The Strategy of Unruffled Persistence
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171 THE STRATEGY OF UNRUFFLED PERSISTENCE BORG OLIVIER'S 1952 NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT JOSEPH M. PIROTIA Following the restoration of Responsible Government in 1947, Maltese Govern ment delegations went to London in 1948 and 1949 for talks with the Secretary of State for the Colonies and his officials.o> The common factor underlining these visits was Malta's precarious financial and economic situation. This was partly due to the devastation caused during the Second World War, and partly to Imperial defence policy which caused the Island's economy to become lop-sided. Officials at the Colonial Office had become used to negotiating with both Boffa and Mintoff. Steady refusal tended to result in Boffa ultimately accepting the situation. Mintoff tended to react stormily and to attempt to devise ways and means of hitting back in an effort to convince the British to change their attitude. <2> In 1952, the Colonial Office had to deal with Dr G. Borg Olivier. Like Mintoff, Borg Olivier would not accept a negative answer, but his reactions, as well as his subsequent tactics, differed considerably from either Boffa's or Mintoff's. It is my intention in this paper to examine Borg Olivier's negotiating strategy, and evaluate the degree of success obtained by it. Borg Olivier's Commitment to Constitutional Reform Notary George Borg Olivier, became leader of the Part it Naz~onalista and Prime Minister within a few hours of Dr Enrico Mizzi's death on 20 December 1950.(3) The 38 year old notary had been deputy party leader since 18 September 1949.<4> The I. Dr Paul Boffa, Labour Prime Minister between 1947 and 1950, and Mr Dom Mintoff, Minister of Public Works and Reconstruction (1947 -49), formed the delegations. For a full treatment of the political events and issues of the period, see Pirotta J.M., Fortress Colony: The Final Act 1945-64, Vol. I. Malta ( 1987). 2. The differing attitudes adopted by Boffa and Mintoff precipitating a split in the Malta Labour Party and led to a government crisis. 3. Dr Enrico Mizzi, leader of the Nationalist Party, became Prime Minister at the head of a minority governrpent in October 1950. 4. Following Mizzi's deportation to Uganda on 13th February 1942, and the death of the Nationalist Party's co-leader, Sir Ugo Mifsud on lith February 1942, Borg Olivier had become the chief Nationalist spokesman in the Council of Government. By the time of Mizzi 's repatriation on 8 March 1945, many Nationalists had begun to consider Borg Olivier as the de jure deputy party leader. He was formally elected to this post during the party's 1949 Congress. 172 Nationalist Administration that he continued to lead was, as expected, short-lived,<5l but Borg Olivier's career as Party leader began quite successfully. In the General Election held in May 1951, the Nationalist Party gained a further three seats and emerged once more as the largest party in the Legislative Assembly although it remained short of an overall majority.<6l A coalition government was formed between the Nationalists and Boffa's Malta Workers Party, with Borg Olivier as Prime Minister. Borg Olivier possessed a strong commitment to traditional Nationalist policy of seeking dominion status for Malta. He had inherited this commitment from his predecessor Enrico Mizzi.(7) He believed that Malta's priority was the earliest possible shedding of its colonial status. In July 1951 he explained to the Giornale d'ltalia that the Nationalist Party's fundamental principles included defence of the ... Constitutional rights on which our aspirations for Dominion Status are based.<8l In November he told the Legislative Assembly: What I and my party want is a radical [constitutional] reform. We aspire to Dominion Status, and I will continue to believe until I die that before Malta achieves certain responsibility she cannot make any progress.<9l The most pressing problem facing Borg Olivier's Administration was the Island's uncertain financial and economic position. In a statement to the Legislative Assembly on 25 June 1951, Dr J. Frendo Azzopardi, Minister of Finance, predicted 'a deficit of not less than £832,000' at the end of the financial year.< 10l On 19 July the Administration resorted to a Temporary Borrowing Bill to raise £500,000. This sum was required to meet the increased cost of importing meat and other essential commodities. oo In October the Government announced that a ministerial delegation would proceed to London at the earliest opportunity. It would seek financial and economic aid to put Malta's 'yearly budget on a sounder footing. '< 12l The government expressed its determination 5. In the 1950 General Election to fill the 40 seats in the Legislative Assembly, the Nationalist Party won 12 seats; Malta Labour Party - II seats; Boffa's Labour Group - II seats; Constitutional Party - 4 seats; Democratic Action Party - I seat; and Dr G. Cauchi was elected as an Independent. The minority government was decisively defeated on 10 February 1951. Legislative Assembly Debates, 10-2-51. 6. The 1951 election result was: Nationalist Party - 15 seats; Malta Labour Party - 14 seats; Malta Workers Party (ex-B.L.G.) - 7 seats; Constitutional Party - 4 seats. 7. The Nationalist Administration of 1932-33, formally demanded dominion status for Malta in 1932. Mizzi F.P., A Memorandum on the Dominion Status of Malta, Malta (1964), reproduces the relevant documents. 8. As quoted in Patria!, 8-8-51. 9. Legislative Assembly Debates, 21-11-51. 10. Ibid., 26-5- 51 . The 1951 -52 Financial Estimates had not yet been presented for the Legislative Assembly's approval. II. Ibid., 19-7-51 . Prices on world markets had soared as a result of the Korean War. Malta had also been hit by sterling's devaluation. 12. Ibid., 16-10-51. THE 1952 DELEGATION 173 to leave nothing undone in[its] endeavour to secure wider constitutioalliberties by the removal of reserved matters.< 13> In a broadcast to the nation prior to the delegation's departure, Borg Olivier stated that they would insist on immediate financial assistance[so as to] be able to count on a certain degree of stability in the economy ... a stability that will enable us to keep pace with our political development.< 14> The reference to political development in connection with the scheduled financial talks was indicative of the Nationalist leader's primary political objective. Although it seems fairly certain that Malta's constitutional status was very much on Borg Olivier's mind on the eve of the delegation's departure for London, he had made no attempt to broach the subject with the Colonial Office. This indicates that he did not judge the moment to be opportune for a direct approach. But as the talks proceeded Borg Olivier was ready to grab any opportunity to draw attention to Malta's constitutional restrictions, and to attempt to lesson them. Delegation's Poor Prospects for Success The Colonial Office did not welcome the imminent arrival in London of yet another Maltese delegation claiming a right to financial aid. Maltese political parties were unanimous that the role of fortress colony imposed by Britain on Malta had warped the Island's economy by rendering it subservient to Imperial defence needs. The British rejected the notion that Malta had a right to aid. J.S. Bennett, a Colonial Office official, had tried, in connection with another matter, to come to grips with the problem: 'The crux of the matter is what can be regarded as Malta's rightful due.' The British point of view was bluntly entered in the margin - 'Answer: Nothing. •os> Britain was only ready to consider need as the basis for any claim submitted by Malta.< 16> Such a premise was totally unacceptable to the Maltese who had a 'dislike of coming forward cap in hand. '< 17> British officials regarded the Maltese as obdurate. This made them rather appre hensive of a Maltese delegation led by Borg Olivier, whom the Governor, Sir Gerald Creasy, described as 'most stubborn and obstinate.'< 18> On this occasion the urgency of receiving the Maltese delegation was emphasised by the Governor, who was greatly perturbed by the Island's financial situation. However, when Creasy suggested to Sir J.M. Martin at the Colonial Office that it 9 was essential that the delegation did not return 'entirely empty-handed,'0 > he was 13. Ibid. Reserved matters covered those areas which, under the 1947 Constitution the British government reserved to its jurisdiction alone. 14. Broadcast by Dr G. Borg Olivier, as reported in the Times ofMalta 31 - 5 -52 . 15. Minute by 1 .S. Bennett, C.O. !58 584 89859. 16. Note prepared by 1 .M. Martin regarding a proposed Parliamentary Paper on Malta. C.O. !58 584 89889. 17. Minute by C.M. Harrison 7-2- 52 . C.O. 926 108. 18. Creasy to Martin, 9- I -52 . C.O. 926 108. 19. Ibid. 174 THE 1952 DELEGATION told that there was 'not the least chance of further financial assistance being approv ed'<20> to Malta. At the Colonial Office it was deemed that a good deal of the U.K. case would 'consist of saying "No" or "Why" ,'<21 > Mr Oliver Lyttelton, Secretary of State for the Colonies, did not possess a free hand to settle financial and economic claims on his own authority. His decisions had to have prior Treasury approval. Not only was the Treasury at this time particularly antagonistic towards Malta/22> but they were also grappling with Britian's own economic problems. Lyttelton therefore asked the Malta Government to submit a list of the matters they wished to discuss.