List of Tables To" Prices in Recession and Recovery: a Survey of Recent
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X-6737 TUB DISCOUNT RATE CONTROVERSY BETWEEN THE FEDERAL RESERVE BOARD and THE FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF NEW YORK -1- November [1st approx., 1930. The Federal Reserve Bank of New York, in its Annual Report for the year 1929, stated: "For a number of weeks from February to May, 1929, the Directors of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York voted an increase in the discount rate from 5% to 6%. This increase was not approved by the Board." Annual Report, Page 6. ~2~ The above statement makes clear the error of the prevailing view that the discount rate controversy lasted from February 14, 1929, - the date of the first application for increase in discount rates, - to August 9, 1929, the date of the Board's approval of the increase from 5% to 6%. The controversy began on February 14, 1929, but practically ended on May 31, 1929. On May 22, 1929, Governor Harrison and Chairman McGarrah told the Board that while they still desired an increase to 6%, they found that the member banks, under direct pressure, feared to increase their borrowings, and that they wanted to encourage them to borrow to meet the growing demand for commercial loans. 16 Diary 76 (69). Furthermore, on May 31, 1929, Chairman McGarrah wrote to the Federal Reserve Board that the control of credit without increasing discount rates Digitized for FRASER http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis X-6737 - 2 - (direct pressure) had created uncertainty; that agreement upon a program to remove uncertainty was far more important than the discount rate; that in view of recent changes in the business and credit situation., his directors believed that a rate change now without a mutually satis- factory program, might only aggravate existing tendencies; that it may soon be necessary to establish a less restricted discount policy in order that the member banks may more freely borrow for the proper conduct of their business:; that the Federal reserve bank should be prepared to increase its portfolio if and when any real need of doing so becomes apparent. -
Records of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, 1891-1957, Record Group 85 New Orleans, Louisiana Crew Lists of Vessels Arriving at New Orleans, LA, 1910-1945
Records of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, 1891-1957, Record Group 85 New Orleans, Louisiana Crew Lists of Vessels Arriving at New Orleans, LA, 1910-1945. T939. 311 rolls. (~A complete list of rolls has been added.) Roll Volumes Dates 1 1-3 January-June, 1910 2 4-5 July-October, 1910 3 6-7 November, 1910-February, 1911 4 8-9 March-June, 1911 5 10-11 July-October, 1911 6 12-13 November, 1911-February, 1912 7 14-15 March-June, 1912 8 16-17 July-October, 1912 9 18-19 November, 1912-February, 1913 10 20-21 March-June, 1913 11 22-23 July-October, 1913 12 24-25 November, 1913-February, 1914 13 26 March-April, 1914 14 27 May-June, 1914 15 28-29 July-October, 1914 16 30-31 November, 1914-February, 1915 17 32 March-April, 1915 18 33 May-June, 1915 19 34-35 July-October, 1915 20 36-37 November, 1915-February, 1916 21 38-39 March-June, 1916 22 40-41 July-October, 1916 23 42-43 November, 1916-February, 1917 24 44 March-April, 1917 25 45 May-June, 1917 26 46 July-August, 1917 27 47 September-October, 1917 28 48 November-December, 1917 29 49-50 Jan. 1-Mar. 15, 1918 30 51-53 Mar. 16-Apr. 30, 1918 31 56-59 June 1-Aug. 15, 1918 32 60-64 Aug. 16-0ct. 31, 1918 33 65-69 Nov. 1', 1918-Jan. 15, 1919 34 70-73 Jan. 16-Mar. 31, 1919 35 74-77 April-May, 1919 36 78-79 June-July, 1919 37 80-81 August-September, 1919 38 82-83 October-November, 1919 39 84-85 December, 1919-January, 1920 40 86-87 February-March, 1920 41 88-89 April-May, 1920 42 90 June, 1920 43 91 July, 1920 44 92 August, 1920 45 93 September, 1920 46 94 October, 1920 47 95-96 November, 1920 48 97-98 December, 1920 49 99-100 Jan. -
The 1930S: a New Curriculum and Coeducation, by Mary Hull Mohr
The 1930s: A New Curriculum and Coeducation, by Mary Hull Mohr Two of Luther’s most transformative changes came in the early 1930s: the ending of the classical curriculum and the beginning of coeducation. Both decisions were in part driven by financial concerns. The enrollment of the college dropped from 345 in 1930-31 to 283 students in the 1931-32 school year, and the college had significant debt. President Olson had strongly supported the classical curriculum, but in the face of financial pressures and student and constituency challenges, he affirmed the faculty’s vote to adopt new curricular requirements starting in September of 1931. Christianity retained its 14 hour requirement, but students were no longer required to take Greek, Latin, German, Norwegian, history, and mathematics. A two- year requirement in the language of the student’s choice remained (one year if the student had taken two years in high school). History was folded into a social science requirement and mathematics into a science and math requirement. Since majors, minors, and electives were already options, Luther had finally adopted the pattern common in most of the colleges and universities in the United States. The day after the adoption of the new curriculum by the faculty, President Olson announced that he was advocating coeducation. A staunch supporter of Luther as a college for men, Olson must have believed that the financial crisis would be alleviated by the admission of women. Not everyone agreed. Some believed coeducation would require additional resources: new courses for women, female faculty, housing needs. And, indeed, it did. -
Stagflation in the 1930S: Why Did the French New Deal Fail?
Stagflation in the 1930s: Why did the French New Deal Fail? Jeremie Cohen-Setton, Joshua K. Hausman, and Johannes F. Wieland∗ August 15, 2014 VERSION 1.0. VERY PRELIMINARY. DO NOT CITE WITHOUT PERMISSION. The latest version is available here. Abstract Most countries started to recover from the Great Depression when they left the Gold Stan- dard. France did not. In 1936, France both left the Gold Standard and enacted New- Deal-style policies, in particular wage increases and a 40-hour week law. The result was stagflation; prices rose rapidly from 1936 to 1938 while output stagnated. Using panel data on sectoral output, we show that the 40-hour week restriction had strong negative effects on production. Absent this law, France would likely have followed the usual pattern of rapid recovery after leaving the Gold Standard. We construct a model to show how supply-side policies could have prevented output growth despite excess capacity and a large real interest rate decline. ∗Cohen-Setton: University of California, Berkeley. 530 Evans Hall #3880, Berkeley, CA 94720. Email: [email protected]. Phone: (510) 277-6413. Hausman: Ford School of Public Policy, Uni- versity of Michigan. 735 S. State St. #3309, Ann Arbor, MI 48109. Email: [email protected]. Phone: (734) 763-3479. Wieland: Department of Economics, University of California, San Diego. 9500 Gilman Dr. #0508, La Jolla, CA 92093-0508. Email: [email protected]. Phone: (510) 388-2785. We thank Walid Badawi and Matthew Haarer for superb research assistance. “CABINETS, in France, may come and Cabinets may go, but the economic crisis seems to go on for ever.” - The Economist, 2/5/1938, p. -
Business in the 1920S Is This Photo of President and Mrs
BECOMING MODERN: AMERICA IN THE 1920S PRIMARY SOURCE COLLECTION ONTEMPORAR Y IN OMMENTARY THE T WENTIES C — BUSINESS — * Aptly illustrating the faith in American business in the 1920s is this photo of President and Mrs. Coolidge in 1924 welcoming members of the Republican Businessmen’s Association of New York. In an address the next year, Coolidge delivered his most frequently quoted statement: “After all, the chief business of the American people is business.” For by 1925 the nation’s economy had lifted itself out of the dreadful postwar recession and was setting new highs for production and consumption. American free enterprise was robust, confident, and delivering the goods, literally. Collected here is period commentary on the “chief business of the American people,” the rewards and pitfalls of its predominance, and the proper relationship of business and government in promoting the general welfare. An early proponent of applying scientific management principles to market analysis, Percival Percival White White published this essay on Americans’ embrace of business as a national ideal, satirizing “The Almighty Minute” while applauding its centrality in Americans’ sense of the successful modern life. Atlantic Monthly, July 1920 Business is not a part of American life; it is American life. The American businessman devotes 1440 minutes a day to business. Before daybreak, an alarm clock wrests him from his fitful business dreams. He gulps down business news along with his eggs and coffee. He plans business on his way to the office. His morning is spent in reading business, dictating business, and talking business. He keeps a business engagement for luncheon. -
1929 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-SENATE· 5895 Will Ascertain Bow Absurd His Fig'ures Were at That' Time; ·And Made Any Estifnates Upon ·Raw Wool
1929 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-SENATE · 5859 'MAINE The VICE PRESIDENT. Seventy-two Senators have an- Joseph. Otto Fisher, Lewiston. · swered to their names. · A quorum is present. MINNESOTA THE joUJ.iNAL Louis M. Larson, .Alberta. Mr. JONES. Mr. President, _I ask unanimous consent for Arthur J. Schunk, Minneapolis. the approval of the Journal of .Monday, November 18, Tuesday' Tollef P. Anderson, Thief River Falls. November 10, and Wednesday, November 20, 1929. The VICE PRESIDENT. Without objection, it' is so ordered. MONTANA ORDER FOR RECESS Helen P. Gibb, Belton. John M. Evans, jr., Butte. Mr. SMOOT. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that at the conclusion of to-day's business the Senate take a recess NEW MEXICO until10 o'clock to-morrow morning. John P. Milner, Anthony. The VICE PRESIDENT. Is there objection? The Chair NEW YORK hears none, and it is so ordered. Fred C. Conrad, Saranac Lake. HON. WALTER E. EDGE, AMBASSADOR TO FRANCE NORTH CAROLINA A message was communicated to the Senate from the Presi Byron J. Luther, Enka. dent of the United States by Mr. H~s. one of his secretaries. NORTH DAKOTA Mr. BORAH. Mr. President, I ask that there be laid before the Senate the nomination of Bon. WALTER E. EDGE, to be am Ellis R. Dennison, Neche. bassador to France. UTAH . .The VICE PRESIDENT. The clerk will announce the nom George A. Murphy,- Spring Canyon. ' ination. VERMONT The legislative clerk read as follows: Burton N. Sisco, Brandon. To be ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary to France, WALTER E. EDGE, of New •Jersey. WEST VIRGINIA Mr. -
The Olimpiada Popular: Barcelona 1936, Sport and Politics in an Age of War, Dictatorship and Revolution
Article The Olimpiada Popular: Barcelona 1936, Sport and Politics in an Age of War, Dictatorship and Revolution Physick, Ray Available at http://clok.uclan.ac.uk/19183/ Physick, Ray (2016) The Olimpiada Popular: Barcelona 1936, Sport and Politics in an Age of War, Dictatorship and Revolution. Sport in History, 37 (1). pp. 51-75. ISSN 1746-0263 It is advisable to refer to the publisher’s version if you intend to cite from the work. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17460263.2016.1246380 For more information about UCLan’s research in this area go to http://www.uclan.ac.uk/researchgroups/ and search for <name of research Group>. For information about Research generally at UCLan please go to http://www.uclan.ac.uk/research/ All outputs in CLoK are protected by Intellectual Property Rights law, including Copyright law. Copyright, IPR and Moral Rights for the works on this site are retained by the individual authors and/or other copyright owners. Terms and conditions for use of this material are defined in the policies page. CLoK Central Lancashire online Knowledge www.clok.uclan.ac.uk The Olimpiada Popular: Barcelona 1936 Sport and Politics in an age of War, Dictatorship and Revolution In an attempt to undermine the IOC Games of 1936, organisations linked to the international worker sport movement responded to an invitation from the Comité Organizador de la Olimpiada Popular (COOP) to take part in an alternative Olympics, the Olimpiada Popular, in Barcelona in July 1936. It is estimated that some 10,000 athletes and 25,000 visitors were in Barcelona to celebrate the Olimpiada. -
S Ubject L Ist N O. 103
iD,5TRiBUTED TO t h e Official No. : C . 5 6 1 . M . 2 1 2 . 1929- , EM8ERS OF THE LEAGUE] LEAGUE OF NATIONS Ge n e v a , December 4th, 1929. S ubject L ist N o. 103 OF DOCUMENTS distributed to the m em bers of the league DURING NOVEMBER 1929. ( Prepared by the Distribution Branch.) Key to Signs. $ Distributed previously. Key to Abbreviations. Assem bly Jan . J an u ary . and A.P. Allied and Associated Powers L. of N. League of Nations dd. Addendum, Addenda Memo. M em orandum Xddit. A dditional M tg. * M eeting Adv. A dvisory Min. M inutes N ovem ber 'g»- A greem ent Nov. Ml. A nnex Obser\. Observation O ctober PP- A ppendix O ct. Arb. and Sec. Cttee. Arbitration and Security Committee O.J. Official Journal Arrgt. Arrangement Org. Organisation to. Article P- Page A ssem bly P.A. and A.P. Principal Allied and Associated A ugust Pow ers Council Para. P a rag rap h 'hapt. Chapter Perm . P erm an e n t 1. Council Pet. Petition ,.L. * Circular Letter Plen. Mtgs. Plenary Meetings .M. * Council and Members Prelim. Preliminary .omm. Com mission Prep. Preparatory xmf. Conference Pres. P resident .onsult. Consultative Prov. Provisional x m v . C onvention Pt. P a rt '.P.J.I. * Permanent Court of International R ecom m . Recommendation Justice R edist. Redistributed ttee. C om m ittee Rep. R eport ec. D ecem ber R epres. Representative el. Delegation Resol. R esolution isc. Discussion Sec.-Gen. Secretary-General ist. -
Areas of Intense Drought Distress, 1930-1936
WORKS PROGRESS ADMINISTRATION Harry L. Hopkins, Administrator Corrington Gill, Assistant Administrator Howard B. Myers, Director Division of Social Research RESEARCH BULLETIN AREAS OF INTENSE DROUGHT DISTRESS, 1930-1936 Prepared by Francis D. Cronin and Howard W. Beers under the supervision of T. J. Woof ter, Jr. Rural Research Section, Division of Social Research, Works Progress Aaministration and Carl C. Taylor, in charge Division of Farm Population and Rural Life, Bureau of Agricultural Economics, and Social Research for the Resettlement Administration Washington January 1937 Digitized for FRASER http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Digitized for FRASER http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis CONTENTS Page Introduction............................................... 1 The problem of drought.................................. 1 The Great Plains Region........... ..................... 2 Drought incidence in the Great Plains Region.......... 2 Misdirected agricultural expansion................ 5 The measure of drought effect.......................... 6 Rainfall......................................... ......... 7 Crop conditions............... ............................ 13 Pasture conditions........................................ 17 Number of cattle.......................................... 21 Federal aid................................................ 25 Combined indices of drought intensity............... 29 Type of farming areas..................................... 33 Appendix— Methodological -
Current Literature
Journal of Accountancy Volume 48 Issue 3 Article 10 9-1929 Current Literature American Institute of Accountants. Library Follow this and additional works at: https://egrove.olemiss.edu/jofa Part of the Accounting Commons Recommended Citation American Institute of Accountants. Library (1929) "Current Literature," Journal of Accountancy: Vol. 48 : Iss. 3 , Article 10. Available at: https://egrove.olemiss.edu/jofa/vol48/iss3/10 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Archival Digital Accounting Collection at eGrove. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Accountancy by an authorized editor of eGrove. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Current Literature Compiled in the Library of the American Institute of Accountants. [Photostatic reproductions (white printing on a black background) of most of the articles listed in The Journal of Accountancy or Accountants' Index may be obtained from the library of the American Institute of Account ants, 135 Cedar Street, New York, at a rate of 25 cents a page in. x 11 in.), at 35 cents a page (11in.1/2 x 14 in.), plus postage. Members and Associates of the American Institute of Accountants are entitled to a discount of 20 per cent. Identify the article by author, title, name of periodical in which it appeared, date of publication and paging. Payment must accompany all orders.] ACCOUNTING Gill, S. Laurence. On the Value of Accountancy in Business. Cost Ac countant, July, 1929, p. 40-7. Hayes, Monard V. Accounting from the Management Viewpoint. New York, National Association of Cost Accountants, July 1, 1929. -
Union Power and the Great Crash of 1929
CEP Discussion Paper No 876 June 2008 Real Origins of the Great Depression: Monopoly Power, Unions and the American Business Cycle in the 1920s Monique Ebell and Albrecht Ritschl Abstract We attempt to explain the severe 1920-21 recession, the roaring 1920s boom, and the slide into the Great Depression after 1929 in a unified framework. The model combines monopolistic product market competition with search frictions in the labor market, allowing for both individual and collective wage bargaining. We attribute the extraordinary macroeconomic and financial volatility of this period to two factors: Shifts in the wage bargaining regime and in the degree of monopoly power in the economy. A shift from individual to collective bargaining presents as a recession, involving declines in output and asset values, and increases in unemployment and real wages. The pro-union provisions of the Clayton Act of 1914 facilitated the rise of collective bargaining after World War I, leading to the asset price crash and recession of 1920-21. A series of tough anti-union Supreme Court decisions in late 1921 induced a shift back to individual bargaining, leading the economy out of the recession. This, coupled with the lax anti-trust enforcement of the Coolidge and Hoover administrations enabled a major rise in corporate profits and stock market valuations throughout the 1920s. Landmark pro-union court decisions in the late 1920s, as well as political pressure on firms to adopt the welfare capitalism model of high wages, led to collapsing profit expectations, contributing substantially to the stock market crash. We model the onset of the Great Depression as an equilibrium switch from individual wage bargaining to (actual or mimicked) collective wage bargaining. -
The Japanese Economy During the Interwar Period
20092009--JE--21 The Japanese Economy during the Interwar Period: 両大戦間期Instabilityの日本における恐慌と政策対応 in the Financial System and ― 金融システム問題と世界恐慌への対応を中心にthe Impact of the World Depression ― Institute for Monetary and Economic Studies 金融研究所 鎮目雅人 Masato Shizume 2009 年 4 月 May 2009 The Japanese economy during the interwar period faced chronic crises. Among them, the Showa Financial Crisis of 1927 and the Showa Depression of 1930-31 marked turning points. The Showa Financial Crisis of 1927 was the consequence of persistent financial instability because of the incomplete restructuring in the business sector and postponements in the disposal of bad loans by financial institutions. The crisis brought reforms in the financial sector through large-scale injections of public funds and the amalgamation of banks. The Showa Depression of 1930-31 was caused by the Great Depression, a worldwide economic collapse, which had been intensified in Japan by the return to the Gold Standard at the old parity. Japan escaped from the Great Depression earlier than most other countries through a series of macroeconomic stimulus measures initiated by Korekiyo Takahashi, a veteran Finance Minister who resumed office in December 1931. Takahashi instituted comprehensive macroeconomic policy measures, including exchange rate, fiscal, and monetary adjustments. At the same time, the Gold Standard, which had been governing Japan’s fiscal policy, collapsed in the wake of the British departure from it in September 1931. Then, Japan introduced a mechanism by which the government could receive easy credit from the central bank without establishing other institutional measures to govern its fiscal policy. This course of events resulted in an eventual loss of fiscal discipline.