The Pennsylvania State University the Graduate School Donald P. Bellisario College of Communications STATE PROPAGANDA and COUNTE

Home , 2016 in China, Alvin Cheng, Anastasia Lin, Bauhinia Party, Charles Ho, Counterpropaganda

The Pennsylvania State University

The Graduate School

Donald P. Bellisario College of Communications

STATE PROPAGANDA AND COUNTER-PROPAGANDA: TWO CASE STUDIES

ON NATIONALIST PROPAGANDA IN MAINLAND CHINA AND HONG KONG

A Dissertation in

Mass Communications

Luwei Rose Luqiu

@2018 Luwei Rose Luqiu

Submitted in Partial Fulfillment

of the Requirements

for the Degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

May 2018

The dissertation of Luwei Rose Luqiu was reviewed and approved by the following:

Bu Zhong

Associate Professor of Journalism

Dissertation Advisor

Chair of Committee

Mary Beth Oliver

Distinguished Professor of Media Effect Research

Patrick Parsons

Don Davis Professor of Ethics

John McCarthy

Distinguished Professor of Sociology

Matthew McAllister

Professor of Media Studies

Chair of Graduate Programs of Donald P. Bellisario College of Communications

*Signatures are on file in the Graduate School

iii

ABSTRACT

This research aims to study the propaganda and counter-propaganda strategies used in both a closed and an open society by conducting two case studies in mainland China and Hong

Kong. Nationalist propaganda campaigns concerning four independence movements in Tibet,

Xinjiang, Taiwan, and Hong Kong were compared and analyzed to explore the underlying mechanism of Chinese Communist Party’s propaganda strategies. The framing strategies employed in the four independence movements were also compared, which were significant different among the movements under study. The Hong Kong independence movement was used to demonstrate the framing contest in Hong Kong, while state propaganda faces different challengers. A hostile media effect and a third-person effect were revealed among mainland

Chinese netizens. This research adds new evidence to the observation that the state-controlled media might change people’s behavior, but they could hardly change their beliefs. It also shows that the free flow of information is one of the key factors that may fight official propaganda information circulated in an open society, but an open society remains vulnerable to foreign governments’ propaganda manipulation, especially through economic means and pressures. The consequences of mainland China’s propaganda campaigns in Hong Kong included undermining

Hong Kong’s social mobilization and political participation, which could lead to a more polarized society.

iv TABLE OF CONTENTS

List of Figures ------v list of Tables ------vi

Acknowledgment ------viii

Chapter 1 Introduction ------1

Chapter 2 Defining Propaganda ------10

Chapter 3 Nationalist Propaganda in Chinese State Media: Four Independence Movements------31

Chapter 4 Measure Nationalist Propaganda Strategy in Close Society------65

Chapter 5 How Chinese Government Control Media in Hong Kong------88

Chapter 6 Framing Contest: Why China’s State Propaganda Backfired in Hong Kong------118

Chapter 7 Role of Media for Challengers of State Power in an Open Society------146

Chapter 8 Conclusion------173

Reference ------180

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 3-1: News coverage on Taiwan, HK, Tibet, and Xinjiang independence movements

------46

Figure 3-2. Total percentage of factors in stories about the four independence movements

------47

Figure 3-3: Percentage comparison of the total number of factors between the Xinjiang and

Chechen independence movements ------56

Figure 6-1. Cascade of state propaganda in Hong Kong------122

Figure 6-2. Ethnic Identity Among Hong Kong Citizens 1997.7.12 – 2017.1.6------125

Figure 6-3: News stories that mentioned “Hong Kong independence”: 1998-2017------127

Figure 6-4: News stories that mentioned “Hong Kong independence”: 1998-2003------129

Figure 6-5: News stories that mentioned “Hong Kong independence”: 2004-2009------131

Figure 6-6: News stories that mentioned “Hong Kong independence”: 2010-2014------133

Figure 6-7: News stories that mentioned “Hong Kong independence”: 2015 – present---135

Figure 6-8: News coverage that mentioned Hong Kong independence: 1998-2017------139

LIST OF TABLES

Table 3-1: Result of one-way ANOVA of between groups effect of factors------48

Table 3-2: The frame of the political factors in covering the Taiwan, HK, Xinjiang and

Tibet movements------49

Table 3-3: The descriptive data of Chechen independence------55

Table 3-4: Results of One-way ANOVA of factors top Xijiang independence and

Chechen independence------57

Table 3-5: The framing of the political factors in covering the Xinjiang and Chechen independence movements------58

Table 4-1: Perceived message quality: Frame X Source X Topic------80

Table 4-2: Perceived message quality: media literacy x frame and trust in US media x frame------81

Table 4-3: Perceived message quality: Attitude towards Tibetan independence x frame and attitude towards Tibetan independence x source------82

Table 4-4: Multiple linear regression on the individual predictors of support for censorship------83

Table 4-5: Multiple linear regression on the individual predictors in support censor two articles------83

Table 5-1: Ownership of the major news media in Hong Kong------98

Table 5-2: Ownership of the major digital news media in Hong Kong------112

Table 6-1: Views on the prospects of Hong Kong after 2047: Independence------125

Table 6-2: Five most frequently used words: 1998-2003------129

Table 6-3: Five most frequently used words: 2004 – 2009------132

vii

Table 6-4: Five most frequently used words: 2010 – 2014------134

Table 6-5: Five most frequently used words: 2015 – present------137

Table 7-1: SMOs accused by state propaganda of advocating independence------150

Table 7-2: Interviewee information------152

Table 7-3: News coverage of pro-independence SMOs------156

Table 7-4: Social media accounts and media products (Till Oct. 7, 2017) ------160

Table 7-5: Money mobilization technologies and membership recruitment------164

Table 7-6: Media framing and role in mobilization------167

viii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I am grateful to all the members of my Dissertation Committee whom have provided extensive personal and professional guidance: Professor Mary Beth Oliver, Professor Patrick

Parsons, Professor John McCarthy, and Professor Bu Zhong who served as the chair of my committee. As my teachers and mentors, they have taught a great deal about scientific research and have been supportive of my career goals. Each of you have given your time and careful attention to detail.

I want to extend my thanks to Donald P. Bellisario College of Communications, for providing me the opportunity to pursue my academic dream and change my career path.

Most importantly, I wish to thank the members of my family. I am especially grateful to my husband, who supported me emotionally and financially, encouraging me in all of my pursuits. This journey would not have been possible without their support.

Finally, to my friends, thank you for listening, working with me and supporting me through this entire process.

Chapter 1

Introduction

As a journalist and news executive working in China for 20 years, I spent a lot of time in receiving and responding to government censorship messages in those years, which was part of my daily routine at a Chinese newsroom. When I joined Phoenix Satellite Television (hereafter

Phoenix TV) in 1996, the TV network, a Hong Kong-based joint venture between Rupert

Murdoch’s News Corporation and a Chinese entrepreneur named Liu Changle, was the only overseas Chinese-language media organization that was allowed to be broadcast to the audience in mainland China.

Phoenix TV, in those years, was part of the Chinese government’s overseas propaganda machine, and the government intended to use it to inform and influence Chinese people overseas.

However, since it serves as an alternative source of information for mainland Chinese beyond state media, the mainland became the station’s major market and source of advertising revenue.

Since Phoenix TV mainly targeted the mainland audience, the newsroom managers had been carefully produced the programming to avoid being blocked by the Chinese government that did not tolerate any “sensitive” information. So the Phoenix approach to reporting news was very different from other free news media in Hong Kong. Under the “one county, two systems” policy, the press freedom in Hong Kong is guaranteed by the Hong Kong Basic Law, the mini- constitution of Hong Kong, as well as human rights laws that Beijing does not recognize.

It is difficult to judge which news events could be sensitive to the Chinese government, since most of the time, news proceeds ahead of censorship. The central government’s

Propaganda Department usually issues its orders after an event breaks and news has been broadcast.

However, there are several widely known “red lines” among Chinese journalists that they are never allowed to cross, for example, reporting annual memorials for the Tiananmen Square protests of 1989 at Victoria Park in Hong Kong; Falun Gong; overseas Chinese dissidents and their activities. All these topics had been a taboo in the news to mainland China’s audiences. But to the Hong Kong audiences and local media, any news outlets that fail to cover the anniversaries of the Tiananmen Square protests in 1989 are viewed as either pro-Chinese government or

Chinese government-owned media.

Facing the censorship from Chinese government, which also triggered a large degree of self-censorship, Phoenix TV still enjoyed more freedom than other official news media in mainland China, especially when they reported international news events and issues concerning

Taiwan. Phoenix TV was the first news outlet to live broadcast the 2000 Taiwan Election for the mainland audience, although Taiwan’s national flag had to be covered by mosaic, and the term

“Taiwanese leader” was substituted for “president.” It was the first time that mainland audiences heard the name of Chen Shui-bian, the first president from the Democratic Progressive Party

(DPP), which ended the Kuomingtang’s more than 50 years of continuous rule in Taiwan. At that time, the Chinese state media were not allowed to mention his name or party in the news, since

Chen and the DPP were labeled as the forces of Taiwan independence by Beijing.

The propaganda strategy was changed after Chen won the 2000 election. The state media started to cover more and more Taiwan issues, denouncing the Taiwan leader and his party for their separatist words and deeds. Audiences in mainland China also demonstrated a huge interest in following news about Taiwan, especially about whether Beijing would use force to intimidate

3 the DPP administration. A weekly program on Phoenix TV, the “Situation Room,” became one of the most watched shows on Phoenix TV at that time, and market research showed that its loyal audience was dominated by male civil servants and hawkish nationalists.

Compared with the high frequency and flexibility of news coverage on Taiwan independence by Chinese state media, the coverage of Xinjiang independence was totally restricted by the censors. The Urumqi riot in 2009 began as a protest and then deteriorated into attacks on the Han people on July 5; two days later, hundreds of Han people clashed with

Uyghurs. The official death toll, mostly consisting of Hans, was 197, and 1,721 more people were injured. Beijing blamed the tragedy on Uyghur separatists and separatist groups, and denied the speculation that the failure of government policies had played a role in the Han-Uyghur conflicts. In addition to employing nationalist rhetoric and narratives to denounce the Uyghur separatists and separatist groups in news reports, commentaries, and editorials, China’s state media were not allowed to report the events on their own, but had to use Xinhua-provided wire stories that were pre-approved by the censors during and after the conflict.

One year after the riot, I was allowed to visit Xinjiang as the only reporter covering stories about daily life in the aftermath. I was told to avoid any discussion related to separatism, because providing any alternative information would cross the red line set by officials. For

Chinese audiences, information about Xinjiang separatists and the separatist movement – where it came from, how the movement was formed, what its appeal was for these people – was heavily censored. However, the violence in Xinjiang was enough for the majority of Han people in China to support the government’s policy in Xinjiang, under the name of counterterrorism and maintaining unity and territorial integrity.

Nationalist propaganda worked very well in mainland China. Before and during the

Umbrella Movement in Hong Kong in 2014, many mainlanders believed that Occupy Central was advocating for Hong Kong’s independence and that the leaders of the movement were supporters of separatism, although in reality the movement was asking for universal suffrage, which Beijing had promised before the 1997 handover. Even liberal intellectuals on the mainland who fight for democracy showed their antipathy toward the movement and its leaders. Social media and the Internet were strictly censored to prevent any alternative information and discussions from conflicting with the state media’s narrative about the movement. Although

Phoenix TV is based in Hong Kong, it was only allowed to cover stories about pro-establishment groups as indications of public opinion in Hong Kong, to give the impression that most citizens supported the central government in Beijing. As a TV commentator, I was told not to comment on the movement in Hong Kong. I understood that management was trying to protect me, and also avoid the trouble caused by any comments not in line with Beijing.

However, Beijing’s nationalist propaganda did not work well in Hong Kong; it triggered a huge backlash. The first time I saw British colonial flags featuring a Union Jack at protests was in 2012. The appearance of the British flags was inspired by Hong Kong Autonomy Movement formed by Hong Kong scholar Chin Wan, who argued that Hong Kong has the characteristics of a city-state in his book Hong Kong City-State Theory. Chin and his followers claimed that they were not seeking independence for Hong Kong; instead, seeking more autonomy under “one country, two systems.” Just four years later, two young pro-independence candidates were elected to the Legislative Council of Hong Kong (LegCo), although they were finally disqualified by the court following Beijing’s interpretation of the Basic Law. Since Chinese state capital has changed the media landscape in Hong Kong, transforming it from mainstream to

5 digital media. Meanwhile, the Hong Kong independence as a new ideology was being diffused.

This research is trying to answer the following research questions. First, what is the role of nationalist propaganda in an authoritarian regime like China? How does it work in a tightly controlled society, and will it encounter any backlash there? Second, in an open society, but in which the ownership of large news media outlets is under state control, why are new ideologies still able to spread and counter state propaganda?

To answer these research questions, I am using the journalistic practice in mainland

China and Hong Kong as two cases to demonstrate the effects of propaganda and counter- propaganda, in a closed and an open society respectively. Hong Kong is also a perfect example of how the Chinese government takes advantage of market economies and press freedom in open and law-abiding societies in order to promote its ideology and agenda through propaganda. I used nationalist propaganda concerning four independence movements to explore the Chinese

Communist Party’s propaganda strategy, because in modern Chinese state nationalism, sovereignty and the integrity of China’s territory is the most important concern. Since territorial integrity is the “red line” in China, there is no such discussion of it in the public arena where only the state propaganda narrative is available. The CCP was trying to enforce this “red line” in

Hong Kong; however, under the policy of “one country, two systems,” freedom of the press and freedom of speech are protected by law, and state propaganda has to compete with counter- propaganda narratives.

Chapter 2 mainly defines the concept of propaganda. In recent decades, the concepts of public diplomacy and persuasion have been commonly used to describe governments’ and organizations’ domestic and international propagandizing efforts. However, with the development of technology and narrative skills, propaganda has become more powerful and less

6 visible. I discuss different forms of propaganda and technology, and how they affected by technology, especially the Internet. Media technology enables the flow of information across borders, and in particular the flow of government propaganda; however, this flow is unbalanced.

Authoritarian regimes use the Internet to pour their propaganda into open societies and create a more closed society by adapting technology to block information that they believe would undermine their power outside of their borders. I also discuss different methodologies of studying propaganda, and the importance of studying propaganda.

Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 are the studies related to the first case study of nationalist propaganda in the closed society of mainland China. In Chapter 3, I address the relationship between nationalism and government propaganda, demonstrating under what circumstances and to what ends states prefer to deploy nationalist propaganda. I compared 17 years of Chinese news coverage of four independence movements in Tibet, Xinjiang, Taiwan, and Hong Kong, so to identify the Chinese government’s strategies for deploying nationalist propaganda. The news coverage comparison between the Xinjiang and Chechen independence movements identifies which political factors are not discussed and which factors are more frequently used in domestic reporting. The techniques of nationalist propaganda are predictable. First, it depicts the challengers as enemies of the State. Second, it uses foreign political powers, such as foreign governments, international media, and NGOs, to demonstrate how Western imperialism continually bullies China, as it did in the past. Third, it uses foreign political powers to help craft the image of a strong China. However, these techniques are used differently depending on the issues being covered.

Chapter 4 seeks to measure the effects of the Chinese government’s nationalist propaganda on citizens’ attitudes towards Tibetan independence. I do this by investigating the

7 mechanisms involved in the hostile media effect and considering whether a third-person effect exists in this ideologically uniform environment. A 2x3 and within-subjects factorial survey experiment was adopted (N = 1163). The study shows that participants tend to use sources instead of frames to judge the quality of news stories. Although a news story’s perceived effect on other people is the most significant predictor of supporting government censorship, its significance disappeared when the participants were asked whether they supported censoring the news stories to which they were exposed. On the one hand, this study demonstrates the effectiveness of state propaganda in changing mass behaviour in a closed society and in sending a strong signal of social control; on the other hand, it also provides evidence of the limitations of state media, which necessarily affects mass beliefs. The study also shows that improving media literacy and access to alternative information are the two factors that counter propaganda.

Three chapters are devoted to the second case study in this dissertation, demonstrating how the CCP was trying to deploy nationalist propaganda in an open society like Hong Kong.

Unlike in Mainland China, the state media had to compete with local commercial media, since

Hong Kong has a libertarian media system and no internet censorship, which allows information to flow freely. This provides an excellent opportunity to explore the interaction between state propaganda, local commercial media, alternative media, and state challengers. The second difference between Hong Kong and Mainland China is that Hong Kong has freedom of assembly and free elections. The turnouts for protests and elections were also indicators for measuring the effect of state propaganda. In 2016, two pro-independence candidates were successfully elected to the legislative council and several political organizations advocated for independence from

China, which marked the rise of the independence movement. I used different approaches in this case study and focused on counter-propaganda, including local media and state challengers, the

8 political organizations of the independence movements, and the role of media in movement mobilization and their counter-propaganda narrative strategies.

Chapter 5 provides a broad picture of how the Chinese government attempted to control the media in Hong Kong, the consequences of political participation, and how Hong Kong resisted the incursions of Beijing by using social media and alternative media. In Hong Kong’s open and law-abiding society, applying the political principle of “one country, two systems” presents a challenge to the Chinese government, particularly with respect to its efforts to control media ownership. Focusing on the structure of media ownership in Hong Kong, this chapter describes the ways in which the Internet – and especially social media – has empowered activists and alternative media by providing a means of avoiding censorship and social control. it also describes the Chinese government’s use of political power and capital to censor and shape the media landscape in Hong Kong in order to dampen public interest in politics and influence public opinion. Finally, it attempts to identify potential solutions to this problem.

Chapter 6 focuses on how local mainstream newspapers react to state propaganda. For the last two decades, the CCP has deployed nationalistic propaganda in Hong Kong in order to pass a national security law that is designed to prevent Hong Kong from threatening Chinese rule.

Under “one country, two systems” and the Basic Law, Hong Kong is the only place in China where people have the right to advocate independence and the end of one-party dictatorship. This study compares the coverage of Hong Kong independence by three newspapers that occupy different parts of the political-ideological spectrum in Hong Kong from 1998–2017 in order to analyse the framing contest between state propaganda, the Hong Kong media, the public, and other social actors, since Hong Kong is an open society. The study divided the framing contest process into four stages to demonstrate when and how the term “Hong Kong independence” used

9 by state media to denounce the opposition entered the mainstream media and spread activation.

State propaganda failed to win the framing contest and gain the support of the public. On the contrary, it desensitised the idea of independence and made it a legitimate public-interest topic, which led to polarisation in the public debate.

Chapter 7 focuses on how state challengers countered the negative framing of state propaganda and via for media resources to mobilize movements. After the 2014 Umbrella

Movement in Hong Kong, pro-independence social movement organizations (SMOs) successfully formed the independence movement. I interviewed 30 activists from these SMOs to examine the role of various media in movement mobilization – and in particular, how these challengers to state power use media to frame their movement and provide counter-propaganda narratives. The study shows that with the high penetration of social media in Hong Kong, among different types of media, local mainstream media are still the most important means of reaching and mobilizing the public. Although social media enable these SMOs to have a basic platform to communicate with supporters and the public, they are constrained by their lack of media resources, due to the political environment and their organizational capacity. In an open and law- abiding society, state propaganda has a counter-effect, positively related to mobilization, due to its low credibility and the way that it triggers public sympathy for the movement.

Chapter 2

Defining Propaganda

The word “propaganda” is often associated with authoritarian regimes, such as North

Korea, China, and Russia, referring to their use of different mass media channels to undermine democracy. Or it is frequently used to explain how terrorist groups use ideology for recruitment or to create fear.

However, if we read the news, dictators use the same word when accusing the Western world of trying to destabilize their regimes. Even Western scholars point out that Western governments also manipulate the news to achieve certain purposes: “the impression given is that our governments engage in truthful ‘public relations’, ‘strategic communications’ and ‘public diplomacy’ while the Russians lie through ‘propaganda’” (Robinson, 2016).

This argument raises two questions: what is the definition of propaganda? And what are the differences between persuasion, which is the core of strategic communication, and propaganda?

Defining Propaganda

The term “propaganda” dates to 1622, when the Roman Catholic Church set up a specialized agency to promote the faith and repress spreading Protestantism. In that context, propaganda was used as “an attempt to ‘propagate’ the faith in order to ‘increase’ the faithful”

(Prendergast & Prendergast, p. 26).

After World War I, scholars began to explore the role of propaganda in wartime.

Lasswell defined propaganda as “the management of collective attitudes by the manipulation of significant symbols” (1938, p. 627). He also provided a systematic theoretical analysis of

11 propaganda and the conditions under which (and the methods with which) it was employed in

World War I (1938). During World War II, the US government carried out an intensive effort to manipulate the public’s attitude to war by influencing Hollywood to produce pro-war propaganda films (Koppes & Black, 1990).

Ross (2002) has more recently argued that four conditions need to be met for a message to be considered propaganda. There must be an intention to persuade and an intention to benefit a sociopolitical institution; the message must target a large population and it must be epistemically flawed. This view echoes that of Richard Crossman, member of the British Political Warfare

Executive during World War II and an expert on “psychological warfare,” who insisted that propaganda should not be explicit and that “the art of propaganda is not telling lies but rather selecting the truth you require and giving it mixed up with some truths the audience wants to hear” (Higham, 2013, p. xxx).

Jowett and O’Donnell (2014) defined propaganda as “the deliberate, systematic attempt to shape perceptions, manipulate cognitions, and direct behavior to achieve a response that furthers the desired intent of the propagandist” (p. 6). This definition emphasizes the intention of the producers of propaganda, who calculate the potential effect of, and feedback from, a message that promotes an ideology. Such a message is delivered by a particular institution with the goal of shaping the perceptions of a specific audience.

In the 1980s, Herman and Chomsky (1988) developed what they termed the “propaganda model” to explain how systematic biases in mass media serve to manipulate the public. Their theory pointed to structural features of the production and presentation of news, such as advertising, the concentration of media ownership, and government sourcing. Sproule (1994) narrowed the concept of propaganda to the notion of organized mass persuasion launched by

12 large organizations or groups. They are not alone in emphasizing a characterization of propaganda as institutionalized communication for the purpose of generating actions that benefit the source of the communication (Parry-Giles, 2002).

Ellul (1950), on the other hand, focused on how technology enables psychological manipulation, defining propaganda as a means of gaining power through mass support. He disagrees with Ogle’s views that propaganda is any effort to change opinions or attitudes and that the propagandist is anyone trying to influence others with their ideas as the definition of the propagandist is too broad—everyone falls under it (Ellul, 1950). Ellul also differs from other scholars in regarding propaganda as a sociological phenomenon, rather than actions involving certain people with certain purposes: “Differences in political regimes matter little; differences in social levels are more important; and most important is national self-awareness” (1973, p. x). For example, he suggested that the success of propaganda depend on several external characteristics.

For institutions to generate successful propaganda and to mobilize all the relevant means, individuals must regard themselves as part of the mass of society.

Like Ellul, George Orwell is also concerned about the future of the individual in mass- mediated society and seek to identify the forces that integrate an individual into a large system and that compromise individual freedom (1941). Orwell viewed propaganda as controlled by the state and worries about the control of truth by the government in order to indoctrinate the public, whereas Ellul pointed out its destructive nature towards democracy.

Definitions of propaganda themselves can be categorized into different kinds, such as descriptive, hegemonic, and negative (Marlin, 2013). Bertrand Russell, for example, is among those who offer a negative definition. He characterizes propaganda as a one-sided approach to truth. The information given by the sender might be accurate, but it will tend in a given direction.

Propaganda is thus one of the resources available to governments in democratic societies. Russell offered both epistemic and social characterizations of the concept, claiming that propaganda’s

“appeal is generally to irrational causes of belief rather than to serious argument; ... it gives an unfair advantage to those who can obtain the most publicity, whether through wealth or through power” (1922, p. 38).

In summary, scholars have developed their definitions of propaganda by focusing on one or another of its key characteristics. These include the manipulation of the public’s attitude through providing tailored information; the intention had by the source of the propaganda (which is usually to benefit itself); the dissemination of the message (to masses of people, often from an institution or group); the use of propaganda as a means for different social groups to gain power

(understood as a sociological phenomenon); and the relation between propaganda and truth.

However, none of these definitions has yet distinguished between propaganda and persuasion.

Given that “propaganda” is derogatory, is it possible that “persuasion” is just a new, much more acceptable word for the same phenomenon?

The Difference between Propaganda and Persuasion

During the interwar period, German generals held that Germany had lost the World War I because of the influence of British and American propaganda on the German people; as such, the

Germans began adopting their own methods of persuasion. When the Nazis came to power in

1933, a new form of propaganda was accordingly developed and implemented by the Reich

Ministry of Public Enlightenment and Propaganda, which used the mass media to enforce the

National Socialist ideology (Jansen, 2013).

After World War II, as the Soviet Union and other communist regimes learned from the strategies of the Nazis, the term “propaganda” came to be widely used to describe the perceived

14 threat to human freedom posed by such misinformation. Although the advertising and consumer cultures of the 1950s in Western democratic societies such as the United States relied on information dissemination strategies that in some ways resembled those used to disseminate Nazi fascist propaganda—being designed to transform diversity into unity for the purpose of control, efficiency, and consensus—the utilization of propagandist strategies in commercial form in the

U.S. in this period is understudied, and what research there is tends to use other terms, such as persuasion, in order to avoid the negative connotations of “propaganda” (Samuel, 2013).

The literature on propaganda often refers to “mass persuasion” (Jowett & O’Donnell,

2015). The question of the definition of propaganda continues to be an open one and some even suggest giving up the use of the term to avoid confusion with the concept of persuasion in contemporary society (Marlin, 2013). In early studies of propaganda, persuasion was treated as the result of propaganda (Krech & Crutchfield, 1948). Some scholars have even tried to alert the public that, in contemporary everyday life, persuasion has the character of propaganda, since persuasion has been abused. Persuasion occurs, not only for commercial uses, but also for political uses (Sears & Kosterman, 2001).

The notion of persuasion can be traced back to ancient Greece. Then the Romans used persuasion for the purpose of enlightenment (Anthony et al., 2001). O’keefe (2002) defines persuasion as “a successful intentional effort at influencing another’s mental state through communication in a circumstance in which the persuadee has some measure of freedom”. Gass and Seither (2015) take persuasion and propaganda to be very similar. They define persuasion as an attempt to influence a person’s beliefs, attitudes, intentions, motivations or behaviors ; it differs from propaganda only insofar as it can be one-to-one, while propaganda is always one-to- many.

Markova (2008) aimed to show that propaganda and persuasion are underpinned by distinct forms of communication, one aiming at monologue and the other aiming at dialogue. She suggests that distinguishing these two concepts requires studying them as part of the systems— such as institutions, organizations and forms of communication—to which they belong.

Jowett and O’Donnell (2015) provided a model of communication, which involves the notions of sender, receiver and gatekeeper, to differentiate between persuasion, information delivery, and propaganda. In information delivery, the sender shares ideas along with explanation and instruction; the purpose is to promote mutual understanding between sender and receiver. In persuasion, the sender seeks to affect the receiver’s response to the message, through either response shaping, response reinforcing or response changing, and the sender’s purpose is to promote the mutual fulfillment of the sender’s and receiver’s needs. Propaganda includes all the processes of persuasion and information delivery, but adds control over the flow of information, the management of public opinion, and the manipulation of behavior patterns; its purpose is to promote the objectives of the sender, and it is not necessarily in the best interest of receiver. This model reveals the similarity between propaganda and persuasion and, at the same time, demonstrates their differences in technique and purpose.

Forms of Propaganda

Ellul (1973) argued that propaganda messages are not necessarily false but rather combine truth, half-truths, and limited truth. For Ellul, the most important characteristic of propaganda is the use of the media to deliver the message. There are two types of propaganda, vertical and horizontal. Vertical propaganda is vertical in the sense that it is made by a leader, a technician, a political or religious head who acts from the superior position of his authority and seeks to influence the crowd below. Such propaganda comes from above. It is conceived in the

16 secret recesses of political enclaves; it uses all technical methods of centralized mass communication; it envelops a mass of individuals, but those who practice it are on the outside (p.

80).

Horizontal propaganda, by contrast, is made inside the group (not from the top), where, in principle, all individuals are equal and there is no leader. This individual makes contact with others at his own level rather than with a leader; such propaganda therefore always seeks

“conscious adherence.” Its content is presented in didactic fashion and addressed to the intelligence. The leader, the propagandist, is there only as a sort of animator or discussion leader; sometimes his presence and his identity are not even known (p. 81).

Ellul used China as the model example of horizontal propaganda, since he believed that in China, individual participation in the country’s ideological vision requires small social groups, as opposed to the huge apparatus of mass media communication (which he takes to be required by vertical propaganda). The China Ellul had in mind is the China of the Cultural Revolution.

The success of horizontal propaganda in China today depends on two conditions: lack of contact between groups and groups being preoccupied with activities related to politics. Since the Chinse

Communist Party (CCP) is able to break up traditional groups, such as the family, and to instill political instruction on the group members, the primary form of propaganda is vertical. The horizontal model can be implemented in the US, however, because American groups already know “the principal and institutions of democracy” (p. 83).

Ellul discussed a further distinction in types of propaganda: rational and irrational. He maintains that the difference between propaganda and information is that information is for the purpose of reasoning, while the purpose of propaganda is to bring about feeling and passion.

That said, so-called “rational propaganda” operates as though it is information and, rather than

17 make outright appeals to emotion, involves offering facts, figures and other accurate information in the service of uncritical persuasion. This kind of propaganda is widely used now by the CCP and Russia to demonstrate the superiority of their system and to demand mass support. For example, when trying to persuade people of the efficiency and legitimacy of the Chinese political system, the CCP cites facts about the cost of the U.S. presidential election, and points out that the candidates issue from only from the two major parties, whereas in China, the leader is selected by the people and must have local administration experience.

Ellul was also concerned to point out that, unlike political propaganda, which has been studied a lot, sociological propaganda is an understudied phenomenon. It is “the penetration of an ideology by means of its sociological context” (p. 63). The ideology is established through the medium of economic and political structures, rather than the mass media. It is expressed in education, social services, and in technology in general. It combines with advertising, public relations, social welfare and other concepts of the society. It might begin to operate intentionally and then change individuals’ habits and values without their knowing it.

Jowett and O’Donnell (2015) point out that it is always in some form of activated ideology. They distinguish three types of propaganda: white propaganda, black propaganda, and gray propaganda.

According to their definition, white propaganda “comes from a source that is identified correctly, and the information in the message tends to be accurate” (p. 20). There are many examples, such as the propaganda issued by government-owned news media.

Early in 2016, during Chinese president Xi Jinping’s visit to three state-media news outlets, he declared that media workers “must love the party, protect the party, and closely align themselves with the party leadership in thought, politics and actions.” He also asked for the

“absolute loyalty” of the state media (AP, 2016). As of 2014, in order to obtain the government press card, journalists have to pass an exam on the “Marxist view of journalism.” According to the Chinese version of Marxism, journalists and the media are the mouthpiece of the party and the people. And the media is a place to address the ideology and political ideas of the CCP, as well as a weapon to defend them (Wee, 2014). Although the CCP has a different vision of journalism, it is nonetheless trying to establish the credibility of Chinese media domestically and internationally.

The Kremlin-funded news outlet RT is another example of a source of white propaganda.

Although it is accused of bias, RT is also trying to build credibility among audiences in Western countries, where it has to compete with local news channels. Interestingly, RT claims that even though it is funded by the Russian government, it is just another international news network, akin to the BBC, the British public broadcaster (Erlanger, 2017). The BBC is sometimes accused by some media scholars of being the propaganda tool of the British government, especially during the Iraq war, and of helping the government to tell lies to the public (Miller, 2003). However, this accusation’s merit is doubtful, since the BBC has a tradition of editorial independence.

Similar accusations were leveled against American mainstream commercial media during the

Iraq war. It is worth asking whether the accusations result from bad journalism that was used by the government for its own purposes or whether the media actually intended to deceive their audience.

Black propaganda is “when the source is concealed or credited to a false authority and spreads lies, fabrications, and deceptions” (Jowett & O’Donnell, 2015, p. 21). The most famous propagandist is Joseph Goebbels, Hitler’s propaganda minister. One of his propaganda principles is that “credibility alone must determine whether propaganda output should be true or false”

(Doob, 1950, p. 428). Although he believed that truth should be used frequently, since the enemy might use facts to expose the falsehood—he also used to lie in his propaganda campaign whenever he thought these lies could not be disproved. This strategy was commonly used in

Stalin’s Soviet Union and Mao’s China. Significant falsehoods appeared on the news media, since the audience had no access to information that would reveal the truth. These regimes even made special arrangements to make routine use of foreign journalists and intellectuals to misinform the rest of the world. Walter Duranty, the News York Times Moscow correspondent under Stalin, underestimated Stalin’s brutality and denied the existence of famine (Wald, 1987).

Agnes Smedly, an American writer, a known communist sympathizer who served as a spy for

China and the Soviet Union in the late 1930s, successfully established a positive image of the

CCP’s Red Army among left-leaning Western readers, based on the one-sided information provided by the CCP (Green, 2013).

Currently, black propaganda is everywhere online. State-sponsored fake news, which provides distorted and false information, is the new form of black propaganda. The Russian government is reported to have sponsored online trolling for disseminating fake news, especially during the 2017 U.S. presidential election (Timberg, 2016). In China, the government-organized

“water army” posts distorted information on social media (Chen, Wu, Srinivasan, & Zhang,

2013). Some scholars believe that the success or failure of black propaganda depends on the receiver—in particular, the extent to which they care about the credibility of the source and the content. However, recent research on the ability of American students to evaluate information online shows that more than 80 percent of middle school students believed sponsored content was real news and could not tell real and fake news sources apart on Facebook (Wineburg,

McGrew, Breakstone, & Ortega, 2016).

Compared to the other two types of propaganda, especially fake news, gray propaganda is more difficult for audiences to detect. Gray propaganda “is somewhere between white and black propaganda. The source may or may not be correctly identified, and the accuracy of the information is uncertain” (Jowett & O’ Donnell, 2015, p. 24).

Media ownership is one factor the public can use to judge content, and this is why many governments try to cover up their influence on the media. In the US, during the 1960s, the CIA denied its connection with Radio Free Asia, although it financed and controlled the network

(Barnouw, 1978). In Hong Kong, after the handover in 1997, a great deal of Chinese state capital flooded into Hong Kong and was used to buy local newspapers. To maintain the perceived independence these media enjoyed in the public eye, however, the ownership structure would usually name local business enterprises as the owners of record (Lau & To, 2007). The

Chinese government has also actively established overseas news media and these media are frequently quoted by Chinese state media as the “international voice,” portraying global interest in, and support for, Beijing. During China’s National People’s Congress, foreign-looking journalists who work for foreign-sounding news outlets—but which actually have links to

Chinese state-controlled media or are owned by state-controlled media—were given more opportunity to ask questions during live press conferences (Fung & Yu, 2016). The purpose of this strategy is to demonstrate the transparency of the Chinese government.

The credibility an audience attaches to a government depends on its impression of it.

Hiding the source of news is a strategy to lower an audience’s alertness and enable it to focus on the message instead of the source. Research shows that the perceived credibility of a Chinese online propaganda video is significantly correlated with the perceived source. Viewers who were aware that a video was produced by the CCP assigned it much less credibility than did those who

21 were told the video was made by an independent studio (Fang & Mutz, 2016). The CCP understands this very well: several propaganda videos that went viral on YouTube and Chinese social media were produced by a studio called “On the road of Renaissance,” which is actually an apparatus of the CCP’s propaganda department.

Of course, some scholars would describe these activities simply as public diplomacy.

Starting in the 2000s, some U.S. scholars began to use the term “public diplomacy” instead of

“government propaganda” on the basis that straightforward or obvious propaganda lacks credibility, whereas good public diplomacy is able to go beyond propaganda (Nye, 2008; Cull,

2008; Melissen, 2005). But many who study propaganda continue to categorize foreign aid and government-sponsored international programs as propaganda (Constable, 2002; McCall, 2012).

The distinction between propaganda and public diplomacy is, like that between persuasion and propaganda, difficult to draw. After 9/11, when writing about how to get the anti- terrorism message out, former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Richard Holbrook called the strategies “public diplomacy, or public affairs, or psychological warfare, or—if you really want to be blunt—propaganda” (2011, para. 1). Although the Chinese government calls their international outreach strategy public diplomacy, it is intended to increase the country’s soft power and ought generally to be treated as international propaganda.

Technology and Propaganda

Although propaganda existed before the emergence of the media, the expansion of propaganda activities led to the development of mass media: propagandists’ desire to reach wider audiences drove the development of the communication technology that makes mass media possible. With print media and broadcasting, propaganda could cross borders, and thus evolve beyond targeting a domestic audience (Jowett & O’Donnell, 2015).

Governments often use leafleting for international communication efforts, especially during wartime, to affect international public opinion and increase policy support. It has three main functions: national survival, countering disinformation, and facilitative communication

(Clark & Christie, 2005). Movies, being a popular form of entertainment, are another favorite medium of the propagandist. Fake news films have been produced along with newsreels

(Fielding, 1972). During World War I, the UK and the US produced propaganda movies aimed at influencing public opinion in favor of entering the war. Although set up to produce propaganda movies at the end of World War I, Germany’s propaganda arm became the largest film studio in

Europe and a major propaganda agency for the Nazis during World War II (Furhammer &

Isaksson, 1971).

In the Soviet Union, under Stalin’s rule, the aims of film were to glorify the country and to disseminate anti-American sentiment (Furhammer & Isaksson, 1971). Although the Chinese government reclassified film as a cultural industry, rather than a propaganda apparatus, in 1990s, the CCP’s goals for Chinese films remain the same (Yeh & Davis, 2008). Film scripts must be vetted by the government. And in order to enter the Chinese market, some overseas studios provide a second version of their movies for Chinese audiences (He, 2010).

Radio was the first medium to allow messages to cross long distances, including borders, without a physical presence. Governments use radio worldwide to spread different political ideologies. The ideological battle between governments has changed. Jowett and O’Donnell

(2015) describe the change as follows: “clearly, the battle for the ‘hearts and minds’ of listeners will not be the epic battles of the past between communism and capitalism, but probably on a larger world scale between the conflicting cultures of the industrially advanced countries and the less advantaged Third World countries” (p. 148).

But this prediction and description does not capture the current propaganda battle between different countries. The export of ideology and the effort to undermine Western democracy are definitely not part of a culture war and are not launched by third-world countries.

The reality is that international propaganda is expensive, which means so-called third-world countries have been excluded from the international communication system. Although television, especially cable news channels, is a much more efficient and effective medium for reaching domestic and international audiences, only a few countries can afford to run a worldwide network. Only Russia, China, Iran, the UK, France, German, Spain, Italy, Turkey, Japan, South

Korea, Qatar, and Abu Dhabi have a state-owned international television channel.

The Internet has changed the landscape of propaganda. It has lowered the cost of production, distribution, and exhibition of content, especially since the rise of social media. It makes state-sponsored propaganda much more difficult to detect, since it is not easy to trace the original source in cyberspace. Since radio and television consist in individual media outlets, it is possible for people to identify the shareholders and find out where the money comes from. And the technological ability to block frequencies and channels permits governments to regulate and require transparency from foreign companies wishing to broadcast on their soil. In 2012, Iran’s state-propaganda machine Press TV was shut down in the UK, its broadcasting license revoked by the UK broadcasting regulation authority. Press TV was found to have broken the UK’s broadcasting code: editorial decisions governing the channel were made in Tehran, and not by the London company which held the license. It was also accused of broadcasting fake news

(Blair, 2012).

The Internet is full of misinformation, conspiracy theories, and fake news, some of it sponsored by governments as a propaganda strategy. There are several reports that, in Russia, the

24 government and well-connected businessmen sponsor Russian trolls to manage Twitter accounts, leave comments on news websites, and smear opponents online (Applebaum, 2014). However,

Russia has also claimed to be a victim of fake news and Western propaganda. As part of an effort to counter fake news, Russia’s foreign ministry has launched a website to collect purported fake news from leading Western media; it includes several stories reported by established media, such as The New York Times and CNN (Robinson, 2017).

To label content that has a clear source and is from commercial media as fake news and propaganda is less persuasive than to call it bad journalism. However, the Internet does contain vast amounts of black and gray propaganda.

The advent of the Internet, and in particular social media, then, have aided the Chinese government’s dissemination of gray propaganda overseas by disguising sources and hiding their connections with the state. Thus, for example, a 2013 video titled “How Leaders are Made,” which compares Chinese and Western leadership, and a 2015 animated video titled “13 What,” which promotes China’s thirteenth economic five-year plan, were both produced by an entity called “Studio on Fuxin Road,” which claims to be an independent production house in China.

These videos, which use animation, music, and informal speech to communicate with the intended audience in personal way, were clearly designed to reach out to the more discerning and younger social-media generation. Both videos were posted on YouTube, promoted by state- media Twitter accounts, and covered by many foreign media. Despite a mixed reception from the international media, the Chinese government and state media described these videos as successes. The only Chinese news report on “Studio on Fuxin Road,” by People’s Daily, the party newspaper, describes the studio as a group of young Chinese people who want to tell better stories about their country (Chai, 2015). According to the Wall Street Journal, however, the

25 studio is in fact part of the CCP’s International Department, which handles foreign relations, while a British public-relations company is among several outside contractors that helped to produce the videos (Wong, 2016).

The CCP has also begun to sponsor and encourage individual not organizational effort in spreading propaganda messages by using flexible rhetoric and Western-style arguments. Thus, for example, Eric Li Shimo, an American-educated venture capitalist, delivered an 18-minute

TED talk defending China’s authoritarian political system and has written op-eds for The New

York Times, extolling the supposed superiority of China’s political model (Carlson, 2013). In

August 2016, a film emerged on the Internet with Chinese and English subtitles warning viewers that U.S.-led forces are seeking to implement a “Color Revolution” in mainland China, having already done so in Hong Kong. The video accuses the West of trying to destroy China’s domestic stability and harmony. The individual behind this video, Lei Xiying, is a PhD candidate at the Australian National University and a committee member of the All-China Youth

Federation in Australia. The video is credited to Lei’s own company. The CCP thus came to realize that it is important to use private entities in order to increase source credibility, especially when targeting overseas audiences. Experimental studies show that videos attributed to the CCP are unlikely to be effective in cultivating favorability towards the government and Chinese people, while attribution to individuals has the potential to increase source credibility and cultivate favorability regardless of age, ideology, or party identification (Fang & Mutz, 2016).

Governments use different modes to implement propaganda to influence domestic and international public opinion, no matter whether the government is democratic or authoritarian

(Guth, 2009). There is abundant literature on the systems responsible for the CCP’s propaganda products, but the effect of these products, especially those delivered through social media with

26 anonymous attribution, is understudied. Propaganda of course remains a critical issue, especially since, with the rise of the Internet, no sort of information monopoly exists, though the manipulation of information naturally persists, so that ordinary citizens remain vulnerable to mass persuasion (Auerbach & Castronovo, 2013).

The Internet raises a related question for democratic countries. Will the Internet, especially social media, falsify world-system theory? The most important structural feature of

Wallerstein’s world-system theory is the hierarchical placement of the powerful and wealthy

“core” societies and the weak and poor “peripheral” societies (1974). Will the diffusion of the

Internet change this hierarchical relationship? Theoretically, the Internet allows media to overcome geopolitical hierarchies in the international news flow. After studying 223 news websites in 73 countries, researchers found that geography has no predictive power over news flow. Core countries still dominate cyberspace in a manner consistent with the pattern of world- system theory (Himelboim, Chang, & McCreery, 2010). Another study assessed the salience of countries in different news stories on 35 popular news websites in 10 different languages. It also found a strong correlation between the economic power of a country and its salience on the news websites (Segev, 2010).

But now, with social media, each country or individual has the opportunity to disseminate messages to an international audience. Studying Twitter sheds light on avenues for further research. After examining government-sponsored news media and their news flow on Twitter, a recent study finds that social media platforms change the global media ecology and present challenges to world-system theory (Golan & Himelboim, 2015). The study demonstrates the power of non-institutional actors, especially social-media users, such as bloggers, who are not affiliated with governments, the established media, or other organizations. These users have

27 established a non-hierarchical core-periphery structure for sharing information. They provide an opportunity for non-core countries to deliver their messages to audiences in core countries

(2015).

Among the countries that use censorship domestically, some are trying to influence public opinion in open societies. As Ellul (1973) pointed out, media control is essential for propaganda; in an open society, therefore, media ownership is an effective way to amplify propaganda messages and suppress counterpropaganda messages. In Hong Kong, the “one country two systems” arrangement permits private media companies, but in the 20 years since the handover, a majority of the mainstream media outlets have been bought out using state- sponsored capital, effectively becoming part of the CCP’s propaganda machine (Sun, 2017). In

Australia, Fairfax Media started to print content provided by Chinese state media in their newspapers in order to raise revenue. And it is not alone: the Washington Post in the US, the

Daily Telegraph in the UK, and Le Figaro in France all have the same deal with Chinese official media to help the CCP “tell Chinese stories” and use their credibility to endorse this propaganda

(Dyer, 2017).

The flow of information across borders, especially the flow of government propaganda, is unbalanced. On the one hand, authoritarian regimes are becoming increasingly good at keeping outside information from their citizens by using technology; on the other hand, they can use the

Internet to pour their propaganda into open societies, and they can buy airtime and newspaper space to deliver their messages. So, who will win this propaganda battle, ultimately?

Studying Propaganda

Many studies of propaganda have tried to measure its effects. Bernays’ work is a pioneering study that examined the techniques of public communication, explored the impact of

28 propaganda on mass politics and social change, and provided examples of the effective use of propaganda to lobby for gender and racial equality (1928). Other scholars have focused on mass media, such as newspapers, in order to explore the relationship between government propaganda and mass action. Having analyzed newspapers in 21 African countries, scholars found that proregime propaganda reduced the probability of protests in autocratic states (Carter, 2016).

Research investigating the role of mass media in the Rwandan genocide shows that popular radio, which disseminated government-sponsored hate speech, encouraged violence against the

Tutsi minority. Radio listeners were significantly more likely to participate in the killing. The study also found that, due to social interaction, government propaganda broadcasted over the radio indirectly influenced people in neighboring villages, which were unable to receive the programs (Yanagizawa-Drott, 2014).

Along with the development of the Internet, the twenty-first century has seen changes in the media landscape as a whole. The deployment of propaganda has posed a challenge for governments since the start of the “chaos” information war (Hoskins & O’Loughlin, 2010). The declining credibility of mainstream media has driven people to alternative news sources, which are full of fake news and misinformation (Boler & Nemorin, 2013). Propaganda itself is partly responsible for the perceived unreliability of mainstream media—propaganda efforts have aimed to increase skepticism towards professional news media and authorities. Those who produce and spread fake news and political rumors do not seek primarily to make people believe their content, but rather to make them doubt credible sources and the political system.

Research comparing the cyber-propaganda war between the regimes in Egypt and Syria and their political challengers shows that the Internet provides a grassroot, bottom-up, decentralized interactive propaganda process, dissolving barriers between information producers

29 and consumers. Government propaganda that portrayed political activists as enemies of the country during the Arab Spring backfired (Sahar, Gold, & Vaughn, 2013). But no study— including those on the Middle East—has adequately answered the following question: why does the grassroots propaganda fail to significantly change people’s action? In Egypt and Syria, the autocratic governments were able to maintain social control. In Egypt, after the Arab Spring, the government was even able to impose stricter online censorship. Sometimes, effective propaganda activities do not need many forms of technology. In Iraq, in addition to using multimedia and diverse art forms, such as poems, paintings and songs, terrorists and insurgents use graffiti and slogans on the walls and houses to remind the public of their presence; and the Pentagon’s counterpropaganda efforts there have not had satisfactory results (Garfield, 2007).

Given that everyone living under an authoritarian regime knows that the media are censored, some scholars have explored the circumstances under which citizens would resist or ignore the messages, as well as those under which they cooperate with the government. One study found that the purpose of Chinese propaganda is to send a signal to citizens that the government is in control of the society. A survey of Chinese college students shows that, although the participants do not believe the government’s messages and are dissatisfied with the government, they are still likely to believe that the regime is strong enough to maintain social control (Huang, 2015). A further study shows that some of those who are aware of government propaganda choose to respond to it, for the motive of coordination; others support the government, since they are unaware of the propaganda. This provides an opportunity for the government to manipulate the public’s responsiveness to make more citizens compliant; the government uses more propaganda if citizens are less responsive (Little, 2016).

Compare with authoritarian regimes which under strict information control and censorship, free societies could be more vulnerable to foreign-state-sponsored propaganda. By imposing censorship, authoritarian governments make information flow in only one direction and they also take advantage of open societies. The interference in the 2016 U.S. presidential election was an example that demonstrates the importance of citizens in free societies remaining aware of all forms of propaganda. Citizens should maintain a vigilant awareness of messages that they receive from the governments or organizations that have special commercial, political purposes.

Chapter 3

Nationalist Propaganda in Chinese State Media: Four Independence Movements

In June 2017, the Dalai Lama was invited by the University of California San Diego

(UCSD) to deliver a commencement address. Some Chinese students at the university were angered by the invitation, because the Dalai Lama, in their eyes, is a separatist committed to the splitting of China – a view promoted by the CCP via education and the mass media (Horwitz,

2017). Different types of protests were organized by the Chinese Students and Scholars

Association (CSSA) at UCSD, which is a chapter of the worldwide Chinese collegiate organization. In their posters, the Dalai Lama was called a “fraud, criminal, and power-obsesser” to explain why the Dalai Lama is controversial to the Chinese. They claimed that “the invitation the of Dalai Lama to be the commencement speaker would disappoint prospective Chinese students and harm UCSD’s renowned reputation, due to his controversial status. Furthermore, the commencement is a significant milestone in the lives of every graduate and their families. It is the same for Chinese students and their parents, who would be flying a long way from China to witness this memorable moment together. They would be disheartened to find the Dalai Lama as the speaker” (UCSDCSSA, 2017). This was not the first protest launched by Chinese students overseas. Anastasia Lin, a former Miss World Canada and also a human rights activist and outspoken opponent of the repression of Falun Gong, was invited to speak by Durham University in the UK in 2017. Because the Chinese government deems Falun Gong “an evil cult,” the CSSA in Durham issued an email petitioning university officials to cancel the event, and some Chinese students accused her of being the equivalent of an IS terrorist; the invitation was seen as a

“violation of the belief and feelings of Chinese students” (Waterson, 2017).

The phrase “to hurt the feelings of the Chinese people” was first used in 1959 by Liao

Chengzhi, a senior CCP leader, who was criticizing the Japanese Prime Minister Kishi

Nobusuke. Since then, the phrase has been frequently used by Foreign Ministry spokespeople and the state media. In 2008, months before the Beijing Olympics, the phrase was used by China

Daily eighty-eight times “to condemn all manner of issues in which Chinese officials perceived that their country’s status (a benevolent, successful, rising power) had been undermined by the very countries who had engaged in ‘imperialistic’ behavior towards China during (and after) the century of national humiliation” (King, 2017).

In China, the official construction of national identity includes two elements: pride in being a great power (and ethnic unity and territorial integrity are crucial for being a great nation- state); and the memory of historical humiliation, meaning that any actions that undermine the power and image of China hurt Chinese people’s feelings. This rhetoric exists not only in official statements and the mass media, but is also rooted in the minds of Chinese citizens. In the digital age, the younger generation is extremely active and aggressive in using the Internet to express their patriotism. “Diba Chuzheng,” the Crusade of Diba, is a symbolic event. Days after Tsai

Ing-Wen’s election as Taiwan’s president, her Facebook page was flooded by mainlanders using

VPN to cross the Great Firewall to demand unification. When her Democratic Progressive Party

(DPP) won a landslide election in both the presidential and parliamentary contests, it was interpreted on the mainland as a swell of public support for Taiwan’s independence from mainland China. Thousands of members of Diba, a message board of Baidu.com, posted tens of thousands of messages demanding that Taiwan return under the control of Beijing. They used stickers and slogans from the Cultural Revolution and there was an official-sounding rhetoric and tone to their texts. Supporters in Mainland China claimed that this was a spontaneous

33 manifestation of the younger generation, demonstrating their nationalism; meanwhile, critics treated these young people as having been brainwashed by CCP propaganda, calling them “little pinkos” (Sonnad, 2016).

Although people have different views on these young netizens’ action, they all agree that it was indeed an eruption of nationalist sentiment. As one Chinese scholar, Shi Anbin, told the media, “Nationalism is a dominating ideological trend driving the Chinese millennial generation”

(Huang, 2016a). The aforementioned reactions of Chinese students abroad are also the result of the state construction of national identity and education campaigns following the 1989

Tiananmen Student Movement (Zhao, 1998). The CCP propaganda department uses particular issues and instruments to foster a collective identity in order to maintain the legitimacy and stability of the regime. The cumulative achievement of its nationalist project is remarkable

(Perry, 2013). Since the state news media have an important role in the CCP’s patriotic education campaign, what are the strategies of the state news media for deploying nationalist propaganda?

How do they manipulate information in the age of the Internet, in which people can more easily get alternative information online? How do the CCP construct their version of nationalism by using news reporting?

Nationalism and Propaganda

Nationalist ideology has several features that provide a sense of common identity and establish shared feelings and joint actions among individuals in a nation-state. It also emphasizes some aspects of the nation that are unique, and often superior over those of different nations, which enables citizens to distinguish between their nationality and others (Hoselitz, 1956).

Nationalism renders individual members willing to give primary loyalty to their own ethnic or national community to build an independent nation-state (Van Evera, 1994). For

34 empires to arise out of coalitions of interests, they need to deploy nationalism to expand and ensure the stability of the coalitions (Snyder, 1991). Nationalism is commonly used in propaganda campaigns to mobilize citizens to defend against invasion from out-groups, which can be seen in examples from the First World War (Novick, 2001) to the war in Yugoslavia

(MacDonald, 2010). Nazi Germany skillfully used nationalist propaganda to reconstruct a national identity (Hagen, 2008). Under Stalin, Soviet newspapers and periodicals published huge number of articles that dealt with nationalist issues to carry out nationalist policies, especially during the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, signed in 1939 between Nazi Germany and the USSR after their joint invasion of Poland (Thompson, 1991). Comparatively studying the Nazis and the

Islamic State suggests many commonalities in their propaganda strategies, especially when it comes to engaging and recruiting young people by using nationalist propaganda in the construction of a new identity (Thompson, 2017).

In the procommunist and developing worlds, in countries with weak political institutions and civic cultures, the initial phases of democratization are problematic. Nationalist and ethnic conflicts are not always due to the resurgence of ancient hatreds, but from elites struggling to maintain authority (Snyder, 2000). Once independence is achieved, the images of the invader or the foreign dominant power, which have been used as scapegoats for all of the previous suffering, disappear (Hoselitz, 1956); nationalist propaganda then requires different discourses to project a persuasive message through state propaganda.

In India, the core issue of nationalism for some Indian intellectuals is poverty. They treat

India as a nation still in need of “making” instead of as a glorious, established entity, and poverty is its greatest enemy. This enables the terms of “developmental nationalism” to become much more powerful than those of “cultural nationalism,” which demand careful policies for

35 development (Sarkar, 2008). In Thailand, the monarchist legacy is dependent on sacralizing the

Thai nation. The king was rendered a sacred nationalist starting in the 1930s, in order to elevate the traditional system as a response to modernization (Fong, 2009).

Nationalist Propaganda of the CCP

Nationalism was an effective instrument for the CCP’s grasp of power during the civil war with Kuomintang (KMT), and for maintaining its legitimacy and establishing the People’s

Republic China (PRC). Chinese nationalism started in the nineteenth century after the country’s defeat in the Opium War with the British. For Chinese political leaders and elites who wanted to rule China, nationalism was used to demonstrate both their ambition and their ability to recreate

China as a nation-state and erase the humiliation of imperialist intervention (Zhao, 2000). The

CCP uses the term “the century of humiliation” to describe the interference and invasions of

Western powers and Japan between 1839 to 1949 (Kaufman, 2010). Chinese political elites have competed with three different types of nationalism in modern China, based on different political values and interests: ethnic nationalism, liberal nationalism, and state nationalism. Under the one-party state, since the CCP controls the media and the education system, state nationalism is the most powerful and influential; however, it still has to compete with other two (Zhao, 2004).

The CCP’s state nationalism defines the nation as a territorial-political unit and the interests of the nation come before individual citizens’ interests. Liberal nationalism carries different implications, pursuing individual rights in the area of political participation while defending national rights (Zhao, 2000). After the crackdown of the 1989 Tiananmen Students’

Movement, CCP began undertaking the ideological reeducation of the public to protect the dominant power of state nationalism. The “century of humiliation” was invoked relentlessly in

36 this nationalist propaganda, portraying China as the victim of foreign imperialist bullies (Wang,

2014).

Nationalist propaganda is demonstrably effective, and since the early 1990s, anti-

American sentiments have grown; Chinese people hold negative attitudes towards US foreign policies, even though they are able to access alternative media sources beyond the CCP’s control

(Shi, Lu & Aldrich, 2011). As a consequence of the deep-rooted anti-Western sentiment, the marketized media in China understand the commercial value of nationalism, and it carries almost no political risk. The success of The Global Times, a Chinese tabloid belong to People’s Daily, got its fame by reporting the US bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade, Yugoslavia in

1999. The accident caused massive anti-US protests in different cities across China, and unlike other state newspapers, The Global Times published its front-page story with an eye-catching photo and called it a “slaughtering” of Chinese people. The Chinese state media, such as the

Xinhua news agency, Chinese Central Televsion (CCTV), and People’s Daily, are very cautious with their words when reporting stories related to foreign governments to avoid misinterpretations of China’s official attitudes and policies; most of the time, they can only use

Xinhua scripts which have been pre-screened by the Foreign Ministry. But in The Global Times, as its editor-in-chief Hu Xijin told the US media, the tone “often reflects what party officials are actually thinking, but can’t come out and say” (Huang, 2016b).

A study comparing marketized newspapers and less marketized newspapers in China shows that the emergence of these marketized media exert pressure on less marketized papers to change news contents, and specifically to publish more negative news about Western countries in order to compete for bottom-up nationalism. Thus, the increase in negative stories in the Chinese media are not the direct result of an intentional strategy by the Propaganda Department

(Stockmann, 2011). However, this raises a question: where does this bottom-up nationalism come from, and does it undermine the capacity of CCP to exert social control? The post-1989

Tiananmen state nationalism reeducation effort is a top-down, state-led movement, a response to the decay of Communist ideology to bolster the legitimacy of its ruling. The propaganda campaign for patriotic education was intensive (Zhao, 1998), and the CCP’s unrestrained nationalism could jeopardize political stability and economic modernization (Zhao, 2005). The passive promotion of nationalism in the media by using nationalist and sensationalist versions of events might backfire (Schenk, 2012). Media and internet censorship always go along with nationalist propaganda, to make sure that the expressions and activities of popular nationalism in public spheres are under control. Four rounds of anti-Japanese protests from 1985 to 2012 demonstrate a pattern: the CCP would only initially tolerated protests and make sure they have no impact on its foreign policy (Reilly, 2013).

Applying technical innovation in state control of the media agenda setting and framing,

CCP changes in its communication strategy (Landsberger, 2001). The usage of quasi-

Confucianism allows them to rationalize one-party rule and discredit Western ideals (Ford,

2015). The state provides access to selected information instead of instating a complete block, usually leading to more favorable results for the CCP. When Liu Xiaobo, who was sentenced to jail for eight years in 2009, became a Nobel Prize laureate, any information about him and the

Nobel Peace Prize was heavily censored. However, weeks before and after his death, his name was able to be searched in the Chinese search engine Baidu, but the only results linked to official

Chinese news websites containing all the articles denouncing him after he got the Nobel Prize.

His page on Baidu Baike (Baike), a Chinese equivalent to Wikipedia, lists him as being on the payroll of the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), a United States organization

38 supported by the CIA. In the references, it links to a 2010 article published by the People’s Daily

Overseas Edition with the title: “Liu Xiaobo and his nonsense: China needs to be colonized for three hundred years” (Li, 2010).

After the death of Liu, public opinion about him was polarized. In his critics’ eyes, he was a traitor to the Chinese nation because he advocated imperialism and colonization, and took money from an imperialist power, namely the United States. “Three hundred years of colonization” was a commonly used figure for people when attacking or arguing with his supporters. Recent studies on Chinese netizens demonstrate how the CCP’s renewed emphasis on nationalism in education and state media are able to play a role in social control (Yongming,

2005; Gorman, 2017).

Nationalist Propaganda about Four Independence Movements in China

In modern Chinese state nationalism, sovereignty and the integrity of China’s territory is the most important concern (Callahan, 2004). Incidents like the US bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade also evoked references to the “century of humiliation” (Gries, 2001). These two aspects, sovereignty and territorial integrity, provide the two main themes for the CCP’s nationalist propaganda. Anti-Japanese sentiment represents modern nationalism in China, which combines the humiliated history of the Empire of Japan’s invasion and the island disputes with the conflict over Taiwan (He, 2007).

For a nation-state, territory represents the physical body of the country and is one of the most important elements in the construction of national identity (Cairo, 2006). Before the founding of the PRC in 1949, the propaganda campaign in favor of military action to “liberate”

Taiwan has been launched. After the United States’ intervention in the Taiwan Strait in 1950, the

CCP used Taiwan as an example to show how the US and other imperialist powers intervened in

Chinese domestic affairs, which was the main theme of anti-imperialist propaganda during the

Mao era (Friedman, 1994). In January 1979, Deng Xiaoping proposed “one country, two systems,” and the Joint Declaration was ratified by the UK and the PRC in 1985, signaling the further transfer of Hong Kong from British to Chinese sovereignty. It also became the symbol of the capacity and sincerity of the CCP to solve the Taiwan issue peacefully (Bundy, 1988).

However, starting in 1990s, along with the increasing anti-Western nationalism in China, Taiwan again played an important role in the CCP’s anti-Western propaganda campaign (Xu, 2001). And this time, the nationalist sentiments were driven not only by the CCP and its propagandists, but also by the Chinese intellectuals (Zhao, 1997).

The Chinese media started reporting on the Taiwan independence movement in 1995, after Lee Teng-hui’s visit to the United States. Lee delivered a speech at Cornell University which was interpreted by the CCP as a public endorsement of independence. In response, Beijing deployed short-range missiles across the strait from Taiwan and blocked Taiwan in the international arena (Ross, 2006). The nationalist propaganda used at the time shows the determination of the CCP to protect territorial integrity for its domestic audiences, and it also sent the signal to the Taiwanese – to influence public opinion, but, more importantly, to influence the election results. CCP also regarded those who supported or sympathized with

Taiwanese independence as being “anti-China” (Brady, 2015). The CCP worried that after so many years of using unification with Taiwan to mobilize citizens, the independence of Taiwan would ultimately threaten their legitimacy as the ruling party. As reported by Taiwan’s media, Xi

Jinping told his KMT counterparts during their visit in Beijing that independence was not tolerated by anyone on the mainland, and that if it became the reality, the CCP would be

40 overthrown by its own people. Of course, there was no official report in the mainland media

(Zhou & Lin, 2016).

Hong Kong independence is a new movement which arose along with the defeat of the pro-democratic movement in Hong Kong. The 2016 Legislative Council (LegCo) election institutionalized the discourse on Hong Kong’s national and self-determination. Several candidates were banned for refusing to sign a declaration rejecting secession, which was the first time such a thing occurred in an election, and several elected lawmakers were disqualified for protesting during oath-taking (Keading, 2017). The CCP tried to implement its version of a nationalist education campaign in Hong Kong and it was rejected by mass protest. The 2014

Umbrella Movement also demonstrated the rise of civic nationalism and the widening identity gap between Hong Kong and Beijing, which uses ethnicity and culture to define the Chinese nation (Veg, 2017).

Although the term “Hong Kong independence” had been used in the Hong Kong media in the colonial period before 1997, for mainlanders, it only became familiar starting in 2012 when it occasionally appeared in state media news coverage and commentaries. The propaganda campaign to repress the ideology of independence started in 2013, when the organization Occupy

Central with Love and Peace (OCLP) advocated a civil disobedience campaign to pressure

Beijing into granting universal suffrage; voting rights met the international standard in the Hong

Kong Chief Executive election in 2017 and the propaganda campaign peaked after two pro- independence were elected as lawmakers in 2016. In March 2017, Chinese Premier Li Keqiang made the unprecedented statement in a government work report that the notion of Hong Kong independence would lead nowhere (Xinhua, 2017a). During Chinese President Xi Jinping’s visit to Hong Kong to celebrate the 20th anniversary of Hong Kong’s handover to China, he promised

41 his full support to the Hong Kong government to curb independence advocacy (Lam, Lau &

Cheung, 2017). The message is clear and also sets the tone for the propaganda campaign: “Any attempt to endanger national sovereignty and security, challenge the power of the central government and the authority of the Basic Law of the HKSAR, or use Hong Kong to carry out infiltration and sabotage activities against the mainland is an act that crosses the red line, and is absolutely impermissible” (Xinhua, 2017b).

This is obviously the “red line” for all kinds of independence movement in China, and it is why the 14th Dalai Lama, who fled after a failed armed rebellion in 1959, is called a

“separatist” by the CCP. Although the Dalai Lama has repeatedly claimed that Tibet wants autonomy, not independence, and he won the Noble Peace Prize for his commitment to non- violence, the state media continually condemns his efforts to win Western support for his anti-

China activities, including international tours, which they argue reveals the ulterior motive of achieving his separatist scheme with the use of foreign forces (Smith, 2009). The CCP blames all the unrest and violence in Tibet on separatist groups led by the Dalai Lama, and offers rewards for “tip-offs on overseas terrorist organizations and their members’ activities inside China, the spreading of religious extremism, terror related propaganda, those producing, selling and owning weapons, activities that help terrorists cross national borders and terror activities via the internet”

(Xinhua, 2015).

The same accusation is made towards the Xinjiang independence movement by state media. Officials blame attacks on separatists with links to terrorist groups, such as the East

Turkestan Islam Movement (ETIM). The US government placed the ETIM on its terrorist blacklist after 9/11, and Britain added it to the list of proscribed organizations in 2016, after a request from the Chinese government (Xinhua, 2016). Unlike the reporting on Tibetan

42 independence, the state media started mentioning the term “Xinjiang independence” in 2002, after the United Nation listed ETIM as terrorist group. Rebiya Kadeer, a former Uyghur businesswoman and political activist, went to United States in 2005 on compassionate release.

Although she claims that she is committed to non-violence, she is accused by the state media of being one of the leaders of the Xinjiang separatist group who was behind the Urumqi riot in

2009; However, the English versions of these stories on state media websites have been all deleted (Cao et. al., 2009).

The tension between Mainland China and Taiwan impacts regional stability, but the unrest in Xinjiang and Tibet, because the latter are frontiers and borders, are immediate threats to

Mainland China’s domestic stability. In Chinese official rhetoric, Xinjiang and Tibet are important security barriers. Although hardline domestic security politics might foster resentment that energizes extremism, the Chinese central and local governments use them in Xinjiang and

Tibet to achieve stability, albeit only short-term (Hillman, 2017). Xin Jinping declared that the

“great wall of iron” should be fortified to safeguard national unity, ethic solidarity and social stability” (Xinhua, 2017c).

Journalism reforms brought institutional changes in China, creating a unique dynamic of state media system without a fundamental change in the communist political system (Pan, 2000).

The restrictions on reporting about these “four independence” movements in the Chinese media are very tight. Although compared with the party-oriented official press, the market-oriented commercial press is more likely to use journalistic techniques including sensationalism and the sharing of personal details, it is still constrained by the propaganda needs of the party (Wang,

Sparks & Yu, 2017). Even the party-oriented official press are able to use media rituals and framing, in accordance with both the state’s mandate to maintain social stability and the media’s

43 logic of commercial success, in order to reduce the apparent complexity of social problems and provide alternative interpretations (Li, 2017). A study shows that when political violence is covered as international news, but it is defined as “our” violence, the journalists’ professional practice become subordinate to national loyalty (Nossek, 2004). In China, separatist movements in other countries also serve the purpose of the CCP’s nationalist propaganda, and they are covered in a manner consistent with its domestic and foreign policies to avoid sending contradiction messages to the domestic audiences. For example, during the second Chechen war, the Chinese state media strongly supported the Russian military operation in Chechnya and often used it to justify the Chinese government’s action towards Xinjiang independence (Zhang, 2001).

Method

Data

News coverage and commentary articles from The Global Times from January 1, 2010 to

April 30, 2017 were collected from Wisers, a Chinese newspaper database run by the Chinese

University of Hong Kong. The key words were “Taiwan independence” (taidu), “Hong Kong independence” (gangdu), “Xinjiang independence” (jiangdu) and “Tibetan independence”

(zangdu). A total of 3,356 excerpts were collected. The key word “Chechnya” (checheng) was also used to search the related articles. After excluding all articles unrelated to the Chechnyan conflict, there were 639 pieces in total from the same time period as the other four categories of independence movement articles. However, missing from the database was the collection of newspapers from September 1, 2008 to July 30, 2011.

The Global Times is a daily Chinese newspaper wholly owned by People’s Daily, the official newspaper of the CCP. Established in 1993, it focuses on international issues, and has a daily distribution of 1,500,000 copies. The editor-in-chief, Hu Xijin, claims that it has over

15,000,000 Chinese readers per day including those who access its website and social media accounts. Its populist approach to journalism and its aggressive defense of the Chinese government allow it to touch on some sensitive issues, such as Hong Kong independence and overseas Chinese dissidents; mostly importantly, these characteristics help it to maintain a stable revenue and bring in huge profits (Huang, 2016). “The Global Times is predictable in its world view: American wants to keep China down, Japan today is no different from the warmongering invader of the 1930s, other Asian countries are US puppets, Russia is a much-maligned partner in fending off the world-conquering ambitions of the US and NATO, popular democracy is a disaster” (Hornby, 2016).

Variables and measures

In every political conflict, the contest over the news media has become an important element. The relationship between political antagonists and the news media is able to explain why the politically powerful have more access to the news media and how the relationship can change (Wolfsfeld, 1997). Although in China the CCP controls media access, in order to serve the purpose of news reporting and storytelling, other political antagonists will inevitably be mentioned, and this is why some topics are still taboo in China. The Chinese search engine Baidu still blocks the term “June 4 incident,” the Tiananmen students’ movement in 1989. However, it is no longer as sensitive an issue for The Global Times, the only Chinese newspaper permitted by

CCP censors to mention the issue in its editorials. These editorials take a pro-government stance and denounce the participants and the sympathizers as more evidence of the Western desire to keep China down (Shan, 2016).

By comparing political factors in news coverage, this study will demonstrate how the

Chinese state media use nationalist propaganda to frame different political powers for their

45 audience, the Chinese people. The news stories and commentaries are coded into ten factors: (1) news stories; (2) commentary; (3) challengers, including Taiwan’s presidents (past and present),

Hong Kong’s independence party leaders, the 14th Dalai Lama, Rebiya Kadeer, and Chechen separatist leaders; (4) pro-independence activities and attacks, including pro-independence politicians; (5) anti-independence activities and politicians (6) national governments, including the activities and statements of the PRC and the Russia government, and their leaders and officials (7) local media (Hong Kong and Taiwan media); (8) international media (for Taiwan,

Hong Kong media are counted as international media; for Hong Kong, Taiwan’s media are counted as international media; for Xinjiang and Tibet, Hong Kong and Taiwan’s media are counted as international); (9) local public opinion (polls among Chechnya, Taiwan, Hong Kong,

Xinjiang, and Tibet residents; interviews of Chechnya, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Xinjiang, and Tibet residents and those in the diasporas; columns written by Taiwanese); and (10) national public opinion (national polls of China and Russia; interviews with Chinese and Russian scholars and columns written by Chinese scholars and experts).

Intercoder reliability

One Chinese journalist coded the articles with the author. Both coded a randomly selected sub-sample of 20% of the articles to pretest the coding protocols. After reaching satisfactory internal reliability (Cohen’s K=.86), the author proceeded with the remainder for coding and content analysis.

Results

Although Hong Kong has the same percentage of coverage as Tibet on its independence movement, considering that the newspaper only started to report on it in 2012, it appears that the paper focused more on Hong Kong in recent years, which is in line with government policy.

After the Umbrella Movement in 2014 and the election of two pro-independence lawmakers in

2016, the central government started taking a strong stance towards Hong Kong (Figure 3-1).

Figure 3-1: News coverage on Taiwan, HK, Tibet, and Xinjiang independence movements

600

500

400

300

200

100

Xinjiang Taiwan Hong Kong Tibetan

Source: WiseSearch (Data from Sept.1, 2008 to July 30, 2011 are missing from the database)

Taiwan’s leaders are the most frequently covered by the newspaper. 30% of the stories mentioned the Taiwan leaders’ names. The Dalai Lama is the second most-frequently-mentioned challenger, accounting for 28% of the stories. Accused of being the leader of Xinjiang independence, Rebiya Kideer is also mentioned in the stories, accounting for 18%. The challengers from Hong Kong have the lowest percentage in the stories, and several people were mentioned. For the factor of local public opinion, several polls are mentioned in the stories.

Taiwan and Hong Kong experts and scholars are interviewed and quoted in the newspaper, as

47 well as being invited to write columns. In a one-party state, there are no local elected political parties to serve political power other than the ruling party. While it is understandable that there is no public poll among Xinjiang and Tibetan people in China, it is still astonishing to see that the local people are totally silenced in the stories (Figure 3-2).

Figure 3-2. Total percentage of factors in stories about the four independence movements

Xinjiang Tibet Hong Kong Taiwan

Mainland pulibc opinion Local public opinion International Media Local media Foreign government Mainland government Anti-independece Pro-independence Challengers

0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6

A one-way ANOVA was conducted to test the differences among Taiwan, Hong Kong,

Tibet, and Xinjiang independence coverage in terms of the number of factors used. Except mainland government, all other factors have main effect among four independence movement.

Post hoc comparison using the Bonferroni test indicated that the percentage of challengers in

Hong Kong independent movement is significantly low among four independence movement.

The percentage of pro-independence politicians in Hong Kong is statistic significantly high, since different from other three independence movement, there is no clear leadership for the movement. The percentage of foreign governments are significantly low in the stories on Hong

Kong, while the percentage of foreign governments on Tibet and Xinjiang, is significantly higher than Taiwan and Hong Kong. The percentage of local media on Hong Kong is significantly higher than Taiwan, while this factor is no existed in the stories on Tibet and Xinjiang.

International media are significantly important for reporting Tibet and Xinjiang than Hong Kong and Taiwan. The percentage of public opinion on Hong Kong is significantly higher than

Taiwan, while this factor is also missing in the stories on Tibet and Xinjiang. The percentage of mainland public opinion on Xinjiang and Tibet is significantly higher than Taiwan and Hong

Kong (Table 3-1).

Table 3-1: Result of one-way ANOVA of between groups effect of factors

Taiwan Hong Kong Tibet Xinjiang F

Factors n=2532 n=359 n=333 n=132

Mean SE Mean SE Mean SE Mean SE

Challengers .30 .01 .05 .01 .28 .03 .18 .03 37.76*

Pro-independence .25 .00 .43 .03 .23 .02 .20 .03 19.361*

Anti-independence .14 .01 .09 .02 .00 .00 .00 .00 25.751*

PRC Government .14 .01 .13 .02 .15 .01 .22 .04 2.264

Foreign Governments .34 .01 .07 .01 .51 .03 .44 .04 57.361*

Local Media .14 .01 .22 .02 .00 .00 .01 .01 33.250*

International Media .06 .00 .03 .01 .27 .02 .24 .04 74.627*

Local Public Opinion .23 .01 .37 .03 .00 .00 .00 .00 64.554*

PRC Public Opinion .16 .01 .20 .02 .42 .03 .37 .04 52.355*

Note: *p<0.05

Qualitative content analysis has also been used to identity how the newspaper frames the factors in different topics. A summative approach was adapted to explore the usage of the key factors in order to go beyond just word counts (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005). For each factor, there is a summary of how the newspaper framed the story (Table 3-2).

Table 3-2: The frame of the political factors in covering the Taiwan, HK, Xinjiang and Tibet movements

Factors Taiwan Hong Kong Xinjiang Tibet

Challengers -Lee Teng-hui, -Chin Wan, the -Rebiya Kadeer is -The 14th Dalai

Chen shui-ban and author of the book supported by Lama is seeking

Tsai ing-wen are “Hong Kong City- foreign forces in support from

seeking Taiwan’s State Theory,” order to destroy foreign anti-China

independence, advocates an the stability of forces.

leading Taiwan independent Hong China. -He is trying to

into a dangerous Kong. -She is not destroy the

direction. -His disciples popular overseas Beijing Olympic

-Chen’s registered an and foreign Games, from the

corruption case independence leaders refuse to bidding to the

occupied the party in the UK, meet her. torch rally.

newspaper for following the -She launched -He should be

many years. Tibetan many smear held responsible

-Lee was also independence campaign against for the violent

frequently movement’s China. conflicts in Tibet.

reported on after practice. -She is - He is spreading

his retirement, -Chan Ho-tin responsible for 75 rumors about

especially his founds the Hong Urumqi incidents China.

relationship with Kong National and many other

Japan. Party, which is the terrorist attacks in

-In his earlier first political party Xinjiang.

presidential in HK advocating

period, Ma ying- independence.

jeou was praised Conservative

for his Party (Hong

rapprochement Kong)

with Mainland -The pro-

China, but later democratic

was criticized as a opposition and the

weak leader who organizers of

was unable to put Occupy Central

down the pro- “are seeking

independence independence and

movement. collusion with

Taiwan and

Xinjiang and

Tibetan

independence

forces.”

Pro-independence -The Democratic -Occupy Central -Terrorist attacks -Conflicts in Tibet

Progressive Party (the Umbrella in China -Overseas protests

(DPP) is seeking Movement) - Participated in to defame China

independence. supports an Jihad overseas

-The Sunflower independent Hong -Connected with -Destroying the

Student Kong. international torch rally

Movement is anti- - Localism and terrorist groups, internationally

China and self-determination such as Al-Qaeda

supports are tantamount to and ISIS

independence and seeking

collusion with independence.

Tibetan and -The separatists in

Xinjiang HK are in

separatists. collusion with

-The DPP is Taiwanese and

hostile towards Tibetan

mainlanders separatists; only

Article 23 can

curb these

dangerous forces.

Anti- -KMT lawmakers -Pro- None None independence establishment

politicians

National -PRC official -PRC official -PRC official -PRC official

Government statements to statements statements to statements to

assert its -PRC leaders’ assert its assert its

determination official visit determination in determination

against any pro- -Promise of “one favor of anti- against any pro-

country, two terrorism

independence systems” and independence

words and deeds maintaining words and deeds.

-PRC official territorial

interactions with sovereignty as the

Taiwan officials red line

-CCP interaction

with KMT

Foreign -US arms sales -The US and UK -The Western -Hostile forces in

Governments and military are secretly forces employ a the West are using

support of Taiwan supporting the double standard Tibet to curb

-The US uses independence for terrorist China.

Taiwan to curb movement attacks in -India uses the

the PRC -NED is Xinjiang, which Dalai Lama and

-Japan is the sponsoring fundamentally his followers as a

“black hand” of separatists in violated justice. tool to negotiate

independence Hong Kong with China.

Local Media -Taiwan media are - Hong Kong None None

anti-independence media denounce

-The pro- separatist

independence activities

media are quoted

occasionally to

show that the

Taiwan

government,

especially the

military, are

worried by a

powerful

Mainland China.

International -International -International -Western media -Western media

Media media are media claim that are biased and are biased and

concerned about Hong Kong’s hostile towards hostile towards

the situation in the independence is the Chinese the Chinese

Taiwan Strait, inevitable government. government and

fearful of military they hurt the

conflicts between feelings of the

the mainland and Chinese people.

Taiwan

Local Public -Polls show that -Polls show no None None

Opinion the majority of support for

people in Taiwan independence

do not support among Hong

independence Kong’s people

-Pro-

establishment

protests represent

the silence

majority

National Public -The US is the -The West is the -The West is the -The US is the

Opinion culprit. culprit behind the culprit. culprit.

-An economically so-called -The Chinese -Stability is

powerful independence government China’s highest

mainland China movement. should use tough priority.

will finally win -China should use means to fight -The West would

Taiwan economic means terror. be afraid of a

to punish strong China.

separatists and

their supporters.

There is a total of 639 pieces of coverage on Chechnya that have been collected from the same time period. Stories about how Putin and his government dealt with Chechen separatists account for 46% of the whole collection. 38% of the stories are about how Western powers, such as the United States, European Union, and NATO are suppressing Russia’s rise as a super power using Chechnya as an excuse (Table 3-3).

Table 3-3: The descriptive data of Chechen independence (N= 639)

Factors Mean SD N Percentage

(%)

Challengers .044 .205 28 .04

Pro-independence .257 .437 164 .26

Anti-independence .055 .228 35 .05

National Government .460 .499 294 .46

Foreign Government .382 .486 244 .38

International Media .074 .261 47 .07

Local Public Opinion .019 .136 12 .02

National Public Opinion .080 .271 51 .08

Although both issues are related to religion and ethnic conflicts, which are very sensitive in China, the conflicts in Chechnya were intensively covered during the same period – especially when Putin was first elected the president of Russia and the newspaper used it to demonstrate his efficiency and toughness, praising his fight with the hostile Western powers critical of his actions in Chechnya. The newspaper frequently uses Russia polls to portray Putin as a strong and popular leader. Compared with domestic news, international news reporting gives more flexibility to the state news media under the regulation of the CCP Propaganda Department.

However, there is no coverage discussing why Chechens seek independence, and only four stories mentioned that the majority of the population in Chechnya are Muslims.

The point of comparing news coverage of the Xinjiang and Chechen independence movements is to identify which factors are missing and which factors are more frequently used

56 in domestic reporting. Two factors are missing here, local public opinion and anti-independence reporting. Thus, what is absent is the voice of Xinjiang’s people – even those in Xinjiang who oppose the separatist activities (Figure 3-3). The newspaper dedicates a good deal of coverage to portraying the separatist leader as an enemy of the State in order to create the conditions for political repression. The coverage of the Russian government and its Leader is significantly higher than the coverage of the Chinese government and leaders, since the Chinese state media are not free to comment on government and party policies.

Figure 3-3: Percentage comparison of the total number of factors between the Xinjiang and Chechen

independence movements

Xinjiang Chechen

NATIONAL PUBLIC OPINION 0.37 0.08

LOCAL PUBLIC OPINION 0.020

INTERNATIONAL MEDIA 0.24 0.07

FOREIGN GOVERNMENT 0.44 0.38

NATIONAL GOVERNMENT 0.22 0.46

ANTI-INDEPENDENCE 0.050

PRO-INDEPENDENCE 0.2 0.26

CHALLENGERS 0.18 0.04

To compare the differences among factors between the issues of the Xinjiang and

Chechen independence movements, a one-way ANOVA was conducted and there are significant analysis differences on challengers (F=34.522, p<0.001), anti-independence activities (F=7.629,

57 p<0.05), national government (F=26.808, p<0.001), international media (F=32.540, p<0.001) and national public opinion (F=91.892, p<0.001) (Table 3-4).

Table 3-4: Results of One-way ANOVA of factors top Xijiang independence and Chechen independence (N=771) Factors F df P

Challengers 34.522 1 .000**

Pro-independence 2.099 1 .148

Anti-independence 7.629 1 .006*

National Government 26.808 1 .000**

Foreign Government 1.520 1 .218

International Media 32.540 1 .000**

Local Public Opinion 2.52 1 .113

National Public Opinion 91.892 1 .000**

Note: *p<0.05, **p<0.001

For Chinese readers, Chechnya is a remote and small place compared to Russia. In order to increase the readability of the stories, the newspaper uses a popular journalism approach, focusing on sensational and eye-catching topics such as female snippers; they also use terms such as “black widow” to describe female suicide bombers, and dwell in great detail on the love life of the separatist leader. In its commentaries, the newspaper frequently mentioned that China should learn from Putin and Russia so as to avoid Xinjiang becoming another Chechnya.

However, this seems inconsistent with the CCP’s stance on Xinjiang, because the CCP leaders have pointed out that Xinjiang is totally different from Chechnya (Table 3-5).

Table 3-5: The framing of the political factors in covering the Xinjiang and Chechen independence movements Factors Xinjiang Chechen

Challengers -Rebiya Kadeer is supported by - The leaders mysteriously

foreign forces to destroy the appear and disappear during

stability of China. operations

-She is not popular overseas and - Details of the personal lives of

foreign leaders refuse to meet some leaders, including love

with her. stories.

-She launched many smear

campaign towards China.

-She is responsible for 75

Urumqi incidents and many

other terrorist attacks in

Xinjiang.

Pro-independence -Terrorist attacks in China -Terrorist attacks in Russia

- Attended Jihad overseas -Participated Jihad overseas

-Connections with international -Foreign jihadists participated in

terrorist groups, such as Al- the Chechen war

Qaeda and ISIS -Connections with international

terrorist groups, such as Al-

Qaeda and ISIS

-Plots to assassinate Putin

Anti-independence None -Locally elected government

leaders and officials fight

separatists

National Government -PRC official statements -Putin won the election and

asserting their determination to gained his support because of

defeat terrorism. his operations and policies in

Chechnya

-The rise of Russia under Putin

Foreign Governments The Western forces employ a -The Western powers use a

double standard for terrorist double standard for human

attacks in Xinjiang, which rights and terrorist attacks in

fundamentally violated justice. Russia, which fundamentally

violated justice.

-The US uses Chechnya as a

negotiation tool to curb Russia

-The UK support Chechen

independence, since the UK

shelters several separatists

-China must learn from Putin to

deal with the problem in

Xinjiang

International Media -Western media are biased and -Western media are biased and

hostile towards the Chinese hostile towards Russia and

government. Putin.

- After the Boston marathon

bombing, the US media started

reflecting on their attitude

towards Russia

Local Public Opinion None -The majority of Chechens want

a safe life and stable society

-Chechens support Putin

National Public Opinion -The West is the culprit. -The Russian people appreciate

-The Chinese government Putin’s policy on Chechnya

should use tough means to fight -The Russian people are worried

terror. about terrorist attacks and

support Putin’s imposition of

hard policies on Chechnya and

other places

Discussion and Conclusion

After the Tiananmen student movement in 1989, the Chinese government launched a propaganda campaign of patriotic education, which is one of the most important maneuvers for the enactment of Chinese nationalism (Zhao, 1998). The nationalist propaganda employed by

The Global Times is well-engineered and appeals to state-led nationalism. Since it is treated as a tabloid by the international mainstream media for its rude and crass contents, it has more flexibility to play up nationalism and to be wielded by the CCP when the latter needs an attack dog or hawkish soldier. As the editor-in-chief Hu Xijin said publicly, “They can’t speak willfully, but I can” (Huang, 2016). In September 2016, the newspaper claimed that Singapore partially helped the Philippines on the south China dispute and then Singapore’s ambassador to

China rejected the report in an open letter. Hu stood by his paper’s report and the Chinese government also came out to support the paper (Huei, 2016).

The techniques of CCP’s nationalist propaganda are predictable. First, depict the challengers as enemies of the State: the Dalai Lama, Taiwan’s presidents, Rebiya Kadeer, and the latest, the hardline pro-democratic opposition in Hong Kong. Working along with state censorship, the one-sided stories with well-calculated information are effective for creating resentment among the public in Mainland China and generating public support for the central government to take strong stance. The criticism of the CCP’s tough policies in Xinjiang and

Tibet by Western powers and international media are held to illustrate how Western society is biased against China, and how they are attempting to undermine China’s goal of becoming the world’s super power.

To stigmatize the challengers and they are associated with violence, which also inspires self-censorship among Chinese people on the mainland. Secession becomes taboo in public discourse and the public sphere. People are scared to be labeled as supporters of or sympathizers with separatism, so the possibility of public discussion disappears. Even in private conversation, people automatically avoid touching this topic so as not to make any trouble. And when these people have the chance to study and work overseas, self-censorship follows.

Second, the nationalist propaganda uses foreign political powers, such as foreign governments, international media, and NGOs to demonstrate how Western imperialism continually bullies China, as it did in the past. The West is irretrievably hostile to China’s rise and uses every deceitful means to try to undermine China.

Third, the nationalist propaganda also uses foreign political powers to help craft the image of a strong China. Complimentary remarks from foreign governments, international

62 media, and experts are amplified in these stories to show how important China is in the world arena. When Western leaders refuse to meet the Dalai Lama, it is described as being because these leaders fear losing access to the Chinese market, which is crucial to their nation’s economy and future development.

However, these techniques are used differently depending on the issues. For Xinjiang and

Tibetan independence, since the territory is under the CCP’s control and all the pro- independence activities are overseas, the purpose of the propaganda is illustrating the resolve of the government and deter those potential supporters and sympathizers, make them unarguable.

That’s why the coverage of these two issues is heavily dependent on commentaries written by

Chinese scholars and concentrates on criticizing foreign governments, the outsiders.

The coverage of Hong Kong independence is different. It covers so-called pro- independence activists and activities intensively and expands the target to those who publicly deny supporting Hong Kong independence. Unlike in Xinjiang and Tibet, under “one country, two systems,” all non-violent activities and speeches supporting independence are legal in Hong

Kong and out of the direct control of the CCP. The newspaper frequently picks non-politicians as its targets to send a message to people in Hong Kong. In 2016, it launched a boycott campaign against Lancôme and Listerine accusing them of sponsoring Denise Ho, a pro-democratic pop singer in Hong Kong, who advocated for Hong Kong and Tibetan independence (GlobalTimes,

2016). Worried about its mainland market, Lancôme cancelled its sponsorship, while Listerine maintained it. Ho was arrested during the Umbrella Movement and blacklisted by the Chinese media (Cheung & Leung, 2016). For the CCP, the independent movement in Hong Kong is not an imminent problem. By expanding its targets and labeling more people as separatists, the ultimate goal is to implement Article 23, the national security law which enables the CCP to

63 exert direct control over Hong Kong. It worries that the pro-democratic movement in Hong Kong could spread to the mainland. By featuring the public opinion of Hong Kongers in the stories, it is able to send the message to mainland readers that the pro-democratic movement is unpopular.

In contrast to coverage of Xinjiang and Tibet, here the insiders’ voice plays an important role.

Among the four independence movements, Taiwan accounted for the majority of the stories. This shows that Taiwanese independence is the least sensitive topic for state media to cover in Mainland China. News coverage containing “Taiwan independence” are changed with the government change. When KMT came to power, it dropped significantly. Since the CCP treats the Taiwan question as the core issue affecting China-US relations, the newspaper spends a large amount of coverage on the US, showing how the Chinese government demands that

America abide by the One China policy and uphold the “1992 Consensus” and oppose “Taiwan independence.” The message is clear to its audiences: China is acting as an aggressive counter to the only world super power, and boosting national pride.

Different from other state media, The Global Times is allowed to cover sensitive issues and people by the CCP Propaganda Department – even the Tiananmen student movement – by supporting the Chinese government’s stance and using nationalist propaganda techniques to frame the issue, most of the time providing distorted views of the truth. It seems to be more effective than simply blocking access to the topics altogether.

It is difficult to conclude that nationalist propaganda has effects in Mainland China, namely boosting nationalism and generating support for the CCP. Under heavy censorship, voices in the public sphere, both online and offline, are manipulated by the censors, and self- censorship must also be taken into account.

In Hong Kong and Taiwan, nationalist propaganda has provoked counteractions. The state nationalism the CCP employs has to compete with another form of nationalism in Hong

Kong and Taiwan: localism.

This is a similar situation to one that state nationalism has been facing for a long time elsewhere – an ongoing battle to compete with ethic nationalism in Xinjiang and Tibet. The continuing conflicts and tensions in these regions reflect the failure of nationalist propaganda.

This could be caused by using the wrong techniques, such as the lack of insider voices from

Xinjiang and Tibet, making the people there feel irrelevant and excluded; or it could be caused by the ignorance of Han-centrism.

Chapter 4

Measure State Propaganda

Censorship and propaganda are two complementary ways that authoritarian states shape political perception. Censorship is a passive form of control over the flow of information, while propaganda is a proactive form; both contribute to promoting political ideology and avoiding potential challenges to the state (Kalathil & Boas, 2001).

However, in authoritarian regimes, citizens often know that the government uses propaganda and might choose to ignore such messages. Research on China shows that citizens with more exposure to state media have less trust in the government (Chen & Shi, 2001).

Sometimes the purpose of massive government propaganda campaigns is not to change individuals’ beliefs or attitudes but to send a signal demonstrating the government’s capacity to maintain social control and political order (Huang, 2015). According to another theory, developed by Little, propaganda affects mass behaviour without necessarily affecting mass belief. Of course, some citizens are unaware of the propagandistic nature of the information they absorb, but even those who know the government is lying are motivated to coordinate their behaviour in order to avoid standing out by defying the government and being subject to potential punishment from the government (2016).

The different ways to measure the effects of propaganda include measuring the retention of the message (Thurstone, 1932; Chen, 1936). Experiments have tested the effects of propaganda on recall, recognition, and behaviour (Belbin, 1956). Yanagizawa-Drott investigated the impact of exposure to radio programming that encouraged violence during the Rwandan

66 genocide, and the results show that state-sponsored propaganda had a significant effect on participation in the killing (2014).

This study seeks to measure the effects of the Chinese government’s nationalist propaganda on citizens’ attitudes towards Tibetan independence by investigating the mechanisms involved in the hostile media effect and whether a third-person effect exists in this ideologically uniform environment. Will individuals exposed to propaganda or biased media see the propaganda as having a greater effect on others than it has on themselves?

The Hostile Media Effect and Tibetan Independence

After the takeover of Tibet by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in the 1950s, propaganda began to appear from both the government of the PRC and Tibetan exiles. The government of the PRC had the power to determine which narrative would count as historical

“truth.” As a group, Tibetan exiles challenged the PRC’s authority by attempting to spread their version of Tibetan history. Having examined published articles on Tibetan history written by contemporary Chinese and Tibetan authors, as well as articles from Chinese government websites and from the official website of the Tibetan government-in-exile, John Powers found that most of the Chinese sources were published by the Foreign Language Press in Beijing or by other Chinese government-sponsored presses, while on the Tibetan side, most articles were published by mainstream Western press outlets (2004).

Because of censorship, citizens inside the PRC, whose information about Tibet came from the mass media and history textbooks, received only the official version of Tibetan history:

Tibet has always been part of China. The purpose of this propaganda is to justify the legitimacy of Chinese rule over Tibet. The government began an external propaganda campaign in the

1990s and introduced the strategy of using academic Tibetan studies as a medium of propaganda.

The external campaign has been much less persuasive than the domestic one, largely because of the counterpropaganda activities of overseas Tibetans and the Tibetan government-in-exile

(Smith, 2008).

The government’s efforts to spread its political ideology regarding Tibet, unlike their efforts on some other issues, seems to have work very well. Most Chinese people are upset and sometimes outraged about Tibetan resistance and treat the prospect of Tibetan independence or autonomy as a betrayal of China. Even among Chinese citizens who are in an open information environment, resistance to alternative versions of the Tibetan narrative is strong. Chinese students on American campuses joined together in opposition to the University of California San

Diego’s 2017 invitation to the Dalai Lama to serve as commencement speaker (Horwitz, 2017).

The website Anti-CNN, established by a Chinese student at a US college in 2008, accuses the

Western media of distorted and exaggerated reports of Tibetan unrest (Xinhua, 2008).

The hostile media effect refers to the tendency of individuals with a strong pre-existing attitude on an issue to perceive media coverage as biased (Perloff, 2015). An early study on the coverage of the Beirut massacre showed that audiences with divergent pre-existing political views judged the same news coverage differently. Charges of media bias may reflect more than self-serving attempts to secure preferential treatment and was first referred to as the “hostile media phenomenon,” which is the origin of the phrase “hostile media effect” (Vallone, Ross, &

Lepper, 1985).

Hastorf and Cantril developed a questionnaire concerning a disputed college football game; the results led them to conclude that different people have different versions of the “real”

(1954). Tversky and Kahneman suggested that heuristics are employed in judgements and decisions (1975). Sherif and Hovland introduced the key concepts of latitude of acceptance and

68 latitude of rejection and explained the implications of these concepts for attitude change and communication (1961). Heuristic processing allows people to focus on a minimal amount of data and to conduct minimal analysis, which enables them to use simple inferential rules (Chaiken,

Liberman & Eagly, 1989). Partisans tend to judge news coverage as biased as a result of their prior beliefs about media bias together with their attitudes towards the issue at hand. Individuals tend to use selective information that favours their pre-existing attitudes (Giner-Sorolla &

Chaiken, 1994). Once an attitude is formed, maintaining evaluative-cognitive consistency ends up strengthening that attitude, making it increasingly stable (Chaiken, Pomerantz, & Giner-

Sorolla, 1995). A study on strikes revealed that level of involvement is another factor that predicts the hostile media effect (Christen, Kannaovakun, & Gunther, 2002). The hostile media effect is also associated with in-group identification, which evokes cognitive differentiation between the in-group and the out-group and reflects a form of in-group bias (Matheson &

Dursun, 2001).

Although some scholars insist that the cuing effect of the media on people’s attitudes is minimal, research has shown otherwise. A study examining the flow of partisan information from newspapers to voters during the 1992 US presidential election found a strong correlation between a newspaper’s editorial content and readers’ candidate preferences, demonstrating the role of media in providing cues for voters to use to form their attitude towards candidates

(Dalton, Beck, & Huckfeldt, 1998). One example of the nefarious consequences of the hostile media effect is its effect on the use of the media to gauge public opinion: in perceiving the media to be biased against one’s side of an issue, one also overestimates the extent to which public opinion is opposed to that position (Gunther, Christen, Liebhart, & Chia, 2001).

Whereas the hostile media effect results from the tendency to judge mass media coverage as favouring the opposite point of view, assimilation bias is the tendency to find information more supportive of one’s own viewpoint. To reconcile these two notions as having the same theoretical basis, Gunther and Schmitt designed an experiment exposing a partisan audience to the same content in two different formats: a news story and a student essay. The audience perceived media bias when confronted with the news story. However, the hostile media effect did not appear in their reactions to the student essay—assimilation biases emerged (2004). This suggests that factors regarding the way that the audience judges the source of the information are predictive of the hostile media effect.

Most research on the hostile media effect has been conducted in the broad context of democratic political systems. With regard to authoritarian regimes, limited effort has been made to understand whether and how media coverage is found to be biased or to examine the relation between news media coverage and audience perceptions. A study from Singapore, where the press is highly regulated, showed that the hostile media effect can persist in a restricted press environment where citizens are aware of the government’s control over the media (Chia, Yong,

Wong, & Koh, 2007). However, Singapore is a competitive authoritarian regime; opposition parties are allowed to compete for ruling power. Indeed, the government’s liberalisation of the

Internet has enabled opposition parties to expand their influence (Ortmann, 2011). Most importantly, Singapore’s government never imposed systematic censorship to block the flow of information; people can freely use Twitter, Facebook, and Google and can access foreign media, whereas these websites are all blocked in China.

Testing for and measuring the hostile media effect in a media environment monopolised by ideology is an effective way to measure the effects and extent of propaganda. Giner-Sorolla

70 and Chaiken have provided a causal model featuring four factors that explain hostile media judgement: different standards, selective recall, selective categorisation, and prior beliefs about the media (1994). To clarify the mechanisms underlying the operation of the hostile media effect in authoritarian regimes, I propose the addition of two factors to this causal model: media- dependency pattern and media literacy.

Research shows that media dependency has a significant impact on political perception in authoritarian regimes and that one’s level of education contributes significantly to the usage of illegal oppositional media for alternative political information-seeking (Halpern, 1994). Under the strict regulation of the flow of information in China, citizens’ opportunities to access alternative information, such as by using a virtual private network (VPN) service to access blocked Internet sites or by receiving blocked information during overseas travel, are limited.

That said, not everyone who has the opportunity to seek alternative information takes it, and the

Chinese people’s impression of the foreign media, especially the US media, come from state propaganda. However, the image of the US media would be mixed, since the state media frequently quotes the US media to support the argument of how powerful the China state is or uses the Western media, especially the US media, to demonstrate Western hostility and the attempt by foreign forces to try to interfere in Chinese domestic issues and the rise of China in the world.

Media literacy is the key to interpreting media messages (Silverblatt, Miller, Smith, &

Brown, 2014). However, media literacy is not taught as part of the formal school curriculum in

China, and its importance is downplayed (Wan & Gut, 2008). Without the knowledge of media ownership, different media systems, and different news structures, individuals will have difficulty judging the quality of news reporting.

The Tibetan independence movement is an ideal topic through which to test the hostile media effect given that the Chinese media and the Western media frame the cause and history of

Tibetan independence differently. Gunther and Schmitt have found that the nature of the source of information predicts the hostile media effect (2004); however, we do not yet know whether the way a story is framed is similarly relevant. Although Chinese citizens are surrounded by government propaganda and deprived of alternative information because of censorship, they are still sometimes passively exposed to censored information or opposing narratives. When US universities invite the Dalai Lama to campus, for example, Chinese students in the US are confronted with an alternative set of attitudes regarding Tibet. Some treat this as an opportunity to seek alternative political information and to make a judgement based on the new information; others treat it as an example of Western bias against China and refuse to take in any new information. The difference between these responses may depend on media-dependency patterns and levels of media literacy. Research has also found that an increased level of involvement in relevant events triggers the formation of in-group identity and initiates the cognitive process of the hostile media effect (Matheson & Dursun, 2001; Christen, Kannaovakun, & Gunther, 2002).

For a person who has been educated to believe that Tibet is part of China, rhetoric implying the possibility or reasonableness of Tibetan independence might evoke the identity of being Chinese as well as the hostile media bias.

H1a: Perceived message quality will vary as a function of the sources of the stories.

H1b: Stories labelled as originating with the Chinse state media have a higher perceived message quality than stories labelled as originating with the US media.

H2: Perceived message quality will not vary as a function of the frame of the stories.

H3: Perceived message quality will vary as a function of the attitude towards Tibetan independence.

H4: Perceived massage quality will vary as a function of the level of media literacy.

H5a: Perceived massage quality will vary as a function of the level of trust in the foreign media.

H5b: The more people trust the foreign media, the more likely they will be to sympathise with Tibetan independence.

H5c: The more people trust the foreign media, the more likely they will be to have a higher level of media literacy.

The Third-Person Effect, Censorship, and Propaganda

News coverage does not significantly change individuals’ attitudes on political issues.

However, people tend to overestimate its influence on others and underestimate its influence on themselves (Perloff, 1989). Research shows that this phenomenon, called the third-person effect, may explain the growing trend of support for censorship, including censorship of pornography, violence on television, and violent music products (Rajas, Shah & Faber,1996; Mcleod, Eveland,

& Nathanson, 1997; Hoffner & Buchanan, 2002). Research on political elections shows that the third-person effect influences voters’ attitudes towards polls; individuals tend to overestimate the influence of polls on other people (Wei, Chia, & Lo, 2011). Likewise, when the media make exit poll results available on election day, the third-person effect might cause an adverse public reaction, such as the decision not to vote, since voters might overestimate the effect of these polls on others (Milavsky et al., 1985).

The third-person effect was first articulated as a hypothesis by Davison, who studied the effect of propaganda during World War II and the influence of the press on foreign policy. He concluded that this theory explains various aspects of social behaviour, such as political rulers’

73 fear of dissent, as well as censorship in general, since censors believe that although they themselves are exempt, others are influenced by mass media messages (1983). When Davison revisited this hypothesis more than a decade later, he admitted that “the third-person effect was not a manifestation of a single psychological tendency but was a complex reaction that varied with the type of communication, the characteristics of the individual, and the situation” (1996, p.

114).

The third-person effect does not emerge in all people; it can be predicted to a certain extent by age and education (Tiedge et al., 1991). Perloff found the effect likely appears when the media message contains recommendations that are perceived to be both unfavourable to oneself and important (1993). Further research shows that social distance is another factor influencing individuals’ judgement of the impact of media on others. People usually consider their socially closer counterparts to be more vulnerable to media messages than more distant others (Perloff, 1999).

The third-person effect has been used to explain why people support government censorship in countries under democratic political systems (Sun, Shen, & Pan, 2008; Youn,

Faber, & Shah, 2000; Salwen, 1998). This effect can also be used to explain the reaction of some

Chinese students to the Dalai Lama; they overestimate the effect of Western media coverage of the Dalai Lama and worry that others—especially their friends, teachers, and classmates—will be influenced by his version of the “truth.” Their reaction demonstrates the influence of presumed influence (Gunther & Storey, 2003). The third-person effect can also explain why dictators tend to impose censorship on the press. They are concerned that others—the masses— will be influenced by non-official rhetoric, which raises the risk of revolt, since the masses use media content to judge the climate of public opinion and calculate the cost of collective action.

In authoritarian regimes such as China, studies have provided inconsistent findings.

Research examining an online forum containing extremely nationalistic messages and the censorship of such posts shows that Chinese Internet forum users tend to perceive others as more influenced by these posts and tend to favour censorship. However, unlike their Western counterparts, these forum participants support only interpersonal censorship, not censorship by the government (Zheng & Detenber, 2009). By contrast, a study investigating youth support for

Internet censorship in China failed to determine the power of the third-person effect to explain the phenomenon (Guo & Feng, 2012).

Since previous studies on China that considered the third-person effect have resulted in conflicting findings, the subject of Tibetan independence is a perfect opportunity to explore this mechanism in the Chinese context.

H6: People tend to believe that news stories have a stronger perceived effect on others than on themselves.

H7: The higher the level of the perceived effect on others is, the more likely a person is to support Chinese government censorship.

Method

Participants

Participants were recruited from Weibo, a Chinese microblogging site that is equivalent to Twitter. A survey link was posted on Weibo, and participants were randomly assigned to one of six stimuli, which included two news articles. Internet surveys have higher response rates and lower labour costs; they are also more efficient. Surveys relying on email contacts are the fastest growing form of survey in the US. However, a web-only survey would omit some segments of

75 the general population, such as people who do not use the Internet, so it is important to determine how the survey will be programmed and hosted. In recent years, social science studies have started to use online crowdsourced labour to conduct experiments by using tools such as

Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk). Studies exploring the viability of MTurk for recruiting survey participants found that although samples of respondents do not perfectly match all relevant characteristics of the US population, they are also not widely misrepresentative compared with samples recruited face to face (Berinsky, Huber, & Lenz, 2012; Weinberg,

Freese, & McElhattan, 2014). Recruitment on Weibo is akin to recruitment on MTurk; based on my previous recruitment experience, participation is voluntary and free.

All participants were ensured anonymity and received no incentive for their participation.

The survey design was also reviewed by the IRB at the researcher’s university. The 1163 participants are Weibo users (N=1163, male = 689, female = 465). Sixty five percent of the participants have a bachelor’s degree or above, 14% have a high degree diploma, 15% are high school graduates, and 6% have graduated from junior middle school. Thirty one percent of the participants are between the age of 18 and 24, 42% are between the age of 25 and 44, and 27% are between the age of 45 and 65. Seventy five percent of the participants spent over one hour reading the news each day in the past week; only 15% of the participants said they were not very familiar or not familiar with current affairs. All participants are Chinese nationals and currently live and work in China. Only 13% of the participants have overseas experience, and 41% of them have used a VPN to access blocked websites to gain information. Fifty percent of the participants have rarely read American news media reports, and 10% of them have never read American news media reports. The survey was presented in simplified Chinese.

Design

To test these hypotheses, this study adopts a 2 (frame) x 3 (sources) factorial survey experiment that includes both between- and within-subjects variables (topics). It uses stimuli to simulate the real-world decision-making process and assesses participants’ beliefs, judgment principles, and decision rules (Auspurg & Hinz, 2014). By using multidimensional stimuli and combining the experiments into a survey, this method increases internal validity (Mutz, 2011).

Three news sources were used as the stimuli: a Chinese state media outlet (Global Times), a Western media outlet (CNN) and one outlet whose identity was withheld from the participants.

Global Times (GT) is a daily Chinese newspaper published under the CCP’s People’s Daily.

Established in 1993, it specialises in the coverage of international affairs (Xinhua, 2009).

According to its official website, its circulation is over two million

(http://hd.globaltimes.cn/html/abouthq/). It is a major propaganda tool of the CCP, reflecting the

Party’s real thinking; as its editor-in-chief told the media, “They can’t speak wilfully, but I can”

(Huang, 2016). CNN is chosen here to represent the Western media since it is the foreign news outlet most familiar to the Chinese due to the Chinese state media’s routine criticism of its allegedly biased reporting on China. Stimuli from the media outlet whose identity will be withheld will serve as the control group.

The study also used two pairs of stories from GT and CNN about two topics: the Dalai

Lama’s plans to visit a Buddhist town in India in April 2017 and a sandstorm in Beijing on May 4,

2017. CNN’s English reports were translated into Chinese. Both of the stories on the Dalai Lama include the details of the plan and the Chinese Foreign Ministry’s reaction. However, whereas the

CNN’s story has more background information on the town and the historic meaning of the Dalai

Lama’s visit, GT only quotes some commentary from Indian newspapers. Although the content of

77 its news coverage is relatively neutral, GT uses “Cuanfang” (dirty visit) to describe the Dalai

Lama’s visit. This term, though not unusual, was removed from the article to avoid priming among the participants. The ways that the two outlets frame the sandstorm in Beijing are different. CNN uses netizen reactions and background information to explain how serious the problem is, whereas

GT uses only a weather summary to report the story; it is typical of Chinese state media coverage not to sensationalise such news in order to avoid triggering dissatisfaction and anger in the audience.

Participants were randomly assigned to six conditions; group n was as follows: CNN’s stories (202), CNN’s stories identified as GT (198), CNN’s stories with its identity withheld

(191), GT’s stories (198), GT’s stories identified as CNN (192) and GT’s stories with its identity withheld (182). Following their exposure, individuals answered a series of questions about their impressions of the page.

Measures

News media literacy. News media literacy is important for news consumption, civic engagement, and democratic participation (Hobbs, 2010). The knowledge requirements of critical media literacy suggest that it may be important for news media consumers to have some specific knowledge of the news to increase their ability to make the right judgement regarding the quality of the news (Ashely et al., 2013). In this study, a news media literacy scale with five dimensions – media ownership, media and politics, media effect, news framing, and agenda- setting and the role of journalists – was used to assess respondents’ understanding of how news is produced and the relationship between news stories and media ownership. Based on these dimensions, 18 items have been used to assess the degree to which respondents understand the

78 news media; they have also been adapted to the context of the Chinese media system on a 5- point scale (Cronbach’s α=0.77, M = 40.39, SD = 8.79).

Attitude towards Tibetan independence. Before exposure to the stimuli, all participants were asked ten questions about their attitudes and beliefs regarding independence movements in different countries and their attitude towards Tibetan independence, including their personal impression and view of the Dalai Lama (Cronbach’s α = .91, M = 26.51, SD = 8.76).

Trust in the media. Before exposure to the stimuli, all participants were asked their perception of the Chinese news media’s credibility (Cronbach’s α = .96, M = 17.96, SD = 4.96) and their perception of the US news media’s credibility (Cronbach’s α = .92, M = 13.62, SD =

3.74) by using a multidimensional concept consisting of accuracy, unbiasedness, trustworthiness, fairness and telling of the whole story.

Perceived impact on oneself. After rating the news stories, the participants were asked whether they would be influenced by the stories and whether the stories would change their views, especially on Tibet (Cronbach’s α = .79, M = 6.84, SD = 2.51).

Perceived impact on others. The participants were also asked whether others would be influenced by the stories and whether the stories would change others’ views, especially on

(Cronbach’s α = .82, M = 8.49, SD = 2.36).

Support censorship. The participants were asked whether they support the government in censoring the stories they just read. The four questions assessing the participants’ support asked whether they agreed that sometimes censorship is for public good, whether they agreed that it is better for a society to block harmful information, whether they agreed that the information they just read should be blocked, and whether they agreed that censorship is necessary because some people are fragile regarding propaganda (Cronbach’s α = .81, M = 13.39, SD = 3.97)

Manipulation check

This study also includes two multiple-choice questions designed to conduct the manipulation check. Immediately after read one article, each participant was asked about its sources and specific content. The average correct answer rate for these manipulation questions was 97.5%, indicating that a majority of the participants accurately perceived the information of the articles.

Results

I hypothesised that the participants would judge the news stories by their sources (H1a) instead of judging them by how they were framed (H2). I also hypothesised that stories labelled as being from the Chinese media would have a higher score than stories labelled as being from the US media (H1b). The next set of hypotheses concerned evaluations of individual variance with the perceived message quality emerging in part from differences in attitudes towards

Tibetan independence (H3), media literacy (H4) and trust in foreign media (H5a). I also hypothesised that people who place more trust in the foreign media would be more likely to sympathise with Tibetan independence (H5b)

To evaluate H1 to H7, a between 2 (frame of the news stories) x 3 (sources of the news stories) mixed model repeated measures analysis of variances was conducted to examine the estimated perceived message quality, with news topic as a within-subjects factor. A main effect was obtained for source, F (2, 1152) = 11.40, p < .001, partial h2 = .02, with participants reporting a higher score in perceived message quality for The GT (M = 13.84, SE =.21) than No source (M = 13.53, SE = .21) and CNN (M = 12.51, SE = .21). H1a was supported. There is no main effect for frame, F (1, 1152) = .13, p > .05, partial h2 = .00. H2 was also supported.

A topic X frame X source interaction was also obtained, F (2, 1152) = 4.81, p < .01, partial h2 = .01. Table 4-1 shows the means and standard errors associated with this interaction, and illustrates that whereas respondents gave higher scores of perceived message quality to GT than CNN. Story on Tibet originated of GT and also labelled as GT has highest score (M=14.34,

SE=.34). Story on air pollution which is originated from CNN and labelled as GT have highest score (M=13.77, SE=.33). Stories labelled as originating with the Chinese state media have a higher perceived massage quality than sorties labelled as originating with US media. H1b was supported.

Table 4-1: Perceived message quality: Frame X Source X Topic Source No Source CNN Global Times Topics Tibet Air Tibet Air Tibet Air

Frame-CNN M 14.31a 12.46c 12.92c 11.78c 14.26b 13.77a SE .34 .33 .34 .33 .34 .33 Frame-GT M 14.01b 13.34a 13.02c 12.31c 14.34a 12.99b SE .34 .35 .34 .33 .34 .33 F (2, 1152) = 4.81, p < 0.01, partial h2 = .01

A main effect was also obtained for media literacy (median split was conducted,

M=40.393), F (1, 1152) = 6.56, p < .05, partial h2 = .01, trust in the US media (median split was conducted, M=13.617), F (1, 1152) = 9.20, p < 0.01, partial h2 = .01, and attitude towards

Tibetan independence (media split was conducted, M = 26.506), F (1, 1152) = 24.19, p < .001, partial h2 = .02. H3, H4 and H5a were supported. The individual differences of the level of media literacy, attitude towards Tibetan independence and trust in the US media all have significant impact on participants perceived quality of the news stories to which they were exposed.

A media literacy x frame interaction, F (1, 1152) = 5.74, p < .05, h2 = .01, and a trust in

US media x frame interaction, F (1, 1152) = 45.21, p<.001, h2 = .04, were obtained. Table 4-2 shows that although people who read the news from GT in general reported higher perceived quality of the news compared to those who read the news from CNN, such a difference was not as big for those with higher media literacy or greater trust in the U.S. media.

Table 4-2: Perceived message quality: media literacy x frame and trust in US media x frame Frame CNN Global Times Media Literacy Low M 12.65 13.32 SE .24 .25 High M 13.84 13.36 SE .23 .24

Trust in US media Low M 12.56 13.30 SE .25 .26 High M 13.94 13.37 SE .23 .23 F (1, 1152) = 5.74, p < .05, h2 = .01 for media literacy X frame F (1, 1152) = 45.21, p <.001, h2 = .04 for trust in the U.S. media X frame

Attitude towards Tibetan independence x frame interaction, F (1, 1152) = 45.21, p <

.001, h2 = .04, and an attitude towards Tibetan independence x source interaction, F (1, 1152) =

23.98, p < .001, h2 = .04, were also obtained. Table 4-3 demonstrates that people who are more sympathetic towards Tibetan independence gave a higher score of perceived message quality to the stories framed by CNN and labelled the media source CNN, while people who are more opposed to Tibetan Independence scored the stories framed by GT higher and labelled the media source GT.

Table 4-3: Perceived message quality: Attitude towards Tibetan independence x frame and attitude towards Tibetan independence x source Attitude towards Tibetan independence Low (Sympathised) High (Opposed) Frame CNN M 13.47 13.03 SE .24 .23 GT M 11.94 14.73 SE .26 .22 Source No source M 13.28 13.78 SE .30 .29 CNN M 12.72 12.30 SE .31 .27 GT M 12.11 15.56 SE .31 .27 Note: F (1, 1152) = 45.21, p < .001, h2 = .04 for Attitude towards Tibetan independence x frame interaction; F (1, 1152) = 23.98, p < .001, h2 = .04 for attitude towards Tibetan independence x source interaction

To test H5b and H5c, a one-way ANOVA was conducted. There was a significant effect of trust in media and attitude towards Tibetan independence, F (1, 1161) = 180.56, p < 0.001, people who trust the US media more are more sympathetic towards Tibet independence and H5b is support. However, there was no significant effect of trust in media and media literacy, F (1,

1161) = 3.59, p > 0.05. H5c are not supported.

To test H6, whether there is a third-person effect among the participants, a paired samples

T-test was conducted to compare the means of the perceived effect on oneself and the perceived effect on others. There was a significant effect for perceived effect, t (1162) = -15.01, p < .001, with the perceived effect on others receiving a higher score (M = 8.49, SD = 2.37) than the perceived effect on oneself (M = 6.84, SD = 2.51). The third-person effect existed among the participants, and H6 was supported.

The remaining hypotheses suggest different indicators to predict the likelihood of supporting censorship by the Chinese government. These indicators include the perceived effect on others (H7). A multiple linear regression was calculated to predict support for censorship. A significant regression equation was found F (5, 1157) = 236.56, p < .001 with an R2 of 0.51. The individual predictors were examined further and indicated that the perceived effect on others (β =

.06, p < .005 was significant predictors in the model. Thus, H7 was supported. (Table 4-4).

Table 4-4: Multiple linear regression on the individual predictors of support for censorship Predictors Mean SE β

Perceived effect on others .10 .04 .06** Media literacy .02 .01 .05* Trust in Chinese media .31 .02 .39*** Trust in US media -.09 .03 -.08** Attitude towards Tibetan independence .17 .01 .38*** Note: F (5, 1157) = 236.56, p < .001, R2 = 0.51, * p < .05, **p < .01, *** p < .001

However, when the participants were asked specifically whether they supported censoring the two news stories they just read, the perceived effect on others (β = .04, p >.05), was not the significant predictors of supporting censorship (Table 4-5).

Table 4-5: Multiple linear regression on the individual predictors in support censor two articles Predictors Mean SE β

Perceived effect on others .01 .01 .04 Media literacy -.00 .00 -.01 Trust in Chinese media .05 .00 .26* Trust in US media -.01 .01 -.02 Attitude towards Tibetan independence .02 .00 .18* Note: F (5, 1157) = 44.85, p < .001, R2 = 0.40, * p < .001.

Discussion

The structure and narrative of the two stories on the Dalai Lama’s India trip written by

CNN and GT have huge differences. CNN’s story contains the reaction of the Dalai Lama and the

Indian government to the Chinese government in which they defend the Dalai Lama’s visit and the speech in which he recalled taking “political asylum” in India. These kinds of content would never be published in the Chinese media, and for readers who only obtain information from the

Chinese media, CNN’s story on the Dalai Lama demonstrates a Western narrative regarding

Tibet that is different from the story in GT, which is characterised by intrusive, state-mandated

Indology. However, the study shows that frame has no significant effect on judging message quality.

This lack of effect can be explained two different ways. One is that the state propaganda, especially the nationalist propaganda campaign, has effectively deployed the notion that Western media outlets are biased against China. For people who trust the state rhetoric, the source of stories is the direct cue for them when perceiving the credibility of a news story. There are three levels of credibility assessment: construction, heuristics and interaction (Hilligoss, et al., 2008).

In China, state propaganda is systematically deployed though mass media and the education system and is part of citizens’ daily life. Some people have been trained to habitually stay at the heuristic level to use cues instead of contents to make judgements regarding credibility. This study shows that people who place more trust in the foreign media tend to give higher scores to the stories in CNN than GT because they judge the stories based on frame instead of source, which uses an interaction level that refers to credibility judgements.

However, as Little (2016) notes, there might be another scenario in which the state propaganda affects mass behaviour without affecting mass beliefs. People providing a higher

85 score to the stories from the state media source are showing their willingness to co-ordinate in order to avoid punishment from the government. In a closed society such as China, which is under heavy censorship and provide exposure to state propaganda, taboo topics include Tibetan independence. During the data collection, more than two thousand participants quit the survey when they encountered the questions about their attitude towards Tibetan independence. Some participants emailed me to explain their decision. Most of them explained that they felt the topic was too sensitive, and some said that they did not want to cause trouble by participating in a survey such as this. For some participants who finished the survey and used the source instead of the frame of the stories as their cue in rating the content, one possibility that should not be excluded is that a higher score was given to state media because it is politically correct in China and avoids provoking government censors.

This study shows that a third-person effect exists among Chinese netizens. People tend to believe that others would be more easily persuaded by the news stories then themselves. Does this perception lead to the support of government censorship? When the participants were evaluated by a set of questions asking whether they supported government censorship on certain contents for the public good, the perceived effect on others is a significant predictor. However, when the participants were asked whether they supported censoring the two stories they just read, the perceived effect on others lost its significance and failed to predict whether people support censorship. This also demonstrates that some participants believe that censorship is unnecessary; however, they also believe that they must show their support of government policy to avoid standing out by defying the government.

In authoritarian states, surveys, which require self-reporting, are less reliable. Motivated by the fear of being perceived as dissenting or by the desire to conform with others’ opinions,

86 participants might fail to answer candidly. If they believe that the state propaganda works well on others, they might decide to verbally and physically show their support for the government, including government censorship. This also explains why media literacy is the significant predictor of supporting government censorship instead of opposing it, which is another example how state propaganda changes mass behaviour in a close and repressive society but is unable to change mass beliefs.

The results of this study raise the following question: in a closed society, why is there still a certain portion of people who are able to resist the state propaganda? After conducting several multiple linear regressions, the level VPN use appeared to be the only significant predictor of media literacy (t = 2.58, p < 0.05) and attitude towards Tibetan independence (t = -

1.00, p < .001). Although using a VPN is not a significant predictor of trust in the US media, it demonstrates a negative effect on trust in Chinese media (t = -2.17, p <0.05). Although many participants reported that they had overseas experiences, such as study abroad or working overseas, and were able to access non-state propaganda information, overseas experiences still failed to be the predictor. This further explains the importance of motivation to obtain alternative information in China. People proactively seeking alternative information are able to counter state propaganda, which is why the Chinese government exerts huge efforts to crack down on VPN services to stop people who eager to obtain outside information. The government is concerned that the masses will be influenced by non-official rhetoric, which will decrease the effectiveness of state propaganda and raise the risk of revolt, since the masses might use such information to judge the climate of public opinion, calculate the cost of collective action and signal a weakness in the government’s capacity to maintain social control and political order.

Conclusion

With the emergence of the Internet, the state propaganda in China has become subtle and sophisticated. By using a two-pronged approach deploying nationalist propaganda and heavy censorship, the CCP has built a closed society that allows information to be effectively controlled and manipulated by government. Individuals are vulnerable when facing the huge propaganda machine.

Ideally, state propaganda is everywhere, and improving the level of media literacy is an efficient way for individuals to counter propaganda. However, in a closed society such as China, the education system is dominated by nationalist propaganda and does not provide any curricula related to critical thinking. The Internet can be used to provide opportunities for individuals to obtain alternative information and to improve people’s media literacy through self-education.

Unfortunately, the CCP has quickly adapted to the technology and is able to use technology to block the flow of information from the outside.

However, the Chinese people, like people in other countries, want to express their political and economic grievances connected to corruption and bad governance. When they realise that the state media is not the channel through which they can lodge complaints or receive justice, the credibility of state propaganda will decline and the people will know that the government is lying. Some people will be more motivated by non-state rhetoric and alternative information, and it is impossible for the CCP to cut off all access to information. Even without a

VPN, people are still able to obtain information by traveling aboard and engaging in interpersonal communication. For others, even if they are still motivated to co-ordinate their behaviour with the government, state propaganda still cannot win their hearts and minds.

Chapter 5

How Chinese Government Control Media in Hong Kong

The development of Internet technology lowers the cost of collective action.

Cyberactivism has become a recent trend in this type of social movement. It creates collective identities without human face-to-face interaction and helps to organize collective action more efficiently (Buechler, 2011). However, when new media is used, the cultural and infrastructural differences produce a variety of media effects and social movement outcomes (Khamis et al.

2012). The Internet also provides equal opportunities for the government and other institutions to impose social control (Buechler, 2011).

In mainland China, the government has adapted to new technologies quickly. Many pieces of legislation and projects have been initiated by the Chinese government to regulate the

Internet and censor online content to enhance government control of society and defend the government’s legitimacy (Sullivan, 2014). Compared with the mainland, Hong Kong remains an open society with a free flow of information. Consequently, the Chinese government found controlling the flow of information in Hong Kong increasingly more complicated and difficult than it was in the mainland. Compared with mainlanders, people in Hong Kong still enjoy relatively more civic engagement and political participation. Although the level of social media penetration in Hong Kong was lower than in the mainland before 2007, it has caught up quickly in recent years. With increasing interference from Beijing, social media became the main tool for mobilizing people for street protests and other types of political participation.

In mainland China and Hong Kong, civil society reacted differently to the squeezing of the public spheres, including cyberspace. A social movement represents a collective challenge of

89 the establishment, and its number of participants is important (Tarrow, 2011). In the 2014

Umbrella Movement in Hong Kong, one thousand demonstrators occupied Central District in

Hong Kong for eighty days. Their demand for universal suffrage revealed that some people in

Hong Kong had lost faith in the local political elites and the authoritarian government in China

(Ortman, 2015). Since the Umbrella Movement, political participation among young people has increased. Some are forming organizations, whereas others participate in elections. Indigenous awareness has also grown. Institutions, particularly the state, influence social movements. The government and media often radicalize a movement or simply curb it, which affects the direction of the movement (Goodwin & Jasper, 2009). Publicly advocated separatism did not exist in

Hong Kong before the handover or in the early years following it. However, the central government refused to commit to universal suffrage, which caused the Umbrella Movement and changed the political spectrum of Hong Kong. The radical right wing started to emerge and compared with the pro-Beijing establishment, the pan-democratic camp started to fall apart. The consequences of this collapse included the riot in Mongkok in 2016 between protesters and police, the first such incident since the 1960s, and a polarized Hong Kong (Mckirby & Chan,

2016).

In the mainland, the Internet, especially social media, brought changes to public policy, which was one positive outcome. However, online collective action has disappeared since 2013 because the government is not only regulating but also taking advantage of social media

(Sullivan, 2014). The situation in the mainland is different from Hong Kong, where social movements have a common purpose. Although Hong Kong still has many physical protests, called “mass incidents”, against the Chinese government, these activities lack the sustained interaction with elites and authorities that social movements have (Tarrow, 2011).

Under “one country two systems”, the Basic Law legally guarantees freedom of the press and free access to information in Hong Kong. These guarantees present a challenge for a Chinese government that seeks to control the media in an open and law-abiding society. By focusing on the structure of media ownership in Hong Kong, this paper provides details regarding how the

Chinese government uses political power and economic means to censor and shape Hong Kong’s media landscape in order to dampen public interest in politics and influence public opinion. The paper also describes how the Internet, especially social media, has empowered activists and alternative media, providing a way to avoid censorship and social control. Finally, this paper attempts to identify whether the Internet, especially alternative media, might serve to protect press freedom in Hong Kong and to allow the Hong Kong media to withstand the influence of

Chinese capital and thereby resist Chinese government control.

Media ownership and control

The social impact and systems of control of different media ownership structures are directly related to democracy (Pickard, 2016). McChesney provided details regarding how a few corporations dominating mass media threatens democratic governance because the citizens in such a structure are not well informed, which is the basis of a well-functioning democracy

(McChesney, 2000). Since all capital comes with conditions, studies of different forms of media ownership are unable to investigate the levels of control (Picard & Weezel, 2008). From an authority perspective, loose regulation (or no regulation) might reduce the government’s capability to control society and could reduce its credibility. Consequently, the government tends to create new laws and regulations on new forms of technology (Zuckman et al., 1999).

Therefore, it is unclear whether the Internet and social media will change China and make it more open.

How does the Internet influence a closed society? Optimists believe that technology ultimately breaks down barriers and brings social change. Zuckerman listed three theories addressing how the Internet changes closed societies. One theory is that access to suppressed information may finally change people’s attitudes towards their government, which might lead to a revolution. A second theory states that through social media and different communication tools, people can enlarge their networks and more effectively plan anti-government activities.

The third theory suggests that online debate can cultivate new leaders with a modern mindset

(Zuckerman, 2010). Morozov referred to Zuckerman a cyber-utopian who wants to build an online United Nations—an unrealistic fantasy. He noted that Western theories are difficult to adapt to non-Western contexts. Since authoritarian countries have invested many resources in suppressing free speech, believing that the Internet would make them change their minds is naïve

(Morozov, 2011).

In mainland China, only the state capital allows access to the telecommunication industry and traditional media, including newspapers, magazines, television and radio. The government could control these entities to serve the interests of the Communist Party. However, the influential Internet companies are all private, and most of them are foreign-listed companies.

According to Alexa, the most popular websites in China are Baidu.com, QQ.com and

Taobao.com, which are owned by Baidu, Inc., Tencent Holdings Ltd. and Alibaba Group

Holding Ltd. These companies, referred to collectively as BAT, dominate China’s Internet services, including search engines, social media and e-commerce (Yuan, 2015). They were established by individual entrepreneurs and have been on the stock market in the United States and Hong Kong.

The government implements strict regulations on the content produced by these private

Internet companies and has classified news websites into three categories. Only news websites in the first category are permitted to produce their own news reporting. Other websites are only allowed to republish news stories from traditional media and news websites in the first category.

The government also encourages the development of joint venture digital media organizations, which are funded by private investors and local governments. Although commercial Internet companies in mainland China cooperated with the government on content and censorship, the government recently solicited major Internet companies and proposed taking a 1% ownership and one sitting seat on their boards to have more direct influence and tighten control (Yuan,

2016).

According to the Basic Law, Hong Kong’s mini-constitution, Hong Kong is guaranteed to retain its capitalist economic system as a special administrative region (SAR) of China for fifty years, set to expire in 2047. “The National People’s Congress authorizes the Hong Kong

Special Administrative Region to exercise a high degree of autonomy and enjoy executive, legislative and independent judicial power, including that of final adjudication in accordance with the provisions of this law” (The Basic Law, Chapter 1, Article 2). In the contract with mainland China, the freedom of the press is protected by Hong Kong’s Bill of Rights and Basic

Law. Laws related to the regulation of the media are inherited from the British colonial period.

While these laws are very loose regarding print media registration, an increasing number of recent cases show that some laws used by the government undermine press freedom

(Weisenhaus, 2014). In 2013, tens of thousands of people took to the streets to protest the Hong

Kong government’s television licence ruling. Protests criticized the decision refusing to grant a

93 free-to-air licence to Hong Kong Television Network as a bow to Beijing, as the owner of the network, Ricky Wong, was not favoured by the central government (Yang, 2013).

The Hong Kong government also tried to limit the impact of digital media through regulation. Journalists who work in online media are barred from government press conferences and press releases. Unlike in mainland China, journalists can use legal tools to protect their rights. One editor who works for an online news outlet plans to sue the government for a Bill of

Rights violation in obscuring discrimination (HKFP, 2016).

However, as in other market economies under a libertarian media system (Siebert et al.,

1956), it is more difficult for journalists and media workers in Hong Kong to counter commercial power than to resist government power. The freedom of journalists and editors is constrained and subject to the whims of their employers, while media owners pursue their own agendas and commercial motives; the Chinese government fully understands the weakness of press freedom in an open society. The Chinese government is actively pushing cooperation deals between its state media and international media outlets, such as the Washington Post in the US and The

Sydney Morning Herald in Australia, to buy newspaper pages with supplements straight from the

Chinese Daily (Birtles, 2016). In 2015, Reuters reported that the Chinese government directly controlled radio operations inside the United States, and a total of 33 radio stations backed by the

Chinese government were broadcasting China-friendly programming in 14 counties (Qing &

Shiffman, 2015).

Compared with people in the mainland, people in Hong Kong still have freedom of the

Internet, freedom of the press, and freedom of speech. All these rights are protected by law. The

Chinese government cannot directly implement administrative regulations and restrictions on the media in Hong Kong. Although the government of Hong Kong is inevitably being influenced by

Beijing, any restrictions on freedom of the press and freedom of speech would cause outrage among the public. However, when the Chinese government uses different economic means to limit the flow of information and personal freedom in Hong Kong, the situation becomes more subtle.

Freedom is vulnerable. Imagine what would occur in a market economy if broadband suppliers filter content or refuse to host certain kinds of websites for political reasons by using commercial excuses. On June 13, 2014, HKU’s Public Opinion Programme (POP), which hosted the civil referendum on universal suffrage, endured the largest distributed denial of service attack in its history. Two of its hosting providers, Amazon Web Services and Hong Kong’s UDomain, also withdrew their services from the project. Their explanation was concern for the safety of their other customers. Finally, CloudFlare, a San Francisco-based technology company, came forward and showed its support by fighting the attackers. The POP provided evidence to the police to no avail (Makinen, 2014).

The role of the media in political participation

The media plays an important role in mobilizing people for political participation in

Hong Kong. Call-in radio talk shows on public affairs have been a phenomenon since the 1990s.

They provide political information to audiences and serve as forums in which the pubic to criticize the government (Lee, 2002). During a wave of large-scale demonstrations from 2003 to

2006, the people of Hong Kong viewed protests as important means of expressing public opinion and have participated in them frequently (Lee & Chan, 2008).

Studies also show that mass media corporations are considered to be major mobilizing agents because they convey a significant amount of mobilizing information from political leaders

95 to citizens in Hong Kong (Lee & Chan, 2006) to legitimize protests and encourage individual participation (McAdam et al., 2003).

A longitudinal study in Hong Kong shows that although television is still the main source from which the youth in Hong Kong acquire information about current affairs, the percentage of people who use social media through mobile phones has increased over the past four years. With new devices, such as smartphones and personal access devices, young people are showing an increasing interest in the news (Ma et al. 2015). Unlike in the mainland where Facebook,

YouTube, Twitter, Google, and other international social networking sites are blocked, people in

Hong Kong are free to access all these websites. According to Internet World Stats, the penetration rate of the Internet in Hong Kong was 80.3% at the end of June, whereas it was

49.5% in the mainland (IWS, 2015). Hong Kong has 4.4 million Facebook users, which exceeds

50% of its entire population (Go-Globe, 2015).

Does online news consumption increase civic participation? Different studies yield divergent results. In Europe, studies have shown that searching for news online was a strong indicator of voter turnout (Esser & De Vreese, 2007), while studies in the US have shown that information seeking (even about politics) played a limited role in increasing individuals’ motivation to participate (Scheufele & Nisbet, 2002). Other studies have demonstrated that political discussion is a mediator of the relationship between searching for news online and participation (Eveland & Dylko, 2007).

After comparing the last six legislative election turnout rates in Hong Kong from 1998 to

2016 following the establishment of the SAR, it is clear that the election turnouts followed special events. Specifically, the first election of legislators was in 1998, he year following the handover, and the turnout was 53%. Additionally, the 2004 election was the result of the

96 historical 2003 demonstration against the implementation of Article 23, which was the first time that people in Hong Kong showed their resistance to the central government. Although Beijing suspended the plan, the former chief executive resigned, and people used their votes to support pro-democratic candidates. In that election, 55.50% of voters casted their vote. With the election coming immediately after a 10-day anti-patriot Chinese education demonstration organized by

Scholarism, a group founded by three high school students, turnout in 2012 raised to 53.05%, while it was 45.20% in 2008. Scholarism later played an important role in the Umbrella

Movement in 2014, and the turnout in 2016 was a record-high 58.28%.

In these protest cases, we can observe the interactions between online news information, online political discussions, and offline activities. A study focusing on Facebook use among university students in Hong Kong also shows that political participation is correlated with direct connections to public political actors and exposure to shared political information (Tang & Lee,

2013). In addition, in 2014 Umbrella Movement, social media and mobile devices played a crucial role in sustaining the protests by spreading images and information over different platforms (Parker, 2014).

Social media amplifies the public’s voice and provides a more efficient channel through which people can discuss public affairs in a virtual public domain. An informant application of the social identity model of deindividuation effects (SIDE model) is online collective action

(Spears & Postmes, 2015). Social media also creates an alternative political space and provides an alternative media platform (Fenton & Barassi, 2011; Peoll & Borra, 2012). Due to the influence of Beijing on mainstream media organizations in Hong Kong, most of the news coverage during the Umbrella Movement took an anti-movement stand. This destroyed their

97 credibility and drove many Hong Kong citizens to the Internet to criticize the mainstream media and gain access to alternative information (Kwong, 2015).

How has Beijing changed the landscape of Hong Kong media?

Controlling the information flow is an effective way for ruling coalitions to prevent mass collective action, as information is crucial in shaping individuals’ decisions about participating in protests. However, social media provides a new source of information and breaks the information barrier (Tufekci & Wilson, 2012).

In the Middle East, authoritarian governments have realized that although they are not able to stop the flow of information, they can at least limit it (Aman & Jayroe, 2011). In China, the government went further, building the Great Fire Wall and initiating cyber-attacks domestically and overseas, demonstrating the power of technology. The Chinese government is also trying to establish the norms for international technology companies by using its market power. This strategy seems to work well for companies that are eager to enter the Chinese market.

Some people optimistically believe that by using technology, individuals will be able to bypass censorship and mobilize easily. However, when all the IT technology infrastructure is controlled by the government and the cooperation of commercial companies opens back doors for the government, individuals’ online activities are monitored even more closely by the authorities (Morozov, 2011). Meanwhile, those governments that are able to supply different types of localized applications can also increase people’s gratification in association with usage, which decreases the demand for outside information. These copycats of Twitter, Facebook and

YouTube in the mainland meet the needs of Internet users there while crackdowns on VPNs by the government also frustrate users and reduce demand and action (Li, 2016).

Given that controlling the flow of information is impossible in Hong Kong, controlling agenda-setting and framing has become more important for the authorities. For the Chinese government, there are two ways to control the major news media in Hong Kong: direct control and co-opting media owners by absorbing them into the political system. Over 50% of media owners in Hong Kong have been appointed to the National People’s Congress (NPC) and the

Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) (HKJA, 2013). The Chinese government also influences media owners by offering or withholding business opportunities – inicluding advertising, which is crucial for commercial media outlets – in the mainland and

Hong Kong. (Table 5-1.

Table 5-1: Ownership of the major news media in Hong Kong News Media Owner Editorial

Independence

Television Broadcasts Li Ruigang According to a

Ltd. (TVB) Securities and Futures

Li is the president of Commission panel review, Li,

China Media Capital, a public who is listed as the vice

equity and venture capital firm. chairman of TVB, is actually the

Li was a senior party official in owner of the company and thus

Shanghai. Since he is a has the ability to make various

mainland citizen, his ownership decisions.

may violate the restrictions non- Before the latest

Hong Kong residents owning a shareholder change, TVB drew

local broadcaster. criticism for its pro-

establishment bias in news

reporting.

As the most influential

news channel in Hong Kong, the

newsroom is strictly monitored

by Beijing.

i-CABLE TV Consortium: i-Cable News Channel

In May 2017, Forever is the first 24-hour news channel

Top took over from Wharf in Hong Kong, has the highest

Holdings as the majority public rating for news quality,

shareholder. The consortium and is famous for critical

includes New World’s chairman reporting on mainland China.

Henry Cheng Kar-shun, David However, David Chui, the new

Chui Tat-Cheong of Forever owner, recently said he that he

Top, and two mainland wants the news channel to focus

companies. on financial news reporting in

the future, which hints at a

possible change in editorial

focus in the newsroom.

South China Morning Jack Ma Yun: Although Jack Ma

Post (SCMP) Jack Ma is one of the promised to preserve the

richest businessmen in China. newspaper’s editorial

His vision for the SCMP independence, SCMP closed its

is that it should offer a fair Chinese websites and stopped

100

chance to understand what is publishing HK Magazine, a

occurring in China, to counter weekly feature of the paper. In

the biased reporting of foreign July 2016, it published an

media. “exclusive” interview with

detained Chinese activist Zhao

Wei, who expressed regrets

about her activism. This kind of

public confession is usually

carried by Chinese state media

and it was the first time this

newspaper was used as a tool by

Beijing.

Sing Tao Daily Charles Ho Tsu Kwok: Sing Tao Daily has a

long history of supporting the

Headline Daily Member of the Chinese government. It supported the

People’s Political Consultative British government, and after

Conference; awarded the Grand the handover in 1997, it

Bauhinia Medal, the highest continued its pro-establishment

official award in Hong Kong. policy to support HKSAR

government and Beijing.

Since it has a global

readership made up of overseas

Chinese readers, the CCP uses it

as part of its international

propaganda machine.

101

In 2016, it was used as

the channel for public

confessions by Chinese human

rights activists. Wang Yu, a

prominent human rights lawyer

who was detained for 12 months

and accepted an interview with

Sing Tao, said that she was used

by foreign forces to defame the

CCP.

Ming Pao Daily News Tiong Hiew King In 2014, the newspaper

replaced their Hong Kong chief

A Malaysian Chinese editor with a Malaysian. The

who operates two of the major move was interpreted as

Chinese national dailies in avoiding antagonizing Beijing

Malaysia and a newspaper in and caused resistance among

Papua New Guinea. newsroom staff.

He also has huge After its repositioning

investments in China. and personnel changes, the

newspaper’s credibility ranking

dropped in 2014 from no. 1 to

no. 3 for the first time.

Oriental Daily News Ma family According to its official

The Sun website, in May 2004, the

Oriental Daily News and The

102

In 2003, Ma Ching- Sun were granted permission to

Kwan, the Oriental Press directly distribute in the

Group’s honorary chairman, was mainland, and subscriptions

appointed a member of the became available in 22

Chinese People’s Political cities/regions there.

Consultative Conference; in the As a family business,

same year, the group’s CEO, Ma the newspapers are often used as

Ching-fat (Ricky) was awarded a tool for family and business

the Bronze Bauhinia Star by the interests.

HKSAR government. In recent years, the

newspapers have reduced

coverage of politically sensitive

stories from mainland China,

such as the Tiananmen

anniversary, and have

cooperated with Beijing to

publish the “public confessions”

of human rights activists.

Hong Kong Economic Richard Li Richard Li acquired the

Journal newspaper in 2006 and

Chairman of the Hong promised there would be no

Now TV Kong-based telecommunications editorial interference.

giant Pacific Century In 2013, after new chief

CyberWorks (PCCW). editor appointed, three reporters

103

Youngest son of Hong and one deputy editor-in-chief

Kong’s richest man, Li Ka- resigned to protest censorship.

Shing. In 2016, a political

commentator’s column was

suspended and several current

and former newspaper staff

penned an open letter

demanding that the suspension

be revoked the decision be

explained.

AM730 Shih Wing-ching In 2014, several

Shih is a Hong Kong mainland companies cancelled

businessman and the founder advertising with the paper; $8

and owner of one of the largest million revenue was lost. Shih

property agencies in both Hong then asked the newsroom to be

Kong and mainland China. He neutral instead of pro-

founded free daily newspaper democratic and anti-

AM730 in 2014. government.

Apple Daily Jimmy Lai Chee Ying The newspaper’s pro-

democratic and anti-government

Lai is one of the main editorial stance has caused

contributors to the pro- advertising boycotts due to

democracy camp. He has political pressure.

suffered organized attacks,

104

including firebombings of his It has also suffered

home, for his political stance. hacking attacks.

In 2016, its print

advertising revenue fell 38.8%.

(Sources: Annual reports issued by the Hong Kong Journalists Association; news stories reported by media sources)

Challenges to journalistic independence in Hong Kong come increasing from self- censorship due to the infiltration of Chinese capital into the local media system. In 2014, 46 TVB journalists published an open letter criticizing their television station’s management and objecting to their censorship. Exclusive footage showing seven police officers beating an activist,

Ken Tsang, during the Umbrella Movement was first broadcast with the voiceover saying that the police “punched and kicked” Tsang, but the report was then toned down at the request of news director Keith Yuen. One month later, Ho Win-ghong, the reporter who covered the event, was demoted from his frontier reporting post (Ismail, 2016).

Self-censorship among the press has been encouraged since the handover in 1997 in order to avoid pressure from China and please Beijing (Lee, 1998). Surveys among Hong Kong journalists and the general public show that journalists are more pessimistic concerning press freedom. Journalists believe that media self-censorship is more serious than the general public does (POP, 2015). One of the consequence of this belief is the deterioration of the press environment in Hong Kong. In 2017, Hong Kong came in at 73 in the ranking table that examines 180 countries and regions according to international press freedom watchdog

105

Reporters Without Borders. Hong Kong was ranked 18th when the index was first launched in

2002 and Hong Kong received its best rating. Its ranking sank to 56th in 2003 (RSF.org).

In open societies, the increasing use of alternative news outlets has reduced the influence of the traditional mainstream media on agenda setting (Shehata & Stromback, 2013). Digital media in Hong Kong has been created by small-scale independent media outlets such as InMedia and House News. In the debate over political reform and social activities, this digital media not only attracts young readers and influences agenda setting online but also serves as a tool to mobilize people. After the transfer of sovereignty and the change of ownership of the media to pro-China owners as well as the increase in self-censorship, people became upset about freedom of the press in Hong Kong (Fung, 2007).

However, as other studies noted, most people gather news from the websites of mainstream news outlets (Takeshita, 2006). People who are interested in citizen-generated news account for only 1% of total web traffic (Patterson, 2013). Studies in Hong Kong yielded the same results. Although people have changed their reading habits, using mobile phones and social media to gather news, TV and newspapers are still the dominant news sources (Ma et al., 2015).

Even worse, pro-government capital started to pour into digital media in Hong Kong after the

Umbrella Movement, which increased competition, especially for small-scale digital media corporations.

Todd Gitlin described the news media coverage of the anti-war movement in the late

1960s in the United States. The overall news coverage was vague and contradictory, destabilizing the movement and ignoring its rhetoric. The media became a form of anti- democratic social management and affected the ability of the anti-war movement (1980). During the Umbrella Movement, the mainstream and certain digital media either radicalized the

106 movement or tried to provide a “moderate alternative”. The Mongkok riot occurred on the night of February 8, 2016, and lasted until the next morning. During a government crackdown on unlicensed street hawkers who sold fish balls and other traditional local snacks during the

Chinese New Year holidays, people stepped in to protect the vendors from the police. This demonstration turned into violent clashes between the police and protesters. The police fired warning shots, and protesters threw bricks at the police and set fires in the street. It was described by the top Beijing leader in Hong Kong as “radical separatists inclined to terrorism”, a sentiment that was echoed by the media (Wong, 2016). Not surprisingly, the reaction on social media was polarized. Many people condemned the protesters’ violence towards the police, while others supported it, calling it the “fish ball revolution”, insisting that the police should not have fired their guns and listing all the incidents of police brutality towards peaceful protesters during recent years. Unlike the Umbrella Movement, the Mongkok riot was widely reported in the mainland by the state media. The reaction of mainland netizens was one-sided support for the police. Beijing skilfully used the Mongkok riot as a negative example to educate mainlanders on the importance of social stability.

There is a war on cyberspace between pro-establishment and pro-democratic organizations in Hong Kong, which is especially apparent on Facebook. These two sides also battle in the streets. While some people protest the government, others hold banners to show their support of the government. After the referendum held by the pro-democratic camp, which attracted over 790,000 people, the pro-Beijing camp mobilized its resources and claimed that it collected more signatures. Research shows that as the gap between perceived first-hand and third-person effects increases, individuals are more likely to manifest pro-censorship attitudes

(Rajos et al., 1996). This effect has also impacted voting behaviour in the United States

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(Banning, 2006). A climate of polarized opinion causes nonparticipation in the form of self- censorship in public political activities (Hayes et al., 2006). Research on Taiwan’s Sunflower

Movement also demonstrates how media coverage and people’s inferences regarding the effect of the news on themselves versus its effect on others affect individuals’ participation in the movement (Lo et al., 2016).

There are two affordances of technology that have strategic implications. One is the effect of anonymity on the empowerment of people. The other is the means of establishing contacts and networks and gaining more autonomy in deciding to act (Spears & Postmes, 2015).

For the Chinese government, the top priority is maintaining social stability in the mainland. What concerns officials the most is that the calls for universal suffrage in Hong Kong will create a chain reaction through social media in the mainland, encouraging more political demands from the people. During the Umbrella Movement, Weibo and WeChat filtered texts and pictures related to the activities. They did the same on June 4 to censor content on the anniversary of the

Tiananmen student movement in Hong Kong. However, due to geographic proximity and close personal exchanges, it was difficult for the government to stop the flow of information.

However, between the mainland and Hong Kong, the use of official media to frame people’s calls for greater democracy as separatism (and spread rumours and organize flaming on social media to create misunderstanding and hatred between people) worked well, at least initially. The

Chinese censors also changed their strategy to adapt, allowing a select and controlled information flow. Particular state media and some social media accounts were picked to report the protests in Hong Kong and frame them as chaos and social instability. Kidnapped Hong

Kong booksellers publicly confessed on state television on January 17, 2016. The media’s

108 rhetoric of banning two pro-independence Hong Kong lawmakers aroused online nationalism in the mainland.

Internet resistance

Studies in Hong Kong show that digital media not only promotes more political participation but also encourages individuals to assume leadership roles in certain protests.

Meanwhile, exposure to traditional media decreases individuals’ online political participation due to self-censorship and interference from pro-China owners (Lee & Chan, 2015). Some scholars have raised the following question: Are people in Hong Kong conscious of the collective change in the media (Fung, 2007)? After the Umbrella Movement, at least members of young generations are aware of the problem. The question now addresses how the public will cope with it. Digital media is the future and the alternative to counterbalance the diminishing diversity of media content in Hong Kong. Beijing has realized this and has started to fund digital media while hinting that local businesses should invest in advertising in these digital outlets, copying the strategy of controlling disobedience in traditional media by cutting off the income sources. Without commercial advertising income, how can independent digital media outlets survive and face those giant competitors?

Research shows that if the Internet can be used by authoritarian governments as

“repression technology” to shape public opinion and control the domestic information flow, governments will be more willing to expand the market instead of pulling back (Rod &

Weidmann, 2015). The Chinese government seems to be confident in adopting and expanding the Internet if it can control media ownership through policies and the regulation of power in the mainland. In Hong Kong, the strategy is slightly different. Lacking regulatory and policy power, it uses capital to implement control of ownership.

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The mass media is crucial to the public sphere because it impacts institutional structure; consequently, ownership matters (Baker, 2006). Authoritarian governments are fully aware of the importance of mass media and impose strict censorship and regulations to manipulate the information flow. Their ultimate goal is to control the public sphere. The Chinese government is doing well in the mainland. Commercial Internet companies have become the tool for the government to promote propaganda and disseminate distracting materials to temper political interest. The government understands that the Interment’s democratic potential depends on how people choose to use it. Research shows that people in authoritarian countries who use the

Internet to access entertainment information are less likely to demand democratic reforms

(Stoycheff et al., 2016).

In managing Hong Kong, which is an open society with a rule of law, the mission for

Beijing would be more challenging. Beijing continues to find proxies to buy Hong Kong media outlets. Jack Ma is the chairman of Alibaba, a mainland Internet corporation that acquired the

South China Morning Post, the prestigious English newspaper in Hong Kong. The control of media ownership has already impacted society. Beijing’s control of ideology threatens Hong

Kong’s freedom of the press. The annual report of the Hong Kong Journalist Association claimed that media outlets have been “occupied” by pro-Beijing people. In addition, it stated that the kidnapping of a Causeway Bay bookseller in Hong Kong by mainland policemen could mean that journalists “will be frightened off from writing or publishing stuff that may be deemed as being unacceptable to China” and that self-censorship could become more common (Ng, 2016).

However, Internet technology provides the opportunity for increasing the diversity of media and the chance to counteract the control of political power and capital. Tony Choi, one of the founders of House News, publicly expressed his support for Occupy Central. He was

110 subsequently threatened by Beijing. Before Occupy Central started, he ordered the website that supported the Occupy Central movement to be shutdown. He published an open letter to the readers entitled “I am scared. I made the wrong judgement. I feel guilty” (Cheung & Zhao,

2014). After the movement, Choi and others established a new website, Stand News. Based on previous lessons, the website is owned by a trustee committee with eight board members instead of a single legal holder in order to resist personal threats from Beijing (Steger, 2014).

Facing the invasion of mainland capital in mass media and political influence in commercial advertising income, how can independent digital media corporations survive and face those giant competitors? After the Umbrella Movement, more Chinese and English non- profit digital news media corporations were created through crowdfunding. The Hong Kong Free

Press is an English news website that was founded by several former journalists and columnists.

Although they planned to take one month to raise two thousand US dollars to create a start-up, they reached their goal in just two days. During the second round of fundraising, they exceeded their goal. After the third round, they had raised a total of approximately 150,000 US dollars

(hongkongfp.com). Research shows that this kind of ownership might focus more on values than profits, which is the key weakness of commercial media corporations (Picard & Weezel, 2008).

Can crowdfunded media sustain itself and counteract the hegemony? It depends on the willingness of the public to protect freedom of the press through political participation.

Another model for the development of alternative digital news media in Hong Kong is for private investors to provide a financial runway because they either see the media industry as profitable or regard such investment as their social responsibility. However, as in the case of the owners of traditional media, private investors in digital media will face political pressure if they do not cooperate with Beijing. Initium Media was launched in this way in 2015, and within a

111 short period of time, it has established a good reputation among Chinese readers in Hong Kong,

Taiwan, mainland China and overseas. In less than a year, it was receiving two million unique visitors per year. However, in 2017, the company announced that it was restructuring and laid off most of its staff due to cash-flow difficulties. Cai Hua, the founder and major shareholder of the website, promised that it would not have to worry about closing during its first three to five years when he launched it. However, he explained that the layoffs were due to potential investors changing their plans (Tong, 2017). Purely from a business perspective, the outstanding performance of Initium Media demonstrates its business potential. However, the hesitation of investors demonstrates how difficult it is for news media to proceed without following CCP commands. The Chinese government has an interest in the development of new digital media that can influence a Hong Kong audience rather than a mainland one.

Digital media is growing quickly because of the boom in the use of social media platforms. At the same time, these companies are still seeking a sustainable business model. This also provides an opportunity for the Chinese government to pour capital into Hong Kong to finance pro-Beijing digital media (Table 5-2). Initium and HK01 have frequently been questioned about their financing because given the current financial climate, the Chinese state is among the very few that can afford the financial risks of investing in digital media in Hong

Kong, a small and competitive market.

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Table 5-2: Ownership of the major digital news media in Hong Kong Digital News Media Founder Funding

HK01 Yu Pun-hoi Private investors. The company

Born in Hong Kong, this does not disclose its ownership

entrepreneur has invested in structure. According to its chief

China and has a PhD in editor, its estimated annual

Marxism from Beijing operation costs are more than

University. HK$60 million.

FactWire Ng Hiu-tung Crowdfunding. The company

This former journalist was born raised HK$4.6 million in three

in Hong Kong. months.

Initium Will Cai Hua Private investors.

Born in mainland China, Cai is a The company does not disclose

former judicial clerk for the its ownership structure.

Chinese Supreme Court.

Currently a partner at the US

law firm Skadden (Hong Kong)

Bastille Post Lo Wing Hung 70% and 30% owned by BPHL

Born in Hong Kong, Lo is and Sing Tao, respectively.

former chief executive officer of BPHL is solely owned by Lo

Sing Tao News Corporation Wing Hung.

Limited and currently its

executive director.

Post 852 Yau Ching Yuen Public donations.

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Yau is a former deputy chief

editor of the Economic Journal

and was born in Hong Kong.

Orange News Joint Publication Hong Chinese government funds.

Kong

The company is fully owned by

the Central Government Liaison

Office in Hong Kong

CitizenNews Ten veteran Hong Crowdfunding. The site’s

Kong journalists. annual target is HK$5 million.

Hong Kong Free Press Tom Grundy Crowdfunding, paid

Grundy is a British freelance membership scheme, sponsored

writer and activist. events.

The Stand News Board of Trustees with Public donations, advertising.

eight members.

Inmediahk Ip Iam-chong Public donations, international

Born in Macao, Ip is an foundation funds.

assistant lecturer at Linnan

University.

Speakout Barry Cheung Chun- Private investors. The company

yuen does not disclose its ownership

Born in Hong Kong, Cheung is structure.

a businessman and former

unofficial member of the

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Executive Council of Hong

Kong.

HKGpao Robert Chow Yung Private investors.

Born in Hong Kong, Chow is a The company does not disclose

former RTHK Radio host and a its ownership structure.

pro-government activist. He is a

co-founder of Silent Majority

for Hong Kong and the Alliance

for Peace and Democracy.

Conclusion

Studies show that the psychological processes that promote online and offline actions have no significant differences. The variables that are involved in modern norms of street actions are predictors that are used for certain periods of time: shared social identity, assessments of the efficacy of action, and feelings of anger and injustice (Zomeren et al., 2008). These variables can predict collective actions not only in open societies such as Hong Kong but also in authoritarian countries such as China. Before the advent of social media, on May 19, 1989, over one million people flooded Tiananmen Square just by word of mouth and landlines. In Hong Kong, the largest demonstrations in history occurred in 1989 and 2003, long before the Internet and social media became popular.

However, the weight of the Internet on civic engagement differs between Hong Kong and mainland China. In the mainland, the last large-scale student movement occurred in 1989.

Although there are continued sporadic clashes around the country, they are not interconnected.

Unlike in Hong Kong, which has a strong political infrastructure, a social movement tradition,

115 and an open society, mainlanders are still in the early stages of citizenship. The Internet broadens their horizons and provides a platform for them to learn how to express themselves, debate, and listen to others, which is why the CCP seeks to strengthen social control in Hong Kong and refuses to fulfil its promise of universal suffrage.

Social media enables cross-regional collective activities within mainland China among different cities and provinces, between mainland China and Hong Kong and even internationally.

On March 8, 2015, five feminists were detained by the government and accused of interrupting public order by preparing to perform offline anti-sexual harassment activities on International

Women’s Day. Although this case was not reported in the mainland, it received attention in

Hong Kong. People in Hong Kong demonstrated to show their support for the release of the five girls. Their photographs were posted and disseminated through Chinese social media, and people started to ask who these girls were and why they were arrested (Wong, 2015). It was not the first time that people in Hong Kong showed their support for Chinese dissidents. The annual

Tiananmen commemoration has persisted since 1989.

For the CCP, what occurs in Hong Kong might serve as an example for mainland people who would then demand their rights as citizens. Information control is fundamental to determining the stability or failure of authoritarian regimes. As the result of a sophisticated media control strategy, Chinese media contribute to the regime’s legitimacy and effective rule by providing certain information (Stockmann et al., 2011). The Chinese government has developed a formal model to keep limited media independence from leading to revolt and to permit certain information to improve governance. When it finds online discontent difficult to control, it tightens the control over traditional media and successfully discredits the bad news circulated online or reported by the independent media (Lorentzen, 2014).

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Both people in Hong Kong and people in mainland China face a difficulty: a power that understands technology to a much greater extent than individuals do and can use capital to control ownership in a market economy and rule of law society. On the one hand, social media can be used by democratic activists; on the other hand, it can also be used as a mechanism for surveillance of citizens and the dissemination of propaganda (Kyriakopoulou, 2011).

The first wave of changing media ownership in Hong Kong started before 1997.

International capitalists and pro-China businesspeople were eager to ingratiate themselves with the Chinese government by acquiring media in Hong Kong. These acquisitions raised concerns about freedom of the press among some scholars. They noted that the takeover was a strategy of the Chinese government to impact policies using economic means (Fung & Lee, 1994). The strategy has been effective. Facing political pressure after the handover, the editorial discourse in local newspapers has shifted its focus towards pro-democracy protests instead of advocacy (Lee

& Lin, 2006).

Now the battlefield is digital media. The Chinese government is imposing the same strategy it uses on traditional media to control new media in Hong Kong through direct investment, co-opting the media, personal threats, cutting advertising revenue and a new method: digital attacks. The Hong Kong government has also demonstrated an unfriendly attitude towards online media. During the chief executive election in 2017, online news media were continuously denied access to official functions and election sites.

It is too early to say whether online media will be able to resist the influence of Chinese capital and safeguard Hong Kong’s freedom of the press. Although the Internet, especially social media, lowers the entry cost for media start-ups, funding and revenue streams are still crucial for quality journalism and sustained development. Because some of these start-ups rely solely on

117 private investors who may divest due to political or commercial pressure, the success of economic models, such as paywall, public donation and crowdfunding, depends on the attitude of consumers - that is, whether Hong Kong citizens are willing to pay for news online and support online journalism in the long term. Withstanding the incursion of the Chinese government’s control is a task, not only for journalists, but also for Hong Kong citizens who treasure press freedom. More people are involved, and they are more powerful than we have been led to believe.

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Chapter 6

Framing Contest: Why China’s State Propaganda Backfired in Hong Kong

On September 4, 2016, two years after the city’s Umbrella Movement, 2.03 million people—58% of eligible voters—turned out to vote in Hong Kong’s Legislative Council election. Six newcomers were elected, all of whom ran on a campaign of “localism,” and two of whom supported Hong Kong independence. Both the turnout rate and the number of votes cast set records for the post-1997 period following Britain’s handover of Hong Kong to Mainland

China.

All localist groups in Hong Kong advocate protecting its culture, values, and political system, and many even seek self-determination and greater autonomy in the future. The groups supporting Hong Kong independence are different insofar as whether they advocate for Hong

Kong to become a sovereign state. From the standpoint of the central government in Beijing, groups seeking Hong Kong independence, similar to the independence movements in Tibet and

Xinjiang, cannot be tolerated. Top Chinese officials have publicly warned Hongkongers not to seek independence (Reuters, 2016).

Weeks before the Legislative Council election, the Hong Kong government announced that every candidate had to sign an election pledge to ensure that they met certain requirements.

Six candidates were barred from running for office because they refused to declare that Hong

Kong is an inalienable part of China (Cheung, 2016). Moreover, two elected lawmakers were subsequently disqualified by Hong Kong’s high court for having altered their oaths to insult

China and promote Hong Kong independence during their swearing-in ceremonies (BBC, 2016).

Although Beijing launched a propaganda campaign in Hong Kong, which included controlling the mainstream media to dominate the framing of Hong Kong independence, a July

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2016 poll of Hong Kong residents found that 17% supported independence (CUHK, 2016).

Based on the Umbrella Movement and the recent election of the six localist candidates, it is clear that localism is a new political force in the Hong Kong political arena (Lim, 2017).

For the last two decades, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has deployed nationalistic propaganda in Hong Kong in order to pass a national security law that is designed to prevent

Hong Kong from threatening Chinese rule. Under “one country, two systems” and the Basic

Law, Hong Kong is the only place in China where people have the right to advocate independence and the end of one-party dictatorship (Mai & Lau, 2017). The label “pro- independence” is frequently used in state propaganda to target pro-democracy political figures in

Hong Kong, especially for people who advocate universal suffrage and demand political reform.

The CCP uses this strategy to silence dissidents and trigger nationalism among the public to curb political participation in Mainland China (Wan, 2001). However, because Hong Kong is an open society with free information flow and press freedom, the CCP has to tolerate some degree of debate and allow legitimate counter-propaganda voices. For the CCP, this is a challenge, and how it addresses this challenge can provide insight into an open society that faces strong incursions from an authoritarian power.

This study compares the coverage of Hong Kong independence by three newspapers that occupy different parts of the political-ideological spectrum in Hong Kong from 1998–2017 in order to analyse the framing contest between state propaganda, the Hong Kong media, the public, and other social actors by focusing on the following research questions: when did state propaganda start to use “Hong Kong independence” to label the opposition, and when did this term enter the mainstream media? When did the framing contest in the mainstream media start,

120 how did it spread? Why did state propaganda fail to win the framing contest and gain the support of the public?

Framing Contest and the Cascading Activation Model

To achieve successful political communication and to promote perceptions and interpretations that benefit the government, framing is a central process (Riker, 1986). Framing, agenda-setting and priming influence people’s political priorities (Wolfsfeld, 1997). The government has to sell its version or framing of policy and political events to the news media and the public to implement its policies (Entman, 2004). Policy agenda changes only occur when the majority of media coverage contests the current policy frame (Dekker & Scholten, 2017). Media autonomy enables journalists to quote alternative voices instead of only established elite voices in public debates, which limits the ability of elites to introduce some policy options (Althaus,

Edy, Entman & Phalen, 1996). During political conflicts, culture resonance and magnitude can be used to measure the capacity to stimulate support or opposition (Snow & Benford, 1988).

Higher levels of resonance and magnitude are more likely to trigger similar thoughts and feelings among the public (Entman, 2003; Geiß, Weber & Quiring, 2016). Imaginative framing, which appeals to emotions, and framing through evidence via factual language reinforce each other, and these framing processes can lead to polarisation in the public debate, thus making policies become contested (Wolf & Van Dooren, 2017).

Complex issues have many facets, and different stakeholders try to gain public support for their positions. Different factors, such as economics, ideology, group identity and individual opinions come into play (Miller & Riechert,2001). The political contest model provides a theoretical model for the challenges authorities face in framing news reporting on political issues, as the role of the news media in political conflicts varies across time and circumstances

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(Wolfsfeld, 1997). Carragee & Roefs (2004) suggest that framing contests should be examined within wider political and social contexts. However, the political contest model only focuses on authorities and their challengers, which ignores many other social actors in framing processes, such as the public, and the contest between authorities and challengers is vertical.

Entman (2003) proposed a cascading activation model to explain the mechanism of how thoughts and feelings spread throughout an individual’s mind. A horizontal cascading flow of influence links each level in a system, including the government, non-government elites, news organisations, news frames and the public. Although government framing is a top-down cascading flow of influence, the representation of the public in this model is a dependent variable, but the public sometimes feeds back to influence the media. The influence of the public on the media is reflected through news frames, which are responded to by nongovernment elites.

When the authorities perceive that they face an unfavourable situation with the public, the elites are able to contest the authorities’ framing, which spreads in a cascade to the news frame.

Entman (2003) used this model to demonstrate how the US news media contested the White

House’s framing after 9/11 and concluded that even as the White House promoted the “war on terror”, the media were not entirely passive in receiving the cascade from the government.

Deviations occur because of dissonance among the elites, which is a necessary condition for challenging government propaganda, and the news media sometimes hamper these conditions and sometimes facilitate them.

Figure 1 illustrates the cascading network among state propaganda, Hong Kong elites, the media, news frames and the public. Although Hong Kong has a media system that is similar to that in the U.S., in contrast to the U.S., the CCP is able to directly control Hong Kong’s media through direct and indirect ownership or by using other strategies, such as co-opting media

122 owners to absorb them into its political system (Luqiu, 2017). The second difference is that the elites of Hong Kong, including Hong Kong’s government, have no impact on the framing that extends down from the CCP. The public is therefore the key actor for challenging state propaganda. Polls, election turnout and results, grassroots activists and protests can all influence media news frames depending on how the media evaluate the cultural resonance and newsworthiness of the events.

Figure 6-1. Cascade of state propaganda in Hong Kong

The Failure of the CCP’s Framing Contest in Hong Kong

The ultimate goal of CCP propaganda is to strengthen the regime’s capacity to resist foreign influence. However, Mainland China and Hong Kong are different. In China, the CCP can impose censorship and engage in surveillance to block any information that might undermine the credibility and image of the party, including Western efforts to promote democracy; these measures eliminate the possibility of collective action (Zheng & Wu, 2005). State propaganda

123 faces no framing contest in China’s mainstream media, especially with regard to issues related to independence movements. Because broadcast, online, and social media are all subject to government control, citizens in Mainland China are rarely exposed to messages related to the independence movements in Tibet or Xinjiang. The primacy of nationalist rhetoric in China and the geographic remoteness of these minority ethnic populations mean that very few people have knowledge of these populations’ histories or situations. The signal from the CCP is clear: support for the independence movements in Tibet or Xinjiang amounts to treason and support for terrorism. Among the majority Han Chinese population, sympathisers are very rare (Leibold,

2010).

In Hong Kong, the disqualification of legislative candidates and the removal of two elected lawmakers indicate Beijing’s wariness of allowing the discourse on Hong Kong independence to become institutionalised (Kaeding, 2017). Although the CCP is trying to send a strong signal to Hong Kong’s citizens to demonstrate its tough stance on this issue, the rising support for localist candidates indicates that the CCP’s attempt to use “Hong Kong independence” to stimulate negative feelings among Hongkongers by bringing to mind conscious or unconscious associations with “separatists” or “treason” is failing. Of course, the CCP has no choice but to make a show of its hostility towards pro-independence discourse and actions. Its ultimate goal is to stop the dissemination of these ideas into the mainland, which could make mainland citizens wonder about the capacity of the CCP to maintain its authority and thereby increase the risk of disobedience and revolt. In contrast to the mainland, the opposition targeted by the CCP in Hong Kong is able to respond to accusations and influence the media frame.

Although grassroots pro-independence activities such as protests and public meetings are usually ignored by the media, when they became targets of state propaganda, the chance for media

124 exposure increases because of the events’ newsworthiness, which allows the activists to influence the news frame, for example, by building a network with journalists.

The other indicator of how state propaganda lost its framing contest is the Chinese identity crisis among Hong Kong citizens. In a long-term identity survey that began in 1997, the results from June 2017 show that 37.3% of the respondents identified themselves as

Hongkongers, 26% said that they were Hongkongers in China, and 35% said that they were

“broadly Chinese”. However, only 3.1% of the younger generation identified themselves as

“Chinese” or “broadly Chinese” (HKUPOP, 2017a). Figure 6-2 shows that the sense of Chinese identity among Hong Kong citizens started to drop in 2008, and the percentage of people identifying themselves as Hongkongers began to increase. The year 2008 was a turning point in terms of Hong Kong’s identity, as it marked the starting point of the formation of a new Hong

Kong identity. However, post-Olympics, the Chinese governments has tightened its control of both Mainland China and Hong Kong and refused to allow full democracy through universal suffrage in Hong Kong (Lam & Cooper, 2017).

Figure 6-2. Ethnic Identity among Hong Kong Citizens 1997.7.12 – 2017.1.6

Source: People’s ethnic identity, Public Opinion Programme, The University of Hong Kong (https://www.hkupop.hku.hk/english/popexpress/ethnic/)

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When asked whether they support Hong Kong independence in a university survey in

2016, as Table 6-1 shows, 17% somewhat or strongly supported the idea. However, this figure dropped to 11% in 2017, although the percentage of people who strongly or somewhat opposed independence did not show a significant increase.

Table 6-1: Views on the prospects of Hong Kong after 2047: Independence 2016.7 2017.5 15+ 18+ 15+ 18+ % % % % Strongly support 6.2 6.1 4.4 4.5 Somewhat support 11.2 10.7 6.9 6.8 So-so 22.9 22.4 25.9 25.4 Somewhat against 19.0 19.1 17.5 17.1 Strongly against 38.6 39.7 42.7 43.6 No View/Refuse 2.1 1.9 2.5 2.5 Source: Public Opinion & Political Development in Hong Kong, Center for Communication and Public Opinion Surveys, The Chinese University of Hong Kong http://www.com.cuhk.edu.hk/ccpos/en/

Data and Methods

The data were selected from three Hong Kong newspapers: Apple Daily (n = 2,705),

Ming Pao (n = 2,759), and Wen Wei Po (n = 5,860). A total of 11,324 articles that include the key word “Hong Kong independence” from January 1, 1998, to August 31, 2017, were collected using key word searches on WiseSearch, a Chinese news media database.

To get some sense of when the news media started becoming interested in this topic and when it became routinised in the news media, the annual amount of coverage will be examined for a range of 19 years among the three newspapers.

The timeline of responses to the independence movement, both by the CCP and the international community, will also be compared to the annual amounts of coverage. Coverage including the same key word from The New York Times (NYT) was also collected through the

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NYT website (n = 114), and the annual amount of coverage in The Global Times, a tabloid newspaper that serves as a CCP mouthpiece, was collected using WiseSearch (n = 402).

The three Hong Kong newspapers in the study are situated on different parts of the political spectrum. The owner of Apple Daily is one of the main contributors to the pro- democracy camp in Hong Kong, and the newspaper has been a vocal supporter of the democracy movement. Its anti-government editorial stance has led to harsh criticism and several physical attacks on the newspaper and its owner, and it also faces an advertising boycott due to political pressure. Ming Pao is owned by a Malaysian Chinese who operates two of the major national dailies in Malaysia. In 2014, for the first time, the newspaper’s creativity ranking dropped from first to third after the newspaper replaced its Hong Kong chief editor (Luqiu, 2017). Finally, Wen

Wei Po is directly owned by the Chinese central government and is widely regarded as a mouthpiece for the CCP. It is controlled by the central government’s liaison office in Hong Kong

(Lo, 2016).

Word frequency analysis was used in R to count the yearly word frequency in articles in the three newspapers. There are two steps. The first step involves segmenting. Stanford Word

Segmenter, developed by the Stanford NLP Group, was used to split the texts. Instead of

Stanford’s “smart” tool, a dumb segmentation was used that separated all instances of “Hong

Kong independence” into “Hong Kong” and “independence”. Second, after segmenting, the author used the tm package (Feinerer & Hornik, 2017), developed by Ingo Feinerer, Kurt Hornik and David Meyer (2008), in R to transform the corpus into a term-document matrix, with each row being an observation of a unique work/token and each column showing the count of that word/token in a document. The outcome is cluster analysed to discern the frames and points of view in the articles that can be attributed to related messages and signals sent out by the news

127 outlets (Miller, 1997). Framing word counts are commonly used when comparing news coverage

(Entman, 1991). Computer-assisted text analysis of news reports is able to identify the frequency of concepts among different media outlets (Tian & Stewart, 2005).

Four Stages of the Framing Contest between State Propaganda and the Hong Kong

Public

The first two research questions are as follows: When did state propaganda start to use the “Hong Kong independence” to label the opposition? When did the framing contest in the mainstream media start, and how did it spread? Figure 6-3 shows the number of stories that mentioned “Hong Kong independence” from 1998 to 2017. As the state propaganda branch in

Hong Kong, Wen Wei Po accused two Hong Kong pro-democracy lawmakers of secession activities in 1998; however, this accusation did not gain much attention in the local mainstream media, and the story had an unseemly ending. However, beginning in 2004, state propaganda again picked up this charge and re-targeted the pro-democracy camp. This time, the story caused public discussion and finally influenced the mainstream media’s news frame. Based on the number of stories, the framing contest for state propaganda can be divided into four phrases.

Figure 6-3: News stories that mentioned “Hong Kong independence”: 1998-2017 (n = 11,324)

Source: WiseSearch

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Stage One: Ignored by the mainstream media (1998–2003). During this period, as the representative of state propaganda in Hong Kong, Wen Wei Po occasionally accused lawmakers of advocating Hong Kong independence. These charges were based on “evidence” that the lawmakers worked with foreign governments (such as the United States) to interfere in the affairs of Hong Kong; that the lawmakers tried to undermine the central government’s authority and constrain its power in relation to Hong Kong’s affairs; and most importantly, that the lawmakers enjoyed a close relationship with Lee Teng-hui, the first popularly elected president of Taiwan and the person most reviled by Beijing’s state propaganda. In 1999, Lee announced that bilateral ties between Taipei and Beijing should take place on a “special state-to-state” basis; for Beijing, this was tantamount to calling Taiwan a separate state. It also caused alarm in

Beijing regarding Hong Kong independence, and Beijing expressed a desire for Hong Kong’s government to enact laws on its own to protect national security.

These accusations against specific lawmakers did not receive any coverage or follow-up in the other two newspapers, Ming Pao and Apple Daily. The intense debate about the legislation referred to as Article 23 was not related to the issue of Hong Kong independence, even in Wen

Wei Po (Figure 6-4). Table 6-2 shows the five most frequently used words in these stories. The state propaganda accused pro-democracy lawmaker Lau Wai-hing of advocating independence by attending a seminar in Taiwan, and her reaction was reported by local mainstream newspapers. However, the coverage was very scant, and there was a consensus among the different political camps that advocating Hong Kong independence was a non-issue.

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Figure 6-4: News stories that mentioned “Hong Kong independence”: 1998-2003 (n = 86)

Table 6-2: Five most frequently used words: 1998-2003 (n = 86) Apple Daily Ming Pao Wenwei Po

Hong Kong independence Basic Law Lau Wai-hing

Lau Wai-hing Legislative Council Basic Law

Political reform Lau Wai-hing Legislative member

Tung Chi hua Chief Executive Hong Kong independence

Article 23 Hong Kong independence Hong Kong

Stage Two: Influencing the news frame (2004–2009). The Annual July 1st protest in

2004 featured the slogan, “Return power to the people”. Because this slogan was viewed by some as advocating Hong Kong independence (Ni, 2004), it provoked a good deal of criticism from Beijing bureaucrats and pro-Beijing political parties. The Liaison Office of the Central

People’s Government (LOCPG) issued a statement criticising the slogan as “inappropriate”

(Xinhua, 2004). However, a poll showed that 73% of the participants in the July 1st march

130 supported the slogan and did not associate it with Hong Kong independence. For them, the phrase simply represented the pursuit of democracy in Hong Kong (Chan, Chong & Lee, 2004).

The phrase was first used at the July 1st march in 2003. The theme of this march was to oppose the anti-subversion Hong Kong Basic Law Article 23. After a half-million people protested against the law, the government backed down on the proposal. However, in 2004, the

National People’s Congress Standing Committee (NPCSC) passed an interpretation of Basic

Law Article 45 that added a provision that the chief executive must first report any amendment to the method of holding elections to the NPCSC for its approval. This crushed Hong Kong’s hope of direct elections and curbed the democratic process in the territory (Huang & Huang,

2016).

The state media also launched a propaganda campaign to establish an official standard for patriotism for future chief executives, and it accused the pro-democracy camp of being unqualified for office because “they keep on hassling the SAR government and the central authorities. They are opposed to legislation for national security, organise or participate in activities against the central government, invite foreign intervention in Hong Kong affairs, and lend open support to Taiwan independence” (China Daily, 2004). Nevertheless, Wen Wei Po, the mouthpiece of the CCP in Hong Kong, only published 62 pieces mentioning Hong Kong independence, while Apple Daily had 124 pieces and Ming Pao published 129 pieces (Figure 6-

5). Beijing’s criticism of the slogan sparked discussion in Hong Kong. Some pro-democracy political leaders considered changing the phrase to demonstrate kindness towards Beijing to help foster future dialogue, but many criticised this move because it was viewed as appeasing Beijing.

The organisers ultimately retained the slogan.

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Figure 6-5: News stories that mentioned “Hong Kong independence”: 2004-2009 (n = 448)

The year 2004 represented the first peak in Hong Kong newspapers mentioning “Hong

Kong independence,” largely in response to the slogans of the July 1st march, “Returning power to people” and “End one-party dictatorship,” after the NPCSC made a decision concerning the constitutional development of Hong Kong based on the Basic Law. In addition, beginning in

2004, the confrontation between Hongkongers and the CCP regarding the democratic process in

Hong Kong touched on the primary question: the interpretation of fifty years of “a high degree of autonomy” under “one country, two systems,” which is promised by the Basic Law. The term

“Hong Kong independence” was seldom mentioned in the newspapers during the debates over the process of political reform and the fight for universal suffrage. State propaganda had not yet begun its large-scale campaign of labelling the pro-democracy movement secessionist, and the local news media were also avoiding references to the fact that Hong Kong is not a sovereign territory; thus, these media organisations did not want any association with the idea or the term

“Hong Kong independence.” (Table 6-3).

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Table 6-3: Five most frequently used words: 2004 – 2009 (n = 448) Apple Daily Ming Pao Wenwei Po

Universal suffrage Pro-democracy camp Basic Law

Hong Kong Hong Kong Universal suffrage

independence independence

Pro-democracy Universal suffrage Hong Kong

Chief Executive Hongkonger Pro-democracy

Hongkonger Hong Kong Leong Kah-kit

Stage Three: The spread (2010-2014). In 2013, the Occupy Central campaign was launched to put pressure on the government if its universal suffrage proposals proved to fall short of the international standard. State propaganda claimed that the campaign was promoting Hong

Kong independence and colluding with Taiwan separatists and was supported by Western anti-

China forces – all accusations designed to decrease the legitimacy of the movement and participation in it. The coverage in Wen Wei Po steadily increased. As Figure 6-6 shows, in 2012, the newspaper only published 102 pieces, but in 2013, this figure doubled to 261 before increasing further to 355 pieces in 2014. Apple Daily, which was considered a member and propaganda tool of the pro-democracy camp, published steadily fewer articles that mentioned

Hong Kong independence: from 146 in 2012, to 122 in 2013 and 122 in 2014. It seems that the newspaper attempted to disassociate the movement from the state media’s accusation of pro- independence. Finally, during Occupy Central in 2014, Ming Pao doubled its coverage of Hong

Kong independence to 147 mentions, while it had only had 70 articles referring to it in 2013. To some extent, this demonstrates the level of control by the CCP over the newspaper. In January

2014, the newspaper ousted its top editor and replaced him with a more pro-Beijing Chief Editor.

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In April, another editor was suddenly dismissed, and journalist unions and the paper’s staff believed the move was politically motivated (BBC, 2014).

Figure 6-6: News stories that mentioned “Hong Kong independence”: 2010-2014 (n = 1,654)

Following street protests, hunger strikes, and legislative debate, five legislators from the

League of Social Democrats (LSD) and the Civic Party, representing each of Hong Kong’s five electoral districts, resigned in 2010, and they turned their resignations into a platform for the position that every citizen in Hong Kong should be able to cast a vote in the hope of having a de facto referendum to push the democracy movement. At the beginning, state propaganda’s strategy was to put the label of separatists onto specific parties, such as the LSD and the Civic

Party. This strategy was deployed continuously during the district council election in 2011 and then was extended to all pro-democracy parties and the entire democratic movement, such as

Occupy Central. The key parties and members were the targets of a state propaganda smear campaign conducted through Wen Wei Po.

At this stage, the other two newspapers provided extensive coverage of the reactions of the politicians and political parties. The politicians and political parties criticised the chief executive of Hong Kong for exaggerating the situation, expanding the conflict for his own

134 interests and then seeking more support from Beijing because of his weak governance and low popularity. They also blamed the Liaison Office of the Central People’s Government and some former senior Beijing officials for playing important roles in fanning the flames of the situation.

The papers passively responded to the state propaganda and carefully avoided direct criticism of the CCP and top leaders. Although the newspapers also covered some activities such the demonstrations employing dragon and lion flags in public spaces, they did not follow them closely, while the state media treated these activities as the perfect opportunity to demonstrate

Beijing’s authority. As Table 6-4 shows, the state propaganda encouraged activism, and the responses and views of the elites and the public started to influence news frame and provided a counter-propaganda rhetoric to compete with the state propaganda in the news media. The state media labelled Occupy Central a pro-independence movement, but this frame was rejected by the public and elites, including officials in Hong Kong’s government.

Table 6-4: Five most frequently used words: 2010 – 2014 (n = 1,654) Apple Daily Ming Pao Wenwei Po

Hong Kong independence Hong Kong independence Occupy Central

Hongkonger Hongkonger Opposition

Universal suffrage Universal suffrage Hong Kong independence

Leung Chi Ying Hong Kong Civic Party

Chief Executive Chief Executive Universal suffrage

Stage Four: Intense framing contest (2015 – present). Wang Guang Ya, the Director of the Hong Kong and Macau office, told some pan-democratic lawmakers that the purpose of the

831 decision was to prevent pro-independence candidates from running for office (Cheung,

2015). The state propaganda campaign was even larger. There were 1,021 articles published in

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Wen Wei Po in 2015, which was a three-fold increase from the previous year; in 2016, the number of articles reached 2,867. Despite the state propaganda and the pre-screening of candidates by requiring them to promise to uphold the Basic Law and pledge allegiance to it, two pro-independence candidates won the election.

After several lawmakers used the inaugural legislative meeting as a platform to stage a protest, the NPCSC interpreted Article 104 of the Basic Law to clarify the requirement that legislators must swear allegiance to Hong Kong as part of China. Later, two pro-independence candidates, Yau Wai-Ching and Sixtus Leung Chun-hang, were disqualified in 2016, and four pro-democracy lawmakers were unseated in 2017 by Hong Kong courts. This made Hong Kong independence a trending issue, and the coverage in the three newspapers reached a new peak.

The Apple Daily published 385 pieces in 2015 and 1,317 in 2016. Ming Pao had 365 articles in

2015 and 1,451 in 2016. Finally, as part of the state propaganda machine, Wen Wei Po published far more pieces than the other two (Figure 6-7).

Figure 6-7: News stories that mentioned “Hong Kong independence”: 2015 - present (n = 9,136)

The strategy of the state propaganda remained the same, using the charge of secessionism to undermine the credibility and legitimacy of the democracy movement and activists in Hong

Kong, while the amount of coverage increased significantly.

However, some columnists in Ming Pao and Apple Daily started discussing why young

136 people were pro-independence after different polls began to survey people’s attitudes towards the independence of Hong Kong. Thus, it seems that the increasingly large-scale state propaganda produced a counter-effect that enabled a taboo issue to be decentralised, which finally created a public space for discussion. The same counter-effect occurred after the chief executive Leung

Chun-ying used his annual policy address to denounce the University of Hong Kong’s student union magazine, Undergrad, for “advocating independence” and “putting forward fallacies”

(Cheung & So, 2015). This served as an admission that “Hong Kong independence” was an ongoing movement, or at least an issue that people should not avoid.

A new requirement for running in the 2016 Legislative Council general election also put the issue into the public arena, where it received even more public attention. All candidates were required to sign an additional confirmation form that promised to uphold the Basic Law and pledging allegiance to the Hong Kong Administrative Region to show that they fully understood the following:

The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region is an Article 1 inalienable part of the People’s Republic of China.

The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall

be a local administrative region of the People’s

Article 12 Republic of China, which shall enjoy a high degree of

autonomy and come directly under the Central

People’s Government.

No amendment to this Law shall contravene the

Article 159(4) established basic policies of the People’s Republic of

China regarding Hong Kong.

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The Electoral Affairs Commission (EAC) argued that the new requirement had a legal basis and was necessary because some comments and proposals in the public arena had deviated from “one country, two systems” and the Basic Law (EAC, 2016). Two pro-independence lawmakers were elected but disqualified after the fifth interpretation of the Basic Law in 2016, and later in 2017, four more pro-democracy lawmakers were unseated by the court based on its interpretation of the NPCSC. Unlike in previous years, when the key word “Hong Kong independence” was usually associated with other issues, people, or organisations, it now became the most frequently used word; indeed, the key word itself had become the protagonist of the articles. Although the newspapers had different interpretations and attitudes, Hong Kong independence was no longer a non-issue and had become the norm in political discourse (Table

6-5).

Table 6-5: Five most frequently used words: 2015 – present (n = 9,136) Apple Daily Ming Pao Wenwei Po

Hong Kong independence Hong Kong independence Hong Kong independence

Leung Chi Ying Basic Law Basic Law

Chief Executive Chief Executive Opposition

Running in election Running in election Legislative Council

Basic Law Pan-democratic Occasion

Becoming a national and international issue. The state media, which targeted mainland audiences, began to report on Hong Kong independence in 2012. The related coverage in The

Global Times gradually increased along with Wen Wei Po’s: from only 12 pieces in 2012 to 55 pieces in 2014, 103 articles in 2015, and, in 2016, 148 pieces, including news stories, commentaries, and editorials. The CCP’s primary concern was that mainlanders would be

138 influenced by the pro-democracy movement in Hong Kong and follow the same path of demanding political reforms. On the other hand, the spectacle of the Hong Kong independence movement also represented an opportunity for the CCP to deploy domestic nationalist propaganda to demonstrate that Western anti-China forces were trying to undermine the stability of China by meddling in the affairs of Hong Kong and to encourage the public to stand up for the importance of law and order. A study of the Chinese state news media coverage of women’s rights indicated that the CCP is able to manipulate international human rights diplomacy as state propaganda to retain the support of the public while suppressing their human rights (Gruffydd-

Jones, 2016). Thus, state propaganda signalled to citizens that pursuing political reforms was politically incorrect and dangerous by labelling the democracy movement a secessionist activity.

Because of sit-in street protests in Hong Kong that lasted 79 days, the international media started to take notice of the pro-independence movement, although the wave of coverage was still at an initial stage in 2014. With the harsh criticism by Beijing officials in charge of Hong

Kong affairs and by former chief executive Leung Chun-ying, the New York Times had 17 mentions of the Hong Kong independence movement or pro-independence voices. In 2016, with the victory and subsequent disqualification of two pro-independence lawmakers, the newspaper had a total of 48 pieces, which constitutes the peak to date (Figure 6-8).

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Figure 6-8: News coverage that mentioned Hong Kong independence: 1998-2017 (n = 517)

Source: WiseSearch and The New York Times website

Why State Propaganda Backfired in Hong Kong

To answer the second research question concerning why state propaganda backfired in

Hong Kong, we must start with the goal of state propaganda in Hong Kong. The purpose of state propaganda in Hong Kong has always been to implement national security laws to cover secession and subversion and to prevent Hong Kong from becoming a hub of human rights activities that will threaten the ruling party. The only obstacle to passing the amendment of

Article 23 was the opposition of lawmakers in the Legislative Council. Amendments to the Basic

Law require a two-thirds vote, and then they must receive the consent of two-thirds of Hong

Kong’s deputies to the National People’s Congress. After experiencing six legislative general elections after the handover, the pan-democrats were able to retain more than one-third of the seats and block the government’s proposed national security bill.

This is the reason that the state propaganda strategy in Hong Kong targeted the opposition parties and lawmakers, and the number of articles denouncing the opposition increased significantly before the election in an attempt to reduce their support. This study shows that there were three waves of news articles related to Hong Kong independence published by

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Wen Wei Po, and all three came around the times of general elections, which represents evidence that supports this contention. Accusations of secessionism and subversion are usually used by the

CCP to repress domestic dissidents and external enemies, so it is not surprising at all that state media used the same charges to repress the opposition in Hong Kong.

Nationalist propaganda generally works quite well domestically. For example, China’s state media call the Dalai Lama an anti-China separatist, and the official version of history according to the state media is that he fled Tibet after a failed military revolt in the 1950s. Many

Chinese harbour hostile attitudes towards the Dalai Lama, even overseas Chinese students who protest when he is invited to speak or when their instructors provide a different version than the official Chinese history in class (Saul, 2017).

The free flow of information in Hong Kong

The nationalist propaganda campaign obviously failed in Hong Kong. The constitution of the Legislative Council did not change, and in 2016, two pro-independence candidates were successfully elected, although they were later unseated. As we have seen, this forced departure was followed by four more by pro-democracy lawmakers as a result of Beijing’s interpretation of the Basic Law. This action represented hard repression that resulted from the failure of soft repression (namely, state propaganda) to achieve its goal of reducing the number of opposition lawmakers and implementing the National Security Law as soon as possible.

The CCP understands the importance of the media in political participation, and it understands that its own propaganda outlets in Hong Kong, such as Wen Wei Po and Ta Kung

Pao, have very little influence in the territory. Therefore, the CCP began using economic and political means to control the news media in Hong Kong after the handover, especially the main news outlets, such as Television Broadcasts Limited (TVB), which is the largest and most

141 watched free television station in Hong Kong. However, unlike on the mainland, under the promise of “one country, two systems” and the Basic Law, it is impossible for the CCP to have absolute control over the media, especially since the emergence of the Internet, which significantly lowered the entry threshold to establish a media outlet. Many online media outlets have emerged in Hong Kong to counter the influence of the state in the mainstream media

(Luqiu, 2017). A poll in 2016 after the legislative general election revealed that trust in Hong

Kong’s main news outlets had hit a ten-year low (HKUPOP, 2017b).

Although the CCP has successfully controlled the online information flow and blocked

Facebook, Google, Twitter, and YouTube domestically, Hong Kong remains the only city in

China that is able to access the Internet freely. As an open society, Hongkongers are able to search for information locally and internationally without impediment. As of the fourth quarter of 2016, the penetration rate of Facebook in Hong Kong had reached 72 percent. In addition,

YouTube had a 69 percent penetration rate, and WhatsApp was at 64 percent (Statista, 2017).

Facebook’s features facilitate personal influence and make users more likely to read endorsed content (Anspach, 2017). When the audience believes that the main news outlets are engaged in self-censorship, they turn to alternative media to seek information that they endorse.

Different campaign and advocacy groups are always trying to gain media exposure to establish a local presence (Darr, 2016). Activities opposing government-proposed policies usually gain more attention from the media, although the coverage in the news media is typically thematic and event-oriented (De Bruycker & Beyers, 2015; Wouters, 2015). Pro-independence activists have successfully attracted media attention by using racial strategies, such as displaying colonial flags. In this study, the appearance of the colonial flag was one of the top ten most frequently used key words in 2012 in Ming Pao and Apple Daily, two commercial media outlets

142 that are essentially market-oriented.

Compared with local Hong Kong media, Wen Wei Po provides more details about these pro-independence activities and figures, since it offers more coverage. For state propaganda, amplifying pro-independence activities is considered a way to cultivate negative or radical images of them among readers. However, this is a double-edged sword because more coverage also provides the opportunity for pro-independence ideas to establish a presence in the public arena. On the mainland, state propaganda is able to cultivate a negative image of dissidents and enemies by providing one-sided information. In a closed society, even such negative exposure would trigger curiosity and questions; however, people are not able to access alternative information to counter the propaganda. However, in an open society such as Hong Kong, the audience is able to react to propaganda by searching for more information and making their own decision if they so desire. Most importantly, those targeted by state propaganda have a platform and an opportunity to defend themselves.

Civic Society and Citizen Expertise

In contrast to mainland China, Hong Kong’s civic society has a long history with a different political system, which also provides Hongkongers with practice exercising their political rights. The 1966 Hong Kong riots gave rise to a series of decolonisation and social movements in Hong Kong (Butenhoff, 1999). During the transitional period from 1984 to 1997, political reforms towards a representative democratic system were introduced; different political parties formed, and social organisations and NGOs emerged. In 1991, Hong Kong had its first direct election to the Legislative Council; in addition, civic education was added to students’ curriculum to reduce Hong Kong-centeredness. During almost 30 years of separation from

Mainland China, Hong Kong experienced a different social and governmental system; hence, the

143 colonial government was trying to foster the national identity of the Chinese (Tse, 2004).

However, the crackdown on the 1989 Student Movement in Tiananmen Square triggered mass emigration from Hong Kong (Hampton, 2015). Moreover, over 1.5 million people joined the demonstration each year at Victoria Park to condemn the Chinese government; the annual

Tiananmen Square Anniversary Vigil has become a symbolic civic activity in Hong Kong.

The transition period promised a “rule of law” discourse with a rights-based conception of citizenship. The Basic Law gave Hong Kong’s people constitutional rights to maintain the territory’s political system and autonomy for 50 years. However, the fundamental difference between Hong Kong’s common law and China’s legal tradition triggered civil conflicts between the Hong Kong government and its citizens. In 2003, 500,000 people joined a march against the implementation of Article 23 of the Basic Law. This marked the beginning of Hongkongers flexing their civic power and showing their resistance to the state (Ku, 2004). Since then, the

SAR Establishment Day has become an annual day of protest.

China still calls itself a socialist country, but compared to capitalist Hong Kong, it invests less in welfare and has more social inequality. Although both Hong Kong and mainland China are market economies with ethnic Chinese as the majority ethnic group, the differences are fundamental. After over one hundred years of colonialism, the “rule of law” and “resistance to social injustice” have been deeply embedded in Hong Kong society, while in Mainland China, the official definition of law and order is “rule by law” (Ku, 2004). Freedom of speech, which has been engrained in Hong Kong society, is treated as a threat to governance and stability in

Mainland China. On an individual level, civic engagement is common in Hong Kong, as the citizens have extensive expertise in mobilisation and communication, while in Mainland China, civic engagement is at only a very early stage (So, 2004).

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Civic engagement also provides a solid basis for political participation and reduces citizens’ dependence on the news media for mobilisation. Although one study shows that newspaper closures have a short-term negative impact on citizens’ civic participation (Shaker,

2014), in Hong Kong, a 2004 poll showed that the role of the media and other organisations in mobilising protesters decreased significantly and was bypassed by the influence of friends, classmates, and colleges. In addition, a large proportion of the participants reported that they are self-motivated (Chan, Chong & Lee, 2004). In Hong Kong, the counter-state propaganda effect is mainly generated by government performance. Disqualifications of elected lawmakers as well as the jailing of Occupy Central’s student leaders became sources of counter-propaganda to offset state propaganda’s effects.

For the CCP, the failure of state propaganda as soft repression also reduced its patience for achieving its goals in Hong Kong. The interpretation of the Basic Law and the jailed activists have signalling to Hongkongers the determination of the CCP, which is well aware that in an open and law-abiding society, the only way to suppress the opposition is through legal means. In addition, if the amendment of Article 23 is not rights-centred, the cost of participating in the pro- democracy movement will dramatically increase, and Hong Kong will no longer be a special region where people can advocate an end to one-party dictatorship.

Conclusion

After the handover in 1997, the CCP used “advocating independence” to label pro- democracy camp members and those who demanded universal suffrage, which was promised by the CCP before the handover. The goal of this strategy has been to try to silence the critics and decrease their popularity among voters. However, in an open society with the free flow of information, the state propaganda trigged counter-propaganda, and the CCP faced an intense

145 framing contest for local elites and the public. Although the CCP has been able to exert its influence on the local mainstream media through direct and indirect ownership and co-optation, the media market ultimately acted as a balancing force for political pressure and enabled the local elite and the public to participate in the framing contest to counter the state propaganda (So

& Chan, 2007). In Hong Kong, in contrast to Mainland China, political leaders have to consider public opinion because a belief in independence exists in the society, not just as an outcome of the framing contest (Gamson, 2004).

State propaganda successfully used the accusation of engaging in separatist activities; however, it failed to manufacture negative feelings among the Hong Kong public. The exaggerations and unreasonable accusations in state propaganda by central government officials and pro-Beijing elites who endorsed state’s framing trigged counter-propaganda appeals that conveyed the Hong Kong public’s anger and frustration and caused citizens to seek evidence to substantiate the opposition’s arguments and appeals (Wolf & Van Dooren, 2017). Source attribution influences individuals’ credibility assessments and can help change their beliefs

(Slater & Rouner, 1996). Since the handover, the CCP has confronted many difficulties achieving credibility in Hong Kong (Loh, 2010).

The state propaganda also caused a “my enemy’s enemy is my friend” effect that empowered the counter-propaganda social forces. Different social actors in this framing contest have developed their own frames of the issue, but their tolerance for ambiguity decreased as the intensity of the framing contest increased. After passing a tipping point, the topic of independence became habitual instead of blocked (Entman, 2003). The state propaganda ultimately produced a polarised society and made the topic legitimate in the public arena, thus actually supporting the rise of the Hong Kong independence movement.

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Chapter 7 The Role of the Media for Challengers of State Power in an Open Society

Unlike in Mainland China, citizens’ rights to freedom of speech and freedom of assembly in Hong Kong are protected by the Basic Law and Hong Kong’s judicial system. It is difficult for state power to exert direct hard repression to curb resistance activities; therefore, it relies heavily on propaganda. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) fully understands the importance of media in mobilizing protests and social movements, which is why it is investing a huge amount of resources in Hong Kong to control the local media with the aim of dampening political participation (Luqiu, 2017).

The idea of Hong Kong independence from China once seemed unthinkable, a taboo topic in the public arena. However, after being continuously mentioned by state propaganda to attack the pro-democratic movement and the opposition for the last two decades, the Hong Kong independence movement emerged in the wake of the 2014 pro-democratic Umbrella movement.

Pro-independence political parties and groups were launched and publicly advocated independence for the territory (Jenkins, 2016). The Umbrella movement crystallized a new civic dimension that claims that democracy and universal suffrage are at the root of the right to self- determination (Veg, 2017). It also distinguished the notion of being pro-independence from localism for some activists, who believe that autonomy is impossible without independence. As the founder of the first pro-independence party, Chan Ho-tin said, “When I assessed the political environment of Hong Kong, it seemed like the city was at a dead end. I realised that independence was the only way out” (Pang, 2017).

The Chinese state media used to attack pro-democratic parties, lawmakers, and activists to undermine their credibility and intimidate them by calling them separatists, especially prior to

147 and during the Umbrella movement. The People’s Daily claimed that the secret plot of the

Umbrella movement was to achieve independence instead of democracy (He, 2014). However, the state propaganda led to a backlash in Hong Kong, and the CCP faces a real problem. Despite the vicious denunciation of pro-independence activists and activities from the state media and public officials of the Central and Hong Kong governments, the pro-independence activists have been able to mobilize the public (though still just a small fraction) and compete with the state media framing of the movement.

In democratic societies, movements that are seen as threatening generally still have space to operate publicly, albeit under strict monitoring and nonviolent suppression by law enforcement, whereas movements that are perceived as seeking to displace an existing institutional authority or causing fear among citizens usually encounter violent repression

(Goldstone & Tilly, 2001). Under “one country, two systems,” although advocating independence for Hong Kong has been seen as threatening towards CCP, it is neither illegal nor against Basic Law, which is the mini constitution of Hong Kong. The CCP is only able to use soft suppression, such as state propaganda and controlling these social movement organizations’

(SMOs) access to media. This raises questions about how these challengers of state power use media, especially social media, to frame their ideas and mobilize supporters and about the role of media in the rise of the Hong Kong independence movement.

Social Media as a Resource of Mobilization

The media is one of the sources of social movement mobilization (McCarthy & Zald,

1977). Media exposure represents an important resource for movements with few assets; therefore, many SMOs intentionally seek media attention (Baylor, 1996). Faced with nonviolent repression from the CCP and the Hong Kong government, as well as a hostile media

148 environment, the challenge for these SMOs is how to build a collective identity for collective action, and media can enable or constrain their collective struggles (Roscigno & Danaher, 2001).

The news media is one of the most important factors and forces that direct public attention toward some and away from other objective or putative conditions of social movements

(Hilgartner & Bosk, 1988). To increase public attention, SMOs aim to attract media coverage by holding protests; however, due to two major sources of bias in media representation of public protests (selection and description bias), only a few are covered by the news media, and the media framing of the social movements is usually inconsistent with the goals of the protesters

(Smith, McCarthy, McPhail & Augustyn, 2001). Due to the political environment, SMOs advocating Hong Kong independence are targeted by state propaganda and find it difficult to gain sympathy among the mainstream media in Hong Kong. Youth politics in Hong Kong is deliberately and collectively framed in an undesirable way, and young people are demoralized, devalued, disempowered, and discredited by the mainstream media. The mainstream media are trying to construct a model youth image that is patriotic to the CCP, claiming that those advocating independence are committing the most heinous crime (Wong, 2017).

As an open and law-abiding society, it is impossible for the CCP to have the total control of media in Hong Kong that it has in Mainland China. Most importantly, the CCP cannot impose online censorship or block the Internet. This allows room for challengers to offer competing constructions of reality and to find support from audiences who are also constructing the meaning of their daily lives (Gramson et al., 1993).

Unlike Mainland China, where Facebook, YouTube, Twitter, WhatsApp, and Google are blocked by the government, Facebook is the most popular social media platform among Hong

Kong’s Internet users. As of the 4th quarter of 2016, 75% of the population actively uses social

149 media. The penetration of Facebook is 72%, while YouTube is 69% and WhatsApp 64%

(Statista). The SMOs advocating Hong Kong independence can build their own Facebook pages and other social media accounts to reach their audiences directly, promoting their ideas and engaging in recruitment and fundraising. Some SMOs also open their own online digital media, such as online newspapers and magazines, podcasts, and YouTube channels, to counter mainstream media and state propaganda.

The Internet enables organizational change, which begins to resemble the looser networks characteristic of social movements (Chadwick, 2007). SMOs use email lists, web pages, and open software to organize and coordinate their actions, sharing information between each other.

The Internet enables SMOs to create temporary media hubs to convey alternative information

(Juris, 2005). Digital media also bring individual narratives into the mobilization process, and a recent study showed that a more personalized collective action process maintains a higher level of engagement and a stronger network (Bennett & Segerberg, 2011).

However, although many studies have shown that digital technologies are changing the logic of collective action and facilitating the emergence of offline mobilizations (Gonzalez-

Bailon, Borge-Holthoefer & Moreno, 2013; Khondker, 2011), other scholars have noted the limitations of digital media in mobilization. A study showed that face-to-face mobilization has a significant impact on offline behavior (Vissers, Hooghe, Stolle & Maheo, 2012). Online selective exposure creates an “echo chamber” and increases polarization (Asker & Dinas, 2017). The results of meta-analysis of research on social media use and political participation suggest that social media has a minimal impact on participation in election campaigns (Boulianne, 2014). In

Hong Kong, although research has shown that social media use has a positive relationship with political participation in young people (Tang & Lee, 2013), the mainstream media are still the

150 main new sources among social media users (Chan, Chen & Lee, 2017). For these SMOs trying to expand their audiences and supporters, the Internet is an important and indispensable tool for mobilization; however, it also imposes certain limitations that are a challenge to overcome.

Methods

I selected the SMOs that have been defined as pro-independence organizations by three state media (People’s Daily, The Global Times, and China Daily) and two Beijing-owned newspapers in Hong Kong (Ta Tung Pao and Wen Wei Po). Eleven SMOs were identified as the targets of state propaganda for allegedly advocating Hong Kong Independence (Table 7-1).

Table 7-1: SMOs accused by state propaganda of advocating independence Name Established Year Founder/Key Figures *Self-proclaimed

Political Goals

Proletariat Political 2011 Wong Yuk-man Anti-CCP

Institute dictatorship;

achieving universal

democracy;

suggesting a

perpetual Basic Law

Civic Passion 2012 Cheng Chung-tai Suggesting a

Alvin Cheng Kam- perpetual Basic Law

mun to make Hong Kong a

city-state

Hong Kong 2014 Chin Wan-kan Suggesting a

Resurgence perpetual Basic Law

151

to make Hong Kong a

city-state

Valiant Frontier 2014 Hong Kong

Independence

Kowloon East 2014 Chan Chak-to Independence

Community Wong Chi Ken referendum in 2021

Hong Kong 2014; N Netwon Hong Kong

Independence Party registered in UK Independence

in 2015

Youngspiration 2015 Baggio Leung Independence

referendum in 2021

Hong Kong 2015 Edward Leung Tin- Independence

Indigenous kei referendum in 2021

Ray Wong-Toi-yeung

Hong Kong 2015 Building Hong Kong

National Front as a nation, regaining

autonomy

Hong Kong 2016 Chan Ho-tin Building a free and

National Party independent Hong

Kong Republic

Student Localism 2016 Tony Chung Hon- Building a free and

Iam independent Hong

Kong Republic

*Source: official Facebook page and websites, campaign manifestos

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I used the name of the SMOs as the key words and searched the frequency of news coverage using Wise News (http://wisesearch.wisers.net), a news search engine, from January 1,

2011 to September 30, 2017. I also read the official websites and social media accounts, such as the Facebook pages of the SMOs. In-depth structured interviews were conducted. Thirty members of different SMOs, including founders and core members, were asked the same series of questions to maintain consistency from interview to interview. The interviewees were asked how local mainstream media, social media, international media, and state propaganda were framing the SMOs and the movement. They were also asked about the role of these four categories of media in mobilization, including recruitment, fundraising, and elections. The interviewees’ ages ranged from 16 to 42, with 24 males (80%) and 6 females (20%), all born in

Hong Kong (Table 7-2). Ground theory analysis was used to look for recurring themes (Charmaz

& Belgrave, 2012).

Table 7-2: Interviewee information Interviewee Sex Age Education Occupation Birth Place

001 M 31 Master Professional HK

002 M 29 Bachelor Clerk HK

003 M 25 Bachelor Media worker HK

004 M 33 Bachelor Engineer HK

005 M 33 Bachelor Consultant HK

006 M 29 Master Administrative officer HK

007 M 40 Higher Diploma Warehouse officer HK

008 M 33 Master Administrative staff HK

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009 M 26 Bachelor Programmer HK

010 M 25 Diploma Social worker HK

011 M 39 Master Professional HK

012 M 19 Sophomore Student HK

013 M 32 Bachelor Clerk HK

014 F 26 Bachelor Freelance HK

015 M 31 Bachelor Unemployed HK

016 M 33 Bachelor Freelance writer HK

017 F 31 Master Marketing Manager HK

018 M 36 Form 7 Sales manager HK

019 M 16 Form 5 Student HK

020 M 23 Bachelor Legislator assistant HK

021 F 19 Sophomore Student HK

022 M 22 Bachelor Sales HK

023 M 20 Form 5 Waiter HK

024 F 22 Bachelor Freelance HK

025 F 27 Bachelor Media worker HK

026 M 24 Diploma Student HK

027 F 21 Senior Student HK

028 M 37 Master Management HK

029 M 21 Senior Student HK

030 M 37 Bachelor Media worker HK

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Framing Competition

A master frame was originally conceptualized for observing the cycle of protest in the absence of a favorable political opportunity structure. Different from collective action frames, a master frame can be revised and adopted by other social movements in their campaigns

The strategy of their master frame is to emphasize the injustice of the current political system and the untrustworthiness of the CCP for their promise of “one country, two systems,” with the purpose of heightening the grievances of Hong Kongers. This new master frame mobilized some previous supporters of localism. At the same time, this master frame has also been borrowed by other pro-democratic parties and politicians – those who are reacting to public opinion and seeking to expand their support base by trying to absorb new supporters from the localism movement. However, state propaganda uses negative framing for both the independence and localism SMOs, portraying them as violent threats to society. Hong Kong’s local media that are under the CCP’s control or have a pro-Beijing political stance also follow the state propaganda strategy.

Table 7-3 demonstrates the counts of all the Pro-Independence SMOs on Hong Kong media from 2011 to 2017, including newspapers and magazines, after the birth of the first pro-

155 independence SMO. Some of the SMOs gained more media attention than the others.

Participating in an election is an efficient way to gain access to the mainstream media.

Youngspiration, Hong Kong Indigenous, Hong Kong Independent Party, and Civic Passion are the top four SMOs that obtained the most mainstream news coverage. They all sent their key members to participate in the 2016 legislative council election. The “fair and equal treatment” principle requires that broadcasters who organize election forums in their programs ensure that all candidates in a constituency be invited and share equal time during the show. The exposure on the television show increased their popularity and news value for the printing media. At the same time, in order to prevent them from being successfully elected, pro-Beijing mainstream media followed the state propaganda to attack these candidates during the election, which increased the amount of coverage they received. The disqualification of the candidacy of Edward

Leung Tin-kei, the key member of Hong Kong Indigenous, and Chan Ho-tin, the founder of the

Hong Kong National Party, made them the newsmakers. Later, two elected lawmakers, a member of Youngsprirition, Baggio Leung, and Regine Yau Wai-ching, were disqualified over oath-taking, which made them and their organization a household name. The Civic Party was founded to run in the 2012 district legislative election and was actively involved in local politics in the aftermath. Through interaction between SMOs and the media, media attention can unfold as a positive feedback process, wherein past attention encourages future attention (Seguin, 2015).

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Table 7-3: News coverage of pro-independence SMOs Hong Kong Media Coverage (2011.1.1-2017.9.30)

Student Localism (2016) 365 Hong Kong National Party (2016) 2176 Hong Kong National Front (2015) 43 Hong Kong Indigenous (2015) 5146 Youngspiration (2015) 8949 Hong Kong Independence Party (2014) 97 Kowloon East Community (2014) 16 Valiant Frontier (2014) 197 Hong Kong Resurgence (2014) 243 Civic Passion (2012) 6473 Proletariat Political Institute (2011) 515

0 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 6000 7000 8000 9000 10000

SMOs must compete with each other for external resources, including the news media.

Older and larger SMOs have more advantages when it comes to gaining media attention

(McCarthy & Zald, 1977). In Hong Kong, the media resources for the pro-democratic movement are limited, since the CCP has successfully acquired majority media ownership over the mainstream media through direct investment and co-optation, and few resources are left over

(Luqiu, 2017). Although the established pan-democrats agree on the principle of putting Hong

Kong first in resource allocation, they are worried that radical localism could stir up hatred and discrimination (Kwong, 2016). The pan-democrats are even worried that publicly advocating independence, which obviously crosses the red line set by the CCP, might cut off the channel of communication with Beijing and jeopardize the pro-democratic movement. This kind of concern is reflected in the media coverage by some news media – even those that openly hold a strong anti-CCP political stance, such as Apple Daily. Jimmy Lai, the founder and owner of Apple

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Daily, announced that he had ordered his newspaper to try not to provide coverage on localists after he was attacked by the People’s Daily for supporting Hong Kong Independence in 2014

“because their remarks would be interpreted as pro-independence, and it would become the biggest blow to the pro-democracy movement, since it would enable the CCP to label pan- democrats and Apple Daily as separatists and block you” (Appdaily, 2014).

However, despite their limited access to the public arena via the news media, these SMOs have also found ways to steal the spotlight – the most efficient being the formation of political parties and groups and participating in elections. The SMOs with the most media coverage are all actively involved in elections at the local and general levels. Two candidates for the Hong Kong

Indigenous and Hong Kong National Party were disqualified from their candidacy by the city’s election watchdog before the Legislative Council election. Two candidates of Youngspritaion won the election, but they were disqualified by the court for their anti-China antics while taking their oaths after Beijing issued an interpretation of the Basic Law. Another candidate from Civic

Passion was also successfully elected. Such news events put these SMOs in the local headlines for a certain period of time and attracted international news media attention. As one interviewee said, an election is the best opportunity to leverage media resources:

“After the Umbrella Revolution, the whole society is in the doldrums because we just experienced a failed social movement. We decided to participate in the election because we had a consensus: an election is a battlefield. We are a new political group, no money and no human resources; it would be impossible for us to win an election. The only resource we can leverage is the mainstream media … we can’t control how journalists write the stories, but we can guess how they will write. So, we had our plan to create the topic. I know media need clicks, and I give you clicks.” – 015.

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Another strategy is staging unconventional protests. For corporate media, selection bias exists in different news media outlets when covering protests. Protest sizes and media issue cycles are the main factors in the structure of media selection (McCarthy, McPhail & Smith,

1996). Disruptive and symbolic actions also attract the media spotlight (Wouters, 2013). In Hong

Kong, big news media outlets are profit-driven private companies. Unlike the state media and

Beijing-owned media in Hong Kong, these news media also face pressure from consumers who demand quality journalism and thereby make the Hong Kong media system more complicated.

On the one hand, there are the millionaire media owners who act as proxy censors for the CCP; on the other hand, there are the sovereign consumers and a market that rewards independent news offerings (Lai, 2007). This means that, while the media cannot afford to ignore newsworthy events, especially conflicts with drama and visual impact, the framing of the same events differs among different news media outlets.

Protests in Hong Kong are common. The official figure shows that there were 1,304 public processions and 11,854 public meetings in 2016

(http://www.police.gov.hk/ppp_en/09_statistics/poes.html). It is highly competitive for SMOs to make it through the media gate and gain media attention. Hong Kong is also famous for peaceful protests, at least until the violent clash between protestors and police in 2016. Protesters gathered in Mong Kok to protest the government’s crackdown against illegal street vendors selling fishballs during the Lunar New Year holidays. The protesters physically clashed with police.

Police fired warning shots and used pepper spray and batons to disperse the crowd, and some protestors threw bricks and bottles at the police. Hong Kong officials and state media called it a

“riot,” while protesters and some Hong Kong media called it the “fishball revolution” (Mckirdy

& Chan, 2016). Hong Kong Indigenous, which was founded in January 2015, was one of the

159 main organizers of the protests. Its political philosophy, according to its Facebook page, claims that:

“We are a group of nameless Hong Kong people who are on the frontline of protests.

Since the old resistance methods have failed against the authorities, we have no choice but to stand out and break the stalemate. We are doing more and more to get this message across to the government – we are not going to back away or accept our fate lying down. The pseudo democrats time after time created fake protests, which achieved nothing but keeping the peace for the authorities. Hong Kong people are being betrayed and kept away from true democracy, as well as being hindered in developing our own indigenous virtue.” –Facebook Page

@hkindigenous

Before the violent clash in Mong Kok, Hong Kong Indigenous had been known for protests and street action. In January 2016, although it did not win the district council by- election, its candidate surprisingly gained 15% of the total votes. This is because, after the

Umbrella Revolution, localism was in the media issue cycle. Thus, even their small-scale protests (at the time they only had 50 members) were still able to obtain media coverage.

However, studies show that media coverage of protests is framed to focus on the protest event itself, to the exclusion of the message that the movements are attempting to propagate

(Smith, McCarthy, Mcphile & Augustyn, 2001; Watkins, 1999). Considering that they are surrounded by a hostile media environment, the interviewees all used the words “negative” and

“not serious” to describe their public image as represented in the media. A movement’s success and failure partly depend on a group’s ability to frame their collective actions to connect with mainstream beliefs and values (Snow, Rochford Jr., Worden & Benford, 1986; Snow & Benford,

1988). In countries where the media are controlled by the government and social movements

160 only receive negative framing, social media enable participants to use a human-interest frame to define the movement and shape public opinion (Hamdy, 2012).

Although the Internet, and especially social media, provides platforms to form alternative media for SMOs to spread their political philosophy and counter-narratives to defend themselves, a lack of talent and financial support nonetheless constrains the role of the Internet and means that the web is not utilized to its full potential. Among the 11 SMOs, only five have an official website, and six have their own media products, such as a YouTube channel, Internet radio, or online newspaper (Table 7-4). However, this is not a unique problem for SMOs in Hong

Kong. Studies on American social movement websites posit similar reasons for their failure to take full advantage of the Internet due to organizational objectives, organizational resources, and resource sharing (Stein, 2009).

Table 7-4: Social media accounts and media products (Till Oct. 7, 2017) Name Official Facebook Twitter Instagram Print Media Online Media

Website Page Products1 Products2

(Followers) (Followers)

Proletariat Yes 15,103 No No Book Internet

Political Radio

Institute

Civic Passion No 12,555 No No No Online

Newspaper

Hong Kong No 12,910 No No Book YouTube

Resurgence Channel

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Valiant Frontier No 9,602 No No No No

Kowloon East Yes 14,887 No No No No

Community

Hong Kong Yes 3,800 No No No No

Independence

Party

Youngspiraton Yes 54,573 No 2,598 No YouTube

Channel

Hong Kong No 87,059 1,844 No No Internet

Indigenous Radio

Hong Kong No 4,439 1,169 No No No

National Front

Hong Kong Yes 28,779 No No Magazine No

National Party

Student No 8,380 No No No Internet

Localism Radio

Program

1) Print media products include magazines, newspapers, and books. 2) Online media products include online newspapers, podcasts, Internet radio, and YouTube channels.

Facebook is the most important platform for these SMOs, since it is the most popular social media platform in Hong Kong. Facebook announced that it has 5 million monthly active

162 users in Hong Kong; among them, 4.6 million are mobile monthly active users (The Standard,

2016). However, these SMOs still encounter some constraints in using Facebook pages to explain and spread their political philosophy. First, few followers have the patience to read long articles; Internet communication requires short sentences and eye-catching photos that simplify the complicated political issues of Hong Kong independence. Second, online discussions are sometimes irrational. Third and most importantly, discussions on Facebook often create an illusion of popularity because of the echo chamber effect created by political homophily.

“Nowadays, most of the time, our posts on social media are for the news media, for journalists, to attract media attention. We are not using social media exclusively to increase our visibility among Hong Kongers because those who hold different political views would not follow our page; those people need face-to-face communication.” – 020

Digital Mobilization

Traditional media used to have an important role in political mobilization in Hong Kong.

The annual July 1 protest in 2003 had over 500,000 marchers and was the largest protest after the

1997 handover. A survey showed that traditional media, especially newspapers and radio, are the main sources of mobilization, along with personal social networks, such as friends, colleagues, and classmates (Chan & Chung, 2003). However, in post-handover Hong Kong, interpersonal networks also played an instrumental role in facilitating large-scale demonstrating. A mode of self-mobilization was formed by the combined effects of media and interpersonal networks.

Media have an important role in helping legitimize movements in the public arena (Chan & Lee,

2007). Media also create a collective memory about past events to mobilize political participation in Hong Kong (Lee & Chan, 2016a).

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The rise of the Internet enables citizen journalists to provide alternative narratives for the public, especially the younger generation, to understand social movements and build collective identity. The collective identity of Hong Kongers is the response to the CCP’s suppression and strengthens the new social movement in Hong Kong (Chan, 2017). For individuals, how they use social media has a significant impact on their political participation. Digital activities are the most effective predictor of protest participation among Hong Kong netizens (Lee & Chan,

2016b). A study of Hong Kong university students showed that, when people share political information and connect with political actors via social media, it has a positive impact on their participation in the Umbrella Movement (Lee, Chen & Chan, 2017).

For SMOs, especially the new ones, new technology enables them to build coalition networks, such that online channels collectively drive the movement, and the mobilization process becomes hybrid. The success of the anti-Moral and National Education movement from

2011 – 2012 is a vivid example of a new SMO, formed by middle school students, successfully mobilizing the public and achieving the movement’s goal of pushing the government to withdraw a policy (Wang, 2017). Pro-independence SMOs also benefit from the Internet, especially social media, which makes up for the lack of mainstream media as a mobilization resource. Social media play an instrumental role in daily mobilization, including fundraising and recruitment.

Mobilizing money for sustaining the development of SMOs requires multiple technologies, targeting both a few large donors and widely dispersed shallow pockets (Edward &

McCarthy, 2004). For other SMOs in Hong Kong, the annual July 1st rally and the June 4th vigil are the main collective-action events for collecting public donations for pro-independence

SMOs. Beyond those events, there are various technologies for mobilizing money on a daily

164 basis among these SMOs. As Table 5 shows, some SMOs sell products (such as bags and mobile phone cases), which is a traditional fundraising approach for SMOs small and large around the world. Some directly appeal for donations and provide an online payment option instead of bank account transfers for the potential donors. Social media and online payments lower the cost of money mobilization. In previous money mobilization strategies, such as direct mail and telemarketing technologies, a substantial proportion of the money raised was absorbed by the technology itself (Edward & McCarthy, 2004), while social media are almost zero cost. Social media also enable SMOs to provide the potential donors with sufficient information about themselves (Table 7-5). However, among the 11 SMOs examined, only five SMOs publicly appeal for donations, and four provide an online payment option or a bank account transfer.

Kowloon East Community, which does not accept bank transfers, explained on its website that it can only accept cash since it failed to open a bank account, even though it has been successfully registered as a non-profit organization. It is not the only political group facing trouble when trying to open an account to manage donations. Another student group, Scholarism, criticized

HSBC for refusing to open an account for it over political concerns in 2016 (Huang & Timmons,

2016).

Table 7-5: Money mobilization technologies and membership recruitment Name Fundraising Online Bank Online Online Contacts

appeal payment account product recruitment (address/tel)

sale

Proletariat Political Yes No Yes Yes No Yes

Institute

Civic Passion No No No No No Yes

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Hong Kong No No No No No No

Resurgence

Valiant Frontier No No No No No No

Kowloon East Yes No No No Yes Yes

Community

Hong Kong Yes No Yes No No Yes

Independence Party1

Youngspiration Yes Yes No Yes Yes No

Hong Kong No No No No Yes No

Indigenous

Hong Kong National No No No No No No

Front

Hong Kong National Yes Yes No Yes No No

Party

Studentlocalism No No No No Yes No

1. Hong Kong Independence Party is registered and operated in the UK.

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Only one SMO recruits members through its Facebook page; the other three publicly recruit volunteers instead of members. Although social media enable these SMOs to reach potential supporters, they are very cautious about the online recruitment of members. A large research literature on membership recruitment suggests that media appeals and other disembodied recruitment methods, such as direct mail, can only generate a weak membership.

Recruiting more dedicated members depends on face-to-face interaction and social networks

(Lofland, 1996). Social media are successful at enabling the SMOs to find volunteers, but the way to generate strong membership has not been changed by new communication technologies.

“Sometimes people heard about us from mainstream media, and social media helped them to find us.” – 013

“Although Facebook enables us to find new members, we cannot rely on it. A lot of people are anonymous online. Recruitment relies on commitment and trust. You must meet face- to-face.” – 004

“I think social media have a larger role in recruitment compared with mainstream media.

However, the role has its constraints. For example, the Hong Kong National Party is using underground recruitment, and the founder said he could not publish members’ identities because the members of the party think they are revolutionaries. Hong Kong Indigenous used to recruit members through Facebook, and they faced the problem of how to find trustworthy members.

You know the CCP might send undercover recruits. That’s why social media cannot have a very important role in recruitment.” – 010

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The Counter-effect of State Propaganda

To summarize, although local media generally provide negative framing, the SMOs still treat them as the most important channel through which to initiate mass mobilization. Although social media penetration in Hong Kong is high, a survey showed that, even among young people aged 17 to 20, mainstream media, such as television and newspapers, are still the main news sources (Mediadigest, 2016). Social media are currently the sole resource for these SMOs to advocate their ideas and mobilize supporters. However, they are all concerned about the echo- chamber effect, since they realize that social media outreach may have reached its limit. In addition, when these SMOs are constrained by organization resources and are engaged in highly contested framing processes with state propaganda and other organizations, at the beginning of the agenda-setting process, the influence of SMOs is limited (Joachim, 2003). International media have an indirect effect on mobilization because their positive framing provides psychological support and encouragement for these SMOs and their constituents. The SMOs also believe that international attention would put pressure on the CCP to be less repressive. For state propaganda, these SMOs claim that it creates a counter-effect due to its low credibility in Hong

Kong; the more repressive the CCP is, the more the movement is empowered (Table 7-6).

Table 7-6: Media framing and role in mobilization Media Framing Mobilization Local biased, negative, inadequate important, indispensable

Social media self-control, counter-narrative important within groups International fair insignificant but important

State propaganda smear campaign insignificant, creates counter-effects Longitudinal surveys of media credibility among Hong Kong audiences show that Hong

Kongers are wary of news media with obvious political tendencies. Two Beijing-owned newspapers in Hong Kong, Ta Kung Pao and Wen Wei Po, always scored the lowest in the period between 1997 and 2016. At the same time, Apple Daily, which claimed to be pro-

168 democratic, also scored below average (CCPOS, 2016). In 2016, the two state-backed newspapers merged to pool their resources after losing money for decades (Lo, 2016). State propaganda has adopted a firm stance, issuing shrill warnings that call Hong Kong Independence equivalent to treason, trying to suppress the rising demand for independence. In addition to organized online trolling, there are also offline Astroturf groups designed to cultivate public opinion. However, a study showed that, in times of political turmoil and a high level of polarization, selective information avoidance among individuals increases. People choose to shield themselves from unwanted information and cut the social ties that transmit such information (Zhu, Skoric & Shen, 2017). Perceived out-group threats strengthen the positive in- group relationship and reinforce exclusionism (Scheepers & Gijsberts, 2002).

“We believe that, when you are praised by your enemies, you are toast. When you are attacked by your enemies, you win. The overwhelming criticism from pro-Beijing media, state media, and the pro-Beijing camp only proves that you have done something.” – 004

“It’s like we got certified by the CCP, which makes us more united. We think the CCP and those pro-Beijing media are indirectly promoting the ideology of independence, and they are welcome to.” – 018

“Pro-Beijing media and state media are also in their echo chamber, a bigger one. It has an impact on people who oppose them. The only effective course for the CCP is to use economic means to intimidate its opponents. The British colonial government adopted that approach to co- opt their opposition into the political system. However, the CCP treats their opponents as enemies, and the state propaganda fans the flames, which empowers the opposition. The CCP don’t understand that the heart cannot be won by hard approaches.” – 026

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Conclusion

Although the media have an important role in movement mobilization, they are not the decisive factor in the rise of a movement. Overwhelmingly, studies have shown that the media generally operate in ways that promote apathy and cynicism rather than active citizenship and participation (Miller, 1988; Cappella & Jamieson, 1997; De Vreese & Elenbaas, 2008; Jackson,

2011). Uncertainty also makes it possible for new actors to challenge power by contesting frames

(Kaplan, 2008). Under the arrangement of “one country, two systems” and the fifty years’ promise between the Chinese government and the British government, the uncertainty of Hong

Kong’s future has always been a problem for the people of Hong Kong. The further intensification of democracy movements after 1997, alongside growing dissatisfaction with the established opposition among Hong Kongers, provides the opportunity for the rise of localism, which has taken on a political dimension since 2005 and has become the new force to challenge the existing political system (Kwong, 2016).

The Umbrella movement was the turning point for a more radical social movement. Some participants, frustrated by Beijing, believe that it is possible to speak out and air public opinions in favor of democracy and civil liberty; thus, they proposed a long-term goal that is ambitious in the extreme: the independence of Hong Kong, or at least, the idea that Hong Kong’s people have the right of self-determination, to decide the destiny of Hong Kong (Lim, 2017). All 30 interviewees were actively involved in this 79-day sit-in. Although they had heard the term

“Hong Kong Independence” before the movement through different channels, 25 interviewees said that they made up their minds to support independence after the movement because they realized that the CCP would never give democracy as they had promised. Self-determination or independence became the ultimate choice. The other five relatively older activists I interviewed

170 said that they started to advocate independence in 2010 after the pan-democrats failed to oppose the high-speed rail network linking the city to the mainland. They believe the only choice is to protect local rights and stop the inference from a richer and more powerful China.

The rise of the Hong Kong independence movement is the response to the CCP’s firm position on controlling Hong Kong’s democratic process. For these uncompromising anti- government activists and their supporters, soft repression, such as state propaganda, seems ineffective in an open and law-abiding society. Since Hong Kong is different from Mainland

China, these SMOs can use various forms of media to mobilize themselves and the public to innovate contentious repertoires and organization transformation (Lin, 2017). Therefore, the

CCP and Hong Kong’s government started using hard repression, such as legal means, to constrain the activities and growth of these SMOs. Thus, they have disqualified pro- independence candidates and lawmakers, imprisoned activists, created obstacles to SMOs’ survival (such as making it hard to open a bank account), and declared that publicly advocating independence is illegal.

Mobilization is driven by threats (Goldstone & Tilly, 2001; Einwonhner, 2003). Hard repression used by the state can create widespread sympathy for a movement (Hess & Martin,

2006). After independence banners appeared on several university campuses in Hong Kong, university officials said the banners were illegal, and People’s Daily, the CCP’s official newspaper, urged the Hong Kong government to legally forbid residents from advocating independence (Cheung, 2017). This raised the level of tension and triggered a discussion of the importance of protecting freedom of speech in Hong Kong. Bystanders who used to keep their distance from the movement, such as scholars, politicians, and some news media, began to defend the right to publicly discuss independence. The debate has brought the issue into the

171 public arena and reached the broader public through mainstream media, which, in fact, makes the

Hong Kong Independence movement a legitimate issue rather than taboo.

State propaganda also adopted the strategy of labeling the pro-democratic movement as an independence movement. In its narrative of the Umbrella Movement, the organizers and participants are tantamount to supporters of Independence, although the political spectrum among the pro-democratic movement is quite wide. This also creates a counter-effect, since some people realize that, when dealing with the CCP, no distinction is drawn between themselves and those who support independence. In that case, seeking compromise and accommodation with Beijing becomes useless and unnecessary. Pro-democracy members of the public might as well go further and become pro-independence.

(Benford, 2013). The master frame of the Hong Kong Independence movement was originally from the localism movement, which advocated for the Hong Kong government to prioritize issues perceived as serving local residents. However, since the attributes of a master frame are flexible and inclusive, the SMOs of Hong Kong Independence adopted the frame and revised it to “Hong Kong Independence,” arguing that, in order for Hong Kong’s people to truly be prioritized in the allocation of resources, the local government needed more governance autonomy, and independence became the inevitable (and potentially only) solution. The strategy of their master frame is to emphasize the injustice of the current political system and the untrustworthiness of the CCP for their promise of “one country, two systems,” with the purpose of heightening the grievances of Hong Kongers. This new master frame mobilized some previous

172 supporters of localism. At the same time, this master frame has also been borrowed by other pro- democratic parties and politicians – those who are reacting to public opinion and seeking to expand their support base by trying to absorb new supporters from the localism movement.

However, state propaganda uses negative framing for both the independence and localism SMOs, portraying them as violent threats to society. Hong Kong’s local media that are under the CCP’s control or have a pro-Beijing political stance also follow the state propaganda strategy.

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Chapter 8

Conclusion

Propaganda from the government exists almost everywhere in China: on the streets, in textbooks, and of course, in the media. Although the CCP changed the English-translated name of the Propaganda Department to the Publicity Department, its Chinese name retains the same wording – Xuchuan (propaganda). This department oversees ideology-related work and the enforcement of media censorship and control in China. After the 19th Party Congress in

November 2017, the CCP committed to managing its massive censorship and propaganda apparatus to launch campaigns overseas to promote China’s development path as a model for other countries and to reinforce the identity of Chinese people in different countries by using nationalistic propaganda. In coming years, propaganda from the CCP is expected to increase both at home and abroad. As Chinese President Xi Jinping noted in his speech, “We will never allow anyone, any organization, or any political party, at any time or in any form, to separate any part of Chinese territory from China” (Buckley & Bradsher, 2017); nationalistic propaganda, especially counter-secession propaganda, will continue to serve as an effective instrument for the

CCP to maintain its legitimacy and authority.

The current research offers a timely investigation of some new propaganda strategies adopted by China’s ruling party. This research goes beyond what other studies have demonstrated in terms of how successful and effective such nationalist propaganda is (Huang,

2016b; Shi, Lu & Aldrich, 2011; Stockman, 2011; Zhao, 1998) and analyzes the propaganda information flows in four independence movements in Tibet, Xinjiang, Taiwan, and Hong Kong.

This may be one of the first studies that investigates how the same government used different framing strategies and propaganda effects in both closed and open societies. Under the policy of

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“one country, two systems,” Hong Kong is a capitalist society governed by the rule of law, which makes it similar to other open societies; thus, what occurs in Hong Kong demonstrates the strengths and weaknesses of open societies in the face of state propaganda and censorship.

By analyzing the CCP’s use of domestic nationalist propaganda in the four independence movements in closed society, it is evident that different framing strategies were adopted. first, there is no Tibetan or Uyghur voice in state media when the latter reports on the Tibetan and

Xinjiang Independence movements. However, state propaganda reacted to local public opinion or included local public opinion in its narratives when the topic was related to Hong Kong and

Taiwan, which are under different political systems, in order to demonstrate local popular support for the state. This occurs when, for example, local polls show the unpopularity of independence movements among the local majority. Second, international media and Western governments are pointed to in order to demonstrate how China is bullied by the Western powers, which triggers the memory of a hundred years of humiliation in the stories about the Tibet and

Xinjiang independence movements. The meetings between the Dalai Lama and the leaders of foreign governments were held up as examples of how Western governments attempt to undermine the achievements China had made, which was taken as supporting China’s separatists.

In the stories about the Hong Kong and Taiwan independence movements, international media and Western governments were used as credible sources to demonstrate that the Chinese government and its official stance were widely supported by the international community – such as when the U.S. government noted that it supported the “one China” policy. Third, in regard to

Xinjiang and Tibet, anyone who challenges or even disagrees with the ruling party is portrayed as an enemy of the state in the propaganda published by state media. For example, the state media had launched an effective smear campaign against the Dalai Lama, the leader of Tibetan

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Independence. Some Chinese citizens, even in open societies, have spontaneously engaged in public protests against the Dalai Lama’s legal activities, in support of the sovereignty of China.

However, the state media didn’t pay much attention to those challengers who supported independence of Taiwan and Hong Kong. A comparison between stories about the Xinjiang and

Chechen independence movements found that the differences of framing strategies were the same. These findings illustrate that state propaganda uses different framing strategies when the territories are under total state control.

This study used Hong Kong Independence to demonstrate the frame context in an open society. State propaganda uses domestic frame strategies, including smear campaigns, against political opponents and also uses local public opinion to argue that the idea of Hong Kong

Independence is not welcomed by the majority of Hong Kong’s population. However, in an open society, the audience is able to react to state propaganda by searching for more information and making their own decisions; political opponents and challengers also have a chance to defend themselves. State propaganda accused political opponents of engaging in separatist activities, however, it failed to manufacture negative feelings among Hong Kong’s public. The low credibility of the CCP in Hong Kong influences individuals’ credibility assessments of state propaganda. It also implies that state propaganda will fail if its ideology and values are in conflict with the society in question. Socialist values represented by the CCP are inevitably in tension with the capitalist way of life in Hong Kong.

This study also focused on the effect of nationalist propaganda in closed and open societies. Using the example of Tibetan Independence, this research shows that the hostile media effect exists in a closed society. Inhabitants of Mainland China gave higher scores for the perceived message quality to state media than to foreign media. A third-person effect also exists.

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People tend to believe that others would be more easily persuaded by news stories than they would themselves, and this perception leads to support for government censorship. However, as

Little (2016) notes, in a closed society, state propaganda affects mass behavior without necessarily affecting mass belief: people who know the government is lying are motivated to coordinate their behavior in order to avoid standing out by defying authority. In the present study, there is evidence to show that Mainland Chinese passively react to state propaganda and show their support for government policies to avoid punishment. For some participants who finished the survey and used the source of the stories instead of their frame as their cue when rating the content, a possibility that should not be excluded is that the higher scores given to state media were because this is politically correct in China and avoids provoking government censors. During data collection, more than two thousand participants quit the survey when they were asked about their attitude towards Tibetan Independence, and I received several emails complaining about the question, which participants believed might get them into trouble. When the participants were asked whether they support censoring the two stories they just read, the perceived effect on others failed to predict whether people would support censorship. This also demonstrates that some participants believe censorship to be unnecessary; however, they still believe that they must show their support for government policy.

This study also demonstrates the strengths and weaknesses of an open society when subjected to state propaganda. The free flow of information is the key factor for democracy, since it enables citizens to counter state propaganda and facilitates the collective actions that create social change. However, in an open society, foreign governments are able to directly or indirectly control the media by using direct and indirect investment, cooptation, and repression such as intimidation, and manipulating advertising revenue by exerting influence on third parties.

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For commercial media outlets, advertising revenue is the key to survival in a free market economy. Luckily, even when the CCP has managed to control the mainstream media using different means in Hong Kong, citizens are able to find alternative information, and customer demand also restricts the commercial media from providing too much propaganda content. Thus, while the CCP has successfully controlled the mainstream media and thereby reduced the mobilization resources of SMOs, with alternative media and the free flow of information citizens still possess the means to produce and spread counter-narratives and engage in political mobilization. State hard repression also backfired in Hong Kong. It became the catalyst for mobilization and increased political participation, because Hong Kongers felt the threat to their way of life and core values. The rise of the independence movement in Hong Kong is among the different types of collective response to state repression.

The battle between state propaganda and counter-propaganda in an open society is intense and should not be neglected by scholars. By imposing censorship, authoritarian governments make information flow in only one direction, and at the same time, take advantage of open societies. Open societies are vulnerable when foreign governments dedicate enormous resources to extend their influence beyond their own borders. To take Hong Kong as an example, the efforts by state power to insert state propaganda into the media have changed the society’s media landscape. Public trust in media is declining in Hong Kong, leading to a polarized society and undermining civic society.

In a closed society, alternative rhetoric has a positive impact on the level of media literacy and counter-propaganda. If citizens in a closed society actively seek non-state propaganda narratives, the level of media literacy can be increased through self-education, and media literacy in turn helps citizens to counter propaganda. In Mainland China, state repression

178 also triggers resistance; contention between citizens and governments always exists. However, in contrast with Hong Kong, without the free flow of information, citizens in Mainland China are not able to accurately judge the political environment and the government’s degree of vulnerability, which makes collective action more difficult. At the same time, citizens adopt a passive attitude towards state propaganda and try to find alternative information using various means, such as VPN. The Chinese government, of course, understands the importance of information. Starting in 2013, the government has increased its investment in propaganda, both domestically and internationally; at the same time, dozens of regulations have been imposed to censor Internet content, including the new Cyber Law that took effect in 2017, and the crackdown on VPN. When the government adapts to and is empowered by information technology, the authoritarian model will be reinforced. The term “Digital Leninism”, which was coined by Sebastian Heilmann (2017), perfectly describes the CCP’s program of propaganda and censorship in the era of Xi, who just lifted the ban on term limitation and will likely be in power for the rest of his life. It is also captures the ambitious nature of this program, which not only targets domestic citizens to create an even more closed society, but also targets other nations.

Among open societies, Hong Kong is the first place for the CCP to maneuver its power and resources.

This project has some limitations. First, it focuses only on analyzing newspapers.

Although a state newspaper is the perfect source for analyzing the frame strategies of state propaganda, and the digital news media in China is limited to state media, the study would nonetheless provide a more comprehensive picture if it had additional data from digital and social media. For further studies, examining how the CCP uses the Internet to propel its propaganda into open societies would be an important and timely issue.

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Second, the analysis of framing strategies on the Four Independent Movements only explains how state propaganda works and does not explain why the government uses different framing strategies for Xinjiang, Tibet, Taiwan, and Hong Kong. However, this study does provide some suggestions for further studies on how states counter secession movements by using media and about the influence of media frames.

Finally, this study only focuses on how state propaganda undermines the mobilization of social movement organizations (SMOs). More studies should be undertaken to explore how

SMOs provide alternative information to counter propaganda, and to examine their presentational strategies.

As the findings show, China’s ruling party relies on its propaganda system not only for consolidating its legality and political power within the domestic political environment, but also for branding its international presence and soft power in the world. In this sense, this dissertation makes an original contribution to closing a significant research gap regarding how an authoritarian government attempts to coordinate its domestic and overseas propaganda strategies in order to influence people living in open societies.

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VITA

Luwei Rose Luqiu

EDUCATION Pennsylvania State University State College, PA Ph.D. Candidate in Mass Communications Aug 2015 – May 2018

Harvard University Cambridge, MA Nieman Fellow Aug 2006 – June 2007

Hong Kong University Hong Kong Diploma in International Relation Sept 2003- June 2004

Hong Kong Baptist University Hong Kong M.A. in Mass Communication Sept 1997 – July 1999

Fudan University Shanghai, PRC B.A. in Philosophy Sept 1988 – June 1992

PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCES Phoenix Satellite Television Co. Ltd., Hong Kong Chief correspondent/Commentator Jan 2013- May 2015

Executive News Editor/Anchor Dec 2003– Dec 2012

Reporter/Assignment Editor Jun 1997– Dec 2003

TVBS Hong Kong Reporter/Sub-editor Apr 1996–Jun 1997

Chinese Television Network Hong Kong Sub-editor Dec 1995–Mar 1996

Price Waterhouse Shenzhen, China Auditor Dec 1992–Nov 1995