MASTER'S THESIS M-846

MIO, Eugene O, AN ANALYSIS OF AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH THE ITALIAN STATES IN 1860.

The American University, M.A., 1965 History, modern

University Microfilms, Inc., Ann Arbor, Michigan AN ANALYSIS OF AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH THE ITALIAN STATES IN I860

by

Eugene 0. Mio

Submitted to the

Faculty of the College of Arts and Sciences

of The American University

in Partial Fulfillment of

the Requirements for the Degree

o f

Master of Arts

Signatures of Committee;

Chairman:

a Dean of the College Date>?y^^ /7./96 k" ___ Date:

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY 1965 SEP 7 1965 The American University Washington, D. C. WASHINGTON. D. C

\ 3 PREFACE

The fires of national revolution flamed bright in several corners of the European continent during the middle decades of the nineteenth century. Peoples subject to despotic control, often by governments alien to the native population, rose under the brilliantly lighted banners of liberty, freedom, and self-government.

While the established policy of non-intervention in European affairs eliminated the possibility of assistance by the American govern­ ment, many Americans, seeing these struggles throu^ the perspective of

1776, offered sympathetic understanding, words of strong encouragement, and monetary support.

The public attitude was often reflected in the individual actions of American officials stationed in Europe. This study w ill substantiate that United States representatives to the Italian states during 1860, the critical year for Italian liberation, did extend the American position beyond the negative lim its of a strictly applied non-intervention policy.

There was no effort at any level of government to discourage these activities. By 1860, the United States had developed a vested interest in fairly extensive commercial activity in the Italian peninsula.

Further, the secretary of state under President Buchanan, Lewis Cass, was definitely interested in securing treaty commitments from European nations to guarantee the rights of neutrals on the high seas. A free and inde­ pendent Kingdom of Italy, encompassing the entire peninsula and without sufficient means of naval defense for its coastlines, would be a natural partner in such a treaty.

i i ill Reference material to support this position is not extensive since the basic isolationist approach to European involvement eliminated the possibility of valid negotiations by the United States government on the "Italian question." But the records of the Department of State suggest a connecting thread between the broad directing principles of

American foreign policy during the Buchanan Administration and the particulars of Italian-American relations in I860.

The basic source of information is the "Despatches from United

States Ministers to the Italian States, 1832-1906." Also helpful are the instructions from the secretary of state to these ministers, but these are rather sparse since conditions often changed during the time lag necessary for such communications to reach Italian ports. The consular records are, far the most part, not pertinent to this study except in those instances where particular consuls were involved in decisions of national significance.

Secondary works directed toward Italian-American relations prior to the Civil War are practically nonexistent. Survey-type treatment is given in the few studies which concentrate on the diplomatic activity between the two nations after the establishment of the first American mission to the united Kingdom of Italy in April of 1861.

A few articles deal directly with the particulars of diplomacy before Italian unification, but these give rather superficial coverage to the conclusive events of the summer and fa ll of 1860. Howard

Marraro’s scholarly publication, American Opinion on tl^ Unification of Italy, 1846-1861, serves as a most useful aid in evaluating the iv reaction of the American public to the efforts of Italian nationalists, but Dr. Marraro does not attempt to incorporate an extensive amount of diplomatic correspondence.

Of the dispatches which constitute the basis of this effort, those of John M. Daniel, American minister to Turin, appear most often.

This is not meant to reflect in any way on the abilities of other

American diplomatic representatives. A few of the Daniel dispatches have appeared in print in the writings of H. Nelson Gay, and all of those of John Stockton, American minister to Rome during that period, in Leo Stock's United States Ministers to the Papal States, Instructions and Despatches, 1848-1868.

For the most part, the passages used in this work were taken from the microfilm records in the National Archives of the United

States, Washington, D. C. Any errors in transcription are the sole responsibility of this writer.

A sincere expression of gratitude is extended to Mr. Ronald

Heise and the staff of the Diplomatic, Legal, and Fiscal Branch of the

National Archives, and to the library personnel of The American

University, The Catholic University of America, and The Georgetown

University. Without their patient assistance and understanding, this work would not have been possible. TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER PAGE

I . INTRODUCTIŒ...... 1

I I . ANNEXATION AND EMBARKATION...... 6

I I I . SUCCESS IN THE SOUTH...... 19

IV. UNITY ACCOMPLISHED...... 35

V. CONCLUSION...... 45

BIBLIOGRAPHY ...... 48 CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

In the third week of May, 1860, two events occurred at opposite poles of the western world which were to lead to national wars of rebellion. In Chicago, Abraham Lincoln captured the Republican nomina­ tion for President of the United States on the third ballot cast, and in an obscure mountain village in Sicily, Giuseppi Garibaldi captured the hearts of Italians throughout the peninsula as news of his first military victory against Neapolitan regulars reached the press. The following summer the natural synpathies which the two men shared for the cause of freedom found expression in President Lincoln's offer of a Union army commission of major-general to the Italian patriot.

During the course of the American Civil War, an Italian-American rapprochement emerged which had several antecedents. Italian immigrants from the time of Columbus had found the new land a challenging and, almost always, a rewarding experience. It is estimated that by 1861, some 13,000 Italians had emigrated to the United States. Most of these were skilled and professional people who sought a new life in America and were a credit to their race. Many, like Garibaldi, sought political refuge, especially after the failures of 1848-49 in Europe, and were received with open enthusiasm by the American people. Very often, how­ ever, sympathy toward the Italian states was complicated by the religious issue. The reform legislation of Pio Nono was warmly received and was a 2 significant factor in the assignment by the United States government of a diplomatic mission to the Papal States in 1848. But later develop­ ments and the re-establishment of authoritarian control by the Papal government in the 1850's led to a marked change of opinion among the

American public.

Two incidents, especially, led to a crystallization of public sentiment. In June of 1859, while Sardinia-Piedmont and France waged war in the northern provinces of the peninsula against Austria, several of the cities in the Papal States made declarations of intent to join the

Italian cause. To quell one such insurrection, Pius IX ordered Swiss mercenaries to occupy Perugia. In the chaotic situation which followed, several townspeople were killed and an American family visiting in that city was terrorized and lost its personal belongings.^ The Papal govern­ ment wrote a hasty apology for the enthusiastic activity of the troops and made monetary restitution well beyond the demands, but the American public voiced a loud protest. Our consul at Florence expressed the

significant implications of the Perugia affair when he wrote, "The massacre at Perugia is to be regretted not only for the bloodshed; but because it s till more conçlicates the Italian question. Pius IX had

given anple indication of his determination not to yield to public pressure for Italian liberation.

toward Marraro, American Opinion on the Unification of Italy, 1846-1861 (New York; Columbia University Press, 1932), pp. 263-64. O Consul in F lo ren ce Edward M allet to S e c re ta ry o f S tate Lewis Cass, June 23, 1859, Despatches from United States Consuls in Florence, 1824-1906, Records of the Department of State, National Archives, Record Group 59 (Microcopy File). 3

When Louis Napoleon’s early withdrawal from the Austrian war

eventually led to the French-Sardinian territorial exchanges of early

1860, the Pope excommunicated King Victor Emmanuel for his participation

in the annexation of the Papal Romagna. The official Catholic Church in

the United States supported Pius IX in this decision, but "the general

sentiment in the Americas was one of joy at the advance which the country had made toward independence and constitutional government.

Both events served to bring public opinion closely into line with

the prevailing view of the American government toward the Italian states.

That approach, while primarily dictated by the principle of non-interven­

tion in European affairs, reflected an attitude of encouragement to the

leaders of the Italian liberation movement which can be traced to the

president, himself, and which was consistently applied by American repre­

sentatives in the Italian peninsula. Such help was, of necessity,

offered by Americans on the scene through a loose interpretation of the

restrictions imposed by our policy position, or given through unofficial

channels. It was confirmed by the absence of instructions from Washing­

ton reprimanding or lim iting such activity.

American foreign policy during the Buchanan administration was

largely directed by the president. The appointment of Lewis Cass as

secretary of state had been made as a political expedient to appease

western Democrats, and it facilitated Buchanan’s desire to formulate

foreign policy on the basis of his own convictions and fairly extensive

^M arraro, 0£. cit., p. 274. experience.^

The President, along with Mr. Appleton, the Assistant Secretary, and Judge Black, who was then Attorney-General and later succeeded Cass as Secretary of State, assisted him in his duties and frequently redrafted his more important communications, which were prolix and little to the point.®

It is generally conceded that Buchanan also hoped that his own dominant role in formulating foreign policy would turn the attention of the

American public away from the critical domestic issue of slavery.

One principle to which Buchanan seemed to be committed in the years before the presidency was a strong sympathy for European national movements of liberation. During his service as minister to England, he was responsible for granting numerous American passports to political exiles, and, in 1854, he "graced a dinner party whose guests included

Kossuth, Mazzini, Ledru-RoUin, Garibaldi, Qrsini, Arnold Ruge, and

H erzen.

Buchanan's English experience resulted in a close friendship between the future president and Lord Clarendon, British foreign secretary during the greater part of the 1850's. Their personal corres­ pondence reveals a sim ilarity of views on the "Italian question" and reflects the position of the two governments toward the Italian libera-

4 Lewis Einstein, "Lewis Cass, Secretary of State," The American Secretaries of State and their Diplomacy, 6 Vols., Samuel F. Bemis, ed. (New York: Pageant Book Company, 1958), VI, pp. 299-300.

®Ibid. , p. 300.

®Merle Curti, "Young America," American Historical Review, XXXII (October, 1926), p. 48. 5 tion movement. Buchanan wrote to Clarendon that the "sympathy for poor down-trodden Italy is very strong in this country, and our people would

n hail her deliverer with enthusiastic applause." After the abortive effort of the French had culminated in the negotiations leading to the

Treaty of Villafranca, Clarendon, recently replaced in the foreign office by Lord John Russell, wrote to the American president:

The Italian question is at a deadlock. The King of Sardinia wants to aggrandize himself more than is agreeable to either of his power­ ful neighbors. . . . In the meanwhile the Italian people are behaving admirably under circumstances most trying, and their patience and national dignity, their moderation and love of order and respect for persons and property prove that they are fit to be free and if they persevere and keep united they w ill be free and their liberties w ill be placed on a solid foundation?®

The United States government exhibited sufficient confidence in the manner in which law and order were maintained in Tuscany to officially recognize the territo rial aggrandizement at a time when several of the major European powers were opposing final realization of the secret agreement first made at Plombières.

7 Letter from Buchanan to Lord Clarendon, April 8, 1859, included in The Works of James Buchanan—Comprising His Speeches, State Papers, and Private Correspondence, 12 vols., John Moore, ed. (Philadelphia: Lippincott CompaiQ^, 1910), X, p. 315. O Letter from Lord Clarendon to Buchanan, Oct. 13, 1859, included in Ib id ., X, p. 316. CHAPTER II

ANNEXATION AND EMBARKATION

Count Caraillo Cavour's diplomatic genius had resulted, by March

4, 1860, in the expansion of Sardinia-Piedmont to include the province of Lombardy, the Central Italian States of Parma and Modena, the

Romagna, and Tuscany. It remained for the inhabitants to confirm these annexations by plebiscite. During the period when Cavour was out of office following the Armistice of Villafranca, Parma, Modena, and the

Romagna were jo i n t l y a d m in istered by th e p ro -a n n e x a tio n is t d ic ta to r

Carlo Luigi Farini, under the inclusive title of Emilia; and Tuscany was governed by a man of similar political views, Bettino Ricasoli.^

But these significant acquisitions came with a price tag attached, for "on March 24th in accordance with the secret promises given to Napoleon III at Plombières, Cavour signed an agreement to give Nice 9 and Savoy to France." John Daniel, the American minister at Turin, had correctly anticipated this exchange and had so informed the State

Department a month earlier when he wrote:

There are persons here in Turin whose connections and position enable them to know much and on whose information experience has taught me to rely who now say that the cession of Savoy to France is a settled thing which w ill assuredly be consummated in a few months; and that the public movement and declaration to the

^Arthur J. Whyte, The Political Life and k tters of Cavour, 1848-1861 (London: Oxford University Press, 1930), pp. 332-33.-

^John Parris, The Lion of Caprera (New York: McKay Company, 1962), p. 200. contrary are a mere show, intended to save the Prekler from attacks in Parliament by enabling him to declare that he yielded the national territory ^ main forced ®

The " p u b lic movement and d e c la ra tio n " to which th e American minister referred involved the use of public officials of the Sardinian government in rather loosely disguised attempts to demonstrate in favor of continued control from Turin. The facts dictated that economically the mountainous terrain of Savoy could only prove to be a continuing burden on the Sardinian treasury, while strategically the French m ili­ tary could profit considerably by control of these natural defense 4 p o s itio n s .

In addition to information which he received from his unofficial sources, John Daniel had reasoned that since the Italian appeal "to the sentiments and rights of nationality" had been a basic tenet of Cavour’s policy, the Italian people "must be just and logical in the application of their favorite principle" vis^-vis Nice and Savoy.® The American also surmised that the Sardinian government hoped to apply this same principle in some manner, which he failed to outline in detail, to acquire Venice. Circumstances, of course, dictated another direction

M inister to Sardinia-Piedmont John Daniel to Secretary of State Lewis Cass, Feb. 14, 1860, Despatches from United States Ministers to the Italian States, 1832-1906, Sardinia-Piedmont, Records of the Depart­ ment of State, National Archives, Record Group 59 (Microcopy File). Hereafter the diplomatic despatches of this particular minister w ill be indicated "Despatches, Sardinia-Piedmont, NA,RG 59."

^Sardinian is used throughout as the adjective reference to the Kingdom of Sardinia-Piedmont.

® Da ni el to Cass, Feb. 7, 1860, Despatches, Sardinia-Piedmont, NA,RG 59. 8 for Sardinian expansion in the immediate future.

Daniel’s emphasis on the importance of the force of "nationality" to the Italian unification movement was put forward in this conclusive manner:

Besides and above all it should not be forgotten that the present Kings of Piedmont were long previously Dukes of Savoy; and so long as they keep that hereditary province, are not regarded altogether as Italian Princes, which the peninsula earnestly desires them to be. Savoy to the Italians at the present time is just what Hanover was to England under the Georges ; and they would let it drop into the hands of its natural rulers with an equal pleasure.®

Daniel had correctly estimated the opinion of the majority of

Italians, but Cavour was genuinely concerned over the opposition expected from some members of the Chamber of Deputies. In a letter addressed simply "To An Intimate Friend," Cavour wrote:

You know that a treaty carrying a modification of territory is only valid when it has received the sanction of the Parliament. Also in countersigning a recent treaty which advocates the cession of two provinces I commit a highly unconstitutional act which for me could have the most grave consequences.^

Further evidence of the sincerity of the premier’s concern can be gleaned from the following letter to one of the governmental repre­

sentatives from Nice:

The provisions that I had communicated to you before the begin­ ning of the war are close to being realized. I could do nothing

®Ibid. , the underlined passages appear in the original.

^Letter from Cavour to An Intimate Friend, March 11, 1860, Letteive Edite ed Inedite di CamiUo Cavour, 6 Vols., Luigi Chiala, ed. (Turin: Roux E Fauale, 1884), III pp. 226-27. Translated from the French by Bernard Fouquet at the request of the writer. It is generally accepted that this letter was sent to Constantino Nigra, Sardinian minister to France. to avoid it . . . I write to you with a heavy heart. The politics are very sadly necessary.®

One may question Cavour’s "heavy heart," but the basic purpose of this message seems to be an attenç>t to justify his actions to the parlia­ mentary opposition, or at least to give that opposition a face-saving position. It was written only a few weeks before the critical vote was taken to approve the treaty.

Neither Cavour nor John Daniel had anticipated the more direct and aggressive possibility that was proposed by Giuseppi Garibaldi. Although

Garibaldi, born in Nice some fifty years earlier, had spent the greater part of his life searching the corners of the Western world for action and adventure, he never forgave Cavour this bartering of his birth­ place. Even a personal message from the king, reminding him that Savoy was the traditional holding of the royal family and that it, too, had to be sacrificed to the national cause, failed to dull his indignation.

By early April, there existed a definite possibility that Gari­ baldi would lead an expedition "into Nice oh the day of the plebiscite, seize the ballot boxes, and destroy the votes.The rebel leader went so far as to appeal to the United States for protection or assistance in a venture designed to prevent the cession of Nice to France. The

American minister simply replied that such action would not be consist­ ent with the United States’ policy of non-intervention in the internal

®Cavour to Giovanni de Foresta, March 1860, in Ibid., pp. 232-33. The exact date is not given.

^ P a r r is , 0 £. cit., p. 201 10

affairs of a foreign state.

The conspirators speculated that by intense campaigning after

such a dramatic manifestation, the people of Nice could be persuaded to vote against annexation to France. Garibaldi could not reconcile him­

self to the fact that the Nizzards were strongly influenced by the

commercial advantages to be enjoyed by again coming under the rule of

the French throne. In the final analysis, this fact more than any

other resulted in a plebiscite favorable to France.

Garibaldi also considered the possibility of a landing at Nice

as the first step in the plan to send an expedition to Sicily. Pressure

had been mounting for some time within the "Party of Action" to combine

a Sicilian uprising with a landing of volunteers on the island. Indeed,

this plan had steadily gained support since the government of Victor

Emmanuel had s u c c e s s fu lly v eto ed th e proposed in v asio n o f th e P ap al

States by Garibaldi and his volunteers following the Armistice of V illa­

fran ca .

Another of the rather sporadic Sicilian revolts had begun in

early April and had enjoyed the typical first flush of success, but

Garibaldi was forced to postpone a mid-April departure for the island

because of the unfavorable turn of events there.

John Chandler, the American minister to Naples, had evaluated

that much of the situation correctly:

It can scarcely be expected that this revolutionary attempt w ill prove successful. Others may, as it is believed that the govem-

^®Daniel to Cass, April 10, 1860, Despatches, Sardinia-Piedmont. NA,R6 59. 11

ment has allowed to pass by the moment when appropriate concessions gracefully made would have satisfied the people .... The attempt to subvert the government is not . . . made to increase the glory of the Sicilies, but to augment the territory of the King of S a r d i n i a .^

In Turin, John Daniel, who always used his unofficial sources of information to the greatest advantage, informed the State Department that the current policy of the Sardinian government was "either annexa- 12 tion or a new monarch of the Two Sicilies ." The emphasis, however, in this dispatch of mid-April, is placed on events of some significance in the future:

There w ill be no more war this year, but there w ill be revolu­ tions if it is in the power of intrigue to make them. Up to the present moment the King of the Two Sicilies « . . appears to have resisted the revolutionary movement in Sicily.

Daniel had predicted the future course of Italian nationalism.

The "powers of intrigue" were hard at work to resolve internal

differences. They enlisted the able services of the great general in welding the dissident factions of the revolutionary cause into an

effective weapon for war, and thereby profited by the emotional appeal

o f th e name " G a rib a ld i," as w e ll.

^^Minister to the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies Joseph Chandler to Secretary of State Lewis Cass, Apr. 15, 1860, Despatches from United States Ministers to the Italian States, 1832-1906, Kingdom of the Two Sicilies, Records of the Department of State, National Archives, Record Group 59 (Microcopy File). Hereafter the diplomatic despatches of this particular minister w ill be indicated "Despatches, Two Sicilies, NA,RG 5 9 ."

^Daniel to Cass, Apr. 21, 1860, Despatches, Sardinia-Piedmont, NA,RG 59.

l® Ibid. 12

The expedition that finally embarked on the morning of May 6,

1860, was not the result of the efforts of any single party:

Mazzini and his friends instigated the expedition; Garibaldi and his followers accomplished it; the King and Cavour allowed i t to start, and when it had begun to succeed gave it the support and the guidance without which it must inevitably have failed m i d w a y . ^4

On this last point, especially on the issue of Cavour’s support of the expedition, considerable historical controversy has arisen, but the dispatches of all of the American representatives consistently adhered to the position that Garibaldi’s venture was, from its inception, actively supported by the Sardinian government.

John Daniel apprised Washington on May 10, the day before Gari­ baldi landed at Marsala, that the organization and embarkation of the expedition ’’was conducted without concealment or disguise" and that the general had, on the day before sailing

changed 3 millions of Francs from notes to gold at the Bank of Genoa . . . that this and other large sums which have lately passed through his hands was directly received from the government of this country for the purpose of overthrowing that of N a p l e s . T5

The Neapolitan protest of this apparent connivance on the part of the Sardinian government was couched in much more emotional terms and dispatched to Washington, via Chandler, on May 12: ’’An act of the most savage piracy has been consummated by a band of brigands publicly

^^George M. Trevelyan, Garibaldi and the Thousand (London: Longmans, Green and Company, 1909), p . 162.

TSDaniel to Cass, May 10, 1860, Despatches, Sardinia-Piedmont, NA,RG 59. 13

enlisted, organized and armed in a state not at war with us."^®

The note also pointed to the possibility of a European conflict precipitated by "the abettors and accomplices of the barbarous invasion.*^^

In a later dispatch, John Daniel was to propose the political purpose of

such a move by Sardinia. He reasoned that the Sardinian government had

desired a war with the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies at that propitious

moment, but, because there were no justifiable grounds for such action, had supported the extra-legal maneuver of Garibaldi’s Sicilian expedi­

tio n .^®

The passage of time and the greater amount of evidence accumulated

have excited scholarly debate over how active a role the government,

under Cavour, played in the Sicilian expedition.But, given the dis­

patches from the American ministers on the scene, it seems reasonable to

conclude that the decisions made by Daniel and Chandler concerning the

governments of Sardinia-Piedmont and the Two Sicilies proceeded from the

assumption that the Sardinian government did indeed provide aid and

^®Memoranda from N eap o litan M in iste r f o r F oreign A ffa irs C arafa to Chandler, May 12, 1860, enclosed in Chandler to Cass, May 15, 1860, Despatches, Two S icilies, NA,RG 59.

^^Ib id .

^®Daniel T. Cass, June 4, 1860, Despatches, Sardinia-Piedmont, NA,RG 59.

IQ The leading exponent of the traditional view that Cavour did support the embarkation of the Thousand is George M. Trevelyan. The most scholarly presentation for the revisionist position is made by Denis M. Smith. Ironically, Smith studied under Itevelyan and dedicated his challenging work to Janet and G. M. Trevelyan. 14 assistance to Garibaldi's venture in the south.

The conflicting accounts later given by men active in the Sar­ dinian government at the time of the expedition are indicative of the extreme dissension then existing between the "Party of Action" and the

"Party of Order." Illustrative of that dissension, and the different interpretations of the same historical evidence made by exponents of diverse points of view, is a hotly contested debate, which took place in the Italian Chamber of Deputies on June 19, 1863, "in vdiich Bertani,

La Farina, Bixio and Sirtori all took part."^® Each of these men was a close associate of Garibaldi, and each had participated in the events and decisions leading to the sailing of the Thousand.

Trevelyan quoted Bertani as reporting the following exchange between Sirtori and Cavour on April 23, 1860:

Count Cavour said . . . "I don't know what to say or what to do," and, in the sly way he had, ended rubbing his hands, "I think they w ill be taken" [io credo che li prenderannqj. Cavour, as the Chamber well knew, used to rub his hands vdien he was pleased, and Bertani inqplied that he was pleased at the prospect of Garibaldi being taken by the Bourbon troops.^^

S i r t o r i , who was p r e s e n t in th e Chamber when B e rta n i spoke, later rose to give a contradictory account of the same interview:

As to the expedition to the Marches, Cavour said:

"Absolutely no; the government w ill oppose it by every means in its power." As to the expedition to Sicily, Cavour said exactly these words: "Well and good. Begin at the south, to come up again by the north. When it is a question of undertakings of that kind, however bold they may be. Count Cavour w ill be second

^OTrevelyan, op^. c it. , pp. 162-63.

^^ibid. , Appendix E, pp. 336-37. 15

to none." These were his precise words. He said this naturally referring to a ll those means by which the government without compromising itself could help the expedition. He promised to help it, provided the responsibility of the government was completely concealed. 22

In support of his choice to include S irtori’s version of the conversation, Trevelyan offered a letter from Sirtori to Count Giulini, w ritten on May 3, 1860:

Some days ago I saw Cavour at Genoa; I touched on the insuffi­ ciency of our means; his words gave me reason to hope for his help [mi lascia sperare aiutq].23

Garibaldi’s most recent biographer, John Parris, dealt with the conflicting reports of General Sirtori ’ s interview with Cavour in the following manner. He quoted briefly from both versions, but from the letter written by Sirtori to Count Giulini on May 3, 1860, he repeated

only the words, "Cavour led me to hope for help." The actual text of the letter used as a reference by both Trevelyan and Parris contains two 2S preceding clauses vhich are quoted above. In omitting the clause which seems to be the key to Sirtori’s personal opinion, "I touched on the insufficiency of our means," Parris discounted the validity of

Cavour’s proposed "help," concluding, "It is more than possible that he [Sirtori] was acting throughout as Cavour’s agent in the inner

22lbid., Appendix E, p. 337.

^®Ibid. , Appendix F, p. 337, citing Bianchi, Storia Documentato della Diplomazia Europea in Italia, 1814-1861, VII: 290. 24 P a r r i s , 0 £. cit., p. 206.

^®Cf. abte, p. ■ 15. 16 council of the plotters."^®

There is strong probability that General Sirtori, who was to become Garibaldi’s commander-in-chief, was simply voicing the thoughts of many m ilitary men who viewed the possibilities of success of one thousand poorly equipped volunteers opposed by twenty thousand regulars, supported by cavalry and artillery, as well nigh impossible. Garibaldi, himself, agreed on the invasion contingent upon a successful uprising on the island to give him the necessary support, and he seems to have been somewhat deceived by the Sicilian, Crispi, who was his chief advisor, as to the status of the rebel forces in Sicily.

Garibaldi sinqply made an all-inclusive statement in his autobiog­

raphy that "Cavour’s government was beginning that system of petty

intrigue and contemptible opposition, which pursued our expedition to n o the last." The straightforward nature of this military leader pre­ vented him, to the very end of his days, from understanding the devious

methods of the man who had to deal with the powers of Europe.

The problem of obtaining arms for a successful show of force by

the rebels also led to controversy. Cavour had made discreet arrange­

ments, using the Sicilian, La Masa, as an intermediary, to secure 1,500

guns for a Sicilian expedition, which he anticipated would be led by

Garibaldi. His adversaries later charged him with duplicity even in

^®Ibid., p. 206. 97 Trevelyan, o£. c it., p. 192.

28 Giuseppi Garibaldi, Autobiography of Giuseppi Garibaldi, 3 Vols., A. Werner, translatorr (London: Smith and Innes, 1889), II: 149. 17 this arrangement since the weapons eventually turned out to be smooth­ bore muskets—Garibaldi termed them so much "old iron"—that had indeed OQ been sold by the army as obsolete equipment. A few weeks later, however, the general was extremely anxious to lay his hands on gunpowder for this "old iron" since ammunition had eluded him at the very moment of departure because of an error in judgment by some of his followers.®®

Denis M. Smith, in his exhaustive treatise on the events of 1860, presented the negative view that "Cavour . . . did a ll he could, short of 31 using force, to prevent Garibaldi setting out for Sicily." His logic and his supporting evidence are impressive, although he did not quote th e S ir to r i sta te m e n t i n th e Chamber o f D ep u ties.

One can readily understand the hostility of the Garibaldians in the spring of 1860 if consideration is given to the fact that many of them viewed their role in the cause of Italian unification as that of sacrificial lambs on the altar of Sardinian aggrandizement. The

29 Trevelyan, op, c it., pp. 184 and 198. Trevelyan contended that Cavour could not have known that the weapons were bad, and that once D’Azeglio had sequestered the Enfield rifles at Milan, a fact which was known in diplomatic circles, Cavour could not make them available to Garibaldi.

®®Ibid. , pp. 207-208. It had been agreed that the bulk of the gunpowder would be dispatched in several small boats at a point a few miles east of the embarkation point. Because of a long delay in the arrival of the two steamers vdiich were to transport the men, they missed connections with the smaller boats and thus sailed toward Sicily with virtually no gunpowder for their obsolete weapons.

^^enis M. Smith, Cavour and Garibaldi, 1860 (London: Cambridge University Press, 1954), pp. 24-25. 18 political conflict within the revolutionary group had been brought sharply into focus in 1859-60 as Cavour appeared to seize control of the movement.

But, with the successful landing of the Thousand in Sicily, the leaders of all factions were anxious to accept the expedition as sufficient to give common cause to all of their efforts.

Meanwhile, Cavour prepared to deal with the expected protests of the powers, while John Daniel confidently predicted total success for

G a rib a ld i. CHAPTER I I I

SUCCESS IN THE SOUTH

Although he had been notified within hours of the departure of the Thousand in the steamers Piemonte and Lombardo, which cleared Genoa at dawn on May 6, Cavour delayed until the following day to take any action. He then telegraphed the governor of Cagliari, a city on the island of Sardinia, "to arrest the expedition if it stopped at any point in Sardinia but to leave it alone if it was met on the high seas.

This was the rather ambigious order that was relayed to Admiral Persano, whose ship lay at anchor off the coast near Cagliari. The Admiral, in turn, telegraphed Cavour for confirmation and asked that the code word

"Cagliari" be used if the expedition were, in fact, to be stopped.

On the 11th, the day Garibaldi landed at Marsala, Persano received a telegram "the Cabinet has decided for Cagliari" but the Admiral taking this to mean that Cavour in person did not agree with the Cabinet, replied, "I understand" and did nothing.

John Daniel had informed the State Department, in his message of

May 10, "If the Sardinian cruisers interfere in the affair at all, it

Arthur Whyte, The Political Life and Letters of Cavour, 1848-1861 (London: Oxford University Press, 1930), p. 397, citing Persano, Diario Privato. In L. Chiala’s Cavour Letters, this message appeared in two separate telegrams. One was sent to Cagliari, on May 7, 1860, and the other on May 8. The second included the impor­ tant instruction that the expedition was to proceed unmolested if met on the high seas. The lapse of a day between messages would seem to emphasize Cavour’s indecision, which could be reason enough for his biographer to show preference for the Admiral’s recollection of the messages in question.

^ I b id .

19 20 may be safely predicted that it will be for the protection of Garibaldi 3 and his men.” His evaluation of this particular aspect of the situa­ tion was never tested, but it would seem reasonable to conclude from the exchanges between Cavour and Persano that the premier was not anxious to intervene on behalf of the expedition at that time.

Included in the American's account was his view of the degree to which the English government was involved in the safe passage of the volunteers to Sicily. He reported that "Garibaldi sailed under the Eng- 4 lish flag,” speculated that the leaders of the expedition either had

English passports or at least English visas to Malta, and advised, "It is certain that Garibaldi and his chief officers were entertained by the

English minister at a great dinner given on their departure for this expedition.”^

Further implication of the English government was generally accepted in early May of 1860. The European press published several accounts of the landing of the volunteers at Marsala as having been carried out with the assistance of a British naval vessel whose captain prevented two Neapolitan men-of-war from firing on the Piemonte and the

Lombardo until the troops had been safely put ashore. Later historical research verified the presence of the British ship but postulated that

Q Daniel to Gass, May 10, 1860, Despatches, Sardinia-Piedmont, NA,RG 59. 4 I b id .

S ib id . 21 the failure of the Neapolitan navy to prevent the landing of the volun­ teers was due only to the late arrival of the commanders on the scene and their general inadequacy.^

John Daniel questioned the authenticity of the press reports when he wrote on June 4 that although the details of the landing and of Eng­ lish participation "have been published without contradiction . . . the

English captain in his official account of what took place as published by the British government in London does not state other particulars."

Nonetheless, he concluded, "I am fully satisfied that the agents of the

English government are much and favorably occupied with the Expedition of Garibaldi."®

From Naples, the American m inister, Joseph Chandler, had reported in April that British naval strength in the Mediterranean in the form of

"a large fleet . . . a ninety-gun ship in the harbor of Naples and sev-

eral ships of war . . . in the ports of Sicily" gave valid indication

of British interest in the Sicilian revolt. Chandler's first dispatch

after the landing of Garibaldi contained no details of that event except

as they are included in a formal protest by the Neapolitan government to

^George M. Trevelyan, Garibaldi and the Thousand (London: Longmans, Green and Company, 1909), pp. 167-69.

^Daniel to Cass, May 10, 1860, Despatches, Sardinia-Piedmont, NA,RG 59.

8I b id .

^Chandler to Cass, April 15, 1860, Despatches, Two Sicilies, NA,RG 59. 22 the United States. But he related, "It is generally considered here that 10 the English are concerned in the movement against Sicily."

The extent of English "concern" had been astutely diagnosed by the

Sardinian minister to England, the Marquis d'Azeglio, in April of 1860

When he wrote to Cavour on the effect of the cession of Nice and Savoy:

The moral effect of these cessions, like the stain of the parti­ tion of Poland, will never be erased in England. Only great and glorious advances towards the reawakening of Italy w ill neutralize the impression they have made. . . . Italy is s till for them what it was before, a favored land. . . . They are wishing for nothing better than to see us annex the whole peninsula. . . . But if . . . to obtain Venetia, Umbria, etc., you must plot with France . . . then you must stop, for it is no longer Italy which is at stake but the peace and balance of a ll Europe.

Both Palmerston, the British prime m inister, and Russell, secre­ tary for foreign affairs, had given credence by mid-May to the rumors of further aggrandizement of France in Italy. English participation in a continental alliance evolved as a considered solution to the problem of containing France, as English policy makers determined "not to be caught napping a second time. In this respect, the English policy of "Italia far a da se" became most important.^®

Chandler to Cass, April 15, 1860, Despatches, Two Sicilies, NAjRG 59.

^L etter from D'Azeglio to Cavour, April 14, 1860, included in Cavour e 1 'Inghilterra, II: 65-66, cited by Derek Beales, England and Italy, 1859-1860 (New York: Nelson and Sons, Ltd., 1961), p. 148. 12 Beales, England and Italy, pp. 149-50. The failure of English diplomacy in the Savoy cession was the earlier time that the Foreign O ffice was "caught napping." 13 Denis M. Smith, Cavour and Garibaldi, 1860 (London: Cambridge University Press, 1954), p. 32. 23

This implied a virtual guarantee against intervention by any other Power. . . . The only conditions attached were that Cavour should not bargain away any more provinces to Prance, and that he should not try to seize Venice from the Austrian Emperor with whom Britain was in friendly relations.

The rumor that the Sardinian government, in order to acquire

Venice,was considering ceding Genoa and Sardinia to France in exchange

for the Two Sicilies and support against Austria gained sufficient validity to necessitate the following telegram from Sir James Hudson,

the British minister at Turin, to Lord John Russell:

For ray part my belief is based not upon Cavour, but upon Cavour’s necessities. . . . He could not command fifty votes to give away Sardinia or Genoa. . . . "He Qfhe King]added that he had paid his debt to Prance and he would hang the first Minister who proposed to make another cession.

The result of such proposals was to drive the British Foreign

Office further away from Napoleon III since they correctly assumed that

Genoa was most important to a viable Kingdom of Sardinia-Piedmont or to

a united Kingdom of Italy. Thus, the French emperor was effectively

prevented from extracting a second "pound of flesh." It seems that in

the final analysis, "France and Britain were more afraid of each other

than they were of Italian unification,"^^ and the Northern Courts were

forced to settle for diplomatic protests and hope that the revolutionary

fever could be contained within the Italian peninsula.

^^Ib id.

l^George M. Trevelyan, Garibaldi and the Making of Italy (London: Longmans, Green and Company, 1911), Appendix A, pp. 306-07.

Smith, 22' c i t . , p. 32. 24

Given the British position on the Italian situation, which was forcefully conveyed in Daniel's reports of the particulars of British involvement, and the personal convictions of President Buchanan, it would appear that the American government was acting in its own best interests in following the British lead in Italian affairs. Also, since

John Daniel was definitely of the opinion that both the British and the

Sardinian governments were actively supporting Garibaldi, his dispatches necessarily formed an essential part of the evidence upon which any decision by the American government would be based. Further, in view of

Mr. D aniel's prophetic statements of May and June 1860, and the absence of any instructions as events developed along the course which he had predicted, it seems reasonable to conclude that the American government was favorably disposed to Garibaldi's total success vis-ii-vis the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies.

The greatest danger which Garibaldi has to run is in the passage by sea. . . . But should Garibaldi effect a landing, I have no doubt at a ll to his success. Should he fairly land, the days of the Bourbon Dynasty at Naples are numbered, and the separate existence of the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies w ill soon have place in history alone.

And on June 4, during the three-day armistice of the battle for

Palermo, which was to become G aribaldi's first complete and decisive victory against Neapolitan regulars, Daniel wrote:

Up to this moment there has been no sign of insurrection on the mainland. But it will come. In less than six months it may be reasonably anticipated that the Kingdom of Naples will be obliterated

17 Daniel to Cass, May 10, 1860, Despatches, Sardinia-Piedmont, NA,RG 59. 25

from the political map; and before the year is ended, it is quite possible that the entire Italian peninsula, with the exception of Venice and perhaps the city of Rome intra muros w ill be united under the sceptre of Victor Emmanuel.

The American confidently predicted that the only effective deter­

rent to this solution would be forceful intervention by Austria, which had been solicited, but "she {Austria] rests an inert mass on the land

while the river of Italian Revolution runs a straight and now an

unresisted, course."

From Naples, Joseph Chandler also forwarded his opinion to Wash­

ington on conditions in Sicily. Like Daniel, he was quite confident that

the success of the revolutionary movement under Garibaldi's leadership

negated the possibility of acceptance of con^romise terms offered by the

King:

It is evident that no "amnesty" w ill be regarded by victorious insurgents; and no concessions w ill supply the place of independence achieved. . . . and the promise even of a constitution, when in the King's drawer lies the revoked Charter of 1848-9, w ill not appease the Sicilians who with any considerable success w ill declare all these formulas "too late."20

The American Department of State, deeply involved in Mexican

affairs, was certainly not swept away by the Italian nationalistic

torrent, but a few individual Americans did play an active role as

^®Daniel to Cass, June 4, 1860, Despatches, Sardinia-Piedmont,

NA,RG 59.

l* Ib id .

20chandler to Cass, May 26, 1860, Despatches, Two S icilies, NA,RG 59. 26

Garibaldi's forces won surprising victories against impressive odds.^^

During the battle for Palermo, the commander of the American vessel, the Iroquois—at anchor in the Sicilian harbor to secure the safety of United States citizens—had been discreetly questioned by

Garibaldi as to the availability of much-needed powder. At the time, the general was deeply involved in armistice negotiations with the Neapolitan 22 m ilitary and bluffing a very weak hand. The American commander, pre­ vented from open support because of his position, arranged through an intermediary to give some powder to the rebel general. Small as this contribution may have been, it must have looked very big to Garibaldi at th e tim e.

Several Americans had a much more important role to play in the

Sicilian campaign than that of Captain Palmer. As Garibaldi's Thousand

^Trevelyan gives a highly authoritative account of the campaign in western Sicily, from the landing through the conquest of Palermo, in chapters 13-17 of Garibaldi and the Thousand. The Neapolitan array enjoyed tile advantages of superior numbers, superior equipment, and superior defense positions, but lacked effective leadership at all levels. "On the morning of June 7, the day fixed for 20,000 Neapolitans to march defeated out of the city Palermo , there were only 390 muskets among the remnant of the Thousand. . . . It was as though Goliath in his armour were surrendering to David with his sling. The British Admiral and his captains who witnessed the scene from their ships were filled with a sense of mingled exultation and disgust." pp. 323-24. 22 Ibid. , and in "The War Journals of Garibaldi's Englishman, Part II, Sicily and Naples, 1860," George M. Trevelyan, ed., The Corn- h ill Magazine (London: Smith, Elder and Company, June, 1907), p. 817, Feard wrote in his diary that on the final day of the evacuation of Palermo that "it was a great pity the Neapolitans were allowed to carry off their arms and stores, but the general wisely granted their terms, not having above 600 men who were really good and not a dozen rounds of ammunition p e r man l e f t , w h ils t th e enemy were 2 0 ,0 0 0 ." 27 achieved military success in Sicily, the problem of establishing and maintaining adequate lines of supply became increasingly acute. The renegade nature of the venture prevented the Sardinian government from taking direct action since it was ostensibly at peace with the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies; none of the European Powers, even if so disposed, could risk an international incident by open involvement. But, just as unofficial English support of the first expedition can be taken as valid indication of that government’s policy, so can unofficial American support of the second expedition be indicative, even though the American govern­ ment could never seriously entertain thoughts of intervention.

Rebel Italian leaders had assigned the organization of further expeditions to a specific Ufficio M ilitare under the direction of Gia- 23 como M edici, who was to p e rs o n a lly command th e second group. This second expedition consisted of five vessels in a ll but involved two separate departures from the mainland. The first, carrying "2500 men

. . . with appropriate supplies" left Genoa on the night of June 9 in

"three steamers purchased by the M illion Rifles Fund from a French company and christened with the blessings of the American consul, the

Washington, the Franklin, and the O r e g o n . "24 The b ill of sale was signed by an American citizen, William de Rohan, who captained the

Washington to Sicily. The American flag was personally hoisted by

^®Raymond Grew, A Sterner Plan for Italian Unity (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), p. 301.

Ibid., p. 302. 28

W. L. Patterson,25 the American consul to Genoa, who later wrote in

reply to the Neapolitan government that "the three vessels . . . having

been the property of an American citizen, have the right to carry the

flag of their country, and left this port covered with the said f l a g ."26

Patterson gave the expedition his official sanction in spite of his knowledge of its purpose:

It was my private opinion that the purchaser of these vessels intended to employ tiiera in the transportation of men and munitions from there to Sicily. At least rumor said so, but as much as the conditions of the law were con^lied with and the contract of sale and purchase a valid one I could not allow my private opinion as to the ultimate destination of these vessels interfere to prevent my official confirmation of the purchase.27

Thus, a representative of the United States government in a position to assist the rebel forces applied the letter of the law to

justify his personal convictions. He was not reprimanded for his

decision, nor was he instructed to follow a different course of action

in the future.

De Rohan also served the Garibaldians well. On arrival of the

expedition at Cagliari, the Sardinian port which served as the rebels’ point of departure for Sicily, it was learned that "the post steamer

which was to have taken important letters to Palermo had been detained

25Trevelyan, ed., War Journals, p. 813.

26lietter from American Consul at Genoa Patterson to American Minister at Turin Daniel, June 22, 1860, enclosed in Daniel to Cass, June 24, 1860, Appendix C, Despatches, Sardinia-Piedmont, NA,RG 59.

27Patterson to Daniel, June 20, 1860, enclosed in Daniel to Cass, June 24, 1860, Appendix A, Despatches, Sardinia-Piedmont, NA,RG 59. 29 28 by the Governor." Neither de Rohan nor the Englishman who wrote of this incident, Colonel Peard, knew that the ship in question was being searched because Cavour feared that Mazzini was being secretly trans­ ported to Sicily. The prime minister had no desire to see the repub­ lican leader active in the revolutionary movement in Sicily at that time.

To de Rohan and the leaders of the expedition, however, the departure of the vessel meant the safe delivery of the mail, in which they had a particular interest. The Governor attempted to put off any interview with the officer-representatives of Garibaldi, but Peard wrote:

The American was not to be done. He walked in and insisted on the great man being sent for. After some few words he said, "Are you an Italian in heart or only in name?", and then advancing toward him and pointing to a couple of decorations he wore, added, "Those decorations you wear have been given you by your country; w ill you now in return betray her interests and disgrace those ribbons you have received from her?". The Governor jumped off his chair as if he feared he was going to be eaten, but, when he found de Rohan had no such cannibal intention, recovered himself, and at length gave his word she should leave as soon as her steam was up, and he kept his promise.

The second part of this June expedition consisted of two vessels: the Sardinian steamship. U tile, and an American sailing merchantman out of Bath, Maine, called the Charles and Jane, whose crew were nearly all citizens of the United States. The latter, chartered by Medici, was loaded with men and supplies and left Genoa in tow of the U tile, which carried identical cargo. As the American minister at Naples, Joseph

Chandler, reported to the State Department in late June, "the men on

Trevelyan, War Journals, p. 815.

2 ^ Ib id . 30 board the Charles and Jane were undoubtedly part of the division of 30 Colonel Medici which could not find place on the three steamers."

When the two vessels were taken prize on the high seas by the

Neapolitan navy, the American government became directly involved in

Garibaldi's venture for the first time. It would seem that all parties to this voyage were aware of the fact that the ultimate destination of these two vessels was Sicily, but the American consul at Genoa, W. L.

Patterson, who personally dispatched the earlier group and officially cleared the Charles and Jane, informed the American minister at Turin that the captain had "told me that the freight was for Cagliari. I told him that he had a perfect right without fear of molestation to take any

0*1 cargo from this port to Cagliari, being ports within the same kingdom."

This note was included in Daniel's dispatch to Washington, which was received within a few days of the following note from Patterson to

Chandler at Naples: "I find that his clearance [the captain of the :

Charles and Jane] was for Trapani [S icily] touching at Cagliari as you oo will find by a reference to the ship's papers."

Chandler also discovered that the captain had actually sailed for Cagliari on the Washington, and he reported to the State Department

30 Chandler to Cass, June 26, 1860, Despatches, Two Sicilies, NA,RG 59.

^^Patterpon to Daniel, June 20, 1860, enclosed in Daniel to Cass, June 24, 1860, Appendix A, Despatches, Sardinia-Piedmont, NA,RG 59.

Letter from American Consul at Genoa Patterson to American Minister at Naples Chandler, June 20, 1860, enclosed in Chandler to Cass, June 23, 1860, Despatches, Two Sicilies, NA,RG 59. 31 after a personal interview with the captain: Captain Donnell tells me that the Charles and Jane was cleared at Genoa for Sicily. . . . A fte^thi^lgarance and when he had placed his mate Watson in charg^oPTR^^RIpT" he pJonnein received through his consignment from Colonel Medici, one of Garibaldi's officers, an offer to charter the Charles and Jane to carry passengers to Cagliari.33

The American consul was only trying to guarantee the strongest efforts on the part of the United States government to correct what he termed this "flagrant outrage," but it would seem that he did not have to justify the legality of the voyage. Chandler, the American minister, made harsh demands of the Neapolitan government in spite of his own knowledge that in the ship's papers "there was no clearance for

Cagliari nor was there any statement by Captain Donnell the ship's master or the Consul that Mr. Watson had been appointed to the tempor­ ary command of the vessel."34 Further, Chandler, himself, having spoken wildi Watson, knew that the man had hesitated to contact the American government to register formal protest, while at the same time refusing to show his papers to Neapolitan officials, because of the irregulari­ ties that those papers contained and especially because the ships had been cleared at Genoa for S i c i l y . 35

In his report to official Washington on the important details of

33chandler to Cass, June 26, 1860, Despatches, Two Sicilies, NA,R6 59. A ll underlined passages appear in the original.

34chandler to Cass, June 23, 1860, Despatches, Two Sicilies, NA,RG 59.

3Slbid. 32 the capture, Chandler included a copy of his demands to the Neapolitan government:

First, the immediate release of the Charles and Jane. Second, a condensation for detention. Third, reparation for offense against the flag of the United S ta te s .36

These demands were repeated to a new Neapolitan cabinet on June

28, 1860, two days after Chandler had come into possession of the facts and had w ritten the secretary of state that the release had been demanded on the basis

that she was "bonafide" an American ship, that she was on the high seas when captured, and things on board may be ^cotitraband of war," yet no war has been declared, no blockade has been proclaimed and the voyage of the ship was from one port to another of a nation at peace with the captor. The objections of the Neapolitan government may readily be imagined. My reply w ill be founded in the Doctrine proclaimed by the Department of State and by the Senate of the United States.

Chandler's justification that the ship was taken on the high seas is legitimate, but his insistence on the fact that the ship was bound for a country at peace is another example of strict application of the law in order to realize previous intentions.

The prime minister of Sardinia-Piedmont was also interested in the release of the American vessel. Cavour appealed to the United

States government "to maintain the liberty of the seas" and expressed

3bLetter from Chandler to Neapolitan M inister for Foreign Affairs Carafa, June 18, 1860, enclosed in Chandler to Cass, June 28, 1860, Despatches, Two S icilies, NA,RG 59.

Chandler to Cass, June 26, 1860, Despatches, Two Sicilies, NA,RG 59. 33 confidence that that nation "will also take the necessary measures to qo cause its flag to be respected." He was not disappointed. The

Charles and Jane was released, and the condition that the vessel was to be escorted to Genoa by a Neapolitan warship was successfully refused by Chandler. The demand for payment of time lost while in port was dropped since Chandler had found out that Captain Donnell had been paid in advance by the rebel m ilitary officials under Medici, and the ship landed in Genoa with crew, passengers, and cargo intact.

Meanwhile, the American consul at Palermo had informed the State

Department that the Washington, the Franklin, and the Oregon "are sailing under a Certificate of Repository of a B ill of Sale from our

Consul at Genoa and are therefore to the best of my judgement entitled to protection as American vessels.The Washington conç>leted another successful voyage in early July before transportation became suffic­ iently safe for the Ufficio M ilitare to book passage for volunteers in a more conventional fashion on passenger ships bound fairly regularly for Sicily.

The only instructions from Washington to any of these representa­ tives on the use of American-owned vessels to supply Garibaldi’s rebel forces in Sicily was a short note informing Chandler that "your course

^^Letter from Cavour to Daniel, June 23, 1860, enclosed in Daniel to Cass, June 24, 1860, Appendix B, Despatches, Sardinia-Piedmont, NA,RG 59.

®^Letter from American Consul at Palermo Barstow to Chandler, June 27, 1860, enclosed in Chandler to Cass, June 30, 1860, Despatches, Two S i c i l i e s , NA,RG 59. 34 40 is entirely approved."

Thus, while the American consul at Genoa christened newly- purchased rebel vessels with the names of American heroes and while he gave them every encouragement to embark for the ports of a nation deep in the throes of a revolutionary war, the American minister at the capital of that nation successfully demanded the release of any such vessels apprehended in the distribution of the very necessary supplies of war. The complete absence of any specific instructions to the contrary, especially after the incident of the Charles and Jane, would seem to indicate that the American government sanctioned these actions of its representatives in the Italian States and ipso facto provided valuable assistance to Garibaldi’s solution to the "Italian question."

40 Secretary of State Lewis Cass to the Minister to the Kingdom of the Two S icilies Joseph Chandler, Aug. 4, 1860, Diplomatic Instruc­ tio n s o f th e D epartm ent of S ta te , 1801 - 1906, I ta ly , Kingdom o f th e Two S icilies, Records of the Department of State, National Archives, Record Group 59 (Microcopy File). CHAPTER IV

UNITY ACCOMPLISHED

Shortly after the successful embarkation of the Thousand, the government of the United States took action tantamount to diplomatic recognition of the territorial aggrandizement of Sardinia-Piedmont in

central Italy. A notice had been given to representatives of the foreign powers at Leghorn, an important Tuscan seaport, to "have their Exequaturs

renewed in the name of the Sardinian authority.Most simply refused

to comply on the basis that the previous government, that of the Duke of

Tuscany, which had been forced into exile in 1859, remained the legal

authority. "Two Consuls went so far as to say that their governments

would not permit them to do anything of the kind until the Conference at

Paris had sanctioned the annexation."^

The American government, however, decided to elevate the status

of the American representative at Florence, the capital of Tuscany, from

commercial agent to consul general. From Turin, John Daniel commented,

"The ministry here will be well pleased at the recognition of their

rights over Tuscany implied by the appointment of a Consul by the United

States at Florence." The decision came at a critical moment, for several

^Daniel to Cass, June 12, 1860, Despatches, Sardinia-Piedmont, NA,R6 59.

^ I b id .

3lbid.

35 36 of the continental powers were very much concerned about the activist role being played by the Sardinian government, especially since Cavour*s return to power.

Following the American move, the English government yielded on the issue of sending in "the commission of their Consul at Leghorn thereby giving official recognition of the annexation."^ Daniel was disposed to conclude that "this action was prompted by the United States.

In June, the United States Congress approved legislation to elevate the status of the American minister to Sardinia-Piedmont to "envoy extra­ ordinary and minister plenipotentiary.Thus, while some European foreign offices adopted a noncommittal policy toward the Sardinian annexa­ tions and others took a strong negative view, the United States govern­ ment proceeded to accord official approval.

American interest in a viable nation-state encompassing the whole of the Italian peninsula was strongly motivated by commercial considera­ tions. Equally significant was the fact that the State Department, under the controlling influence of President Buchanan, reinstated the tradi­ tional American policy of freedom of the seas.

The principal object was to bring other commercial Powers to the active support of our views, and thereby cause them to be engrafted

^Daniel to Cass, June 26, 1860, Despatches, Sardinia-Piedmont, NA,R6 59.

Si b i d .

^"The Congressional Globe," June 18, 1860, containing the Debates and Proceedings of the First Session of the Thirty-Sixth Congress, Printed at the Office of John C. Rives, Washington, 1860, p. 3056. 37

into the law of nations. . . . It is hoped that the liberal views thus presented by a maritime nation deeply interested in these questions, w ill not be without their due effect upon the opinions and policy of other independent governments.

John Daniel immediately perceived the possibility of realizing the interests of the United States government in a future Kingdom of Q Italy, "only limited by the peninsula itself." As early as February,

1860, he had written:

For a long time it must be what the United States now is, a state possessing a commerce and a coast altogether disproportionate to its naval defense; and in this condition it should be our natural ally in the designs so often set forth by the government of the United States for diminishing the severities of naval war and ameliorating the law of nations for the high seas.*

When the incident involving the Charles and Jane brought this mutual interest dramatically to the fore, Cavour wrote to Daniel stating his immediate concern for gaining American assistance in securing the release of the vessels. More important, the prime minister indicated that he was favorably disposed toward "the labours of the United States government on behalf of neutrals upon the high s e a s .I t would appear that Daniel was correct in his repeated assertion "that the

Sardinian government, or at least such men in it who know anything about

^Cass to Daniel, Nov. 19, 1859, Diplomatic Instructions, Italy, NA,RG 59.

®Daniel to Cass, Feb. 14, 1860, Despatches, Sardinia-Piedmont, NA,RG 59.

*I b id .

^*Private note from Cavour to Daniel, June 10, 1860, enclosed in Daniel to Cass, June 12, 1860, Despatches, Sardinia-Piedmont, NA,RG 59. 38 national law heartily concur in all views enunciated by the Secretary of

State. . . . Interest renders it certain.

In the meantime, the cause of Italian liberation and unification was being successfully championed by Garibaldi. The surrender at Palermo in early June had temporarily halted military endeavors in Sicily. As the general prepared to incorporate the newly arrived volunteers from the north, King Francis II convened the foreign ministers at Naples in an attempt to have the Powers guarantee the territorial integrity of his kingdom. The American minister. Chandler, reported to Washington, "I cannot learn that any power in Europe is willing to come between the people and the Royal government. 'One Italy' is the watchword of Gari­ baldi and 'annexation' is the war cry in Sicily."^

Continued success brought increased concessions from the Neapoli­ ta n monarch, b u t th e re v o lu tio n a ry t i d e had g ath ered to o much momentum to be stopped by promises and compromise measures. Daniel related that

"the king must maintain himself by his courage and his arms or depart

and leave the field open to the ambition of Sardinia.

As Garibaldi swept the army of Naples from Sicily, the general

^Daniel to Cass, June 17, 1860, Despatches, Sardinia-Piedmont, NA,RG 59. The text states "national law." Daniel probably meant international law.

^Chandler to Cass, June 7, 1860, Despatches, Two Sicilies, NA,RG 59.

Daniel to Cass, June 26, 1860, Despatches, Sardinia-Piedmont, NA,RG 59. 39 tone of European diplomacy was one of non-intervention.^^ Although the

Russian government protested the involvement of Sardinia-Piedmont and withdrew its minister from Turin, assistance from that isolated regime was a virtual impossibility.^® The Sardinian government went through the motions of advising Garibaldi against invasion of the mainland, while the facts dictated that Cavour had no choice. Any attempt to prevent

G aribaldi's success would have doomed Cavour's ministry to failure and marked the end of his personal career in Italian politics.

On July 22, Titto Modignani was presented with two messages from

King Victor Emmanuel to be delivered to Garibaldi in Sicily. The first was a request that the general not cross the Straits of Messina; the world was to be given evidence that the Sardinian monarch did not condone the actions of a firebrand and a revolutionary. The second note was to be delivered in the utmost secrecy. It was written in the king's own hand and only came to light some fifty years after the event. It instructed Garibaldi to reply:

Your duty to Italy forbids you to promise not to help the Neapolitans, when they appeal to you to free them from a government which true men and good Italians cannot trust. You cannot, therefore, obey the wishes of the king, but must reserve full freedom of action.

^^The traditional view on intervention as a distinct possibility thwarted at the last possible moment by a special emissary to Lord Russell is best presented by George M. Trevelyan in Garibaldi and the Making of Italy , "The Lacaita Incident." This position has been revised by Derek Beales, England and Italy, 1860, through a new interpretation of the correspondence, especially as it relates to the role of the French m inister to England, M. Persigny. 15 Daniel to Cass, July 24, 1860, Despatches, Sardinia-Piedmont, NA,RG 59.

16 Trevelyan, Garibaldi and the Making of Italy, pp. 101-02. 40

The secrecy of the second note is to be seriously questioned since

Daniel notified the State Department in late July that "General Garibaldi was left free to act as he pleased on his own responsibility."^^ And from Naples, Chandler reported, "There can be no doubt that the King of

Sardinia desires and expects Garibaldi to conquer Naples, but both king and dictator are held in awe of Prance."^® It was not fear of the French, however, that made Garibaldi hesitate to take the great leap forward. It was the uncertain status of the spirit of rebellion among the populace and the degree of loyalty maintained by the government troops.

Both fears were quickly dispelled as the Garibaldians landed in force and routed the first regulars who opposed them. The Neapolitan army showed little enthusiasm for combat, and the people of Calabria turned out in droves to hail their conquering hero. It seemed that

Daniel had correctly anticipated the mass reaction;

Whenever he comes Garibaldi may write the history of the campaign in the words of another captain—veni, vidi, vici.^*

The general’s military accomplishments threatened to disrupt the

existing diplomatic situation. He issued a formal statement of his

ultimate intentions shortly after the victorious entry into the city of

Daniel to Cass, July 29, 1860, Despatches, Sardinia-Piedmont, NAjRG 59.

Chandler to Cass, July 21, 1860, Despatches, Two Sicilies, NA,RG 59.

^*Daniel to Cass, Aug. 7, 1860, Despatches, Sardinia-Piedmont, NA,RG 59. Underlined passages appear in the original. 41

N ap les:

We w ill soon proclaim the annexation of Naples to the dominion of the gallant king of Italy;—but we intend to proclaim it yonder at the top of the Quirinal Hill when Italy can count all her children in the concourse and receive them all free together in her illus­ tr i o u s b r e a s t .20

Garibaldi's forceful solution to the problem of Papal power surely would have caused France to intervene in support of the garrison at Rome.

Count Camillo Cavour was acutely aware of the danger inherent in a successful Garibaldian venture in the south and felt certain that

Victor Emmanuel would be unable to accept "the Crown of Italy at the hands of Garibaldi; it would sit too uneasy on his head.The prim e minister took steps to prevent the Italian hero from riding "roughshod over the susceptibilities of the Catholic world.As early as mid-

August, he secretly began to transport Sardinian troops toward the Papal frontiers. Shortly thereafter, anticipating that the Austrian govern­ ment might seize that propitious moment for revenge, he ordered mobili­ zation of the National Guard to act in a defense capacity.

Cavour was willing to risk a war with Austria because he remained confident of French and English approval of the Sardinian intervention in the south "out of fear of general revolution and war should Garibaldi have the time and opportunity to carry out his entire plan which is by

^^Proclamation of Garibaldi to the People of Palermo, September 10, 1860, enclosed in Daniel to Cass, Sept. 18, 1860, Despatches, Sardinia-Piedmont, NA,RG 59.

^^Arthur Whyte, The P o litic a l L ife and L etters of Cavour (London: Oxford University Press, 1930), p. 416.

^^Ibid. 42 oq no means confined to the Kingdom of Naples.” Thus, the use of force by Victor Emmanuel’s government would be in the best interests of a ll of

the Powers as it would serve "to cut off all further advance of the 9A revolution."

Garibaldi entered Naples on September 7 amid tumultous rejoicing.

Four days later, Sardinian troops crossed the Papal borders. As the

army of Victor Emmanuel, which vastly outnumbered the troops of the Pope,

marched southward. Garibaldi met stiff Neapolitan resistance at the

Volturno River. The delay effectively eliminated any attempt by Gari­

baldi to race the king toward Rome.

The appearance of Sardinian troops in the Papal States temporarily

resolved the most serious breach among Italian leaders, but it also

caused dualism among Americans actively supporting Italian causes.

Committees established in 1859 in New York City to support Garibaldi's

efforts continued to organize money-raising events and send contribu­

tions to the Million Rifles Fund. After the Papal troops took the field

in defense of the Pope, similar fund raising activity was begun by the

Catholic Church.

At the very time when the American people were pouring money to aid the people of Italy in their resistance to a tyranny. Archbishop Hughes, and the Catholic Bishops of the South, were appealing for Peter pence to assist Piux IX in maintaining his temporal power

^®Daniel to Cass, Sept. 4, 1860, Despatches, Sardinia-Piedmont, NA,RG 59. 24lbid. 43

against the assaults of revolutionary Catholics in the papal dom inions.

No such dichotomy on the Italian situation existed within American government circles. A statement of protest and appeal by the Papacy,

issued on September 18, went virtually unnoticed by official Washing­ ton. 2b As the Sardinian army successfully completed the campaign in the

Papal States, John Stockton, the American Minister at Rome, interpreted the French position and outlined the solution to the temporal power of the Papacy which was to place that problem in abeyance for the ensuing te n y e a rs :

I infer that the French will protect the Patrimony against all parties, that they w ill do so more at present, that the Piedmontese understand the matter perfectly, as with an arny three times the size of the French, they fell back from Corneto, Viterbo, etc. at the advance of the French to the lim its of the P a t r im o n y27 .

Diplomatically avoiding the Holy City and the surrounding te rri­ tory, the Sardinian army drove to the south and joined forces with the

Garibaldian volunteers. In protest of the invasion of the Papal States,

the ministers of Spain, France, Russia, Austria, and the Papacy were

OQ withdrawn from Turin, while the American and British delegations

O C Howard Marraro, ^erican Opinion on the Unification of Italy, 1846-1861 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1932, p. 293.

United States Ministers to the Papal States, Instructions and Despatches, 18^8-1868, ed. Leo Stock (Washington: Catholic University Press, 1933), p. 192.

^"^I b id . , p . 202.

2®Daniel to Cass, Oct. 16, 1860, Despatches, Sardinia-Piedmont, NA,RG 59. 44 prepared to deal with the collapse of the Neapolitan government and the

creation of a united Italy. Daniel wrote that "judging by present appear­

ances the Italian millennium is near at hand. Garibaldi has decreed an

election by the people upon the question of annexation. "2^

The historic meeting between Garibaldi and King Victor Emmanuel II

took place in late October as the popular hero yielded to the legitimate

authority. On November 8, Garibaldi again rode triumphantly into Naples,

this time at the side of his sovereign.

In the early dawn hours of a November morning in 1860, within a

few days of the American presidential election, the man who had done so

much for Italy quietly boarded a steamer for his island home of Caprera.

He carried the well-known bag of seed corn and five hundred lire he had

borrowed from a friend. Garibaldi’s great work was nearly finished;

Abraham Lincoln’s was soon to begin.

2*Ibid. CONCLUSION

As the tide of nationalism ran unchecked toward the successful conclusion of the Italian problem, the United States withdrew its mission at Naples in consequence of the collapse of the Spanish Bourbon dynasty.

At Turin, John Daniel requested a leave of absence "as the affairs of the

Italian States have been settled for some time to come. His request was g ran ted , and, with the change of administration in 1861, George Per­ kins Marsh was appointed to be the first American minister to a united

Italy. Thus began a new era in Italian-American diplomatic relations which is beyond the scope of this study.

Hoping to distract the American public from the burning issue of slavery, the Democratic leadership meeting at Cincinnati in 1856 had proposed in their platform a vigorous foreign policy program, including

"the establishment of 'free seas' and 'progressive free trade' throughout the world. " Pursuit of this policy during the ensuing four years failed to stem the inevitable drift toward civil war and the Buchanan adminis­ tration has been criticized, in the light of history, for lack of effec­ tive action in resolving the domestic situation. At the time, however,

Buchanan was more often accused of an overzealous approach to foreign

affairs. An editorial in the National Intelligencer stated:

^Daniel to Cass, Dec. 11, 1860, Despatches, Sardinia-Piedmont, NA,RG 59.

2Philip Klein, President James Buchanan (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1962), p. 317.

45 46

We must retrench the extravagant lis t of magnificent schemes which has received the sanction of the Executive. . . . The great Napoleon, him­ self, with all the resources of an Empire at his sole command, never ventured the simultaneous accomplishment of so many daring projects.^

The activities of the American representatives in the Italian peninsula in 1860 could never amount to "daring projects," but they did establish an American position toward Italy which was, in part, dictated by the State Department’s policy of securing guarantees of freedom of the seas. As the aspirations long espoused by Mazzini were brought dramatically to the fore by Cavour's annexations in the north central states and Garibaldi’s exploits in the south, the American position was brought into the open.

American assistance to the second expedition to Sicily began with the individual decisions of two American ship captains. Before it had ended, the American government was committed to defend its citizens as they openly defied an established European government and transported the necessities of war to a rebel leader. When the desertion of American sailors to the Garibaldian cause reached sufficient proportions to cause an incident, even the Sardinian government commented on the efforts of the American consul at Genoa, William Patterson:

Perhaps the officials at Genoa would have experienced much less embarrassment if the Consul of the United States himself had not on several occasions given reason to suppose that he was much interested in the expedition of volunteers for Garibaldi.^

^Ibid. , p. 327 as included in the "National Intelligencer," Jan. 24, 1859.

^^niel to Cass, Aug. 28, 1860, Despatches, Sardinia-Piedmont, NA,R6 59. 47

The capture of the Charles and Jane and the subsequent decisions of Joseph Chandler serve to substantiate the American commitment to vessels in Italian waters bearing American colors. It also led to one of the few official statements from Washington in support of the approach taken by our representatives in the Italian peninsula and provided Cavour with the opportunity to express a favorable inclination toward the current American emphasis on guarantee of the rights of neutrals. The strongest evidence in support of official recognition and approval of an American position must remain the total absence of instructions lim it­

ing or prohibiting the actions taken by Americans serving in the Italian s t a t e s .

The Italian unification movement became a valid expression of the joint efforts of many outstanding leaders who held varying degrees of

conviction about the ideals of liberalism and nationalism. Mazzini,

Cavour, and Garibaldi are the obvious examples. At that particular

moment in the development of the Italian nation it was not difficult for

the American public or the American government to identify themselves with

the Italian cause. Some recognition of this identification by the American

public has been substantiated; equal recognition remains due the American

government under President James Buchanan. BIBLIOGRAPHY BIBLIOGRAPHY

PRIMARY SOURCES

1. Bibliographical Aids

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Goggin, Daniel T. and H. Stephen Helton. Guides to be Used in Locating Preliminary Inventories, Number 157, General Records of the Depart­ ment of State. Washington: National Archives and Records Service.

The National Archives of the United States. Guide to Records in the Na­ tional Archives. Washington: National Archives and Records Service, 1948.

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Minister to The Kingdom of the Two Sicilies Joseph Chandler to Secretary of State Lewis Cass, Despatches from United States Ministers to the Italian States, 1832-1906, The Kingdom of the Two Sicilies, Records of the Department of State, National Archives, Record Group 59 (Microcopy File).

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Chiala, Luigi (ed.). Lettere Edite ed Inedite di Camillo Cavour. 6 vols. Turin: Roux e F a v a le , 1866.

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Dumas, Alexandre. On Board the Emma. Translated and with an introduc­ tion by R. S. G a rre tt. New York: Appleton and Company, 1929.

Garibaldi, Giuseppi. Autobiography of Giuseppi Garibaldi. Translated by J . W. Mario. 3 vols. London: W alter Smith and Innes, 1889.

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Feiertag, Sister Loretta C. American Public Opinion on the Diplomatic Relations between the United States and the Papal States, 1847-1867, Washington: Catholic University Press, 1933. 51

Grew, Raymond. A Sterner Plan for Italian Unity, The Italian National Society in the Riscrgimento. Princeton; Princeton University Press, 1963.

Hughes, H. S tu a rt. The U nited S ta te s and I t a l y . Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1953.

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Schiavo, Giovanni. The Italians in America before the Civil War. New York; Vigo Press, 1934.

Sm ith, Denis M. Cavour and G a rib a ld i, 1860. London: Cambridge U nivers­ ity Press, 1954.

______. Garibaldi, A Great Life in Brief. Alfred A. Knopf, 1956.

Taylor, A. J. P. Struggle for Mastgry in Europe. 1848-1918. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1954.

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2. A rtic le s

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