Archival Insights Into the Evolution of Economics
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Of Crashes, Corrections, and the Culture of Financial Information- What They Tell Us About the Need for Federal Securities Regulation
Missouri Law Review Volume 54 Issue 3 Summer 1989 Article 2 Summer 1989 Of Crashes, Corrections, and the Culture of Financial Information- What They Tell Us about the Need for Federal Securities Regulation C. Edward Fletcher III Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr Part of the Law Commons Recommended Citation C. Edward Fletcher III, Of Crashes, Corrections, and the Culture of Financial Information-What They Tell Us about the Need for Federal Securities Regulation, 54 MO. L. REV. (1989) Available at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol54/iss3/2 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Missouri Law Review by an authorized editor of University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Fletcher: Fletcher: Of Crashes, Corrections, and the Culture of Financial Information OF CRASHES, CORRECTIONS, AND THE CULTURE OF FINANCIAL INFORMATION-WHAT THEY TELL US ABOUT THE NEED FOR FEDERAL SECURITIES REGULATION C. Edward Fletcher, III* In this article, the author examines financial data from the 1929 crash and ensuing depression and compares it with financial data from the market decline of 1987 in an attempt to determine why the 1929 crash was followed by a depression but the 1987 decline was not. The author argues that the difference between the two events can be understood best as a difference between the existence of a "culture of financial information" in 1987 and the absence of such a culture in 1929. -
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X-6737 TUB DISCOUNT RATE CONTROVERSY BETWEEN THE FEDERAL RESERVE BOARD and THE FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF NEW YORK -1- November [1st approx., 1930. The Federal Reserve Bank of New York, in its Annual Report for the year 1929, stated: "For a number of weeks from February to May, 1929, the Directors of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York voted an increase in the discount rate from 5% to 6%. This increase was not approved by the Board." Annual Report, Page 6. ~2~ The above statement makes clear the error of the prevailing view that the discount rate controversy lasted from February 14, 1929, - the date of the first application for increase in discount rates, - to August 9, 1929, the date of the Board's approval of the increase from 5% to 6%. The controversy began on February 14, 1929, but practically ended on May 31, 1929. On May 22, 1929, Governor Harrison and Chairman McGarrah told the Board that while they still desired an increase to 6%, they found that the member banks, under direct pressure, feared to increase their borrowings, and that they wanted to encourage them to borrow to meet the growing demand for commercial loans. 16 Diary 76 (69). Furthermore, on May 31, 1929, Chairman McGarrah wrote to the Federal Reserve Board that the control of credit without increasing discount rates Digitized for FRASER http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis X-6737 - 2 - (direct pressure) had created uncertainty; that agreement upon a program to remove uncertainty was far more important than the discount rate; that in view of recent changes in the business and credit situation., his directors believed that a rate change now without a mutually satis- factory program, might only aggravate existing tendencies; that it may soon be necessary to establish a less restricted discount policy in order that the member banks may more freely borrow for the proper conduct of their business:; that the Federal reserve bank should be prepared to increase its portfolio if and when any real need of doing so becomes apparent. -
Service Notes
of the Government of India in the Department of Education, Health and Lands. Major H. Caldwell Tait, m.b.E., i.m.s., Military Medi- cal Officer, Roorkee, to ibe the Civil Medical Officer of Roorkee, in addition to his own duties, vice Major E. A. Penny, i.m.s., with effect from the afternoon of 23rd April, 1929. The undermentioned temporary commissioned officers are appointed permanently to the Indian Medical Service subject to His Majesty's approval:? Lieutenant Sher Mohammad Khan Mallick, m.b. Dated 16th February, 1928, with seniority from 18th August, 1927. Lieutenant Euruch Ardeshir Ruttanji Ardeshir. Dated 30th April, 1928, with seniority from 16th Decem- ber, 1927. Lieutenant Thaku Chuharmal Ramchandani, m.b., F.r.c.s.E. Dated 30th April, 1928, with seniority from 12th May, 1926. Lieutenant Cheruvari Kottieth Lakshmanan. Dated 30th April, 1928, with seniority from 21st October, 1925. To be Lieutenants (on probation). Service Notes. K. F. Alford, m.b., 4th February, 1929, with seniority 6th January, 1927. H. J. Curran, m.b., 4th February, 1929. Appointments and Transfers. H. T. McWilliams, m.b., 4th February, 1929. P. Shannon, m.b., 4th February, 1929. Colonel W.- D. c.i.E., m.b., v.h.s., i.m.s., J. Megaw, G. m.b., 4th 1929. with the Government of J. O'Connor, February, Officiating Surgeon-General B. Griffiths, 4th 1929. is to that post, with J. February, Madras, appointed permanently E. A. Y. Mackeown, 4th 1929. effect from the forenoon of the 3rd April. 1929. February, H. S. Waters, m.b., 4th 1929. -
Lack of Economic Diversity the Economy Lacked Diversity
CONFRONT THE ISSUE WHAT CAUSED THE GREAT DEPRESSION? What caused the Great Depression? Historians and economists have debated this question since the 1930s. In the popular imagination Wall Street speculation and the 1929 Stock Market Crash were to blame. The reality is more complicated. Most scholars believe a combination of long and short term factors led to the crisis. During the 1920s, America experienced an economic boom. But the boom was built on shaky foundations. Scroll down to learn more about the causes of the Great Depression. CONFRONT THE ISSUE WHAT CAUSED THE GREAT DEPRESSION? Lack of Economic Diversity The economy lacked diversity. Prosperity rested too heavily on a few basic industries, notably construction and automobiles. In the late 1920s, purchases in those industries declined and newer industries did not emerge to take up the slack. Photo below: Factories closed or reduced production. FDR Library Photograph Collection, NPx 65-593(57) CONFRONT THE ISSUE WHAT CAUSED THE GREAT DEPRESSION? Unequal Wealth Distribution Unequal wealth distribution undercut consumer demand. During the 1920s, the proportion of business profits going to workers as wages was too small to create an adequate market for the goods the economy was producing. In 1929, after nearly a decade of strong economic growth, more than half of American families lived near or below the minimum subsistence level. When they made major purchases, they did so on credit. Photo below: Wife and children of a sharecropper, Washington County, Arkansas. FDR Library Photograph Collection, NPx 53-227(541) CONFRONT THE ISSUE WHAT CAUSED THE GREAT DEPRESSION? Unstable Banking System The banking system was unstable. -
The Frisco Employes' Magazine, February 1929
LOCOMOTIVE FUEL PERFORMANCE RECORDS Ofice of Fuel Agent EL conservation is and always mance previous year. However, the number of sub-divisions which have 7\11 be a live issue on the "Frisco 1928 unit consumption and cost per about the same tonnage rating, grade FLws" growing each year and re- unit was the lowest in the history of line, etc., and keen competition exists By directly in bringing about a the railroad. between the crews on these sub-divi- ksc in money expended for fuel. A word might be said here in con- sions. >,par of 1928 has just ended and nection with records made by individ- The year of 1928 was a record II gratifying to be able to say ual engine and train crews. Through- breaker but by continued close co- + min we made a considerable out the year these records are pub- operation the year of 1929 should over the previous year, verify- lished in the Magmine to allow each bring even better results. I*!?above phrase that each year division to see what the other is do- At this time the fuel performance I$ '? a lower consunlption of fuel ing in lowering the best previous fuel figures for the full year are not avail- records. Each particular division as able, however the following figures TI year. a whole has different conditions under represent performance made on each which to work, therefore one cannot Division and Class of Service for he compared very favombly with month of December, 1928, compared another. Ne~ertheless there are a to same month in 1927: FREIGHT SERVICE Per Cent d 1923 compared to 1928. -
1929 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-SENATE· 5895 Will Ascertain Bow Absurd His Fig'ures Were at That' Time; ·And Made Any Estifnates Upon ·Raw Wool
1929 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-SENATE · 5859 'MAINE The VICE PRESIDENT. Seventy-two Senators have an- Joseph. Otto Fisher, Lewiston. · swered to their names. · A quorum is present. MINNESOTA THE joUJ.iNAL Louis M. Larson, .Alberta. Mr. JONES. Mr. President, _I ask unanimous consent for Arthur J. Schunk, Minneapolis. the approval of the Journal of .Monday, November 18, Tuesday' Tollef P. Anderson, Thief River Falls. November 10, and Wednesday, November 20, 1929. The VICE PRESIDENT. Without objection, it' is so ordered. MONTANA ORDER FOR RECESS Helen P. Gibb, Belton. John M. Evans, jr., Butte. Mr. SMOOT. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that at the conclusion of to-day's business the Senate take a recess NEW MEXICO until10 o'clock to-morrow morning. John P. Milner, Anthony. The VICE PRESIDENT. Is there objection? The Chair NEW YORK hears none, and it is so ordered. Fred C. Conrad, Saranac Lake. HON. WALTER E. EDGE, AMBASSADOR TO FRANCE NORTH CAROLINA A message was communicated to the Senate from the Presi Byron J. Luther, Enka. dent of the United States by Mr. H~s. one of his secretaries. NORTH DAKOTA Mr. BORAH. Mr. President, I ask that there be laid before the Senate the nomination of Bon. WALTER E. EDGE, to be am Ellis R. Dennison, Neche. bassador to France. UTAH . .The VICE PRESIDENT. The clerk will announce the nom George A. Murphy,- Spring Canyon. ' ination. VERMONT The legislative clerk read as follows: Burton N. Sisco, Brandon. To be ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary to France, WALTER E. EDGE, of New •Jersey. WEST VIRGINIA Mr. -
S Ubject L Ist N O. 103
iD,5TRiBUTED TO t h e Official No. : C . 5 6 1 . M . 2 1 2 . 1929- , EM8ERS OF THE LEAGUE] LEAGUE OF NATIONS Ge n e v a , December 4th, 1929. S ubject L ist N o. 103 OF DOCUMENTS distributed to the m em bers of the league DURING NOVEMBER 1929. ( Prepared by the Distribution Branch.) Key to Signs. $ Distributed previously. Key to Abbreviations. Assem bly Jan . J an u ary . and A.P. Allied and Associated Powers L. of N. League of Nations dd. Addendum, Addenda Memo. M em orandum Xddit. A dditional M tg. * M eeting Adv. A dvisory Min. M inutes N ovem ber 'g»- A greem ent Nov. Ml. A nnex Obser\. Observation O ctober PP- A ppendix O ct. Arb. and Sec. Cttee. Arbitration and Security Committee O.J. Official Journal Arrgt. Arrangement Org. Organisation to. Article P- Page A ssem bly P.A. and A.P. Principal Allied and Associated A ugust Pow ers Council Para. P a rag rap h 'hapt. Chapter Perm . P erm an e n t 1. Council Pet. Petition ,.L. * Circular Letter Plen. Mtgs. Plenary Meetings .M. * Council and Members Prelim. Preliminary .omm. Com mission Prep. Preparatory xmf. Conference Pres. P resident .onsult. Consultative Prov. Provisional x m v . C onvention Pt. P a rt '.P.J.I. * Permanent Court of International R ecom m . Recommendation Justice R edist. Redistributed ttee. C om m ittee Rep. R eport ec. D ecem ber R epres. Representative el. Delegation Resol. R esolution isc. Discussion Sec.-Gen. Secretary-General ist. -
Union Power and the Great Crash of 1929
CEP Discussion Paper No 876 June 2008 Real Origins of the Great Depression: Monopoly Power, Unions and the American Business Cycle in the 1920s Monique Ebell and Albrecht Ritschl Abstract We attempt to explain the severe 1920-21 recession, the roaring 1920s boom, and the slide into the Great Depression after 1929 in a unified framework. The model combines monopolistic product market competition with search frictions in the labor market, allowing for both individual and collective wage bargaining. We attribute the extraordinary macroeconomic and financial volatility of this period to two factors: Shifts in the wage bargaining regime and in the degree of monopoly power in the economy. A shift from individual to collective bargaining presents as a recession, involving declines in output and asset values, and increases in unemployment and real wages. The pro-union provisions of the Clayton Act of 1914 facilitated the rise of collective bargaining after World War I, leading to the asset price crash and recession of 1920-21. A series of tough anti-union Supreme Court decisions in late 1921 induced a shift back to individual bargaining, leading the economy out of the recession. This, coupled with the lax anti-trust enforcement of the Coolidge and Hoover administrations enabled a major rise in corporate profits and stock market valuations throughout the 1920s. Landmark pro-union court decisions in the late 1920s, as well as political pressure on firms to adopt the welfare capitalism model of high wages, led to collapsing profit expectations, contributing substantially to the stock market crash. We model the onset of the Great Depression as an equilibrium switch from individual wage bargaining to (actual or mimicked) collective wage bargaining. -
Special Libraries, February 1930 Special Libraries Association
San Jose State University SJSU ScholarWorks Special Libraries, 1930 Special Libraries, 1930s 2-1-1930 Special Libraries, February 1930 Special Libraries Association Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.sjsu.edu/sla_sl_1930 Part of the Cataloging and Metadata Commons, Collection Development and Management Commons, Information Literacy Commons, and the Scholarly Communication Commons Recommended Citation Special Libraries Association, "Special Libraries, February 1930" (1930). Special Libraries, 1930. Book 2. http://scholarworks.sjsu.edu/sla_sl_1930/2 This Book is brought to you for free and open access by the Special Libraries, 1930s at SJSU ScholarWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Special Libraries, 1930 by an authorized administrator of SJSU ScholarWorks. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Vol. 21 February, 1930 No. 2 Business Builders Business Book Reviews THE PACIFIC COAST Librarians' Mecca in June S* L* A. San Francisco, Calif, JUNE 18, 19, 20, 21 A* L* A* Los Angeles, Calif. JUNE 23.28 Entmd u msmnd clu matter at the Pod Ofice, Pmvldence, R. I. under the Act of March 8, 117B. Aemptma for mltllne mt .peeid mta of postago pmvldcd for in don 1105, Act of October 8, 1B11. authorLed October 22, 1921. Rata: 15.00 a year. Fomlgn $6.60; sinela mpla W olltr Contents ' ARTICLES Business Builders. By Margaret Reynolds .............. 39 Digest of Business Book Reviews. By the Staff of the Newark Business Branch Library .................... 46 Commendation.. ...... 59 National Character of 5.L.A.................... 55 Fellowship Grants. ... 59 Sqn Francisco Conven- Japanese Classification 52 ti....................... 53 Milwaukee Municipal Trayslators' Associa- Library .................. 59 tion ............................. 59 DEPARTMENTS Associations ............... -
An Outbreak of Fowl Plague in New Jersey in 1929'
AN OUTBREAK OF FOWL PLAGUE IN NEW JERSEY IN 1929' By F. R. BEAUDETTE, poultry pathologist, C. B. HUDSON, assistant poultry pathol- ogist, New Jersey State Agricultural Experiment Station, and A. HOWARD SAXE, county agricultural agent, Morris County, N.J. INTRODUCTION This report records an outbreak of fowl plague in Morris County, N.J., in the summer of 1929. On June 7, a letter was received at the New Jersey Agricultural Experiment Station from M., of Flan- ders, N.J., stating that a disease had killed about 40 of his fowls in the course of 2 weeks, and that neighboring flocks were similarly affected. As the specimen accompanying the letter was somewhat decomposed, no diagnosis could be made. On June 8 a visit was made to the premises. In the infected quarters there remained 2 or 3 Jersey Black Giant females and a male of the same breed which was said to have recovered from the disease. There were also several broods of Barred Plymouth Rock chicks on the premises but none of these had been affected. There was nothing to indicate an outbreak of plague, nor was this suspected until M. stated that two of his fowls showed swelling of the head. The disease was said to have begun on the premises of K., some 375 yards from M.'s premises. K. conducted a feed mill and also bought and sold chickens. The disease was supposed to have been the cause of the death of all but six chickens on K.'s premises, and these had been taken into the house at the beginning of the outbreak. -
What Caused Chicago Bank Failures in the Great Depression? a Look at the 1920S
Working Papers No. 151/11 What Caused Chicago Bank Failures in the Great Depression? A Look at the 1920s Natacha Postel-Vinay © Natacha Postel-Vinay, LSE July 2012 Department of Economic History London School of Economics Houghton Street London, WC2A 2AE Tel: +44 (0) 20 7955 7860 Fax: +44 (0) 20 7955 7730 What Caused Chicago Bank Failures in the Great Depression? A Look at the 1920s Natacha Postel-Vinay∗ ABSTRACT This paper analyses the long-term behaviour of financial ratios from 1923 to 1933, focusing on a total of 131 Chicago state banks, which suffered the highest urban failure rate in the US Great Depression. The banks that failed are divided into three cohorts. The first finding is that banks which failed early started investing in non-liquid assets as early as 1923. The second finding is that the share of real estate loans is the most important predictor of failure, from 1923 for the first failure cohort and after 1927 for the second failure cohort. Such results suggest a reassessment of the indirect role played by real estate in the Great Depression via the banking channel. At the same time, this paper re-asserts the importance of mass, non- discriminating deposit withdrawals as despite having the largest amount of mortgages, banks failing in the first episode did not lose significantly more deposits than others, and their deposit losses were not determined by mortgages. In the second episode, failing banks did lose significantly more deposits than others, but survivors suffered tremendous withdrawals too. The causes of bank failures in the third episode remain largely unexplained. -
The Shorting Restrictions of 1931-1932 Were All Instituted by the Exchange
PRELIMINARY AND INCOMPLETE SHORTING RESTRICTIONS, LIQUIDITY, AND RETURNS Charles M. Jones Graduate School of Business, Columbia University and New York Stock Exchange This draft: October 9, 2002 First draft: September 10, 2002 JEL Classification: G14 Key words: short sales, securities lending, uptick rule, Great Depression I am grateful to Owen Lamont, Marc Lipson, and members of the New York Stock Exchange research division for helpful comments. I thank Steve Wheeler, archivist at the Exchange, for pointing me toward relevant data, and I thank Rui Zhou for research assistance. The Exchange generously provided funding for this research, but the comments and opinions expressed in this paper are the author’s and do not necessarily reflect those of the directors, members, or officers of the New York Stock Exchange, Inc. The most recent version of this paper is available at http://www.columbia.edu/~cj88 SHORTING RESTRICTIONS, LIQUIDITY, AND RETURNS ABSTRACT During the 1930’s, as stock prices fell in the US, several restrictions were imposed on equity short sellers. This paper examines in detail three specific restrictions adopted at various times: (1) in 1932, brokers were required to secure written authorization before lending a customer’s shares, (2) in 1931, shorting on a downtick was prohibited, and (3) in 1938, this provision was tightened to require that all short sales be executed on a strict uptick. Short interest and securities lending data indicate that each event made shorting more difficult. Average returns associated with the events are significantly positive, consistent with the limits-to-arbitrage notion that when there are restrictions on shorting, optimists have more influence on prices.