also called the hypothetico-deductive method) that has become the Western scientific convention. But Steiner offered 20th Century humanity a broader view of reality than had to date fallen within the constraints of a world entrenched in Reductionism as a consequence of the Scientific Revolution. Steiner’s Esoteric Science was an inner science; a science that sought ‘real knowledge,’ that validated the individual in the context of their surroundings thereby contradicting the separation and retreat of the self into the abstract that Reduction so adored. Steiner’s science of the soul attempted to satiate humanity’s natural longing for knowledge by not only examining the parts that make up a phenomenon, but also by welcoming an examination of a phenomenon embedded within its surroundings. Where Reduction examined the whole as the sum of its parts, Steiner’s Esoteric Science examined the whole through the sum of its parts. For Steiner, human cognition became unavoidably involved in that which is studied by the simple act of studying. Esoteric Science therefore gave credit to the inevitability of subjectivity and challenged the attempt at objectivity that Reductionism had come to

222 Steiner, 1995, p. 74. See also Steiner, 1997, p. viii. 223 Steiner, 1997, p. viii. Note that ‘clairvoyance’ is defined as the supernatural ability to see into the future or beyond ‘normal’ abilities into the realm of intuitive sensory perception. 94 brandish as the ‘ultimate rationale.’ Where Reduction attempted to deny, repress and conceal the senses of the observer, Steiner went to the opposite extreme and encouraged the observer to acknowledge their involvement with the observed coupled with the observer’s inner inklings - arguing that such qualities were present and influenced the outcome of a study whether the observer liked it or not. 224 Steiner’s science of the soul cared less for the outcome of a scientific inquiry into Nature and focused instead on the process of knowing what it is that we know about Nature, where that knowing dwells and how we came to accumulate it.

In Steiner’s own words:

“While observing nature, the soul is guided by the object under observation to a much greater extent than it is while observing the world’s non-sensory contents, when it has to be able to hold fast to the essence of the scientific way of thinking out of purely inner impulses...”225

But, these inner impulses are manifestations of scientific self-education that emerge by observing Nature subjectively. There is an inherent tension here. On the one hand, Reductionist Science (compliments of Cartesian duality) only sees reality at face value, and offers an adequate methodology for studying the immediately visible world. Reductionist Science stops short of transcending the material world thereby embellishes the limits of the human cognitive ability to see.226 Reductionism exercises the human habit of seeing only what is immediately ‘see-able.’ Steiner contradicts such a limited perception when he suggests there is equal possibility that behind the visible world is an invisible world that is no less real and merely temporarily concealed by the limits of the human ability to see through Reduction.227 This is Steiner’s ‘riddle of the visible world’ that he attempted to solve by supporting the development of human cognition beyond a Reductionist perception of the visible to include perception of the invisible ‘super sensible’ world.228 From this, Steiner developed an alternative method of training that is known throughout the world today as Waldorf education. This alternative educational modality offers a broadened view of Nature and reality generally by

224 Ibid., p. 14 – 15. 225 Ibid., pp. 15 – 16. 226 Ibid., p. 20. 227 Ibid., p. 19. 228 Ibid. p. 20 – 21. 95 pushing past the narrowed mainstream focus on visible sensibilities. Steiner’s world- view is one that can only be accessed through a more sensitive investigation. And buried in this sensitivity emerges a broader consensus since:

“ … all people who go far enough come to the same insight about [Nature] rather than to different insights (my emphasis added).”229

Those that will not ‘go far enough’ tend to be what Steiner calls ‘critical idealists’ who he describes as people willing to say:

“ ‘I am enclosed within my world of mental pictures, and I cannot leave it. If I think that there is something behind these mental pictures, then this thought, too, is nothing more than a mental picture.’ An idealist of this kind will therefore either deny the thing-in-itself entirely, or at least explain that it has no significance for human beings; that is, since we can know nothing about it, it is as good as non-existent.”

Steiner’s ‘critical idealists’ might also be labelled ‘Reductionists.’ Here, he neatly exposes the blinders that are at the very heart of my critique of humanity’s rational Reductionism. I suggest that the problem with scientific Reduction is not that it is a flawed methodology. In perceiving the visible world, Reduction works very well – to a point. What I find problematic is that Reductionists (both consciously and unconsciously) confine themselves within the constraints of a purely visible world to the denial of the esoteric, claiming that the invisible world is an ideological phoenix that is better left as myth. As discussed in the introductory chapter, such a science tends to be masculinized – exemplifying qualities of aggressiveness and egocentrism to the negation of gentler and more feminised qualities that would emerge through an acknowledged synergism.230 But the synergy of Steiner’s Esoteric Science only works when the observer believes that it can work. It is through the believing that one fully immerses oneself in the observed and suddenly transcends the limits of objectivity to engage with the world subjectively. From this place, the more subtle (invisible) qualities of Nature are revealed and acknowledged. Such a science broadens our

229 Ibid., p. 22. 230 Naydler (ed.), 1996, p. 12. 96 understanding of reality as well as our place in the living breathing ecosystems within which we are a part. Such a science is therefore based on context.

Steiner observed that:

“ … if we had never seen a human being and had no concept of a human being, we would never be able to derive [aka. discern] the concept of the human being out of our knowledge of an ape.”231

In other words, a full understanding of an organism is entirely relative to where that organism has emerged from - and in our case that is the human emerging from the ancestral ape.

I suggest that by taking time to subjectively observe chimpanzees, the blinders that constrain Reduction can be widened to illuminate a broader understanding of our own reality by revealing the experience of ‘full apeness’ to the human observer. And from this vantage point, the human observer can experience a broader spectrum of ‘full humanness.’ A subjective observation of chimpanzees and bonobos represents the reawakening of human Nature beyond human culture.

Despite my sympathy for a Steinerian approach to scientific inquiry, I do concede that Esoteric Science is limited in that it overemphasises the esoteric at the expense of the rational. Steiner tends to throw the baby out with the bath water by negating the groundedness of Reductionism in his fervent pursuit for a pure and embodied science. As I stated earlier, I give permission for Reduction to play a role in our understanding of Nature and reality, arguing that Holism and Reduction are not mutually exclusive by necessity. I look to the example set by chimpanzees and bonobos in relationship with Nature in formulating this alternative and I do so through a Primate Science. What I anticipate observing is a chimpanzee/bonobo way of relating with Nature that emanates a blend of the immersed intuition with the rational qualities of intellectualised cognition. I suspect that behavioural examples as broad and varied as we would expect to find in human society exist buried within the complexity of qualities in chimpanzee societies. Such behavioural qualities run the full gamut from selfishness, murder, infanticide,

231 Kranich, op. cite., p. xii. 97 cannibalism and rape to acts of caring, various forms of altruism and complete (both intra- and inter-species) selflessness. Through such a broad spectrum we discover an organism that is substantially more in tune with its surroundings than can be said for modern (Western) humans en masse. I suggest that through a holistic study of chimpanzees and bonobos we might be able to rekindle a deeper awareness of Nature than a Reductionist methodology alone permits. And we would be able to do so without rejecting Reduction entirely. Primate Science as a broader method of scientific inquiry contributes to the reunification of Nature ‘out-there’ with humanity ‘in-here’ (or vice versa, draws humanity out of the cloister of the self and reunifies us with Nature ).

Pan troglodytes spp. embodies a subjectivity within Nature that humans also possess but tend to guard against under the auspices of rationality, intelligence, objectivity and acculturated civilization. Chimpanzees and humans are unavoidably subjective participants in an exchange with their surroundings. I offer an alternative to this through Primate Science and puts forth a third-way that embraces Reduction but also recognises its limits and attempts to transcend them through a subjective, immersive, holistic synergy that encourages a relationship between the observer and the observed. Such a science accesses our deeper relationship with Nature through a blend of the rational and the pragmatic with the esoteric and intuitive.

4.2: The Synergistic Whole

 Next, you must trust your senses: they will show you nothing false if your intelligence keeps you awake.

Jeremy Naydler (ed.), 1996, quoting Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, p. 29.

Steiner’s Esoteric Science attempted to reveal the less visible mysteries of Nature and was guided by the work of Darwinian contemporary Johann Wolfgang von Goethe

(1749 – 1832 A.D.). Goethe was generally credited as a poet but actually made a significant contribution to Western scientific thought through his study of the

98 relationship between humans and Nature. Goethe offered a response to Cartesian duality when he suggested that “… human thinking could penetrate into the dynamic laws of organic formation …” which implied that our capacity to think was not locked into a separate and removed rationality that functioned in isolation from reality.232 Goethe put this supposition into practice initially by studying the emergence of consecutive organs within plants through a series of metamorphoses from the one original organ - the leaf - that he described as the ‘archetypal plant’ or Urpflanze.233 Countering the compartmentalization processes inherent in Newton’s study of colour through physics and mathematical proofs and Darwin’s study of Natural Selection through the pragmatism of evolutionary biology, Goethe offered a synthetic approach to science that emerged from a desire to:

“… understand living formations … to grasp their outward, visible, tangible parts in context, to see these parts as an indication of what lies within and thereby gain some understanding of the whole [organism] through an exercise of intuitive perception.”234

Goethe’s science was a science of the observer’s senses expressed through intuition. He argued a case for employing the senses to give a particular but limited perception of an organism that was then rounded out by the intuition’s ability to bring it fully into light.235 In this way, the observer was best able to gain an appreciation for the full depth of the organism being examined. He extended his investigation of the qualities of life, including a study of an organism’s whole ‘shape’ or form by coining the term ‘morphology’ – from the Greek: morphe.236 This he applied to both plant and animal types - meaning the organic formation of an organism and the way its inner principle interacts with the world within which it is embedded.237 The core of Goethe’s science was therefore typological; a science that traced its roots twenty-four hundred years into the past by studying the myths of Nature, philosophically. In his own words, Goethe directly disclosed the influences on his thinking when he stated that:

232 Kranich, op. cite., p. 5. 233 Bortoft, 1986, p. 44. See also Kranich, op. cite., p. 6. 234 Kranich, op. cite., (quoting Goethe), p. 7. 235 Bortoft, 1986, p. 40. 236 Ibid., pp. 7 & 52. 237 Kranich, op. cite., p. 8. 99 “ … to escape the endless profusion, fragmentation, and complication of modern science [aka. Reductionist Science] and recover the element of simplicity, we must always ask ourselves: what approach would Plato have taken to a nature which is both simple in essence and manifold in appearance?”238

Consequently Goethe’s science was neo-Platonic and confronted the Reductionism that emerged from Aristotlean rationalism and that had dominated Western thinking since the days of the Greek Academy (and earlier in the emergence of human kind).239 Further, like Plato, Goethe’s science assumed that a void existed between different types, and yet within each type existed the possibility of inner flexibility that permitted the emergence of special forms. In this way, Goethe’s science avoided the formal mechanisms of evolution per se but encouraged the existence of adaptability within each type. Consequently, one might argue that the foundations for Darwin’s evolutionary theory were laid through Goethean science.240 But by assuming a Platonic bent, Goethe’s science “… was at odds with much contemporary philosophy of science.”241 Goethe’s archetypal theory was similar to Plato’s theory of Forms where both offered validity to the intuitive over and above the intellectual.242 Goethe’s archetypal form that dwelled behind the visible being was not some metaphor. Rather, it was a real entity that represented the being in its purest form.243 For Goethe, the task of the scientist was to discover this archetypal form by immersing oneself in the experience of that particular living being. Plato laid the foundations for individualism by championing the existence of the ‘one over the many.’ Aristotle then distilled this premise into a mechanistic Reductionism that laid the foundations for Cartesian duality (and Western capitalism). Goethe’s science encompassed both polarities since for him ‘the many formed the one and the one formed the many.’ Such a science suggested that an awareness of universal truths comes through engaging the neo-Platonic nebulousness of the intuitive self in tight coupling with the intellectual and pragmatic Aristotlean rational self. 244

238 Naydler (ed.), op. cite., p. 44. 239 For more information on the hypothetico-deductive method as an expression of Reductionism, see Naydler, (ed.), op. cite., pp. 70 – 71. 240 Kranich, op. cite., pp. 12 – 13. 241 Naydler, op. cite., p. 89. 242 Bortoft, op. cite., pp. 49 – 50. 243 Ibid. p. 47. 244 Ibid., p. 48 – 49. 100 Attempting to transcend the limitations of Reduction, Goethe sought the ‘coming into being’ of the entire organism in its surroundings beyond a study of its component organs. A Darwinian study of organisms agreed with Goethe’s statement that “Man is inclined to carry his usual views from life also into science ... ”245 But the two differed in that Goethe understood the organism from the perspective of its organization as a whole which emerged because of its environmental context where Darwin’s theory of Natural Selection was the mechanistic by-product of chance mutations within the individual. Darwin’s organism was revealed through analysis where Goethe’s organism was revealed through an intuitive perception of the meaning of the being that gave consideration to its experience of living in the context of its environment.246 Bortoft (1986) poignantly highlights the divergence between Goethe and Darwin when he states that:

“ … the understanding of the animal as a whole which emerges from Goethe’s organic vision is very different to the way that the animal is understood in Darwin’s theory of evolution by natural selection. For the organic perspective, the different features of an animal are expressions of the whole animal and not just useful adaptations. But for Darwinism, the animal is contingency. There is no form of the animal as a whole, with necessary connections which result in an intrinsically intelligible structure. Instead, the animal is conceived as a bundle of features which are considered to be effectively separate and independent of each other, because any one of them is capable of varying independently by chance. Whether such a variation is biologically viable is then determined by the environment, and not by any factors which are intrinsic to the organism.”

So, Goethe encouraged a relationship between the observer and the observed while Darwin studied life analytically where a perception of the observed was a consequence of removed consciousness.247 For example, Darwin’s suggested that lion possessed large teeth and no horns because teeth were selected for the way they improved the lion’s chances of survival. Implied in this statement is the presumption that horns offer no added survivability for the lion and so they never grew them. By comparison, Goethe’s lion possessed no horns because it had a complete set of teeth in its upper jaw and from his studies of many different species; he observed that only animals with an incomplete set of teeth in their upper jaw possess horns. For Goethe, lions lacked horns

245 Ibid., p. 53. 246 Ibid., 54. 247 Ibid., pp. 64 – 65. 101 because they had big upper teeth whereas for Darwin, the hornless lion was the product of leaving well-enough alone. Goethe therefore studied an organism in the context of other like organisms along with the environment in which it lived. Goethean science was therefore a comparative science that examined species relative to other species whether they existed side by side or in completely different ecosystems. Goethean science offered a search for deeper meaning than that which is immediately observable in Nature.

Such a shift in perception can be used when studying chimpanzees and bonobos. As debates rage about the ‘humanness’ of chimpanzees and the ‘chimpanzeeness’ of humans, what we learn from Goethe’s scientific method is that chimpanzees and bonobos do not speak simply because they and other apes are adept at recognising gestures to such an extent that language is redundant. Their larynx has not developed a ‘voice box’ capable of the multiplicity of sounds, as is the case with humans, because chimpanzee communication relies more heavily on gestures and body language – particularly the directive implications of simple glances.248 They are capable of elaborate communications that need no words, whereas human communication, for all its complexity and sophistication has emerged because our ‘archetypal’ morphology lacks and our societies have suppressed the sensitivities that chimpanzees and bonobos have mastered. We do not read body language as well as chimpanzees/bonobos and so have developed the ability to talk about what we want to communicate. The level of cognition in free-living chimpanzees and bonobos matches the needs of their particular environment and changes (in fact might increase if treated well) when kept in captivity since captive rearing of them accommodates for the satiation of survival needs which leaves some to suggest that there is more room in their intelligence for innovation (along with increased levels of boredom).249

Morris (1967) suggests that human intelligence increased because ‘craftiness’ was needed to ensure the survival of proto-humans once they descended from the safety of the trees.250 This placed the proto-human at much more risk to predation in the open

248 Lorenz and Leyhausen, 1973, p. 378. 249 For more information on the impact of enclosure enrichment on advanced cognition in chimpanzees, see Wemelsfelder, 1990, in Rollin and Kesel (eds.), pp. 248 – 251; Wemelsfelder, 1993, in Lawrence and Rushen (eds.), p. 76. 250 Morris, op. cite., p. 32. 102 plains than the naturally arboreal chimpanzee/bonobo who still retained considerable strength, speed and agility not to mention reasonably large canines that can inflict a savage wound when called upon. Conversely, human teeth offer no such purchase, and our bodies are slow and fragile to the extent that we are comparatively speaking quite weak animals. A Goethean whole-being view of chimpanzees/bonobos and humans places all three species side by side as ‘Urphenomona,’ where each represents a different manifestation of the archetypal primate form that modern scientific convention calls the Dryopithicine. By this hypothesis, the three different morphologies emerged in response to different environmental and societal conditions from the same ancestral morphology that is today invisible but – from a Goethean perspective – still very much alive and well beneath the unique facades of each species. Goethe studied an organism’s overall morphology in the act of living (as opposed to the static isolation that tended to emerge with Darwin’s theory of evolution) and exemplifies the intuitive component of a Primate Science – where the invisible and the archetypal are revealed through immersion in Nature proper.

Goethe might well wear the label: ‘pioneer of holistic biology.’ He offered a science for examining the singular being within the context of its environment by assuming the broader view of life on Earth. His intention was not only to understand the whole organism; Goethe also sought an understanding of the context within which that organism dwelled. 251 This raises the question as to why Goethe’s holistic biology was denied broader recognition in the Western scientific tradition? Through the latter half of the 20th Century, Goethe’s science for the whole being has gained more notoriety. Brilliant elaborations on the theme of his work - such as Man and Mammals by Wolfgang Shad (1977) - now offer alternative scientifically valid views that are particularly applicable to ethology and animal physiology, thereby taking Goethean science far beyond the point that Goethe himself was able to reach.252

But Goethean Science is still a marginalized science. Western schools of thought flocked to the theories of Newton and Darwin, not because Goethe was wrong, but because the theories proposed by these men contained laws that could be proven true and once accepted - as they were - rendered the works of Goethe as iconoclastic even

251 Ibid., p. 54. 252 Ibid. 103 though he may have anticipated evolution before Darwin and may have discovered elements of the nature of light and colour that Newton overlooked.253 Goethean science did not look like biology as modern science had come to accept it, nor did it contain the predictability of mathematical proofs or a study of phenotype relative to genotype as was Darwin’s habit. Goethe’s encouraged the observer to go behind the phenomenon in question by subjectively engaging the senses. He aimed at transcending “ … the mechanisms hidden behind the scenes …” by studying observable relationships.254 For mainstream Western science, what became so abhorrent about this approach was that:

“As victims of the Cartesian confinement of consciousness to the purely subjective, we cannot believe at first that what Goethe experienced as a way of seeing could be an objective feature of the world.”255

Goethe committed the sin of subjectivity at a time when objectivity was the omniscient order of the day and he was marginalized for that. A holistic approach to studying life was simply inconsistent with the third-party impartial investigation that modern science embraced and came to be known as Reductionist Science. A Goethean approach to examining the world gave validity to the intuitive over and above the intellectual. In a world where the logic of hierarchy reigns supreme, intuitive perception was silenced for fear of its eroding the foundations of modern Western rational thought. The result was the more than two hundred years of back grounding that Goethe’s scientific work has suffered. As a remedy, my intention is to include Goethe’s vision of the whole being into a Primate Science where I strengthen the value of the less obvious qualities of intuition throughout an alternative scientific inquiry.

253 Ibid., p. 7. 254 Ibid., p. 8. 255 Ibid., p. 9. 104 4.3: A Third Way

 “If some of what I write seems naive or ʻunscientific,ʼ this is how I really feel when I let my hair down and allow myself easily to become detached from the strong constraints of supposedly objective, value-free science.”

Marc Bekoff, 1997, in Tobias, M. and Solisti, K. (eds.), p. 3.

I make the point here that I am as uneasy with a pure Goethean/Steinerian science as I am with a pure Reductionist Science. The former in isolation appears irrational, ungrounded and idealistic as much as the latter in isolation feels constrained and pretentious. Throughout this dissertation I have been building a case for a science of the third way - a science that is at once both intellectually Reductionist and esoterically Holistic through a Primate Science. I believe a union of these traditionally polarised scientific methods is the more natural manifestation of the archetypal ape from which we have descended; an archetype that I believe continues to dwell in the shadows of human consciousness to this day.

So what is a Primate Science? Primate Science is a transcendent science of discovery that offers credibility to both the cognitive tendency to intellectualise and the esoteric ability to sense and perceive. Primate Science offers a deeper understanding of the whole being as it exists within its environment. Primate Science is an ethological science that permits a study of socio-cultural qualities in non-human animal populations and human populations alike and does so by employing the principles of Geothe, Steiner, neoDarwinism, and the more recent tenets of Deep Ethology as proposed by Marc Bekoff (1997).

Bekoff subscribes to nine principles that guide a Deep Ethological study. They are:

105 1. Immersing oneself in the life of another organism to the point that the observer can take the observed subject's point of view. 2. Observations are governed by morality where respect, compassion, and admiration for the observed are paramount. 3. Advocacy for the observed in regards to concerns about pain or suffering. 4. Acknowledging research as an intrusion and attempt to minimise levels of exploitation that result. 5. Assuming that observer speciesism is inevitable, particularly in reference to the examination of cognition, sentience and well being, and that such self- righteousness needs to eliminated. 6. Giving significant moral recognition to the importance of the individual. 7. Appreciating the diversity of life. 8. Preserving the fidelity of the observed through a policy of non-intervention. 9. Using commonsense and empathy throughout the study.256

Primate Science therefore places the subject that is being observed in the centre of a study rather than the cognition of the observer and thereby welcomes the subjectivity of an observer by encouraging a relationship between the two. Bekoff’s Deep Ethology permits an observer to conduct “ … ‘good science’ and also respect and form intimate relationships with the [organisms] with whom they work.”257 Such a science recognises the textural experience of an observer towards the observed and suggests that a deeper study gives credibility to the stimulation that the subject might experience through the observer’s presence.258 Bekoff’s Deep Ethology unites the traditional polar opposites of Reduction and holism to produce a subjective science of qualities. Such a science contradicts the ‘no-nonsense’ aspirations of value-free science, which Bekoff considers as unachievable.259 As I mentioned in the Introduction to this dissertation, anthropomorphism is the natural tendency for an individual to intuitively recognize the sentience of non-human life in ways that shed light on a deeper understanding of the whole being. Bekoff’s Deep Ethology acknowledges and welcomes anthropomorphism as a means of capturing detailed information about the observed that might otherwise be

256 Bekoff, 1997, p. 2. 257 Ibid., p. 3. 258 Ibid., p. 2. 259 Ibid., p. 5. 106 omitted precisely because such information is intensely personal.260 Bekoff encourages the observer to engage in a ‘dialog’ with the observed, where careful observations present the possibility of revealing much of a subject’s hidden reality. Deep Ethology is philosophically derived from Deep Ecology and follows four levels of analysis:261

1. Developmental: where qualities of an organism emerge ontogenetically. How do developmental stages affect behaviour? 2. Ecological: where the environmental context affects the emergence of traits. What is an organism’s adaptive ability? 3. Evolutionary: where traits change through subsequent generations. What is an organism’s history?

260 Ibid., p. 4. 261 I will refrain from digressing into a discussion on deep ecology in the body text here. For more information about the fundamental tenets of deep ecology, see Devall and Session, 1985.

In Nature in the Mind’s Eye: Western Reductionism and the loss of embodied intuition – unpublished (2002), pp. 6 - 7, I summarise the deep ecology platform thus:

The Norwegian outdoorsman and founder of deep ecology, Arne Naess (b. 1912), established himself as a philosopher at the University of Oslo in his mid-twenties. In 1969, he resigned from his post as Chair of the Department of Philosophy to dedicate his life to exploring what he would formally name in 1973 – ‘deep ecology.’ Deep ecology like Reductionist or “shallow” ecology, aspires to satisfy the human desire to know Nature by studying the relationships that exist in an ecosystem. But unlike shallow ecology, deep ecology encourages such a study from a more transcendent perspective that honours the intuitive self as much if not more than the rational self. Naess’s deep ecology encourages each individual to develop a deep ecosophy or personal relationship with the natural world.

Naess suggests developing this personal ecosophy on four levels: beginning with the philosophical realm where one formulates ultimate norms, we then create a platform that provides a theoretical basis for one’s relationship with Nature. The eight points that define the deep ecology platform are: All life has intrinsic value Richness and diversity in the biota is also valuable and contributes to the well being of all life that the biota contains. Apart from satisfying vital needs, humans do not have the right to reduce the richness and diversity of the biota. Human impacts on nature are significant and are worsening. Central to this impact are lifestyle and populations conditions for humanity. Flourishing biotic richness and diversity can only occur when human impacts upon nature are minimised. For this to happen, there must be a radical shift in Western society’s ideological platform. Once the aforementioned points have been accepted, one has a responsibility to contribute to the changes that are necessary to bring about an ideological shift peacefully and democratically. (From a consensus summary of the Deep Ecology Platform drafted by members of the Deep Ecology course and Dr. Stephan Harding at Schumacher College [The University of Plymouth], May, 1995) Employing these eight points then widens one’s choices and lifestyle and finally culminates in a permanent deepening in the relationship one has with Nature. To many deep ecologists, Cartesian rationalism and anthropocentrism are central to the loss of the intuitive self. Deep ecology offers an opportunity to re-embody the intuitive self by intentionally imbedding the observer in Nature, which enables one to gain a wider identification of the self in the context of the environment that sustains us. In other words, humanity is encouraged through deep ecology to know Nature (and ourselves within it) through intimate sensory awareness. Therefore, Bekoff’s Deep Ethology applies the philosophies of deep ecology to the field of animal behaviour studies. 107 4. Physiological: where the physical composition of an organism reveals much about the qualities it possesses. How do the internal and external properties affect a particular behaviour? 262

Deep Ethology is therefore a reflective and contemplative science that also leaves space for a quantifiable methodology. Deep Ethology is ontological, supports a teleological Nature that echoes the postulates of Plato’s anima mundi without shunning Aristotle’s rationalism. Deep Ethology provides a guide for welcoming the ‘out there-ness’ back within the human observer and draws the observer back into Nature. This process begins with a shift in self-awareness and a deepening of one’s willingness and ability to perceive one’s surroundings.

4.4: A Very Good Eye

 “What it takes to understand a wild animalʼs reality is time, patience and a very good eye for detail and context.”

Francoise Wemelsfelder, 1997, p. 77.

Deep Ethological approaches to studying animal sentience are becoming mainstreamed within existing scientific conventions. 263 The optimistic implications of such a shift is the broadening of human perceptions of Nature where upon living beings and landscapes are seen more holistically. Dr. Francoise Wemelsfelder is one of the champions of this shifting tide, which can be qualified as a holistic ethology that she calls ‘consensus methodology’ or ‘Free-Choice-Profiling.’264 Wemelsfelder’s holistic ethology builds a bridge across the human/Nature divide and offers a very pragmatic approach to undertaking the task of welcoming Nature back within or taking humanity back to Nature and is therefore another pillar of Primate Science. Wemelsfelder’s

262 Bekoff, 2002, pp. 1 – 4. 263 For more information on the mainstreaming of holistic ethological methodologies, see Wemelsfelder (complete works). 264 Wemelsfelder, 2003, personal communications. See also Wemelsfelder, 2003, p. 20. 108 consensus methodology heeds the urgent call of Morris Berman (1989) who boldly stated:

“Children born during the last few millennia inevitably inherit the tendency to interpret the other as fearful or hostile … A bridge, a form of safety, is now required to negotiate the space between Self and Other, and it had better be a reliable one.”265

Consensus methodology is that reliable bridge between Us and Them. Such a science studies the subjectivity of behaviour, attempts to reveal the essential characteristics of an observed animal’s consciousness from the inside, and does so from the first-person perspective where the observer develops a direct relationship with the observed.

Wemelsfelder states her case directly when she says that:

“To regain our ability to see animals whole, what we need is a language that views animals as sentient beings from the very start. Then behaviour and experience are not segregated, but fuse as an expressive body language that communicates how the animal feels [my emphasis added].”266

Wemelsfelder is reaching for a science of qualities that is valid, practical and holistic where animals are described as whole expressive beings.267 This contrasts with the third-person perspective inherent in a purely Reductionist Science where the observer is maximally detached.268 For Wemelsfelder, ethology is most effective when the observer is able to observe precisely what Descartes thought was unobservable; namely the internal, subjective, non-physical, non-mechanistic organizational processes that make up an organism.269 Wemelsfelder explicitly states that:

“ … the on-going bickering between cognitivism [a science of the mind] and baviourism [a science of the body] is a direct reflection of the irreconcilability between ‘internal’ and ‘external’ modes of behavioural causation posed by a Cartesian dualism. This distinction, however, is not given fact of life (sic). The explanatory problems generated by Cartesian dualism may be avoided

265 Berman, 1989, pp. 76 – 77. 266 Wemelsfelder, 2003, p. 20. 267 Ibid. 268 Wemelsfelder, 1993, p. 68. See also Wemelsfelder, 2001b, p. S129 – 130. 269 Wemelsfelder, 1993, p. 68. 109 by models of subjectivity which do not a priori postulate the mechanistic character of animal behaviour and the concomitant unobservability of subjective processes.”270

In other words, why assume a pure objective/cognitive study is valid while a subjective/behavioural study is invalid when subjectivity can reveal much about the true nature of an animal that is being observed. While pure Reduction attempts (indeed at times forces) the abdication of individual subjective perspectives, a holistic ethology recognises that “ … the world is full of human and animal individuals who act, feel and think.”271 Central to Wemelsfelder’s holistic ethology is the recognition of sentience along with the needs, interests and feelings of the animals that are observed.272 This recognition is qualitative but can also be quantified and studies “ … not so much what an animal does, but how it does what it does, i.e., its dynamic style of interaction with the environment.”273 Wemelsfelder’s ethology is a Deep Ethology in the Bekofferian sense of the term that examines animal temperament and personality. Wemelsfelder’s ethology is a primal science - a Primate Science.

Note that within the scientific convention, implying animal personality is viewed as one of the primary ‘red flags’ in committing the sin of anthropomorphism. The concept of anthropomorphism challenges the way human mental images can be projected onto an observed animal.274 Despite this, Wemelsfelder has placed an examination of personality traits at the very heart of her holistic methodology where an animal’s feelings become formally visible.275 Holistic ethology is deliberately anthropomorphic. Wemelsfelder justifies such a maverick stance by stating that:

“ … qualitative terminologies of behavioural style may have a stronger observational (i.e. empirical) foundation than is currently recognized [where] …such terminologies have an important, as yet unexplored potential as a research tool.”276

270 Ibid. p. 69. 271 Wemelsfelder, 2001b, p. S130. 272 Wemelsfelder, 1997, p. 73. 273 Wemelsfelder et al., 2000, p. 194. 274 Wemelsfelder, 2003, p. 20. 275 Ibid. 276 Wemelsfelder et al., 2000, pp. 194 – 195. 110 Wemelsfelder places her trust in an emergent consensus in regards to the welfare of an animal or group of animals that emerges through the intuitive assessment of a wide variety of observers. A group of observers are selected from backgrounds as diverse as farmers who are interested in reviewing the well being of their own livestock to animal rights activist determined to end industrial animal husbandry (where such a dichotomy is in fact preferable). Wemelsfelder’s consensus methodology, primarily implicated in the welfare study of domestic pigs, aspires to glean an assessment of the personality traits and the welfare of those animals that are observed. Such a methodology transcends the biases of an individual observer by seeking out the points of convergence amongst several different observers when assessing the behavioural expressions that they each witness.

Consensus methodology encourages observers to employ every day adjectives that describe the state of being that an observed animal appears to be expressing. Wemelsfelder argues that such an assessments of behavioural expressions sheds a far more accurate light on an animal’s experience in a particular setting than would emerge through reductive analysis alone.277 These adjectives are then plotted on word charts where they are placed along polar axes that permit the emergence of term clusters about loci of similar meaning. Wemelsfelder cross-examines the accuracy of this qualitative assessment through the mathematics of a General Procrustes Analysis (GPA) where the adjective ascribed to certain behavioural gestures are scored and then given statistical value.278 The scores are then charted on ‘sample plots’ that assess the resolution and reliability of the subjective adjectival assessment.279 Wemelsfelder’s methodology therefore combines both qualitative and quantitative analyses with the intention of gaining a deeper understanding of a particular animal. Such a methodology argues that in order to:

“… achieve a full, complete understanding of the world, we need not only a ‘centre-less’ perspective of understanding, but also a perspective which is ‘centre-based.’ ”

277 Ibid., p. 195. 278 An elaboration of the mathematics involved in GPA is beyond the scope of this work. For further information see: Wemelsfelder et al., op. cite. Wemelsfelder (2001). 279 Wemelsfelder et al, 2000, p. 216. 111 Wemelsfelder’s first-person approach to ethology thereby centralises both the human observer and the animal being observed and offers a means of assessing the animal’s relationship with its environment. Wemelsfelder’s approach to studying animal behaviour offers science a way of answering the question proposed in Nagel’s (1974) famous paper ‘What is it like to be a bat?’ 280 Further, implementing holistic ethology follows suit with Marian Dawkins (1990) who unabashedly pronounced that good science places the animal’s point of view first.281 My hope is that the Primate Science which I am proposing through the works of Wemelsfelder et al formulates a (M.) Dawkinian good science. What I mean here is a science that places the observed being first, and places the human ego in its rightful place to be of service in helping humanity understand, respect and (at the risk of sounding overly esoteric … ) love Nature more. Consensus methodology offers the scientific establishment a guiding hand in validating such qualities.

Wemelsfelder’s consensus methodology transcends the Aristotlean and Cartesian mechanisms that have traditionally constrained Western science for the past two millennia. I suggest that holistic ethology rekindles what Berman (1989) refers to as the division between wildness and tameness - a division that emerged more than 7 million years ago when ancestral humans made their first significant break with ‘full apeness.’282 Through consensus methodology, a human researcher gets to fully engage the gift of human intellect while cross-referencing cognitive insights with sensitised perceptions about how it feels to study another living being. The observer thereby actively relates with the observed subject while also creating a considerable wake for the latter to lead the interaction. The tone of the relationship is set not by some detached and aloof third- person researcher but rather by the very subject being studied where the researcher places sentience of Self and other at the forefront of the interaction. Consensus methodology is a sensualized methodology as is a Primate Science.

Wemelsfelder’s consensus methodology offers a way of applying Primate Science to the ‘see-able’ world. Such a methodology brings an element of our primate past into

280 Wemelsfelder, 1993, pp.70 – 71. 281 Wemelsfelder, 2001b, p. S133. 282 Berman, op. cite., p. 66. 112 the forum of modern Western science by shattering the limitations of Reduction and opening science to the possibility that beyond rationality lay fertile, magical, nebulous, sensual, esoteric ground where Self unifies with other, leaving the observer with an unavoidable sense that our species is imbedded in what Berman (1989) refers to as “ … a differentiated universe [that] can still be friendly.”283 Consensus methodology offers a contrary assumption to the message that ‘out-thereness’ is bad, wrong, black, old, organic, ethereal, natural, animal, feminine, embodied and sensual as the stuff of ‘them.’ What we find instead is that the Self and other are separable but not necessarily in opposition.284 Through Wemelsfelder’s unifying methodology, studying ‘out- thereness’ facilitates a rediscovery of the Self that is reminiscent of a pre-Neolithic humanity which was much more ape-like than modern Western thought cares to admit. Like Berman (1989), I suggest that a Primate Science is the merging of the rational self with the intuitive self and I argue that such a consciousness existed throughout human pre-history.285 On the most basic of levels, the body is not ruled by reason but reason is ultimately answerable to the body. Such is my justification for this new - old science. Primate Science is an intuitive science and a pragmatic science that emphasises qualities of kindness from the observer towards the observed.

283 Berman, op. cite., p. 64. 284 Ibid. 285 Ibid. 113

CHAPTER 5: THE KIND OF KINDNESS OF APE-KIND

 It seems certain that both selfishness and altruistic adaptations exist.

W. D. Hamilton in J. F. Eisenberg et al (eds.), 1971, p. 59.

 It is … comforting to think that we are no more than naked apes momentarily disoriented by our jerry-built civilization.

Edward O. Wilson, in J. F. Eisenberg et al (eds.), 1971, p. 183.

114 5.1 A Science of Caring 286

 If we wish to uncover what is, rather than imposing what is not, if we wish to recognise and allow to flourish the complexity of interacting systems (including ourselves), if we wish to ex-ist rather than in-sist, if we wish to ʻlet [living] things beʼ … the way in which they are, if we wish to unite our head, hand and heart, we need to care.”

Patsy Hallen, 1989, p. 7

Patsy Hallen (1989) suggests that a feminised, ecological, holistic and immersed study of Nature offers a remedy to the seriously compromised astigmatism that reduction supports.287 Such a science is an alternative perspective to issues of dominance, aggression, initiative, and competition, relative to the traditionally masculinised lens of scientific research that tends to generate a tone of violence and individualism.288 Hallen emphasises the first tenet of feminism that is a definitive proclamation:

“We need more women scientists to overcome the distorting effect of patriarchy.”289

And Wemelsfelder answers the call, being female and offering a ethological methodology that is usable by men and women alike that encourages the researcher to acknowledge their capacity to care about the subject being observed – to treat the subject with kindness. Such qualities are consistent with a feminist critique of traditional science. Primate Science, as a science of caring, is also a feminist science. Wemelsfelder’s consensus methodology, which serves as an example of applied Primate Science, observes and centralises an animal’s overall well being. But Hallen notes that the first tenet of a feminisation of science alone is inadequate in bringing about radical change towards a science of caring. Through the second tenet of feminism, Hallen states that:

286 Title adapted from Puka (1991). 287 Hallen, 1989, p. 5. 288 Ibid. 289 Ibid. pp. 51 - 57. 115 “ … we do not just need more ecologists: ecology can be exclusively reductionist, ‘understanding’ life (biology) in terms of non-life (physics, chemistry and mathematics), and so failing to see living things in process, in relation and in context, in terms of dynamic energy patterns … We need the second tenet of feminism whereby the so-called ‘feminine’ qualities will be cherished and female experience can be incorporated into explanations … to reclaim science as a human, not a masculine project, and so to … ‘transform the very possibility of creative vision.’ ”290

The transformation Hallen implies here is in the direction of a science of caring and is central to a Primate Science. Hallen stresses the need for a union of ecology with feminism in the same way I have suggested the need for a union between the rational and the intuitive through a Primate Science. The qualities of cooperation, understanding and appreciation are emphasised to counter the masculinised norms of competition, power and domination. In order to cooperate with, to understand and to deeply appreciate Nature, one must care. The kind of care supported by a Primate Science not only observes a subject’s general welfare. Primate Science notices a subject’s capacity to care for the self and others – giving particular attention to expressions of kindness towards others. Primate Science therefore supports an inquiry into gestures of altruism beyond the qualities of competitiveness and aggression that are prevalent in the socio-biology of all Great Apes.

A Primate Science does not see Nature as some inanimate object to be dissected through reduction. Rather, Nature is seen as an infinitely complex self-regulating living system with a wealth of resource worthy of our homage.291 Given I have suggested throughout this dissertation that chimpanzees and bonobos are capable of interacting with their surroundings in the spirit of kindness, I see no reason why humans cannot express such kindness also. Indeed, as an icon of modern ethology, Jane Goodall has been practicing a Primate Science for more than 30 years. In her own words she describes the final moments of parting with a male free-living chimpanzee she was studying in the Tanzanian National Park of Gombe Stream. The individual grasped her hand:

290 Hallen, 1988, p. 10. 291 For further and more detailed discourse on Nature as a self-regulating living system, see James Lovelock’s (2000) Homage to Gaia: The Life of an Independent Scientist. See also Lovelock (1988, 1991 & 1995). 116 “… firmly and gently with his own before scurrying off into the forest … at that moment there was no need for any scientific knowledge to understand this communication of reassurance.”292

Primate Science is a science of listening closely, carefully and kindly to the voice of the voiceless. Primate Science is a science of the qualitative and reflects a kind of kindness that is intuitively perceptive for all ape-kind.

From a more ecological perspective, free-living common chimpanzees express significant examples of kindness through collective and coordinated hunting, food sharing (particularly of meat), reconciliation and peace making, social grooming and sexual contact, along with expressing an emphasis on the nurturing of juveniles. Notably, in all these examples, adult males tend to take an active and lead role and offer more feminised socio-biological alternatives in non-human ape society when compared with the masculinised hubris prevalent in human society. 293 The second tenet of feminism brings a Primate Science closer to full holism.

For Hallen, even the first two tenets of feminism combined, fall short of a radical transformation of science towards intrinsic trans- (as in beyond) gendered equanimity. A third tenet of feminism is also required which insists that the personal, the emotional and the sexual qualities of being human possess recognisable political dimensions.294 Hallen (1989) states categorically that:

“ Primatology is a powerful narrative of [human] origin myths and as such, primatology is politics.”295

292 Hallen, 1988, quoting Jane Goodall (1974/1988, p. 184), p. 16. 293 See deWaal, 1989 pp. 51 - 57. Over the last 30 years, extensive studies on the capacity for caring in captive male common chimpanzees have been conducted by Frans deWaal and colleagues at the Arnhem Zoo in The Netherlands, the San Diego Zoo in California and the Yerkes Primate Centre in Georgia. The findings in these studies tend to be consistent with research on free-living chimpanzees conducted Jane Goodall (1960) and Toshisada Nishida (1965) which show that males are generally more conciliatory, opportunistic and transitory in their relations with other males than females are with other females (where grudges tend to be held for longer and social bonds tend to be more permanent). DeWaal also states that bonobos possess more ‘style’ than common chimpanzees. Studies of captive males tend to reveal consistencies with the findings of Noel and Alison Badrian and Takayoshi Kano and colleagues since 1974. Like humans, male and female bonobos are comfortably bipedal, resolve social tension through sex, and females are sexually receptive throughout their entire oestrus cycle (pp. 181 – 182). 294 Hallen, op. cit., p. 10. 295 Hallen, 1989, p. 5. 117 Viewing primatology as politics implies that the more feminised and sensual qualities of primates facilitates a ‘relational view’ of Nature where an intimate connection with one’s surroundings is assured.296 Primate Science therefore attempts to galvanize a holistic view of Nature where “ … everything is connected to everything else and each aspect is defined by and dependent upon the whole, the total context.”297 Just as is exemplified by chimpanzees and bonobos in their daily existence, Primate Science permits us to see “ … Life [as] interconnected and interdependent: [where] we are not above nature, we are an intimate part of it.”298 Primate Science is therefore a science for a sustainable future, one where the values of peace and justice are distributed not only within human society but are extended towards non-human species also. Primate Science borrows a leaf from annals of many indigenous people’s throughout human history and centralises an ethic of ‘Nature as my body’ within the mainstream Western scientific tradition. Primate Science offers an antidote to speciesism by asserting that we - the human observers - are actually immersed in the natural world whether we care to admit it or not.

In common chimpanzee society, male-on-male cooperative bonding is woven into the fabric of a hierarchical social order where coalitions are created and destroyed as individual access to power is negotiated and distributed according to affiliation. Conversely, females tend to live in a “ … horizontal world of social connections.”299 Such generalisations run parallel to the gendered social norms of human society and imply support for the nature end of the nature/nurture debate. But similar gendered patterns of behaviour are not prevalent amongst male bonobos who – as I mentioned in Chapter 1 - are actually slightly more closely related to humans than common chimpanzees. Male bonobos show little if any evidence of cooperation amongst themselves, are heavily influenced by female community members, and there is seldom any pair bonding, but the society is said to be more stable and cohesive than is true for common chimpanzees.300 So evidence supporting the aggressive and competitive nature of humanity based on the socio-biology of chimpanzees and bonobos is not consistent and is therefore inconclusive.

296 Hallen, 1988, p. 10. 297 Ibid. 298 Ibid. 299 deWaal, op. cit., p. 51. 300 Ibid., pp. 179-182. 118

DeWaal (1989) offers a balanced premise in regards to the nature/nurture debate relative to chimpanzees and bonobos and what their socio-biology implicates for human evolution and behaviour. He bases the following statement on the spectrum of current primatological evidence available:

“ Violence is not the normal state of [chimpanzee] social life. It is there as an undercurrent, a constant threat, but chimpanzees keep their head above the surface 99 percent of the time … when aggression does escalate, I would hesitate to ascribe it to a failure of peacemaking efforts …”301

… since chimpanzees are capable of choosing violence or peaceful reconciliation at will. In other word, chimpanzees possess a sophisticated enough cognition and level of self-awareness/consciousness to negotiate between extremes of violent aggression and selfless altruism at will. In other words, if they want to be kind, they can.

5.2: The Altricial Self

 “A distinctive mark of caring for [a determinant recipient], is that in some contexts it is expressed ʻselflessly.ʼ ”

Deane Curtin, 1991, p. 68

 “It is a fallacy to think that because of our biology we are all necessarily born selfish, in the human sense.”

Michael Ruse, in David Hull and Michael Ruse (eds.), 1998, p. 447.

It is true that in the biological world, acts of kindness are sometimes motivated by the desire to avoid derision.302 Case in point, being raised Catholic, as a youth I felt it a

301 Ibid., 78 – 79. 119 moral obligation to give money during ‘the Offertry’ during Mass, even though I had little money to give at that time and could not tell why I was giving, nor to what purpose such generosity specifically served. I was in fact primarily motivated by a desire to avoid feelings of guilt, or the possibility of being judged as less than generous by my peers or the congregation at-large. I participated in a ritualised social act of kindness that had abstract moral motivations and implications but I did so in order to avoid being attacked.

Morality is all too often taken for granted as a feature of the human being as distinct from other animals. But in Nature beyond human culture, social peer-group pressures similar to the aforementioned are also at play. As Kagan (2002) states, “Animals often share food in order to avoid attack for failing to do so,” which gives evidence to a level of rudimentary morality in at least more complex non-human organism.303 Further, morality likely has biological roots and is particularly prevalent in monkeys and apes that possess the ability to detect subtle modes of communication such as facial gestures and body language along with more obvious vocal signals such as intonation, volume and pitch.304 Hare et al (2000) compiled experimental evidence showing “ … that many nonhuman primate species, especially chimpanzees, Pan troglodytes, reliably follow the gaze direction of conspecifics to external targets.”305 In particular, common chimpanzees have been observed to not only track the gaze of others geometrically but to also check back with others as they move about their environment for communicative reassurance – but such cooperative intent seems to fail to operate in regards to food foraging when the desired item could be consumed by themselves.306 Put simply, these arguments suggest that the degree to which I am willing to help others is dependent on the level of sensitivity I possess in assessing others responses to my action coupled with my personal needs and intentions.

In The Descent of Man (1874), Charles Darwin suggested that morality in humans along with the rest of the animal kingdom was subject to the laws of Natural Selection where

302 Post et al., 2002, p. 42. 303 Ibid. 304 Ibid. 305 Hare et al, (2000), p. 771. 306 Ibid., p. 772. 120 levels of sensitivity emerge and are favoured as a species evolves.307 The fundamental premise of Natural Selection is that physical and behavioural traits emerge through mutation and persist in an individual when these traits permit the maximum number of genes are passed on to the maximum number of offspring.308 Implicit in this premise is the notion of selfishness, where individual gain is considered the primary biological agent of change. Such Darwinian self-interest possesses two tiers. By Darwin’s argument, on the surface, an individual will compete against other individuals to maximise their own fecundity and operated according to the laws of Natural Selection. But when one group is in competition with another group (say for argument’s sake two neighbouring chimpanzee colonies), individuals within each group will ally themselves with their kin against outsiders. Darwin considered that such behaviour was motivated by sympathy towards one’s kin.309 Added to the laws of Natural Selection is what W.D. Hamilton (1964 I & II) termed ‘Kin Selection’ (also know as ‘Group Selection’ or ‘Inclusive Fitness’):

“ ... selection for altruistic behaviour between genetic relatives …”310

or …

“ … organisms being selected to help their relatively close kin.”311

Hamilton attempted to explain this sociality towards one’s immediate relatives on the basis of ‘haplodiploidy’ genetic relatedness in O:Hymenoptera, where an altruistic gene is naturally selected when the benefits of helping behaviour towards one’s kin outweigh the costs to the individual. E. O. Wilson (1975) defined altruism as “ … ‘self- destructive behaviour performed for the benefit of others.’” Alexander Rosenberg (1998) states that altruism occurs “… whenever the behaviour increases the

307 Margolis, 1982, p. 26. 308 Recall that Richard Dawkins (1989) took this argument to its logical reductionist conclusion by suggesting that the primary unit of evolutionary change was the gene that possessed a selfish motif. 309 Rosenberg, 1998, in Hull and Ruse (eds.), p. 449. Note that sympathy is here defined as “ … a state in which the subject feels ‘sorry for’ the object as a result of perceiving the distress of the object.” (Damasio, 2002 in Post et al, p. 287) 310 Levitt, 1975, p. 4531. 311 Trivers, 1971, p. 35. 121 reproductive fitness of another at the expense of one’s own reproductive fitness.”312 When expressed towards one’s kin, such behaviour becomes Kin Selected, i.e. helping traits are selected for favourably when they benefit the population even if they disadvantage an individual in the immediate sense. Helping behaviour directed to one’s relatives can have the effect of increasing one’s individual fecundity from 0.5 to 0.75.313 Hence:

“ … altruism persists among individuals, despite its cost in individual fitness, because it enhances the fitness of the group.”314

From an evolutionary perspective, there is a net individual reproductive benefit through some forms of helping behaviour that evolve in individuals and are expressed throughout a population towards one’s relatives. Kin Selection is also seen as fundamentally selfish, in that such a strategy requires interaction with others to function and thereby lacks the absolute morality that a level of selfless helping behaviour - also referred to by Sober and Wilson (1998) as ‘vernacular altruism’ - would facilitate.

Sober (1998) differentiates between these two types of altruism: Kin Selection as compared with selfless or vernacular altruism. For Sober, Kin Selection is an evolutionary mechanism which all organisms are subject to and capable of participating in whereas a vernacular altruist must by definition possess a mind capable of detecting thoughts and feelings. While the former is motivated by one’s reproductive success, the latter is motivated by qualities of morality, affection, generosity, thereby possessing a general ‘feeling’ of selflessness. Further, it is possible for one’s altruism to be reciprocal and not vernacular and vice versa. 315 Darwin (1871) addressed this dilemma by showing that while it is true that helping behaviour can diminish an individual’s fecundity and is thereby likely to be selected out of a population, it is also true that a high standard of morality, while not offering any direct advantage to the individual, will

312 Rosenberg, op. cite., p. 448. 313 I refrain from a discussion of the mathematics of this statement here. For further detail see Hamiton (1964 I & II). For an overview of Hamilton’s Kin Selection Theory see Ruse, op. cite., p. 446. 314 Rosenberg, op. cite., p. 449. 315 Sober, 1998, in Hull and Ruse (eds.), p. 460. 122 have broad reaching advantages for the longer term survival of the community to which that individual belongs and is therefore advantageous.316

A third kind of altruism also exists and is known as ‘reciprocal altruism.’ This kind of helping behaviour implies cooperation between unrelated individuals within a family group or between different groups. Such altruism is generally described as a tit-for-tat trait and is governed by the limits of the givers self-interest. Game theorists have devised the Prisoner’s Dilemma to explain reciprocal altruism, where two interacting individuals have four choices of interaction:

1. Mutual benefit between A and B. 2. A offers help to B at cost to A and benefit to B. 3. B offers help to A at cost to B and benefit to A. 4. And finally, A and B refuse to extend help towards each other.317

Reciprocal altruism is generally seen as symbiosis, where one individual offers help towards another, and a time lag exists between giving and receiving helpful behaviour from a non-related conspecific. Like Kin Selection, reciprocal altruism ultimately benefits the group even if there is a cost to the individual. Hence all three forms of altruism have a place in any discourse on biological kindness – organisms (humanity included) are not inherently selfish after all but have access to a number of forms of altricial expression.

Post (2002) makes a critical point that humanity is at a crossroads in regards to our capacity to express kindness. Gestures of genuine vernacular altruism are steeped in an emotive expression of love where an individual becomes:

“Overawed, [and] the deeply humbled self is transformed through something like an ego-death to a new self of profound humility, empathy, and regard for all human and other life.”318

Where empathy refers to:

316 Ibid., p. 475. 317 Trivers, 1971, p. 38. 318 Post et al, 2002, p. 42. 123

“ … situations in which the subject has a similar emotional state to an object as a result of the perception of the object’s situation or predicament … [where] … the distinction between self and other is maintained, and the emotional state remains object focused rather than self focused.”319

Such love is timeless (aka. pushes beyond Darwinian evolutionary theory), speciesless (aka. applicable to all life), and transcends cultural norms (aka. contradicts xenophobia). This is precisely the kind of kindness that a Primate Science embodies. Primate Science is therefore a loving science that is sensitive to the nuances of the observed.

5.3: Nature of the Human Primate

 “Empathy and sympathy are emotions. When they occur, do they trigger altruistic desires? Common sense suggests that they do …”

Elliott Sober and David Sloan Wilson, 1998, p. 231.

With the evolution of Homo sapien sapiens some 150,000 years ago came the emergence of human intuition. Our ancestors developed the ability to infer thoughts and feelings, a sense of self-awareness, became able to discern desirable from less desirable qualities, developed a sense of past, present and future along with a level of conscious choice (or free will) that permitted an overriding of instinct.320 We are thus perfectly poised as a species to embrace a Primate Science. In the midst of much banter about the nature versus nurture debate, a Primate Science suggests not only that we must, but also that we are biologically capable of transcending beyond the limitation of the determinist straight jacket that locks human culture to selfishness.

319 Damasio, 2002, in Post et al, p. 286. 320 Ibid., p. 42. 124 Indeed the shackles of biological determinism are much weaker than modern science tends to believe. Thomas Hobbes presents the human need for an omnipotent civil authority to keep its citizen’s in line and to facilitate broad cooperation. But despite such a gloomy view of human nature, Hobbes struggles to avoid suggesting that cooperation might be an integral part of our intuition. In Hobbes seminal work Leviathan, governments institute helping behaviour to counter a life that would otherwise be “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short.”321 Hobbes goes further to explore the sociability of bees and ants as exemplars of the levels of cooperative altruism humanity desires for our own societies. He implies that such helpfulness, while artificially covenant in humanity, is none-the-less achievable.322 But the maximum level of helping behaviour that one can expect from humanity was in Adam Smith’s opinion at best reciprocally altruistic – even to the extent of blatantly chastising ‘free-loaders’ (someone who benefits from the generosity of others without contributing to the giver’s well-being in return). The basic tenet of Smith’s Wealth of Nations was self-interest – and such an edict has woven its way throughout the very fabric of Western civilization, including, indeed particularly prevalent in reductionist science.323

But Russian anarchist, Prince Peter Kropotkin took an opposite view, where cooperative helping behaviour beyond reciprocity – what he referred to as mutual aid – was not only natural but also at the very foundations of the flourishing of life. Through many wanderings in Nature, Kropotkin was carefully watchful and noted that:

“In all these scenes of animal life which crossed before my eyes, I saw mutual aid and mutual support carried on to an extent which made me suspect in it a feature of the greatest importance for the maintenance of life, the preservation of each species and its further evolution.”324

Such a gulf in opinions with regards to the helping nature of humanity might well be cultural. Where Eastern philosophers, from Russia to the Orient, viewed cooperation as the default state of humanity, Western Europeans like Hobbes and Smith tended to laud the individualist bent. Dugatkin (1999) argues that in harsher climates organisms are more likely to need each other’s help – as would be the case in Siberia for example.

321 Gugatkin, 1999, p. 8. 322 Ibid., pp. 1-2. 323 Ibid., pp. 9 – 11. 324 Ibid., p. 31. 125 Meanwhile, the more temperate climate of Western Europe supported organism with the luxurious opportunity to assume an individualist bent that found its way into the fabric of Western society and the sciences that it gave birth to.325 In reality, both camps may well have been right. Primate Science sees the validity in each of these perspectives by offering a vision of reciprocal and vernacular altruism where the qualities of empathy (taking upon the needs of another through one’s self) and sympathy (feeling compelled to help satisfy the needs of others) are centralised. Non-human primates possess these qualities also.

5.4: The Best Kind of Empathy

 “ … we venture to speculate that apes evaluate the emotions and situations of others with a greater understanding than is found in most other animals apart from ourselves.”

Preston and de Waal, in Post et al, 2002, p. 297.

By and large, gestures of kindness are thought to be contrary to Natural Selection.326 W.D. Hamilton’s (1964) Kin Selection Theory posed a remedy to this paradox by offering a mechanism by which an individual is able to discern the degree of relatedness of a conspecific; where the degree of relatedness determines the degree of kindness shown. Hamilton made two predictions about the emergence of altruistic behaviour based on kin selection:

• Firstly - Any act of kindness offered will only be extended to one’s kin. • Secondly - The costlier the act of kindness, the closer the relationship between kin members.

But such parameters raise a crucial question: Where do the boundaries between kin and non-kin lay? Silk (2001) suggests that kin-recognition is particularly dependent upon physical location and proximity, but might also include olfactory cues, visual signals

325 Ibid., 32 – 33. 326 Silk, 2002, p. 849. 126 such as particular cultural gestures, markings and possibly even political ties despite genetic disimialrity.327 In the Tanzanian National Park at Gombe Stream, outright ‘warfare’ erupted between neighbouring chimpanzee populations, and eventually resulted in the genocide of all the males in the vanquished group. Were the victors successful in destroying a rival population with whom they shared no genetic similarity? I think not. More likely, these populations represented distantly related groups whose territorial tensions over access to resources outweighed their relatedness to the point of murderous conflict. The same could be said for human conflicts that result in violence. The fundamental point I make here is that the boundaries between kin and non-kin are indeterminate.

In most primate species, expressions of kin-recognition might take the form of infanticide and cannibalism, preferential food sharing, sexual liaisons (or lack there of), social familiarity and grooming preference/avoidance. All of these examples give evidence for the finely developed kin recognition skills that primates possess. The conventional wisdom around gendered kin-recognition abilities states that maternal kinship was recognised much more intently than along the paternal lineage.328 But recent studies by Widdig et al, (2001) show that this must now be reconsidered since studies on half-sister recognition between female macaques on Cayo Santiago showed similar maternal and paternal recognition.329 In another study on common chimpanzee kin recognition by Parr and de Waal (1999), unfamiliar mother-son photographs were paired correctly, while mother-daughter photographs were less consistently correctly identified. These findings implied at least a degree of visual recognition was employed to determine similarity even though kin-awareness per se could not be proven. 330 Such discerning ability does affect the degree of kindness expressed between individuals. This evidence does not take into account is the affect of mood, along with ‘feelings’ of being in-favour versus the accumulation of grudges that can exist between even the closest of related kin, and to what degree such complications affect gestures of kindness even between closely related individuals.

De Waal (1982) states that:

327 Ibid., p. 854. 328 Ibid., p. 857. 329 Ibid., p. 862. 330 Ibid., pp. 856 - 857. 127

“ Particularly in chimpanzees, complex mental concepts are believed to mediate social exchanges.”331

There is now ample evidence to substantiate that chimpanzee and bonobos are able to remember kin, relational affiliations amongst conspecifics, to harbour grudges, to express favouritism towards a select group of individuals, and even to express kindness towards individuals of other species.332 Given humanity’s similar – albeit more complex – cognition compared with that of chimpanzee/bonobos, our level of consciousness, and our access to free-will, it comes as no surprise that we possesses these same qualities. What is surprising is that such qualities continue to be obscured in mainstream human socio-cultural discourses. What is needed is for us to be reminded of our primatological capacity to be kind, and for such qualities to find a central place not only in science, but also throughout our social infrastructures. Primate Science offers such a reminder along with a method for instituting the philosophical foundations upon which it is built into mainstream Western society. This shift is brought about by broadening the perception of the researcher as they apply holistic research and the perception of the public who gain a more encompassing vision of the research findings upon publication. Primate Science therefore offers a heightened perception of the qualities of sympathy and empathy to the professional and the lay-person alike.

Throughout this chapter I have aimed to show that despite the laws of Kin Selection and the inherent selfishness that they imply, the best kind of kindness is one where the individual recognises their relatedness not just with their kin, but also with all their surroundings. I have attempted to show that this premise is biologically possible and can be expressed through the application of a Primate Science.

331 deWaal, 1982; deWaal &Luttrell, 1988, quoted in Hemelrijk & Anneke, 1991, p. 924. 332 Jane Goodall (1965 & 1988) writes about numerous ‘friendly’ and ‘playful’ interactions between juvenile chimpanzees and baboons observed at the Gombe Stream Reserve along with gestures of reciprocation-free kindness extended towards human field researchers by one or a number of the chimpanzees they observed. Watts (2002) mentions ‘bookkeeping’ as a significant component in determining the cost-to-benefit ratio prior to gestures of kindness being extended between conspecifics. 128

CONCLUSION: FINISHING UP IN THREE DIMENSIONS

 “Look Dad! … They love me!”

Five year-old boy observing the common chimpanzees at Whipsnade Wildlife Park, Hemel Hampstead, U.K., August, 2003.

129 On the rise just before entering Whipsnade Wildlife Park is the wind swept peak of Hampstead Heath. It’s a strange place really - a paradox. On the one hand, especially when the sun shines, there are hundreds of people clustered about flying kites, parasailing or picnicking – seeming to have fun. The breathe of the Atlantic whips up to a mild gale there, sending hats flailing and making it the perfect place for wind sports and long lung-fills of fresh air. It’s a vista, a panorama that gives one the sense of being on top of the world. Yet, this escarpment that thrusts up from the river plain and village below is bleak - an anathema that is not particularly pleasing to the eye, giving meek purchase to battered shrubs and hedgerows and an occasional cluster of small trees that seem melancholy. It is in the shadow of this place, on the leeward side, that the Zoological Society of London’s Whipsnade Wildlife Park is nestled.

Like Hampstead Heath, there is something paradoxical about the Wildlife Park. On the one hand it is a place for us to see a wide variety of the world’s majesty, collected in one manageable location. The grounds are beautifully-kept, the broad promenades are lined with pampered flower beds and short clipped lawns, the trees are large and lush heralding a history of protection for this place that stretches back easily more than one hundred years, and maras (small antelope type creatures that have heads like guinea pigs) amble about freely, tamely and contently, giving the impression that wildness is at one’s fingertips. One’s spirit feels welcomed there. It is a place for us to experience our fuller naturalness.

And … on these grounds, the exotic is separated from the indigenous, dissected by a spaghetti bowl of electrified fences which serve as heralds to remind the eye that the place for us humans is here on this side, and the place for most of the other creatures that (perhaps against their will) call Whipsnade home, is on the other side where no exit routes traverse. Eight common chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes spp.) live in the primate enclosure of this place and for three days, they tolerated my prying eye along with perhaps several thousand others.

The primate enclosure at Whipsnade is tripartite. The main building contains a series of interconnected concrete cubicles laid out in an ‘L’ that can be isolated or co-joined, and are viewable from a walkway across one side that is partitioned with Perspex. To the right of the building is a jungle gym type cage with a wood chip floor, constructed of a 130 series of hexagonal geo-forms that serve as a localized outdoor enclosure, connected to the main building by a tunnel through which the chimps can pass at their leisure during the day. And to the left, butting up against the main building is the ‘natural’ enclosure that is essentially a mound with several scooped out nooks, covered in long grass. There are three grand old oaks on the flat about the mound, but they are the messengers of shade, not to be climbed by the chimps for fear of a painful zap. Atop the mound on opposite sides are a wooden deck and swing set, that but for the eight foot tall electrified perimeter fence that gives these chimpanzees a grassland outdoor sanctuary, could easily be the kind of place a child would love to frolic.

Nikki, Wally, Bonnie-Lewise, Zephyr, Grant, Phil, and Elvis are hybrid by-products of the international Zoological chimpanzee captive breeding program. Primrose is the only chimpanzee in the colony to have been born free-living. 333 All eight chimpanzees spent most of their time being very still and quiet over the three days that I watched them except for extended period of grooming where upon clusters of two or three would form and fracture dynamically, often beneath the shade of the oak nearest the main building. They were easy to see as the most popular points of congregation are within twenty meters from where a human observer can stand to watch them for most of the day. I noted their behaviour for a total of fourteen hours over the three days that I spent at Whipsnade. While brief, and certainly an inadequate amount of time to conduct any serious field research, my visit was the culmination of many months of reading, writing and thinking about chimpanzees and what they have to teach us about themselves and us.

I learned that because of the constraints of living in an enclosure, and perhaps because of their biological nature, these chimpanzees paced regular paths - even outdoors – leaving much of the meadow untouched. This suggested that they are perhaps creatures

333 Primrose: Older Adult female, a little obese and rescued from tea party television shows and generally moving about slowly and carefully. Nikki: adult male in his prime, holding alpha status in the colony, noted for his mellow demeanour. Wally: Nikki’s younger whose support of Nikki’s alpha status is crucial to colony stability. Bonnie-Lewise: adult female in her prime who is the attentive and protective mother to one year-old infant Elvis - likely sired by Nikki. Zephyr: young adult male described by the keepers as “ … a smart chimp who is frustrated and a bit of a loner” because without Wally’s support for Nikki he would be in alpha position in the colony gaining the advantages of permissive reproductive access, choice food and a central role in colony politics. Phil: adolescent male, mischievous, energetic and very attached to Nikki and Wally. Grant: likely half brother to Phil, Grant’s mother died when he was an infant which left him a little less rambunctious but he too tends to shadow the alpha and beta males for much of the day. 131 of habit by instinct or seriously bored, or both. I learned that on wandering forays about the outdoor enclosure, the alpha and beta adult males were almost always shadowed by one or both of the adolescent males. The adolescents were engaged and very attentive to the movements of their mentees who looked back constantly. The adolescents seemed to possess a general desire to interact with the adult males. Observing them, I had the impression that the adolescents seemed less than sure of themselves. I learned that all members of the colony (except for the infant Elvis) suffered excessive grooming that resulted in patchy bald spots on their coat. Zephyr was most susceptible to this and was self-imposed, Kathy Doherty (Senior Chimpanzee Keeper) explaining that such were the consequences of his frustration as a lower ranked male than perhaps he was capable of becoming. I learned that when solo time was sought, an individual (generally Zephyr) would climb a long pole near the swing set and perch atop it quietly watching the world about with a seeming contemplative demeanour. I learned that the females in this colony are generally quite mellow, Bonnie-Lewise tending care for Elvis who was becoming progressively more active and adventurous and that but for an occasional interaction, the adult males did not assist in parenting. Primrose spent much of her time resting and interacted most intently with Grant whom she had adopted when he was an infant after his mother Daisy died. I did observe Phil to mount Primrose once though she did not respond in kind and was not in oestrus. Phil also actively engaged in play with Elvis. Kathy Doherty believes that the two adolescent males are half-brothers and are exactly the same age (6 years). She considers this kinship helps explain their close bond with each other.

I learned that when politicking occurred between individuals it was received as more of a game by the youngsters and was taken seriously by the adults – and could shift the quietness of the colony to raucous aggression and violence very rapidly. Such outbursts seldom lasted more than 30 seconds, and generally involved or lured in the attention of Phil and Grant, and would always involve Nikki and Wally. Sometimes, these displays were directed at we humans who stood at the observation point. When it did, the display often involved an aggressive bipedal swaggering motion on the mound top, complete with a cacophony of loud ‘hoo, hoo, hoo, awh’ vocalizations, followed by a charge at the fence that sometimes included a projectile (generally a rock, stick or clump of faeces) being launched with great force and accuracy underarm towards us. On one occasion, after displaying and charging at the fence, Phil grabbed some sod, 132 threw it at me and then stopped immediately adjacent me on his side of the fence where upon he was joined by Nikki and Wally and all three peed in my general direction before continuing to move past me. I took this as a clear signal to keep my distance. I also took this as an indication that interpersonal differences gave way to cooperation when an individual or some members of the group felt threatened by an outsider, since Phil was generally an annoyance to Wally, constantly pestering him for attention and often being reprimanded with his wrestles and bites.

I also learned that when observing captive chimpanzees, it is equally interesting to observe the human observers. The demography of visitors to the chimpanzee enclosure was mostly families with young children. Fathers tended to show the least interest when the population was mellow (which was much of the time) and the most interest when there was action happening - like a display. Mother’s and grandmothers tended to express the most embarrassment when gestures of copulation or masturbation occurred. The population’s females are on birth control and therefore seldom come into oestrus, which is generally the only time when the reproductively mature males will become sexually aroused – but (as Kathy Doherty informed me) sexual motions do occur throughout the month. I found children the most interesting to observe since their reaction were less ‘adulterated’ by reason. Take these comments as examples in addition to the quote that commences this conclusion:

• “Monkey, hello! I am here.” A 3 year-old boy. • “She was just staring at me!” A 5 year-old girl. • Ew! They are smelly!” A 4 year-old girl responding to being presented with a clear view of Primroses labia’s. • “Oy! Get over here and do something!” A 5 year-old boy. • Hey! Stand up! I want to see you. A 5 year-old boy.

Compared with these:

• “It was just eyeing you up to see if it was gonna eat you.” Adult male speaking to (presumably) his young child.

133 • ‘They’re just like us, aren’t they.” A young adult mother with child in arm talking to her mother. She also said, “ they look sad, don’t they?” before wandering on to another enclosure. • (Said with haste) “Come on dear we need to go now.” A mother responding to Phil’s mounting motions of Primrose. • “C’mon, let’s go.” An adult male speaking to his family after visiting the chimpanzee enclosure for less than 5 minutes. • (Said condescendingly) “Hey Brad, that one looks just like you!” A father talking to his 7-year-old son.

Through my observations of the human observers, I noted that there is a primal interest in chimpanzees that run’s parallel to a primal discomfort, where the former is more strongly expressed by children and the latter more strongly expressed by adults – particularly women. Adult men seemed to have the least expressive reactions when observing the chimpanzees except when the chimpanzees expressed tumult. The juxtaposition between the children’s and the adult’s responses is telling. Children’s expression of curiosity about chimpanzees seemed to be more reflexive and intuitive, centring particularly about on noticed, engaging with the chimpanzees, establishing some form of immediate interaction. Adults seemed to care less about a direct connection; indeed on several occasions I observed adults making particular use of the opportunity to highlight to their children the differences between humans and chimpanzees. Adults tended to be analytical, rational and impatient, almost always being the instigators of moving their children on to the next enclosure.

I therefore conclude this dissertation by stating that Primate Science captures the intuitive essence of youth.

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146 APPENDIX 1:

Branching phylogeny of the hominoids (Superfamily:Hominoidea) relative to the Old World monkeys (Superfamily: Cercopithecoidea) – from de Waal and Lanting, 1997, p. 3.

147 APPENDIX 2:

Traditional Primate Taxonomy, downloaded from the World Wide Web: URL:http://www.umanitoba.ca/anthropology/course/121/primatology/taxonomy.html

148 APPENDIX 3:

The percentage divergence of DNA or Delta Value (∆) between each genera of great ape as compared with Hamadryas baboons as the ‘out-sider’ group (adapted from Sibley and Ahlquist, 1987, p. 113).

149

APPENDIX 4:

Cultural Qualities of Free-living Chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes spp.) - adapted from Whiten, Goodall, McGrew, Nishida, Reynolds, Sugiyama, Tutin, Wrangham and Boesch, 1999, p. 683.

150