Vol. 33, No. 1: Full Issue
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
Denver Journal of International Law & Policy Volume 33 Number 1 Winter Article 13 2004 Sutton Colloquium April 2020 Vol. 33, no. 1: Full Issue Denver Journal International Law & Policy Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/djilp Recommended Citation 33 Denv. J. Int'l L. & Pol'y This Full Issue is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Denver Sturm College of Law at Digital Commons @ DU. It has been accepted for inclusion in Denver Journal of International Law & Policy by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ DU. For more information, please contact [email protected],dig- [email protected]. DENVER JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY VOLUME 33 2004-2005 Denver Journal of International Law and Policy VOLUME 33 NUMBER 1 Wlnter-2004 TABLE OF CoNTENTs 2004 SUTTON COLLOQUIUM KEYNOTE ADDRESS COLLECTIVE SECURITY AND THE UNITED NATIONS .................. U.S. Rep. Mark Udall 1 FOREWORD PREEMPTIVE AND PREVENTIVE USE OF FORCE, COLLECTIVE SECURITY, AND HUMAN SECURITY .................... Ved P. Nanda 7 ARTICLES THE PREVENTIVE/PREEMPTIVE WAR DOCTRINE CANNOT JUSTIFY THE IRAQ WAR ...................... Robert M. Lawrence 16 PREEMPTIVE OR PREVENTIVE WAR: A DISCUSSION OF LEGAL AND MORAL STANDARDS ...... Steven J. Barela 31 COLLECTIVE SECURITY WITH A HUMAN FACE: AN INTERNATIONAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR COORDINATED ACTION TO ALLEVIATE VIOLENCE AND POVERTY .................. Jennifer Moore 43 HUMAN SECURITY, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION, AND THIRD WORLD CONCERNS .... Priyankar Upadhyaya 71 HUMAN SECURITY AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT.. John F. Jones 92 THE ROLE OF THE MEDIA, LAW, AND NATIONAL RESOLVE IN THE WAR ON TERROR ...... Robert Hardaway 104 2003-2004 LEONARD V.B. SUTTON AWARD THE "IMMINENT THREAT" REQUIREMENT FOR THE USE OF PREEMPTIVE MILITARY FORCE: IS IT TIME FOR A NON-TEMPORAL STANDARD? . Mark L. Rockefeller 131 GENERAL ARTICLES ARTICLE PREEMPTIVE SELF-DEFENSE IN AN AGE OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION: OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM .............. Charles Pierson 150 KEYNOTE ADDRESS: COLLECTIVE SECURITY AND THE UNITED NATIONS, UNIVERSITY OF DENVER COLLEGE OF LAW, FEBRUARY 28,2004 U.S. REP. MARK UDALL* Thank you. I'm so pleased to be part of today's important program. I'd like to thank the University of Denver and Ved Nanda for inviting me to join you .this morning. I'm especially honored to be delivering the keynote address this morning. I hope my comments will contribute to your broader discussion on the topic of collective security and the United Nations. The last time I spoke here at the University of Denver on foreign affairs was nearly four years ago-and it feels as though it was another age entirely. So much has happened to change our perceptions of the world. Instead of living in hope- working together with countries around the globe to shape the post-Cold War "new world order"-we are living in fear and are faced with seemingly stark choices-to be multilateral or unilateral, preemptive or reactive, on the side of evil or on the side of good. I don't mean to imply that the role of the United States in the "new world order" was ever particularly clear. We were not able to reach a consensus on how to define the new threats to security and what constitutes our "national interest." For decades our resistance to Communism had been the organizing principle of American political life and foreign policy. But once the "evil empire" collapsed, with it collapsed the cold war paradigm. Then came the collapse of the Twin Towers-at a time when this country was debating its role in the post-Cold War world. After 9-11, we were given a new organizing principle-fighting terrorism. The impact of the terrorist attacks on our nation's psyche changed our entire worldview overnight. As President Bush so memorably put it, "you're either with us or you're against us."' The historical connotations of that phrase are alarming. Former National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski pointed out in a recent speech that "he who is not with us is against us" was popularized by Lenin when he attacked the Social Democrats for being anti-Bolshevik.2 * U.S. House of Representatives (D-CO-2); member of the House Armed Services Committee, the House Science Committee, and the House Resources Committee; ranking member on the Committee on Science Space and Aeronautics Subcommittee; co-chair of the House Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Caucus; member of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly. 1. See Michael J. Jordan, 'With or Against Us' War Irks Many UN Nations, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Nov. 14,2001, at 7. 2. See, e.g., Zbigniew Brzezinski, Another American Casualty: Credibility, WASH. POST, Nov. 9, 2003, at B 1. DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y VOL. 33:1 Unfortunately, it appears that decision makers in the Bush Administration see this as the new basis for our policy. They see the world through the prism of the "war on terrorism," which is understandable after 9-11, but we need to consider how this new organizing principle constricts our foreign policy vision and potentially blinds us to realities on the ground. Bumper sticker slogans are no substitute for careful policy. In the run-up to the U.S. invasion of Iraq, this "blindness" caused the Bush Administration to rush the diplomatic process at the United Nations, and dismiss a strategy of "coercive inspections" 3 that might have improved our intelligence about WMD and served as a foundation for a stronger coalition in the region. The "blindness" of Pentagon leaders caused them to exaggerate intelligence claims 4 and mangle the planning for the post-war occupation and rebuilding of Iraq-and ignore in-depth analyses compiled by State Department experts that would have assisted them in this task. After 9-11, President Bush had no choice but to take an aggressive stance against terrorism and to reorganize his thinking and the thinking of his6 Administration on how to counter its threat. The "democratization of technology" has made tools of terror readily available to people around the world. It is clear that we can no longer focus on states as the main sponsors of terrorism. And waiting for these increasingly dangerous threats to materialize is much riskier than it used to be. I believe there is a growing awareness on both sides of the aisle in Congress that excessive caution, passivity, and diplomatic paralysis are not viable options to any threat-imminent or otherwise. Yet it would not have been excessively cautious or passive for the Bush Administration to have waited a few more months in the spring and summer of 2003 to attempt to gain broader intemational backing for the war against Saddam Hussein's regime. The "broad coalition ' 7 President Bush fashioned to carry out our war in Iraq was no substitute for what could have been a United Nations mandate. And the fact is, by going in without support and without a post-war plan, we made long-term success much more difficult to achieve. I think we can all agree that winning the war isn't enough unless we can also win the peace. One of the reasons I voted against the resolution to go to war-and even went through the effort of drafting my own resolution 8-was my concern that the Bush Administration had no plans for managing post-war Iraq. In the debate 3. See, e.g., The Case for Coercive Inspections, Now with Bill Moyers, Mar. 14, 2003, at http://www.pbs.org/now/politics/inspections.html. 4. David Johnston, Policy, PoliticsAnd Pressure,N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 2004, at Al. 5. See Walter Pincus, Spy Agencies Warned of Iraq Resistance, Wash. Post, Sept. 9, 2003, at Al. 6. See, e.g., THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, THE LEXUS AND THE OLIVE TREE (Anchor Books 2000). 7. See Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, U.K. Defense Minister See Broad Coalition on Iraq, Press Conference (Feb. 12, 2003) (transcript available at http://israel.usembassy.gov/publish/press/2003/february/021305.html). 8. Preliminary Authorization for the Use of Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002, H.R.J. Res. 118, 107th Cong. (2002). 2004 KEYNOTE ADDRESS before the war, many of us argued that while America can go it alone, and should go it alone when we believe an attack is imminent, Iraq presented no such imminent threat. We said that we needed the United Nations with us-not so much to win the war and topple Saddarn Hussein, but to secure the peace and take responsibility for the costly and difficult nation-building to follow. We feared that a preemptive, go-it-alone attack could seriously compromise our efforts to combat global terrorism, particularly in the Islamic world. But these concerns were largely obscured by the "with us or against us" rallying cry. After 9-11 the word "multilateral" came to be associated with weakness, vacillation, lack of conviction, and courage. In the minds of the unilateralists, to defend one's country is to act-not to "seek a permission slip to defend the security of our country," as President Bush pointed out in this year's State of the Union address.9 But it shouldn't have to be a choice. Few thoughtful observers of foreign affairs advocate using exclusively multilateral or unilateral approaches. Yet the "new" unilateralists have done just that, arguing that the nature of today's threat is so dire that we need to extricate ourselves from constraining multilateral institutions.1 0 Defense Secretary Rumsfeld said that issues should determine the coalition, not vice versa." I couldn't disagree more. Multilateral institutions like the United Nations provide the framework for enduring alliances and ties based on common values and interests.