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[2005] 1 MLJ 15 MAJLIS PEGUAM MALAYSIA & ORS v RAJA SEGARAN A/L KRISHNAN
COURT OF APPEAL (PUTRAJAYA) — CIVIL APPEAL NO W–02–75 OF 2000 RICHARD MALANJUM, HASHIM YUSOFF, TENGKU BAHARUDIN SHAH MAHMUD JJCA 24 SEPTEMBER 2004
Civil Procedure — Parties — Locus standi — Association of persons proposing a course of action — Individual arguing against that cause of action — Whether individual could seek injunction to prevent association from acting in breach of law — Whether special injury proven
Constitutional Law — Judiciary — Judicial misconduct — Allegation of judicial misconduct — Discussion on judicial misconduct — Whether ultra vires Federal Constitution — Federal Constitution arts 125 & 127
Legal Profession — Malaysian Bar — Powers — Resolution to appoint board to make inquiries and recommendations to restore confidence in judiciary — Whether amount to contempt of court and sedition — Whether ultra vires powers of Legal Profession Act 1976 — Whether Malaysian Bar be injuncted from holding meeting to discuss such resolutions — Legal Profession Act 1976 s 42(1) (d)
Tort — Defamation — Libel — Maker of statement — Whether statement contemptuous — Whether maker’s intention is relevant in deciding whether statement contemptuous
There are five appeals all filed by the appellants and they arose from two civil suits namely S2–23–93 of 1999 (‘the first suit’) and S2–23–33 of 2000 (‘the second suit’) both filed by the respondent which will be decided together. The first suit was triggered by the move of the Malaysian Bar to hold an Extraordinary General Meeting ‘EGM’ to discuss allegations of impropriety against the then Chief Justice. The respondent, a member of the Bar initiate the first suit seeking various declaration and injunction on the ground that the EGM, and the proposed resolution were ultra vires, contemptuous and seditious. Pending the trial of the first suit the respondent filed an application for an interlocutory injunction while the appellants applied for the suit to be struck out. The learned judge allowed the respondent’s
For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 2 application and dismissed the appellants’ application. The appellants appeals against both the decisions were also dismissed. Subsequently, the respondent filed an application under O 33 r 2 of the Rules of the High Court 1980 (‘the RHC’) for a preliminary issue to be tried and the learned judge allowed the respondent’s application. And on 10 November 2003 the learned judge allowed the various declarations sought by the respondent. Dissatisfied with the decisions the appellants filed three separate appeals inter alia, (a) Civil Appeal W–02–75 of 2004 (Appeal 75) which is against the ||Page 16>> judgment of the learned judge delivered on 10 November 2003; (b) Civil Appeal W–02–647 of 2000 (Appeal 647) which is against the ruling of the learned judge allowing the application by the respondent for the trial of a preliminary issue pursuant to O 33 r 2 of the RHC and (c) Civil Appeal W– 02–780 of 2000 (Appeal 780) which is against the dismissal by the learned judge of the preliminary objection on the issue of secrecy of proceedings conducted by the Bar Council. The second suit was filed as a result of two events, namely, the letter issued on or about 7 June 2000 and amended on 8 June 2000 by the then secretary of the Bar Council to all its members and the public statement purportedly released by the Chairman of the Bar Council in connection with a proposed general meeting of the Malaysian Bar. There were various declaration and injunctions sought by the respondent. An application for interlocutory injunction was also filed in relation to the second suit. It was heard by the same learned judge for the first suit. A preliminary objection was raised by the appellants but it was dismissed. The second suit still pending before the High Court. Dissatisfied with the decisions the appellants also filed two separate appeals inter alia, (a) Civil Appeal W–02–512 of 2000 (Appeal 512) which is against the dismissal of a preliminary objection and (b) Civil Appeal W–02–521 of 2000 (Appeal 521) which is against the granting of the interlocutory injunction. The issues for consideration were: (a) whether the actions of the Bar Council and the Malaysian Bar in calling for the EGM and the proposed general meeting were ultra vires the Legal Profession Act 1976 (‘the LPA’); (b) whether the respondent had the locus standi to institute the suits; (c) whether the High Court had the jurisdiction to grant the relief sought for in the suits and/or the interlocutory applications vis-à-vis contempt of court and the offence of sedition; (d) whether the learned judge failed to observe any of the guidelines above before granting the interlocutory injunction; (e) whether it was correct for the learned judge not to disqualify himself from hearing the suits and applications related thereto; (f) whether the learned judge was correct in refusing to recognize s 76(2) of the LPA as providing the shield of secrecy of all proceedings conducted by the Bar Council and (g) whether O 33 r 2 the RHC properly invoked.
Held, dismissing all the appeals: (1) Being creatures of statute the Bar Council and the Malaysian Bar must act and conduct their affairs within the framework of the LPA. Acts or conducts
For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 3 beyond its parameters would be ultra vires. Hence, in convening the proposed EGM and the proposed general meeting to discuss allegations of impropriety against the then Chief Justice, the Bar ||Page 17>> Council and the Malaysian Bar must be able to satisfy the court that they were acting within the ambit and the parameters of the LPA. The trial judge had correctly noted that this was not the case (see para 54). (2) There was no evidence adduced during the trial in respect of the first suit that there was a request from any quarters for the Bar Council or the Malaysian Bar as a statutory body to express their views or to act or conduct as they did. As such, the Bar Council and the Malaysian Bar were not legally entitled to claim the right or even the privilege to act or conduct as they did notwithstanding the constraints in the LPA. As to who should request for their views is of course another issue but surely it has to come from a relevant and proper authority. At the same time, the appellants’ contention that the sub-s 42(1)(d) is ambiguous was also rejected (see para 56). (3) The act or conduct in convening the proposed EGM and the proposed general meeting was contrary to or undermined Arts 125 and 127 of the Constitution. Such act or conduct of the Bar Council and the Malaysian Bar was unconstitutional, and hence ultra vires the LPA (see para 58). (4) It is inconceivable to say that the proposed EGM and the proposed general meeting would be upholding the cause of justice or to protect the public in matters touching or incidental to the law when the net effect is to ‘censure’ the Judiciary while permitting discussion on the conduct of His Majesty’s Judges in flagrant disregard to Arts 125 and 127 of the Constitution. There is much to say in support of the wisdom of art 127. And allowing an open discussion on conduct of His Majesty’s Judges could amount to questioning the wisdom of the King in his selection. Further the judiciary thrives on the public confidence in the system. Openly criticizing the judiciary could bring about public misunderstanding of the system and would then produce unwarranted public misgivings (see para 61). (5) The notice of 12 October 1999 and the proposed resolution of 12 October 1999 issued by the appellants were contemptuous particularly the language used in the notice of 12 October 1999 seems to suggest that it was a fact that serious allegations of impropriety have been made against certain members of the judiciary. By using the word ‘understands’ it was clear that the appellants, whilst insidiously suggesting a fact, yet are not taking responsibility for asserting such a fact. It is also to be noted that what amounts to contempt of court in this country is also very much a question of fact and guided by common law principles and the learned judge is correct in applying the facts and principles before him (see para 70). (6) The respondent could take out an injunction to restrain the appellants to protect his own interest and if the court is satisfied that the act ||Page 18>> complained of could give rise to the respondent facing criminal
For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 4 prosecution, the respondent ought to be allowed to use injunctive measures to stop the appellants (see para 83). (7) The element of being a member of a statutory body is vital and as a member the respondent has the right to restrain a corporation from doing ultra vires acts. Since, the proposed resolution of 12 October 1999, the holding of the proposed EGM and the proposed general meeting were ultra vires the LPA the question of locus standi of the respondent should not arise and the question of special damage in such situation plays only a minor role. It follows that there is no question of the civil court being asked to enforce any criminal law (see para 95). (8) As a member of the Malaysian Bar the respondent would definitely have been exposed to potential prosecution for sedition and contempt had the proposed EGM and the general meeting proceeded. The fact that he was only one of the many members should not negate his standing to sue on his own to ensure that he would not be exposed to unnecessary legal complexities. The test would be the ‘special damage’ test and the respondent had satisfied the test (see para 97). (9) There is no strict requirement in an application for injunction that the analysis must be systematic and perhaps erudite. Reading the judgment of the learned judge as a whole it can be said that there were serious issues to be tried such as whether the allegations were true or plain hearsay, whether there was any basis to call for the suspension of the then Chief Justice and the consequence of the acts of the appellants. Further, the learned judge did consider where the justice of the case should lie, public interest and balanced the damage that could arise if the proposed general meeting was held (see para 6–7). (10) In determining a recusal issue the primary questions to consider should be whether there was a real danger of bias on the part of the learned trial judge and whether the allegation and the factual circumstance could have caused a fair-minded and informed bystander to entertain a fear of real danger of bias. And it would be stretching too far the principles of law enunciated on when judges and arbiters should recuse from hearing cases which involves similar issues and points (see para 120). (11) There is no provision in the Evidence Act 1950 (‘the EA’) which allows a witness to rely on a statutory protection such as contained in s 76(2) of the LPA and also no expressed exclusion in s 76(2) of the LPA. Unless it is expressly excluded the provisions of the EA apply in any court proceedings as founded in s 2 of the EA. Sections 118 and 136 would have been the provisions in answer (if any objection raised) when Mr R Rajasingam former member of Bar Council was called as a witness to answer a specific question, that is, whether the motion proposed by ||Page 19>> the Bar Council was the same as the proposed resolution of 12 October 1999 to be tabled during the proposed EGM. However, this was not raised and the issue of secrecy fails (see paras 123 and 128).
For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 5 (12) In invoking O 33 r 2 of the RHC the issues in a case should be clear and not riddled with complexities and the facts should not be in dispute. Where the issues on point of law to be decided involve the consideration of facts, resort to O 33 r 2 of the RHC is inappropriate. It is undesirable to resolve such issues on a purely hypothetical state of facts. Further, in the court below the second appellant was conceding to the approach taken by the respondent in proceeding under O 33 r 2 of the RHC and in fact suggested the proposed question in determining the contempt and sedition issues. In addition thereto, since intention is not an element that has to be proved to establish the contempt and sedition, the appellants’ contention that they might call witnesses for the purpose of establishing intention or motive is irrelevant. As such the learned judge was right in allowing the invocation of O 33 r 2 of the RHC in determining the contempt and sedition issues (see paras 135, 136, 138, 139 and 140); Murray Hiebert v Chandra Sri Ram [1999] 4 MLJ 321 (refd).
[ Bahasa Malaysia summary
Terdapat lima rayuan yang kesemuanya difailkan oleh perayu dan rayuan-rayuan ini berbangkit daripada dua guaman sivil iaitu S2–23–93 tahun 1999 (guaman pertama tersebut) dan S2–23–33 tahun 2000 (guaman kedua tersebut) kedua-duanya difailkan oleh responden yang akan diputuskan secara bersama. Guaman pertama berbangkit menerusi tindakan oleh Majlis Peguam untuk mengadakan suatu EGM bagi membincangkan dakwaan salah laku terhadap Ketua Hakim Negara pada masa itu. Plaintif, seorang peguam dan ahli Majlis Peguam memulakan guaman pertama tersebut memohon pelbagai perintah deklarasi dan injunksi atas alasan bahawa EGM dan resolusi yang dicadangkan adalah ultra vires, menghina dan hasutan. Sementara menunggu perbicaraan guaman pertama tersebut responden telah memfailkan satu permohonan untuk perintah injunksi manakala perayu-perayu memohon supaya permohonan tersebut dibatalkan. Hakim bijaksana membenarkan permohonan responden dan menolak permohonan perayu-perayu. Kedua-dua rayuan perayu-perayu kemudiannya telah ditolak. Seterusnya, responden memfailkan satu permohonan di bawah A 33 k 2 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah Tinggi 1980 (‘KMT’) untuk satu isu utama dibicarakan dan hakim bijaksana telah membenarkan permohonan responden. Dan pada 10 November 2003 hakim bijaksana membenarkan deklarasi-deklarasi yang dipohon oleh responden. ||Page 20>> Tidak puas hati dengan keputusan-keputusan tersebut di atas perayu-perayu telah memfailkan tiga rayuan yang berasingan antara lain, (a) Rayuan sivil W– 02–75 tahun 2004 (Rayuan 75) adalah terhadap keputusan hakim bijaksana yang bertarikh pada 10 November 2003; (b) Rayuan sivil W–02–647 tahun 2000 (Rayuan 647) adalah terhadap keputusan hakim bijaksana yang membenarkan permohonan responden untuk membicarakan isu permulaan berdasarkan A 33 k 2 KMT dan (c) Rayuan sivil
For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 6 W–02–780 tahun 2000 (Rayuan 780) adalah terhadap keputusan hakim bijaksana yang menolak bantahan permulaan terhadap isu kerahsiaan prosiding yang telah dilaksanakan oleh Majlis Peguam. Guaman kedua telah difailkan akibat daripada dua peristiwa, iaitu, surat yang dikeluarkan pada atau 7 Jun 2000 dan kemudiannya dipinda pada 8 Jun 2000 oleh setiausaha Majlis Peguam pada masa itu kepada kesemua ahli-ahlinya dan pernyataan awam yang kononnya dikeluarkan oleh Pengerusi Majlis Peguam yang berkaitan dengan mesyuarat am Majlis Peguam yang telah dicadangkan. Responden memohon pelbagai deklarasi dan injunksi. Satu permohonan untuk injunksi turut difailkan oleh responden. Permohonan ini turut didengar oleh hakim bijaksana yang mendengar guaman pertama tersebut. Satu bantahan awalan dibangkitkan oleh perayu-perayu akan tetapi bantahan awalan tersebut telah ditolak oleh perayu. Guaman kedua masih menunggu untuk perbicaraan di Mahkamah Tinggi. Tidak puas hati dengan keputusan-keputusan tersebut perayu-perayu memfailkan dua rayuan yang berasingan antara lain, (a) Rayuan sivil W–02– 512–00 (Rayuan 512) adalah terhadap keputusan hakim bijaksana yang menolak bantahan awalan dan (b) Rayuan Sivil W–02–521–00 (Rayuan 521) adalah terhadap keputusan hakim bijaksana yang membenarkan permohonan injunksi interlokutori. Isu-isu untuk pertimbangan adalah: (a) sama ada tindakan Majlis Peguam dan Badan Peguam dalam memanggil EGM dan mesyuarat agung yang telah dicadangkan adalah ultra vires Akta Profesion Undang-Undang 1976 (“APU”); (b) sama ada responden mempunyai locus standi untuk memfailkan tindakan-tindakan ini; (c) sama ada Mahkamah Tinggi mempunyai bidang kuasa untuk membenarkan relif-relif yang dipohon dalam tindakan-tindakan ini dan/atau permohonan-permohonan interlokutori iaitu penghinaan mahkamah dan kesalahan hasutan; (d) sama ada hakim bijaksana gagal untuk memberi perhatian kepada mana-mana panduan di atas sebelum membenarkan permohonan injunksi interlokutori; (e) sama ada adalah betul untuk hakim bijaksana untuk tidak mengecualikan dirinya daripada mendengar guaman-guaman dan permohonan-permohonan yang berkaitan dengannya; (f) sama ada hakim bijaksana adalah betul apabila enggan mengiktiraf s 76(2) APU yang diperuntukkan sebagai perisai rahsia kepada segala prosiding yang dijalankan oleh Majlis Peguam dan (g) sama ada A 33 k 2 KMT tersebut adalah sesuai untuk diguna pakai. ||Page 21>>
Diputuskan, menolak kesemua rayuan: (1) Memandangkan Majlis Peguam dan Badan Peguam adalah diwujudkan oleh suatu Akta ia hendaklah bertindak dan menjalankan segala tindak-tanduknya di bawah lingkungan APU. Perbuatan dan tindakan di luar lingkungan adalah ultra vires. Maka, dalam mengadakan EGM yang dicadangkan dan mesyuarat agung yang dicadangkan untuk membincangkan dakwaan salah laku terhadap Ketua Hakim Negara, Majlis Peguam dan Badan Peguam hendaklah memuaskan mahkamah bahawa mereka bertindak di bawah skop lingkungan APU. Hakim bicara dengan sememangnya betul dalam mengambil perhatian bahawa ini
For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 7 bukanlah keadaannya (lihat perenggan 54). (2) Tidak terdapat sebarang keterangan telah dikemukakan semasa perbicaraan khususnya guaman pertama bahawa di dalam itu terdapat satu permintaan daripada mana-mana pihak di dalam Badan Peguam ataupun Majlis Peguam yang merupakan badan berkanun untuk menyatakan pandangan mereka atau bertindak atau berkelakuan seperti mereka. Oleh itu, Badan Peguam dan Majlis Peguam tidak berhak di bawah undang-undang untuk menyatakan bahawa mereka mempunyai hak atau mempunyai keistimewaan untuk bertindak atau berkelakuan sebagaimana yang dilakukan meskipun terdapat sekatan-sekatan di bawah APU. Berkaitan dengan siapa yang perlu memohon kepada pandangan-pandangan mereka adalah satu isu yang lain tetapi sebenarnya ia adalah terjatuh di bawah pihak yang sesuai dan relevan. Pada masa yang sama, pernyataan perayu-perayu bahawa sub-s 42(1)(d) adalah kabur juga hendaklah ditolak (lihat perenggan 56). (3) Tindakan atau kelakuan dalam mengadakan EGM dan mesyuarat agung yang dicadangkan adalah bertentangan kepada atau memperkecil-kecilkan Perkara 125 dan 127 Perlembagaan. Tindakan atau kelakuan Majlis Peguam dan badan Peguam sedemikian tidak berperlembagaan dan dengan itu adalah ultra vires APU (lihat perenggan 58). (4) Tidak dapat dibayangkan bahawa EGM dan mesyuarat agung yang dicadangkan akan mempertahankan keadilan atau melindungi orang awam dalam perkara-perkara tentang atau berkaitan dengan undang-undang sedangkan kesan akhirnya adalah untuk “mengecam” badan kehakiman di samping membenarkan perbincangan tentang kelakuan hakim-hakim Yang Dipertuan Agong secara ketara tidak menghormati Perkara 125 dan 127 Perlembagaan. Banyak boleh diperkatakan dalam menyokong kearifan Perkara 127. Dan membenarkan perbincangan terbuka kelakuan hakim-hakim Yang Dipertuan Agong boleh terjumlah kepada mempersoalkan kebijaksanaan Yang Dipertuan Agong dalam pemilihan baginda. Tambahan pula, badan kehakiman berkembang maju dalam sistemnya atas dasar kepercayaan orang awam. Mengkritik badan kehakiman secara terbuka akan menyebabkan orang awam salah ||Page 22>> sangka terhadap sistem keadilan dan akhirnya menghasilkan perasaan waswas di kalangan umum (lihat perenggan 61). (5) Notis bertarikh 12 Oktober 1999 dan resolusi yang dicadangkan yang bertarikh 12 Oktober 1999 yang dikeluarkan oleh perayu-perayu adalah menghina khususnya bahasa yang digunakan di dalam notis bertarikh 12 Oktober 1999 yang mencadangkan ia adalah satu fakta bahawa dakwaan salah laku yang serius telah dibuat terhadap segolongan ahli-ahli kehakiman. Dengan penggunaan perkataan ‘understands’ adalah jelas bahawa perayu-perayu, secara dari dalamnya mencadangkan fakta bahawa, walaupun enggan bertanggungjawab dalam menyatakan fakta sedemikian. Adalah perlu diambil kira bahawa apa yang terjumlah kepada penghinaan di negara ini adalah
For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 8 persoalan fakta dan dibimbing oleh prinsip-prinsip common law dan hakim bijaksana adalah betul dalam menerima pakai fakta-fakta dan prinsip-prinsip di hadapannya (lihat perenggan 70). (6) Responden boleh memohon perintah injunksi untuk menghalang perayu-perayu demi menjaga kepentingannya dan sekiranya mahkamah berpuas hati bahawa tindakan yang diadu yang mana akan menyebabkan responden didakwa bagi kesalahan jenayah, responden seharusnya dibenarkan untuk mengguna langkah tahanan bagi menghalang perayu-perayu (lihat perenggan 83). (7) Menjadi ahli satu badan statutori adalah elemen yang penting dan sebagai ahli, responden mempunyai hak untuk menghalang satu perbadanan daripada melakukan tindakan yang ultra vires. Memandangkan resolusi yang bertarikh 12 Oktober 1999, mengadakan EGM dan mesyuarat agung yang dicadangkan adalah ultra vires APU maka persoalan locus standi responden tidak seharusnya timbul dan persoalan ganti rugi khas hanya memainkan fungsi kecil. Ia diikuti bahawa tiada persoalan yang mana mahkamah sivil diminta untuk menguatkuasakan undang-undang jenayah (lihat perenggan 95). (8) Sebagai ahli Badan Peguam responden pasti didedahkan kepada kemungkinan pendakwaan untuk hasutan dan penghinaan sekiranya EGM dan mesyuarat agung yang dicadangkan itu diteruskan. Fakta bahawa responden hanya seorang daripada banyak ahli yang lain tidak patut menyangkal kedudukannya untuk membawa tindakan secara sendiri untuk memastikan bahawa responden tidak didedahkan kepada kompleksiti undang-undang yang tidak wajar. Ujiannya adalah ujian ‘special damage’ dan responden telah memuaskan ujian tersebut (lihat perenggan 97). (9) Tidak terdapat keperluan yang ketat dalam permohonan untuk injunksi bahawa analisis hendaklah sistematik dan seharusnya berilmu. Pembacaan penghakiman hakim bijaksana secara keseluruhan adalah ||Page 23>> boleh dikatakan bahawa terdapat isu-isu serius patut dibicarakan seperti sama ada dakwaan-dakwaan adalah benar atau hanya dengar cakap, sama ada terdapat apa-apa asas dalam memanggil untuk penggantungan Ketua hakim Negara pada masa itu dan juga kesan tindakan perayu-perayu itu sendiri. Seterusnya, hakim bijaksana turut mengambil kira di mana keadilan kes tersebut patut wujud, kepentingan awam dan juga mengimbang ganti rugi yang akan timbul sekiranya mesyuarat agung yang dicadangkan itu diteruskan (lihat perenggan 106–107). (10) Dalam menentukan isu penarikan diri hakim bijaksana persoalan utama yang harus diambil kira adalah sama ada terdapat ‘real danger of bias’ dipihak hakim perbicaraan yang bijaksana dan sama ada dakwaan fakta-fakta keadaan yang mana boleh menyebabkan seseorang yang berfikiran adil dan bijaksana akan menganggap wujudnya ‘real danger of bias’. Dan adalah meregangkan terlalu jauh prinsip undang-undang yang telah diperuntukkan bilamana hakim dan penimbang tara patut menarik diri daripada mendengar kes-kes yang melibatkan isu-isu dan butir-butir yang sama (lihat perenggan 120).
For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 9 (11) Tidak terdapat sebarang peruntukkan dalam Akta Keterangan 1950 (“Akta”) yang membenarkan saksi untuk bergantung kepada perlindungan statutori seperti yang terkandung di dalam s 76(2) APU dan juga tidak terdapat pengecualian yang nyata di dalam s 76(2) APU. Kecuali dengan nyata dikecualikan peruntukkan Akta Keterangan adalah terpakai di mana-mana prosiding mahkamah seperti yang diperuntukkan di dalam s 2 Akta. Seksyen-seksyen 118 dan 136 merupakan peruntukan yang akan menjadi jawapan (sekiranya bantahan dibuat) apabila En R Rajasingam ahli terdahulu Majlis Peguam yang telah dipanggil sebagai saksi untuk menjawab soalan spesifik, iaitu, sama ada usul yang dicadangkan oleh Majlis Peguam adalah sama dengan resolusi yang dicadangkan pada 12 Oktober 1999 yang akan dibentangkan semasa EGM yang dicadangkan. Walau bagaimanapun, ini tidak bangkitkan maka isu kerahsiaan adalah gagal (lihat perenggan 123 dan 128). (12) Dalam menerima pakai A 33 k 2 KMT isu-isu dalam kes hendaklah jelas dan tidak dipenuhi dengan kompleksiti dan fakta-fakta tidak boleh dipertikaikan. Di mana, persoalan perundangan yang diputuskan melibatkan pengambilan kira fakta-fakta, penggunaan A 33 k 2 KMT adalah tidak sesuai. Adalah susah untuk menyelesaikan isu-isu seumpama tersebut melalui fakta-fakta yang berdasarkan andaian. Malah, di Mahkamah Tinggi perayu kedua turut bersetuju kepada pendekatan yang diambil oleh responden di bawah A 33 k 2 KMT dan juga telah mencadangkan persoalan yang dapat menentukan isu-isu penghinaan dan hasutan. Di samping itu, memandangkan niat bukan merupakan elemen yang perlu dibuktikan di dalam kedua-dua ||Page 24>> penghinaan dan hasutan, pernyataan perayu-perayu bahawa mereka berkemungkinan akan memanggil saksi-saksi untuk membuktikan niat atau motif adalah tidak relevan. Maka, hakim bijaksana adalah betul dalam membenarkan pemakaian A 33 k 2 KMT dalam menentukan isu-isu penghinaan dan hasutan (lihat perenggan 135, 136, 138, 139 dan 140); Murray Hiebert v Chandra Sri Ram [1999] 4 MLJ 321 (dirujuk).
Notes For cases on locus standi, see 2 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2001 Reisue) paras 3924– 3981. For cases on the judiciary, see 3 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2000 Reissue) para 1660. For cases on the powers of the Malaysian Bar, see 9 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 1999 Reissue) para 1585. For cases on libel, see 12 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2000 Reissue) paras 263–352.
Cases referred to Advocate General v D Seshagiri Rao AIR [1966] Andhra Pradesh 167 (refd) Alor Janggus Soon Seng Trading Sdn Bhd & Ors v Sey Hoe Sdn Bhd & Ors [2002] 4 MLJ 327 (refd)
For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 10 American Cyanamid Co v Ethicon Ltd [1975] 1 All ER 504 (refd) Arab Malaysian Finance Bhd v Meridien International Credit Corporation Ltd London [1993] 3 MLJ 193 (refd) Attorney-General v Fred Zimmerman & Ors [1986] 2 MLJ 89 (refd) Bateman’s Bay Local Aboriginal Land Council and Another v Aboriginal Community Benefit Fund Pty Ltd and Another 155 ALR 684 (refd) Beevis v Dawson [1956] 3 All E R 837 (refd) Bermuda Cablevision Ltd v Colica trust Co Ltd (PC) [1998] AC 198 (refd) Brahma Prakash v State of UP AIR [1954] SC 10 (refd) C Ravichandran lyer v Justice AM Bhattacherjee & Ors [1995] 5 SCC 457 (refd) Cheng Hang Guan & Ors v Perumahan Farlim (Penang) Sdn Bhd & Ors [1988] 3 MLJ 90 (refd) Crown v A Rafique & Ors IR [37] 1950 Sind 1 (refd) DP Vijandran v Majlis Peguam [1995] 3 MLJ 576 (refd) Gallagher v Durack [1983] 57 ALJR 191 (refd) Garden Cottage Foods Ltd v Milk Marketing Board [1984] AC 130; [1983] 2 All ER 770; [1983] 3 WLR 143 (refd) Gouriet v Union of Post Office Workers [1978] LR 435 (distd) Government of Malaysia v Lim Kit Siang [1988] 2 MLJ 12 (refd) Hock Hua Bank (Sabah) Bhd v Yong Liuk Thin & Ors [1995] 2 MLJ 213 (refd) Hoole v Great Western Railway (1867) 3 Ch App 262 (refd) Inland Revenue Commissioners v National Federation of Self-employed & Small Businesses Ltd [1982] AC 617 (refd) Jenkin v Phamaceutical Society of Great Britain (1921) 1 Ch D 392 (refd) Keet Gerald Francis Noel John v Mohd Noor bin Abdullah & Ors [1995] 1 MLJ 193 (refd) ||Page 25>> Ketua Pengarah Jabatan Alam Sekitar & Anor v Kajing Tubek & Ors & Other Appeals [1997] 3 MLJ 23 (refd) Locabail (UK) Ltd v Bayfield Properties Ltd & Anor [2000] 1 All ER 65 (refd) Maju Holdings Sdn Bhd v Kamala Devi a/p Ramadass & Anor And Another Appeal [2003] 2 MLJ 36 (refd) Malaysia Shipyard v Bank Rakyat [1985] 2 CLJ 427 (refd) Mohamed Ezam bin Mohd Nor & Ors v Public Prosecutor [2002] 1 MLJ 321 (refd) Monatech (M) Sdn Bhd v Jasa Keramat Sdn Bhd [2002] 4 MLJ 241 (refd) Murray Hiebert v Chandra Sri Ram [1999] 4 MLJ 321 (refd) Newacres Sdn Bhd v Sri Alam Sdn Bhd [1991] 3 MLJ 474 (refd)
For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 11 Oh Keng Seng v Public Prosecutor [1980] 2 MLJ 244 (refd) Powell v Kempton Park Racecourse [1897] 2 QB 242 (refd) Public Prosecutor v Oh Keng Seng [1979] 2 MLJ 174 (refd) R v Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate, ex parte Pinochet Ugarte (No 2) [1999] 1 All ER 577 (refd) Raja Segaran a/l S Krishnan v Bar Council Malaysia & Ors [2000] 1 MLJ 1 (refd) Raja Segaran a/l S Krishnan v Bar Council Malaysia & Ors [2004] 1 MLJ 34 (refd) Rondel v Worsley [1967] 1QB 443 (refd) Simpson v Westminster Palace Hotel Co (1860) 8 HL Cas 712 (refd) Tan Ah Chin & Sons Sdn Bhd v Ooi Bee Tat & Anor [1993] 3 MLJ 633 (refd)
Legislation referred to Federal Constitution Arts 125, 127 Evidence Act 1950 ss 118, 123, 136, 162(2) Legal Profession Act 1976 ss 41(1)(a), (e), (g), 42(1)(d), 56, 57, 76(2) Rules of the High Court 1980 O 33 Sedition Act 1948 ss 3(1)(c), 4(1) (a)
YM Raja Aziz Addruse (Christopher Leong, Leo Su Chang, Ambiga Sreenevasen, Ranjit Singh, Kalvin Seet, James Kong, Gopal Sreenevasen with him) (Chooi & Co and Sivananthan) for the appellants. DP Vijandran (DP Vijandran & Associates) for the respondent.
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[2005] 1 MLJ 115 INSAS BHD & ANOR v DAVID SAMUELS & ORS
HIGH COURT (KUALA LUMPUR) — CIVIL SUIT NO S2–23–47 OF 1996 KAMALANATHAN RATNAM J 20 OCTOBER 2004
Tort — Defamation — Libel — Article in magazine — Whether words complained of defamatory of and concerned plaintiff — Whether words referred to plaintiff — Whether words published to third person
For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 12
Tort — Defamation — Libel — Article in magazine — Damages — Assessment
This was a libel action instituted by the plaintiffs against the defendants arising out of the publication of a feature article entitled ‘Malaysian Justice On Trial’ (‘the said article’) which was published in the November 1995 issue of the International Commercial Litigation magazine (‘the said magazine’). The said magazine was published in London and circulated in Malaysia and elsewhere. In their statement of claim, the plaintiffs pleaded that the natural and ordinary meanings of the words complained of in the said article were meant and were understood to mean that the plaintiffs and each of them had connived at, and participated in the corruption, or the attempted corruption by one Dato’ VK Lingam of the Malaysian judiciary, in the course of the plaintiffs’ litigation against Ayer Molek Rubber Company Berhad in Malaysia. The defendants did not enter appearance to the plaintiffs’ action. The plaintiffs set the matter for trial rather than entering interlocutory judgment against the defendants.
Held, allowing the plaintiffs’ claim: (1) In a defamation action, the plaintiff must prove that: (a) the words complained of were defamatory of and concerned the plaintiff; (b) the words referred to the plaintiff; and (c) the words had been published to a third person (see paras 11). (2) In the instant case, the said article was clearly defamatory of and concerned the plaintiffs. The words complained of bore the natural and ordinary meaning pleaded by the plaintiffs, that is, the plaintiffs had connived at, and participated in the corruption or the attempted corruption by Dato’ VK Lingam of the Malaysian judiciary, in the course of the plaintiffs’ litigation against Ayer Molek Rubber Company Berhad (see para 27). (3) The names of the first and second plaintiffs were clearly stated in the said article. Therefore, the second element of the identity of the plaintiffs had been established (see para 20). ||Page 116>> (4) In proving that there was publication, the plaintiffs had submitted an original copy of the said magazine. The plaintiffs had also called several witnesses who testified that they had received and read the said article. Accordingly, the plaintiffs had proven that the words complained of were published to third parties as required by the law of defamation (see paras 14, 18). (5) Having regard to the established principles of law applicable in the award of damages in libel actions and taking into account the grave and serious libel perpetrated by the defendants against the plaintiffs and to vindicate the plaintiffs’ business and trading reputation, and bearing in mind the guideline given by the Court of Appeal not to award large and extensive awards, a sum of RM500,000 for each of the plaintiffs would be sufficient compensation (see
For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 13 para 47).
[ Bahasa Malaysia summary
Ini adalah tindakan libel yang dimulakan oleh plaintif-plaintif terhadap defendan-defendan yang timbul daripada penerbitan sebuah artikel bertajuk ‘Malaysian Justice On Trial’ (‘artikel tersebut’) yang diterbitkan dalam majalah International Commercial Litigation keluaran November 1995 (‘majalah tersebut’). Majalah tersebut telah diterbitkan di London dan diedarkan di Malaysia dan tempat lain. Dalam pernyataan tuntutan mereka, plaintif-plaintif telah memplidkan bahawa maksud semualjadi dan biasa perkataan-perkataan yang diadukan dalam artikel tersebut bermaksud dan difahami mambawa maksud bahawa plaintif-plaintif dan setiap daripada mereka telah bersubahat, dan terlibat dalam rasuah, atau cubaan rasuah oleh Dato’ VK Lingam daripada kehakiman Malaysia, semasa litigasi plaintif-pliantif terhadap Syarikat Getah Ayer Molek Berhad di Malaysia. Defendan-defendan tidak memasuki kehadiran terhadap tindakan plaintif-plaintif. Plaintif-plaintif telah menetapkan perkara tersebut untuk perbicaraan dan tidak memasuki penghakiman interlokutori terhadap defendan-defendan.
Diputuskan, membenarkan tuntutan plaintif-plaintif: (1) Dalam satu tindakan fitnah, plaintif perlu membuktikan bahawa: (a) perkataan-perkataan yang diadukan berunsur fitnah dan berkaitan plaintif; (b) perkataan-perkataan tersebut merujuk kepada plaintif; dan (c) perkataan-perkataan tersebut telah diterbitkan kepada orang ketiga (lihat perenggan 11). (2) Dalam kes semasa, artikel tersebut dengan jelas berunsur fitnah dan berkaitan plaintif-plaintif. Perkataan-perkatan yang diadukan ||Page 117>> mengandungi maksud semula jadi dan biasa yang diplidkan oleh plaintif-plaintif, iaitu, plaintif-plaintif telah bersubahat, dan terlibat dalam rasuah atau percubaan rasuah oleh Dato’ VK Lingam daripada kehakiman Malaysia, semasa litigasi plaintif-plaintif terhadap Syarikat Getah Ayer Molek Berhad (lihat perenggan 27). (3) Nama-nama plaintif pertama dan kedua dengan jelas dinyatakan dalam artikel tersebut. Oleh itu, elemen kedua berhubung pengenalan plaintif-plaintif telah dibuktikan (lihat perenggan 20). (4) Dalam membuktikan bahawa terdapat penerbitan, plaintif-plaintif telah mengemukakan satu salinan asal majalah tersebut. Plaintif-plaintif juga telah memanggil beberapa orang saksi yang memberi keterangan bahawa mereka telah menerima dan membaca artikel tersebut. Sewajarnya, plaintif-plaintif telah membuktikan bahawa perkataan-perkataan yang diadukan telah diterbitkan kepada pihak ketiga sebagaimana dikehendaki oleh undang-undang fitnah (lihat
For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 14 perenggan 14, 18). (5) Berdasarkan prinsip undang-undang tetap yang terpakai dalam award ganti rugi untuk tindakan libel dan mengambil kira libel yang berat dan serius dilakukan oleh defendan-defendan terhadap plaintif-plaintif dan untuk menjustifikasikan perniagaan dan reputasi perniagaan plaintif-plaintif, dan mengambil kira panduan yang diberikan oleh Mahkamah Rayuan untuk tidak memberi award yang besar dan melampau, sejumlah RM500,000 untuk setiap plaintif adalah pampasan yang memadai (lihat perenggan 47).]
Notes For cases on libel, see 12 Mallal’s Digest (4 th Ed, 2002 Reissue) paras 314–434. For libel, see 5 Halsbury’s Laws of Malaysia paras [80.110]–[80.113].
Cases referred to Baltrop v Canadian Broadcasting Corp [1978] 86 DLR (3d) 61 (NSSC App Div) (refd) Bonnick v Morris [2002] 3 WLR 820 (refd) Broome v Cassell & Co [1972] AC 1027 (refd) Cassell & Co v Broome [1972] AC 1027 (refd) Chok Foo Choo @ Chok Kee Lian v The China Press Bhd [1999] 1 MLJ 371 (refd) Datuk Harris bin Mohamed Salleh v Abdul Jalil bin Ahmad & Anor [1984] 1 MLJ 97 (refd) Dingle v Associated Newspapers Ltd & Ors [1964] AC 371 (refd) Gillick v British Broadcasting Corporation & Anor [1996] EMLR 267 (refd) Insas Bhd & Anor v Ayer Molek Rubber Co Bhd & Ors [1995] 2 MLJ 833 (refd) Jones v Skelton [1963] 3 All ER 952 (refd) ||Page 118>> Karpal Singh a/l Ram Singh v DP Vijandran [2001] 4 MLJ 161 (refd) Manning et al v Hill [1995] 126 DLR (4th) 129 (refd) MGG Pillai v Tan Sri Dato Vincent Tan Chee Yioun and other appeals [1995] 2 MLJ 493 (refd) Rubber Improvement Ltd v Daily Telegraph Ltd [1964] AC 234 (refd) Skuse v Granada Television Ltd [1996] EMLR 278 (refd)
V Siva (R Thayalan with him) (V Siva & Partners) for the plaintiffs. Shubhaa holding watching brief for Raphael Pura. Defendants not represented.
For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 15
[2005] 2 MLJ 397 UTUSAN MELAYU (M) BHD & ORS v TJANTING HANDICRAFT SDN BHD & ANOR
COURT OF APPEAL (PUTRAJAYA) — CIVIL APPEAL NO W–02–228 OF 2001 MOKHTAR SIDIN, ARIFIN ZAKARIA AND NIK HASHIM JJCA 30 NOVEMBER 2004
Tort — Defamation — Slander of goods — Criticism over costumes manufactured by plaintiffs worn by world leaders — Whether slander of goods proven
Tort — Defamation — Defences — Work of art to general public — Whether criticism over costumes manufactured by plaintiffs worn by world leaders amounts to work of art to general public
Tort — Defamation — Libel — Alleged libel by defendant of first plaintiff — Whether second plaintiff alter ego of first plaintiff and therefore also suffered damage
Tort — Defamation — Libel — Criticism over costumes made by plaintiffs worn by world leaders at APEC meeting — Whether words in its natural and ordinary meaning defamatory of plaintiffs — Whether language used is extreme — Meaning intended by article in its original language
Tort — Defamation — Damages — Libel and slander of goods — Libellous article published in monthly women’s magazine — Whether damages of RM1.3 million excessive — Whether trial judge influenced by prevailing trend in awarding damages
Tort — Defamation — Malice — Whether libellous article injured reputation of plaintiffs — Defendant taken to have intended consequences naturally resulting from his act
Tort — Defamation — Aggravated damages — Whether malice proved — Whether amount of aggravated damages may be as much as mother award
The appellants were the publisher, editor, journalist and printer respectively of a monthly magazine called ‘Wanita’. The first respondent carried on the business of manufacturing batik materials and the second respondent was its managing director and its alter ego. The respondents were commissioned by the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (‘MITTI’) to supply batik costumes to all APEC leaders who
For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 16 attended the 1998 APEC meeting. The respondents claimed that the appellants’ Bahasa Melayu article in the magazine had in their natural and ordinary meaning meant and were understood to mean that the respondents produced unsightly batik and the second respondent had brought shame to the country by allowing world leaders to wear unsightly and ugly costumes made from those batik materials. The respondents claimed for damages for slander of goods, libel and ||Page 398>> aggravated damages. The learned trial judge found in favour of the respondents and awarded damages amounting to RM1.3 million against the appellants. The appellants appealed. The appellants submitted essentially on four grounds: (i) batik, being a work of art, once displayed to the general public, may thenceforth be commented and/or criticized upon by any member of the public and therefore the article was an honest comment not actuated by malicious intent on the part of the appellants against the respondents; (ii) in determining whether the said article was defamatory or not, consideration should be given to the original Bahasa Malaysia version in its entirety rather than to its English translation; (iii) the finding that the second respondent was the alter ego of the first respondent was erroneous; (iv) the damages awarded was excessive influenced by the prevailing trend in awarding the damages.
Held, dismissing the appeal on liability and allowing the appeal on quantum; damages reduced to total of RM250,000: (1) The photograph as published in ‘Wanita’ was not taken on occasion of a display of batik silk materials before the public. What was worn by the leaders as appeared in the photograph was presented by MITTI and it was not put on display by the respondents. In the premises it was not meant to invite criticism. Moreover, there was no evidence to show that the third appellant was a qualified art critic (see para 9). (2) The words complained of far exceeded the bound of fair comment and just criticism. The language used was so extreme that no fair-minded person, however obstinate and prejudiced his views were, would have honestly used them (see para 10). (3) On the question of malicious intent, the law looks at the tendency and consequences of the publication and if the defendant has published words which have in fact injured the plaintiff’s reputation, the defendant must be taken to have intended the consequences naturally resulting from his act (see para 12). The learned judge had correctly construed and assessed the Bahasa Malaysia text of the article in its entirety meticulously and given the natural and ordinary meaning that a reasonable man on the street would have of the article and consequently found that the words complained of were defamatory of the respondents (see para 14). (4) There were evidence to support the finding that the second respondent was the alter ego of the first respondent (see para 15). Thus, considering the evidence as a whole and particularly from the contents of the articles complained of and
For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 17 the defences put forward, the article was a grave slander of the first respondent’s goods and libel upon the second respondent. By reasons of the words and in consequence thereof the first respondent had been gravely injured in its manufacturing and ||Page 399>> trading character and the second respondent had been seriously injured in her personal business reputation and goodwill (see para 16). (5) The learned judge had failed to properly address his mind when he held that the article complained of was published in the newspapers when in actual fact it was published in more restricted publication (see para 24). This amounted to misdirection on the part of the learned judge that warranted interference by the court (see para 25). The learned trial judge had misapprehended the facts and was also influenced by the prevailing trend in awarding the damages (see para 26); Karpal Singh a/l Ram Singh v DP Vijandran [2001] 4 MLJ 161 followed. (6) With regard to the award of aggravated damages, there was indeed a case for the award. The finding of fact that the appellants were motivated by actual malice in publishing the article complained of warranted the making of an award of aggravated damages. However, the amount of aggravated damages must be a reasonable one. A reasonable amount should not be as much as the mother award (see para 27). (7) The learned judge was correct in refusing to make separate awards under the head of innuendo for slander of goods and libel as suggested by the respondents. At the trial, the respondents had not applied to amend to include separate causes of action for innuendo. And since in this case the respondents had not pleaded specifically for damages for innuendo, the claim for such damages cannot be entertained (see para 30).
[ Bahasa Malaysia summary
Perayu-perayu merupakan penerbit, penyunting, wartawan dan pencetak kepada majalah bulanan yang bernama ‘Wanita’. Responden pertama telah menjalankan perniagaan pengilangan material batik dan responden kedua merupakan pengarah urusannya dan alter egonya. Responden telah diarahkan oleh Kementerian Perdagangan Antarabangsa dan Industri (‘MITTI’) untuk membekalkan pakaian batik kepada kesemua ketua negara yang menghadiri persidangan APEC. Responden mengatakan bahawa satu artikel Bahasa Melayu perayu di dalam majalah di dalam maksud biasa dan semula jadi bermaksud dan difahamkan sebagai bermaksud bahawa responden mengeluarkan batik-batik yang tidak cantik dan responden kedua telah membawa malu kepada negara dengan membenarkan pemimpin dunia memakai baju yang hodoh dan tidak cantik yang diperbuat daripada material batik tersebut. Responden telah menuntut ganti rugi bagi slander barang-barangan, libel dan ganti rugi teruk. Hakim telah memihak kepada responden dan telah mengawardkan ganti rugi berjumlah RM1.3 juta terhadap perayu. Perayu telah merayu. Perayu telah berhujah
For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 18 berdasarkan kepada empat alasan: (i) Batik, yang merupakan satu kerja seni, apabila dipertontonkan kepada orang awam, boleh seterusnya dikomen dan dikritik oleh mana-mana orang ||Page 400>> awam dan oleh kerana itu artikel tersebut merupakan komen ikhlas yang tidak digerakkan oleh niat jahat di pihak perayu terhadap responden; (ii) untuk menentukan sama ada artikel tersebut adalah fitnah atau tidak, pertimbangan hendaklah dibuat kepada versi asal Bahasa Malaysia secara keseluruhannya berbanding terjemahan Inggeris; (iii) keputusan bahawa responden merupakan alter ego kepada responden pertama adalah salah; (iv) Ganti rugi yang diawardkan adalah keterlaluan yang dipengaruhi oleh budaya yang wujud di dalam mengawardkan ganti rugi.
Diputuskan, menolak rayuan atas liabiliti dan membenarkan rayuan terhadap kuantum; ganti rugi dikurangkan kepada RM250,000: (1) Fotograf yang diterbitkan di dalam ‘Wanita’ tidak diambil semasa pameran material batik sutera kepada orang awam. Apa yang dipakai oleh pemimpin-pemimpin seperti mana yang kelihatan di dalam fotograf telah disampaikan oleh MITTI dan tidak dipamerkan oleh responden. Kerana itu ia bukanlah bertujuan untuk menarik kritikan. Lebih-lebih lagi, tiada keterangan yang menunjukkan bahawa perayu ketiga yang menulis artikel adalah seorang pengkritik seni yang layak (lihat perenggan 9). (2) Perkataan-perkataan yang digunakan jauh melampaui had komen wajar dan kritikan adil. Bahasa-bahasa yang digunakan adalah melampau di mana tiada seorang pun yang berfikiran waras, sekalipun tegar dan prejudis pandangannya, secara jujur akan menggunakannya (lihat perenggan 10). (3) Pada persoalan niat jahat, undang-undang melihat kepada kecenderungan dan kesan-kesan penerbitan dan sekiranya defendan telah menerbitkan perkataan-perkataan yang telah merosakkan reputasi plaintif, defendan mestilah dianggap berhasrat kepada kesan-kesan yang secara semula jadinya terhasil daripada tindakannya (lihat perenggan 12). Hakim telah mentafsir dan menilai dengan betulnya teks Bahasa Malaysia artikel dan telah berbuat demikian secara keseluruhan dan berhati-hati dan mengambil kira makna biasa dan natural artikel tersebut kepada orang biasa sebelum mendapati bahawa perkataan-perkataan yang digunakan itu telah sebenarnya memfitnah responden-responden (lihat perenggan 14). (4) Terdapat keterangan bagi menyokong penemuan bahawa responden kedua adalah alter ego responden pertama (lihat perenggan 15). Oleh itu, melihat kepada keterangan secara keseluruhannya dan terutamanya kepada kandungan artikel yang diadu dan pembelaan yang diutarakan, artikel adalah suatu slander yang teruk terhadap barangan responden pertama dan suatu libel terhadap responden kedua. Akibat daripada perkataan-perkataan dan kesan-kesannya, perniagaan dan perusahaan responden pertama telah rosak dengan teruknya, sementara responden ||Page 401>> kedua pula mengalami kerosakan pada nama baik dan reputasi
For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 19 niaganya (lihat perenggan 16). (5) Hakim gagal membuat pertimbangan yang sewajarnya apabila mendapati bahawa artikel yang diadukan itu diterbitkan di dalam surat khabar apabila pada fakta sebenarnya ia diterbitkan di dalam penerbitan yang terhad (lihat perenggan 24). Ianya dengan itu adalah suatu salah arahan oleh hakim bicara sekaligus mewajarkan campurtangan mahkamah (lihat perenggan 25). Hakim telah tersalah faham akan fakta-fakta dan telah dipengaruhi oleh trend semasa ketika mengaward ganti rugi (lihat perenggan 26); Karpal Singh a/l Ram Singh v DP Vijandran [2001] 4 MLJ 161 diikut. (6) Sebenarnya terdapat sokongan untuk award ganti rugi teruk. Penemuan fakta bahawa perayu didorong oleh niat jahat sebenar dalam menerbitkan artikel yang diadukan menjustifikasikan pemberian ganti rugi teruk. Walau bagaimanapun, kadar ganti rugi yang diawardkan mestilah munasabah. Kadar yang munasabah mestilah tidak sama banyak dengan award ibu (lihat perenggan 27). (7) Hakim adalah betul apabila enggan memberi ganti rugi berasingan di bawah tajuk innuendo bagi slander barangan dan libel. Semasa perbicaraan, responden tidak membuat permohonan untuk meminda bagi memasukkan kausa tindakan berasingan bagi innuendo. Oleh kerana responden tidak memplid permohonan untuk ganti rugi bagi innuendo secara spesifik, tuntutan bagi ganti rugi berkenaan tidak boleh dilayan (lihat perenggan 30).]
Notes For cases on defamation generally, see 12 Mallal’s Digest (4 th Ed, 2000 Reissue) paras 193–409. For cases on defences in defamation, see 12 Mallal’s Digest (4 th Ed, 2002 Reissue) paras 267–273. For cases on aggravated damages, see 12 Mallal’s Digest (4 th Ed, 2000 Reissue) para 116. For cases on libel, see 12 Mallal’s Digest (4 th Ed, 2002 Reissue) paras 314–434. For defences in defamation, see 5 Halsbury’s Laws of Malaysia paras [80.092]– [80.102]. For libel generally, 5 Halsbury’s Laws of Malaysia paras [80.110]–[80.113].
Cases referred to Charleston v News Group Newspapers Ltd [1995] 2 AC 65 (refd) E Hulton & Co v Jones (1910) AC 20 (refd) Fisher v Clement (1830)10 B&C 472 (refd) Karpal Singh a/l Ram Singh v DP Vijandran [2001] 4 MLJ 161 (folld) McQuire v Western Morning News (1903) 2 KB 100 (refd)
For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 20 ||Page 402>>
Legislation referred to Defamation Act 1957 ss 8, 9
Appeal from Civil Suit No S2–23–72 of 1999 (High Court, Kuala Lumpur)
Mohd Ariff Yusof (M Reza Hassan with him) (Cheang & Ariff) for the appellants. Shamsul Bahrain Ibrahim (Skrine & Co) for the respondents.
[2005] 3 MLJ 485 BRE SDN BHD & ORS v TUN DATUK PATINGGI HJ ABDUL RAHMAN YA’KUB
COURT OF APPEAL (PUTRAJAYA) — CIVIL APPEAL NO Q–02–434 OF 1996 DENIS ONG, MOHD GHAZALI AND HASHIM YUSOFF JJCA 11 MARCH 2005
Tort — Defamation — Defence — Fair comment — Publication of defamatory letter in newspaper — Whether appellants could prove publication was fair comment on balance of probabilities
Tort — Defamation — Defence — Justification — Publication of defamatory letter in newspaper — Whether appellants could prove truth of defamatory imputations on balance of probabilities
Tort — Defamation — Defence — Qualified privilege — Publication of defamatory letter in newspaper during state by-election — Whether appellants could prove qualified privilege on balance of probabilities — Whether publication was privileged as by-election generated public interest
Tort — Defamation — Libel — Publication of defamatory letter in newspaper — Whether letter defamatory of respondent — Whether letter calculated to expose respondent to hatred, ridicule or contempt in mind of reasonable man or lower him in estimation of right-thinking members of society
The respondent filed a claim against the appellants for damages as well as for an
For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 21 injunction and costs for libel contained in an article appearing in a daily newspaper in Sarawak (‘the said article’). The said article concerned a letter to the third defendant as the editor of the newspaper regarding a state constituency by-election where the respondent accompanied an independent candidate to the nomination centre on the nomination day. After a full trial, the High Court found in favour of the respondent and awarded the sum of RM100,000 against the appellants as compensatory damages together with interest at 8% per annum from date of judgment until full payment as well as an order for injunction and costs. The appellant appealed to the Court of Appeal and contended that the words complained of in the said article were not defamatory of the respondent. The appellants further argued that even if such words were defamatory of the respondent, they could rely on the defences of justification, fair comment and qualified privilege.
Held, dismissing the appeal: (1) The said article clearly stated the meaning of the allegations and imputations of the words complained of. The High Court had adopted the correct test, ie whether the words complained of were calculated to expose the respondent to hatred, ridicule or contempt in the mind of a reasonable man or would tend to lower the respondent in the estimation of right thinking members of society generally (see para 10); JB Jeyaretnam v Goh Chok Tong [1985] 1 MLJ 334; Syed Husin Ali v Sharikat Penchetakan Utusan Melayu Bhd & Anor [1973] 2 MLJ 56 followed. ||Page 486>> (2) The respondent had relied on imputations couched in specific terms or charges of wrong-doing that could be concluded from the said article. The appellants did not suggest any alternative imputations that could arise from the said article. The burden was therefore on the appellants to establish the truth of those specific charges or imputations bearing in mind s 8 of the Defamation Act 1957 (see para 17). On a balance of probabilities, the appellants had failed to establish the truth of the material statements in the words complained of in the said article and therefore their defence of justification failed (see para 18). (3) The High Court held that it was unable to find that the words complained of in the said article were capable of being fair comments (see para 20). It is now the well-settled rule that in a finding of ‘libel’ or ‘no libel’, the appellate court would rarely interfere because, this was due to the difficulty of applying the principle to a finding that was to a considerable extent, a matter of opinion (see para 22); Odger v Matimer (1872) 28 LT 472 followed. (4) On the balance of probabilities the defence of qualified privilege failed because the said article was not specifically pleaded to be a report on the by-election and that it was confined to the voters of the constituency. Moreover, the respondent was not even a candidate for the by-election (see para 15).
For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 22
[Bahasa Malaysia summary
Responden telah memfailkan satu tuntutan terhadap perayu-perayu untuk ganti rugi dan juga untuk satu injunksi dan kos kerana libel yang terkandung dalam artikel sebuah akhbar harian di Sarawak (‘artikel tersebut’). Artikel tersebut berkaitan sepucuk surat kepada defendan ketiga sebagai editor akhbar berhubung pilihan raya kerajaan negeri di mana responden telah menemani seorang calon bebas ke pusat undian pada hari undian tersebut. Selepas perbicaraan penuh, Mahkamah Tinggi menyebelahi pihak responden dan mengawardkan sejumlah RM100,000 terhadap perayu-perayu sebagai ganti rugi pampasan berserta faedah pada kadar 8% setahun dari tarikh penghakiman sehingga bayaran penuh dan juga satu perintah untuk injunksi dan kos. Perayu telah merayu ke Mahkamah Rayuan dan menegaskan bahawa perkataan-perkataan yang diadukan dalam artikel tersebut tidak memfitnah responden. Perayu-perayu seterusnya berhujah bahawa jika perkataan-perkataan sedemikian memfitnah responden, mereka boleh bergantung kepada pembelaan justifikasi, komen adil dan perlindungan bersyarat.
Diputuskan, menolak rayuan tersebut: (1) Artikel tersebut dengan jelas menyatakan maksud pengataan dan andaian perkataan-perkataan yang diadukan. Mahkamah Tinggi telah menggunakan ujian yang betul, iaitu sama ada perkataan-perkataan yang diadukan ||Page 487>> dianggap sebagai mendedahkan responden kepada rasa benci, malu atau hina dalam pemikiran seseorang yang waras atau mungkin menjatuhkan maruah responden dalam pemikiran masyarakat secara umum (lihat perenggan 10); JB Jeyaretnam v Goh Chok Tong [1985] 1 MLJ 334; Syed Husin Ali v Sharikat Penchetakan Utusan Melayu Bhd & Anor [1973] 2 MLJ 56 diikut. (2) Responden bergantung kepada pengataan dalam istilah atau penuduhan spesifik yang boleh disimpulkan daripada artikel tersebut. Perayu-perayu tidak mencadangkan apa-apa pengataan alternatif yang mungkin timbul dari artikel tersebut. Beban terletak ke atas perayu-perayu untuk membuktikan kebenaran penuduhan atau pengataan spesifik tersebut menurut s 8 Akta Fitnah 1957 (lihat perenggan 17). Berdasarkan imbangan kebarangkalian, perayu-perayu gagal untuk membuktikan kebenaran pernyataan-pernyataan penting berdasarkan perkataan-perkataan yang diadukan dalam artikel tersebut dan oleh itu pembelaan justifikasi mereka gagal (lihat perenggan 18). (3) Mahkamah Tinggi memutuskan bahawa ia tidak mendapati perkataan- perkataan yang diadukan dalam artikel tersebut sebagai komen yang adil (lihat perenggan 20). Adalah rukun yang tetap bahawa dalam satu penemuan ‘libel’ atau ‘no libel’, Mahkamah Rayuan jarang campur tangan kerana kesukaran menggunapakai prinsip ke atas suatu penemuan yang sebahagian besar daripadanya adalah berdasarkan suatu pendapat sahaja (lihat perenggan 22); Odger v Matimer (1872) 28 LT 472 diikut.
For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 23 (4) Atas imbangan kebarangkalian pembelaan perlindungan bersyarat gagal kerana artikel tersebut tidak khusus diplidkan sebagai satu laporan pilihan raya kecil dan terhad kepada pengundi-pengundi bahagian pilihan raya. Tambahan pula, responden bukan seorang calon untuk pilihan raya kecil ini (lihat perenggan 15).]
Notes For cases on libel, see 12 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2002 Reissue) paras 314–434. For cases on fair comment, see 12 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2002 Reissue) paras 289–293. For cases on justification, see 12 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2002 Reissue) paras 309–312. For cases on defences for defamation, see 12 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2002 Reissue) paras 267–273.
Cases referred to Abdul Rahman Talib v Seenivasagam & Anor [1965] 1 MLJ 142 (refd) Blackshaw v Lord [1983] 2 All ER 311 (refd) Dato’ Seri Anwar Ibrahim v Dato’ Seri Dr Mahathir bin Mohamad [2001] 2 MLJ 65 (refd) ||Page 488>> JB Jeyaretnam v Goh Chok Tong [1985] 1 MLJ 334 (folld) Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corp [1997] 189 CLR 520 (refd) Lee Kuan Yew v JB Jeyaretnam [1979] 1 MLJ 281 (refd) Odger v Matimer (1872) 28 LT 472 (folld) Reynolds v Times Newspaper [1999] 4 All ER 609 (refd) S Pakianathan v Jenni Ibrahim [1988] 2 MLJ 173 (refd) Syed Husin Ali v Sharikat Penchetakan Utusan Melayu Bhd & Anor [1973] 2 MLJ 56 (folld)
Legislation referred to Defamation Act 1957 ss 8, 12
Appeal from Suit No KG 400 of 1986 (High Court, Kuching)
Sim Hui Chuang (Reddi & Co) for the appellants. Chong Siew Chiang (Cheng Hui Hang with him) (Cheng & Cheng) for the respondent.
For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 24
[2005] 3 MLJ 494 CHIN CHOON @ CHIN TEE FUT v CHUA JUI MENG
COURT OF APPEAL (PUTRAJAYA) — CIVIL APPEAL NO W–02–372 OF 2000 GOPAL SRI RAM, ABDUL KADIR SULAIMAN AND NIK HASHIM JJCA 14 OCTOBER 2004
Tort — Defamation — Damages — Compensatory damages — Aggravated damages — Exemplary damages — Whether aggravated and exemplary damages should be made — Whether separate awards for aggravated and exemplary damages should be made — Whether of award of damages manifestly excessive
The appellant is an advocate and solicitor. At the date of publication of the admitted libel, the respondent was the deputy minister for International Trade and Industry. The appellant made a charge against the respondent that was of the gravest nature. He alleged that the respondent had acted corruptly in the discharge of his duties. This charge was made at a press conference called at the appellant’s behest. The story was carried by two newspapers of the Chinese vernacular. Later, the appellant repeated the defamatory words to a very limited audience outside the office of the Anti Corruption Agency where he had gone to lodge a report. He said that he had ‘boxes of evidence’ against the respondent. As it turned out, there was no such evidence. This was the appellant’s appeal against the award of damages made against him in respect of the libel admittedly committed by him upon the respondent. The trial judge awarded a total sum of RM1,500,000 made up of RM500,000 as compensatory damages, RM500,000 as aggravated damages and a further RM500,000 as exemplary damages. The appellant complained that these awards were excessive.
Held, allowing the appeal: (1) Aggravated damages should be awarded based on the appellant’s conduct. In this case, we have an arrogant appellant who had not only put a plea of justification on record but said that he had ‘boxes of evidence’ against the respondent. The boxes, as it transpired were empty and the plea of justification was withdrawn. The court was therefore unable to accept the submission that the respondent should receive only nominal damages. That submission itself which suggested that the respondent was of poor character meriting to receive only nominal damages constituted an aggravating factor. In a defamation action, the way in which a defendant conducts the trial or an appeal may be grounds for awarding aggravated damages (see para 10). (2) Any form of advantage gained by a defendant in a defamation case suffices. It need not produce an immediate profit in money terms. It may produce an
For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 25 immediate non-pecuniary advantage that may translate itself into a monetary reward sometime later. In this case, the appellant by his tortuous conduct wanted to impress members of the Chinese community ||Page 495>> that he was an advocate who feared no one, not even a deputy minister of the government when it came to advancing his client’s cause. Reasonable persons who read his statement may well decide to retain his services because of the impression created by him. So, he stood to gain from what he did. This is accordingly a suitable case to make an award of exemplary damages (see para 12); Chong Siew Chiang v Chua Ching Geh & Anor [1995] 1 MLJ 551 followed. (3) Separate awards for aggravated and exemplary damages should not be made in a defamation case. It was never the practice to award interest on each separate head of damages (aggravated and exemplary damages). Interest was merely granted on the single award. In defamation cases, the court should maintain the age old practice of making a global award in order to limit the size of awards. Otherwise there will be runaway damages once again (see para 13); Cassell v Broome [1972] AC 1027 followed. (4) The court having considered and taken into account all the factors operating in the respondent’s favour were of the view that the award of RM1,500,000 was manifestly excessive. It was certainly far in excess of the range of awards in defamation cases. Having regard to the very special circumstances of this case, an award of RM200,000 was a fair sum by way of a global award of damages. The award included compensatory, aggravated and exemplary damages (see para 14); Karpal Singh v DP Vijandran [2001] 4 MLJ 161; Dato Musa bin Hitam v SH Alatas & Ors [1991] 1 CLJ 314 distinguished.
[Bahasa Malaysia summary
Perayu merupakan seorang peguambela dan peguamcara. Semasa tarikh penerbitan libel yang dikatakan, responden merupakan timbalan menteri Perdagangan Antarabangsa dan Industri. Perayu membuat penuduhan terhadap responden yang menjejaskan sifatnya. Beliau mengatakan bahawa responden telah bertindak secara tidak amanah dalam melaksanakan tanggungjawabnya. Penuduhan ini dibuat semasa sidang akhbar yang dipanggil atas permintaan perayu. Cerita ini disiarkan oleh dua akhbar bahasa Cina. Kemudian, perayu mengulangi perkataan-perkataan berunsur fitnah tersebut kepada beberapa orang di luar pejabat Agensi Pencegah Rasuah di mana beliau membuat aduan. Beliau berkata bahawa beliau mempunyai ‘boxes of evidence’ terhadap responden. Namun sebaliknya, tiada bukti sedemikian. Ini merupakan rayuan perayu terhadap award ganti rugi yang dibuat terhadapnya berkaitan libel yang dikatakan dilakukan oleh beliau terhadap responden. Hakim perbicaraan telah mengawardkan jumlah keseluruhan RM1,500,000 yang membentuk RM500,000 sebagai ganti rugi pampasan, RM500,000 sebagai ganti rugi melampau dan selebihnya
For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 26 RM500,000 sebagai ganti rugi teladan. Perayu mengadu bahawa award-award berikut adalah keterlaluan. ||Page 496>>
Diputuskan, membenarkan rayuan tersebut: (1) Ganti rugi melampau hendaklah diawardkan berdasarkan perbuatan perayu. Dalam kes ini, perayu bukan sahaja membuat pli justifikasi atas rekod tetapi mengatakan beliau mempunyai ‘boxes of evidence’ terhadap responden. Kotak-kotak tersebut, rupa-rupanya kosong dan pli justifikasi ditarik balik. Mahkamah oleh itu tidak dapat menerima hujah bahawa responden patut menerima ganti rugi yang nominal sahaja. Hujah itu sendirinya mencadangkan bahawa responden tidak mempunyai sifat baik yang memeritkan diri untuk menerima ganti rugi yang nominal sahaja yang membentuk faktor yang melampau. Dalam satu tindakan fitnah, cara bagaimana defendan mengendalikan perbicaraan atau rayuan boleh menjadi alasan untuk mengawardkan ganti rugi melampau (lihat perenggan 10). (2) Apa-apa bentuk kelebihan yang diperoleh oleh defendan dalam kes fitnah adalah mencukupi. Tidak ada keperluan untuk mengemukakan keuntungan segera dalam bentuk wang. Ia mungkin akan mengemukakan kelebihan segera yang tidak berunsur wang yang mungkin boleh membentuk satu ganjaran berbentuk wang kemudiannya. Dalam kes ini, perayu melalui perbuatan tort beliau hendak menunjukkan kepada golongan Cina bahawa beliau seorang peguam yang tidak takut kepada sesiapa, walaupun timbalan menteri kerajaan sekalipun dalam mengendalikan kes anakguamnya. Sesiapa yang waras membaca kenyataan beliau akan mengekalkan khidmatnya kerana reputasi beliau yang sedemikian. Oleh itu, beliau mempunyai kelebihan daripada apa yang beliau lakukan. Ini adalah satu kes yang sesuai untuk membuat satu award untuk ganti rugi teladan (lihat perenggan 12); Chong Siew Chiang v Chua Ching Geh & Anor [1995] 1 MLJ 551 diikut. (3) Award-award berasingan untuk ganti rugi melampau dan teladan tidak patut dibuat dalam kes fitnah. Bukan satu amalan untuk mengawardkan faedah ke atas setiap kepala ganti rugi yang berasingan (ganti rugi melampau dan teladan). Faedah hanya dibenarkan dalam satu award. Dalam kes- kes fitnah, mahkamah hendaklah mengekalkan amalan lama membuat award secara global bagi tujuan menghadkan bilangan award. Jika tidak, ganti rugi runaway akan berlaku (lihat perenggan 13); Cassell v Broome [1972] AC 1027 diikut. (4) Setelah mahkamah mengambilkira dan menimbangkan semua factor yang berpihak kepada responden ia berpendapat award RM1,500,000 adalah keterlaluan. Ia melampaui batas award-award untuk kes fitnah. Berdasarkan keadaan tertentu kes ini, award RM200,000 adalah jumlah yang adil mengikut award ganti rugi secara menyeluruh. Award tersebut termasuklah ganti rugi-ganti rugi pampasan, malampau dan teladan (lihat perenggan 14); Karpal Singh v DP Vijandran [2001] 4 MLJ 161; Dato Musa bin Hitam v SH Alatas
For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 27 & Ors [1991] 1 CLJ 314 dibeza.] ||Page 497>>
Notes For cases on damages for defamation, see 12 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2002 Reissue) paras 254–264.
Cases referred to Cassell v Broome [1972] AC 1027 (folld) Chong Siew Chiang v Chua Ching Geh & Anor [1995] 1 MLJ 551 (folld) Dato Musa bin Hitam v SH Alatas & Ors [1991] 1 CLJ 314 (distd) Karpal Singh v DP Vijandran [2001] 4 MLJ 161 (distd) Liew Yew Tian v Cheah Cheng Hoc [2001] 2 CLJ 385 (refd) Rookes v Barnar d [1964] AC 1129 (refd)
Appeal from Civil Suit No S2–22–503 of 1994 (High Court, Kuala Lumpur)
Mohamed Zaini Mazlan (CL Chin & Associates) for the appellant. Darryl SC Goon (Yvonne Ong with him) (Raja, Darryl & Loh) for the respondent.
[2005] 5 MLJ 539 DATO’ SERI S SAMY VELLU v PENERBITAN SAHABAT (M) SDN BHD & ORS (NO 2)
HIGH COURT (KUALA LUMPUR) — CIVIL SUIT NO S6–23–72 OF 2003 ABDUL MALIK ISHAK J 9 MAY 2005
Tort — Defamation — Libel — Conspiracy to defame — Whether cause of action would abate with the death of second defendant — Whether claim of conspiracy to defame merged with claim for libel — Civil Law Act 1956 s 8(1)
Tort — Malicious falsehood — Publication of falsehood — Whether cause of action would abate with death of second defendant — Civil Law Act 1956 s 8(1)
The second defendant had passed away. His death gave rise to the question of whether
For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 28 the various causes of action in the plaintiff’s amended Statement of Claim would abate. In the amended Statement of Claim, the plaintiff claimed for the following causes of action: (a) damages for the tort of conspiracy; (b) damages for the tort of malicious falsehood; and (c) damages for the tort of libel.
Held: (1) The tort of conspiracy related to conspiracy to injure by publishing defamatory statements. It was a pure and simple cause of action for defamation. It was also a cause of action for libel which derives its origin from the root word ‘defamation’. But, under the law, there is no separate tort of conspiracy to defame by publishing defamatory statements. And, under the law too, the tort of conspiracy to defame by publishing defamatory statements merge with the plaintiff’s claim for libel: Ward v Lewis & Ors [1955] 1 WLR 9 which was adopted by the Malaysian High Court in Mrs Kok Wee Kiat v Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange Bhd & Ors [1978] 2 MLJ 123. It must abate with the death of the second defendant (see para 29). (2) An action for libel is captured by the provision to s 8(1) of the Civil Law Act 1956 thereby excluding the general application of that section to the tort of defamation. A personal action dies with the person when the person dies. This was what had happened to the deceased second defendant. This cause of action for libel must abate with the death of the second defendant (see para 31). (3) The tort of malicious falsehood survives and that the case of Mrs Kok Wee Kiat v Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange Bhd & Ors [1978] 2 MLJ 123 is still good law and it is binding on this court. Since the claim against the deceased second defendant for malicious falsehood would protect the ||Page 540>> plaintiff’s interest in the deceased second defendant’s property the right of the plaintiff to sue the deceased second defendant survived and such right was transmitted to the deceased second defendant’s personal representatives and administrators (see para 40). The tort of malicious falsehood was not caught by the proviso to s 8(1) of the Civil Law Act 1956 (see para 41).
[Bahasa Malaysia summary
Defendan kedua telah meninggal dunia. Kematian beliau menimbulkan persoalan sama ada pelbagai kausa tindakan dalam pernyataan tuntutan plaintif yang dipinda akan diberhentikan. Dalam pernyataan tuntutan itu, plaintif telah menuntut kausa tindakan berikut: (a) ganti rugi untuk tort konspirasi; (b) ganti rugi untuk tort kepalsuan berniat jahat; dan (c) ganti rugi untuk tort libel.
Diputuskan:
For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 29 (1) Tort konspirasi adalah yang berkaitan untuk menjejaskan melalui kenyataan fitnah. Ia adalah kausa tindakan untuk fitnah yang jelas dan mudah. Ia juga satu kausa tindakan untuk libel yang wujud asalnya daripada perkataan pangkal ‘fitnah’. Tetapi, di bawah undang-undang tersebut, tiada tort konspirasi yang berasingan untuk memfitnah dengan menerbitkan kenyataan-kenyataan fitnah. Dan, di bawah undang-undang tersebut juga, tort konspirasi untuk memfitnah dengan menerbitkan kenyataan- kenyataan fitnah disatukan dengan tuntutan libel plaintif: Ward v Lewis & Ors [1955] 1 WLR 9 yang diguna pakai oleh Mahkamah Tinggi Malaysia dalam Mrs Kok Wee Kiat v Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange Bhd & Ors [1978] 2 MLJ 123. Ia hendaklah diberhentikan dengan kematian defendan kedua (lihat perenggan 29). (2) Suatu tindakan untuk libel diperuntukkan dalam s 8(1) Akta Undang- Undang Sivil 1956 yang mengecualikan pemakaian am seperti mana seksyen untuk tort untuk fitnah. Tindakan peribadi lenyap dengan kematian seseorang itu. Inilah yang berlaku kepada defendan kedua. Kausa tindakan untuk libel ini hendaklah diberhentikan dengan kematian defendan kedua (lihat perenggan 31). (3) Tort kepalsuan berniat jahat kekal dan kes Mrs Kok Wee Kiat v Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange Bhd & Ors [1978] 2 MLJ 123 masih undang-undang yang baik dan ia mengikat dalam mahkamah ini. Memandangkan tuntutan terhadap defendan kedua yang telah meninggal dunia untuk kepalsuan berniat jahat melindungi kepentingan plaintif dalam hartanah si mati defendan kedua, hak plaintif untuk menyaman defendan kedua yang telah meninggal dunia berpindah kepada wakil peribadi dan pentadbir- pentadbir si mati defendan kedua (lihat perenggan 40). Tort kepalsuan berniat jahat tidak terikat oleh proviso kepada s 8(1) Akta Undang-Undang Sivil 1956 (lihat perenggan 41).] ||Page 541>>
Notes For cases on libel, see 12 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2002 Reissue) paras 314–434. For cases on publication of falsehood, see 12 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2002 Reissue) paras 566–568. For libel, see 5 Halsbury’s Laws of Malaysia paras [80.110]–[80.113].
Cases referred to Astrovlanis Compania Naviera SA v Linard [1972] 2 QB 611; [1972] 2 WLR 1414 (refd) Ban Guan Sdn Bhd v United Malaysian Steel Mills Bhd [1977] 2 MLJ 52 (refd) Brown v Feeney [1906] 1 KB 563 (refd) Fhilipps v Philipps (1878) 4 QBD 139 (refd) Hatchard v Mege & Ors (1887) 18 QBD 771 (refd) Kok Wee Kiat, Mrs v Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange Berhad & Ors [1979] 1 MLJ 71
For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 30 (refd) Kok Wee Kiat, Mrs v Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange Bhd & Ors [1978] 2 MLJ 123 (folld) Lonrho plc & Ors v Fayed & Ors (No 5) [1994] 1 All ER 188, [1993] 1 WLR 1489 (refd) Lonrho plc v Fayed & Ors [1991] 3 All ER 303 (refd) Metall und Rohstoff AG v Donaldson Lufkin & Jenrette Inc [1990] 1 QB 391 (refd) Milbank v Milbank [1900] 1 Ch 376 (refd) Mitchell v Australian Broadcasting Commission (1958) 60 WAIR 38 (refd) Monson v Tussauds Ltd [1894] 1 QB 671, 692 (refd) Mulcahy v R (1868) LR 3 HL 306 (refd) Ratcliffe v Evans [1892] 2 QB 524 (refd) Rookes v Barnard [1964] AC 1129 (refd Ward v Lewis & Ors [1955] 1 WLR 9 (folld) Yorkshire Provident Life Assurance Co v Gilbert [1895] 2 QB 148 (refd) Youssoupoff v Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Pictures (1934) 50 TLR 581 (refd)
Legislation referred to Civil Law Act 1956 s 8, (1)
Jeffrey John (Frida Krishnan with him) (Shafee & Co) for the plaintiff. Rajasingam Gothandapani (K Saraswathy with him) (Shearn Delamore) for the defendants.
[2004] 1 MLJ 34 RAJA SEGARAN A/L S KRISHNAN v BAR COUNCIL MALAYSIA & ORS
HIGH COURT (KUALA LUMPUR) — CIVIL SUIT NO S2–23–93 OF 1999 (5) KAMALANATHAN RATNAM J 10 NOVEMBER 2003
Administrative Law — Remedies — Declaration —Whether applicant had locus standi to make application — Whether application was an attempt to avoid a penal sanction — Whether applicants suffered special injury
For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 31
Civil Procedure — Jurisdiction — Court — Civil courts — Criminal jurisdiction of civil courts — Whether civil courts could declare proposed action seditious
Civil Procedure — Locus standi — Association of persons proposing a course of action — Individual arguing that course of action seditious — Whether individual could seek injunction to prevent association from acting in breach of the law — Whether individual must have suffered special injury
Constitutional Law — Judiciary — Judicial Misconduct — Allegations of judicial misconduct — Discussion of judicial misconduct — Whether such discussion unconstitutional — Federal Constitution art 127
Legal Profession — Law Society/Malaysian Bar — Powers of the Bar — Allegations of judicial misconduct — EGM to discuss allegations of misconduct — Whether an attempt to by pass constitutional safeguard — Whether amounts to contempt of court and sedition — Whether ultra vires powers of the Bar — Legal Profession Act 1976 s 42(1)(d)
Tort — Defamation — Libel — Maker of statement — Whether statement contemptuous — Whether position and standing of maker of statement relevant in deciding whether statement contemptuous
The Malaysian Bar had resolved to hold an EGM to discuss allegations of impropriety against the then Chief Justice. The plaintiff, a member of the Bar, was concerned that the notice of the EGM, the resolution and the proposed meeting were ultra vires the powers and objects of the Malaysian Bar under the Legal Profession Act 1976 (‘the LPA’) on the grounds that they may be contemptuous, seditious and unconstitutional. The plaintiff argued that since he could be liable for any actions taken by the defendants. The plaintiff thus sought an injunction to restrain the defendants from holding the proposed EGM. Pending the disposal of the action, the court granted the plaintiff’s application for an interim injunction (see [2000] 1 MLJ 1). Since then the former Chief Justice, the subject of the Bar’s motion, retired and then Chief Justice, also since retired, had exhorted for better Bench/Bar relationship. Thus in reserving judgment in this case, the court urged the parties to settle their differences. Taking the advice of the court, the plaintiff sought leave to discontinue this action. The plaintiff’s application for leave to discontinue was allowed and the suit struck off and each party required to meet its own costs. The Court of Appeal allowed the defendants’ appeal against this decision and directed that the court deliver its judgment on the substantive trial. The defendants argued, inter alia, that the mere fact that the plaintiff was a member of the Bar did not automatically confer any private law rights on him. In any event, the defendants argued that a civil court could not make a finding of contempt or sedition.
For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 32 Held, allowing the plaintiff’s application and granting the declarations sought: (1) In deciding whether a statement was contemptuous, the court may consider the position and standing of the person making the statement. The Malaysian Bar must accept the fact that it is a voice that is heard by the public. It acts as a regulator. It must also act as a moderator; Gallagher v Durack (1983) 57 ALJR 191 followed. If the impression is created in the minds of the public that the judges in the highest court in the land had acted on extraneous considerations in deciding cases, confidence in the administration of justice was bound to be undermined and no greater mischief than that could be imagined (see paras 33–34); Aswini Kumar v Arabina Bose & Anor AIR 1953 SC 75 followed. (2) The Bar Council had asserted they were not concerned with the truth of the allegations as they did not have the power to investigate them. Such callous indifference to the truth of the allegations, coming from an august body, was totally unacceptable. It was a clear abrogation of its duty to the general public as its watchdog. This flagrant disregard to verify the truth of the allegations before calling for an EGM fell far short of the aspirations of a noble Bar (see paras 46–47). (3) Unlike countries like the UK, Australia, the USA and India, the Bar Council in Malaysia has been given statutory recognition. The LPA sets out the Bar as a corporate statutory body duly recognized by the Government. It is imperative that the Bar recognizes this fact and, because of its unique position, acts with concern when making statements. Since the Bar Council and the Malaysian Bar are creatures of statute, their conduct must be confined within the provisions of the LPA. While the Bar sought to rely on s 42(1)(a), (e) or (g) of the LPA, s 42(1)(d) strictly confines the Bar to expressing its views on matters affecting the administration of law only if requested so to do (emphasis added). Since the Bar has not been requested to give its views on the state of the judiciary, the resolution and the motion were clearly in breach of that section ( see paras 27–28, 51–54). (4) The constitutional scheme envisages removal of a judge on proved misbehaviour or incapacity and the conduct of a judge is prohibited from discussion in Parliament or the State Legislative Assemblies. The call for the resolution on admitted hearsay evidence was far from the requirement of ‘proved misbehaviour’. It is absolutely essential that people who hold high office be fair and just in their criticisms and not open themselves, and the organizations they represent, to criticisms. It is clear that the Bar has no power to discuss the conduct of the Judiciary and that any attempt to do so was contrary to art 127 of the Constitution. It must be seen to be manifest that no external pressure is exerted against the Judiciary, whether from the executive or from any other sources, including the Bar Council (see paras 57, 59, 63). (5) Where the plaintiff showed he has the locus to make the application, and where he further showed that the conduct of the defendants was such as to put the
For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 33 plaintiff, in peril of such prosecution as the defendants could face if the defendant was allowed to act, the plaintiff need not wait to see the outcome of the defendant’s actions before acting. To protect his own interest a plaintiff can take out an injunction to restrain the defendant from acting and, if the court is satisfied that the act complained of could give rise to the plaintiff facing criminal prosecution, the plaintiff ought to be allowed to use injunctive measures to stop the defendant. Therefore, the argument that if the plaintiff did not attend the meeting, he could not be sued or punished and that he could have chosen not to attend, is unacceptable (see paras 71, 82); Ketua Pengarah Jabatan Alam Sekitar & Anor v Kajing Tubek & Ors & Other Appeals [1997] 3 MLJ 23 distinguished, Tengku Jaffar bin Tengku Ahmad v Karpal Singh [1993] 3 MLJ 156 followed. (6) In resolving the motion as spelt out, the public needed no legal advice, assistance or representations. Besides, the Bar Council have not been able to show which section of the public in particular they intend to protect. Their act of moving the resolution and having the meeting for that purpose were both ultra vires the LPA (see paras 81–82); Swain and another v The Law Society [1983] AC 598 and Gouriet v Union of Post Office Workers [1977] 3 All ER 70 referred.
[Bahasa Malaysia summary
Badan Peguam Malaysia telah memutuskan supaya mengadakan suatu EGM bagi membincangkan dakwaan salahlaku terhadap Ketua Hakim Negara pada masa itu. Plaintif, seorang peguam, bimbang bahawa notis EGM, resolusi serta mesyuarat yang dicadangkan itu adalah ultra vires kuasa dan matlamat Badan Peguam di bawah Akta Profession Undang-Undang 1976 (‘APU’) di atas alasan bahawa ia adalah menghina, hasutan dan melanggar perlembagaan. Plaintif berhujah bahawa, memandangkan beliau mungkin bertanggungjawab dalam sebarang tindakan yang diambil defendant, beliau memohon suatu perintah injunksi menahan defendant daripada mengadakan mesyuarat tersebut. Sebelum diputuskan tindakan itu, mahkamah telah membenarkan permohonan plaintif bagi injunksi sementara (lihat [2000] 1 MLJ 1). Sejak itu bekas Hakim Negara, yang menjadi tajuk usul Badan Peguam itu, telah bersara dan penggantinya, yang juga telah bersara, telah menegur hubungan yang lebit erat antara pihak peguam dan penghakiman. Sebelum mengumumkan penghakiman dalam kes ini, mahkamah telah mendesak pihak-pihak menyelesaikan perbezaan antara mereka. Dalam mengikut nasihat mahkamah, plaintif memohon kebenaran memberhentikan tindakannya. Permohonan plaintif memberhentikan tindakan ini telah dibenarkan dan tindakan ini dibatalkan dengan kos ditanggung oleh pihak-pihak sendiri. Mahkamah Rayuan telah membenarkan rayuan defendan terhadap keputusan ini dan mengarahkan supaya Mahkamah Tinggi memberikan keputusannya ke atas perbicaraan substantif. Defendan-defendan telah berhujah, antara lain, bahawa hanya kerana plaintif merupakan seorang peguam tidak semestinya mengurniakan sebarang hak
For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 34 undang-undang peribadi ke atas plaintif. Malahan mahkamah sivil tidak dapat memutuskan mengenai penghinaan atau hasutan.
Diputuskan, membenarkan permohonan dan memberikan deklarasi yang dipohon: (1) Dalam memutuskan sama ada sesuatu pernyataan adalah menghina, mahkamah dapat mengambil kira kedudukan orang yang membuat pernyataan tersebut. Badan Peguam harus menerima fakta bahawa ia adalah suara yang didengar oleh orang awam. Ia bertindak sebagai pengawalselia. Ia seharusnya juga bertindak sebagai kuasa redaan; Gallagher v Durack (1983) 57 ALJR 191 diikut. Sekiranya tanggapan diberikan kepada orang awam bahawa hakim-hakim mahkamah teragung telah bertindak di atas pertimbangan yang tidak wajar, keyakinan dalam pentadbiran keadilan pasti dilemahkan dan tidak terdapat sebarang kecelakaan yang lebih berat (lihat perenggan-perenggan 33–34); Aswini Kumar v Arabina Bose & Anor AIR 1953 SC 75 diikut. (2) Majlis Peguam telah menerangkan mereka tidak berminat ke atas kebenaran dakawaan memandangkan mereka tiada kuasa menyiasatnya. Sikap tidak ambil peduli ke atas kebenaran dakwaan seperti ini, yang datang dari badan guaman agung ini, tidak dapat diterima. Ia sememangnya suatu pembantutan kewajipannya sebagai pengawal bagi orang awam. Keengganannya menentusahkan kebenaran dakwaan sebelum memanggil mesyuarat tidak memadai memandangkan aspirasi sebuah badan guaman seperti ini (lihat perenggan-perenggan 46–47). (3) Berbeza daripada negara-negara asing seperti UK, Australia, Amerika Syarikat and India, Majlis Peguam di Malaysia telah diberikan pengiktirafan statutori. APU mendirikan badan guaman sebagai suatu badan berkanun korporat yang diiktiraf kerajaan. Adalah wajar Badan Peguam mengenali fakta ini dan, memandangkan kedudukannya yang unik, bertindak wajar apabila membuat pernyataan. Memandangkan Majlis Peguam dan Badan Peguam adalah diwujudkan statut, maka tingkahlaku mereka harus dihadkan kepada peruntukan APU. Walaupun Badan Peguam ingin bergantung kepada s 42(1)(a), (e) atau (g) APU, s 42(1)(d) menghadkan Badan Peguam supaya menyuarakan pendapatnya ke atas perkara pentadbiran keadilan hanya sekiranya diminta berbuat demikian (penekanan ditambah). Memandangkan yang Badan Peguam tidak pernah diminta memberikan pendapatnya ke atas kedudukan badan kehakiman, maka resolusi dan usul jelas melanggar peruntukan itu (lihat perenggan-perenggan 27–28, 51–54). (4) Rancangan perlembagaan membayangkan penyingkiran seseorang hakim sekiranya salahlakunya yang dibuktikan atau disebabkan kurang upayanya dan tingkahlaku seseorang hakim dilarang dibincangkan di Parlimen atau Dewan Undangan Negeri. Permintaan bagi resolusi tersebut di atas keterangan dengar cakap jauh dari keperluan ‘proved misbehaviour’. Adalah mustahak orang yang memegang jawatan tinggi bertindak secara adil dan saksama dalam kritik mereka dan tidak menjadikan diri mereka, mahupun badan yang mereka wakil,
For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 35 terbuka kepada pengkritikan. Adalah jelas bahawa Badan Peguam tidak mempunyai kuasa bagi membincangkan tingkah laku Badan Kehakiman dan sebarang percubaan berbuat demikian melanggar perkara 127 Perlembagaan. Ia harus menjadi jelas bahawa tiada sebarang penekanan luar diberikan terhadap Badan Kehakiman, sama ada dari pihak exekutif mahupun daripada sumber lain, termasuk dari Majlis Peguam (lihat perenggan-perenggan 57, 59, 63). (5) Sekiranya seseorang plaintif dapat menunjukkan bahawa beliau mempunyai locus membuat sesuatu permohonan, dan jika beliau juga dapat menunjukkan bahawa tindakan yang diambil defendan akan membuka plaintif kepada pendakwaan yang mungkin dikenakan ke atas defendan sekiranya defendan dibenarkan terus bertindak, maka plaintif itu tidak perlu menunggu melihat akibat tindakan defendan sebelum bertindak. Bagi memelihara hak sendirinya seseorang plaintif dapat memohon perintah injunksi menahan defendan dari bertindak dan, sekiranya mahkamah berpuas hati bahawa tindakan yang diadu itu mungkin menyebabkan plaintif didakwa, maka plaintif harus dibenarkan menggunakan perintah injunksi bagi menahan defendan. Oleh yang demikian, hujah bahawa sekiranya plaintif tidak menghadiri mesyuarat itu, beliau tidak dapat didakwa atau hukum dan beliau dapat membuat keputusan tidak menghadiri mesyuarat itu, tidak dapat diterima (lihat perenggan-perenggan 71, 82); Ketua Pengarah Jabatan Alam Sekitar & Anor v Kajing Tubek & Ors & Other Appeals [1997] 3 MLJ 23 dibezakan, Tengku Jaffar bin Tengku Ahmad v Karpal Singh [1993] 3 MLJ 156 diikut. (6) Dalam membuat ketetapan usul seperti dinyatakan, pihak awam tidak memerlukan sebarang nasihat, pertolongan atau representasi undang-undang. Lagipun Majlis Peguam gagal menunjukkan bahagian mana antara orang awam yang ingin mereka melindungi. Tindakan mereka mencadangkan resolusi itu dan memanggilkan mesyuarat baginya kedua-duanya ultra vires APU (lihat perenggan-perenggan 81–82); Swain & Anor v The Law Society [1983] AC 598 dirujuk, Gouriet v Union of Post Office Workers [1978] LR 435 dirujuk.]
Notes For cases on the remedy of declaration, see 1 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 1998 Reissue) paras 321–382. For cases on jurisdiction of courts, see 2 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2001 Reissue) paras 3670–3672. For cases on locus standi, see 2 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2001 Reisue) paras 3924–3981. For cases on the Judiciary, see 3 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2000 Reissue) para 1660. For cases on the powers of the Law Society/Malaysian Bar, see 9 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 1999 Reissue) para 1585. For cases on libel, see 12 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2000 Reissue) paras 263–352.
For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 36 Cases referred to Airport Restaurants, Ltd v Southend-On-Sea Corporation [1960] 2 All ER 888 (refd) Aswini Kumar v Arabina Bose & Anor AIR 1953 SC 75 (folld) Attorney General, Malaysia v Manjeet Singh Dhillon [1991] 1 MLJ 167 (refd) Attorney-General v Times Newspapers Ltd [1974] AC 273 (refd) Bank Bumiputra Malaysia Bhd & Anor v Lorrain Esme Osman; Bank Bumiputra Malaysia Bhd & Anor v Lorrain Esme Osman & Ors [1987] 2 MLJ 633 (refd) C Ravichandran Iyer v Justice AM Bhattacharjee & Ors [1995] 5 SCC 457 (refd) Crown, The v A Rafique & Others 1950 37 AIR 1 (refd) Gallagher v Durack (1983) 57 ALJR 191 (folld) Gouriet v Union of Post Office Workers [1977] 3 All ER 70 (refd) Keng Soon Finance Bhd v MK Retnam Holdings Sdn Bhd & Anor [1989] 1 MLJ 457 (refd) Ketua Pengarah Jabatan Alam Sekitar & Anor v Kajing Tubek & Ors and other appeals [1997] 3 MLJ 23 (dist) Land Executive Committee of Federal Territory v Syarikat Harper Gilfillan Bhd [1981] 1 MLJ 234 (refd) Majlis Peguam Malaysia & 2 Lagi v Raja Segaran a/l S Krishnan Rayuan Sivil No W–02–47–00 dan Rayuan Sivil No W–02–48–00 (refd) Majlis Peguam Malaysia & Ors v Raja Segaran a/l S Krishnan [2002] 3 MLJ 155 (refd) Raja Segaran a/l S Krishnan v Bar Council Malaysia & Ors [2000] 1 MLJ 1 (refd) Raja Segaran a/l S Krishnan v Bar Council Malaysia & Ors [2001] 1 MLJ 472 (refd) Raja Segaran a/l S Krishnan v Bar Council Malaysia & Ors (No 3) [2001] 5 MLJ 305 (refd) Raja Segaran a/l S Krishnan v Bar Council Malaysia & Ors (No 4) [2001] 6 MLJ 166 (refd) Swain and another v The Law Society [1983] 1 AC 598 (refd) Tengku Jaffar bin Tengku Ahmad v Karpal Singh [1993] 3 MLJ 156 (folld)
Legislation referred to Commissions of Enquiry Act [UK]1950 s 2(1)(d) Constitution [India] art 32 Courts of Judicature Act 1964 s 43 Evidence Act 1950 ss 123, 162(2) Federal Constitution arts 125(3), 127 Landlord and Tenant Act [UK] 1954
For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 37 Legal Profession Act 1976 ss 32(d), 42(1), (a), (d), (e), (g), 46, 76(2) Post Office Act 1953 [UK] ss 38, 68 Rules of the High Court 1980 O 33, r 2 Sedition Act 1948 ss 3(1)(a), (c), 4(1)(a) Solicitors Act 1974 [UK] s 37 Solicitors’ Indemnity Rules 1975 [UK] Telegraph Act 1863 [UK] s 45
DP Vijandran (Raja Segaran & Assoc) for the plaintiff. YM Raja Aziz Addruse (Malik Imtiaz Ahmed bin Ghulam Sarwar, Gopal Sreenevasan, D Bhaskaran, Karina Yong, M Mogan and Michele N Kaur with him) (Sivananthan) for the defendants. Ahmad Kamal bin Mohd Shahid holding a watching brief for Attorney General.
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[2004] 3 MLJ 140 HUSSIN MOHD ALI v HO KAY TAT & ANOR
HIGH COURT (KUALA LUMPUR) — SUIT NO S6–22–38 OF 2001 AZMEL J 31 DECEMBER 2003
Tort — Defamation — Libel — Newspaper articles — Whether publication of articles defamed plaintiff — Whether defence of fair comment proved — Whether words complained of were comments — Whether of public importance — Whether based on proven facts
The plaintiff sued the defendants for damages including aggravated and/or exemplary damages, as well as for injunction and costs for libel contained in two articles published by the defendants in the daily newspaper, The Sun. At the material time, the plaintiff was the general manager of Sepang International Circuit Sdn Bhd (‘SIC’). The second defendant was the owner and publisher of The Sun and the first defendant, the editor-in-chief. It was the plaintiff’s claim that the defendants had defamed him by the publication of the said two articles. The construction of the Sepang International Circuit was the venue for Malaysia’s motorsports, the first success being the Formula One Race whereby SIC was awarded the best organizers. However, the subsequent two events that it conducted did not appear to be as successful as the event of the
For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 38 Formula One Race and it was extensively criticized by the newspapers. It was contended by the plaintiff that with the publication of the said articles in The Sun, the defendants had falsely and maliciously written, printed and published words which were defamatory against the plaintiff as there was a natural implication of the first article that the plaintiff as the general manager of the SIC was responsible for the three problems described in the first article and that he was incompetent to hold office as the general manager of the SIC. The defendants argued that the plaintiff as the general manager was to be accountable for the problems, and not that he was personally be blamed for them. Further, there was no suggestion or inference that the plaintiff was incompetent. Being held accountable would not be the same as being incompetent. Further, the three problems reported in the first article did occur and the replacement of the plaintiff as general manager did take place. Therefore, the defendants were justified to make such comments. Apart from that, the defendants also pleaded defence of fair comment on matters of public importance.
Held, dismissing plaintiff’s claims with costs: (1) The defence of fair comment on a matter of public importance consists of four elements, namely: (i) the words complained of are comments, although it may consist or include inference of facts; (ii) the comment is a matter of public importance; (iii) the comment is based on facts; and (iv) the comment is one which a fair-minded person can honestly make on the facts proved (see para 17). (2) Regarding the first element, the gist of the plaintiff’s complaint was not about the words actually used but the natural and ordinary meaning of the articles read as a whole. Opinions and also inference or deduction of facts can amount to a comment. The implications that the plaintiff ||Page 141>> complained of were clearly comments in the sense of being inferences of opinion or conclusion drawn from those facts. They contained the defendant’s belief or conclusion based on or drawn from the established facts (see paras 18-19). (3) As to the second element, there was no doubt that the SIC and the position of the plaintiff was a matter of public importance. Events that were held in the SIC attracted public interest not only locally but also internationally. Even the Prime Minister had shown great interest in SIC and had attended some of the events held there (see para 20). (4) Referring to the third element, the plaintiff had not disputed the material allegation of facts in the said articles. As such, the comments made by the defendants were based on actual facts (see para 22). (5) There were no denials to the truth of the existence of the three problems of SIC. The plaintiff was responsible for incidents occurring in SIC. It would not be unreasonable to comment that the plaintiff should be held accountable for the said problems. Therefore, based on the facts, comments made by the defendants were honest and in absence of malice. If the facts had been
For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 39 inaccurately published, it was mainly due to the unwillingness of the plaintiff and the staff of SIC to give the relevant information sought by the defendant. Thus, the defendant had succeeded in establishing a defence of fair comment on a matter of public importance (see paras 25-26).
[ Bahasa Malaysia summary
Plaintif telah menyaman defendan-defendan untuk ganti rugi termasuklah ganti rugi teruk dan/atau teladan, dan juga untuk injunksi dan kos untuk libel yang terkandung dalam dua artikel yang diterbitkan oleh defendan-defendan dalam akhbar harian, The Sun. Pada masa matan, plaintif adalah pengrus besar Sepang International Circuit Sdn Bhd (‘SIC’). Defendan kedua adalah pemilik dan penerbit The Sun dan defendan pertama, ketua editor. Adalah dakwaan plaintif bahawa defendan-defendan telah memfitnah beliau dengan penerbitan dua artikel tersebut. Pembinaan Sepang International Circuit adalah tempat untuk sukan motor Malaysia, yang pertama berlangsung dengan jayanya iaitu Formula One Race di mana SIC telah diawardkan sebagai penganjur terbaik. Namun begitu, dua perlumbaan berikutnya yang berlangsung tidaklah begitu berjaya seperti perlumbaan Formula One Race dan ia telah dikritik dengan meluas di akhbar-akhbar. Adalah hujah plaintif bahawa dengan penerbitan artikel-artikel tersebut dalam The Sun, defendan-defendan telah secara tipu dan niat jahat menulis, mencetak dan menerbit perkataan-perkataan yang berunsur fitnah terhadap plaintif kerana terdapat implikasi semula jadi berdasarkan artikel pertama bahawa plaintif sebagai pengurus besar SIC adalah bertanggungjawab untuk tiga permasalahan yang dibentangkan dalam artikel pertama dan bahaw beliau adalah tidak kompeten untuk memegang jawatan sebagai pengurus besar SIC. Defendan-defendan berhujah bahawa plaintif sebagai pengurus besar adalah bertanggungjawab terhadap masalah-masalah tersebut, dan beliau tidaklah dipersalahkan secara peribadi untuk ||Page 142>> masalah-masalah tersebut. Tambahan pula, tiada cadangan atau inferens bahawa plaintif adalah tidak kompeten. Untuk menjadikan seseorang itu bertanggunjawab tidak sama seperti menjadikannya tidak kompeten. Tambahan pula, ketiga-tiga masalah yang dilaporkan dalam artikel pertama memang berlaku dan pengganti plaintif sebagai pengurus besar memang wujud. Oleh itu, defendan-defendan dijustifikasikan untuk membuat komen sedemikian. Selain daripada itu, defendan-defendan juga memplidkan pembelaan komen berpatutan berhubung perkara-perkara kepentingan awam.
Diputuskan, menolak tuntutan plaintif dengan kos: (1) Pembelaan komen berpatutan mengandungi empat elemen, iaitu: (i) perkataan-perkataan yang diadukan adalah komen-komen, walaupun ia mengandungi atau termasuklah inferens fakta; (ii) komen tersebut adalah perkara kepentingan awam; (iii) komen tersebut adalah berdasarkan fakta; dan
For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 40 (iv) komen tersebut adalah di mana seorang yang waras boleh dengan jujur buat berdasarkan fakta-fakta yang dibuktikan (lihat perenggan 17). (2) Berhubung elemen pertama, inti pati aduan plaintif bukanlah mengenai perkataan-perkataan sebenar yang digunakan tetapi maksud semula jadi dan biasa artikel-artikel tersebut bila dibaca secara keseluruhan. Pendapat dan juga inferens atau pemotongan fakta-fakta boleh menbentuk satu komen. Implikasi-implikasi yang plaintif adukan dengan jelas merupakan komen-komen dalam erti kata ianya merupakan inferens pendapat atau kesimpulan yang diperolehi daripada fakta-fakta tersebut. Ia mengandungi kepercayaan atau kesimpulan defendan berdasarkan atau didapati daripada fakta-fakta yang telah dibuktikan (lihat perenggan 18-19). (3) Berhubung elemen kedua, tiada keraguan bahawa SIC dan kedudukan plaintif adalah perkara kepentingan awam. Perlumbaan-perlumbaan yang berlangsung di SIC telah menarik kepentingan awam bukan sahaja secara tempatan tetapi juga antarabangsa. Perdana Menteri juga telah menunjukkan minat dalam SIC dan telah menghadiri beberapa perlumbaan yang berlangsung di sana (lihat perenggan 20). (4) Behubung elemen ketiga, plaintif tidak dipertikaikan tentang pengataaan material fakta-fakta dalam artikel-artikel tersebut. Oleh itu, komen-komen yang dibuat oleh defendan-defendan adalah berdasarkan fakta-fakta sebenar (lihat perenggan 22). (5) Tiada penafian tentang kebenaran wujudnya tiga masalah SIC tersebut. Plaintif adalah bertanggungjawab untuk kejadian-kejadian yang berlaku di SIC. Bukanlah tidak munasabah untuk membuat komen-komen bahawa plaintif patut dipertanggungjawabkan untuk masalah-masalah tersebut. Oleh itu, berdasarkan fakta-fakta, komen-komen yang dibuat oleh defendan-defendan adalah dan berniat jahat. Jika terdapat ketidaktepatan dalam fakta-fakta yang diterbitkan ia dilakukan terutamanya disebabkan keengganan plaintif dan pekerja SIC untuk memberikan maklumat relevan yang diminta oleh defendan. Oleh itu, defendan telah berjaya membuktikan terdapat satu pembelaan komen berpatutan berhubung perkara kepentingan awam (lihat perenggan 25-26).] ||Page 143>>
Notes For cases on libel, see 12 Mallal’s Digest (4 th Ed, 2002 Reissue) paras 314–434. For libel generally, 5 Halsbury’s Laws of Malaysia paras [80.110]–[80.113].
Cases referred to Jeyaretnam v Goh Chok Tong [1989] 1 WLR 1109 (refd) Silkin v Beaverbrook [1958] 2 All ER 516 (refd)
For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 41 Chan Tse Yuen (Ronnie Wong Chun Yiam and Haniza Abdul Rani with him) (Chan Tse Yuen & Co) for the plaintiff. N Nadkarni (Azman Thaiyub Khan with him) (Lee Hishammuddin) for the defendants.
[2004] 5 MLJ 377 ABU SAMAH BIN OMAR v ZAINAL BIN MONTEL
HIGH COURT (MELAKA) — CIVIL APPEAL NO 11–30 OF 2001 LOW HOP BING J 4 NOVEMBER 2003
Tort — Defamation — Qualified privilege — Statements made in police report — Whether qualified privilege — Whether in compliance with drafting requirements in pleading libel
This is an appeal by the appellant/defendant (‘the defendant’) against the decision of the learned magistrate who found the defendant liable in libel against the plaintiff and awarded the plaintiff a sum of RM8,000 as damages, and a further sum of RM1,000 as exemplary damages. The basis of the libel claim was on a police report made by the plaintiff against the defendant who was appointed to carry out demolition and construction works in the plaintiff’s house, after money and jewellery were found to be missing. The defendant submitted that the plaintiff’s statement of claim has failed to comply with the drafting requirements in pleading libel to establish the tort of libel against the defendant, and that the learned magistrate has erred in law in holding that the defence of qualified privilege did not apply.
Held, allowing the appeal: (1) The tort of defamation, ie libel and slander requires a special treatment in so far as the drafting of the pleading is concerned, in particular the plaintiff’s statement of claim. The draftsman of the plaintiff’s statement of claim has pleaded ‘bilik tidak diselang’ (the room was not intervened (or interposed)) when the police report stated ‘bilik tidak diselongkar’ (the room was not rummaged). In any event, it has fallen short of the requirement of drafting the statement of claim for the tort of libel as it was not what the defendant has stated in his police report (see paras 7, 9 and 10). (2) In relation to the police report lodged by the defendant, neither the plaintiff’s fundamentally flawed statement of claim nor his oral evidence has ever identified which particular words therein are defamatory of him or has contained any defamatory imputation against him, since the actual words in the
For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 42 police report have never been specifically pleaded by the plaintiff in his statement of claim. The learned magistrate did not appear to have considered this fundamental flaw in the plaintiffs statement of claim (see para 15). (3) Since the plaintiff’s statement of claim did not plead the actual words used in the police report, it is impossible for the learned magistrate to come to a specific finding as to which defamatory words or defamatory imputations were published of and concerning the plaintiff (see para 17). (4) The plaintiff’s statement of claim merely stated that the defendant has made a police report but did not plead to whom the alleged libel has been published. No police personnel has been called by the plaintiff to prove this essential issue of publication to a third party (see para 19). ||Page 378>> (5) The learned magistrate has erred in failing to apply the defence of qualified privilege as the plaintiff was unable to adduce any evidence of malice on the part of the defendant and indeed the learned magistrate has come to a specific finding that there was no malice on the part of the defendant (see para 23).
[ Bahasa Malaysia summary
Ini adalah rayuan daripada perayu/defendan (‘defendan’) terhadap keputusan majistret yang arif yang telah mendapati defendan bertanggungjawab di dalam libel terhadap plaintif dan mengawardkan jumlah RM8,000 sebagai ganti rugi dan jumlah selanjut RM1,000 sebagai ganti rugi teladan. Dasar tuntutan libel adalah laporan polis yang dibuat oleh plaintif terhadap defendan yang telah dilantik untuk melaksanakan kerja-kerja perobohan dan pembinaan di dalam rumah plaintif, selepas wang dan barangan kemas telah didapati hilang. Defendan telah menghujahkan bahawa penyataan tuntutan plaintif telah gagal mematuhi peruntukan-peruntukan draf di dalam merayu untuk libel untuk mendirikan tort libel terhadap defendan dan bahawa majistret yang arif telah khilaf dari segi undang-undang di dalam memutuskan bahawa pembelaan perlindungan bersyarat tidak terpakai.
Diputuskan, membenarkan rayuan: (1) Tort fitnah iaitu libel dan slander memerlukan perlakuan yang khas di mana pendrafan pliding berkenaan, khususnya penyataan tuntutan plaintif. Pendraf penyataan tuntutan plaintif telah menyatakan bahawa bilik tidak diselang apabila laporan polis menyatakan bilik tidak diselongkar. Walau bagaimanapun, ia tidak mematuhi peruntukan untuk mendraf penyataan tuntutan itu untuk tort libel kerana ia bukan apa yang defendan menyatakan di dalam laporan polis (lihat perenggan-perenggan 7, 9 dan 10). (2) Berkenaan laporan polis yang dibuat oleh defendan, penyataan tuntutan plaintif yang cacat pada dasarnya ataupun keterangan lisannya tidak mengenalpasti
For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 43 perkataan-perkataan yang khusus yang memfitnahkannya atau mempunyai kaitan fitnah terhadapnya, memandangkan bahawa perktaan-perkataan sebenarnya tidak diplidkan oleh plaintif di dalam penyataan tuntutannya. Majistret yang arif seakan-akan tidak mempertimbangkan kecacatan dasar di dalam penyataan tuntutan plaintif (lihat perenggan 15). (3) Memandangkan bahawa penyataan tuntutan plaintif tidak memplidkan perkataan-perkataan sebenarnya yang digunakan di dalam laporan polis, ia tidak mungkin untuk majistret memutuskan secara khusus perkataan-perkataan fitnah atau kaitan-kaitan fitnah yang mana yang diterbitkan atau berkait plaintif (lihat perenggan 17). (4) Penyataan tuntutan plaintif hanya menyatakan bahawa defendan telah membuat laporan polis tetapi tidak memplid kepada siapa libel yang dikatakan itu diterbitkan. Tiada polis yang dipanggil oleh plaintif untuk membuktikan isu penting terbitan ke parti ketiga (lihat perenggan 19). ||Page 379>> (5) Majistret yang arif telah khilaf di dalam gagal memakai pembelaan perlindungan bersyarat memandangkan plaintif tidak menunjukkan apa-apa keterangan niat jahat pada defendan dan majistret yang arif telah memutuskan secara khusus bahawa tiada niat jahat pada defendan (lihat perenggan 23).]
Notes For cases on qualified privilege, see 12 Mallal’s Digest (4 th Ed, 2002 Reissue) paras 473-479. For qualified privilege, see 2 Halsbury’s Laws of Malaysia, paras [30.108]– [30.127].
Cases referred to Abdul Rahman Talib v Seenivasagam & Anor [1965] 1 MLJ 142 (refd) Ayob bin Saud v TS Sambanthamurthi [1989] 1 MLJ 315 (refd) Hassan & Anor v Wan Ishak & Ors [1961] MLJ 45 (refd) Hebditch v MacIlwaine [1894] 2 QB 54 (refd) Hoe Thean Sun & Anor v Lim Tee Keng [1999] 3 MLJ 138 (refd) Hough v London Express Newspaper Ltd [1940] 2 KB 507 (refd) Institute of Commercial Management, United Kingdom v New Straits Times Press (Malaysia) Bhd [1993] 1 MLJ 408 (refd) Karpal Singh a/l Ram Singh v DP Vijandran [2001] 4 MLJ 161 (refd) Kian Lup Construction v Hongkong Bank Malaysia Bhd [2002] 7 CLJ 32 (refd) Knupffer v London Express Newspaper Ltd [1944] AC 116 PC (refd) Lee Kuan Yew v Davies & Ors [1989] 1 SLR 1063 (refd) Morgan v Odhams Press Ltd & Anor [1971] 2 All ER 1156 (refd)
For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 44 Murugason v The Straits Times Press [1975] Ltd [1984–1985] 1 SLR 334 (refd) S Pakianathan v Jenni Ibrahim [1988] 1 CLJ 771, [1988] 2 MLJ 173 (refd) SB Palmer v AS Rajah & Ors [1949] MLJ 6 (refd) Syed Husin Ali v. Sharikat Penchetakan Utusan Melayu Bhd & Anor [1973] 2 MLJ 56 (refd) Wennhak v Morgan (1888) 20 QBD 635 (refd) Yussoupoff v Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Pictures Ltd [1934] 50 TLR 58 (refd)
Appeal from Summons No 73–123 of 1998) (Magistrate’s Court, Melaka)
P Vanaja Dewi (A Rengganathan & Co) for the defendant.
[2004] 5 MLJ 573 PUNEET KUMAR v MEDICAL CENTRE JOHORE SDN BHD
HIGH COURT (JOHOR BAHRU) — CIVIL SUIT NO 22–243 OF 1995 ABDUL KADIR MUSA J 7 APRIL 2004
Tort — Defamation — Defences — Qualified privilege — Whether occasion of publishing to persons who took down letter, who transcribed it on typewriter and who filed and dealt privilege occasion
Tort — Defamation — Defences — Qualified privilege — Whether publishing by and to people carrying out legal or moral duty covered by qualified privilege
Tort — Defamation — Libel — Allegation that plaintiff’s conduct was improper and unbecoming of a consultant surgeon — Test applicable
Labour Law — Employment — Termination of employment — Visiting consultant surgeon — Wrongful termination — Total failure of consideration of team work — Whether termination justified
The plaintiff brought an action against the defendant alleging: (i) he was wrongly terminated by the defendant by their letter dated 7 August 1995 from carrying on the duty of a visiting consultant at the defendant’s specialist centre in spite of the fact that the contract between the plaintiff and the defendant was extended till 31 March 1996;
For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 45 and (ii) by the reason of certain words used in the said letter, he was defamed having regard to his status as a specialist. The defendant’s defence was that the publishing occasion of the defamatory words caught by qualified privilege and the termination was justified as the plaintiff’s action was total failure of team work.
Held, dismissing plaintiff’s claim: (1) Based on decided cases consideration must be given to: (i) under what circumstances the alleged defamatory words were published?; (ii) to whom the statement with those alleged defamatory words communicated and or circulated?; and (iii) whether the said statement was published, communicated and or circulated in good faith or otherwise, must be looked into by the court where the defence of qualified privilege was put up (see paras 12–13). (2) The dictation to typist and the handing to the printer was the accepted mode of writing the documents. The occasion (publishing to persons who took down the letter, who transcribed it on the typewriter and who filed and dealt) was, thereof, privileged (see para 22). (3) A privileged occasion is, in reference to qualified privilege, an occasion where the person who makes the communication has the interest or a duty, legal, social or moral, make to the person[s] to whom it is made and those person[s] to whom it is so made have a similar and corresponding interest or duty to receive it. The maker of the letter was certainly under a legal and moral duty to communicate the letter to the ||Page 574>> four persons referred to by the plaintiff and they similarly have corresponding duty to receive (see paras 28–29). (4) None of the relevant medical staff which formed the ‘team’ on the material date was willing to work with plaintiff anymore thereafter as a result of his conduct on that day. That similar stand of ‘other medical staff’ must have propelled the defendants to conclude that there was a ‘total failure of consideration of team work’ ‘so essential to the very existence of guarding the ‘best interest of the patients. The termination was not only justified but was also well within the defendants legal right to do so (see paras 64–65).
[ Bahasa Malaysia summary
Plaintif telah memulakan satu tindakan terhadap defendan mendakwa: (i) beliau telah ditamatkan secara salah oleh defendan melalui surat mereka bertarikh 7 Ogos 1995 dari menjalankan tanggungjawabnya sebagai konsultan yang mengunjungi di pusat pakar defendan walaupun kontrak di antara plaintif dan defendan telah dilanjutkan sehingga 31 Mac 1996; dan (ii) kerana beberapa perkataan yang digunakan di dalam surat tersebut, beliau telah difitnah mengambilkira statusnya sebagai seorang pakar. Pembelaan defendan adalah penerbitan perkataan berfitnah tersebut adalah dilindungi oleh perlindungan bersyarat dan penamatan tersebut adalah adil kerana tindakan
For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 46 plaintif adalah kegagalan kerjasama sepasukan.
Diputuskan, menolak tuntutan plaintif: (1) Berdasarkan kes-kes yang telah diputuskan, pertimbangan harus diberi kepada: (i) dalam keadaan apa perkataan fitnah yang dituduh diterbitkan?; (ii) kepada siapa perkataan fitnah tersebut dikomunikasikan dan atau disebarkan?; dan (iii) sama ada penyataan tersebut diterbitkan, komunikasikan, disebarkan dengan niat baik atau sebaliknya; harus diteliti oleh mahkamah bila pembelaan perlindungan bersyarat dikemukakan (lihat perenggan-perenggan 12–13). (2) Makluman pada jurutaip dan pemberian kepada pencetak adalah cara menulis dokumen yang diterima. Keadaan tersebut (menerbit kepada orang yang mencatit surat tersebut, orang yang menaip dengan mesin taip dan orang yang memfailkan dan berurus) adalah dilindung (lihat perenggan 22). (3) Keadaan yang terlindung merujuk kepada perlindungan bersyarat adalah keadaan di mana orang yang membuat komunikasi tersebut mempunyai hak atau tanggungjawab, undang-undang, sosial atau moral membuat kepada orang yang ditujukan dan orang tersebut mempunyai kepentingan atau tanggungjawab yang sama untuk menerimanya. Orang yang membuat surat ini sudah tentu mempunyai tanggungjawab undang-undang dan moral untuk menghantar surat tersebut kepada empat orang yang dirujuk oleh plaintif dan mereka mempunyai tanggungjawab untuk menerimanya (lihat perenggan-perenggan 28–29). ||Page 575>> (4) Tiada seorang pekerja perubatan yang terdiri dari ‘pasukan tersebut’ pada tarikh yang material sudi untuk bekerja dengan plaintif selepas itu kerana kelakuan plaintif pada hari tersebut. Pendapat yang sama oleh pekerja perubatan yang lain membuat defendan untuk membuat kesimpulan bahawa terdapat kegagalan pertimbangan bekerja sekumpulan. Penamatan tersebut bukan sahaja adil tetapi adalah di bawah hak undang-undang defendan (lihat perenggan-perenggan 64–65).]
Notes For cases on defences in defamation, see 12 Mallal’s Digest (4 th Ed, 2002 Reissue) paras 267–273. For cases on libel, see 12 Mallal’s Digest (4 th Ed, 2002 Reissue) paras 314–434. For cases on termination of employment, see 8(1) Mallal’s Digest (4 th Ed, 2003 Reissue) paras 1070–1140. For defences in defamation, see 5 Halsbury’s Laws of Malaysia paras [80.092]– [80.102]. For libel generally, see 5 Halsbury’s Laws of Malaysia paras [80.110]–[80.113]. For termination of employment, see 7 Halsbury’s Laws of Malaysia (2003 Reissue) paras [120.080]–[120.089].
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Cases referred to Abdul Rahman Talib v Seenivasagam & Anor [1965] 1 MLJ 142 (refd) Adam v Ward [1917] AC 309 (refd) Bryanston Finance Ltd & Ors v de Vries & Anor [1975] QB 703; [1975] 2 All ER 609 (refd) Dato’ Seri Anwar bin Ibrahim v Dato’ Seri Dr Mahathir bin Mohamad [1999] 4 MLJ 58 (refd) Horrocks v Lawe [1975] AC 135 (refd) John Lee & Anor v Henry Wong Jan Fook [1981] 1 MLJ 108 (refd) Joshua Benjamin Jeyaretnam v Goh Chok Tong [1989] 3 MLJ 1 (refd) Luk Kai Lam v Sim Ai Leng [1978] 1 MLJ 214 (refd) Lyndon v Yorkshire Regional Health Authority 10 BMLR 49 (refd) Osborn v Thomas Boulter & Son [1930] 2 KB 226 (refd) S Pakianathan v Jenni Ibrahim [1988] 2 MLJ 173 (refd) Veitch v De Mornay (1805–1884) SS Vol 1 418 (refd)
Legislation referred to Defamation Act 1957 s 7(3)
P Suppiah (Suppiah & Co) for the plaintiff. Subayogan Sinniah, (Rita Elizabeth Iype with him) (Zainal Abidin & Co) for the defendant.
[2004] 6 MLJ 478 ABDUL MANAF BIN AHMAD v MOHD KAMIL DATUK MOHD KASIM
HIGH COURT (SANDAKAN) — SUIT NO T(22)16 OF 2001 LINTON ALBERT JC 26 AUGUST 2004
Civil Procedure — Action — Limitation period — When did cause of action accrue — Burden of proof — Whether onus on plaintiff to prove action commenced within time — Whether action statute-barred — Sabah Limitation Ordinance (Cap 72) s 3
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Tort — Defamation — Proceedings — Action for defamation and malicious falsehood — Limitation period — Burden of proof — Whether onus on plaintiff to prove action commenced within time — Whether action statute-barred — Sabah Limitation Ordinance (Cap 72) s 3
The plaintiff and defendant were members of the Tawau Native Timber Co-operative Society (‘the Co-operative’. He sought damages for defamation against the defendant who had made a police report accusing the plaintiff of misappropriating moneys belonging to the Co-operative. The main issue before this court was whether his claim was beyond the limitation period as prescribed by the Sabah Limitation Ordinance (‘the Ordinance’).
Held, dismissing the plaintiff’s action: (1) The onus is on the plaintiff to prove that his action for defamation and malicious falsehood occurred within the period set out in the Ordinance (see para 4). (2) The plaintiff’s cause of action accrued in 1987, when the words complained of were published at the time they were recorded in the police report and damages to the plaintiff ensued at the annual general meeting of the Co-operative on 23 August 1987. However, by commencing the action 16 years after the expiry of the limitation period, it was caught by s 3 of the Ordinance (see paras 8, 10 and 11).
[ Bahasa Malaysia summary
Plaintif dan defendan merupakan ahli kepada Kesatuan Koperatif Kayu Balak Anak Watan Tawau (‘Koperatif tersebut’). Dia menuntut ganti rugi untuk fitnah, terhadap defendan yang telah sebelum ini membuat aduan polis menuduh plaintif melesapkan wang Koperatif. Isu utama di hadapan mahkamah ini adalah sama ada tuntutannya berada di luar had masa seperti yang diperuntukkan oleh Ordinan Hadmasa Sabah (‘Ordinan tersebut’)
Diputuskan, menolak tindakan plaintif dengan kos: (1) Beban bukti terletak pada plaintif untuk membuktikan bahawa tindakan fitnah dan kepalsuan niat jahat dimulakan dalam lingkungan had masa seperti yang diperuntukkan di dalam Ordinan tersebut (lihat perenggan 4). ||Page 479>> (2) Kuasa tindakan plaintif terakru dalam tahun 1987, bila perkataan-perkataan yang diadukan terpapar semasa ia direkodkan di dalam aduan polis dan ganti rugi kepada plaintif terhasil pada perhimpunan umum tahunan Koperatif pada
For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 49 23 Ogos 1987. Akan tetapi, dengan memulakan tindakan 16 tahun selepas penamatan tempoh had masa, ia dihalang oleh s 3 Ordinan tersebut ((lihat perenggan 8, 10 dan 11).]
Notes For cases on limitation, see 2(3) Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2001 Reissue) paras 138–141. For cases on defamation proceedings, see 12 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2002 Reissue) paras 468–469.
Cases referred to Credit Coporation (M) Bhd v Fong Tak Sin [1991] 1 MLJ 409 (folld) Ong Ah Bee v Hii Chung Siong, Robin [1993] 1 CLJ 504 (folld) Wong Yoke Cheng & Ors v Lai Siew Wah Sdn Bhd and Another Appeal [1998] MLJU 439 (refd)
Legislation referred to Sabah Limitation Ordinance (Cap 72) s 3, Items 11, 12, 20 of Schedule
Alice Imelda Chin (Alice Imelda Chin) for the plaintiff. Mirdin Mamdin (Chin Mirdin and Co) for the defendant.
[2004] 7 MLJ 7 LAU YEONG NAN v LIFE PUBLISHER BERHAD & ORS
HIGH COURT (SHAH ALAM) — CIVIL SUIT NO MT1-22-123 OF 1997 SURIYADI J 1 OCTOBER 2004
Tort — Defamation — Libel — Libel in newspapers — Aggravated damages — Special damages
Tort — Defamation — Libel — Libel in newspapers — Whether wordings defamatory — Whether defence of fair comment available
This was the plaintiff’s defamation action against the defendants. The alleged defamation arose out of an article entitled ‘Praiseworthy Bravery’ published in the
For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 50 ‘New Life Post’ newspaper. The plaintiff had divided the alleged defamatory contents of the article into three portions. The article (translated from Chinese) contained the following ‘… There are not many local recording companies bosses who are so ‘generous’. The first album suffered losses. Maybe could give the second album a try. If the second album also suffered losses, may the singer please practise singing the song ‘Fen Fei Yen’ … Using a naked photograph on the album front cover is a taboo in the musical circle in Malaysia. Later he revealed himself that that a rich woman approached him ‘to borrow his seeds’ to give birth to a child, a homosexual raped him etc ... Recently he even spread news that he would march into China market … His MTV new songs were aired in the Central Television Station. It is not known whether this matter is true or false? Alright, let it be true. But Mr Lau’s image and skill of singing still need ‘polishing’. If he is put out to win honour for his country hastily the Chinese who do not know the truth will think that he is most popular, most potential and has the most representation in Malaysia …’. According to the plaintiff’s pleadings, the above statements in their natural and ordinary meaning were meant to carry the message, inter alia, that the plaintiff was an unknown and a liar, incompetent to sing in the various media and that he was attempting to deceive the public that his music was heard by the world at large and had cheated the Chinese public in China. According to the plaintiff, the sum effect of the above malicious publication was that his character, credit and reputation as a prominent singer had been besmirched and destroyed and, as he has suffered seriously, he thus was entitled to damages. As regards damages, the plaintiff claimed that he had suffered pecuniary losses in the like of several concert contracts being terminated with a company called Sri Steps Sdn Bhd (‘Sri Steps’). The pecuniary loss allegedly suffered by the plaintiff pursuant to the cancellation of the agreement amounted to RM4.5 million. The eventual compensation sought was RM10 million, made up of general, special, aggravated and exemplary damages.
Held: (1) The court had to first arrive at a conclusion that the words complained of were defamatory. After that pronouncement, the law would then presume that they were false, whereupon the onus would shift to the ||Page 8>> defendant to prove justification, namely that those words were true (see para 14). (2) The defendants in their respective capacity did publish the libellous article and evidentially the person mentioned in the article was beyond any doubt the plaintiff. The article did not only identify the plaintiff by name but the defendants had also admitted that the words referred to the plaintiff by calling evidence to that effect (see paras 22 and 37). (3) The article was capable of being defamatory. Any reader in the court selected group, after reading the article would naturally arrive at an opinion that not only was the plaintiff an untalented and unsuccessful singer who thrived on sympathy from recording companies but was also a liar, a homosexual, a
For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 51 sexually perverted person, a sodomised victim, someone no parent would want his or her child to emulate and someone who breached all rules of decency (see para 23). (4) To rebut the presumption that the article was false, in order to be entitled to the defence of fair comment, the defendants had attempted to adduce rebuttal evidence justifying the facts supplied in the article. In respect of the defendants’ statement in the article that the plaintiff had used a naked photograph on his album cover, the cover showed only the bared back of the plaintiff. With all the available evidence, the court was satisfied that the plaintiff never was proven to have posed naked during that impugned photography session. That being so, the defendants’ testimony as regards the naked factor on the album cover was far from the truth (see paras 30 and 31). (5) Another relevant point open to dispute was whether the plaintiff was raped at all. The article prepared by one Ms Lim Mee Fong, which was the very source supposedly reproduced by the defendants, merely stated that the plaintiff was sexually assaulted, an offence which was less demeaning or humiliating. Certainly the plaintiff was not raped (see paras 33 and 34). (6) The message relayed to the public in the article was that the plaintiff’s first album had suffered losses and that he was not a viable investment to any recording company. Despite that spirited statement, the defendants had failed to adduce any admissible evidence to rebut the presumption of falsity of the said facts. Accordingly, the defendants had not been successful in proving that: (a) the plaintiff was a bad and an unsuccessful singer; (b) the plaintiff’s albums had suffered losses; (c) the plaintiff had posed naked on the cover of one of his albums; and (d) the plaintiff was raped (see paras 35 and 36). (7) The defence of fair comment related to matters of public interest. Any person who filled a public position rendered himself to scrutiny and public discussion, and if any of his public acts, which were of public interest, were improper or wrong, he must accept fair criticism from the critical public. This right of fair comment was subject to certain principles, namely, the words complained of must be fair and were bona fide comments and of public interest, and the statements must be true. Even though comments based on untrue facts may be frowned upon, a ||Page 9>> plea of fair comment would not necessarily fail merely on some minor but inaccurate fact made public. In the instant case, the false facts not only were substantial and highly important but effortlessly recognisable as being the heart and soul of the libellous article. With such a failure by the defendants to establish factually the contents of the libellous article, the defendants had thus failed to rebut the presumption of falsity of facts and thus must be denied the legal right to rely on the defence of fair comment (see paras 38, 39, 41 and 42). (8) The negative picture painted by the defendants had clearly stunted the plaintiff’s career growth when contracts suddenly begin to dry up or executed
For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 52 contracts were terminated or not extended. Since the libellous attacks were sarcastic, withering, demeaning, scandalous and outright false and showed how heartless and unfair the defendants were, the court was entitled to award aggravated damages. The unforgiving behaviour of the defendants, which apart from damaging the reputation of the plaintiff, had humiliated him and in the process practically caused mental stress to him. Accordingly, an award of RM300,000 for general and aggravated damages was a fair sum in the circumstances of the case (see para 48, 49 and 51). (9) As for special damages, although the plaintiff had alleged that contracts had dried up and that he was suffering financial setbacks, the plaintiff did not make any attempts to prove those losses except for the termination of a contract with Sri Steps. Despite the oral testimony of Sri Step’s director, supported by a documented agreement, the plaintiff had not succeeded in proving this loss satisfactorily on a balance of probabilities. Although the statement of claim was filed on 24 April 1997, the supposed contract with Sri Steps (signed on 20 December 1996) was only included in the pleadings after an amendment had been made on 26 April 1998. This development was certainly unusual as several negative interpretations can unfold from that, such as it being an afterthought and thus a sham contract. Further, at the time of the supposed execution of the contract with Sri Steps, the plaintiff had already signed a contract with another company (‘Layar Opera’). This agreement with Layar Opera stipulated that the plaintiff was not to appear or perform in any motion picture, stage plays, television features or radio programmes of any kind without the producer’s prior written consent. Written consent was not obtained from Layar Opera. The plaintiff was a singer by profession, yet Sri Step’s principal activity, as reflected in its director’s report was ‘educating and promoting dancing and arts’. Having considered all the evidence of inactivity and unreasonableness of the Sri Steps agreement, the plaintiff’s claim for special damages was accordingly rejected (see paras 52–54 and 57).
[ Bahasa Malaysia summary
Ini merupakan tindakan plaintif untuk fitnah terhadap defendan-defendan. Fitnah yang dikatakan timbul daripada satu artikel yang bertajuk ||Page 10>> ‘Praiseworthy Bravery’ yang diterbitkan di dalam suratkhabar’ New Life Post’. Plaintif telah membahagikan kandungan-kandungan fitnah artikel itu kepada tiga bahagian. Artikel (yang diterjemahkan daripada Bahasa Cina) mengandungi yang berikut: ‘... There are not many local recording companies bosses who are so ‘generous’. The first album suffered losses. Maybe could give the second album a try. If the album also suffered losses, may the singer please practise singing the song ‘Fen Fei Yen’ ... Using a naked photograph on the album front cover is a taboo in the musical circle in Malaysia. Later he revealed himself that a rich woman recently approached him ‘to borrow his seeds’ to give birth to a child, a homosexual raped him
For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 53 etc ... Recently he even spread news that he would march into China market ... His MTV new songs were aired in the Central Television Station. It is not known whether this matter is true or false? Alright, let it be true. But Mr Lau’s image and skill of singing still need ‘polishing’. If he is most popular, most potential and has the most representation in Malaysia...’ Mengikut pliding plaintif, penyataan-penyataan seperti di atas di dalam maksud biasa mereka adalah bahawa, inter alia, plaintif adalah seorang yang tidak terkenal dan penipu, tidak berbakat menyanyi di dalam media dan beliau mencuba memperdayakan orang awam bahawa muzik beliau didengar oleh dunia dan beliau telah memperdayakan orang awam di China. Mengikut plaintif, kesan keseluruhan terbitan niat jahat adalah bahawa peribadi, kebolehpercayaan dan nama baik beliau sebagai seorang penyanyi yang terkenal telah dicemarkan dan dihancurkan dan beliau telah menderita dan berhak kepada ganti rugi. Berkait dengan ganti rugi, plaintif berkata bahawa beliau mengalami kerugian kewangan seperti beberapa kontrak konsert beliau ditamatkan dengan syarikat bernama Sri Steps dn Bhd (‘Sri Steps’). Kerugian kewangan yang dikatakan dialami oleh plaintif menurut penamatan kontrak berjumlah RM4.5j. Pampasan yang dituntut adalah RM10j, iaitu ganti rugi am, khas, teruk dan teladan.
Diputuskan: (1) Mahkamah perlu membuat kesimpulan bahawa perkataan yang diadu adalah fitnah. Setelah itu, undang-undang akan menganggap perkataan-perkataan itu palsu, di mana beban akan memindah kepada defendan untuk membuktikan justifikasi, iaitu perkataan itu adalah benar (lihat perenggan 14). (2) Defendan-defendan di dalam tugas mereka telah menerbitkan artikel berlibel itu dan di sisi keterangan orang yang dikatakan di dalam artikel itu melebihi keraguan adalah plaintif. Artikel itu bukan sahaja mengecamkan plaintif dengan nama beliau tetapi defendan-defendan telah mengaku bahawa perkataan-perkataan itu merujuk kepada plaintif dengan memanggil keterangan mengenai itu (lihat perenggan 22 dan 37). (3) Artikel itu boleh dikatakan fitnah. Sebarang pembaca daripada kumpulan yang dipilih oleh mahkamah, setelah membaca artikel itu akan membuat kesimpulan bahawa plaintif adalah seorang penyanyi ||Page 11>> yang tidak berbakat dan tidak berjaya yang bergantung kepada belas kasihan syarikat rekod dan seorang penipu, homoseks, seorang penyumbaleweng, seorang mangsa yang telah diliwat, seorang yang ibubapa-ibubapa tidak hendak kanak-kanak mereka mengikut jejak orang itu dan seorang yang melanggar semua aturan kesopanan (lihat perenggan 23). (4) Untuk mematahkan anggapan bahawa artikel itu palsu, untuk berhak kepada pembelaan komen berpatutan, defendan-defendan telah cuba mengemukakan keterangan pematahan yang menjustifikasikan fakta-fakta di dalam artikel itu. Berkait dengan penyataan defendan-defendan di dalam artikel itu bahawa plaintif telah menggunakan foto bogel pada penutup album beliau, penutup itu hanya menunjukkan bahagian belakang terdedah plaintif itu. Dengan segala
For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 54 keterangan yang sedia ada, mahkamah berpuas hati bahawa plaintif tidak dibuktikan bergaya bogel semasa sesi mengambil foto. Oleh itu, testimoni defendan-defendan berkait dengan faktor bogel pada penutup album adalah tidak benar (lihat perenggan 30 dan 31). (5) Satu lagi fakta penting adalah sama ada plaintif dirogol. Artikel yang disediakan oleh Ms Lim Mee Fong yang mendapat sumbernya dari defendan telah menyatakan bahawa plaintif telah dieksploit secara seksual, satu kejadian yang memalukan. Plaintif sememangnya tidak dirogol (lihat perenggan 33 dan 34). (6) Apa yang telah dikemukakan kepada masyarakat dalam artikel tersebut adalah bahawa album pertama plaintif telah mengalami kerugian dan beliau tidak memberi sebarang manfaat terhadap syarikat rakaman beliau. Walaupun kenyataan ini agak kasar defendan tidak berjaya memberikan sebarang bukti terhadap ketidaksahihan fakta tersebut. Defendan juga gagal membuktikan bahawa: (a) plaintif adalah seorang yang berkelakuan buruk dan penyanyi yang teruk; (b) album plaintif mengalami kerugian; (c) plaintif telah merakamkan gambarnya muka albumnya dalam keadaan bogel dan (d) plaintif telah dirogol (lihat perenggan 35 dan 36). (7) Pembelaan komen berpatutan yang digunakan itu berdasarkan kepentingan masyarakat. Individu yang menjadi tumpuan masyarakat akan mendapati dirinya diteliti dan dibincang oleh masyarakat dan jika kelakuan individu tersebut adalah salah atau tidak berpatutan maka beliau mesti menerima kritis yang adil dari masyarakat. Ini adalah hak pembelaan komen dan tertakluk kepada beberapa prinsip, iaitu kenyataan yang dikomen mestilah adil dan bona fide dan untuk kepentingan masyarakat. Walaupun komen tersebut berdasarkan fakta yang tidak benar, komen ini tidak akan berjaya jika kenyataan itu hanya kecil dan dinyatakan kepada masyarakat. Dalam kes ini fakta palsu yang dibuat agak substantif dan merupakan nadi kepada artikel yang libel. Defendan juga gagal membuktikan kepalsuan fakta tersebut dan tidak patut diberi pembelaan komen berpatutan (lihat perenggan 38, 39, 41 dan 42). ||Page 12>> (8) Gambaran negatif yang ditonjolkan oleh defendan itu telah mencemar kerjaya plaintif apabila tiada kontrak baru dan kontrak yang lama telah dibatalkan. Komen-komen libel itu merupakan sindiran, skandal yang memeranjatkan, merendahkan martabat palsu dan memalukan plaintif serta menunjukkan bahawa defendan tidak berhati perut dan telah memalukan plaintif dan mengakibatkan tekanan mental terhadap plaintif. Maka mahkamah memberikan ganti rugi terhadap plaintif yang berjumlah sebanyak RM300,000. Mahkamah berpendapat bahawa ganti rugi ini adil dalam keadaan kes ini (lihat perenggan 49 dan 51). (9) Bagi ganti rugi khas, walaupun plaintif mendakwa bahawa tiada tawaran baru dan plaintif mempunyai masalah kewangan, plaintif tidak dapat membuktikan dakwaan ini. Beliau cuma menunjukkan kontrak Sri Steps yang telah dibatalkan. Dalam keterangan lisan pengarah urusan Sri Steps dan bukti
For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 55 dokumen plaintif tidak berjaya menunjukkan kerugiannya secara memuaskan. Walaupun penyata tuntutan difailkan pada 24 April 1997 kontrak dengan Sri Steps (ditandatangani pada 20 Disember 1996) dimasukkan dalam pliding selepas pembetulan dibuat pada 26 April 1998. perkembangan ini agak luar biasa dan terdapat beberapa implikasi negatif terhadap isu ini seperti kontrak ini tidak tepat dan merupakan satu penipuan. Pada masa kontrak ini patut ditandatangani, plaintif telah pun menandatangani kontrak dengan syarikat lain iaitu Layar Opera. Terma Syarikat Layar Opera ini adalah bahawa plaintif tidak boleh muncul untuk filem, televisyen, radio tanpa kebenaran bertulis dari produser. Kebenaran bertulis ini tidak diperolehi dari Layar Opera. Plaintif adalah seorang penyanyi dan aktiviti Sri Steps adalah untuk mempromosikan tarian dan seni. Setelah meneliti kesemua bukti ini dalam perjanjian Sri Steps permohonan plaintif untuk kerugian khas ditolak (lihat perenggan 52–54 dan 57).]
Notes For cases on libel, see 12 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2000 Reissue) paras 263-352.
Cases referred to Abdul Rahman Talib v Seenwasagam [1965] 1 MLJ 142 (refd) AJA Peter v OG Nio & Ors [1980] 1 MLJ 226 (refd) Boardway Approvals Ltd v Oldhams Press Ltd [1965] 2 All ER 423 (refd) Cargill v Carmichael & Anor [1883] 1 Ky 603 (Civ) (refd) Chong Siew Chiang v Chua Ching Geh & Anor [1995] 1 MLJ 551 (refd) Clarence Wilfred v Tengku Adnan bin Tengku & Anor [1983] 1 CLJ 136 (refd) Coopers & Lybrand v Singapore Society of Accountants & Anor [1988] 3 MLJ 134 (refd) Curtis v Metro-Goldwyn-Meyer (Oriental) Inc [1931] SSLR 42 (refd) Drummond-Jackson v British Medical Association [1970] 1 All ER 1094 (refd) Lee Kuan Yew v Davies [1990] 1 MLJ 390 (refd) Lee Kuan Yew v JB Jeyaretnam [1979] 1 MLJ 281 (refd) ||Page 13>> London Artists Ltd v Littler [1969] 2 QB 375 (refd) Lyon v Daily Telegraph [1943] KB 746 (refd) McCarey v Associated Newspapers Ltd [1964] 3 All ER 947 (refd) Mohd Onn bin Muda (Haji) v Saniboy Mohd Ismail [1998] 1 CLJ 569 (refd) Pang Fee Siong v Piong Kien Siong [1999] 3 MLJ 189 (refd) Purshottam Vijay v State AIR 1961 MP 205 (refd) R Murugason v The Straits Times Press (1975) Ltd [1984] 2 MLJ 10 (refd)
For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 56 R v Gray [1900] 2 QB 36 (refd) Raghunath Singh v Mukandi Lal AIR 1936 ALL 780 (refd) Rajagopal v Rajan [1972] 1 MLJ 45 (refd) Rookes v Barnard [1964] AC 1129 (refd) S Pakianathan v Jenni Ibrahim [1988] 2 MLJ 173 (refd) SB Palmer v AS Rajah & Ors [1949] MLJ 6 (refd) Scott v Sampson [1882] 8 QBD 491 (refd) Syed Husin Ali v Sharikat Perchetakan Utusan Melayu Bhd & Anor [1973] 2 MLJ 256 (refd) Tun Datuk Patinggi Abdul Rahman Yakub v Bre Sdn Bhd [1996] 1 MLJ 393 Youssoupoff v Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Picture Ltd [1934] TLR 581 (refd)
Legislation referred to Defamation Act 1957 Civil Law Act 1956 Rules of the High Court 1980 O 78
M Manoharan Malayalam (M Manoharan & Co) and Mahadevi (Mahadevi Nadchatiram & Partners) for the plaintiff Lorraine Cheah (MK Yee with her) (Shearn Delamore & Co) for the defendants
[2003] 1 MLJ 149 Krishnan Rajan a/l N Krishnan v Bank Negara Malaysia & Ors
HIGH COURT (KUALA LUMPUR) — CIVIL SUIT NO S5–23–36 OF 2001 ABDUL MALIK ISHAK J 16 NOVEMBER 2002
Civil Procedure — Preliminary issue — Application for issue or question raised in pleadings to be tried on preliminary basis — First defendant allegedly blacklisted plaintiff wrongfully pursuant to first defendant’s BMC Guidelines — Plaintiff sued defendants for defamation and negligence — Preliminary issue or question on whether BMC Guidelines were ultra vires and unlawful under s 30(1)(mmmm) of the Central Bank of Malaysia Act 1958 — Whether outcome of preliminary issue or question would result or substantially result in disposal of case — Whether there would be a substantial saving of expense and time — Rules of the High Court 1980 O 33 r 2
For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 57
The plaintiff sued the defendants for defamation and negligence arising out of an incident in which the first defendant was said to have wrongfully blacklisted the plaintiff under the first defendant’s ‘Biro Maklumat Cek Operational Framework and Reporting Guidelines’ (‘BMC Guidelines’). The BMC Guidelines were issued by the first defendant pursuant to the Central Bank of Malaysia Act 1958 (‘the Act’). This was the plaintiff’s application (in encl 16) for an issue or question raised in the pleadings of this suit to be tried on a preliminary basis under O 33 r 2 of the Rules of the High Court 1980 (‘the RHC’) on the grounds that it would save considerable time and costs. The issue or question to be tried was whether the BMC Guidelines were ultra vires and unlawful under s 30(1)(mmmm) of the Act. Section 30(1)(mmmm) of the Act permitted the first defendant to establish a central bureau to collect information relating to the rejection by a paying bank of any cheque for reason of insufficient funds in the account of the drawer of the cheque and to disclose any such information to any bank for the purpose only of assisting the bank to assess the eligibility of the said drawer to maintain or open any current account with the bank. The plaintiff’s counsel submitted that s 30(1)(mmmm) of the Act cannot be construed so as to give powers to compulsorily blacklist a bad cheque offender. The first defendant’s contention was that this court should not invoke its discretionary powers under O 33 r 2 of the RHC since the determination of the preliminary issue or question would not substantially dispose of the cause or matter. This was because whether the BMC Guidelines were valid or otherwise, this court would still have to decide on the issue of whether the alleged maintenance of the blacklist amounted to a defamatory statement. Furthermore, transmission of information to the first defendant in the instant case was in coded form and the question of whether there was publication can only be determined at the trial proper by way of viva voce evidence. In this regard, extrinsic evidence would be required to be adduced to ascertain whether or not the maintenance of the blacklist amounted to publication. ||Page 150>>
Held, dismissing the plaintiff’s application: (1) Order 33 r 2 of the RHC conferred upon the court a wide discretionary power to order any question or issue in a cause or matter, whether of fact or law or partly of fact and partly of law, to be tried before, at or after the trial of the cause or matter. An application under O 33 r 2 of the RHC was not appropriate where the facts were in dispute or where extrinsic evidence was required to be adduced. The overriding consideration to take into account was whether the application would result in a substantial saving of time and expenditure. In addition, the court should also be wary and warn itself against the abuse of this process (see p 154E–G). (2) Even if the court were to find the BMC Guidelines to be ultra vires, that outcome would not result or substantially result in the disposal of the case. The plaintiff’s actions for libel and negligence were distinct causes of action and
For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 58 independent of whether the BMC Guidelines were valid or otherwise. The disposal of the proposed question in encl 16 would not render the trial for the actions of libel and negligence unnecessary as this court must also determine whether the legal ingredients for the actions of libel and negligence had been satisfied. Accordingly, if this court were to try the preliminary point as framed in encl 16, there would not be a substantial saving of expense and time (see pp 167E–F, 168G–I).
Bahasa Malaysia summary
Plaintif mendakwa defendan-defendan untuk fitnah dan kecuaian yang timbul dari satu kejadian di mana defendan pertama dikatakan telah dengan salahnya menyenarai hitamkan plaintif di bawah ‘Biro Maklumat Cek Operational Framework and Reporting Guidelines’ (‘Garis Panduan BMC’) defendan pertama. Garis Panduan BMC dikeluarkan oleh defendan pertama menurut Akta Bank Negara Malaysia 1958 (‘Akta tersebut’). Ini merupakan permohonan plaintif (dalam lampiran 16) agar suatu isu atau soalan dibangkitkan dalam pliding guaman ini untuk dibicarakan atas dasar permulaan di bawah A 33 k 2 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah Tinggi 1980 (‘KMT’) atas alasan bahawa ia akan menjimatkan masa dan kos. Isu atau soalan yang harus dibicarakan ialah sama ada Garis Panduan BMC adalah ultra vires dan menyalahi undang-undang di bawah s 30(1)(mmmm) Akta tersebut. Seksyen 30(1)(mmmm) Akta tersebut membenarkan defendan pertama supaya mewujudkan satu pusat biro untuk mengumpul maklumat berhubung dengan penolakan oleh satu bank pembayar atas mana-mana cek dengan alasan kekurangan wang dalam akaun pembayar cek dan untuk mendedahkan maklumat demikian kepada mana-mana bank untuk tujuan semata-mata membantu bank menilai keupayaan pembayar tersebut untuk mengekal atau membuka mana-mana akaun semasa dengan bank. Peguam plaintif berhujah bahawa maksud s 30(1)(mmmm) Akta ||Page 151>>tersebut tidak boleh ditafsir sehinggakan memberi kuasa untuk semestinya menyenarai hitamkan seorang pesalah cek tendang. Hujah defendan pertama adalah bahawa mahkamah ini tidak harus menggunakan kuasa berdasarkan budi bicara di bawah A 33 k 2 KMT oleh kerana penentuan isu atau soalan permulaan tidak akan menyelesaikan kausa atau perkara secara substantial. Ini adalah kerana sama ada Garis Panduan BMC adalah sah atau sebaliknya, mahkamah ini masih tetap harus memutuskan isu tentang sama ada pengekalan senarai hitam yang dikatakan membawa kepada satu pernyataan berfitnah. Tambahan pula, penyampaian maklumat kepada defendan pertama dalam kes ini adalah berbentuk kod dan soalan sama ada berlakunya terbitan hanya boleh diputuskan di perbicaraan sebenar melalui keterangan viva voce. Berhubung hal ini, keterangan luar perlu dikemukakan untuk menentukan sama ada pengekalan senarai hitam berjumlah kepada terbitan.
Diputuskan, menolak permohonan plaintif:
For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 59 (1) Aturan 33 k 2 KMT memberikan mahkamah kuasa berdasarkan budi bicara yang luas untuk memutuskan sebarang soalan atau isu dalam satu kausa atau perkara, sama ada mengenai fakta atau undang-undang atau sebahagian fakta dan sebahagian undang-undang, untuk dibicarakan sebelum, semasa atau selepas perbicaraan sesuatu kausa atau perkara. Satu permohonan di bawah A 33 k 2 KMT tidak wajar bila mana fakta-fakta dipertikaikan atau di mana keterangan luar perlu dikemukakan. Timbangan paling utama untuk diambil kira adalah sama ada permohonan tersebut akan mengakibatkan penjimatan masa dan perbelanjaan yang substantial. Tambahan pula, mahkamah juga harus berwaspada dan berjaga-jaga terhadap penyalahgunaan proses ini (lihat ms 154E–G). (2) Jikapun mahkamah mendapati Garis Panduan BMC adalah ultra vires, keputusan tersebut tidak akan mengakibatkan atau secara substantial mengakibatkan penyelesaian kes. Tindakan plaintif untuk fitnah dan kecuaian merupakan kausa tindakan berlainan dan bebas daripada sama ada Garis Panduan BMC adalah sah atau sebaliknya. Penyelesaian soalan yang dicadangkan dalam lampiran 16 tidak menyebabkan perbicaraan untuk tindakan fitnah dan kecuaian tidak perlu kerana mahkamah ini mesti juga memutuskan sama ada unsur-unsur perundangan untuk tindakan fitnah dan kecuaian telah dipenuhi. Oleh yang demikian, sekiranya mahkamah membicarakan hujah permulaan seperti yang dirangka dalam lampiran 16, penjimatan perbelanjaan dan masa yang substantial tidak mungkin berlaku (lihat ms 167E–F, 168G–I).]
Notes For cases on preliminary issue, see 2 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2001 Reissue) para 4903. ||Page 152>>
Cases referred to Arab Malaysian Finance Bhd v Meridien International Credit Corporation Ltd London [1993] 3 MLJ 193 (refd) Carl-Zeiss-Stiftung v Herbert Smith [1968] 2 All ER 1002 (refd) Chan Kum Loong v Hii Sui Eng [1980] 1 MLJ 313 (refd) Commonwealth Shipping Representative v P & O Branch Services [1923] AC 191 (refd) Dawson v Lunn (1984) 149 JP 491 (refd) Dominic J Puthucheary v Jet Age Construction Sdn Bhd & Anor; Module Construction Sdn Bhd & Ors v Jet Age Construction Sdn Bhd & Anor [1997] 2 MLJ 252 (refd) Everett v Ribbands & Anor [1952] 2 QB 198 (refd) Federal Insurance Co v Nakano Singapore (Pte) Ltd [1992] 1 SLR 390 (refd)
For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 60 Fulcrum Capital Sdn Bhd v Dato’ Samsudin Abu Hassan; Rahaz Sdn Bhd & Anor (Interveners) and another case [2000] MLJU 610; [2001] 5 CLJ 73 (refd) Holland v Jones (1917) 23 CLR 149 (refd) Huang Ee Hoe & Ors v Tiong Thai King & Ors [1991] 1 MLJ 51 (refd) Newacres Sdn Bhd v Sri Alam Sdn Bhd [1991] 3 MLJ 474 (refd) Thanaraj a/l Manikam & Ors v Lower Perak Tamil Co-operative Society [1997] 4 MLJ 82 (refd) The Attorney-General & Ephraim Hutchings (Relator) v The Directors of the Great Eastern Railway Company [1880] 5 App Cas 473 (refd)
Legislation referred to Central Bank of Malaysia Act 1958 ss 2, 30(1)(mmmm) Rules of the High Court 1980 O 33 r 2 Banking and Financial Institutions Act 1989 ss s 43(3), 114
Amir bin Ismail (Goh Peng Hong and Tee Kim Chan with him) (Edmund Ponniah & Tee) for the plaintiff. Porres Royan (Shook Lin & Bok) for the first defendant. Adibah Ishak (Nur Nadia bte Mohd Amin with her) (Michael Chen, Gan, Muzafar & Azwar) for the second defendant. Chen Siew Mei (Raslan Loong) for the third defendant.
[2003] 2 MLJ 91 K SURJIT KAUR A/P GEAN KARTAR SINGH v BELINDA GHOI SHUK YEE
HIGH COURT (KOTA KINABALU) — CIVIL APPEAL NO 12–25 OF 2002 IAN CHIN J 26 FEBRUARY 2003
Tort — Defamation — Qualified privilege — Petition against appellant circulated and then forwarded to two persons of high ranks — Claim for damages for libel dismissed on the ground what was published enjoyed qualified privilege — Whether there was a common interest in the matter between the person issuing and the person receiving the communication — Whether the sessions court judge was right in his findings
For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 61 The appellant, a cabin crew officer with the Malaysian Airline System (‘MAS’) sued the respondent for damages for libel but her claim was dismissed by the sessions court judge on the ground that what was published enjoyed qualified privilege. The defamation was contained in a letter authored by the respondent on behalf of the MAS cabin crew to the senior vice president and executive vice president of MAS to seek their interference as to remove the appellant from her post. It stated that some of the cabin crew were unhappy with the way they were treated in matters that were under the supervision of the appellant. The appellant, not being satisfied with the decision of the sessions court judge, appealed. The issue to be determined by the court was whether the session court judge was right in deciding that the petition letter published enjoyed qualified privilege and its requirements met.
Held, dismissing the appeal with costs: (1) One of the essentials to be established for such a plea was that there must be a common interest in the matter between the person issuing and the person receiving the communication. The learned sessions court judge found that there was that common interest (see p 94E, G–H); Watt v Longsdon [1930] 1 KB 130 and Abdul Rahman Talib v Seenivasagam & Anor [1965] 1 MLJ 142 followed. (2) In his impeccable judgment, the sessions court judge concluded that there was a corresponding or common interest on the part of the two personages of MAS mentioned in the petition. These two persons held very high positions in MAS and any matter that might affect MAS, of which the unhappiness or grievances of the cabin crew must surely be one, and that must surely commanded their interest as much as it was the interest of the defendant as a member of MASEU to resolve the matter for the cabin crew. The High Court could add no more to the reasoning, except to adopt every word of it and found nothing wrong in that conclusion. The appellant had rested their appeal on this one ground of common interest and the High Court found that the ||Page 92>>sessions court judge was right in concluding that there was such (see pp 95H–96B).
Bahasa Malaysia summary
Perayu, seorang pegawai pekerja kabin dengan Malaysian Airline System (‘MAS’) telah menyaman responden untuk ganti rugi kerana libel tetapi tuntutan beliau telah ditolak oleh hakim mahkamah sesyen atas alasan apa yang diterbitkan menikmati perlindungan bersyarat. Fitnah tersebut terkandung dalam sepucuk surat yang telah ditulis oleh responden bagi pihak pekerja kabin MAS kepada naib presiden kanan dan naib presiden eksekutif MAS yang memohon mereka campur tangan agar perayu dipecat daripada jawatannya. Ia menyatakan bahawa beberapa pekerja kabin tidak gembira dengan cara mereka dilayan dalam perkara-perkara di bawah penyeliaan
For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 62 perayu. Perayu, yang tidak puas hati dengan keputusan hakim mahkamah sesyen, telah membuat rayuan. Persoalan yang perlu ditentukan oleh mahkamah adalah sama ada hakim mahkamah sesyen betul dalam memutuskan bahawa surat petisyen tersebut menikmati perlindungan bersyarat dan keperluannya telah dipenuhi.
Diputuskan, menolak rayuan dengan kos: (1) Suatu yang penting yang perlu dibuktikan untuk pli sedemikian adalah perlu ada kepentingan bersama dalam perkara antara orang yang menyampaikan dan orang yang menerima komunikasi tersebut. Hakim mahkamah sesyen yang bijaksana telah mendapati terdapat kepentingan bersama (lihat ms 94E, G–H); Watt v Longsdon [1930] 1 KB 130 dan Abdul Rahman Talib v Seenivasagam & Anor [1965] 1 MLJ 142 diikut. (2) Dalam penghakiman beliau yang kemas dan rapi, hakim mahkamah sesyen telah memutuskan bahawa terdapat satu kepentingan yang sama atau bersama di pihak dua orang ternama MAS yang dinyatakan dalam petisyen. Kedua-dua orang yang memegang jawatan tinggi di MAS dan apa-apa perkara yang mungkin memberikan kesan kepada MAS, seperti perasaan tidak gembira atau kegelisahan pekerja kabin pasti merupakan salah satu daripadanya, dan yang harus diambil berat oleh mereka sama seperti keprihatinan defendan sebagai seorang ahli MASEU untuk menyelesaikan perkara tersebut untuk pekerja kabin. Mahkamah Tinggi tidak dapat menambah apa-apa kepada hujah tersebut, selain daripada memakai setiap perkataan dan mendapati tiada apa-apa yang salah dengan keputusan tersebut. Perayu telah menumpukan rayuan mereka atas satu alasan kepentingan bersama ini dan Mahkamah Tinggi mendapati bahawa hakim mahkamah sesyen adalah betul (lihat ms 95H–96B).] ||Page 93>>
Notes For cases on qualified privilege, see 12 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2000 Reissue) paras 377–380.
Cases referred to Abdul Rahman Talib v Seenivasagam & Anor [1965] 1 MLJ 142 (folld) Watt v Longsdon [1930] 1 KB 130 (folld)
Sugumar Balakrishnan ( Sugumar & Co) for the appellant. Ronny Cham ( Ronny Cham & Co) for the respondent.
[2003] 2 MLJ 385
For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 63 KARPAL SINGH A/L RAM SINGH v DP VIJANDRAN
FEDERAL COURT (KUALA LUMPUR) — CIVIL APPEAL NO 02–02 OF 2002(W) MOHAMED DZAIDDIN CHIEF JUSTICE, AHMAD FAIRUZ CJ (MALAYA) AND SITI NORMA YAAKOB FCJ 27 FEBRUARY 2003
Civil Procedure — Interest — Interest in defamation cases — No claim for interest on damage sought made in the writ of summons or statement of claim — No omnibus prayer in writ of claim seeking further or other relief — Whether court could in its discretion award interest on damages
Some time in March 1996, the appellant made a press statement published in two local English dailies concerning the conduct of the respondent in issuing a dishonored cheque to the appellant. As a result of the above publication, the respondent sued the appellant and the two English dailies for libel and claimed damages, injunction and costs. The High Court gave judgment for the respondent. As against the appellant, the trial judge awarded RM500,000 for compensatory and aggravated damages with interest at the rate of 4%pa from the date of the press statement and costs. The appellant appealed against the whole of the decision. The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal against liability. On quantum, it held that the award was excessive and reduced the amount awarded by the High Court. The Court of Appeal did not however disturb the award of interest of 4%pa. On further appeal, leave was granted by the Federal Court on the following question of law: whether in a defamation action, interest ought to be awarded by the court on the damages ordered to be paid, particularly, where no claim for interest on the adjudged sum is made in the writ of summons or statement of claim and there is no omnibus prayer therein seeking any further or other relief deemed fit and proper.
Held, dismissing the appeal with costs: Under the new O 18 r 8(4) of the (English) Rules of the Supreme Court, all claims for interest must be specifically pleaded, whereas the corresponding provision in O 18 r 8 of the Malaysian Rules of the High Court 1980 (‘the RHC’) has not been amended. After considering O 18 r 8 of the Malaysian RHC and O 18 r 8(4) of the English Rules of the Supreme Court, the applicable rule would be O 18 r 8 of the Malaysian RHC. Therefore, in the absence of specific provision that claims for interest must be pleaded in the pleadings in the Rules of the High Court, a judge in the exercise of his discretion can award such interest. It is unfair to deprive plaintiffs of interest for the period in which they have been deprived of their money, as interest ought to be awarded to the extent that is fair and proper. Thus, in the instant appeal, the trial judge had acted fairly when he awarded interest at half the normal rate, ie 4% from the date of publication to
For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 64 date of judgment and thereafter until the date of realization (see pp 388D–F, 392C–D); John Fairfax & ||Page 386>>Sons Ltd v Kelly (1987) 8 NSWLR 131 followed.
Bahasa Malaysia summary
Pada Mac 1996, perayu telah membuat pernyataan akhbar yang dilaporkan di dalam dua akhbar Bahasa Inggeris tempatan mengenai kelakuan responden dalam memberi cek tendang kepada perayu. Responden telah mendakwa perayu dan kedua-dua akhbar Bahasa Inggeris tempatan tersebut dalam libel dan menuntut ganti rugi, injunksi dan kos. Mahkamah Tinggi telah memutuskan untuk responden. Hakim telah memberi award RM500,000 untuk ganti rugi pampasan dan ganti rugi teruk dengan faedah pada 4%pa daripada tarikh pernyataan akhbar tersebut dan kos terhadap perayu. Perayu telah merayu keseluruhan keputusan tersebut. Mahkamah Rayuan telah menolak rayuan terhadap liabiliti. Mengenai kuantum, mahkamah telah memutuskan bahawa award tersebut adalah keterlaluan dan telah mengurangkan jumlah yang diawardkan oleh Mahkamah Tinggi. Mahkamah Rayuan tidak campur tangan dalam award faedah 4%pa. Di dalam rayuan lanjutan, Mahkamah Persekutuan telah memberikan kebenaran di atas soalan fakta berikut: sama ada di dalam tindakan fitnah, faedah patut diawardkan oleh mahkamah pada ganti rugi yang diperintahkan dibayar, khususnya, di mana tiada tuntutan untuk faedah pada jumlah yang dihakimi dibuat di dalam writ saman ataupun penyata tuntutan dan tidak terdapat permohonan pelbagai di dalamnya menuntut relif-relif lanjut yang sesuai.
Diputuskan, menolak rayuan dengan kos: Di bawah A 18 k 8(4) Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah Agung (England), segala tuntutan untuk faedah mesti dipohon dengan jelas, manakala peruntukan bersamaan A 18 k 8 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah Tinggi 1980 Malaysia (‘KMT’) belum dipinda. Setelah mempertimbangkan A 18 k 8 KMT Malaysia dan A 18 k 8(4) Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah Agung (England), kaedah yang terpakai adalah A 18 k 8 KMT Malaysia. Oleh itu, di dalam ketiadaan peruntukan khusus di mana faedah mesti dituntut di dalam pliding-pliding di dalam Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah Tinggi, seseorang hakim di dalam melaksanakan budibicara beliau boleh mengawardkan faedah tersebut. Ia tidak adil untuk tidak memberi plaintif faedah untuk tempoh di mana plaintif tidak dibayar wang memandangkan faedah patut diawardkan seperti mana yang adil dan sesuai. Oleh itu, di dalam rayuan ini, hakim perbicaraan telah berlaku adil dalam mengawardkan faedah separuh daripada kadar biasa, iaitu 4% daripada tarikh penerbitan sehingga tarikh keputusan dan selepas itu sehingga tarikh realisasi (lihat ms 388D–F, 392C–D); John Fairfax & Sons Ltd v Kelly (1987) 8 NSWLR 131 diikut.
Notes ||Page 387>>
For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 65 For cases on interest, see 2 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2001 Reissue), paras 3009–3067.
Cases referred to Australian Consolidated Press Ltd v Driscoll 1988 NSW Lexis 9678 (refd) BP Exploration Co (Libya) Ltd v Hunt (No 2) [1982] 1 All ER 925 (refd) Jefford v Gee [1970] 1 All ER 1202 (refd) Jeyaretnam Joshua Benjamin v Lee Kuan Yew [1992] 2 SLR 310 (refd) John Fairfax & Sons Ltd v Kelly (1987) 8 NSWLR 131 (folld) Lim Eng Kay v Jaafar bin Mohamed Said [1982] 2 MLJ 156 (refd) Riches v Westminster Bank Ltd [1943] 2 All ER 725 (refd) Saunders & Anor v Edwards & Anor [1987] 1 WLR 1116 (refd)
Legislation referred to Rules of the High Court 1980 O 18 r 8 Rules of the Supreme Court [Eng] O 18 r 8(4)
Civil Appeal No W–02–385 of 2000 (Court of Appeal, Kuala Lumpur)
Karpal Singh a/l Ram Singh ( Jagdeep Singh Deo with him) ( Karpal Singh & Co). DP Vijandran ( MS Murthi and P Selvaraj with him) ( DP Vijandran Associates).
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[2003] 2 MLJ 554 THIRUCHELVASEGARAM A/L MANICKAVASEGAR v MAHADEVI A/P NADCHATIRAM
HIGH COURT (KUALA LUMPUR) — CIVIL SUITS NOS S5–23–08, S5–23–04 OF 1997 AND S5–23–13 OF 2000 AZMEL J 19 FEBRUARY 2003
Civil Procedure — Contempt of court — Committal proceedings — Defence — Whether defence of absolute privilege available as in an action for defamation
For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 66 Civil Procedure — Contempt of court — Sentence — Wilful and contumacious conduct by contemnor — Complete disregard shown by contemnor to an order of the High Court Contemnor a senior member of the Bar — Contemnor financially well-off — Whether warning or fine manifestly inadequate — Whether a custodial sentence appropriate
Civil Procedure — Contempt of court — Wilful and contumacious conduct by accused — Complete disregard shown by accused to an order of the High Court — Whether accused guilty of contempt
Civil Procedure — Injunction — Appeal against — Appeal filed to the Court of Appeal against injunction granted by High Court — Appeal heard but judgment reserved by Court of Appeal — Whether injunction of High Court ceased to be effective
Civil Procedure — Injunction — Breach of — Permanent injunction restraining defendant from publishing libellous and scandalous statements against plaintiff — Defamatory documents sent by defendant to Advocates & Solicitors Disciplinary Board despite objection by plaintiff and non-assurance of protection from action by Disciplinary Board — Whether permanent injunction breached by defendant
Legal Profession — Professional privilege — Communication by litigant to Disciplinary Board/Investigating Tribunal — Whether such communication equal to communication by litigant to a court of law — Whether such communication protected or covered by absolute immunity — Whether proceedings before Disciplinary Board/Investigating Tribunal equal to proceedings before a court of law — Legal Profession Act 1976 s 111
On 22 January 2000, the Kuala Lumpur High Court, as a result of two defamation suits instituted by the plaintiff (‘the Kuala Lumpur suits’), inter alia, issued a permanent injunction against the defendant prohibiting her from publishing any libellous and scandalous statements against the plaintiff. In these two suits which were tried together, the Kuala Lumpur High Court had found the defendant liable for defamation, having ruled certain documents to be libellous and scandalous materials. These Kuala Lumpur suits were, inter alia, based on serious libellous and scandalous statements imputing criminal conduct on the part of the plaintiff made by the defendant in a written submission in an earlier civil suit at the Seremban High Court (‘the Seremban suit’). The defendant appealed to the Court of Appeal against the decision of the High Court in the Kuala Lumpur ||Page 555>>suits. The appeal was heard but judgment reserved. Apart from the defamation suits, the plaintiff had also complained of the defendant’s conduct in the Seremban suit to the Advocates & Solicitors Disciplinary Board (‘the Disciplinary Board’). Pursuant to the complaint, an Investigating Tribunal (‘the Investigating Tribunal’) was established and by letters dated 9 and 24 October 2000, the Investigating Tribunal requested from the defendant, an explanation for her conduct in the Seremban suit. The defendant by letter dated 27 October 2000 sought direction
For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 67 from the Investigating Tribunal as to whether she could forward to the Board documents produced at the Kuala Lumpur suits. She also requested assurances from the Board and from the plaintiff that no further action would be commenced against her. Both the plaintiff and the Board rejected her requests for the assurances. Despite such rejections, the defendant by letter dated 27 November 2000 to the Board, sent all the documents produced in the Kuala Lumpur suits and certain pleadings filed in the Seremban suit. Some of the documents sent were documents ruled libellous and scandalous in the Kuala Lumpur suits. The plaintiff, having obtained leave of court, applied for an order to commit the defendant to prison for breaching the injunction. The High Court thus had to determine whether the defendant had in law contravened the injunction dated 22 January 2000. The plaintiff contended that the defendant had breached the injunction by publishing the documents which she had sent by her letter of 27 November 2000. The defendant however asserted that her disclosure did not breach the injunction for the reasons that such disclosure constituted privileged communication and was mandatory under s 101(4)(a)(i) of the Legal Profession Act 1976.
Held, convicting the defendant for contempt of court and sentencing her to three months’ imprisonment: (1) The defendant was fully aware that the publication of the defamatory documents to any third party would constitute a breach of the injunctive order. It was for that reason that she sought directions and assurances from the Disciplinary Board not to bring any action against her for adducing additional documents which contained the prohibited documents. Despite her requests for assurances having been rejected by the Disciplinary Board coupled with the plaintiff’s objection, she had nevertheless sent the documents containing the defamatory statements against the plaintiff, such statements having established her liability for defamation in the Kuala Lumpur suits. There was thus no doubt whatsoever that the defendant had breached the permanent injunction issued by the Kuala Lumpur High Court. The fact that the defendant had filed an appeal to the Court of Appeal and that the appeal was heard but the court’s decision reserved did not mean that the injunctive order was no longer in force. The injunctive order would only cease to be ||Page 556>>effective and cease to be in force if the Court of Appeal had given a decision setting aside the injunction. On the facts, there was no evidence that the Court of Appeal had given an order setting aside the High Court’s injunction (see pp 564G–H, 565C–F). (2) Communications to the Disciplinary Board or to the Investigating Tribunal cannot be equated with communication to a court of law. Section 111 of the Legal Profession Act 1976 did not confer any immunity to the defendant when she communicated with the Disciplinary Board or the Investigating Tribunal. Section 111 only confers protection to the members of the Disciplinary Board and the Investigating Tribunal. Proceedings before the Disciplinary Board or
For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 68 the Investigating Tribunal cannot be equated to proceedings before a court of law where the litigants enjoy judicial immunity conferred by s 14(1) of the Courts of Judicature Act 1964 (see pp 566H–567A).[See Editorial Note on p 567.] (3) In an action for committal proceedings a defendant cannot invoke a defence of absolute privilege in the manner available in an action for defamation. A litigant’s communication to the Disciplinary Board or Investigating Tribunal is not covered by absolute immunity under s 111 of the Legal Profession Act 1976. Even communications to a court of law that contain defamatory statements may only be done within certain limits. If the limits are exceeded then the defence of absolute privilege will no longer be available (see p 567A–C); Attorney General, Malaysia v Manjeet Singh Dhillon [1991] 1 MLJ 176 followed. (4) On the facts, the defendant had gone beyond the reasonable limit principle as stated in Manjeet Singh Dhillon. Her act of sending the defamatory documents to the Disciplinary Board or Investigating Tribunal was clearly wilful and contumacious. The defendant had failed to create any doubt in the plaintiff’s case and was guilty of contempt of court as alleged by the plaintiff. Having regard to all the circumstances of the case, the High Court was of the view that the acts of the defendant in sending the defamatory documents to the Disciplinary Board or Investigating Board were most unbecoming of a senior member of the Bar. She had shown complete disregard to an order of the High Court. As such, a caution or a warning was manifestly inadequate and a deterrent sentence should be imposed. A fine would serve no purpose as the defendant was financially well-off. A custodial sentence was most appropriate and would act as a deterrence. The defendant was thus sentenced to three months’ imprisonment. She was also ordered to bear the costs of the proceeding (see pp 567G–H, 568B–C, G–569A). ||Page 557>>
Bahasa Malaysia summary
Pada 22 Januari 2000, Mahkamah Tinggi Kuala Lumpur, akibat daripada dua guaman fitnah yang dimulakan oleh plaintif (‘guaman-guaman Kuala Lumpur tersebut’), antara lain, mengeluarkan satu injunksi kekal terhadap defendan kerana menghalang beliau daripada menerbitkan apa-apa kenyataan yang berunsur libel dan melampau terhadap plaintif. Dalam kedua-dua guaman tersebut yang telah didengar bersama, Mahkamah Tinggi Kuala Lumpur mendapati defendan bertanggungjawab kerana fitnah tersebut, setelah memutuskan beberapa dokumen adalah berunsur libel dan bahan-bahan yang penuh skandal. Guaman-guaman Kuala Lumpur tersebut adalah, antara lain, berdasarkan kenyataan-kenyataan serius berunsur libel dan penuh skandal dengan mengatakan perbuatan jenayah ke atas pihak plaintif dibuat oleh defendan dalam satu
For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 69 hujah bertulis dalam guaman sivil terdahulu di Mahkamah Tinggi Seremban (‘guaman Seremban tersebut’). Defendan telah merayu ke Mahkamah Rayuan terhadap keputusan Mahkamah Tinggi dalam guaman-guaman Kuala Lumpur tersebut. Rayuan tersebut telah didengar tetapi penghakiman ditangguhkan. Selain daripada guaman-guaman fitnah tersebut, plaintif juga mengadu tentang perbuatan defendan dalam guaman Seremban tersebut kepada Lembaga Tatatertib Peguambela & Peguamcara (‘Lembaga Tatatertib’). Berikutan aduan tersebut, satu Tribunal Siasatan (‘Tribunal Siasatan tersebut’) telah ditubuhkan dan melalui surat-surat bertarikh 9 dan 24 Oktober 2000, Tribunal Siasatan tersebut telah memohon daripada defendan, satu penjelasan untuk perbuatan beliau dalam guaman Seremban tersebut. Defendan melalui surat bertarikh 27 Oktober 2000 memohon arahan dari Tribunal Siasatan tersebut sama ada beliau boleh mengemukakan dokumen-dokumen yang telah dikemukakan dalam guaman-guaman Kuala Lumpur tersebut. Beliau juga memohon jaminan daripada Lembaga Tatatertib dan daripada plaintif agar tiada tindakan selanjutnya akan dimulakan terhadap beliau. Kedua-dua plaintif dan Lembaga Tatatertib telah menolak permohonan-permohonan beliau untuk jaminan-jaminan tersebut. Walaupun dengan penolakan-penolakan tersebut, defendan melalui surat bertarikh 27 November 2000 kepada Lembaga Tatatertib, telah menghantar kesemua dokumen-dokumen yang telah dikemukakan dalam guaman-guaman Kuala Lumpur tersebut dan pliding–pliding tertentu telah difailkan dalam guaman Seremban tersebut. Beberapa dokumen yang dihantar adalah dokumen-dokumen yang telah diputuskan sebagai berunsur libel dan melampau dalam guaman-guaman Kuala Lumpur tersebut. Plaintif, setelah mendapat kebenaran mahkamah, telah memohon satu perintah untuk memasukkan defendan ke dalam penjara kerana melanggar injunksi tersebut. Mahkamah Tinggi dengan itu perlu menentukan sama ada defendan dari segi undang-undang telah menentang injunksi bertarikh 22 Januari 2000. Plaintif menegaskan bahawa defendan telah melanggar injunksi tersebut dengan ||Page 558>> menerbitkan dokumen-dokumen yang beliau telah hantar melalui sepucuk surat bertarikh 27 November 2000. Defendan bagaimanapun menegaskan bahawa pendedahan beliau tidak melanggar injunksi tersebut atas sebab pendedahan sedekimian membentuk satu komunikasi terlindung dan adalah mandatori di bawah s 101(4)(a)(i) Akta Profesyen Undang-Undang 1976.
Diputuskan, menyabitkan defendan kerana menghina mahkamah dan menjatuhkan hukuman tiga bulan penjara ke atas beliau: (1) Defendan amat sedar bahawa penerbitan dokumen-dokumen berunsur fitnah kepada mana-mana pihak ketiga akan membentuk satu perlanggaran perintah injunksi. Adalah untuk sebab sedemikian beliau telah memohon arahan-arahan dan jaminan-jaminan daripada Lembaga Tatatertib tersebut agar tidak memulakan apa-apa tindakan terhadap beliau kerana mengemukakan dokumen-dokumen tambahan yang mengandungi dokumen-dokumen yang dilarang. Walaupun permohonan-permohonan beliau untuk jaminan-jaminan tersebut ditolak oleh Lembaga Tatatertib sekali dengan bantahan plaintif, namun begitu beliau telah menghantar dokumen-dokumen yang mengandungi
For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 70 kenyataan-kenyataan berunsur fitnah mengenai plaintif, kenyataan-kenyataan sedemikian telah membuktikan liabiliti kerana fitnah dalam guaman-guaman Kuala Lumpur tersebut. Oleh itu sama sekali tidak diragui bahawa defendan telah melanggar injunksi kekal yang dikeluarkan oleh Mahkamah Tinggi Kuala Lumpur. Hakikat bahawa defendan telah memfailkan satu rayuan ke Mahkamah Rayuan dan bahawa rayuan tersebut telah didengar tetapi keputusan mahkamah telah ditangguhkan tidak bermaksud bahawa perintah injunksi tersebut tidak lagi. Perintah injunksi hanya akan berhenti mempunyai kesan dan berhenti berkuatkuasa jika Mahkamah Rayuan telah memberikan satu keputusan mengenepikan injunksi tersebut. Berdasarkan fakta-fakta tersebut, tiada keterangan bahawa Mahkamah Rayuan telah memberikan satu perintah mengenepikan injunksi Mahkamah Tinggi (lihat ms 564G–H, 565C–F). (2) Perhubungan kepada Lembaga Tatatertib atau kepada Tribunal Siasatan tidaklah sama seperti perhubungan kepada satu mahkamah undang-undang. Seksyen 111 Akta Profesyen Undang-Undang 1976 tidak memberikan apa-apa kekebalan kepada defendan apabila beliau berhubung dengan Lembaga Tatatertib atau Tribunal Siasatan. Seksyen 111 hanya memberikan perlindungan kepada ahli-ahli Lembaga Tatatertib atau Tribunal Siasatan. Prosiding di hadapan Lembaga Tatatertib atau Tribunal Siasatan tidak boleh disamakan dengan prosiding di hadapan mahkamah undang-undang di mana litigan-litigan menikmati kekebalan kehakiman yang diberikan oleh s 14(1) Akta Mahkamah Kehakiman 1964 (lihat ms 566H–567A). ||Page 559>> (3) Dalam satu tindakan untuk prosiding kerana penghinaan seorang defendan tidak boleh menggunakan satu pembelaan perlindungan mutlak dengan cara sebagaimana yang ada dalam satu tindakan untuk fitnah. Perhubungan litigan kepada Lembaga Tatatertib atau Tribunal Siasatan tidak dilindungi dengan kekebalan sepenuhnya di bawah s 111 Akta Profesyen Undang-Undang 1976. Begitu juga dengan perhubungan kepada satu mahkamah undang-undang yang mempunyai kenyataan berunsur fitnah hanya boleh dibuat dalam batasan tertentu. Jika batasan tersebut dilanggar maka pembelaan untuk perlindungan mutlak akan lenyap (lihat ms 567A–C); Attorney General, Malaysia v Manjeet Singh Dhillon [1991] 1 MLJ diikut. (4) Berdasarkan fakta-fakta tersebut, defendan telah melampaui batasan munasabah prinsip sebagaimana yang dinyatakan dalam Manjeet Singh Dhillon. Tindakan beliau menghantar dokumen-dokumen berunsur fitnah kepada Lembaga Tatatertib atau Tribunal Siasatan tersebut dengan jelas dilakukan dengan sengaja dan tegar. Defendan telah gagal untuk menimbulkan apa-apa keraguan dalam kes plaintif dan adalah bersalah kerana menghina mahkamah sebagaimana yang dikatakan oleh plaintif. Berdasarkan semua keadaan kes, Mahkamah Tinggi berpandangan bahawa tindakan-tindakan defendan menghantar dokumen-dokumen berunsur fitnah kepada Lembaga Tatatertib atau Tribunal Siasatan tersebut adalah tidak wajar dilakukan oleh seorang ahli
For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 71 kanan Majlis. Beliau telah menunjukkan bahawa beliau tidak menghiraukan langsung perintah Mahkamah Tinggi. Oleh itu satu amaran memang tidak mencukupi dan satu hukuman pencegahan patut dikenakan. Satu denda tidak akan berkesan kerana defendan amat mampu dari segi kewangan. Satu hukuman penjara adalah sesuai dan akan bertindak sebagai satu pencegahan. Defendan oleh itu telah dijatuhkan hukuman penjara tiga bulan. Beliau juga diarahkan menanggung kos prosiding (lihat ms 567G–H, 568B–C, G–569A).]
Notes For cases on committal proceedings, see 2 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2001 Reissue) paras 1466–1472. For cases on sentence, see 2 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2001 Reissue) paras 1529–1534. For cases on injunction generally, see 2 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2001 Reissue) paras 2463–3008. For cases on professional privilege generally, see 9 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 1999 Reissue) paras 1832–1841.
Case referred to Attorney General, Malaysia v Manjeet Singh Dhillon [1991] 1 MLJ 167 (refd) ||Page 560>>
Legislation referred to Courts of Judicature Act 1964 s 14(1) Legal Profession Act 1976 ss 101(4)(a)(i), 111
Gurbachan Singh ( Malik Imtiaz with him) ( Syarikat M Segaram) for the plaintiff. Mahadevi a/p Nadchatiram ( Mahadevi Nadchatiram & Partners) for the defendant.
[2003] 4 MLJ 96 WONG YOKE KONG & ORS v AZMI M ANSHAR & ORS
HIGH COURT (KUALA LUMPUR) — CIVIL SUIT NO 23–61 OF 1996 HELILIAH MOHD YUSOF J 14 MARCH 2003
Tort — Defamation — Libel — Article on political behavior of deputy minister — Comment hoping that ‘his legal firm’ was doing decent business — Whether defamatory of lawyers
For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 72 carrying on business under name and style including name of that politician
Tort — Defamation — Libel — Locus standi — Whether defamatory words referred to plaintif — Whether ‘his legal firm’ was capable of bearing reference to legal firm bearing name of deputy minister and in which he was no longer a partner
Tort — Defamation — Libel — Whether natural and ordinary meaning of words or innuendo defamatory — Whether the words ‘doing decent business’ were defamatory — Intention of defamer irrelevant — Whether the words capable of bearing the meaning that partners of the firm were not fit to practise as advocates and solicitors
Mohamed Nazri bin Abdul Aziz (‘Nazri Abdul Aziz’) was a politician and a qualified lawyer, and was, at one time, a partner of a firm of solicitors, Messrs Nazri Aziz & Wong. When Nazri Abdul Aziz was appointed Deputy Minister in the Prime Minister’s Department in May 1995, he ceased his legal practice and terminated his partnership in Messrs Nazri Aziz & Wong. The remaining partners, however, continued to practice under the name and style of Messrs Nazri Aziz & Wong. The first defendant was an editor employed by the second defendant newspaper, which was, in turn, published and printed by the third defendant. Barely nine months after Nazri Abdul Aziz had ceased legal practice and left the firm, the first defendant wrote an article in which he spoke disparagingly of Nazri Abdul Aziz. The article concluded with the observation that ‘… Now, in a turnaround, [Nazri Abdul Aziz] wants to give the [UMNO] Youth leader post back to Rahim on a silver platter. Hope his law firm is doing decent business …’. The plaintiffs, all solicitors practicing under the name and style of Messrs Nazri Aziz & Wong, contended that the ‘law firm’ referred to in the last sentence of said article could only refer to their firm and to no other. The plaintiffs were embarrassed and distressed by the connotations and implications arising from the sentence in the article which, they argued, was highly defamatory of their law firm. The plaintiffs sued for defamation. The defendants denied that the article was defamatory. Further the defendants denied that the article was defamatory of the plaintiffs. The defendants pointed out that the article in no way referred specifically to the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs were never identified in the article since, at the time of the publication, Nazri Abdul Aziz was also no longer practicing as a lawyer. The defendant further argued that the allegedly offensive sentence, understood in its natural and ordinary meaning, merely meant that, based on the behaviour of Nazri Abdul Aziz, it was hoped that his law firm would obtain good business. ||Page 97>>
Held, finding the defendants liable for defamation, and ordering that the parties proceed to the question of quantum of damages: (1) There being no dispute as to publication, and the defendants having chosen not to advance the plea of justification, the issues that were necessary for determination were, firstly, whether the words that were published were
For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 73 defamatory and, secondly, whether the words were defamatory of the plaintiffs (see p 101D–E). (2) There are two steps involved in deciding whether or not an alleged offensive sentence is defamatory. The first is to consider what meaning the words would convey to the ordinary person. Having established this, the next stage is to consider whether, under the circumstances in which the words were published, the reasonable man would be likely to understand them in a defamatory sense. The abstraction of the reasonable man was but a measure to strike a balance between freedom of speech and the safeguard of reputation (see p 123G–H). (3) The ‘test’ to be applied where a plaintiff is not specifically named is whether the words were such as would reasonably, in the circumstances, lead persons acquainted with him to believe that the person referred to by those words was the plaintiff (see p 110C) Knupffer v London Express Newspaper Ltd [1944] AC 116 followed. Extrinsic evidence may go to show that a given statement, considered to be defamatory, was thought to refer to the plaintiff. A plaintiff will not need, in every case, to produce witnesses who will actually testify that they felt the article referred to him. It would, of course, be much better if the plaintiff could produce such witnesses (see p 113B). (4) The words bore a defamatory imputation on the conduct of the business of a legal firm in that it was implied that since Nazri Abdul Aziz was somewhat dubiously double dealing in his political activity it was hoped that his law firm would not conduct its business in a similar fashion. If, as alleged by the author, Nazri Abdul Aziz had been tergiversating, and if it was implied that the firm could be equated to him, it would be strange to suggest that the statement meant his firm ought to obtain good business (see p 127C–E). (5) The defendants’ argument was that the whole article related, as the title itself suggested, to politicians. Yet in relation to Nazri Abdul Aziz, there was an additional sentence incorporating the words ‘his law firm’. The first defendant himself had admitted to Nazri Abdul Aziz being associated with a law firm. What the first defendant intended to refer to was irrelevant. The first defendant was evasive when asked if he knew whether Nazri Abdul Aziz was still a partner in the firm (see p 113G–I). ||Page 98>> (6) The alleged offensive sentence was capable of bearing the meaning that the plaintiffs were carrying on an indecent business, using the firm as a front, that the plaintiffs were unprofessional and/or unethical in the conduct of their legal business, the plaintiffs were not fit and proper persons to practice as Advocates and Solicitors of the High Court of Malaya and that the plaintiffs were, accordingly, guilty of breaching rules of practice and etiquette (see p 114F–G).
Bahasa Malaysia summary
For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 74 Mohamed Nazri bin Abdul Aziz (‘Nazri Abdul Aziz’) seorang ahli politik dan peguamcara yang berkelulusan, pernah menjadi pekongsi suatu firma guaman, Tetuan Nazri Aziz & Wong. Apabila beliau dilantik sebagai Timbalan Menteri dalam Jabatan Perdana Menteri dalam bulan Mei 1995, beliau telah menghentikan amalan guamannya dan mengakhiri perkongsiannya dalam firma Tetuan Nazri Aziz & Wong. Walaubagaimanapun, pekongsi-pekongsi yang lain terus beramal di bawah nama dan gaya Tetuan Nazri Aziz & Wong. Defendan pertama adalah seorang editor yang dilantik oleh syarikat surat khabar defendan kedua, yang seterusnya diterbit dan dicetak oleh defendan ketiga. Hampir sembilan bulan selepas Nazri Abdul Aziz telah menghentikan amalan guamannya dan meninggalkan firma tersebut, defendan pertama telah menulis satu rencana di mana beliau telah memperkecilkan Nazri Abdul Aziz. Rencana tersebut diakhiri dengan tinjauan bahawa ‘ … Now, in a turnaround, [Nazri Abdul Aziz] wants to give the [UMNO] Youth leader post back to Rahim on a silver platter. Hope his law firm is doing decent business …’. Plaintif-plaintif, kesemua daripada mereka peguamcara yang beramal di bawah nama dan gaya Tetuan Nazri Aziz & Wong, mendakwa bahawa ‘law firm’ yang dimaksudkan dalam ayat terakhir rencana tersebut hanya merujuk kepada firma mereka dan tiada yang lain. Plaintif-plaintif merasa malu dan sedih dengan erti tambahan dan implikasi yang wujud daripada ayat dalam rencana tersebut, yang mereka mendakwa, memfitnahkan firma guaman mereka. Plaintif-plaintif telah mendakwa bagi fitnah tersebut. Defendan-defendan menafikan bahawa rencana tersebut berfitnah. Defendan-defendan juga menafikan rencana tersebut memfitnahkan plaintif-plaintif. Defendan-defendan menyatakan rencana tersebut tidak pernah merujuk kepada plaintif-plaintif secara khusus. Plaintif-plaintif tidak dikenal pastikan dalam rencana tersebut memandangkan, pada masa penerbitan Nazri Abdul Aziz tidak lagi mengamal sebagai peguamcara. Defendan-defendan juga mengatakan bahawa ayat yang dikatakan menyakitkan tersebut, jika difahamkan dalam maksud semulajadi dan biasanya, hanya membawa maksud bahawa, berasaskan tingkah laku Nazri Abdul Aziz, adalah diharapkan firma guamannya akan mendapat perniagaan yang lumayan. ||Page 99>>
Diputuskan, mendapati defendan-defendan bertanggungjawab bagi fitnah, dan mengarahkan pihak-pihak teruskan ke persoalan jumlah ganti rugi: (1) Memandangkan tiada pertikaian akan penerbitan, dan defendan memilih tidak menghadapkan dalih justifikasi, isu-isu yang perlu diselesaikan adalah, pertama, sama ada perkataan-perkataan yang diterbitkan memfitkahkan dan, kedua, sama ada perkataan-perkataan tersebut memfitnahkan plaintif-plaintif (lihat ms 101D–E). (2) Terdapat dua langkah yang terlibat dalam mengenalpasti sama ada perkataan-perkataan memfitnahkan. Pertama sekali perlu ditimbangkan maksud yang dibawa perkataan-perkataan tersebut kepada seorang awam. Setelah ini telah dikenalpasti, tahap seterusnya adalah untuk menimbangkan sama ada, dalam keadaan di mana perkataan-perkataan telah diterbitkan, orang awam
For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 75 mungkin menganggapkan perkataan-perkataan tersebut sebagai memfitnahkan. Abstrak orang awam adalah hanya sebagai sukat untuk membuat penimbangan antara kebebasan bersuara dan menjaga maruah (lihat ms 123G–H). (3) ‘Ujian’ yang perlu dipakai dalam situasi seseorang plaintif yang tidak dinamakan secara khusus adalah sama ada perkataan-perkataan tersebut dengan munasabah, dalam keadaan yang sedia ada, membawa orang yang kenal plaintif untuk percaya bahawa orang yang dirujuk dengan perkataan-perkataan tersebut adalah plaintif (lihat ms 110C); Knupffer v London Express Newspapers Ltd [1944] AC 116 diikut. Keterangan luar mungkin menunjukkan bahawa perkataan-perkataan, yang dianggap memfitnahkan, telah dianggap merujuk kepada plaintif. Seseorang plaintif tidak perlu, dalam setiap kes, mengemukakan saksi yang dapat memberi keterangan bahawa mereka menganggap rencana tersebut merujuk kepada plaintif. Sudah pasti lebih baik sekiranya plaintif dapat membawa saksi-saksi seperti itu (lihat ms 113B). (4) Perkataan-perkataan tersebut membawa imputasi memfitnahkan ke atas perlaksanaan perniagaan sesuatu firma guaman memandangkan ia membayangkan bahawa memandangkan tingkahlaku Nazri Abdul Aziz yang didakwa bersikap talam dua muka dalam kegiatan politiknya, maka adalah diharapkan firma guamannya tidak menjalankan perniagaan dalam cara yang sama. Jika, sepertimana didakwa oleh pengarangnya, Nazri Abdul Aziz telah berkelakuan penghianat, dan jika diimplikasikan bahawa firma tersebut dapat dipersamakan dengannya, adalah ganjil mencadangkan bahawa perkataan-perkataan membawa maksud diharapkan firmanya mendapat perniagaan baik (lihat ms 127C–E). (5) Hujah defendan-defendan adalah bahawa keseluruhan rencana tersebut merujuk, sepertimana tajuknya sendiri mencadangkan, ||Page 100>>kepada ahli politik. Akan tetapi berkait dengan Nazri Abdul Aziz, wujudnya suatu ayat tambahan yang menandungi perkataan-perkataan ‘his law firm’. Defendan pertama sendiri telah mengakui Nazri Abdul Aziz telah dikaitkan dengan sebuah firma guaman. Perkara yang defendan pertama ingin merujuk kepada adalah tidak relevan. Defendan pertama mengelak daripada ditanya sama ada beliau tahu Nazri Abdul Aziz masih menjadi pekongsi firma tersebut (lihat ms 113G–I). (6) Ayat yang dikatakan menyakitkan tersebut dapat membawa maksud bahawa plaintif-plaintif menjalankan suatu perniagaan yang tidak senonoh, menggunakan firma tersebut sebagai topeng, bahawa plaintif-plantif berkelakuan tidak profesional dan/atau tidak beretika dalam menjalankan perniagaan guamannya, plaintif-plaintif adalah orang yang tidak layak menjalankan amalan sebagai Peguambela dan Peguamcara Mahkamah Tinggi Malaya dan plaintif-plaintif, sedemikian, bersalah kerana telah melanggar kaedah-kaedah amalan dan etiket (lihat ms 114F–G).]
Notes
For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 76 For cases on libel, see 12 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2000 Reissue) paras 263–352.
Cases referred to A Balakrishnan & Ors v Nirumalan K Pillay & Ors [1999] 3 SLR 22 (refd) Abdul Khalid Bakar Shah v Party Islam Se Malaysia (PAS) & Ors [2001] 4 CLJ 15 (refd) Berkoff v Burchill and another [1996] 4 All ER 1008 (refd) Cassidy v Daily Mirror [1929] All ER 117 (refd) Charleston and another v News Group Newspapers Ltd and another [1995] 2 All ER 313 (refd) David Syme v Canavan [1918] 25 CLR 234 (refd) Institute of Commercial Management United Kingdom v New Straits Times Press (Malaysia) Bhd [1993] 1 MLJ 408 (refd) Knupffer v London Express Newspaper Ltd [1944] AC 116 (folld) Le Fanu and others v Malcomson and others [1843–60] All ER Rep 152, (1848) 1 HLC 637 (refd) Lee Kuan Yew v Derek Gwyn Davies & Ors [1990] 1 MLJ 390 (refd) Lewis and another v Daily Telegraph, Ltd; Same v Associated Newspapers, Ltd [1963] 2 All ER 151 (refd) Morgan v Odhams Press Ltd [1971] 1 WLR 1239 (refd) Norman v Future Publishing Ltd [1999] EMLR 325 (refd) Slim and Ors v Daily Telegraph, Ltd and Anor [1968] 1 All ER 497 (refd) ||Page 101>>
R Thayalan (Charis Wong with him) (Zaid Ibrahim & Co) for the plaintiffs. Mohd Izral Khairy (Lorraine Cheah with him) (Shearn Delamore & Co) for the defendants.
[2003] 4 MLJ 180 SOH CHUN SENG v CTOS-EMR SDN BHD
HIGH COURT (KUALA LUMPUR) — CIVIL SUIT NO S2–23–35 OF 1997 RAMLY ALI J 12 JUNE 2003
For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 77 Tort — Defamation — Libel — Publication of information regarding creditor’s petition presented against plaintiff — Whether defendant under duty to publish most up-to-date account as to status of bankruptcy proceedings brought against plaintiff — Whether damages for omission to publish words in domain of tort of libel
Tort — Defamation — Libel — Publication of information regarding creditor’s petition presented against plaintiff — Whether words complained of defamatory — Whether ordinary reasonable and fair-minded person would discern meanings as alleged by plaintiff — Whether words complained of true in substance and in fact
This was the plaintiff’s claim for damages for defamation arising from a libellous statement which had allegedly been published against him by the defendant. The plaintiff stated that by a report dated 29 April 1997 (‘the said report’), the defendant had published statements to Audio One Entertainment Sdn Bhd (‘AOE’) which by its natural and ordinary meaning and/or innuendo were false and libellous in nature. The said report stated, inter alia, that a creditor’s petition dated 30 October 1992 had been issued against the plaintiff by American Express (M) Sdn Bhd. A notation ‘Star 010493’ appeared in the said report, thus indicating that the information was sourced from the 1 April 1993 issue of The Star newspaper. The following remark also appeared at the top of the said report: ‘Important: This report is confidential. Reproduction is prohibited. The report only indicates the information was published in the relevant source. It is not intended as confirmation of the ‘current status’ of the case. For the case’s current status, your further probe with the relevant parties is required’ (‘the header’). The plaintiff contended that the said report had caused injury to the plaintiff’s reputation as it inferred to anyone who had read the same that the plaintiff was an undischarged bankrupt; had been adjudicated a bankrupt; was an insincere and untrustworthy person; was not fit to be a businessman and/or was not an honest and financially sound director; and the companies under the management of the plaintiff qua director were neither stable nor sound. The defendant admitted it had furnished to AOE the said report based on the information collated and compiled in its database relating to the plaintiff, which was obtained from The Star newspaper dated 1 April 1993. The defendant stated that the information furnished to AOE in respect of the plaintiff was correct in every respect, to wit, that a creditor’s petition dated 30 October 1992 was presented against the plaintiff at the instance of American Express (M) Sdn Bhd and a notice of the same was advertised in The Star newspaper by way of substituted service. The defendant denied that the information furnished was false or defamatory and was capable of ||Page 181>>bearing the meanings as pleaded by the plaintiff. The defendant’s defence was premised on the grounds that the words were not defamatory and the words were true in substance and in fact.
Held, dismissing the plaintiff’s claim: (1) The plaintiff must first discharge the onus of proving that the words
For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 78 complained of were defamatory of the plaintiff. Only upon the plaintiff establishing this would the burden then rest on the defendant to prove that those words were in substance and in fact true (see p 189A); Progressive Insurance Sdn Bhd v RM Insurance Underwriting Agency Sdn Bhd & Ors [2003] 5 CLJ 321 and Ayob bin Saud v TS Sambanthamurthi [1989] 1 MLJ 315 followed. (2) In considering whether the words complained of were defamatory or capable of bearing the meanings as alleged by the plaintiff, the court must construe the said report in its entirety and ask if an ordinary, reasonable and fair-minded person who had read the whole of the said report would discern the meaning as alleged by the plaintiff (see p 191B–C); Ratus Mesra Sdn Bhd v Shaik Osman Majid & Ors [1999] 3 MLJ 529; Noor Asiah bte Mahmood & Anor v Randhir Singh & Ors [2000] 2 MLJ 175 and Kian Lup Construction v Hongkong Bank Malaysia Bhd [2002] 7 MLJ 283 followed. (3) In the instant case, the court must scrutinize the matters stated in the said report relating to the plaintiff and in the light of the header which preceded the information, consider whether an ordinary, reasonable and fair-minded person who had read the whole of the said report would discern the meanings as alleged by the plaintiff. Here, the header had made it plain to any reasonable reader that the information appearing below it was not intended as confirmation of the current status of the creditor’s petition and that if the reader wished to know the current status, a check with the parties concerned was necessary. The header also made it plain that it only served to confirm that the information appearing below it had been obtained from a source, namely, The Star newspaper. Therefore, by the contents of the header, the defendant had in fact asserted that the information appearing below the header was not intended to mean any of the imputations that the plaintiff had alleged. As such, when the header was so read, it was impossible that any reasonable man should collect from it the libellous imputation alleged (see pp 191H–192A, F–G); Stubbs, Ld v Russel [1913] AC 386 followed. (4) Accordingly, the court was satisfied that the plaintiff had failed to establish that the contents of the said report, which was the subject matter of the present action, were defamatory and on this ground alone, the plaintiff’s claim against the defendant can be dismissed with costs (see p 194C–D). ||Page 182>> (5) The court could not agree with the plaintiff’s propositions that the defendant was under a duty, imposed in the law of libel, to publish the most up-to-date account as to the status of the bankruptcy proceedings brought against the plaintiff or make every effort to ascertain the most up-to-date account as to the status of the bankruptcy proceedings before it published the matters contained in the said report. The law of libel afforded a remedy where a person was libelled by the publication of defamatory words. Damages for the omission to publish words were not the domain of the tort of libel. It may well be that
For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 79 where such omission had occasioned loss to a party, that party may have his remedy in the tort of negligence, but as the law of libel catered for situation where words were published, a complaint of omission to publish, fundamentally, cannot found an action in libel. The law of defamation imposed a singular, paramount duty on the publisher — to speak to truth. The ingredients of the tort of negligence should not be allowed to be used to make true but defamatory statement actionable (see pp 194H–195D, 196C). (6) Even assuming the plaintiff had successfully established that the words were defamatory, the defendant by its own evidence as well as evidence of the plaintiff himself had clearly shown that those words were in substance and fact, true. As a matter of law, truth or justification was an absolute defence to an action in libel or slander. If the statement was true, no amount of malice or bad faith or belief in the falsity of the statement will make it actionable. If people think the worst of the plaintiff when they hear the truth about him, then his reputation had been reduced to the proper level (see pp 196F, 197E–F).
Bahasa Malaysia summary
Ini adalah tuntutan ganti rugi plaintif kerana fitnah yang timbul dari kenyataan libel yang dikatakan telah diterbitkan terhadap beliau oleh defendan. Plaintif menyatakan bahawa melalui satu laporan bertarikh 29 April 1997 (‘laporan tersebut’), defendan telah menerbitkan kenyataan-kenyataan kepada Audio One Entertainment Sdn Bhd (‘AOE’) yang mana melalui maksud semulajadi dan biasa dan/atau sindiran adalah palsu dan bersifat libel. Laporan tersebut menyatakan, antara lain bahawa satu petisyen pemiutang bertarikh 30 Oktober 1992 telah dikeluarkan terhadap plaintif oleh American Express (M) Sdn Bhd. Satu notasi ‘Star 010493’ tertera dalam laporan tersebut, yang menandakan bahawa maklumat tersebut diperolehi dari akhbar The Star keluaran 1 April 1993. Kata-kata tersebut juga tertera pada bahagian atas laporan tersebut: ‘Important: This report is confidential. Reproduction is prohibited. The report only indicates the information was published in the relevant source. It is not intended as confirmation of the ‘current status’ of the case. For the case’s current status, your further probe with the relevant parties is ||Page 183>>required’ (‘kepala tajuk tersebut’). Plaintif menegaskan bahawa laporan tersebut telah menjejaskan reputasi plaintif kerana ia membuat inferens kepada sesiapa yang membacanya bahawa plaintif adalah seorang yang bankrap dengan hutang yang tidak berbayar; seorang yang tidak ikhlas dan tidak boleh dipercayai; tidak layak menjadi peniaga dan/atau bukan seorang pengarah yang jujur dan mempunyai kedudukan kewangan yang kukuh dan syarikat-syarikat di bawah pengurusan plaintif sebagai pengarah tidak stabil mahupun kukuh. Defendan telah mengaku bahawa ia telah mengemukakan kepada AOE laporan tersebut berdasarkan maklumat yang dikumpul dan disusun dalam pangkalan datanya berkaitan plaintif, yang telah diperolehi dari akhbar The Star bertarikh 1 April 1993. Defendan menyatakan bahawa maklumat yang dikemukakan kepada AOE berkaitan plaintif adalah betul dalam semua aspek,
For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 80 bahawa satu petisyen pemiutang bertarikh 30 Oktober 1992 telah dikemukakan terhadap plaintif atas permintaan American Express (M) Sdn Bhd dan satu notis yang sama telah diiklankan dalam akhbar The Star melalui penyampaian gantian. Defendan menafikan bahawa maklumat yang dikemukakan adalah palsu atau berunsur fitnah dan mampu untuk membawa maksud sebagaimana yang diplidkan oleh plaintif. Pembelaan defendan berasaskan alasan-alasan bahawa perkataan-perkataan tersebut tidak berunsur fitnah dan perkataan-perkataan tersebut adalah benar pada amnya dan secara fakta.
Diputuskan, menolak tuntutan plaintif: (1) Plaintif perlu melepaskan beban membuktikan perkataan-perkataan yang diadukan sebagai berunsur fitnah terhadap plaintif. Hanya setelah plaintif dapat membuktikan ini maka beban tersebut terletak ke atas defendan untuk membuktikan bahawa perkataan-perkataan adalah pada amnya dan secara fakta benar (lihat ms 189A); Progressive Insurance Sdn Bhd v RM Insurance Underwriting Agency Sdn Bhd & Ors [2003] 5 CLJ 321 dan Ayob bin Saud v TS Sambanthamurthi [1989] 1 MLJ 315 diikut. (2) Dalam mempertimbangkan sama ada perkataan-perkataan yang diadukan berunsur fitnah atau mampu untuk membawa maksud sebagaimana yang dikatakan oleh plaintif, mahkamah hendaklah menafsirkan laporan tersebut secara keseluruhan dan jika bertanyakan kepada seorang yang biasa, munasabah dan berfikiran waras yang telah membaca keseluruhan laporan tersebut akan menanggap maksud sebagaimana yang dikatakan oleh plaintif (lihat ms 191B–C); Ratus Mesra Sdn Bhd v Shaik Osman Majid & Ors [1999] 3 MLJ 529; Noor Asiah bte Mahmood & Anor v Randhir Singh & Ors [2000] 2 MLJ 175 dan Kian Lup Construction v Hongkong Bank Malaysia Bhd [2002] 7 MLJ 283 diikut. ||Page 184>> (3) Dalam kes semasa, mahkamah hendaklah meneliti perkara-perkara yang dinyatakan dalam laporan tersebut berkaitan plaintif dan berdasarkan kepala tajuk tersebut sebelum maklumat tersebut, menimbangkan sama ada seorang yang biasa, munasabah dan berfikiran waras yang telah membaca keseluruhan laporan tersebut akan menanggap maksud-maksud sebagaimana yang dikatakan oleh plaintif. Di sini, kepala tajuk tersebut dengan jelas menunjukkan kepada mana-mana pembaca yang munasabah bahawa maklumat yang tertera di bawahnya tidak dimaksudkan sebagai pengesahan kedudukan semasa petisyen pemiutang tersebut dan dan jika pembaca ingin mengetahui kedudukan semasa, perlulah memeriksa dengan pihak-pihak berkaitan. Kepala tajuk tersebut juga dengan jelas menunjukkan bahawa ia hanya bermaksud untuk mengesahkan maklumat yang tertera di bahagian bawah telah diperolehi dari satu sumber, iaitu akhbar The Star. Oleh demikian, berdasarkan kandungan kepala tajuk tersebut, defendan pada hakikatnya menegaskan bahawa maklumat yang tertera di bahagian bawah kepala tajuk tersebut tidak berniat untuk membawa maksud
For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 81 apa-apa tuduhan sebagaimana yang diaktakan oleh plaintif. Dengan itu, apabila kepala tajuk tersebut dibaca, tidak mungkin seorang yang munasabah akan menganggapnya sebagai tuduhan berunsur libel sepertimana dikatakan (lihat ms 191H–192A, F–G); Stubbs, Ld v Russel [1913] AC 386 diikut. (4) Sewajarnya, mahkamah berpuas hati yang plaintif telah gagal untuk membuktikan bahawa kandungan-kandungan laporan tersebut, yang merupakan perkara pokok tindakan semasa, berunsur fitnah dan atas alasan ini sahaja, tuntutan plaintif terhadap defendan boleh ditolak dengan kos (lihat ms 194C–D). (5) Mahkamah tidak bersetuju dengan cadangan plaintif bahawa defendan di bawah satu kewajipan, yang dikenakan di bawah undang-undang libel, untuk menerbitkan berita terkini berkaitan kedudukan prosiding kebankrapan yang dimulakan terhadap plaintif atau membuat apa-apa usaha yang patut untuk memastikan berita terkini berkaitan kedudukan prosiding kebankrapan sebelum ia menerbitkan perkara-perkara yang terkandung dalam laporan tersebut. Undang-undang libel memberikan satu remedi di mana seseorang yang difitnah secara libel melalui penerbitan perkataan-perkataan berunsur fitnah. Ganti rugi untuk peninggalan menerbit perkataan-perkataan bukan domain tort untuk libel. Ia boleh dikatakan di mana peninggalan sedemikian mengakibatkan kerugian kepada satu pihak, pihak tersebut boleh mendapat remedinya dalam tort untuk kecuaian, tetapi memandangkan undang-undang libel hanya membincangkan keadaan-keadaan di mana perkataan-perkataan yang diterbitkan, satu aduan terhadap peninggalan untuk menerbitkan, pada dasarnya, tidak boleh dimulakan dengan satu tindakan untuk libel. Undang-undang fitnah ||Page 185>>mengenakan satu kewajipan yang penting ke atas penerbit — untuk bercakap benar. Unsur-unsur dalam tort kecuaian tidak sepatutnya dibenarkan untuk digunakan bagi membuat kenyataan yang benar tetapi berunsur fitnah (lihat ms 194H–195D, 196C). (6) Walaupun dengan andaian plaintiff telah berjaya membuktikan perkataan-perkataan tersebut berunsur fitnah, defendan melalui keterangannya dan juga keterangan plaintif sendiri menunjukkan bahawa perkataan-perkataan tersebut pada amnya dan secara fakta adalah benar. Berdasarkan undang-undang, kebenaran atau justifikasi adalah pembelaan yang mutlak terhadap satu tindakan untuk libel atau slander. Jika kenyataan adalah benar, tiada niat jahat atau kepercayaan terhadap kepalsuan kenyataan tersebut membolehkan satu tindakan dibuat. Jika orang memikirkan perkara buruk berkenaan plaintif apabila mendengar kebenaran tentang beliau, maka reputasi beliau telah diturunkan ke tahap yang betul (lihat ms 196F, 197E–F).]
Notes For cases on libel, see 12 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2002 Reissue) paras 314–434.
For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 82 Cases referred to Abdul Rahman Talib v Seenivasagam & Anor [1966] 2 MLJ 66 (refd) Ayob bin Saud v TS Sambanthamurthi [1989] 1 MLJ 315 (folld) Balfour v Attorney-General [1991] 1 NZLR 519 (refd) Bell-Booth Group Ltd v Attorney General [1989] 3 NZLR 148 (refd) Dato’ Musa Hitam v SH Alattas & Ors [1991] 1 CLJ 315 (refd) Dato’ Seri Anwar bin Ibrahim v Dato’ Seri Dr Mahathir bin Mohamad [1999] 4 MLJ 58 (refd) Hasnul bin Abdul Hadi v Bulat bin Mohamed & Anor [1978] 1 MLJ 75 (refd) Kapt (B) Hj Mohd Ismail v Perwira Affin Bank Bhd (No 2) [2001] 5 CLJ 184 (refd) Kian Lup Construction v Hongkong Bank Malaysia Bhd [2002] 7 MLJ 283 (folld) Le Mercier’s Fine Furnishing Pte Ltd & Anor v Italcomm (M) Sdn Bhd [1996] 3 CLJ 590 (refd) Noor Asiah bte Mahmood & Anor v Randhir Singh & Ors [2000] 2 MLJ 175 (folld) Pong Fee Voon v Piong Kien Siong & Ors [1999] 8 CLJ 383 (refd) Progressive Insurance Sdn Bhd v RM Insurance Underwriting Agency Sdn Bhd & Ors [2003] 5 CLJ 321 (folld) Ratus Mesra Sdn Bhd v Shaik Osman Majid & Ors [1999] 3 MLJ 529 (folld) S Pakianathan v Jenni Ibrahim [1988] 2 MLJ 173 (refd) Stubbs, Ld v Russel [1913] AC 386 (folld) ||Page 186>> Uniphone Sdn Bhd v Chin Boon Lit & Anor [1998] 6 MLJ 441 (refd) Zolkefly bin Haron v Yahya bin Chik & Anor [2001] 62 MLJ 1 (refd)
Legislation referred to Civil Law Act 1956 s 3 Defamation Act 1957
Philip Chai (CW Kok with him) (Soo Thien Ming & Nashrah) for the plaintiff. Haris Mohd Ibrahim (Nor Isman Ismail with him) (Liza Chan & Co) for the defendant.
[2003] 4 MLJ 216 PETROLIAM NASIONAL BHD & ORS V KHOO NEE KIONG
For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 83 HIGH COURT (PULAU PINANG) — CIVIL PROCEEDINGS NO 22–623 OF 2001 SU GEOK YIAM JC 5 JULY 2003
Civil Procedure — Parties — Proper parties to be sued, whether — Application for inter partes interim injunction to restrain defendant from publishing impugned statements on the internet — Whether defendant was person who had sent e-mails — Whether defendant was person who had operated website
Evidence — Documentary evidence — Computer printout — Application for inter partes interim injunction to restrain defendant from publishing impugned statements — Whether mandatory for plaintiffs to exhibit certificate pursuant to s 90A of the Evidence Act 1950 in respect of the computer printouts containing impugned statements in their application for the interim injunction
Tort — Defamation — Libel — Publication on internet — Application for inter partes interim injunction to restrain defendant from publishing impugned statements — Whether impugned statements calculated to injure reputation of plaintiffs — Whether impugned statements had been published to third parties — Whether plaintiffs suffered irreparable loss and damage by reason of publication — Whether plaintiffs in financial position to meet undertaking as to damages — Whether there was delay on plaintiffs’ part in bringing application
Tort — Passing off — Name of business — Domain names — Defendant registered domain names containing the word ‘Petronas’ — Application for inter partes interim injunction to restrain defendant from passing off website with domain name comprising word ‘Petronas’ — Whether defendant had eroded exclusive goodwill in the name ‘Petronas’ — Whether domain names were instruments of fraud — Whether use of domain names by defendant would result in passing off — Whether plaintiffs had shown that there was threat of passing off and trademark infringement on defendant’s part
The first plaintiff was a well-known national petroleum corporation. The second plaintiff was one of the marketing arms of the first plaintiff and the third plaintiff was in the business of processing and transmitting natural gas and it conducted its gas business under the trade name ‘Petronas Gas’. The defendant was an individual carrying out trading operations as a registered sole proprietor under the trade/business name ‘Araneum Consulting Services’ and was in no way associated with the plaintiffs. Sometime in 2001, the plaintiffs made a series of searches of domain names on the Internet using the search engine ‘better-whois.com’ and discovered that the defendant had registered the domain names ‘petronas-dagangan.com’, ‘petronasgas.com’, ‘mypetronasdagangan.com’ and ‘mypetronas.com’ (‘the said domain names’) for purposes of sale. The defendant had also maintained a website under the name
For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 84 ‘www.petronasgas.com’ (‘the Petronas website’) which purported to provide information on, ||Page 217>>inter alia, the locality of the plaintiffs’ service stations. A printout of the main webpage of the Petronas website showed that it was maintained by the defendant. The Petronas website was also accessible via ‘URL HTTP://www.searchmalaysia.com’ (‘the searchmalaysia website’). On the searchmalaysia website, the domain name ‘petronasgas.com’ was described as a subsidiary of ‘searchmalaysia. com’. In response to a request from the first plaintiff to the defendant to transfer to the first plaintiff the registration of the said domain names on the ground that ‘Petronas’ was the first plaintiff’s trade name worldwide and the intellectual property rights in the trade name belonged to the first plaintiff, the defendant had published certain statements via e-mail (‘the impugned statements’) which the plaintiffs averred clearly referred to the plaintiffs and were defamatory. In this application, the plaintiffs sought the following reliefs on the grounds of passing off of domain names and defamation: (a) an inter partes interim injunction to restrain the defendant from: (i) passing off or attempting to pass off any website with a domain name comprising the word ‘Petronas’ which was not related to a website connected with the plaintiffs; (ii) making any representation to any registrar of domain names that the defendant was connected or associated with the plaintiffs and/or the name ‘Petronas’ and the goodwill subsisting therein; and (iii) registering or attempting to register on the internet any domain name containing the word ‘Petronas’; and (b) an inter partes interim injunction to restrain the defendant from publishing or posting or disseminating the impugned statements.
Held, allowing the plaintiffs’ application: (1) The plaintiffs had shown that the name in the e-mail address was that of the defendant and that the defendant was the sole proprietor of Araneum Consulting Services and that both the websites were operated by Araneum Consulting Services. The searches conducted by the plaintiffs on the said domain names showed that the registrants were the defendant, Araneum Consulting Services and ‘[email protected] for sales’. Further, the offensive e-mail also carried the hand phone number of the defendant. In the circumstances of this case, the court was more than satisfied that it was most probably the defendant who had sent the e-mail and who had set up the webpage and it followed, therefore, that the plaintiffs had sufficiently identified the defendant for the purposes of the injunctive relief sought by the plaintiffs in this application (see pp 233A–B, 235F, 236G–H). (2) It was not mandatory for the plaintiffs to exhibit a certificate pursuant to s 90A of the Evidence Act 1950 (‘the Act’) in respect of the computer printouts containing the impugned statements in the affidavit-in-support of their application for the interim injunctions. This was because at this stage of the proceedings, the plaintiffs only had to show a bona fide case or a serious question ||Page 218>>to be tried and there was no necessity for the plaintiffs to show a
For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 85 prima facie case. The deponent of the plaintiffs’ affidavit-in-support had deposed that the contents of the affidavit were within his personal knowledge unless otherwise stated. The defendant had not challenged nor disputed the deponent’s affidavit-in-reply. The plaintiffs would only have to tender the s 90A certificate if the plaintiffs did not wish to call the officer who had personal knowledge as to the production of the computer printouts by the computer to testify to that effect in the trial proper (see pp 236H–I, 237F–H). (3) The impugned statements were manifestly defamatory. The plaintiffs had shown that the natural and ordinary meaning of the impugned statements was that: (a) the plaintiffs did not have any lawful claim to any domain name containing the word ‘Petronas’; (b) the plaintiffs were in the habit of resorting to strong-arm tactics to oppress and intimidate other local companies and/or local business entities; (c) the plaintiffs were attempting or have in the past attempted to extort money from local companies or business entities by forcing them to transfer domain names to the plaintiffs for free; (d) the plaintiffs consistently behaved in an arrogant or high-handed fashion to oppress and intimidate other local companies and/or local entities; (e) the plaintiffs had acted like a ‘robber’ and their actions may be likened to a form of theft; and (f) the legal services department of the plaintiffs was generally incompetent and/or ignorant. Secondly, the plaintiffs had shown that the impugned statements were: (a) calculated to injure the reputation of the plaintiffs by exposing them to hatred, contempt or ridicule; (b) intended to lower the plaintiffs in the estimation of right-thinking members of society generally; (c) calculated to injure and disparage the plaintiffs’ reputation in the plaintiffs’ office, profession and trade; and (d) intended to bring the plaintiffs, by virtue of their standing, honour and integrity, into public scandal, odium and contempt. Thirdly, the plaintiffs had sufficiently demonstrated that the impugned statements had been published to third parties. Fourthly, the plaintiffs had shown that by reason of the publication of the impugned statements, the plaintiffs had suffered grave injury to their trading personality and irreparable loss and damage and would continue to suffer such irreparable loss and damage. Fifthly, the court was satisfied that there had been no improper delay on the part of the plaintiffs in bringing this application because the existence of the Petronas website maintained by the defendant was only discovered by the plaintiffs on or about the end of November 2001 and the defendant’s official response to the plaintiffs’ solicitors was only received on 5 December 2001. Finally, the plaintiffs had given an undertaking as to damages and the court was satisfied that the plaintiffs were in a strong financial position to meet their undertaking should the defendant win at the trial (see pp 240I–241F, 242E–F, H–243B). ||Page 219>> (4) By registering the said domain names which contained the word ‘Petronas’, there was a serious issue to be tried in that the defendant was making a false representation to persons who may have consulted the register that the
For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 86 registrant, ‘Araneum Consulting Services’ was connected or associated with the name registered and thus the owner of the goodwill in the name ‘Petronas’. By registering the said domain names, the defendant had eroded the exclusive goodwill in the name ‘Petronas’ which had cause damage to the plaintiffs. The said domain names were instruments of fraud and any realistic use of them as domain names would result in passing off. This would cause irreparable injury and damage to the plaintiffs and by virtue of this, the balance of convenience tilted in favour of the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs had sufficiently demonstrated that since the said domain names contained the word ‘Petronas’, the court can assume that the intention of the defendant in using the said domain names was to deceive the public by passing off himself as part of the Petronas group of companies or his business or products as those of the plaintiffs’. In the circumstances, the plaintiffs had shown that there was a threat of passing off and trademark infringement on the defendant’s part which was likely to cause confusion in the minds of consumers of the plaintiffs’ products, thereby resulting in irreparable injury and damage to the plaintiffs’ trade, business and goodwill. Therefore, as the plaintiffs had provided an undertaking as to damages, the interim injunction sought for ought to be granted (see p 246B–H); British Telecommunications plc and another v One In A Million Ltd and others and other actions [1998] 4 All ER 476 followed.
Bahasa Malaysia summary
Plaintif pertama adalah satu perbadanan petroleum nasional yang terkenal. Plaintif kedua merupakan salah satu cabang pemasaran plaintif pertama dan plaintif ketiga merupakan satu perniagaan memproses dan mengalirkan gas semulajadi dan ia mengendalikan perniagaan gasnya di bawah nama dagangan ‘Petronas Gas’. Defendan adalah seorang individu yang menjalankan operasi-operasi dagangan sebagai seorang tuanpunya tunggal berdaftar di bawah nama dagangan/perniagaan ‘Araneum Consulting Services’ dan tiada kaitan langsing dengan plaintif-plaintif. Sekitar tahun 2001, plaintif-plaintif telah membuat rangkaian carian ke atas nama-nama domain dalam internet dengan menggunakan enjin carian ‘better-whois.com’ dan mendapati bahawa defendan mempunyai nama-nama domain berdaftar ‘petronas-dagangan.com’, ‘petronasgas.com’, ‘mypetronasdagangan.com’ dan ‘mypetronas.com’ (‘nama-nama domain tersebut’) bagi tujuan jualan. Defendan juga menyenggarakan satu laman web di bawah nama ‘www.petronasgas.com’ (‘laman web Petronas tersebut’) yang bertujuan memberikan maklumat tentang, antara lain, tempat stesen-stesen khidmat plaintif-plaintif. Cetakan ||Page 220>>laman web utama kepada laman web Petronas tersebut menunjukkan bahawa ia diselenggarakan oleh defendan. Laman web Petronas tersebut juga boleh dimasuki melalui ‘URL HTTP://www.searchmalaysia.com’ (‘laman web searchmalaysia tersebut’). Pada laman web searchmalaysia tersebut, nama-nama domain ‘petronasgas.com’ digambarkan sebagai satu anak syarikat ‘searchmalaysia.
For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 87 com’. Sebagai membalas permintaan dari plaintif kepada defendan untuk memindahkan kepada plaintif pertama nama-nama domain tersebut atas alasan bahawa ‘Petronas’ merupakan nama dagangan pertama seluruh dunia plaintif dan hak-hak harta intelektual dalam nama dagangan tersebut terletak pada plaintif pertama, defendan telah menerbitkan kenyataan-kenyataan tertentu melalui e-mel (‘kenyataan-kenyataan yang dipersoalkan’) yang plaintif-plaintif mengegaskan dengan jelas merujuk kepada plaintif-plaintif dan adalah berunsur fitnah. Dalam permohonan ini, plaintif-plaintif telah memohon relief-relief berikut atas alasan kelirupaan nama-nama domain dan fitnah: (a) satu injunksi interim inter partes untuk menyekat defendan dari: (i) kelirupaan atau cubaan untuk mengekelirupakan apa-apa laman web dengan suatu nama domain yang mengandungi nama ‘Petronas’ yang tiada kaitan dengan satu laman web yang berkaitan dengan plaintif-plaintif; (ii) membuat apa-apa representasi kepada mana-mana pendaftar nama-nama domain bahawa defendan mempunyai kaitan atau hubungan dengan plaintif-plaintif dan/atau nama ‘Petronas’ dan nama baik yang wujud; dan (iii) mendaftar atau cuba untuk mendaftar dalam internet apa-apa nama domain yang mengandungi perkataan ‘Petronas’; dan (b) satu injunksi interim inter partes untuk menyekat defendan dari menerbit atau mempos atau mengedarkan kenyataan-kenyataan yang dipersoalkan tersebut.
Diputuskan, membenarkan permohonan plaintif: (1) Plaintif-plaintif telah menunjukkan bahawa nama dalam alamat e-mel tersebut adalah alamat defendan dan bahawa defendan adalah tuanpunya tunggal Araneum Consulting Services dan bahawa kedua-dua laman web tersebut dikendalikan oleh Araneum Consulting Services. Carian-carian yang dijalankan oleh plaintif-plaintif ke atas nama-nama domain tersebut menunjukkan bahawa pendaftar-pendaftarnya adalah defendan, Araneum Consulting Services dan ‘[email protected] for sales’. Tambahan pula, e-mel yang menjelikkan tersebut juuga mempunyai nombor telefon bimbit defendan. Dalam keadaan kes ini, mahkamah lebih dari berpuashati bahawa ia adalah berkemungkinan besar defendan yang menghantar e-mel tersebut dan yang telah memulakan halaman web tersebut dan ia diikuti, oleh demikian, bahawa plaintif-plaintif telah dengan memadai mengenalpasti defendan bagi tujuan relief injunksi yang dipohon oleh plaintif-plaintif dalam permohonan ini (lihat ms 233A–B, 235F, 236G–H). ||Page 221>> (2) Ia tidaklah mandatori untuk plaintif-plaintif mengekshibitkan satu sijil menurut s 90A Akta Keterangan 1950 (‘Akta tersebut’) berhubung ccetakan-cetakan komputer yang mengandungi kenyataan-kenyataan yang dipersoalkan tersebut dalam afidavit sokongan permohonan mereka untuk injunksi-injunksi interim tersebut. Ini adalah kerana di peringkat prosiding ini, plaintif-plaintif hanya perlu menunjukkan satu kes bona fide atau satu persoalan serius yang perlu dibicarakan dan tiada keperluan untuk menunjukkan satu kes prima facie. Deponen kepada afidavit sokongan plaintif telah mendeposkan bahawa isi kandungan afidavit tersebut adalah dalam pengetahuan peribadinya kecuali
For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 88 dinyatakan sebaliknya. Defendan tidak mencabar maupun mempertikaikan afidavit jawapan deponen. Plaintif-plaintif hanya perlu menenderkan sijil s 90A jika plaintif-plaintif tidak berhasrat untuk memanggil pegawai yang mempunyai pengetahuan peribadi tersebut berhubung penghasilan cetakan-cetakan komputer oleh komputer untuk memberi keterangan mengenainya dalam perbicaraan sebenar (lihat ms 236H–I, 237F–H). (3) Kenyataan-kenyataan yang dipersoalkan tersebut memang berunsur fitnah. Plaintif-plaintif telah menunjukkan bahawa maksud semulajadi dan biasa kenyataan-kenyataan yang dipersoalkan tersebut adalah bahawa: (a) plaintif-plaintif tidak mempunyai hak yang sah ke atas mana-mana nama domain yang mengandungi perkataan ‘Petronas’; (b) menjadi amalan plaintif-plaintif menggunakan taktik-taktik kekerasan untuk menindas dan menakut-nakutkan syarikat-syarikat tempatan dan/atau entiti-entiti perniagaan tempatan yang lain; (c) plaintif-plaintif cuba atau sebelum ini pernah mencuba untuk memeras wang daripada syarikat-syarikat tempatan atau entiti-entiti perniagaan dengan memaksa mereka memindahkan nama-nama domain kepada plaintif-plaintif dengan percuma; (d) plaintif-plaintif sentiasa bersikap angkuh atau melakukan perbuatan menindas yang begitu angkuh untuk menindas atau menakut-nakutkan syarikat-syarikat tempatan dan/atau entiti-entiti tempatan; (e) plaintif-plaintif telah bertindak seperti ‘robber’ dan tindakan-tindakan mereka boleh disifatkan sebagai membentuk pencurian; dan (f) jabatan perkhidmatan undang-undang plaintif-plaintif secara amnya tidak kompeten dan/atau bersikap tidak tahu. Kedua, plaintif-plaintif telah menunjukkan bahawa kenyataan-kenyataan yang dipersoalkan tersebut: (a) dikira akan menjejaskan reputasi plaintif-plaintif dengan mendedahkan mereka kepada kebencian, penghinaan atau cemuhan; (b) bertujuan untuk merendah-rendahkan plaintif-plaintif pada anggapan masyarakat umum yang waras; (c) dikira untuk menjejas dan merendah-rendahkan reputasi plaintif-plaintif dalam jawatan, profesion dan dagangan plaintif-plaintif; dan (d) bertujuan untuk menjatuhkan plaintif-plaintif, menurut kedudukan, maruah dan integriti plaintif-plaintif, ke dalam skandal awam, rasa benci dan penghinaan. Ketiga, plaintif- ||Page 222>>plaintif telah menunjukkan dengan memadai bahawa kenyataan-kenyataan yang dipersoalkan tersebut telah diterbitkan kepada pihak-pihak ketiga. Keempat, plaintif-plaintif telah menunjukkan bahawa oleh sebab penerbitan kenyataan-kenyataan yang dipersoalkan tersebut, plaintif-plainti telah mengalami kerosakan pada personaliti dagangan dan kerugian yang tidak boleh diperbaiki dan akan berterusan mengalami kerugian dan kerosakan yang tidak boleh dipulihkan. Kelima, mahkamah berpuashati bahawa tiada kelewatan yang tidak betul berlaku di pihak plaintif-plaintif dengan memulakan permohonan ini kerana kewujudan laman web Petronas yang diselenggarakan oleh defendan hanya diketahui oleh plantif-plaintif pada atau akhir bulan November 2001 dan jawapan rasmi defendan kepada peguamcara-peguamcara plaintif-plaintif hanya diterima pada 5 Disember 2001. Akhirnya, plaintif-plaintif telah memberikan satu akujanji berhubung ganti rugi
For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 89 dan mahkamah berpuashati bahawa plaintif-plaintif mempunyai kemampuan kewangan yang kukuhs untuk memenuhi akujanji mereka sekiranya defendan berjaya dalam perbicaraan (lihat ms 240I–241F, 242E–F, H–243B). (4) Dengan mendaftar nama-nama domain yang mengandungi perkataan ‘Petronas’, terdapat persoalan serius yang perlu dibicarakan di mana defendan telah membuat representasi yang tidak benar kepada mereka yang pernah berunding dnegan pendaftar bahawa si pendaftar, ‘Araneum Consulting Services’ adalah berkaitan atau mempunyai hubungan dengan nama yang didaftarkan dan oleh itu tuanpunya nama baik dalam nama ‘Petronas’. Dengan mendaftar nama-nama domain tersebut, defendan telah menghakis nama baik eksklusif dalam nama ‘Petronas’ yang telah menyebabakan reputasi plaintif-plaintif terjejas. Nama-nama domain tersebut adalah unsur-unsur fraud dan apa-apa penggunaan realistiknya sebagai nama-nama domain akan mengakibatkan kelirupaan. Ini akan menyebabkan kerosakan dan kerugian yang tidak boleh dipulihkan kepada plaintif-plaintif dan menurut ini, imbangan kesesuaian berpihak menyebelahi plaintif-plaintif. Plaintif-plaintif dengan memadai telah menunjukkan bahawa memendangkan nama-nama domain tersebut mengandungi perkataan ‘Petronas’, mahkamah boleh mengandaikan bahaw niat defendan untuk menggunakan nama-nama domain tersebutadalah untuk memperdayakan orang awam dengan mengelirupakan dirinya sebagai sebahagian dari kumpulan syarikat Petronas atau perniagaan atau produk-produknya sebagai perniagaan atau produk-produk plaintif-plaintif. Dalam keadaan ini, plaintif-plaintif telah menunjukkan bahawa terdapat ugutan kelirupaan dan pelanggaran tanda dagangan di pihak defendan yang berkemugkinan menyebabkan kekeliruan pada pemikiran pengguna produk-produk plaintif-plaintif, yang akan mengakibatkan kerosakan dan kerugian yang tidak boleh dipulihkan kepada dagangan, perniagaan dan nama baik plaintif-plaintif. Oleh itu, memandangkan plaintif- ||Page 223>>plaintif telah memberikan akujanji berhubung ganti rugi, injunksi interim yang dipohon sepatutnya diberikan (lihat ms 246B–H); British Telecommunications plc and another v One In A Million Ltd and others and other actions [1998] 4 All ER 476 diikut.]
Notes For cases on documentary evidence of computer printouts, see 7(2) Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2003 Reissue) paras 1104–1112. For cases on libel, see 12 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2002 Reissue) paras 314–434. For cases on passing off, name of business, see 12 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2002 Reissue) para 1421. For cases on the proper parties to be sued, see 2(3) Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2001 Reissue) paras 4322–4328.
For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 90 Cases referred to Alor Janggus Soon Seng Trading Sdn Bhd & Or v Sey Hoe Sdn Bhd & Ors [1995] 1 MLJ 241 (refd) American Cyanamid v Ethicon Ltd [1975] AC 396; [1975] 1 All ER 504 (refd) Bonnard v Perryman [1891] 2 Ch 269 (refd) British Telecommunications plc and another v One In A Million Ltd and others and other actions [1998] 4 All ER 476 (folld) Company of Proprietors of Selby Bridge Ltd v Sunday Telegraph Ltd (1966) 197 Estates Gazette 1077 (refd) D and L Caterers Ltd and Jackson v D’Ajou [1945] KB 3649; [1945] 1 All ER 563 (refd) Directors of Imperial Gas Light and Coke Co v Broadbent (1859) 7 HL Cas 600 (refd) Fullwood v Fullwood (1878) 9 Ch D 176 (refd) Gnanasegaran a/l Pararajasingam v PP [1997] 3 MLJ 1 (refd) Keet Gerald Francis Noel John v Mohd Noor bin Abdullah & Ors [1995] 1 MLJ 193 (refd) Leather Cloth Co Ltd v American Leather Cloth Co Ltd (1865) 11 HL Cas 523 (refd) Lewis v Daily Telegraph Ltd, Lewis v Associated Newspapers Ltd [1963] 2 All ER 151 (refd) Linotype Co Ltd v British Empire Type-Setting Machine Co Ltd (1899) 81 LT 331 (refd) Lyan v Lipton (1914) 49 L Jo 542 (refd) Magnolia Metal Co v Tandem Smelting Syndicate Ltd (1900) 17 RPC 477 (refd) Metropolitan Saloon Omnibus Co Ltd v Hawkins (1859) 4 H & N 87 (refd) Martin v Price [1894] 1 Ch 276 (refd) New Straits Times Press (M) Bhd, The v Airasia Bhd [1987] 1 MLJ 36 (refd) Potts v Leyy (1854) 2 Drew 272 (refd) ||Page 224>> Pride of Derby and Derbyshire Angling Association Ltd v British Celanese Ltd [1953] 1 Ch 149; [1953] 1 All ER 179 (refd) Quartz Hill Consolidated Gold Mining Co v Beall (1882) 20 Ch D 501 (refd) Rubber Improvement Ltd v Daily Telegraph Ltd, Rubber Improvement Ltd v Associated Newspapers Ltd [1964] AC 234 (refd) Spottiswoode v Clark (1846) 2 Ch 154 (refd) Takenaka (United Kingdom) Ltd and Anor v Frankl [2001] EWCA CIV 348 (refd) Slazengers Ltd v C Gibbs & Co (1916) 33 TLR 35 (refd)
For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 91 South Hetton Coal Co Ltd v North-Eastern News Association Ltd [1894] 1 QB 133 (refd) Spalding & Bros v AW Gamage Ltd (1915) 84 LJ Ch 449 (refd) Standard Chartered Bank v Mukah Singh [1996] 3 MLJ 240 (refd) United States v Smith 918 F 2d 1501 (refd) USA v Siddiqui US 11th Circuit Court of Appeals No 98-6994 (refd) Williams v Beaumont (1833) 10 Bing 260 (refd) Wood v Conway Coon [1914] 2 Ch 47 (refd)
Legislation referred to Companies Act 1965 Evidence Act 1952 ss 62 explanation 3, 90A, 90B Federal Rules of Evidence [US] ss 901(a), (b)(4) Petroleum Development Act 1974 s 3(1)
Tai Foong Lam (Lee Hishammuddin) for the plaintiff. Ravin Vello (Lee Khai with him) (Tasn Beng Hong) for the defendant.
[2003] 4 MLJ 345 MAHADEVI A/P NADCHATIRAM v THIRUCHELVASEGARAM A/L MANICKANICKAVASEGAR
FEDERAL COURT (KUALA LUMPUR) — CIVIL APPEAL NO 02–22 OF 2001(W) STEVE SHIM CJ (SABAH & SARAWAK), ABDUL MALEK AHMAD FCJ AND MOKHTAR SIDIN JCA 3 SEPTEMBER 2003
Tort — Defamation — Absolute privilege — Whether statement was defamatory — Whether absolute privilege applied
Tort — Defamation — Fair comment — Whether statement was published — Whether defence of fair comment applied
There were various overlapping issues and preliminary objections before the court but the main issues for consideration concerned alleged defamatory statements (referred to as the ‘third defamation’ and the ‘seventh defamation’). The third defamation was
For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 92 based on the allegation that on 12 October 1993 at the courthouse of the High Court of Seremban and in the presence of several advocates and solicitors and members of the public, the appellant falsely and maliciously published concerning the respondent and of him in relation to his behaviour and conduct and in the way of this profession, the following words, ‘The several actions were brought by Vishi’s husband to cover-up the incest committed by Segaram with Shanti’. The seventh defamation was based on the writing at the back of the last page of the serving copy of a writ for Suit No 04. Suit No 04 was filed by the respondent. After the sealed copy of the writ was extracted, it was served on the appellant. Instead of the normal practice of affixing the signature at the rear of the seving copy, the appellant wrote and while writing, read out aloud to her staff present the following, ‘Segaram, I am not your enemy but your friend, I have not read your summons. It is most unfair for you to chase and harass me continously since London days in 1960s — that time you wrote to complain about me going out with white boys to my parents and now you keep chasing me’. With regard to the seventh defamation, the defendant argued that the statement was written in the private office and thereafter placed in a sealed envelope marked ‘private and confidential’.
Held, dismissing the appeal with costs: (1) The utterance with regard to the third defamation was scandalous based on the facts that: (a) there was not truth in the allegation of incest by the respondent; (b) the remark was actually uttered by the appellant; (c) absolute privilege does not apply to any statement made not in the course of legal proceedings. The statement uttered by the appellant there was really an outburst to ||Page 346>> defame the respondent and the appellant could not rely on qualified privilege or absolute privilege (see p 353E–H). (2) With regard to the seventh defamation, as an advocate and solicitor, the defendant would be aware of the rules and procedures that require such an acknowledgement copy of a serving writ to be exhibited to an affidavit of service. With such a practice she would have known that there could not be no confidentiality for this document (see p 354G–I). (3) Although there seems to be some truth of the harrassment by the respondent, this was actually due to his frustration in not being able to gain control of this daughter and not because of any infatuation for the appellant. With regard to the incident that happened in London, even if true, it took place too long ago to be of any relevance and effect (see p 355B–C). (4) On the appellant’s claim of fair comment, the matter attracts no interest to the public. It is entirely a private family squabble (see p 355C–D).
Bahasa Malaysia summary
Terdapat pelbagai persoalan-persoalan bertindan dan bantahan-bantahan awal di
For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 93 hadapan mahkamah tetapi persoalan-persoalan penting untuk dipertimbangkan adalah berkaitan kenyataan-kenyataan yang dikatakan berunsur fitnah (dirujuk sebagai ‘fitnah ketiga’ dan ‘fitnah ketujuh’). Fitnah ketiga berdasarkan pengataan bahawa pada 12 Oktober 1993 di Mahkamah Tinggi Seremban dan dalam kehadiran beberapa orang peguambela dan peguamcara dan orang awam, perayu telah secara palsu dan berniat jahat menerbitkan berkaitan responden dan beliau berhubung kelakuan dan perbuatan beliau dan juga dalam profesyen ini, perkataan-perkataan berikut, ‘The several actions were brought by Vishi’s husband to cover-up the incest commintted by Segaram with Shanti’. Fitnah ketujuh berdasarkan tulisan di bahagian belakang mukasurat terakhir salinan penyampaian satu writ untuk Guaman No 04. Guaman No 04 telah difailkan oleh responden. Selepas salinan writ yang dimeteraikan telah dikeluarkan, ia telah disampaikan ke atas perayu. Dari amalan biasa menurunkan tandatangan di bahagian belakang salinan penyampaian, perayu telah menulis dan sementara menulis, telah membaca dengan kuat kepada kakitangan beliau seperti berikut, ‘Segaram, I am not your enemy but your friend, I have not read your summons. It is most unfair for you to chase and harass me continously since London days in 1960s — that time you wrote to complain about me going out with white bouys to my parents and now you keep chasing me’. Berhubung fitnah ketujuh tersebut, defendan menghujahkan bahawa kenyataan tersebut telah ditulis di pejabat persendirian dan selepas itu telah dimasukkan ke dalam sampul surat bertanda ‘sulit dan rahsia’. ||Page 347>>
Diputuskan, menolak rayuan dengan kos: (1) Ucapan berhubung fitnah ketiga menimbulkan skandal berdasarkan fakta-fakta bahawa: (a) tidak ada kebenaran dalam pengataan sumbang mahram tersebut oleh responden; (b) kenyataan tersebut sebenarnya diucapkan oleh perayu; (c) perlindungan mutlak tidak terpakai kepada apa-apa kenyataan yang tidak dibuat semasa prosiding menurut undang-undang. Kenyataan yang diucapkan oleh perayu hanyalah satu perasaan yang tiba-tiba naik radang untuk memfitnah responden dan perayu tidak boleh bergantung kepada perlindungan bersyarat ataupun perlindungan mutlak (lihat ms 353E–H). (2) Berhubung fitnah ketujuh, sebagai seorang peguambela dan peguamcara, defendan harus sedar dengan peraturan-peraturan dan prosedur-prosedur yang diperlukakn untuk mengesahkan penyampaian salinan writ yang diekshibitkan kepada afidavit penyampaian. Dengan amalan itu beliau sepatutnya mengetahui bahawa tidak ada apa-apa yang rahsia tentang dokumen tersebut (lihat ms 354G–I). (3) Walaupun terdapat sedikit kebenaran tentang tentang gangguan oleh responde, ini adalah disebabkan oleh kekecewaan beliau kerana tidak dapat mengawal anak perempuan ini dan bukan kerana perasaan tergila-gila akan perayu. Berhubung kejadian yang berlaku di London, jikapun is benar, ia telah berlaku lama dahulu dan tidak mempunyai apa-apa relevan dan kesan (lihat ms 355B–C).
For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 94 (4) Berhubung tuntutan perayu untuk komen berpatutan, perkara tersebut tidak mempunyai kepentingan awam. Ia hanyalah satu pertelingkahan peribadi sebuah keluarga (lihat ms 355C–D).]
Notes For cases on absolute privileges, see 12 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2002 Reissue) para 230. For cases on fair comment, see 12 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2002 Reissue) paras 289–293.
Cases referred to Auto Dunia Sdn Bhd v Wong Sai Fatt & Ors [1995] 2 MLJ 549 (refd) Capital Insurance Bhd v Aishah bte Abdul Manap & Anor [2000] 4 MLJ 65 (refd) Dashtgard v Blair (1990) CCLT (2nd) 284 (folld) Demopolis v Peoples National Bank 796 p 2nd 426 (Wash 1990) (folld) Lam Kong Co Ltd v Thong Guan Co Pte Ltd [2000] 4 MLJ 1 (refd) Lincoln v Daniels [1962] 1 QB 237 (refd) Megat Najmuddin bin Dato’ Seri (Dr) Megat Khas v Bank Bumiputra (M) Bhd [2002] 1 MLJ 385 (refd) ||Page 348>> Minister for Human Resources, The v Thong Chin Yoong and another appeal [2001] 4 MLJ 225 (refd) Raphael Pura v Insas Bhd & Anor [2003] 1 MLJ 513 (refd) Watson v M’Ewan [1905] AC 480 (refd)
Legislation referred to Rules of the Federal Court 1995, 47(4)
Civil Suits No S5–23–08 of 1997 consolidated with No S2(S5)–23–04 of 1997 (High Court, Kuala Lumpur)
KS Narayanan (Rishan Kumar with him) (Mahadevi Nadchatiram & Partners) for the appellant. Malik Imtiaz Sarwar (Syarikat M Segaram) for the respondent.
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For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 95
[2003] 4 MLJ 494 JOCELINE TAN POH CHOO & ORS v V MUTHUSAMY
COURT OF APPEAL (KUALA LUMPUR) — CIVIL APPEAL NO P–02–854 OF 2000 MOKHTAR SIDIN, ARIFIN ZAKARIA AND RAHMAH HUSSAIN JJCA 1 AUGUST 2003
Civil Procedure — DamagesA — ssessment of damages — Interest — Interest in defamation cases — No claim for interest on damage sought made in the writ of summons or statement of claim — No omnibus prayer in writ of claim seeking further or other relief — Whether court could in its discretion award interest on damages
Tort — Defamation — Libel — Court proceedings — Publication of report of proceedings in court — Whether defamatory of plaintiff — Plaintiff a lawyer and member of state legislative assembly — Quantum of damages to be awarded
Tort — Defamation — Libel — Damages — Aggravated Damages — Failure to publish apology or retraction — Defence of absolute privilege — Apology or retraction would not be appropriate — Whether sufficient grounds for award of aggravated damages
Tort — Defamation — Libel — Damages — Publication of report of proceedings in court — Plaintiff a lawyer and member of state legislative assembly — Whether quantum of damages awarded excessive
Tort — Defamation — Libel — Defences — Absolute privilege — Publication of report of proceedings in court — Whether defence limited to report of proceedings in open court only — Whether defence applicable to report of statement in pleadings — Whether report of plaintiff’s pleadings a fair and accurate report of the proceedings
Tort — Defamation — Libel in newspaper — Court proceedings — Publication of report of proceedings in court — Whether defamatory of plaintiffQuantum of damages to be awarded
The defendants published an article reporting the suit of a driver who claimed to have been cheated of certain property as the result of an alleged conspiracy between a lawyer and another person. It was not in dispute that the ‘lawyer’ in the report referred to the plaintiff, a practicing lawyer and a state assemblyman. Accompanying the report was a photograph of the plaintiff. The plaintiff brought an action claiming, inter alia, damages for libel against the author, the editor and the proprietor and publisher of the publication. The defendants relied on the defence of absolute privilege. The trial judge
For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 96 found that the defendants liable for libel and awarded RM300,000 in general damages, a further RM50,000 as aggravated damages, interest on the awards at 8% pa from the date of judgment and costs. The defendants appealed against the findings on liability and quantum. The plaintiff cross-appealed on the quantum and for interest on the awards to run from the date of the publication. ||Page 495>>
Held: (1) The first pertinent issue for determination was whether the report was defamatory of the plaintiff. Any reasonable person reading the report would form the opinion that the plaintiff was a cheat and a dishonest person, not fit to practise law or to hold public office. The finding of the trial judge that the report was defamatory of the plaintiff was thus upheld (see pp 500D, 501B); Syed Husin Ali v Sharikat Penchetakan Utusan Melayu Berhad & Anor [1973] 2 MLJ 56 referred. (2) The critical issue here was whether the report was a fair and accurate report of the proceedings that had taken place in the open court. In order to be so regarded, the report should be confined to what was publicly heard in open court and not to matters contained in documents filed in court. Privilege will not attach to the publication of the contents of pleadings, affidavits or other papers which, although filed in civil proceedings, are not brought up in open court (see p 502C–D); McCarey v Associated Newspapers Ltd & Ors [1964] 1 WLR 855 distinguished and Stern v Piper [1996] 2 All ER 385 referred. (3) In the present case defendants admitted that the article was based in part on the evidence given in open court, as well as on the statement of claim. The trial judge found that the report was primarily based on the statement of claim rather than on what had taken place in the open court. The publication of parts of the amended statement of claim, not having been read out in open court, was not within the scope of the protection given by the defence of absolute privilege (see p 503E, 504B, D). (4) The libel was contained in a newspaper article related to an on-going civil suit. The report merely contained allegations made by the driver against the lawyer. Such allegations were not uncommon in a court of law. The defendants were not free from blame but it is a question of degree. Judged in that light, and in the current trend of award of damages for libel in this country, the award by the trial judge was grossly excessive. The award of general damages was reduced from RM300,000 to RM100,000 (see p 506H–507A). (5) Whether a defendant’s failure or refusal to retract or to make a satisfactory correction of an report would render a defendant liable to aggravated damages depends on the facts and circumstances of a given case. Here, the want of apology could not, without more, have aggravated the plaintiff’s injury. The appellants had relied wholly on the statutory defence of absolute privilege, where an apology or retraction would not be appropriate. There was no
For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 97 evidence that the defendant’s conduct had been motivated by malice. The award of aggravated damages was thus wholly unwarranted and was set aside (see p 507H, 508B–C). ||Page 496>> (6) The award of interest should run from the date of publication of the reports (see p 508E–F); Karpal Singh a/l Ram Singh v DP Vijandran [2003] 2 MLJ 385 followed.
Bahasa Malaysia Summary
Defendan telah melaporkan tindakan yang difailkan oleh seorang pemandu yang mendakwa telah ditipu hartanahnya akibat suatu komplot antara seorang peguam dan seorang lagi. Adalah tidak dinafikan bahawa ‘peguam’ dalam laporan tersebut merujuk kepada plaintif , seorang peguambela bertauliah yang juga ahli dewan undangan negeri. Laporan tersebut diiringi suatu gambar plaintif. Plaintif membawa tindakan menuntut, antara lain, ganti rugi bagi finath dari pengarang, penyunting serta tuanpunya dan penerbit akhbar tersebut. Defendan bergantung kepada pembelaan hak istimewa mutlak. Hakim perbicaraan mendapati defendan bertanggungjawab bagi fitnah tersebut dan memberikan award RM300,000 sebagai ganti rugi am, RM50,000 selanjutnya bagi ganti rugi peruncingan, faedah ke atas award pada kadar 8% setahun dari tarikh penghakiman dan kos. Defendan merayu ke atas pendapatan mengenai liabiliti dan kuantum. Plaintif juga telah merayu balas ke atas kuantum dan memohon faedah dikira dari tarikh penerbitan laporan tersebut.
Diputuskan: (1) Isu relevan pertama yang perlu dikenalpasti sama ada laporan tersebut memfitnahkan plaintif. Seorang yang munasabah yang membaca laporan tersebut pasti berpendapat bahawa plaintif seorang penipu dan tidak jujur, tidak layak mengamal undang-undang atau memegang jawatan awam. Pendapat hakim perbicaraan bahawa laporan tersebut telah memfitnahkan plaintif dikekalkan (lihat ms 500D, 501B); Syed Husin Ali v Sharikat Penchetakan Utusan Melayu Berhad & Anor [1973] 2 MLJ 56 dirujuk. (2) Isu penting di sini sama ada laporan tersebut suatu laporan adil dan tepat persidangan yang diadakan dalam mahkamah terbuka. Bagi menepati kehendak ini, laporan tersebut harus dihadkan kepada apa yang telah dibentangkan dalam mahkamah terbuka dan bukannya kepada perkara yang terkandung dalam dokumen yang difailkan dalam mahkamah. Hak istimewa tidak wujud kepada penerbitan kandungan sebarang pliding, afidavit atau dokumen lain yang, walaupun telah difailkan di mahkamah, tidak dibentangkan dalam mahkamah terbuka (lihat ms 502C–D); McCarey v Associated Newspaper [1964] 1 WLR 855 dibeza dan Stern v Piper [1996] 2 All ER 385 dirujuk. (3) Dalam kes ini defendan mengaku laporan tersebut berasaskan dari keterangan
For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 98 yang diberikan dalam mahkamah terbuka, ||Page 497>> mahupun dari pernyataan tuntutan. Hakim perbicaraan mendapati laporan tersebut terutamanya berasaskan pernyataan tuntutan dan bukannya pada persidangan mahkamah terbuka. Penerbitan sebahagian pernyataan tuntutan, yang tidak dibentangkan dalam mahkamah terbuka, bukannya dalam skop perlindungan yang diberikan oleh pembelaan hak istimewa mutlak (lihat ms 503E, 504B,D). (4) Fitnah yang terkandung dalam laporan tersebut berkaitan suatu tuntutan sivil yang berterusan. Laporan tersebut hanya mengandungi dakwaan yang dibuat pemandu tersebut terhadap peguam tersebut. Dakwaan sebegitu lazimnya dibuat dalam mahkamah unbdang-undang. Walaupun defendan bersalah, ia persoalan setakat mana ia bersalah. Jika dilihat sebegini, dan aliran award-award ganti rugi dalam kes fitnah dalam negeri, award hakim perbicaraan jelas keterlaluan. Award bagi ganti rugi am dikurangkan dari RM300,000 kepada RM100,000 (lihat ms 506H–507A). (5) Sama ada kegagalan atau keengganan seseorang defendan menarik balik atau membetulkan sesuatu laporan menjadikannya bertanggungjawab terhadap ganti rugi teruk tertakluk kepada fakta dan keadaan sesuatu kes. Di sini, ketiadaan pembetulan laporan tersebut tidak, tanpa keterangan lain, menjejaskan kedudukan plaintif. Defendan berpegang kepada pembelaan statutori hak istimewa mutlak, di mana sesuatu pembetulan atau penarikan balik tidak memadai. Tiada sebarang keterangan menunjukkan bahawa defendan berniat jahat terhadap plaintif. Award ganti rugi teruk tidak wajar dan diketepikan (lihat ms 507H, 508B–C). (6) Faedah yang ditawarkan harus dikira dari tarikh penerbitan laporan tersebut (lihat ms 508E–F); Karpal Singh a/l Ram Singh v D P Vijandran [2003] 2 MLJ 385 diikut.]
Notes For cases on assessment of damages, see 2(2) Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2001 Reissue) paras 1919–1927. For cases on libel, see 12 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2002 Reissue) paras 314–434. For cases on libel in newspaper, see 12 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2002 Reissue) para 440.
Cases referred to Capital and Countries Bank v Henty (1882) 7 App Cas 741 (refd) Carson v John Fairfax & Sons Ltd (1993) 113 AL 577 (refd) Hill v Church of Scientology of Toronto (1995) 2 SCR 1130 Jones v Skeiton [1963] 3 All ER 952 (refd) ||Page 498>>
For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 99 Karpal Singh a/l Ram Singh v DP Vijandran [2001] 4 MLJ 161 (refd) Karpal Singh a/l Ram Singh v DP Vijandran [2003] 2 MLJ 385 (folld) Liew Yew Tiam & Ors v Cheah Cheng Hoe & Ors [2001] 2 CLJ 385 (refd) Ling Wah Press (M) Sdn Bhd & Ors v Tan Sri Dato’ Vincent Tan Chee Yioun [2000] 4 MLJ 77 (refd) Mc Carey v. Associated Newspaper [1964] 1 WLR 855 (distd) MGG Pillai v Tan Sri Dato’ Vincent Tan Chee Yioun & other appeals [1995] 2 MLJ 493 (refd) Praed v Graham (1889) 24 QBD 53 (refd) Stern v Piper [1996] 2 All ER 385 (refd) Syed Husin Ali v Sharikat Penchetakan Utusan Melayu Berhad & Anor [1973] 2 MLJ 56 (refd)
Legislation referred to Defamation Act 1957 s 11(1) Law of Libel Amendment Act 1888 [Eng]
Suit No 22–147 of 1992 (High Court, Pulau Pinang)
JA Yeoh (Shearn Delamore & Co) for the appellant. Dato’ V Muthusamy (C Prabhakaran with him) (V Muthusamy & Tan) for the respondent.
[2003] 5 MLJ 91 Chew Sew Khian @ Chew Hua Seng v Saniboey Mohd Ismail & Ors
HIGH COURT (JOHOR BAHRU) — CIVIL SUIT NO (MT–1) 22–24 OF 1999 SYED AHMAD HELMY JC 23 JULY 2002
Tort — Defamation — Libel — Libel in newspaper — Identity of plaintiff — Whether plaintiff was the person referred to in article
The plaintiff claimed against the defendants for damages for libel in respect of an article published in the Johor edition of the newspaper Harian Metro. The article
For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 100 stated that the district Police was pursuing a ‘jurujual’ known as Chew aged 56 years for cheating a timber merchant. The plaintiff claimed that by the article, the defendants meant and were understood by the readers to mean that the plaintiff was the person referred to in the article and that he was a cheat, untrustworthy, prepared to falsify documents and involved in criminal activities and was wanted by the police in connection with the activities aforesaid. By reason thereof, the plaintiff has been greatly injured in his credit and reputation and had been brought to public scandal, odium and contempt. The defendants proceeded in respect of the defence that the article did not refer to the plaintiff.
Held, dismissing the plaintiff’s claim with costs: (1) A fair minded reader ‘not avid for scandal’ and not ‘unduly suspicious’ upon reading the article cannot be said to reasonably understand that the article and the words complained of refers to the plaintiff. The word specifically used was ‘jurujual’ (salesman) and not ‘ahli perniagaan’ (businessman). Nowhere in the article were the words ‘ahli perniagaan’ used. The word ‘jurujual’ means what it says, namely salesman and cannot by any stretch of imagination be extended to a businessman (see p 95B–C). (2) The cumulative effect of the evidence as presented would lead to the conclusion that a fair minded reader upon reading the article objectively would understand the article to refer to a salesman involved in the timber business who is being sought by the police, and hence the plaintiff cannot be said to fit in the descriptive category aforesaid (see p 95F).
Bahasa Malaysia summary
Plaintiff telah menuntut terhadap defendan-defendan untuk gantirugi libel berhubung dengan suatu artikel yang diterbitkan di dalam suratkhabar Harian Metro edisi Johor. Artikel tersebut menyatakan bahawa polis daerah sedang mencari seorang ‘jurujual’ yang dikenali sebagai Chew, berumur 56 tahun kerana beliau telah menipu seorang saudagar balak. Plaintif telah menyatakan bahawa melalui artikel tersebut, defendan-defendan bermaksud dan difahami oleh pembaca-pembaca untuk membawa makna plaintif merupakan orang yang dimaksudkan di dalam artikel tersebut dan bahawa beliau merupakan seorang penipu, tidak boleh dipercayai, sedia memalsukan dokumen dan terlibat dalam kegiatan jenayah dan dikejar oleh polis berkaitan kegiatan-kegiatan yang dikatakan itu. Oleh kerana itu, kebolehpercayaan dan reputasi plaintif telah terjejas dan beliau telah diheret ke dalam skandal awam, rasa benci dan penghinaan. Defendan-defendan memegang kepada pembelaan bahawa artikel tersebut tidak merujuk kepada plaintif.
Diputuskan, menolak tuntutan plaintif dengan kos: (1) Seorang pembaca yang berfikiran waras ‘not avid for scandal’ dan ‘unduly
For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 101 suspicious’ setelah membaca artikel tidak boleh dikatakan untuk faham secara munasabah bahawa artikel tersebut dan perkataan-perkataan yang diadukan merujuk kepada plaintif. Perkataan-perkataan yang khusus digunakan adalah ‘jurujual’ dan bukan ‘ahli perniagaan’. Perkataan-perkataan ‘ahli perniagaan’ tidak digunakan di dalam artikel tersebut. Perkataan ‘jurujual’ bermakna seperti yang dikatakan, iaitu seorang jurujual dan tidak dapat dikatakan membawa makna seorang ahli perniagaan (lihat ms 95B–C). (2) Kesan kumulatif keterangan yang dikemukakan akan membawa kepada kesimpulan bahawa seorang pembaca yang berfikiran waras setelah membaca artikel tersebut secara objektif akan memahami artikel tersebut merujuk kepada seorang jurujual yang terlibat di dalam perniagaan balak yang sedang dikejar oleh polis dan oleh itu plaintif tidak boleh dikatakan merupakan orang yang digambarkan (lihat ms 95F).
Notes For cases on libel, see 12 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2000 Reissue), paras 263–352.
Cases referred to David Syme v Canavan (1918) 25 CLR 234 (refd) Lee Kuan Yew v Derek Gwyn Davies & Ors [1990] 1 MLJ 390 (refd) Morgan v Odhams Press Ltd [1971] 1 WLR 1239 (refd) Sandison v Malayan Times Ltd & Ors [1964] MLJ 332 (refd)
Appeal from:
Gobind Singh Deo (Karpal Singh & Co) for the plaintiff. Mohd Izral Khairi (Shearn Delamore & Co) for the first, third and fourth defendants.
[2003] 5 MLJ 481 J HENG CONSULTING SERVICES (M) SDN BHD & ANOR v THE NEW STRAITS TIMES PRESS (M) BHD
HIGH COURT (PULAU PINANG) — CIVIL SUIT NO 22–435 OF 2001 KAMALANATHAN RATNAM J 23 APRIL 2003
Tort — Damages — Aggravated damages — Whether the court should award aggravated
For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 102 damages — Present trend of award — Interest
Tort — Defamation — Freedom of speech — Duty of press in reporting court proceedings – Restriction imposed by law — Whether there is special privilege accorded to the press — Whether defendant recklessly and maliciously defamed the first plaintiff
The first plaintiff is engaged in providing professional secretarial services and advice to clients and has been so engaged for 20 years and has acquired a good reputation and is believed to have a good clientele from the Chinese business community. The second plaintiff, an accountant and a chartered secretary, was at all material times the managing director and the alter ego of the first plaintiff. The defendant is the foremost leading English daily in Malaysia with a very wide circulation. The defendant published a news article that one Tan Phaik Tin (‘Tan’), a company director from the first plaintiff was charged with four counts of forgery by using false resolutions. It was the case of the plaintiffs that at no time did they ever engage the services of, nor did they employ the said Tan. The plaintiffs brought an action against the defendant and contended that they suffered humiliation and felt defamed by the publication. The defendant entered appearance and filed an elaborate defence. Subsequently, the defendant and the plaintiffs recorded a consent judgment. Damages was awarded at RM200,000 but no aggravated or exemplary damages was awarded. Both parties were dissatisfied with that decision and appealed to the High Court.
Held, dismissing the defendant’s appeal: (1) Whilst the defendant has a duty to report on court proceedings, it must only report what is actually said in court. A distinction must be drawn between the right to ‘freedom of speech’ and the ‘freedom of the press’. Whilst the courts would endeavor to see that the right to freedom of speech is protected, there is no special privilege accorded to the press. It must conform and be liable for its publication just like any ordinary citizen if it transgresses the law relating to libel (see p 488E, H). (2) Neither the defendant nor its solicitors made a search at the Registry of Companies (‘the ROC’) to ascertain if Tan was a director of the first plaintiff. A search at the ROC would most certainly have shown that the first plaintiff had indeed been wronged; and at that very stage when the demand notice was ||Page 482>> received, the defendant could have, as requested in the demand letter, admitted liability and mitigated damages (see pp 487H–488A). (3) The adamant stand of the defendant with its ill-advised course of defence must lead the court to conclude that the defendant was reckless in its publication and was not concerned whether such an allegation was true or false. The defendant paid no heed to its publication and recklessly and maliciously defamed the first plaintiff (see p 489B–C). (4) The court declined to make an award of aggravated or exemplary damages
For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 103 because of the present trend to minimize the awards. The court found that the plaintiff had already been given a sufficiently reasonable award under general damages. The court, however, made the award of interest at 4% to run from the date of publication of the article to the date of assessment (see pp 489H–I, 490B); Karpal Singh a/l Ram Singh v DP Vijandran [2003] 2 MLJ 385 followed.
Bahasa Malaysia summary
Plaintif pertama berniaga dengan memberikan perkhidmatan kesetiausahaan dan nasihat kepada pelanggan-pelanggan dan telah melakukan perkhidmatan tersebut selama 20 tahun dan mendapat nama baik serta dipercayai mempunyai hubungan yang baik dengan masyarakat peniaga China sebagai pelanggannya. Plaintif kedua, seorang akauntan dan setiausaha berkanun, adalah pada setiap masa matan pengarah urusan dan alter ego kepada plaintif pertama. Defendan adalah akhbar harian utama berbahasa Inggeris di Malaysia dengan sebaran yang luas. Defendan telah menerbitkan berita tentang Tan Phaik Tin (‘Tan’), seorang pengarah syarikat daripada plaintif pertama yang dituduh dengan empat pertuduhan pemalsuan melalui penggunaan resolusi-resolusi yang palsu. Plaintif-plaintif telah mengatakan bahawa mereka tidak pernah sesekalipun menggunakan khidmat atau menggaji Tan sebagai pekerja mereka. Plaintif-plaintif telah memulakan satu tindakan terhadap defendan dan menegaskan bahawa mereka telah dimalukan dan difitnah oleh penerbitan tersebut. Defendan telah memasuki kehadiran dan memfailkan satu pembelaan yang panjang lebar. Berikutan itu, defendan dan plaintif-plaintif telah merekodkan satu penghakiman persetujuan. Ganti rugi telah diawardkan sebanyak RM200,000 tetapi tiada ganti rugi teruk atau teladan telah diawardkan. Kedua-dua pihak berasa tidak puas hati dengan keputusan tersebut dan telah merayu kepada Mahkamah Tinggi.
Diputuskan, menolak rayuan defendan: (1) Meskipun defendan mempunyai kewajipan untuk membuat laporan tentang prosiding mahkamah, ia hanya perlu melaporkan ||Page 483>> apa yang sebenarnya dikatakan dalam mahkamah. Satu perbezaan harus dinyatakan antara ‘kebebasan bersuara’ dan ‘kebebasan akhbar’. Walaupun mahkamah-mahkamah akan berusaha untuk memastikan bahawa hak kebebasan bersuara dilindungi, tiada apa-apa keistimewaan khas diberikan kepada akhbar. Ia harus akur dan bertanggungjawab terhadap penerbitannya seperti mana-mana warganegara biasa sekiranya ia melanggar undang-undang berkaitan (lihat ms 488E, H). (2) Defendan maupun peguamcaranya tidak membuat carian di Pendaftar Syarikat (‘PS’) untuk memastikan jika Tan adalah pengarah plaintif pertama. Satu carian di PS sudah pasti menunjukkan bahawa plaintif pertama memang telah teraniaya; dan pada peringkat tersebut di mana notis tuntutan diterima,.
For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 104 defendan sepatutnya seperti yang dikehendaki dalam notis tuntutan tersebut, mengaku bertanggungjawab dan meminta ganti rugi diringankan (lihat ms 487H–488A). (3) Pendirian tetap defendan untuk meneruskan dengan pembelaannya yang tidak bijak membawa mahkamah kepada kesimpulan bahawa defendan telah bersikap melulu dalam penerbitannya dan tidak peduli sama ada suatu pengataan itu benar atau palsu. Defendan tidak peduli tentang penerbitannya dan secara melulu dan dengan niat jahat telah memfitnah plaintif pertama (lihat ms 489B–C). (4) Mahkamah enggan untuk membuat satu award untuk ganti rugi teruk atau teladan kerana amalan sekarang yang mengurangkan jumlah award. Mahkamah mendapati plaintif telahpun diberikan satu award yang munasabah dan mencukupi di bawah ganti rugi am. Mahkamah, bagaimanapun, telah membuat award untuk faedah 4% bermula dari tarikh penerbitan artikel tersebut hingga tarikh penilaian (lihat ms 489H–I, 490B); Karpal Singh a/l Ram Singh v DP Vijandran [2003] 2 MLJ 385 diikut.]
Notes For cases on aggravated damages, see 12 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2000 Reissue) para 116. For cases on freedom of speech, see 12 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2000 Reissue) para 248.
Cases referred to Arnold v King Emperor (1914) 83 LJ PC 299 (refd) Karpal Singh a/l Ram Singh v DP Vijandran [2003] 2 MLJ 385 (folld) Langlands v Leng (1916) SC (HL) 102 (refd) Normala Samsudin v Keluarga Communications Sdn Bhd [1999] 2 MLJ 654 (refd) ||Page 484>> Noor Asiah bte Mahmood & Anor v Randhir Singh & Ors [2000] 2 MLJ 175 (refd)
John Khoo ( Ismail, Khoo & Assoc) for the plaintiffs. Harminder Kaur Gill ( Shearn Delamore & Co) for the defendant.
[2003] 6 MLJ 433 DATO’ SERI TIONG KING SING v DATUK JUSTINE JINGGUT
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HIGH COURT (BINTULU) — SUIT NO 22–14 OF 2002(BTU) SULAIMAN DAUD J 3 JULY 2003
Tort — Defamation — Libel — Pleadings — Offending statement reported in Chinese — Failure to plead actual words of offending statement — Whether action ought to be struck out for failure to reproduce actual words of offending statement — Whether actual words of offending statement must be set out in pleadings — Whether failure to set out actual words of offending statement fatal to action — Whether translation of gist of statement and identification of publication sufficient
Tort — Defamation — Libel — Publication — Defendant made offending statement at political party gathering — Statement reported in vernacular newspapers — Whether defendant responsible for re-publication — Defendant aware members of press present at meeting — Whether re-publication the natural consequence of the offending statement made by defendant
Tort — Defamation — Libel — Summary disposal — Whether court can summarily decide whether words complained of capable of bearing the meaning attributed to them — Supreme Court Rules (UK) O 82 r 3A — Whether such jurisdiction exists in Malaysia — Whether court ought to act under the Rules of the High Court 1980 O 18 r 19
Tort — Defamation — Slander — Actionable per se — Words calculated to disparage the plaintiff in any office, profession, calling, trade or business — Plaintiff a member of Parliament, a Justice of the Peace, CEO of a public listed company and adviser to clubs and associations — Whether such positions amount to the holding of an office, profession, calling, trade or business — Whether such action for slander ought to be struck out for want of proof of damages — Defamation Act 1957 s 5
The plaintiff was a member of Parliament and a member of the Sarawak National Party (SNAP). The defendant was the secretary general of the party. At a meeting with members of the party, the defendant allegedly spoke certain words defamatory of the plaintiffs. These words, or words to the like effect, were subsequently published in four local Chinese language newspapers. The plaintiff filed a claim for damages for libel and slander in respect of the speech and publications, in addition to other injunctionary relief related thereto. The defendant sought to strike out the plaintiff’s action. The defendant argued that, while the offending words were set out in full in the statement of claim and the publication of the offending words in the four newspapers were duly pleaded, the actual words in Mandarin as published in the newspapers were not reproduced. Only a translation thereof in English was set out in the pleadings. The defendant argued that the omission to state the words complained of, in the language
For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 106 they were published in the Chinese newspapers, was fatal to the plaintiff’s action for libel. The defendant also argued he could not be liable for libel as the words complained of were spoken and, in the absence of a plea for special damages, an action for libel ||Page 434>>could not be sustained. In any event, the defendant argued, the words complained of, as reproduced in the plaintiff’s statement of claim, were incapable of bearing any defamatory meaning as alleged by the plaintiff. Finally the defendant claimed that the plaintiff had failed to allege special damage in the pleadings, thereby lacking an element of cause of action for slander. There was no averment that the words complained of were calculated to disparage the plaintiff in any office, profession, calling, trade or business for s 5 of the Defamation Act 1957 to apply. In the absence of such proof of special damage the plaintiff has no cause of action for slander against the defendant.
Held, dismissing the defendant’s application to strike out the action: (1) Although the alleged defamatory words were not stated in the statement of claim in the original language in which they were so published, such publication was specifically referred to in the statement of claim. The publications had been sufficiently identified. The translation of the alleged defamatory words in the language of the court in the statement of claim constituted sufficient cause of action for the purpose of striking out application. The omission to plead the actual words so spoken or published was not a fundamental defect which would nullify the pleadings. The question of whether the exact words complained of, which were in Chinese in the instant case, should be set out in the statement of claim, was not an issue for determination in an application to summarily strike out. Whether the same was the correct or accepted translation of the original publication was a question of fact to be determined at the trial upon examination of witnesses. The defendant was entitled to put the plaintiff to proof of all facts alleged in the statement of claim by the production of the original publications and by the examination of witnesses. It was open for the defendant to provide the court with his alternative version at the trial. This was not a plain and obvious case where the plaintiff’s writ and statement of claim could be struck out for want of cause of action (see pp 441C, G, 442A–D); Hassan & Anor v Wan Ishak & Ors [1961] MLJ 45 followed and Karpal Singh a/l Ram Singh v DP Vijandran [2001] 4 MLJ 161 distinguished. (2) It was pleaded in the statement of claim that the defendant had falsely and maliciously intended to use, permit or cause the mass media or press to publish the defamatory allegations against the plaintiff, and the defendant well knew that the reporters of the newspaper were present at the meeting and that his impugned statements against the plaintiff would be published in newspapers. It was further pleaded that the defendant had caused or permitted to be published in the respective newspapers the words set out therein which were alleged to be defamatory of the plaintiff. It appeared the plaintiff has a cause of action in
For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 107 libel against the defendant. It was alleged that the defamatory words were spoken ||Page 435>>by the defendant in the presence of newspaper reporters. It could be said the publication of such defamatory words by the said newspapers was the natural consequence of the statement made by the defendant. The defendant himself should know or ought to have known that the words spoken by him, owing to its nature and content, would be picked up for republication (see p 443C–E, G–H); Datuk Seri Panglima Datuk Seri Panglima Joseph Pairin Kitingan v Datuk Yong Teck Lee & Ors [1998] 2 CLJ 923 distinguished and Slipper v British Broadcasting Corp [1991] 1 All ER 165 followed. (3) The defendant argued that the court may, at any stage after service of the statement of claim, determine whether or not the words complained of were capable of bearing the particular meanings attributed to them. In support of this proposition he referred to a passage in Gatley on Slander & Libel (9th Ed). However that passage was nothing more than a restatement of the law as provided in O 82 r 3A of the Supreme Court Rules (UK). There is no such corresponding provision under our rules of court. While it cannot be doubted that the court was empowered, under O 18 r 19 of the Rules of the High Court 1980 or under its inherent jurisdiction, to dismiss an action on the ground that the pleadings disclosed no reasonable cause of action, such jurisdiction ought to be sparingly exercised, and only in very exceptional cases. Whether the words complained of were capable of the defamatory meaning attributed to them could only be resolved at a trial, upon a consideration of the context and circumstances in which the statement was made as a whole (see pp 445D–F, H–446A). (4) By virtue of s 5 of the Defamation Act 1957, a person who pursues any office, profession, calling, trade or business may have an action if slandered in respect of it. It was expressly pleaded in the statement of claim that the plaintiff was a member of Parliament, a Justice of the Peace, the chief executive officer of Wijaya Baru Global Berhad and the adviser to numerous clubs and associations in Sarawak. The plaintiff alleged that the words complained of was calculated to disparage the plaintiff in his office, profession, calling, trade or business which was actionable, without proof of special damages, even though not spoken directly to his vocation. The question as to whether any designation or post held by the plaintiff as pleaded in the statement of claim falls under the category office, trade or business cannot be determined solely on the pleading. Such a determination requires evidence to be adduced by witnesses at a trial. Likewise, the question as to whether the words complained of would disparage the plaintiff in such capacity was also a triable issue to be determined upon a consideration of the context of the words and the circumstances in which the same were so uttered (see pp 446E–F, 447A–C). ||Page 436>>
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Bahasa Malaysia summary
Plaintif seorang ahli Parliamen dan ahli Parti Nasional Sarawak (SNAP). Defendan merupakan setiausaha agung parti tersebut. Pada suatu mesyuarat dengan ahli-ahli parti, defendan dikatakan telah melafazkan kata-kata yang memfitnahkan plaintif. Kata-kata ini, atau perkataan yang membawa maksud yang sama, telah diterbitkan dalam empat akhbar tempatan bahasa China. Plaintif telah memfailkan tuntutan ganti rugi bagi libel dan slander berkenaan dengan ucapan dan terbitan, sebagai tambahan kepada relief injunksi lain yang berkenaan. Defendan memohon membatalkan tuntutan plaintif. Defendan berhujah bahawa, walaupun kata-kata yang sama adakan itu tertera sepenuhnya di dalam pernyataan tuntutan dan penerbitan kata-kata tersebut dalam akhbar-akhbar telah diplidkan, kata-kata sebenarnya words dalam bahasa Mandarin seperti diterbitkan dalam akhbar-akhbar tersebut tidak diberikan. Hanya suatu terjemahan terbitan dalam bahasa Inggeris dinyatakan dalam pliding. Defendan berhujah bahawa peninggalan untuk menyatakan kata-kata yang diadukan, dalam bahasa ia diterbitkan dalam akhbar China, memudaratkan tindakan libel plaintif. Defendan juga mengatakan beliau tidak bertanggungjawab untuk libel memandangkan kata-kata yang diadukan itu telah dilafazkan dan, disebabkan tiada permintaan bagi ganti rugi khas, suatu tindakan bagi libel tidak patut wujud. Dalam apa keadaan, defendan mengatakan, kata-kata yang diadukan, sepertimana diterbitkan semula dalam pernyataan tuntutan plaintif, tidak dapat membawa maksud yang berunsur fitnah sebagaiman yang dikatakan oleh plaintif. Akhirnya defendan mendakwa plaintif gagal menuntut ganti rugi khas dalam plidingnya, maka ada kekurangan suatu elemen kausa tindakan untuk slander. Tiada sebarang dakwaan bahawa kata-kata yang diadukan tersebut membawa maksud sama ada plaintif dalam sebarang jawatan, profesion, atau perniagaannya agar s 5 Akta Fitnah 1957 terpakai. Dengan ketiadaan bukti ganti rugi khas, plaintif tidak mempunyai kausa tindakan kerana slander terhadap defendan.
Diputuskan, menolak permohonan defendan membatalkan tindakan: (1) Walaupun kata-kata yang dikatakan berunsur fitnah tidak dinyatakan dalam pernyataan tuntutan dalam bahasa asalnya yang diterbitkan, penerbitan tersebut telah dirujuk secara spesifik dalam pernyataan tuntutan tersebut. Penerbitan tersebut telah dikenalpasti secara memadai. Penterjemahan kata-kata yang dikatakan berunsur fitnah tersebut dalam bahasa mahkamah dalam pernyataan tuntutan tersebut adalah memadai sebagai kausa tindakan bagi maksud suatu permohonan pembatalan. Kegagalan memplidkan kata-kata sebenar yang dilafazkan atau diterbitkan bukannya suatu kecacatan asas yang membawa kepada pembatalan pliding. Soalan sama ada kata-kata ||Page 437>>sebenarnya yang dakwa sama ada itu, dalam bahasa China dalam kes ini, wajib dinyatakan dalam pernyataan tuntutan tersebut, bukannya satu isu untuk diputuskan dalam suatu permohonan pembatalan terus. Sama ada kata-kata adalah penterjemahan yang betul dan dapat diterima akan penerbitan
For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 109 asal itu adalah persoalan fakta yang perlu diputuskan pada perbicaraan selepas pemeriksaan saksi. Defendan berhak menghendaki plaintif memberi bukti akan fakta-fakta yang didakwanya dalam pernyataan tuntutan tersebut dengan membawa penerbitan-penerbitan asal dan dengan pemeriksaan saksi. Defendan juga dapat memberikan kepada mahkamah versi alternatifnya semasa perbicaraan. Ini bukannya suatu kes yang jelas dan nyata di mana writ plaintif dan pernyataan tuntutan dapat di batal kerana ketiadaan kausa tindakan (lihat ms 441C, G, 442A–D); Hassan & Anor v Wan Ishak & Ors [1961] MLJ 45 diikut dan Karpal Singh a/l Ram Singh v DP Vijandran [2001] 4 MLJ 161 dibeza. (2) Ia telah diplidkan dalam pernyataan tuntutan tersebut bahawa defendan telah secara palsu dan niat jahat berniat untuk menggunakan, membenarkan atau menyebabkan media masa atau akhbar untuk menerbitkan pengataan-pengataan berunsur fitnah terhadap plaintif, dan defendan memang mengetahui bahawa pemberita-pemberita dari akhbar hadir di mesyuarat tersebut dan pernyataan-pernyataan yang dipersoalkan terhadap plaintif akan diterbitkan dalam akhbar. Ia juga diplidkan bahawa defendan telah menyebabkan atau membenarkan diterbitkan dalam akhbar masing-masing kata-kata yang tertera dalam pernyataan tuntutan tersebut kata-kata yang didakwa sama ada plaintif itu. Nampaknya plaintif mempunyai suatu kausa tindakan libel terhadap defendan. Adalah dikatakan kata-kata yang dikatakan berunsur fitnah telah dilafazkan defendan dalam kehadiran pemberita akhbar. Boleh dikatakan penerbitan kata-kata yang dikatakan berunsur fitnah oleh akhbar tersebut adalah akibat biasa kata-kata yang dilafazkan defendan. Defendan sendiri patut tahu bahawa kata-kata yang dilafazkannya itu, memandangkan sifat dan kandungannya, akan dipetik untuk penerbitan semula (lihat ms 443C–E, G–H); Datuk Seri Panglima Datuk Seri Panglima Joseph Pairin Kitingan v Datuk Yong Teck Lee & Ors [1998] 2 CLJ 923 dibeza dan Slipper v British Broadcasting Corp [1991] 1 All ER 165 diikut. (3) Defendan berhujah mahkamah dapat, pada bila-bila masa selepas pernyataan tuntutan tersebut diserahkan, memutuskan sama ada kata-kata yang dikatakan berunsur fitnah tersebut dapat membawa maksud yang diberikan kepadanya. Sebagai sokongan hujah ini mahkamah telah dirujuk kepada buku Gatley on Slander and Libel (9th Ed). Walau bagaimanapun, perenggan itu semata-mata suatu pernyataan undang-undang yang diberikan dalam A 82 k 3A Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah Agung (UK). Tiada sebarang peruntukan yang sepadan dengannya dalam kaedah ||Page 438>>mahkamah kita. Walaupun tidak dapat dinafikan bahawa mahkamah ini berkuasa, di bawah A 18 k 19 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah Tinggi 1980 atau di bawah bidang kuasa semulajadinya, membatalkan suatu tindakan di atas alasan bahawa pliding tidak mendedahkan suatu kausa tindakan yang munasabah, bidangkuasa itu tidak patut digunakan secara kebiasaan, hanya dalam kes teristimewa sahaja. Sama ada kata-kata yang dikatakan berunsur fitnah itu dapat membawa maksud yang berunsur fitnah hanya dapat
For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 110 diputuskan semasa perbicaraan, dengan mengambilkira konteks dan keadaan di mana pernyataan tersebut dibuat secara keseluruhan (lihat ms 445D–F, H–446A). (4) Di bawah s 5 Akta Fitnah 1957, seseorang yang memegang sebarang jawatan, profession, atau perniagaan dapat membawa suatu tuntutan fitnah ke atas jawatan yang dipegangnya itu. Adalah dikatakan secara nyata dalam pernyataan tuntutan tersebut bahawa plaintif seorang ahli Parliamen, seorang Jaksa Pendamai, ketua pegawai eksekutif syarikat Wijaya Baru Global Berhad dan penasihat kepada beberapa kelab dan persatuan di Sarawak. Plaintif mengatakan bahawa kata-kata yang dikatakan berunsur fitnah itu dimaksudkan untuk memperkecilkan plaintif dalam jawatan, profesion, atau perniagaan suatu tuntutan yang dapat dibawa, tanpa bukti ganti rugi khas, walaupun tidak memperkecilkan pekerjaannya secara terus. Persoalan sama ada sebarang jawatan yang dipegang plaintif yang disebut dalam pernyataan tuntutan tersebut termasuk dalam kategori jawatan, profession, atau perniagaan tidak dapat diputuskan di atas pliding semata-mata. Keputusan ini memerlukan keterangan diberikan oleh saksi pada suatu perbicaraan. Seperti itu juga, persoalan sama ada kata-kata yangdiadukan akan memperkecilkan plaintif dalam kedudukannya itu adalah suatu isu yang perlu dibicarakan dan diputuskan dengan mengambikira konteks kata-kata itu dan keadaan kata-kata itu dilafazkan secara keseluruhan (lihat ms 446E–F, 447A–C).]
Notes For cases on libel, see 12 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2002 Reissue) paras 314–434. For cases on slander, see 12 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2002 Reissue) paras 485–494.
Cases referred to Datuk Seri Panglima Datuk Seri Panglima Joseph Pairin Kitingan v Datuk Yong Teck Lee & Ors [1998] 2 CLJ 923 (distd) Hassan & Anor v Wan Ishak & Ors [1961] MLJ 45 (folld) Karpal Singh a/l Ram Singh v DP Vijandran [2001] 4 MLJ 161 (distd) ||Page 439>> Lim Kit Siang v Datuk Dr Ling Liong Sik [1997] 5 MLJ 523 (refd) Mooney & Ors v Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co & Anor [1967] 1 MLJ 8 (refd) New Straits Times (Malaysia) Bhd v Kumpulan Kertas Niaga Sdn Bhd & Anor [1985] 1 MLJ 226 (refd) Slipper v British Broadcasting Corp [1991] 1 All ER 165 (folld) Workers’ Party v Tay Boon Too; Workers’ Party v Attorney-General [1975] 1 MLJ 47 (refd)
Legislation referred to
For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 111 Defamation Act 1957 s 5 Defamation Act 1952 [UK] s 2 Rules of the High Court 1980 O 18 r 19, O 78
Henry Ling Kuong Meng (Ling & Wong) for the plaintiff. Chong Siew Chiang (Chong & Brothers) for the defendant.
[2002] 1 MLJ 160 Abdul Khalid @ Khalid Jafri bin Bakar Shah v Party Islam Se Malaysia & Ors
HIGH COURT (KUALA LUMPUR) — SUIT NO S2(S3)–23–57 OF 1999 KAMALANATHAN RATNAM J 13 AUGUST 2001
Tort — Defamation — Publication in newsletter of political party — Article undermined plaintiff’s journalistic credibility — Whether words referred to plaintiff, applicable test — Fair and natural meaning of words — Intention of defendant, whether relevant
The plaintiff was a journalist and a freelancer writer. Initially, he was employed by the Utusan Melayu newspapers. As a founder member of the National Union of Journalists, he was made its first secretary and sat in its national committee. He then left Utusan Melayu and launched his own daily newspapers. This was followed by a twice weekly tabloid and subsequently he ventured into magazines. In most cases he was the editor. The first defendant was a political party called Parti Islam Se Malaysia (‘PAS’). The first defendant’s appeals and struggles were channeled through a newsletter called Harakah. The second defendant was its editor and the third defendant was its printer. The plaintiff contended that in its issue of the Harakah of 29 March 1999, the defendants maliciously and with intent to vilify him, wrote, printed and published, or caused to be written, printed and published, in the issue of Harakah, of the plaintiff and of him in the way of his said occupation and employment and in relation to his character, conduct, journalistic ability, credibility, reputation therein and with the object of destroying the plaintiff’s character, reputation and journalist career.
Held: (1) It was not necessary that the words should refer to the plaintiff by name, provided that the words would be understood by reasonable people to refer to
For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 112 the plaintiff. The court would have to consider whether the libel designated the plaintiff in such a way so as to let those who knew him understand that he was the person alluded to. It was not necessary that all the world should understand the libel; it was sufficient if those who know the plaintiff could make out that he was the person referred to. Reading the context of the impugned publication in its entirety, the court concluded that the name ‘Caled Jeffry’ was indeed meant to refer to the plaintiff (see p 167B–D). (2) It was immaterial that the defendant did not intend to refer to the plaintiff, or did not even know of his existence. The question was, would the words complained of be understood by reasonable people who knew the plaintiff to refer to him? If so, they were published of and concerning the plaintiff, no matter what the intention of the defendant may have been (see p 167G–H); ||Page 161>>Jones v E Hulton & Co [1909] 2 KB 444 (CA); [1910] AC 20 (HL) followed. The words and phrases in the article served as pointers to the identity of the person defamed, namely the plaintiff. The libel had indeed designated the plaintiff in such a way that those who know him would have understood that he was the person referred to (see pp 168A, F). (3) In determining whether the words were capable of defamatory meaning, the court would construe the words according to the fair and natural meaning which would be given to them by reasonable persons of ordinary intelligence. The test to be applied was to see the meaning and inference that would be drawn naturally upon reading the impugned article by a person of reasonable intelligence. So in actions based on libel, the meaning of the writer was quite immaterial. It was not a question as to what the writer meant but what he conveyed to those who read it (see pp 168G, 169B). (4) When the words complained of were defamatory in their natural and ordinary meaning, the plaintiff needed prove nothing more than their publication. The onus was on the defendant to prove from the context in which the words were used, or from the manner of their publication or other facts known to those whom the words were published, that the words could not be understood by a reasonable man to convey the imputation suggested by the mere consideration of the words themselves. The plea of the defendants therefore that the words complained of were to be understood as a joke or as in no sense defamatory of the plaintiff could not be sustained (see p 169D–F). (5) The defendants falsely and maliciously and with intent to vilify, wrote, printed and published the words complained of. It was an act of sensationalism solely motivated by a desire to boost the sale of the newsletter and to live off the ruin of the plaintiff’s calling, pursuit and trade and the loss of his reputation. The defendants were not only callous of conduct but also indifferent to promulgating injurious falsehood and oblivious to the fact that the words were untrue and that the said words were calculated to disparage the plaintiff in his profession. The fact that the language of the defendants was unnecessarily strong and entirely disproportionate to the exigency of the occasion was
For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 113 evidence of malice. The defendants published the words without considering or caring whether they were true or not; they were indifferent to the truth. In that sense, they acted recklessly (see p 174C–E).
Bahasa Malaysia summary
Plaintif adalah seorang wartawan dan penulis bebas. Sebelum ini, beliau diambil bekerja oleh akhbar Utusan Melayu. Sebagai pengasas Persatuan Wartawan Nasional, beliau dilantik sebagai setiausaha pertamanya dan mempengerusikan jawatan kuasa nasionalnya. Beliau ||Page 162>>kemudian meninggalkan Utusan Melayu dan memulakan akhbar harian beliau sendiri. Ini diikuti dengan tabloid dua kali seminggu dan kemudiannya beliau menerokai bidang majalah. Dalam kebanyakan kes beliau adalah seorang editor. Defendan pertama adalah parti politik yang dikenali sebagai Parti Islam Se Malaysia (‘PAS’). Rayuan-rayuan dan perjuangan-perjuangan defendan pertama disalurkan melalui satu surat berita bernama Harakah. Defendan kedua adalah editornya dan defendan ketiga adalah pencetaknya. Plaintif menghujahkan bahawa dalam keluaran Harakah bertarikh 29 Mac 1999, defendan-defendan telah dengan niat jahat dan dengan niat untuk mencerca beliau, menulis, mencetak dan menerbitkan, atau menyebabkan ditulis, dicetak dan diterbitkan, dalam keluaran Harakah, tentang plaintif dan tentang beliau dalam pekerjaan beliau tersebut dan berkaitan dengan perbadi, perbuatan, keupayaan, kebolehpercayaan, reputasi kewartawanan beliau dan dengan tujuan untuk memusnahkan peribadi, reputasi dan karier kewartawanan plaintif.
Diputuskan: (1) Adalah tidak perlu bagi perkataan-perkataan tersebut merujuk kepada plaintif melalui nama, dengan syarat perkataan-perkataan tersebut boleh difahami oleh orang yang munasabah bahawa ia merujuk kepada plaintif. Mahkamah perlu mempertimbangkan sama ada libel tersebut menggelar plaintif sehingga sesiapa yang mengenali beliau memahami bahawa beliaulah orang yang secara tak langsung dimaksudkan tersebut. Adalah tidak perlu langsung untuk dunia memahami libel tersebut; adalah mencukupi jika sesiapa yang mengenali plaintif boleh mengagak bahawa beliau adalah orang yang dirujuk. Dengan membaca konteks penerbitan yang dipersoalkan secara keseluruhannya, mahkamah memutuskan bahawa nama ‘Caled Jeffry’ sememangnya bermaksud untuk merujuk kepada plaintif (lihat ms 167B–D). (2) Adalah tidak penting defendan tidak berniat untuk merujuk kepada plaintif, ataupun tidak langsung mengetahui tentang kewujudan beliau. Persoalannya ialah, adakah perkataan-perkataan yang diadukan akan difahami oleh orang yang munasabah yang mengenali plaintif bahawa ia merujuk kepada beliau? Jika begitu, perkataan-perkataan tersebut diterbitkan tentang dan berhubung plaintif, tidak kira apakah maksud defendan (lihat ms 167G–H); Jones v E
For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 114 Hulton & Co [1909] 2 KB 444 (CA); [1910] AC 20 (HL) diikut. Perkataan-perkataan dan frasa-frasa dalam artikel tersebut bertindak sebagai petunjuk kepada orang yang difitnahkan, iaitu plaintif. Libel tersebut sememangnya telah menggelar plaintif secara begitu sehingga sesiapa yang mengenali beliau akan memahami bahawa beliaulah orang yang dirujukkan (lihat ms 168A, F). (3) Dalam menentukan sama ada perkataan-perkataan tersebut mampu membawa maksud yang berunsur fitnah, mahkamah ||Page 163>>akan mentafsirkan perkataan-perkataan tersebut menurut maksudnya yang adil dan biasa yang akan diberikan oleh orang yang munasabah dengan kepintaran yang biasa. Ujian untuk diterapkan adalah untuk melihat maksud dan inferens yang akan diperolehi dengan mudah setelah membaca artikel yang dipersoalkan oleh seorang yang munasabah dengan kepintaran yang biasa. Oleh itu tindakan-tindakan berdasarkan libel, maksud penulis tidak begitu penting. Ia bukan satu persoalan mengenai apa yang penulis maksudkan tetapi apa beliau telah sampaikan kepada sesiapa yang membacanya (lihat ms 168G, 169B). (4) Apabila perkataan-perkataan yang diadukan berunsur fitnah dalam maksud yang asal dan biasa, plaintif tidak perlu membuktikan apa-apa kecuali penerbitan mereka. Beban terletak ke atas defendan untuk membuktikan daripada penerbitan mereka atau fakta-fakta lain yang diketahui oleh sesiapa perkataan-perkataan tersebut telah diterbitkan, bahawa perkataan-perkataan tersebut tidak boleh difahami oleh seorang yang munasabah untuk menyampaikan tohmahan yang dicadangkan dengan hanya pertimbangan perkataan-perkataan tersebut. Pli defendan-defendan oleh itu bahawa perkataan-perkataan yang diadukan difahami sebagai gurauan atau tidak berunsur fitnah tentang plaintif tidak boleh dikekalkan (lihat ms 169D–F). (5) Defendan dengan palsu dan niat jahat dan dengan niat untuk mencerca, telah menulis, mencetak dan menerbitkan perkataan-perkataan yang diadukan. Ia adalah satu tindakan penggunaan sensasi yang semata-mata bermotivasikan hasrat untuk menggalakkan jualan surat berita tersebut dan bergantung atas kemusnahan pekerjaan, usaha dan perniagaan dan kehilangan reputasi plaintif. Defendan-defendan bukan sahaja tidak mempunyai perasaan tetapi juga bersikap tidak ambil peduli dengan menyebarluaskan penipuan yang memudaratkan dan tidak sedar tentang fakta bahawa perkataan-perkataan tersebut adalah tidak benar dan bahawa perkataan-perkataan tersebut dikira memperkecilkan plaintif dalam profesyen beliau. Hakikat bahawa bahasa defendan-defendan tidak perlu kasar dan memang tidak sesuai dengan keterdesakan keadaan adalah keterangan tentang niat jahat. Defendan-defendan telah menerbitkan perkataan-perkataan tersebut tanpa mengambilkira atau mengendahkan sama ada perkataan-perkataan tersebut adalah benar atau tidak; mereka bersikap tidak ambil peduli tentang kebenaran. Dalam erti kata yang sebenarnya, mereka telah bertindak secara melulu (lihat ms 174C–E).]
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Notes For a case on publication in a newsletter of political party, see 12 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2000 Reissue) para 375. ||Page 164>>
Cases referred to Adam v Ward [1917] AC 309 (refd) Bryce v Rusden (1886) 2 TLR 435 (refd) Capital & Counties Bank Ltd, The v George Henty & Sons (1882) 2 TLR 741 (refd) Citizens’ Life Assurance Co Ltd v Brown [1904] AC 423 (refd) Cook v Ward (1830) 130 ER 1338 (refd) Cuddington v Wilkins (1615) Hob 81 (refd) David Syme & Co v Canavan (1918) 25 CLR 234 (refd) Donoghue v Hayes (1831) Hayes (Ir Ex) R 265 (refd) Egger v Viscount Chelmsford & Ors [1965] 1 QB 248 (refd) Haire v Wilson (1829) 9 B & C 643 (refd) Hellwig v Mitchell [1910] 1 KB 609 (refd) J’Anson v Stuart (1787) ITR 748 (refd) Jones v E Hulton & Co [1909] 2 KB 444; [1910] AC 20 (folld) Lambert v Thomson (1937) 2 DLR 662 (refd) Lee Kuan Yew v Derek Gwyn Davis [1990] 1 MLJ 390 (refd) Limpus v London General Omnibus Co (1862) 7 LT 641 (refd) Marks v Samuel [1904] 2 KB 287 (refd) PP v Dato’ Seri Anwar Ibrahim (No 3) [1999] 2 MLJ 1 (refd) Roach v Garvan (1742) 26 ER 683 (refd) Scott v Sampson (1882) 8 QBD 491 (refd) Shapiro v La Morta [1923] All ER 378 (refd) St James’ Evening Post: Case No 291; Roach v Garvan AKT 469 (refd) Thomas v Bradbury, Agnew & Co Ltd & Anor [1906] 2 KB 627 (refd) Watkin v Hall (1868) 3 QB 396 (refd) Webb v Beavan (1883) 11 QBD 609 (refd)
Legislation referred to Emergency (Essential Powers) Ordinance No 22 of 1970 s 2(1) Rules of the High Court 1980 O 2 r 2(1)
For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 116 Societies Act 1966 s 9(c)
Shamsul Bahrain bin Ibrahim (Skrine) for the plaintiff. Mohamed Hanipa bin Maidin (Mohamed Hanipa & Associates) for the first, second and fifth defendants. KA Gan (Adlin Majid with him) (Lee Hishamuddin) for the third defendant.
[2002] 3 MLJ 341 Ngoi Thiam Woh v Maxwell, Kenion, Cowdy & Jones (sued as a firm) & Anor
HIGH COURT (PULAU PINANG) — CIVIL SUIT NO 22–894 OF 1999 KAMALANATHAN RATNAM J 5 JULY 2002
Tort — Defamation — Publication of proclamation of sale — Absence of conspiracy or fraud and negligence — Whether the first defendant defamed the plaintiff by causing the advertisement of the proclamation of sale — Whether the plaintiff could sustain an action in defamation against the defendants — Rules of the High Court 1980 O 31, O 33 r 2 and O 8
The plaintiff borrowed a sum of money from the second defendant to pay the balance purchase price of one unit of a condotel and this sum was to be repaid by 156 monthly instalments. The plaintiff executed a deed of assignment as a security for the loan in favour of the second defendant. The plaintiff defaulted in his instalment payments and the first defendant, on instructions from the second defendant, issued a notice of demand dated 21 October 1997. Subsequently, the first defendant issued a notice of default dated 22 November 1997 demanding that the plaintiff make good the alleged default upon the expiry of seven days, failing which the second defendant would exercise its rights to sell the plaintiff’s condotel. The defendants then on 9 January 1998 advertised in The Star newspaper a proclamation of sale of the said condotel. The plaintiff filed a suit in the High Court in Ipoh, Civil Suit No 22–24–98 against the second defendant and others to restrain the second defendant from selling the said unit until disposal of the case. Meanwhile, the first defendant filed an originating summons under O 31 of the Rules of the High Court 1980 (‘the RHC’) which they withdrew and filed a fresh originating summons under O 83 of the RHC. The second defendant filed another suit in the Ipoh High Court vide Civil Suit No 22–68–99 against the plaintiff to recover the loan sum together with interest. During case management, it was agreed that the court decide the case pursuant to O 33 r 2 of the RHC on two issues namely:
For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 117 (i) whether the first defendant, acting as solicitors for and on the instructions of the second defendant, defamed the plaintiff by causing the advertisement of the proclamation of sale dated 9 January 1998 and (ii) whether the plaintiff could sustain an action in defamation against the defendants upon the High Court in Ipoh having held in a civil suit filed by the second defendant against the plaintiff, that there was no conspiracy or fraud and negligence on the part of the second defendant.
Held, dismissing the suit with costs: (1) In this case, there was an absolute assignment and the second defendant had an absolute right to proceed to advertise the proclamation of sale and to auction off the condotel without ||Page 342>>applying for an order of the court. Since the second defendant had the absolute right to proceed with the proclamation of sale, the first defendant, who acted as solicitors and thus as agents of the second defendant, was clearly acting within the law when it caused the advertisement to appear in The Star, Phileoallied Bank (M) Bhd v Bupinder Singh a/l Avatar Singh & Anor [2002] 2 MLJ 513 followed (see p 347G–H). (2) In Civil Suit No 22–68–99 filed by the present second defendant against the present plaintiff claiming the loan sum, whilst the trial judge dismissed the second defendant’s claim, he however dismissed the present plaintiff’s contention of misrepresentation, conspiracy, fraud and negligence against the second defendants and related companies. Since the plaintiff was not appealing the decision the finding of the trial judge must be accepted as correct (see pp 347H–348A).
Bahasa Malaysia summary
Plaintif telah meminjam daripada defendan kedua satu jumlah wang untuk membayar baki harga belian sebuah unit condotel dan jumlah ini hendaklah dibayar balik melalui 156 ansuran bulanan. Plaintif telah menyempurnakan satu suratikatan penyerahhakan sebagai jaminan untuk pinjaman tersebut yang memihak kepada defendan kedua. Plaintif telah mengingkari bayaran-bayaran ansuran beliau dan defendan pertama, atas arahan-arahan daripada defendan kedua, telah mengeluarkan satu notis tuntutan bertarikh 21 Oktober 1997. Kemudiannya, defendan pertama telah mengeluarkan satu notis keingkaran bertarikh 22 November 1997 menuntut supaya plaintif memulihkan keingkaran yang didakwa itu selepas tamat tempoh tujuh hari, kegagalan yang mana menyebabkan defendan-defendan kedua melaksanakan hak mereka untuk menjual condotel plaintif. Defendan-defendan kemudiannya pada 9 Januari 1998 mengiklankan di dalam akhbar The Star satu pengisytiharan jualan akan condotel tersebut. Plaintif telah memfailkan satu guaman di dalam Mahkamah Tinggi di Ipoh, Guaman Sivil No 22–24–98 terhadap defendan kedua dan pihak-pihak lain untuk menghalang defendan kedua daripada menjual unit tersebut sehingga penyelesaian kes tersebut. Sementara
For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 118 itu, defendan pertama memfailkan satu saman pemula di bawah A 31 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah Tinggi 1980 (‘KMT tersebut’) yang mana telah mereka tarikh balik dan memfailkan satu saman pemula yang baru di bawah O 83 KMT. Defendan kedua telah memfailkan satu guaman yang lain dalam Mahkamah Tinggi Ipoh melalui Guaman Sivil No 22–68–99 terhadap plaintif untuk mendapatkan balik jumlah pinjaman tersebut bersama-sama faedah. Ketika pengurusan kes, telah dipersetujui bahawa Mahkamah memutuskan kes tersebut selaras dengan A 33 k 2 KMT atas dua isu iaitu: (i) sama ada defendan pertama, yang bertindak sebagai peguamcara untuk dan atas arahan-arahan defendan kedua, memfitnah plaintif dengan ||Page 343>>menyebabkan iklan pengisytiharan jualan bertarikh 9 Januari 1998 dan (ii) sama ada plaintif boleh mempertahankan suatu tindakan memfitnah terhadap defendan-defendan setelah Mahkamah Tinggi di Ipoh memutuskan dalam guaman sivil yang difailkan oleh defendan kedua terhadap plaintif, bahawa tidak terdapat konspirasi atau fraud dan kecuaian oleh defendan kedua.
Diputuskan, menolak guaman tersebut dengan kos: (1) Dalam kes ini terdapat penyerahhakan mutlak dan defendan kedua mempunyai hak mutlak untuk meneruskan bagi mengiklankan pengisytiharan jualan dan untuk melelongkan condotel tersebut tanpa memohon untuk mendapatkan perintah mahkamah. Oleh kerana defendan kedua mempunyai hak mutlak untuk meneruskan pengisytiharan jualan tersebut, defendan pertama, yang bertindak sebagai peguamcara dan oleh itu sebagai ejen defendan keluar, telah dengan jelasnya bertindak di dalam lingkungan undang-undang apabila ianya menyebabkan iklan tersebut dikeluarkan dalam akhbar The Star, Phileoallied Bank (M) Bhd v Bupinder Singh a/l Avatar Singh & Anor [2002] 2 MLJ 513 diikut (lihat ms 347G–H). (2) Dalam Guaman Sivil No 22–68–99 yang telah difailkan oleh defendan kedua semasa terhadap plaintif semasa menuntut jumlah pinjaman tersebut, sementara hakim perbicaraan menolak tuntutan defendan kedua, beliau walaubagaimana pun menolak penegasan plaintif semasa mengenai salah-nyataan, konspirasi, fraud dan kecuaian terhadap defendan-defendan kedua dan syarikat-syarikat yang berkaitan. Oleh kerana plaintif tidak merayui keputusan tersebut, maka keputusan hakim perbicaraan mestilah diterima sebagai betul (lihat ms 347H–348A).]
Notes For cases on defamation generally, see 12 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2000 Reissue) paras 193–409.
Cases referred to Asia Commercial Finance (M) Bhd v Kawal Teliti Sdn Bhd [1995] 3 MLJ 189 (refd) MBF Finance Bhd v Ngoi Thiam Woh [2001] 7 CLJ 221 (refd)
For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 119 Phileoallied Bank (M) Bhd v Bupinder Singh a/l Avatar Singh & Anor [2002] 2 MLJ 513 (folld)
Legislation referred to National Land Code 1965 s 221 Rules of the High Court 1980 O 31, O 33 r 2, O 83 ||Page 344>>
Ngan SH (Ahmad Yani with him) (Abbas & Ngan) for the plaintiff. Silvanathan (Rathi Nair with him) (Kean Chye & Sivalingam) for the first defendant. Loh Yen Zin (Jeyaratnam & Chong) for the second defendant.
[2002] 4 MLJ 371 Mark Ignatius Uttley @ Mark Ostyn v Wong Kam Hor & Anor
HIGH COURT (PULAU PINANG) — CIVIL SUIT NO 22–369 OF 1999 KAMALANATHAN RATNAM J 11 SEPTEMBER 2002
Tort — Defamation — Libel — Libel in newspaper — Whether the words in the impugned article were defamatory of the plaintiff — Test to be applied
The plaintiff was at the material time of the publication of the impugned article, the resident conductor of the Pulau Pinang State Symphony Orchestra and Chorus (‘PESSOC’). The first defendant was at the material time, the editor of the Nanyang Siang Pau, a Chinese daily newspaper, and the second defendant, the publisher and printer of the said Nanyang Siang Pau. On 10 June 1998, Chong Eng, the then sole DAP State Assemblywoman for Batu Lancang, Pulau Pinang, had in her adjournment speech in the Pulau Pinang State Assembly raised, for the consideration of Kee Phaik Cheen (‘Kee’), the Chairman of the PESSOC Committee and also the State Assemblywoman for Batu Uban and an Exco Member responsible for PESSOC, various matters concerning the academic qualifications and conduct of the plaintiff. The plaintiff had in the statement of claim reproduced parts of the text of the impugned article as the basis for his claim that his credit and reputation had been brought into public scandal, odium and contempt. The plaintiff claimed that the words in the impugned article were defamatory of the plaintiff in that the words in their natural and ordinary meaning meant and were understood to mean that the plaintiff had no qualifications and no experience to be the conductor of PESSOC, that he had obtained
For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 120 the appointment by false pretences and/or cheating, that he was a dishonest person who assaulted his students and ought to be investigated by the authorities, that he was giving lessons in musical instruments in which he was not qualified, that he had no permit to do so, and that he was a tax evader.
Held: (1) Where an issue is raised in the newspapers or in Parliament or at a state assembly, the court must assure that the matter is one of significance and is therefore more likely then not to convey a defamatory meaning to the ordinary reader. As to whether the said meaning is defamatory the test is to see if such words tend to make reasonable people think the worse of the plaintiff; or whether such words would cause him to be shunned or avoided. There is no requirement of the plaintiff to show that any of the readers actually thought the worse of him. Clearly therefore, an allegation that the plaintiff has been guilty of tax evasion would be defamatory. The allegation levied against the plaintiff that he lacked the qualification for the post of resident conductor, that he had obtained the appointment by false pretences and/or cheating, ||Page 372>>that he was a dishonest person who assaulted his students and ought to be investigated by the authorities, that he was giving music lessons illegally and was a tax evader, were all defamatory of the plaintiff (see p 382C–F). (2) When words tend to affect a person in his office, profession or trade, such words must impute to the plaintiff some attribute, the absence of which would be necessary to ensure his success or the presence of some attribute which would be detrimental towards his success. Here, the implications are severe enough to affect the plaintiff in his profession. He had been maligned as having lack of integrity (see p 382F–G). (3) In this case, the impugned article was entirely based on the press statement of Chong Eng and had quoted extensively from it. Where the defendants are repeating what somebody else had told them, they are generally to be treated as having said it themselves. So the defendants here are to be treated as though they had themselves made the defamatory allegation against the plaintiff (see p 385A). (4) In these days of investigative journalism, the defendants could not claim that they honestly believed in the truth of the impugned words when any information required could easily have been checked out. Since the press statement was given because of accusations by one politician against another, the defendants ought to have been all the more alert to verify the truth of the press statement and to ascertain from the plaintiff whether the information was reliable. The defendants omitted to take such steps because they did not care whether the matters relating to the plaintiff as contained in Chong Eng’s press statement were true or not. In short, the defendants were indifferent to the truth or otherwise of the statement (see p 388F–G).
For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 121
Bahasa Malaysia summary
Plaintif telah pada masa material penerbitan rencana yang meragukan itu, merupakan konduktor tetap Pulau Pinang State Symphony Orchestra and Chorus (‘PESSOC’). Defendan pertama telah pada masa material itu merupakan pengarang Nanyang Siang Pau, sebuah Akhbar Harian Cina, dan defendan kedua, adalah penerbit dan pencetak Nanyang Siang Pau tersebut. Pada 10 Jun 1998, Chong Eng, wanita Dewan Undangan Negeri DAP tunggal bagi Batu Lancang, Pulau Pinang, telah di dalam ucapan penangguhan beliau di dalam Dewan Undangan Pulau Pinang membangkitkan, untuk pertimbangan berhubung Kee Phaik Cheen (‘Kee’), Pengerusi Jawatankuasa PESSOC dan juga wanita Dewan Undangan Negeri bagi Batu Uban dan seorang Ahli Exco yang bertanggungjawab bagi PESSOC, pelbagai perkara-perkara berkenaan kelayakan-kelayakan akademik dan perlakuan plaintif. Plaintif telah di dalam pernyataan ||Page 373>>tuntutan tersebut mengemukakan semula bahagian-bahagian teks rencana yang meragukan tersebut sebagai dasar bagi tuntutan beliau bahawa kebolehpercayaan dan reputasi beliau telah menjadi skandal awam, kebencian ramai dan penghinaan. Plaintif mendakwa bahawa perkataan-perkataan di dalam rencana yang meragukan adalah memfitnah plaintif iaitu perkataan-perkataan mengikut maknanya yang biasa dan asli bermakna dan difahamkan supaya bermakna bahawa plaintif tidak mempunyai kelayakan dan tiada pengalaman untuk menjadi konduktor PESSOC, bahawa beliau telah mendapatkan perlantikan itu melalui penipuan dan/atau kepalsuan, bahawa beliau merupakan seorang yang tidak jujur yang menyerang pelajar-pelajarnya dan haruslah disiasat oleh pihak berkuasa, bahawa beliau memberi kelas dalam alat-alat muzik yang beliau tidak berkelayakan, bahawa beliau tidak mempunyai permit untuk melakukan sedemikian, bahawa beliau adalah seorang yang mengelak daripada membayar cukai.
Diputuskan: (1) Di mana satu persoalan dibangkitkan dalam akhbar-akhbar atau dalam Parlimen atau dalam satu dewan undangan negeri, mahkamah harus memastikan bahawa perkara tersebut adalah suatu yang penting dan oleh itu adalah lebih berkemungkinan dari tidak membawa satu maksud yang memfitnah kepada pembaca biasa. Berhubung dengan sama ada maksud tersebut adalah bersifat memfitnah ujiannya adalah untuk melihat jika perkataan-perkataan yang sedemikian berkemungkinan membuat orang yang berfikiran wajar untuk memikirkan perkara yang buruk berhubung dengan plaintif; atau sama ada perkataan-perkataan yang sedemikian akan menyebabkan beliau dijauhi atau cuba dielakkan oleh orang awam. Tiada keperluan untuk plaintif menunjukkan bahawa mana-mana pembaca sesungguhnya memikirkan perkara yang paling buruk mengenai beliau. Adalah jelas dengan itu, satu dakwaan bahawa plaintif telah bersalah kerana mengelak cukai akan bersifat memfitnah. Dakwaan yang
For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 122 dilevikan terhadap plaintif bahawa beliau tidak mempunyai kelayakan untuk jawatan residen konduktor, bahawa beliau telah mendapatkan perlantikan tersebut melalui penipuan dan/atau pemalsuan, bahawa beliau adalah seorang tidak jujur yang menyerbu pelajar-pelajar beliau dan haruslah disiasat oleh pihak berkuasa, bahawa beliau mengajar muzik secara tidak sah di sisi undang-undang dan merupakan seorang yang mengelak daripada membayar cukai, adalah kesemuanya memfitnah plaintif. (lihat ms 382C–F) (2) Apabila perkataan-perkataan bermaksud untuk menjejaskan seseorang dalam jawatan, profesyen atau perdagangannya, perkataan-perkataan sedemikian semestinya melambangkan plaintif, ketiadaannya adalah perlu untuk menentukan kejayaaan beliau atau adanya anggapan yang akan menjejaskan kejayaannya. ||Page 374>>Di sini, akibatnya adalah memudaratkan sehingga menjejaskan plaintif dalam profesyen beliau. Beliau telah difitnah sebagai tidak jujur (lihat ms 382F–G). (3) Dalam kes ini, rencana yang meragukan itu adalah sesungguhnya berdasarkan kenyataan akhbar Chong Eng dan telah dipetik darinya secara ekstensif. Di mana defendan-defendan mengulangi apa yang setiap orang telah beritahu mereka, mereka adalah secara umumnya dianggapkan sebagai telah menyatakannya sendiri. Oleh itu defendan-defendan di sini hendaklah dianggap seolah-olah mereka telah dengan sendirinya mempunyai dakwaan memfitnah terhadap plaintif (lihat ms 385A). (4) Pada hari kewartawanan yang bersifat menyiasat ini, defendan-defendan tidak boleh mendakwa bahawa mereka sesungguhnya mempercayai akan kebenaran perkataan-perkataan yang meragukan itu sedangkan sebarang maklumat yang diperlukan boleh disemak dengan mudahnya. Oleh kerana kenyataan akhbar tersebut telah diberikan kerana tuduhan-tuduhan oleh seorang ahli politik terhadap seorang yang lain, defendan-defendan haruslah lebih berwaspada untuk menentusahkan kebenaran kenyataan akhbar tersebut dan untuk memastikan daripada plaintif sama ada maklumat tersebut boleh dipercayai. Defendan-defendan tertinggal untuk mengambil langkah-langkah yang sedemikian kerana mereka tidak mempedulikan sama ada perkara-perkata berkaitan dengan plaintif sepertimana yang terkandung di dalam kenyataan akhbar Chong Eng adalah benar ataupun tidak. Secara ringkasnya, defendan-defendan bersikap tidak peduli kepada kebenaran kenyataan tersebut atau sebaliknya (lihat ms 388F–G).] [Editorial Note: The defendants have appealed to the Court of Appeal vide Rayuan Sivil No P–02–773–2002.]
Notes For cases on libel, see 12 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2000 Reissue) paras 263–352.
For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 123 Cases referred to Abdul Khalid @ Khalid Jafri bin Bakar Shah v Party Islam Se Malaysia & Ors [2002] 1 MLJ 160 (refd) DP Vijandran v Karpal Singh & Ors [2000] 3 MLJ 22 (refd) English & Scottish Co-operative Properties Mortgage and Investment Society Ltd v Odhams Press Ltd [1940] 1 KB 440 (refd) Karpal Singh a/l Ram Singh v DP Vijandran [2001] 4 MLJ 161 (refd) Lee Kuan Yew v Derek Gwyn Davies & Ors [1990] 1 MLJ 390 (refd) Reynolds v Times Newspaper Ltd & Ors [1999] 4 All ER 609 (refd) Tjanting Handicraft Sdn Bhd v Utusan Melayu (M) Sdn Bhd [2001] 2 MLJ 574 (refd) ||Page 375>>
Legislation referred to Defamation Act 1957 s 9 Penal Code s 420 Rules of the High Court 1980 O 78 r 3(2)
P Navaratnam (R Subramaniam with him) (Nava, Subra & Co) for the plaintiff. JA Yeoh (Harminder Kaur Gill with him) (Shearn Delamore & Co) for the defendants. Jagdeep Singh (Karpal Singh & Co) watching brief for YB Chong Eng.
[2001] 2 MLJ 1 Zolkefly bin Haron v Yahya bin Chik & Anor
HIGH COURT (MUAR) — CIVIL SUIT NO 22–18 OF 1999 JEFFREY TAN J 6 FEBRUARY 2001
Tort — Defamation — Imputation of status of plaintiff’s banking account — Whether there was publication to third parties — Whether wordings defamatory — Whether there was libel — Justification
The plaintiff, an erstwhile customer of the second defendant, brought an action against the defendants for alleged defamatory imputations over oral and written statements made by the defendants about the status of his banking account. The plaintiff’s case was that the defendants published and communicated to third parties the following
For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 124 words: ‘that the plaintiff had a personal debt with the second defendants and that therefore the EAP could not open its current account with the second defendant’, and that the defendants released without the consent of the plaintiff the ‘customer account profile’ of the plaintiff. It was submitted that the facts asserted in the words spoken to the third parties and in the customer account profile of the plaintiff were false. Amongst the documents tendered were two copies of the customer account profile of the plaintiff (PB231 and 232), the second defendant’s ledger relating to the erstwhile account of the plaintiff (PB234), two letters of the plaintiff to the second defendant (DB18 and 19) and a letter of the second defendant to the plaintiff (DB20). Both parties agreed that a decision on the question ‘whether the statements in PB231 and 232 are true or false, in the light of the statements in PB234 and DB18-20’ could dispose of the cause or matter or could render the trial of the cause or matter unnecessary.
Held, dismissing the plaintiff’s claim: When read as a whole, PB231 and 232 stated that a bad debt of RM7,469.83 was written off but also that nothing was owing on the account. That was all that was imputed by total statements in PB231 and 232. Objectively there were no words in their ordinary and natural meaning capable of any defamatory imputation, unless the words ‘bad debt’ were read in isolation. PB231 and 232 only reflected what had happened. The remaining debt was written off, but not the records. And the second defendant was entitled to its records. The defendants had clearly established that the imputation in respect of which they were sued was true. The defendants had proved the truth of every defamatory facts alleged. The customer account profile tallied with the truth (PB234). Until ‘written off’, there was a bad debt (see p 8C–D, F, H). ||Page 2>>
Bahasa Malaysia summary
Plaintif, seorang pelanggan defendan kedua, telah memulakan satu tindakan terhadap defendan-defendan untuk penuduhan yang dikatakan memfitnah ke atas pernyataan lisan dan bertulis yang dibuat oleh defendan-defendan mengenai keadaan akaun pembankannya. Kes plaintif adalah bahawa defendan-defendan menerbit dan menyampaikan kepada pihak ketiga perkataan-perkataan berikut: ‘that the plaintiff had a personal debt with the second defendants and that therefore EAP could not open its current account with the second defendant’, dan bahawa defendan-defendan mengeluarkan ‘Customer Account Profile’ plaintif tanpa izin plaintif. Adalah dihujahkan bahawa fakta-fakta yang ditegaskan dalam kata-kata yang diucapkan kepada pihak ketiga dan dalam profil akaun pelanggan adalah palsu. Di antara dokumen yang dikemukakan adalah dua salinan profil akaun pelanggan plaintif (PB231 dan 232), lejar defendan kedua berhubung dengan akaun plaintif (PB234), dua surat plaintif kepada defendan kedua (DB18 dan 19) dan sepucuk surat defendan kedua
For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 125 kepada plaintif (DB20). Kedua-dua pihak bersetuju bahawa keputusan atas soalan ‘whether the statements in PB231 and 232 are true or false, in the light of the statements in PB234 and DB18-20’ boleh menyelesaikan kausa atau perkara atau boleh menyebabkan perbicaraan kausa atau perkara tersebut menjadi tidak perlu.
Diputuskan, menolak tuntutan plaintif: Apabila dibaca secara keseluruhan, PB231 dan 232 menyatakan bahawa satu ‘bad debt’ sebanyak RM7,469.83 telah dibatalkan tetapi juga bahawa tiada apa yang terhutang atas akaun. Cuma itu sahaja dikaitkan oleh pernyataan-pernyataan dalam PB231 dan 232. Secara objektif, tiada apa perkataan dalam maksud biasa dan semulajadi yang dapat memberikan apa-apa penuduhan yang memfitnah, melainkan perkataan ‘bad debt’ dibaca secara berasingan. PB231 and 232 cuma membayangkan apa yang telah berlaku. Baki hutang telah dibatalkan, tetapi bukan rekod-rekod tersebut. Dan defendan kedua berhak memperolehi rekodnya. Defendan-defendan telah berjaya membuktikan bahawa penuduhan itu berkenaan mana mereka didakwa adalah benar. Defendan-defendan telah membuktikan kebenaran setiap fakta fitnah yang dikatakan. Profil Akaun Pelanggan itu adalah selaras dengan kebenaran (PB234). Sehingga ia ‘dibatalkan’, ‘bad debt’ masih wujud (lihat ms 8C–D, F, H).]
Notes For cases on defamation, see 12 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2000 Reissue) paras 193-409. ||Page 3>>
Cases referred to Dato’ Musa bin Hitam v SH Alattas & 2 Ors [1991] CLJ 315 (refd) Hasnul bin Abdul Hadi v Bulat bin Mohamed & Anor [1978] 1 MLJ 75 (refd)
Amrit Pal Singh (Sukhdev & Amrit) for the plaintiff. Kumar Kanasingam (Allen & Gledhill) for the defendant.
[2001] 2 MLJ 574 Tjanting Handicraft Sdn Bhd & Anor v Utusan Melayu (M) Bhd & Ors
HIGH COURT (KUALA LUMPUR) — SUIT NO S2–23–72 OF 1999 KAMALANATHAN RATNAM J
For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 126 6 FEBRUARY 2001
Tort — Defamation — Damages — Compensatory damages — Aggravated damages — Assessment — Relevant factors
Tort — Defamation — Fair comment — Publication of defamatory article in magazine — Whether publication was a comment — Whether publication was fair — Whether a fair-minded person could honestly make such comment without having basic facts to rely upon — Defamation Act 1957 s 9
Tort — Defamation — Justification — Publication of defamatory article in magazine — Whether justifications made out on facts — Defamation Act 1957 s 8
Tort — Defamation — Malice — Meaning of — Publication of defamatory article in magazine without prior verification — Whether editor was reckless and not concerned with truth and falsity of article — Whether malice of editor can be imputed to his employer
Tort — Defamation — Slander of goods — Elements of the tort — Whether made out — Test of defamatory nature of a statement
The first plaintiff at all material times carried on the business of manufacturing batik materials under the trade name of Tjanting and the second plaintiff was and is its managing director and its alter ego. The first defendant was the publisher of the daily newspaper and of a monthly magazine called Wanita. The second defendant was the editor of the said magazine. The third defendant was employed by the first defendant as its journalist. The fourth defendant was the printer of the said magazine. In 1998, the plaintiffs were commissioned by the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (‘MITI’) who entered into a contract with the plaintiffs to supply batik attire to the leaders of the 21 countries of the Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation (‘APEC’). The leaders wore their respective batik shirts and baju kurung during the ceremony held at Cyberjaya. In the issue of Wanita of February 1999, the defendants published and printed in Bahasa Malaysia an article written by the third defendant, in relation to the quality of the plaintiffs’ said products as well as concerning the second plaintiff. The plaintiffs contended that in their natural and ordinary meaning the words referred to meant and were understood to mean that the plaintiffs produced unsightly batik and the second plaintiff had brought shame to the country by allowing the world leaders to wear unsightly and ugly shirts. The contract to manufacture and supply batik shirts to be worn by APEC leaders should not have been given to the plaintiffs as they did not have the capability of producing quality handicraft befitting the country’s reputation. The first plaintiff thus pleaded that by reason of the said words and in consequence ||Page 575>>thereof it had been gravely injured in its manufacturing and trading character. The second plaintiff pleaded that she had been seriously injured in her
For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 127 personal business reputation and goodwill and had suffered considerable distress and embarassment. The defendants denied that the words complained of refererd to or were understood to refer to the plaintiffs or to any one of them. They also denied that the words bore or were capable of bearing any of the meanings alleged by the plaintiffs. They also denied any allegation of malice on their part. There was also reliance on s 8 (justification) and s 9 (fair comment) of the Defamation Act 1957.
Held: (1) There can be no other conclusive evidence of malice than evidence that shows that at the time the third defendant wrote the article complained of she knew it to be untrue. One look at the photograph of all the leaders shows even to a lay person that the charges levied against the plaintiffs by the defendants had not been borne out. The material and pattern were approved by MITI and as compared to the expertize of the second plaintiff in the field of batik, the third defendant had no stature (see p 591C–D). (2) Surely the defendants ought to have known that the vitriolic verbiage of condemnation heaped upon the plaintiffs in the impugned article could not have been true, more so when the first defendant had itself edited and published articles in adulation of the plaintiffs’ craftsmanship in the field of batik design. Therefore when there was recklessness in the publication with total disregard as to whether the statement is true or false, then it is fair and proper for the court to hold malicious intent (see p 591E–F). (3) In an action for slander of goods for libel it is not necessary that the words should refer to the plaintiff by name, so long as the words would be understood by reasonable people to refer to the plaintiff. In the present case, there was no doubt that the article referred to and was understood to refer to the plaintiffs (see p 592E, H). (4) The test of defamatory nature of a statement is its tendency to excite against the plaintiff the adverse opinion of others, although no one believes the statement to be true. There was no doubt that the words complained of were indeed defamatory of the plaintiffs in their ordinary meaning (see p 593C–D); Syed Husin Ali v Sharikat Penchetakan Utusan Melayu Bhd & Anor [1973] 2 MLJ 56 followed. (5) The court was satisfied that there had been publication by the defendants of the plaintiffs whereby the defendants maliciously published false statements disparaging the plaintiffs’ hand-drawn batik silks under the brand name Tjanting. The plaintiff had alleged and proved that the article was published concerning the plaintiffs’ goods, that the said publication was false and that it was ||Page 576>>published maliciously with intent of injuring the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs had indeed established their case for slander of goods (see p 594A–B, D).
For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 128 (6) The defendants had failed to confine their evidence strictly to the particulars of justification as set out in their defence. The libel contains numerous charges but the defendants were unable to prove any of them as true and neither have they pleaded some other defence such as qualified privilege. The authorities are clear in that any statement which alters the character of the main imputation or adds to its sting must be proved to be true; otherwise the defendant will fail in this plea. In any case the court had found that the defence of justification had been defeated by the present of malice (see p 597E–F, I). (7) The defendant had failed to comply with O 78 r 3(2) of the Rules of the High Court 1980 in not stating ‘which words of the words complained of they allege are statements of facts and of the facts and matters they had relied on in support of the allegations that the words are true’. A defendant should not enter a plea of fair comment unless he is satisfied that the facts which are relied upon in support of the plea are true and that he has reasonable evidence to support them or reasonable grounds for believing that he has sufficient evidence to prove them at trial. In any case, since the court had already found evidence of malice in this case, the defence of fair comment must therefore necessarily fail (see pp 598G–H, 599A). (8) Having considered the law relating to fair comment and freedom of speech the court found that the defendants had indeed with malicious intent transgressed the border and maligned the plaintiffs. The views expressed far exceeded the realm of fair and just criticism. The defendants published the criticism with reckless indifference as to whether they were true or not. The language used was so extreme that no fair-minded person however obstinate and prejudiced his views were would have honestly used them. There can be no room for an inference that the article in question was in fact the genuine expression of the defendants’ views (see pp 599F, H, 600A). (9) The court accepted from the evidence that the second plaintiff was the alter ego of the first plaintiff. This is the type of case other than those relating to the Companies Act Act 1965 where the corporate veil ought to be lifted because the first plaintiff is a nonentity without the second plaintiff (see p 601C, E). (10) Having considered the entire evidence and the submissions of all the defendants the court found that all four defendants as publisher, editor, writer and printer respectively liable. All the defendants were liable because they had taken part in publishing it or in ensuring its publication. The proprietor of a newspaper is ||Page 577>>liable even though the libel may have been published without his knowledge or even in his absence because the editor is his servant and it is within the scope of his employment to send to the printers whatever he thinks ought to be published (see p 601G–H). (11) The award of damages must be sufficient to convince any person of the baselessness of the libel and ought to show the public the vindication of the plaintiffs’ reputation. In the present case the court found that the defendants ought to pay the first plaintiff a sum of RM300,000 as damages for the slander
For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 129 of goods and a sum of RM700,000 to the second plaintiff as damages for libel. The court also found that there was a case for aggravated damages. An award of RM300,000 was awarded to the second plaintiff as aggravated damages (see pp 603E–F, H–I, 604F).
Bahasa Malaysia summary
Plaintif pertama pada semua masa matan menjalankan perniagaan mengeluarkan bahan-bahan batik di bawah tanda niaga Tjanting dan plaintif kedua adalah pengarah urusannya atau alter egonya. Defendan pertama adalah penerbit akhbar harian dan majalah bulanan yang bernama Wanita. Defendan kedua adalah editor majalah tersebut. Defendan ketiga telah digaji oleh defendan pertama sebagai wartawannya. Defendan keempat adalah pencetak majalah tersebut. Pada tahun 1998, plaintif telah ditugaskan oleh Kementerian Perdagangan Antarabangsa dan Industri (‘MITI’) yang telah memasuki suatu kontrak dengan plaintif-plaintif untuk membekalkan pakaian batik kepada 21 ketua negara Usahasama Ekonomi Asia Pasifik (‘APEC’). Para pemimpin memakai baju batik dan baju kurung masing-masing semasa upacara yang diadakan di Cyberjaya. Di dalam isu Wanita pada Februari 1999, defendan telah menerbitkan dan mencetak di dalam Bahasa Malaysia suatu rencana yang ditulis oleh defendan ketiga, berkenaan dengan kualiti barangan plaintif begitu juga dengan plaintif kedua. Plaintif-plaintif menegaskan bahawa di dalam maksud biasa dan semulajadi, perkataan-perkataan tersebut yang dirujuk bermaksud dan difahamkan sebagai bermaksud bahawa plaintif mengeluarkan batik-batik yang tidak cantik dan plaintif kedua telah membawa malu kepada negara dengan membenarkan pemimpin dunia memakai baju yang hodoh dan tidak cantik. Kontrak untuk membuat dan membekalkan baju batik yang akan dipakai oleh ketua-ketua APEC tidak sepatutnya diberikan kepada plaintif-plaintif oleh kerana mereka tidak mempunyai kemampuan untuk menghasilkan kraftangan yang setaraf dengan reputasi negara. Maka plaintif pertama menghujahkan bahawa dengan alasan perkataan dan di atas akibatnya nama plaintif pertama telah tercemar dari segi kebolehan pengeluaran dan perdagangannya. Plaintif kedua menghujahkan bahawa beliau telah terjejas dengan teruk di dalam reputasi perniagaan dan nama baik peribadinya dan telah mengalami kesedihan dan dimalukan. ||Page 578>>Defendan-defendan menafikan bahawa perkataan-perkataan yang diadukan merujuk atau difahamkan sebagai merujuk kepada plaintif-plaintif atau kepada salah satu daripada mereka, Mereka juga menafikan bahawa perkataan-perkataan tersebut membawa maksud atau boleh bermaksud apa-apa yang dikatakan oleh plaintif-plaintif. Mereka juga menafikan sebarang pengataan niat jahat di pihak mereka. Terdapat juga pergantungan kepada s 8 (justifikasi) dan s 9 (komen berpatutan) Akta Fitnah 1957.
Diputuskan: (1) Tidak terdapat keterangan konklusif yang lain berkenaan dengan niat jahat
For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 130 daripada keterangan yang menunjukkan bahawa semasa defendan ketiga menulis recana yang diadukan beliau tahu ia adalah tidak benar. Sekali pandang ke atas kesemua gambar para pemimpin menunjukkan kepada orang biasa bahawa tuduhan terhadap plaintif-plaintif oleh defendan-defendan adalah tidak berasas. Bahan dan corak telah diluluskan oleh MITI dan berbanding dengan kepakaran plaintif kedua di dalam bidang batik, defendan ketiga adalah tidak berkaliber (lihat ms 591C–D). (2) Sudah tentu defendan-defendan patut tahu bahawa kata-kata mengkritik yang menyakitkan serta menjela-jela ke atas plaintif di dalam rencana yang dikatakan adalah tidak benar, lebih-lebih lagi apabila defendan pertama telah mengedit dan menerbitkan rencana memuji akan hasil pertukangan plaintif di dalam bidang batik. Oleh itu terdapat kesemberonoan di dalam penerbitan dengan tidak mengendahkan langsung sama ada kenyataan adalah benar atau salah, jadi ia adalah adil dan wajar bagi mahkamah untuk memutuskan niat jahat (lihat ms 591E–F). (3) Di dalam suatu tindakan slander barang-barangan untuk libel ia adalah tidak perlu bahawa perkataan-perkataan merujuk kepada plaintif dengan nama, selagi perkataan-perkataan akan difahamkan oleh orang munasabah untuk merujuk kepada plaintif. Di dalam kes ini, tidak dapat disangsikan bahawa rencana tersebut merujuk atau difaham sebagai merujuk kepada plaintif-plaintif (lihat ms 592E, H). (4) Ujian unsur fitnah di dalam suatu kenyataan adalah kecenderungannya untuk membangkitkan pendapat yang bertentangan terhadap plaintif oleh orang lain, walaupun tiada sesiapa percaya kenyataan tersebut sebagai benar. Tidak dapat disangsikan bahawa perkataan-perkataan yang diadukan adalah memfitnah plaintif-plaintif di dalam maksud biasa (lihat ms 593C–D); Syed Husin Ali v Sharikat Penchetakan Utusan Melayu Bhd & Anor [1973] 2 MLJ 56 diikut. (5) Mahkamah berpuashati bahawa terdapat penerbitan oleh defendan-defendan mengenai plaintif-plaintif di mana defendan dengan niat jahat telah menerbitkan kenyataan palsu mengecil- ||Page 579>>gecilkan batik sutera plaintif yang dilukis sendiri di bawah jenama Tjanting. Plaintif telah mengatakan dan membuktikan bahawa rencana tersebut diterbitkan berkaitan dengan barangan plaintif, bahawa penerbitan tersebut adalah palsu dan ia diterbitkan secara niat jahat dengan niat untuk memburukkan plaintif-plaintif. Plaintif telah membuktikan kes mereka untuk slander barangan (lihat ms 594A–B, D). (6) Defendan-defendan telah gagal untuk menghadkan keterangan mereka secara khusus mengenai justifikasi seperti yang dikemukakan di dalam pembelaan mereka. Libel tersebut mengandungi pelbagai pertuduhan tetapi defendan-defendan tidak dapat membuktikannya langsung sebagai benar dan mereka juga tidak memplidkan pembelaan yang lain seperti keistimewaan bersyarat. Nas-nas adalah jelas bahawa sebarang kenyataan yang mengubah bentuk tohmahan utama atau menokok tambah mestilah dibuktikan sebagai
For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 131 benar; jika tidak defendan akan gagal di dalam pembelaan ini. Di dalam sebarang kes mahkamah mendapati bahawa pembelaan justifikasi telah digagalkan dengan kehadiran niat jahat (lihat ms 597E–F, I). (7) Defendan telah gagal untuk mematuhi A 78 k 3(2) Kaedah-kaedah Mahkamah Tinggi 1980 di dalam tidak menyatakan ‘perkataan-perkataan mana yang diadukan sebagai dikatakan mereka adalah kenyataan-kenyataan fakta dan fakta-fakta dan perkara-perkara yang mereka telah bergantung di dalam menyokong pengataan bahawa perkataan-perkataan adalah benar’. Seorang defendan tidak sepatutnya menghujahkan pembelaan komen berpatutan kecuali beliau berpuashati bahawa fakta-fakta yang digantung harap di dalam menyokong pembelaan tersebut adalah benar dan beliau mempunyai keterangan yang munasabah untuk menyokongnya atau alasan-alasan yang munasabah untuk mempercayai beliau mempunyai keterangan yang mencukupi untuk membuktikannya semasa perbicaraan. Di dalam sebarang kes, oleh kerana mahkamah telah mendapati keterangan niat jahat di dalam kes ini, pembelaan komen yang berpatutan mestilah gagal (lihat ms 598G–H, 599A). (8) Selepas mempertimbangkan undang-undang berkenaan dengan komen berpatutan dan kebebasan bersuara mahkamah mendapati bahawa defendan sememangnya dengan niat jahat melampaui sempadan tersebut dan memfitnah plaintif-plaintif. Pandangan-pandangan yang diluahkan telah melampaui ruang lingkup kritikan adil dan saksama. Defendan-defendan telah menerbitkan kritikan tersebut tanpa menghiraukan sama ada mereka adalah benar atau tidak. Bahasa yang digunakan adalah begitu keterlaluan sehinggakan tiada seorang yang berfikiran waras walaupun pandangannya adalah teguh dan prejudis akan secara jujur menggunakannya. Tiada ruang untuk inferens bahawa rencana tersebut adalah pada hakikatnya luahan ikhlas pandangan defendan (lihat ms 599F, H, 600A). ||Page 580>> (9) Mahkamah menerima daripada keterangan bahawa plaintif kedua adalah alter ego plaintif pertama. Ini adalah jenis kes selain daripada mereka yang berkenaan dengan Akta Syarikat 1965 di mana litupan korporat patut dialihkan oleh kerana plaintif pertama bukanlah suatu entiti tanpa plaintif kedua (lihat ms 601C, E). (10) Selepas mempertimbangkan keseluruhan keterangan dan hujahan-hujahan kesemua defendan-defendan mahkamah mendapati bahawa keempat-empat defendan sebagai penerbit, editor, penulis dan pencetak adalah masing-masing bertanggungan. Kesemua defendan-defendan adalah bertanggungan oleh kerana mereka telah mengambil bahagian di dalam menerbitkannya atau memastikan penerbitannya. Pengusaha akhbar adalah bertanggungan walaupun libel mungkin diterbitkan tanpa pengetahunannya atau walaupun dalam ketidakhadirannya oleh kerana editor adalah pekerjanya dan adalah di dalam skop pekerjaannya untuk menghantar kepada pencetak apa yang beliau berpendapat patut diterbitkan (lihat ms 601G–H).
For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 132 (11) Award gantirugi mestilah mencukupi untuk menyakinkan sesiapa akan ketiadaan dasar libel tersebut dan patut menunjukkan kepada orang awam justifikasi reputasi plaintif. Di dalam kes ini mahkamah mendapati bahawa defendan-defendan patut membayar plaintif pertama suatu jumlah sebanyak RM300,000 sebagai ganti rugi untuk slander barangan dan suatu jumlah sebanyak RM700,000 kepada plaintif kedua sebagai ganti rugi untuk libel. Mahkamah juga mendapati bahawa terdapat suatu kes untuk ganti rugi teruk. Suatu award sebanyak RM300,000 telah diawardkan kepada plaintif sebagai ganti rugi teruk (lihat ms 603E–F, H–I, 604F).]
Notes For cases on defamation generally, see 12 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2000 Reissue) paras 193–409.
Cases referred to Burnet v Wells [1700] 12 Mod 421 (refd) Dato’ Seri Anwar bin Ibrahim v Dato’ Seri Dr Mahathir bin Mohamad [1999] 4 MLJ 58 (refd) David Syme & Co & Anor v Canavan [1918] 25 CLR 234 (refd) Egger v Viscount Chelmsford & Ors [1965] 1 QB 248 (refd) Hunt v The Star Newspaper Company, Ltd [1908] 2 KB 309 (refd) Lee Kuan Yew v Derek Gwyn Davies & Ors [1990] 1 CLJ 583 (refd) McDonald’s Corp & Anor v Steel & Anor [1995] 3 All ER 615 (refd) McQuire v Western Morning News Co Ltd [1903] 2 KB 100 (refd) Mirzan bin Mahathir v Star Papyrus Sdn Bhd [2000] 6 MLJ 29 (refd) Payne v Sheffield [1882] 2 EDC 166 (refd) Rajagopal v Rajan [1972] 1 MLJ 45 (refd) ||Page 581>> Ratus Mesra Sdn Bhd v Shaik Osman Majid & Ors [1999] 3 MLJ 529 (refd) Salomon v A Salomon Co Ltd [1897] AC 22 (refd) Simpson v Robinson [1848] 12 QB 511 (refd) Straits Times Press (1975) Ltd, The v Workers’ Party & Anor [1987] 1 MLJ 186 (refd) Syed Husin Ali v Sharikat Penchetakan Utusan Melayu Bhd & Anor [1973] 2 MLJ 56 (folld) Terry v Hooper [1663] 1 Lev 115 (refd) Whitaker v Bradley [1827] 7 D&R 650 (refd) Zenobia v Axtell [1795] 6 TR 162 (refd)
For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 133
Legislation referred to Companies Act 1965 Defamation Act 1957 ss 6, 7, 8, 9 Federal Constitution art 10 Rules of the High Court 1980 O 78 r 3(1), (2)
Shamsul-Bahrain bin Ibrahim (Skrine & Co) for the plaintiffs. M Reza A Hassan (V Vishnu Kumar and Ng Thiang Tuan with him) (Syarikat Kam Woon Wah) for the defendants.
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[2001] 3 MLJ 86 K Magathevan v Shafie bin Hj Kassim
HIGH COURT (KUALA LUMPUR) — SUIT NO S2–23–83 OF 1998 KAMALANATHAN RATNAM J 25 APRIL 2001
Tort — Defamation — Letter to regulatory authorities — Allegation that plaintiff caused substantial loss to defendant in securities trading — Recovery action filed against defendant, whether defendant’s complaints intended to stall recovery action against him — Proof of malice would defeat qualified privilege — Whether defendant’s complaints connote defamatory meaning as pleaded
The plaintiff was at all material times the operation manager of Lion Commodities & Futures Trading Sdn Bhd (‘Lion’). The defendant was at all material times a client/customer of Lion. The defendant was introduced to Lion by the Futures Broker Representative (‘FBR’), a commission agent of Lion. In a letter dated 2 October 1998 sent to the Executive Director of Lion, the defendant wrote and published of the plaintiff concerning his conduct in his employment as the operation manager which had caused substantial losses to the defendant. The defendant also sent copies of the said letter to the Chairman of Lion and to the Chairman of the Securities Commission of Malaysia. The plaintiff claimed that in their natural and ordinary meaning, the words contained in the letter meant and were understood to mean that the plaintiff made decisions and carried out trading transactions without the defendant’s knowledge and
For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 134 consent, that the losses suffered by the defendant were caused by the plaintiff, that the plaintiff misled the defendant and also misled or lied to the management and that the plaintiff cheated the FBR of his commission. The plaintiff contended that by sending copies of the letter to the various chairmen the defendant was motivated by malice. It was the plaintiff’s case that he had been seriously injured in his character and reputation and had suffered damage. The plaintiff thus claimed both general and aggravated damages for libel. The defendant pleaded the defence of qualified privilege. He also pleaded that the complaints or allegations against the plaintiff were correct, accurate and true in substance and in fact. It was not in dispute that the transactions were done in 1997, ie more than 12 months before the letter was sent. The defendant had accepted the losses then. It was also a fact that the defendant wrote and published the letter in October 1998 after Lion had instituted legal proceedings against the defendant.
Held, allowing the plaintiff’s claim: (1) The plaintiff’s evidence was given in a forthright and clear manner. There was no attempt at prevarication. The defendant, on the other hand, was not telling the truth. He never protested when he received the various statements. In spite of being told by ||Page 87>>the FBR that the plaintiff had messed up his accounts he waited until Lion actually sued him before sending the impugned letter. The court was satisfied that the defendant was clearly motivated by malice when he wrote the impugned letter and when he sent copies of same to the various chairmen. Evidence had been led to show that even after sustaining losses the defendant had been updating his account by payment through cheques (see p 95F–G). (2) It was clear that Lion had kept the defendant informed of every stage of the transactions. It was also clear that the defendant had ample opportunities to dispute any wrongful transaction. With all material and relevant evidence, the court accepted the plaintiff’s submission that the defendant was solely motivated by malice when he wrote the letter. Clearly it was a way out of his predicament. By accusing the plaintiff of wrong doings and by extending copies of the letter to the relevant regulatory authorities, the defendant intended to stall for time and stop the recovery action filed against him. There was no room here for the defendant’s defence of qualified privilege (see p 96A, E–F). (3) It is trite that proof of malice defeats the defence of qualified privilege even assuming that it is available to the defendant. Whilst the legitimate complaint to Lion of any wrong doing by its employees of matters where the defendant had an interest will come under qualified privilege accorded by common law, in this case there had been absolutely no wrong doing by any employee of Lion including the plaintiff. The complaint of the defendant was ill-founded and connote the defamatory meaning as pleaded by the plaintiff (see p 96G–H). (4) Having considered all aspect, in particular the plaintiff’s position and standing, the nature of the libel, the extent of the publication and also the refusal of an
For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 135 apology, the court awarded the plaintiff a sum of RM75,000 as general damages and a further sum of RM75,000 as aggravated damages (see p 97D–E).
Bahasa Malaysia summary
Plaintif, pada semua waktu material, merupakan pengurus operasi Lion Commodities & Futures Trading Sdn Bhd (‘Lion’). Defendan, pada semua waktu material, merupakan seorang klien/pelanggan Lion. Defendan diperkenalkan kepada Lion oleh seorang wakil broker Futures (‘FBR’), yang juga agen komisen Lion. Dalam satu surat bertarikh 2 Oktober 1998 yang dikirim kepada Pengarah Eksekutif Lion, defendan menulis dan menerbitkan tentang kelakuan plaintif sebagai seorang pengurus operasi yang telah mengakibatkan kerugian yang besar kepada defendan. Defendan juga menghantar salinan surat tersebut kepada Pengerusi Lion dan Pengerusi Suruhanjaya Sekuriti Malaysia. Plaintif menuntut bahawa dalam maksud semulajadi dan ||Page 88>>biasa kata-kata yang terkandung dalam surat tersebut, ia difahamkan bahawa plaintif membuat keputusan dan menjalankan urusan perdagangan tanpa pengetahuan dan kebenaran defendan, bahawa kerugian yang menimpa defendan disebabkan oleh plaintif, bahawa plaintif mengelirukan defendan dan juga mengelirukan atau menipu pihak pengurusan dan bahawa plaintif menipu FBR dari mendapatkan komisennya. Plaintif berhujah bahawa dengan menghantar salinan surat tersebut kepada pengerusi-pengerusi tersebut, defendan berniat jahat. Adalah hujahan plaintif bahawa perwatakan dan reputasi beliau telah terjejas dan beliau telah mengalami kerugian. Oleh itu, plaintif menuntut gantirugi am dan khas untuk fitnah bertulis. Defendan menggunakan pembelaan perlindungan bersyarat. Beliau juga menuntut bahawa aduan dan dakwaan terhadap plaintif adalah betul, tepat dan benar dalam isi halnya dan dalam faktanya. Adalah tidak dipertikaikan bahawa urusan-urusan tersebut berlaku pada tahun 1997, iaitu lebih dari 12 bulan sebelum surat tersebut disampaikan. Defendan telah menerima kerugian tersebut pada masa itu. Adalah juga satu fakta bahawa defendan menulis dan menerbitkan surat tersebut pada bulan Oktober 1998 selepas Lion telah memulakan tindakan undang-undang terhadap defendan.
Diputuskan, membenarkan tuntutan plaintif: (1) Keterangan plaintif diberi secara terus terang dan jelas. Beliau tidak cuba mereka cerita. Manakala defendan pula tidak bercakap benar. Beliau tidak membantah apabila menerima pernyataan-pernyataan tersebut. Walaupun diberitahu FBR bahawa plaintif telah menyebabkan akaun-akaunnya kelam-kabut, beliau menunggu sehingga Lion mendakwanya sebelum menghantar surat yang dipersoalkan itu. Mahkamah berpuas hati bahawa defendan didorong niat jahat apabila menulis surat yang dipersoalkan itu dan apabila beliau menghantar salinan surat tersebut kepada pengerusi-pengerusi tersebut. Keterangan menunjukkan bahawa walaupun selepas mengalami
For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 136 kerugian, defendan telah mengemaskinikan akaunnya melalui bayaran cek (lihat ms 95F–G). (2) Jelas bahawa Lion telah memaklumkan defendan mengenai setiap peringkat urusan. Juga jelas bahawa defendan mempunyai banyak peluang mempertikaikan apa-apa urusan yang salah. Dengan semua keterangan yang material dan relevan, mahkamah menerima hujahan plaintif bahawa defendan hanya didorong niat jahat semata-mata apabila beliau menulis surat tersebut. Jelas ini merupakan satu cara defendan menyelesaikan masalahnya. Dengan menyalahkan plaintif atas kesilapan yang dilakukan dan dengan menghantar salinan surat tersebut kepada pihak berkuasa yang relevan, defendan berniat melenggahkan dan menghentikan tindakan mendapatkan balik yang difailkan terhadapnya. Tiada ||Page 89>>ruang di sini bagi defendan menggunakan pembelaan perlindungan bersyarat (lihat ms 96A, E–F). (3) Adalah difahami semua bahawa bukti niat jahat mengalahkan pembelaan perlindungan bersyarat walaupun jika pembelaan ini dianggap terbuka kepada defendan. Aduan sah kepada Lion mengenai apa-apa salah laku pekerja mengenai perkara di mana defendan mempunyai kepentingan akan diliputi perlindungan bersyarat yang diberi oleh undang-undang duluan, akan tetapi, dalam kes ini, terdapat tiada salah laku oleh mana-mana pekerja Lion termasuk plaintif. Aduan defendan tidak berasas dan menunjukkan maksud fitnah seperti yang didakwa plaintif (lihat ms 96G–H). (4) Setelah mempertimbangkan semua aspek, terutamanya kedudukan dan status plaintif, jenis fitnah, tahap penerbitan dan keengganan defendan meminta maaf, mahkamah memberikan plaintif jumlah RM75,000 sebagai gantirugi am dan jumlah tambahan RM75,000 sebagai gantirugi khas (lihat ms 97D–E).
Notes For cases on defamation generally, see 12 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2000 Reissue) paras 193–409.
Cases referred to Abdul Karim bin Ayob v Kumpulan Karangkraf Sdn Bhd & Ors [2000] 1 MLJ 243 (refd) Normala Samsuddin v Keluarga Communications Sdn Bhd [1999] 2 MLJ 654 (refd)
S Periasamy (M Kumar with him) (Radzi Sheikh Ahmad & Peri) for the plaintiff. Azhar Azizan Harun (RN Sivaraja with him) (Hashim Sobri & Kadir) for the defendant.
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[2001] 3 MLJ 140 Tan Chong & Son Motor Co Sdn Bhd v Borneo Motors (M) Sdn Bhd & Anor
HIGH COURT (KUALA LUMPUR) — SUIT NO (S2)P84 OF 1979 KAMALANATHAN RATNAM J 10 MAY 2001
Tort — Defamation — Libel — Libellous advertisement — Allegation of imitation and unreliability of plaintiff’s product — Predominant purpose of advertisement, whether to discredit plantiff — Injury to plaintiff’s reputation — Considerations for awarding of damages
Tort — Malicious falsehood — Libellous advertisement — Allegation of imitation and unreliability of plaintiff’s product — Predominant purpose of advertisement, whether to discredit plantiff — Whether malicious falsehood proved
The plaintiff was the sole and exclusive importer and distributor of motor vehicles in Malaysia bearing the trade marks Datsun and Nissan. The first defendant traded in Toyota motor vehicles. The second defendant was a media specialist and had advertised for and on behalf of the first defendant. In the later part of 1970s, the plaintiff distributed the new Datsun B310/120Y with an original design and additional accessories, as its latest model passenger car. The said model was released into the Malaysian market in July 1978. In conjunction with the release of the new Datsun B310/120Y into the Malaysian market, the plaintiff caused an advertisement to be inserted in The New Straits Times in its issue on 15 July 1978 to inform the public of the availability of the new model. In the issues of The New Straits Times for 28 July 1978, 4 August 1978 and 8 August 1978, the defendants printed and published of and concerning the plaintiff in the form of advertisement a lateral view picture of the plaintiff’s new model Datsun B310/120Y motor car alongside that of a lateral view picture of the Toyota Corolla model motor car marketed by the first defendant with the words that the plaintiff’s new Datsun B310/120Y was an imitation of the first defendant’s Toyota Corolla and was less reliable. The plaintiff claimed damages against the defendants under trade libel and malicious falsehood. The defendant admitted publication of the words in the advertisements. The issue before the court were: (i) whether those words were defamatory; and (ii) the plaintiff was the ‘person’ defamed.
Held: (1) The court found that the statements in the advertisements were of the kind
For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 138 which were calculated to be injurious to the plaintiff in its trade. It appeared that from the defendant’s advertisements, the publication was not intended solely to promote sale of the first defendant’s Toyota Corolla cars but rather was intended with the predominant purpose of discrediting the new Datsun B310/120Y and the plaintiff company (see pp 149E, 150E). ||Page 141>> (2) From the defendant’s advertisements, it was clear that the ‘other’ car in the comparison with the first defendant’s Toyota Corolla was the plaintiff’s new Datsun B310/120Y. It was obvious that the defendants’ remarks were made of and concerning the plaintiff’s new model and were false. The fact that the disparaging advertisements did not specifically identify the plaintiff is immaterial. Further the vehicle depicted in all of the defendants’ advertisements did refer to the plaintiff’s new Datsun B310/120Y and not to any other vehicle (see p 149G–I). (3) The court found that the said advertisements were published in a manner so as to indicate to the public that the plaintiff’s new Datsun B310/120Y was an imitation of the first defendant’s Toyota Corolla. This was certainly not true. The words also gave the connotation that the plaintiff was dishonest and untrustworthy by its representations to the Malaysian public that its Datsun B310/120Y was new in the market. The first defendant, being a member of the car trade, ought to have known the falsity of the statements made in its advertisement, but blatantly disregarded the truth. In printing and publishing and/or causing to be published the said advertisements, the second defendant too failed to verify the truth of the advertisements with the plaintiff prior to the publications (see pp 150F, H–151A). (4) The defendants in using the word ‘imitation’ in the advertisements were defaming the plaintiff by unjustly and maliciously accusing it of dealing in the new Datsun B310/120Y which was, according to the defendants an imitation of the first defendant’s Toyota Corolla and of holding out the model as an authentic one (see p 151G–H). (5) The court found that the words and pictures published in the defendants’ advertisement which when read as a whole, coupled with the fact that the plaintiff had only a few days prior advertised its new Datsun B310/120Y in the same newspaper, and the fact that no other similar models were in the market at the material time, were defamatory of the plaintiff and referred to no one else but the plaintiff (see p 152D–E). (6) The court found that the plaintiff’s new Datsun was not an imitation of the first defendant’s Toyota Corolla. The plaintiff’s Datsun B310/120Y was a new model and its design was registered in Japan. The alleged claim made by the defendants that the new Datsun was less reliable than the Toyota Corolla was also never established. In the circumstances the court found for the plaintiff in libel against both the defendants (see pp 152E–F, 153E). (7) The court found that all the ingredients for malicious falsehood had been
For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 139 satisfied and that the defendants had failed to prove that there was no malice in the publications. It was obvious that the defendants had gone to great pains to dress up their advertising material in disparagement of the plaintiff’s goods and since their ||Page 142>>advertisement had been shown to be false and the plaintiff had succeeded in proving malice, the court also found that the plaintiff had proved its case of malicious falsehood against the defendants (see p 154A–B, G). (8) The plaintiff’s standing in society is a relevant factor to be taken into consideration in awarding damages. In the present case, the plaintiff’s reputation was extensive and well-known in Malaysia. The defamatory and malicious statements published against the plaintiff in a newspaper which has a nationwide circulation is a very relevant factor since such publication to so many persons has a greater effect and thus a far greater potential to harm the plaintiff. The defendants not only refused to apologize to the plaintiff but also denied liability. Taking all these factors and having read all the submissions the court awarded the plaintiff a sum of RM500,000 in damages for libel (see pp 157E–G, 158E). (9) The plaintiff’s reputation was injured as Datsun/Nissan vehicles have always been associated with the plaintiff, and hence, any false advertisements attacking the Datsun cars seriously affect the plaintiff’s reputation as well. Taking all factors into consideration, the court awarded the plaintiff a sum of RM500,000 as damages for malicious falsehood inclusive of aggravated damages (see p 159A–C). (10) As for the loss by way of special damages, the calculation provided by the plaintiff was too speculative and remote. The court found that the plaintiff had failed to prove special damages (see p 159C–D).
Bahasa Malaysia summary
Plaintif merupakan pengimpot dan pengedar tunggal kenderaan bermotor di Malaysia berjenama Datsun dan Nissan. Defendan pertama menjalankan perdagangan kenderaan bermotor Toyota. Defendan kedua merupakan seorang pakar media dan telah mengendalikan kerja pengiklanan untuk dan bagi pihak defendan pertama. Pada penghujung tahun 1970-an, plaintif mengedar model baru Datsun B310/120Y dengan reka bentuk asli dan kelengkapan tambahan sebagai model kereta penumpangnya yang terbaru. Model tersebut dikeluarkan ke pasaran Malaysia pada bulan Julai 1978. Sempena pengeluaran model baru Datsun B310/120Y ke pasaran Malaysia, plaintif menyebabkan penerbitan suatu iklan di dalam akhbar The New Straits Times dalam isu bertarikh 15 Julai 1978 yang memaklumkan orang awam mengenai terdapatnya model baru tersebut. Dalam isu-isu The New Straits Times bertarikh 28 Julai 1978, 4 Ogos 1978 dan 8 Ogos 1978, defendan-defendan mencetak dan menerbitkan mengenai plaintif dalam bentuk suatu iklan, gambar pandangan sisi model baru motokar Datsun
For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 140 B310/120Y plaintif bersebelahan dengan pandangan sisi model kereta Toyota Corolla ||Page 143>>yang dipasarkan oleh defendan pertama, dengan perkataan yang membawa makna bahawa model baru plaintif, Datsun B310/120Y, adalah satu peniruan Toyota Corolla defendan pertama dan kurang kebolehpercayaannya. Plaintif menuntut gantirugi daripada defendan-defendan di bawah fitnah bertulis perdagangan dan kepalsuan niat jahat. Defendan mengakui penerbitan perkataan-perkataan dalam iklan-iklan tersebut. Isu di hadapan mahkamah ialah: (i) sama ada perkataan-perkataan tersebut bersifat fitnah; (ii) plaintif ialah pihak yang difitnah.
Diputuskan: (1) Mahkamah mendapati bahawa pernyataan-pernyataan dalam iklan-iklan tersebut adalah jenis yang sengaja diperhitungkan agar menjejaskan plaintif dalam perdagangannya. Ia kelihatan dari iklan-iklan defendan bahawa terbitan tersebut bukan hanya bertujuan mempromosikan jualan kereta Toyota Corolla defendan pertama, tetapi diniatkan dengan tujuan utama menimbulkan kesangsian terhadap Datsun B310/120Y baru tersebut dan syarikat plaintif (lihat ms 149E, 150E). (2) Dari iklan-iklan defendan, ia jelas bahawa kereta ‘yang lagi satu’ yang dibandingkan bersama kereta Toyota Corolla defendan pertama adalah kereta Datsun B310/120Y baru plaintif. Ia jelas bahawa pernyataan-pernyataan defendan dibuat terhadap dan mengenai model baru plaintif dan bersifat palsu. Hakikat bahawa iklan-iklan yang memperkecilkan itu tidak secara khusus mengecam plaintif tidak material. Selain itu, kenderaan yang diperlihatkan di dalam semua iklan defendan memang merujuk kepada Datsun B310/120Y baru plaintif dan bukan kepada apa-apa kenderaan yang lain (lihat ms 149G–I). (3) Mahkamah mendapati bahawa iklan-iklan tersebut diterbitkan dalam cara yang memberitahu masyarakat umum bahawa Datsun B310/120Y baru plaintif merupakan satu peniruan Toyota Corolla defendan pertama. Ini memang tidak benar. Perkataan-perkataan tersebut juga membawa maksud tersirat bahawa plaintif tidak jujur dan tidak boleh dipercayai dari representasinya kepada masyarakat umum Malaysia bahawa Datsun B310/120Ynya baru di pasaran. Defendan pertama, sebagai seorang ahli perdagangan kereta, sepatutnya tahu akan kepalsuan pernyataan-pernyataan dalam iklannya, tetapi sengaja tidak menghiraukan kebenaran. Dalam mencetak dan menerbitkan atau menyebabkan terbitnya iklan-iklan tersebut, defendan kedua juga gagal memastikan benar atau palsunya iklan-iklan tersebut dengan plaintif sebelum penerbitan (lihat ms 150F, H–151A). (4) Dalam menggunakan perkataan ‘peniruan’ dalam iklan-iklan mereka, defendan-defendan telah memfitnah plaintif dengan mendakwanya secara tidak adil dan dengan niat jahat bahawa plaintif menguruskan model baru Datsun B310/120Y yang, ||Page 144>>menurut defendan, merupakan peniruan Toyota Corolla defendan pertama dan plaintif memberikan maklumat yang model tersebut merupakan
For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 141 satu model yang asli (lihat ms 151G–H). (5) Mahkamah mendapati bahawa perkataan-perkataan dan gambar-gambar yang diterbitkan dalam iklan-iklan defendan-defendan, apabila dibaca secara keseluruhan, dan tambahan pula cuma beberapa hari sebelum itu plaintif mengiklankan Datsun B310/120Y barunya dalam akhbar yang sama dan tiada model kereta yang serupa terdapat di pasaran pada waktu yang material, bersifat fitnah dan merujuk kepada tiada sesiapa yang lain melainkan plaintif (lihat ms 152D–E). (6) Mahkamah mendapati bahawa kereta Datsun baru plaintif bukannya satu peniruan Toyota Corolla defendan pertama. Datsun B310/120Y plaintif adalah satu model baru dan reka bentuknya telah didaftarkan di negara Jepun. Tuntutan yang dibuat oleh defendan-defendan bahawa Datsun baru tersebut kurang boleh dipercayai berbanding dengan Toyota Corolla juga tidak berasas. Dalam hal keadaan ini, mahkamah membenarkan kes plaintif dalam fitnah bertulis terhadap kedua-dua defendan (lihat ms 152E–F, 153E). (7) Mahkamah mendapati bahawa semua unsur kepalsuan niat jahat telah dipenuhi dan bahawa defendan-defendan gagal membuktikan bahawa terdapat tiada niat jahat dalam terbitan mereka. Ia jelas bahawa defendan-defendan bersusah-payah merekabentuk bahan pengiklanan mereka untuk memperkecilkan barangan plaintif, dan oleh kerana iklan mereka telah dibuktikan palsu dan plaintif telah berjaya membuktikan niat jahat, mahkamah juga mendapati bahawa plaintif telah membuktikan kes pemalsuan niat jahat terhadap defendan (lihat ms 154A–B, G). (8) Kedudukan plaintif dalam masyarakat adalah satu faktor yang relevan yang perlu dipertimbangkan dalam menilaikan gantirugi. Dalam kes ini, reputasi plaintif luas dan terkenal di Malaysia. Pernyataan-pernyataan yang bersifat fitnah dan berniat jahat yang diterbitkan mengenai plaintif dalam akhbar yang mempunyai edaran seluruh negara ialah satu faktor yang sungguh relevan kerana penerbitan ini yang mencapai begitu ramai orang mempunyai kesan yang lebih ketara dan potensi yang lebih tinggi untuk menjejaskan plaintif. Defendan-defendan bukan hanya enggan meminta maaf dari plaintif tetapi juga menafikan liabiliti. Setelah mempertimbangkan semua faktor ini dan membaca semua hujahan, mahkamah memberikan plaintif jumlah RM500,000 sebagai gantirugi fitnah bertulis (lihat ms 157E–G, 158E). (9) Reputasi plaintif terjejas kerana kenderaan Datsun/Nissan memang selama ini dikaitkan dengan plaintiff, dan oleh itu, apa-apa iklan palsu yang memperkecilkan kereta Datsun juga akan menjejaskan reputasi plaintif secara serius. Setelah mempertimbangkan semua faktor, mahkamah memberikan ||Page 145>>plaintif jumlah RM500,000 sebagai gantirugi pemalsuan berniat jahat, termasuklah gantirugi tambahan (lihat ms 159A–C). (10) Mengenai kerugian melalui gantirugi khas, perhitungan yang diperuntukkan oleh plaintif bersifat terlalu spekulatif dan luar dugaan. Mahkamah mendapati bahawa plaintif gagal membuktikan gantirugi khas (lihat ms 159C–D).]
For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 142
Notes For cases on libel generally, see 12 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2000 Reissue) paras 263–358.For cases on malicious falsehood, see 12 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2000 Reissue) paras 458–463.
Cases referred to Chua Jui Meng v Hoo Kok Wing & Anor [2000] 3 MLJ 1 (refd) De Beers Abrasive Products Ltd, De Beers Industrial Diamonds (Ireland) Ltd and Diamond Products (Sales) Ltd v International General Electric Co of New York Ltd and General Electric Co [1975] FSR 323 (refd) Horrocks v Lowe [1974] 1 All ER 662 (refd) Khodaparast v Shad [2000] 1 All ER 545 (refd) Lyne v Nicholls (1906) 23 TLR 86 (refd) Mark Sallows v Laurie Griffiths (2001) 15 FSR 188 (refd) Noor Asiah bte Mahmood & Anor v Randhir Singh & Ors [2000] 2 MLJ 175 (refd) Ratus Mesra Sdn Bhd v Shaik Osman Majid [1999] 3 MLJ 529 (refd) Schindler Lifts Australia Pty Ltd & Anor v Milan Debelak & Ors 15 IPR 129 (refd) Sin Heak Hin Tyres Pte Ltd v Yuasa Battery Singapore Co Pte Ltd [1995] 3 SLR 590 (refd) Tang Liang Hong v Lee Kuan Yew & Anor [1998] 1 SLR 97 (refd) Timothy White v Gustav Mellin [1895] AC 154 (refd) Tjanting Handicraft Sdn Bhd & Anor v Utusan Melayu (M) Bhd & Ors [2001] 2 MLJ 574 (refd) Uren v John Fairfax & Sons Pty Ltd (1965-1966) 117 CLR 118 (refd) Wilts United Dairies Ltd v Thomas Robinson Sons & Coy, Ld (1957) 9 RPC 22 (refd)
Legislation referred to Evidence Act 1950 s 73A
Nagarajah Muttiah (Grace Ho with him) (Shook Lin & Bok) for the plaintiff. Rueben Mathiavaranam (Gurbakh Singh and Francis Tan with him) (Azman, Davidson & Co) for the defendants. ||Page 146>>
[2001] 4 MLJ 161
For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 143 Karpal Singh a/l Ram Singh v DP Vijandran
COURT OF APPEAL (KUALA LUMPUR) — CIVIL APPEAL NO W–02–385 OF 2000 HAIDAR, ABDUL HAMID MOHAMAD AND ABDUL KADIR SULAIMAN JJCA 3 AUGUST 2001
Tort — Defamation — Damages — Press statement alleged to be defamatory — Plaintiff a politician, former deputy speaker of Dewan Rakyat, member of Parliament and lawyer — Allegation of issuing dishonoured cheque — Damage to reputation and credit of plaintiff — Whether plaintiff’s reputation was at its pinnacle at the time of libel — Award of RM500,000, whether excessive
Tort — Defamation — Pleadings — Press statement alleged to be defamatory — Failure to plead actual words in toto in pleadings — Translation into Bahasa Malaysia not certified — Whether pleadings defective
The respondent had sued the appellant for defamation. The High Court gave judgment for the respondent and awarded a total of RM500,000 in damages, taking into consideration the position and standing of the plaintiff as a politician, a former deputy speaker of the Dewan Rakyat, a member of Parliament and a lawyer (see [2000] 3 MLJ 22). The appellant appealed. It was submitted that: (i) the respondent did not sue the appellant on the actual words of the appellant’s press statement in the sense that the respondent did not quote the whole of the press statement issued by the appellant and thus rendering the pleading defective; (ii) the translation into Bahasa Malaysia was not certified; and (iii) the damages awarded was excessive.
Held, dismissing the appeal on liability and allowing the appeal on quantum: (1) There is neither statutory provision nor rules of court that the actual words must be pleaded in toto failing which the action fails. The court must look at the purpose, what prejudice it causes to a defendant in putting up his defence, in short the justice of the case. Where the libel turns on the meaning of a particular word or words, of course the words must be pleaded so that the word used can be understood in the proper context it was used. In the present case, the court were concerned with statements of facts. There were no two meanings to them. It was not even challenged before the court that they have other meanings. There was clearly no prejudice to the appellant. In the circumstances, the court found that even though the press statement was not quoted in toto in the statement of claim, the failure to do so, in the circumstances of this case, was not fatal (see p 178D–G). (2) The press statement and the press report were in English. The material words
For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 144 were quoted in the statement of claim. The lawyers and the judges understood them perfectly well. Anyway, a translation was given in Malay which, though not certified, was not disputed that it was correct. Under the circumstances, the court found no merit in the argument that the action failed because the translation into Bahasa Malaysia was not certified (see p 179H–I). (3) The trial judge had misapprehended the facts and was also influenced by the prevailing trend then in awarding the damages. No doubt the position and standing of the respondent was an important factor to be considered. But the fact that a person had at one time held a high position is not synonymous with his having a high personal integrity, reputation and honour. It would not be correct to say that the respondent’s standing, character, credit and reputation as a public figure was at its pinnacle at the time the libel was committed and totally collapsed because of this libel. This libel, after all, concerned a dishonoured cheque. Taking all factors into consideration, the court found that the award made by the trial judge was excessive. A total award of RM100,000 would be more reasonable (see pp 185H–I, 186B–C, G).
Bahasa Malaysia summary
Responden telah menyaman perayu kerana fitnah. Mahkamah Tinggi telah memberikan penghakiman yang menyebelahi responden dan mengawardkan sejumlah RM500,000 sebagai ganti rugi, dengan mengambilkira kedudukan dan pendirian plaintif sebagai seorang ahli politik, bekas timbalan speaker Dewan Rakyat, ahli Parlimen dan peguam (lihat [2000] 3 MLJ 22). Perayu telah membuat rayuan. Adalah dihujahkan bahawa: (i) responden tidak menyaman perayu berdasarkan perkataan-perkataan sebenar kenyataan akhbar perayu dalam erti kata bahawa responden tidak memetik keseluruhan kenyataan akhbar yang dikeluarkan oleh perayu dan oleh itu menyebabkan pliding tersebut cacat; (ii) tafsiran ke dalam Bahasa Malaysia tidak disahkan; dan (iii) ganti rugi yang diawardkan adalah keterlaluan.
Diputuskan, menolak rayuan atas liabiliti dan membenarkan rayuan atas kuantum: (1) Tiada peruntukan-peruntukan statutori maupun kaedah-kaedah mahkamah bahawa perkataan-perkataan sebenar mestilah diplikan sepenuhnya jika tidak tindakan akan gagal. Mahkamah mestilah melihat tujuannya, apa prejudis yang berlaku ke atas defendan dengan mengemukakan pembelaan beliau, pendek kata keadilan kes tersebut. Di mana libel membawa maksud satu perkataan atau perkataan-perkataan tertentu sememangnya perkataan-perkataan tersebut mestilah diplikan supaya perkataan yang digunakan boleh difahami dalam konteks yang betul ia digunakan. Di dalam kes ini, mahkamah mementingkan penyataan fakta-fakta. Tiada dua maksud kepada perkataan-perkataan tersebut. Ia tidak langsung dicabar di hadapan mahkamah bahawa perkataan-perkataan tersebut mempunyai maksud lain. Adalah jelas tiada perjudis terhadap perayu.
For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 145 Dalam keadaan demikian, mahkamah mendapati bahawa walaupun kenyataan akhbar tidak memetik sepenuhnya penyataan tuntutan tersebut, kegagalan untuk berbuat demikian, dalam keadaan kes ini, tidak memudaratkan (lihat ms 178D–G). (2) Kenyataan akhbar dan laporan akhbar adalah dalam bahasa Inggeris. Perkataan-perkataan yang penting telah dipetik dalam penyataan tuntutan. Peguam-peguam dan hakim-hakim memahami perkataan-perkataan tersebut dengan baik sekali. Lagipun, satu penafsiran dalam bahasa Malaysia telah diberikan, meskipun tidak disahkan, tidak dipertikaikan bahawa ia adalah betul. Di dalam keadaan ini, mahkamah mendapati tiada merit dalam penghujahan bahawa tindakan tersebut telah gagal kerana penafsiran dalam bahawa Malaysia tidak disahkan (lihat ms 179H–I). (3) Hakim perbicaraan telah salah faham tentang fakta-fakta dan juga dipengaruhi oleh budaya yang wujud ketika itu semasa mengawardkan ganti rugi. Adalah tidak dinafikan kedudukan dan pendirian responden memainkan faktor penting untuk dipertimbangkan. Tetapi hakikat bahawa seseorang pada ketika itu memegang kedudukan tinggi tidak merupakan sinonim dengan beliau mempunyai integriti peribadi yang tinggi, reputasi dan dihormati. Adalah tidak betul untuk mengatakan bahawa kedudukan, sikap, kewibawaan dan reputasi responden sebagai seorang tokoh masyarakat berada di kemuncak pada masa libel dilakukan dan telah musnah sama sekali kerana libel ini. Libel ini, lagipun, adalah berkaitan satu cek tak laku. Dengan mengambilkira semua faktor-faktor dalam pertimbangan, mahkamah mendapati bahawa award yang dibuat oleh hakim perbiacaraan adalah keterlaluan. Award berjumlah RM100,000 adalah lebih munasabah (lihat ms 185H–I, 186B–C, G).]
Notes For cases on damages in defamation cases, see 12 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2000 Reissue) paras 216–222.For cases on pleadings in defamation cases, see 12 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2000 Reissue) paras 366–369.
Cases referred to Abdul Karim bin Ayob v Kumpulan Karangkraf Sdn Bhd [2000] 1 MLJ 243 (refd) AJA Peter v OG Nio & Ors [1980] 1 MLJ 226 (refd) British Data Management plc v Boxer Commercial Removals plc & Anor [1996] 3 All ER 707 (refd) Cheah Cheng Hock & Ors v Liew Yew Tiam & Ors [2000] 6 MLJ 204 (refd) Chong Siew Chiang v Chua Ching Geh & Anor [1995] 1 MLJ 551 (refd) Collins v Jones [1955] 2 All ER 145 (refd) Dato Musa bin Hitam v SH Alatas & Ors [1991] 2 CLJ 314 (refd) Datuk Harris bin Mohd Salleh v Abdul Jalil bin Ahmad [1984] 1 MLJ 97 (refd)
For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 146 Dr Jenny Ibrahim v S Pakianathan [1986] 2 MLJ 154 (refd) Great One Coconut Products Industries (M) Sdn Bhd v Malayan Banking Bhd [1985] 2 MLJ 469 (refd) Harris v Warre 4 CPD 125 (refd) Hassan & Anor v Wan Ishak & Ors [1961] MLJ 45 (refd) Institute of Commercial Management United Kingdom v New Straits Times Press (M) Bhd [1993] 1 MLJ 408 (refd) John Lee & Anor v Henry Wong Jan Fook [1981] 1 MLJ 108 (refd) Liew Yew Tiam & Ors v Cheah Cheng Hock & Ors [2000] 6 MLJ 204 (refd) Liew Yew Tiam & Ors v Cheah Cheng Hoe & Ors [2001] 2 CLJ 385 (refd) Lim Kit Siang v Datuk Dr Ling Liong Sik & Ors [1997] 5 MLJ 523 (refd) Ling Wah Press (M) Sdn Bhd & Ors v Tan Sri Dato’ Vincent Tan Chee Yioun & other appeals [2000] 4 MLJ 77 (refd) MGG Pillai v Tan Sri Dato’ Vincent Tan Chee Yioun & other appeals [1995] 2 MLJ 493 (refd) Ng Cheng Kiat v Overseas Union Bank [1984] 2 MLJ 140 (refd) Noor Asiah bte Mahmood & Anor v Randhir Singh & Ors [2000] 2 MLJ 175 (refd) Normala Samsudin v Keluarga Communication Sdn Bhd [1999] 2 MLJ 654 (refd) Pang Fee Yoon v Piong Kien Siong & Ors [1999] 3 MLJ 189 (refd) Slim v Daily Telegraph Ltd [1969] 1 All ER 497 (refd) Tan Sri Vincent Tan Chee Yioun v Haji Hassan bin Hamzah & Ors [1995] 1 MLJ 39 (refd) Thiruchelvasegaram a/l Manickavasegar v Mahadevi a/p Nadchatiram [2000] 5 MLJ 465 (refd) Tjanting Handicraft Sdn Bhd & Anor v Utusan Melayu (M) Bhd & Ors [2001] 2 MLJ 544 (refd) Tournier v National Provincial Bank [1923] All ER 550 (refd) Tun Datuk Patinggi Haji Abdul Rahman Ya’kub v Bre Sdn Bhd & Ors [1996] 1 MLJ 393 (refd) Ummi Hafilda bte Ali & Anor v Karangkraf Sdn Bhd & Ors (No 2) [2000] 6 MLJ 532 (refd) Workers’ Party v Tay Boon Too & Anor [1975] 2 MLJ 124 (refd)
Legislation referred to Penal Code s 420
Karpal Singh (Karpal Singh & Co) for the appellant.
For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 147 DP Vijandran representing himself as respondent.
[2001] 4 MLJ 307 Re Geoffrey Robertson QC
HIGH COURT (KUALA LUMPUR) — ORIGINATING MOTIONS NO R1–17–35 OF 1999 AND R2–17–56 OF 1999 KC VOHRAH J 2 APRIL 2001
Legal Profession — Admission — Ad hoc — Queen’s Counsel — Applicant with his extensive and formidable experience had special qualifications in defamation, media and civil liberties, whether such expertise readily available in Malaysia — Whether quantum of damages for defamation settled law in Malaysia — Whether complex and novel issues requiring expertise of applicant
The applicant, a Queen’s Counsel practising in England, sought to be admitted and enrolled as an advocate and solicitor of the High Court of Malaya under s 18 of the Legal Profession Act 1976 (‘the Act’). The solicitors of the first defendant in Civil Suit No S2–23–14–99 (‘S2’) and the solicitors for the defendant in Civil Suit No S5–22–13–99 (‘S5’) were instructed to engage the applicant as lead counsel for them in the suits. S2 and S5 concerned claims for damages against the defendants for alleged libel of the plaintiff arising from the publication of an article. The plaintiff disputed that the two civil suits raised complex issues which require the services of the applicant. It was argued that no novel, complicated or serious issues had been raised; that art 10 of the Federal Constitution (‘the Constitution’) has been the subject matter of decided cases in Malaysia and that the same is not an issue which requires the services of the applicant; that the applicant in any event has no ‘special qualification or experience’ to argue constitutional issues arising from art 10 of the Constitution as he has not disclosed any particular expertise in the Malaysian Federal Constitution; that the issue pertaining to quantum of damages in defamation cases is settled law in Malaysia and as such the defendants could not be said to require the expertise possessed by the applicant in this field. The plaintiff also disputed that for the purpose of the particular cases, the applicant possesses any special qualifications or experience of a nature not available amongst advocates and solicitors in Malaysia.
Held, allowing the application: (1) There was no dispute, as disclosed in the verifying affidavits, that the applicant is accepted in England, in America and the British Commonwealth as being a
For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 148 leading barrister and a leading scholar in the area of defamation, media and civil liberty laws. The court had no doubt that the applicant with his extensive and formidable experience had special qualifications in the field of defamation, media and civil liberties law (see pp 314F, 315G, 316A). (2) Clearly there were complex issues posed by the two civil suits whether the defence of qualified privilege should also be extended or liberalized in this jurisdiction and whether this extension ||Page 308>>would be consonant with our art 10 of the Constitution. In addition there was the novel issue in Malaysia whether the publication of the said article in jurisdictions other than Malaysia are actionable in Malaysia. Then there was also the novel issue whether the role played by or the assistance given The Star makes The Star liable as a ‘printer’ at common law and whether The Star should be held liable for the publication within Malaysia (see p 318D–F). (3) As to the argument that the quantum of damages has been settled by case law, the court had grave hesitation to conclude that the matter is closed. The court agreed with the submission that the applicant’s ‘special expertise and qualifications’ in the area of defamation laws would give him an edge with respect to leading the argument on the issue of the proper quantum of damages to be awarded to a plaintiff in a libel action (see pp 318I, 319B). (4) There could be no doubt whatsoever that there are excellent lawyers in our country who have expertise in the area of law relating to defamation, the media and civil liberties. But these lawyers are not specialists in or devoted to these particular areas of law. The court found that the applicant possesses special qualifications and experience of a nature not really available amongst advocates and solicitors in practice in Malaysia (see pp 319E, 320A).
Bahasa Malaysia summary
Pemohon, yang merupakan seorang Queen’s counsel yang berkhidmat di England, memohon ingin diterima dan didaftarkan sebagai seorang peguambela dan peguamcara Mahkamah Tinggi Malaysia di bawah s 18 Akta Profesyen Guaman 1976 (‘Akta tersebut’). Peguamcara defendan pertama dalam Guaman Sivil No S2–23–14–99 (‘S2’) dan peguamcara defendan dalam Guaman Sivil No S5–22–13–99 (‘S5’) diarahkan mengambil khidmat pemohon sebagai peguam utama mereka dalam guaman-guaman tersebut. S2 dan S5 adalah berkaitan dengan tuntutan gantirugi terhadap defendan-defendan untuk dakwaan libel yang timbul dari penerbitan satu artikel. Plaintif mempertikaikan bahawa dua guaman sivil tersebut mewujudkan isu-isu yang rumit yang memerlukan perkhidmatan pemohon. Ia dihujahkan bahawa tiada isu yang baru, rumit atau serius telah dikemukakan; bahawa perkara 10 Perlembagaan Persekutuan (‘Perlembagaan’) pernah menjadi perkara kes-kes yang telah diputuskan di Malaysia dan bahawa ia bukan satu isu yang memerlukan perkhidmatan pemohon;
For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 149 bahawa pemohon tidak mempunyai apa-apa ‘kelayakan atau pengalaman khas’ untuk membincangkan isu-isu perlembagaan berkenaan perkara 10 Perlembagaan kerana beliau tidak mendedahkan apa-apa kepakaran khas dalam Perlembagaan Persekutuan Malaysia; bahawa isu yang melibatkan lingkungan gantirugi dalam kes-kes fitnah adalah undang- ||Page 309>>undang mantap di Malaysia dan oleh itu defendan-defendan tidak boleh dikatakan memerlukan kepakaran pemohon dalam bidang ini. Plaintif juga mempertikaikan bahawa bagi tujuan kes-kes tertentu, pemohon memiliki apa-apa kelayakan atau pengalaman khas yang tidak terdapat pada peguambela dan peguamcara di Malaysia.
Diputuskan, membenarkan permohonan tersebut: (1) Terdapat tiada pertikaian, seperti yang didedahkan dalam afidavit penentusahan, bahawa pemohon diterima di England, Amerika dan negara-negara Komanwel sebagai seorang peguambela yang unggul dan seorang cendekiawan utama dalam soal fitnah dan undang-undang kebebasan media dan kebebasan awam. Mahkamah tiada keraguan bahawa pemohon, dengan pengalamannya yang luas dan mengkagumkan, mempunyai kelayakan khas dalam bidang fitnah dan undang-undang kebebasan media dan kebebasan awam (lihat ms 314F, 315G, 316A). (2) Jelasnya terdapat isu-isu rumit yang dikemukakan oleh dua guaman sivil tersebut yang melibatkan soal sama ada pembelaan perlindungan bersyarat patut dilanjutkan atau diberi kelonggaran dalam bidangkuasa ini dan sama ada lanjutan ini selaras dengan perkara 10 Perlembagaan. Tambahan pula, terdapat isu baru di Malaysia sama ada penerbitan artikel tersebut dalam bidang kuasa selain daripada Malaysia boleh didakwa di Malaysia. Terdapat juga isu baru sama ada peranan yang dimainkan oleh, dan bantuan yang diberikan oleh, akhbar The Star menyebabkan The Star turut bertanggungjawab bagi penerbitan di dalam Malaysia (lihat ms 318D–F). (3) Berkenaan penghujahan bahawa lingkungan gantirugi telah diselesaikan oleh kes-kes duluan, mahkamah ragu-ragu untuk membuat kesimpulan bahawa perkara ini dianggap selesai dan tidak boleh dibicarakan lagi. Mahkamah bersetuju dengan hujahan bahawa ‘kepakaran dan kelayakan khas’ pemohon dalam soal undang-undang fitnah akan memberikannya kelebihan dalam mengemukan hujahan mengenai isu lingkungan gantirugi yang sesuai yang patut diberikan kepada plaintif dalam satu tindakan libel (lihat ms 318I, 319B). (4) Terdapat tiada keraguan sama sekali bahawa terdapat peguam yang cemerlang dalam negara ini yang mempunyai kepakaran dalam bidang undang-undang berkenaan fitnah, undang-undang kebebasan media dan kebebasan awam. Tetapi para peguam ini bukannya pakar dalam, atau berjurusan khusus dalam, bidang-bidang undang-undang ini. Mahkamah mendapati bahawa pemohon mempunyai kelayakan dan pengalaman khas yang tidak boleh didapati di kalangan peguambela dan peguamcara yang berkhidmat di Malaysia (lihat ms
For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 150 319E, 320A).] ||Page 310>>
Notes For cases on ad hoc admission, see 9 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 1995 Reissue) paras 1345–1363.
Cases referred to AG v Wain & Ors [1991] 2 MLJ 525 (refd) Ahmad bin Said v Zulkiflee bin Bakar [1997] 5 MLJ 542 (refd) Albert Reynolds v Times [1998] 3 All ER 961 (refd) Albert Reynolds v Times Newspapers [1999] 4 All ER 609 (refd) Berezovsky and Glouchkov v Forbes Inc & Anor Times, 27 November 1998 (refd) Bowman v UK [1998] 1 CLY 1 (refd) Chadha & Osicom v Dow Jones Inc [1999] CLY 283 (refd) Goodwin v UK (1996) 22 EHRR 123 (refd) Institute of Commercial Management (UK) v New Straits Times Press (M) Bhd [1993] 1 MLJ 408 (refd) Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corp (1997) 189 CLR 520 (refd) Lee Kuan Yew v Chin Vui Khen & Anor [1991] 3 MLJ 49 (refd) Lee KuanYew v Derek Gwyn Davies & Far Eastern Economic Review [1990] 1 MLJ 390 (refd) Pratt & Morgan v AG of Jamaica [1994] 2 AC 1 (refd) Pustaka Delta Pelajaran Sdn Bhd v Berita Harian [1998] 6 MLJ 529 (refd) Rees v Crane [1994] 2 AC 173 (refd) Reynolds v Times [1998] 3 WLR 862 (refd) Saif Al Islam Gaddafi v Telegraph Group Ltd [2000] EMLR 43 (refd) Tolstoy Miloslavsky v UK [1995] 1 CLY 458 (refd)
Legislation referred to Advocates and Solicitors Ordinance 1947 s 8A Federal Constitution art 10(1)(a), (2)(a) Legal Profession Act 1976 s 18(1)(a), (2)
Gurmeet Kaur (Bhag Singh with him) (Shafee & Co) for the applicant in Originating Motion No R1–17–35 of 1999. Ahmad Kamal (Senior Federal Counsel) for the Attorney General’s Chambers,
For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 151 Edmund Bon for the Bar Council and Yasmeen Shariff for the Kuala Lumpur Bar Committee in Originating Motion No R2–17–56 of 1999. R Thayalan (Ashok Vijay with him) (VK Lingam & Co) for the plaintiff in Civil Suits No S2–23–14 of 1999 and No S2(S5)–23–13 of 1999.
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[2001] 4 MLJ 497 Albert Chew v Hong Leong Finance Bhd
HIGH COURT (KUALA LUMPUR) — SUIT NO S2-23-53 OF 1999 KAMALANATHAN RATNAM J 7 SEPTEMBER 2001
Tort — Defamation — Libel — Police report and complaint to Bar Council — Forged discharge document attested by legal assistant — Falsified attestation — Usual practice of legal firms, whether court should condone illegality — Whether defence of qualified privilege applied — Unmitigated delay in filling suit — Whether libel proved
The plaintiff was a legal assistant attached to the firm of LS Chua & Co. A police report was lodged requesting the police to investigate the alleged forgery of a discharge document which was attested by the plaintiff. A formal complaint was also made against the plaintiff to the Bar Council requesting for an investigation to be conducted by the Disciplinary Board of the Bar Council. Having considered the complaint and the explanation from the plaintiff and the report of the Investigating Tribunal, the Bar Council dismissed the complaint. The plaintiff brought an action for defamation against the defendant whereby it was pleaded that the words contained in police report in their natural and ordinary meaning charged the plaintiff and/or implicated him with and/or imputed the offence of forgery in respect of the transaction adverted to therein. In respect of the complaint to the Bar Council the plaintiff pleaded that the said words in their natural and ordinary meaning charged the plaintiff and/or implicated him with and/or imputed the offence of forgery and that the said words were also calculated to further discredit him in his profession as an advocate and solicitor by falsely and maliciously attributing to and/or connecting him with unethical and/or dishonorable and/or discreditable and/or disreputable conduct that warranted him being disciplined. The plaintiff therefore prayed for special damages and damages for libel.
Held, dismissing the claim:
For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 152 (1) Having read the police report and the complaint to the Bar Council, the court could not found it anywhere stated that the plaintiff was the author of the forged document. All that the defendant said was that the plaintiff had attested as true, a document which was not a true document (see p 507D). (2) The plaintiff had certified to the genuineness and correctness of an untrue copy. The defence of qualified privilege must succeed in this case. The defendant had a duty to report because of a serious allegation of forgery. If the discharge of charge which the plaintiff was alleged to have attested to was genuine and a true document, then the charge would have been discharge and the defendant’s charge would have been duly registered. In the circumstances, the court could not fault the defendant for lodging the police report and the complaint to the Bar Council (see pp 507H, 508C–D). ||Page 498>> (3) The initial misconduct of the plaintiff was the causa causans for the defendant to lodge a police report and the complaint to the Bar Council. If this court accepts the plaintiff’s explanation that it is the practice of most legal firms to do as he did then it would be tantamount to condoning an illegal or improper act by this court. Legal assistant should have the courage to tell their respective employers that they will not be a party to any illegal or improper conduct (see pp 507C, 508E). (4) Another factor that the court had to take into consideration was the plaintiff’s unmitigated delay in filing this suit. His explanation that he was emotionally upset could not be a sufficient and valid reason for failing to forthwith file a suit to vindicate his reputation. He filed this suit hardly a month or two before the six-year limitation period had set in and no satisfactory explanation was given for the delay (see p 509B–C).
Bahasa Malaysia summary
Plaintif merupakan seorang pembantu guaman yang bekerja dengan firma LS Chua & Co. Laporan polis telah dibuat meminta pihak polis supaya menyiasat jenayah pemalsuan yang dikatakan telah dilakukan ke atas suatu dokumen discaj yang disahkan oleh plaintif. Satu aduan rasmi telah pun dibuat terhadap plaintif kepada Majlis Peguam memohon supaya satu siasatan dijalankan oleh Lembaga Tatatertib Majlis Peguam. Setelah menimbang aduan tersebut dan penjelasan daripada plaintif serta laporan Tribunal Siasatan, Majlis Peguam telah menolak aduan tersebut. Plaintif telah memulakan suatu tindakan fitnah terhadap defendan yang mana ia dihujahkan bahawa perkataan-perkataan yang terkandung dalam laporan polis dalam maksud lazim dan biasa mereka telah mendakwa plaintif dan/atau mengaitkannya dengan dan/atau menuduhnya dengan kesalahan pemalsuan berhubung dengan transaksi yang dirujuk di dalamnya. Berkaitan dengan aduan kepada Majlis Peguam, plaintif berhujah bahawa perkataan-perkataan tersebut dalam maksud lazim dan biasa mereka telah menuduh
For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 153 plaintif dan/atau mengaitkannya dengan dan/atau menuduhnya dengan kesalahan pemalsuan dan bahawa kata-kata tersebut juga dijangka menjatuhkan namanya dengan lebih lanjut dalam profesyennya sebagai seorang peguambela dan peguamcara dengan mengatakan secara palsu dan berniat jahat mendakwa dan/atau mengaitkannya dengan kelakuan yang tidak beretika dan/atau tidak bermaruah dan/atau memalukan dan/atau yang kurang hormat yang mewajarkan tindakan tatatertib diambil ke atasnya. Maka plaintif memohon ganti rugi khas dan ganti rugi untuk fitnah bertulis.
Diputuskan, menolak tuntutan tersebut: (1) Setelah membaca laporan polis dan aduan kepada Majlis Peguam, mahkamah tidak menjumpai apa-apa kenyataan bahawa ||Page 499>>plaintif merupakan penulis dokumen yang dipalsukan. Apa yang dikatakan oleh defendan ialah bahawa plaintif telah mengesahkan apa yang benar, satu dokumen yang bukannya satu dokumen yang benar (lihat ms 507D). (2) Plaintif telah mengesahkan kesahihan dan ketepatan salinan yang tidak benar. Pembelaan perlindungan bersyarat mesti berjaya dalam kes ini. Defendan bertanggungjawab membuat laporan disebabkan dakwaan jenayah pemalsuan yang serius. Sekiranya discaj caj yang mana plaintif dikatakan telah mengesahkan adalah benar dan satu dokumen yang benar, maka caj itu tentunya dilepaskan dan caj defendan pastinya akan didaftarkan seperti yang sepatutnya. Dalam keadaan ini, mahkamah tidak boleh mempersalahkan defendan kerana membuat laporan polis dan aduan kepada Majlis Peguam (lihat ms 507H, 508C–D). (3) Salah laku permulaan plaintif merupakan causa causans yang menyebabkan defendan membuat laporan polis dan aduan kepada Majllis Peguam. Sekiranya mahkamah ini menerima penjelasan plaintif bahawa ia merupakan amalan kebanyakan firma guaman untuk membuat sebagaimana yang dilakukannya, ia sama sahaja dengan memaafkan tindakan yang salah di sisi undang-undang atau yang tidak wajar oleh mahkamah ini. Pembantu guaman seharusnya berani memberitahu majikan masing-masing bahawa mereka tidak akan menjadi pihak kepada apa-apa kelakuan yang menyalahi undang-undang atau yang tidak wajar (lihat ms 507C, 508E). (4) Satu lagi faktor yang harus diambil kira oleh mahkamah adalah kelewatan plaintif dalam memfailkan guaman ini. Penjelasan beliau bahawa emosinya tersinggung tidak boleh diterima sebagai satu alasan yang mencukupi dan sah atas kegagalan memfail satu guaman dengan serta-merta untuk membersihkan reputasinya. Beliau memfailkan guaman ini tidak hampir sebulan atau dua bulan sebelum tempoh had masa enam tahun luput dan tiada penjelasan yang memuaskan telah diberi untuk kelewatan tersebut (lihat ms 509B–C).]
Notes For cases on libel generally, see 12 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2000 Reissue) paras
For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 154 263–252.
Legislation referred to Defamation Act 1957 s 12 National Land Code 1965 s 211(2)
Terrance Marbeck (SG Yahna with him) (TS Marbeck & Co) for the plaintiff. Robert Lazar (TM Yap with him) (Shearn Delamore & Co) for the defendant. ||Page 500>>
[2001] 4 MLJ 510 Ngoi Thiam Woh v CTOS Sdn Bhd & Ors
HIGH COURT (IPOH) — CIVIL SUIT NO 22–87 OF 2001 ABDULL HAMID EMBONG J 30 AUGUST 2001
Civil Procedure — Injunction — Interim injunction in defamation action — Restraint against proclamation of sale in newspaper — Bona fide defence of qualified privilege — Whether court could grant interim injunction in defamation action — Delay in application for injunction — Whether plaintiff must provide undertaking to damages
Tort — Defamation — Injunction — Interim injunction against proclamation of sale in newspaper — Bona fide defence of qualified privilege — Whether court could grant interim injunction in defamation action — Delay in application for injunction — Whether plaintiff must provide undertaking to damages
The plaintiff was a businessman and the sole distributor of a wide range of health and skin care products. He was also formerly a member of Parliament and a state assemblyman. The first defendant (‘CTOS’) was a computer database information company which collated information from newspapers, government gazettes, the registries of businesses and companies and stored them into its electronic archive for the information of its customers which included banks. The second defendant (‘The Star’), was the publisher of a popular daily newspaper and the third defendant was the printer of the second defendant. The plaintiff had, in May this year, filed a suit against the defendants seeking damages for defamation and for injunctive reliefs. In this application, the plaintiff sought for an interlocutory injunction pending the disposal of the suit to restrain the defendants, from, inter alia, publishing and communicating a
For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 155 proclamation of sale (‘the proclamation’). The defendants had raised two preliminary objections to this application. Firstly, it was submitted that the affidavit in support did not offer any undertaking for damages. Secondly, it was submitted that there had been a long delay of 40 months in seeking this injunctive relief, a delay for which there was no plausible explanation. The primary issue for determination was whether the court may grant an interim injunction in a defamation action.
Held, dismissing the application: (1) The court should be slow in granting an interim injunction in a defamation action. The court may only grant interlocutory injunctions of this species if the following factors are satisfied: (i) that the statement is unarguably defamatory; (ii) there are no grounds for concluding that the statement may be true; (iii) there is no other defence which might succeed; and (iv) there is evidence of an intention to repeat or publish the defamatory statement. The burden of proof falls upon the plaintiff, and not on the defendants. In the instant application, the plaintiff had ||Page 511>>failed to satisfy the court all of the first three factors stated (see pp 517F, 519B, 520D–E). (2) The proclamation complained of was, on the face of it, a usual advertisement published on The Star, pursuant to its normal day to day transaction. The plaintiff had not satisfied the court that the proclamation was published out of malice. The plea of qualified privilege by the second and the third defendants should therefore be considered by this court as prima facie bona fide defence in refusing the grant of an interim injunction (see p 519G–H). (3) Form 58 of the Rules of the High Court 1980 (‘the RHC’), ie the Form for an order for interim injunction shows that the court, in its discretion, may order that the plaintiff gives an undertaking as to damages. This order on an undertaking may be made by the court if it is of the opinion, after enquiring into the matter, that a defendant would sustain some damages as a result of the injunction granted. Clearly then, this order on the undertaking is left to the court’s discretion. The omission to provide for an undertaking for damages in the plaintiff’s affidavit or his application is thus not fatal, and that under the RHC, it is a non-mandatory requisite although the general practice, with some exceptions is for the court to require that such an undertaking be given. Being a discretionary remedy and one founded on equity, the court must have regard to the essential justice of the case (see p 522C–F). (4) The complaint here was a most grave and pressing matter, as was impressed upon this court by the plaintiff in his own application, and surely, one that required immediate attention and compelling action. The plaintiff need not have waited until after the writ was filed to seek this interlocutory relief. He should have acted promptly upon the proclamation coming to his knowledge. Discretionary remedies being exceptional in nature, should not be made available to those who sleep on their rights. In the instant case, the plaintiff’s
For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 156 prolonged slumber of some 40 months was certainly inexcusable (see pp 520I–521C). Obiter: The application before this court was defective and one wanting in procedure. There was no machinery to enable the plaintiff to apply for an interlocutory injunction by a motion to a judge in open court. An application that failed to comply with a mandatory procedural requirement is was and could not stand. A fundamental breach of an expressed requirement had occurred and one not curable under O 2 of the RHC. It was unfortunate that this matter was not earlier brought to the court’s attention for, if it had been, a summary striking out of this motion would not have been inappropriate in the circumstance (see pp 522I–523C). ||Page 512>>
Bahasa Malaysia summary
Plaintif merupakan seorang ahli perniagaan dan pengedar tunggal berbagai jenis barangan kesihatan dan penjagaan kulit. Beliau juga merupakan bekas ahli Parlimen dan ahli dewan undangan negeri. Defendan pertama (‘CTOS’) merupakan syarikat maklumat pangkalan data komputer yang mengumpul semak maklumat daripada suratkhabar, warta kerajaan, pejabat-pejabat pendaftaran perniagaan dan syarikat-syarikat dan menyimpannya di dalam arkib elektroniknya untuk maklumat pelanggan-pelanggannya termasuk bank-bank. Defendan kedua (‘The Star’) adalah penerbit suratkhabar harian yang popular dan defendan ketiga merupakan pencetak defendan kedua. Pada Mei tahun ini, plaintif telah memfailkan guaman terhadap defendan menuntut ganti rugi untuk fitnah dan untuk relif-relif injunksi. Di dalam permohonan ini, plaintif memohon untuk injunksi interlokutori sementara menunggu penyelesaian guaman untuk memberhentikan defendan-defendan daripada, inter alia, menerbitkan suatu proklamasi jualan (‘proklamasi tersebut’). Defendan-defendan membangkitkan dua bantahan awal kepada permohonan ini. Pertamanya, telah dihujahkan bahawa affidavit sokongan tidak mengandungi sebarang akujanji untuk ganti rugi. Kedua yang dihujahkan adalah bahawa telah berlaku kelewatan selama 40 bulan dalam memohon relif injunksi tersebut, dan kelewatan ini tidak beralasan. Isu utama untuk ditentukan adalah sama ada mahkamah boleh memberi injunksi interim di dalam guaman fitnah.
Diputuskan, menolak permohonan tersebut: (1) Mahkamah tidak sepatutnya tergesa-gesa memberikan injunksi interim dalam guaman fitnah. Mahkamah hanya boleh memberikan injunksi sebegini jika faktor-faktor seperti berikut dipuaskan: (i) pernyataan tersebut adalah fitnah; (ii) tiada alasan untuk memutuskan bahawa pernyataan tersebut adalah benar; (iii) tiada pembelaan yang mungkin berjaya; dan (iv) terdapat keterangan yang menunjukkan niat untuk mengulangi ataupun menerbit fitnah tersebut. Beban
For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 157 membukti jatuh ke atas plaintif dan bukan defendan-defendan. Di dalam permohonan ini, plaintif gagal memuaskan mahkamah di atas ketiga-tiga faktor tersebut (lihat ms 517F, 519B, 520D–E). (2) Proklamasi yang dikatakan, pada dasarnya, adalah iklan biasa yang diterbitkan dalam The Star, sebagai urus niaga sehari-hari. Plaintif gagal memuaskan mahkamah ini bahawa proklamasi tersebut dibuat dengan niat jahat. Rayuan perlindungan bersyarat defendan kedua dan ketiga sepatutnya dipertimbangkan oleh mahkamah sebagai pembelaan yang prima facie bona fide dalam menolak permohonan untuk injunksi interim (lihat ms 519G–H). (3) Borang 58 Keadah-Keadah Mahkamah Tinggi 1980 (‘KMT’), iaitu borang untuk perintah untuk injunksi interim, menunjukkan ||Page 513>>bahawa mahkamah, melalui budi bicaranya boleh memberi perintah supaya plaintif memberi akujanji ganti rugi. Jika mahkamah berpendapat bahawa, setelah menyiasat bahawa defendan akan menanggung kerugian oleh kerana injunksi tersebut, mahkamah boleh membuat perintah akujanji. Jelas bahawa perintah aku janji ini adalah pada budi bicara mahkamah. Kegagalan plantif dalam menyediakan aku janji di dalam afidavitnya atau permohonannya tidak membawa padah, dan di bawah KMT, ia tidak merupakan keperluan yang mandatori, walaupun, sebagai amalan, dengan kekecualian, mahkamah menghendaki aku janji sedemikian diberi. Sebagai remedi yang mengikut budi bicara dan berdasarkan ekuiti, mahkamah mestilah mengambil berat terhadap keadilan kes tersebut (lihat ms 522C–F). (4) Aduan di dalam kes ini adalah perkara yang serius dan mendesak, seperti yang ditekan oleh plaintif di dalam afidavitnya dan merupakan perkara yang memerlukan perhatian segera dan tindakan mendorong. Plaintif tidak perlu menunggu sehingga writ difailkan sebelum memohon untuk relif interlokutari tersebut. Beliau sepatutnya bertindak sebaik sahaja selepas beliau mendapat tahu mengenai proklamasi tersebut. Remedi yang mengikut budi bicara tidak sepatutnya diberi kepada pemohon yang tidak bertindak dengan segera. Di dalam kes ini, kegagalan plaintif untuk bertindak selama 40 bulan tidak dapat dimaafkan (lihat ms 520I–521C). Obiter: Permohonan di hadapan mahkamah ini adalah cacat dan tidak mengikut prosedur. Plaintif tidak boleh memohon untuk injunksi interlokutari melalui usul kepada hakim di dalam mahkamah terbuka. Permohonan yang tidak mengikut prosedur mandatori akan membawa padah. Kemungkiran asasi peruntukkan yang nyata telahpun berlaku dan tidak dapat dibetulkan di bawah A 2 KMT. Jikalau perkara ini dibawa kepada perhatian mahkamah terlebih dahulu, pembatalan terus usul ini tidak boleh dikatakan tidak patut di dalam situasi ini (lihat ms 522I–523C).
Notes For cases on interim injunction generally, see 2(2) Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2001
For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 158 Reissue) paras 2626–2706.For cases on an injunction in a defamation action, see 12 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2000 Reissue) paras 253–257.
Cases referred to Allen & Ors v Jambo Holdings Ltd & Ors [1980] 2 All ER 502 (refd) American Cyanamid Co v Ethicon Ltd [1975] 1 All ER 504 (refd) ||Page 514>> Asia Commercial Finance (M) Bhd v Kimden Housing Development Sdn Bhd [1993] 1 MLJ 283 (refd) Best Electronics Sdn Bhd v Chen Li Yeng [1997] MLJU 167 (refd) Bonnard v Perryman [1891] 2 Ch 269 (refd) Cheng Hang Guan & Ors v Perumahan Farlim (Penang) Sdn Bhd & Ors [1988] 3 MLJ 90 (refd) Coulson v Coulson (1887) 3 TLR 846 (refd) Delbert-Evans v Davies and Watson [1945] All ER 167 (refd) Evercrisp Snack Products (M) Sdn Bhd & Anor v Sweeties Food Industries Sdn Bhd [1980] 2 MLJ 297 (refd) Haji Wan Habib Syed Mahmud v Datuk Patinggi Haji Abdul Taib Mahmud & Anor [1986] 2 MLJ 198 (refd) Keet Gerald Francis Noel John v Mohd Noor bin Abdullah & Ors [1995] 1 MLJ 193 (refd) Lim Hean Pin v Thean Seng Co Sdn Bhd & Ors [1992] 2 MLJ 10 (refd) Lim Kit Siang v United Engineers (M) Bhd & Ors (No 2) [1988] 1 MLJ 50 (refd) Mogul Steamship Co v M’Gregor, Gow & Co (1885) 15 QBD 47 (refd) Murray Hiebert v Chandra Sri Ram [1999] 4 MLJ 321 (refd) New Straits Times Press (M) Bhd, The v Airasia Bhd [1987] 1 MLJ 36 (refd) Noor Jahan bte Abdul Wahab v Md Yusoff bin Amanshah & Anor [1994] 1 MLJ 156 (refd) Perbadanan Nasional Insurans Sdn Bhd v Pua Lai Ong [1996] 3 MLJ 85 (refd) Quartz Hill Consolidated Gold Mining Co v Beall (1882) 20 Ch D 501 (refd) Rajamanikam a/l Adaikalam v Bolton Finance Bhd [2000] 3 MLJ 454 (refd) Seema Development Sdn Bhd v Mah Kim Chye & Anor [1997] MLJU 235 (refd) Si Rusa Beach Resort Sdn Bhd v Asia Pacific Hotels Management Pte Ltd [1985] 1 MLJ 132 (refd)
Legislation referred to Defamation Act 1957 s 12(1) Rules of the High Court 1980 O 29 rr 1(2), 2A, Form 58
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Ngan Siong Hing (Abbas & Ngan) for the plaintiff. Harris Ibrahim (Nor Isman with him) (Liza Chan & Co) for the first defendant. Bhag Singh (Bhag Sulaiman & Co) for the second and third defendants.
[2001] 5 MLJ 48 Anwar bin Ibrahim v Abdul Khalid @ Khalid Jafri bin Bakar & Anor
HIGH COURT (KUALA LUMPUR) — CIVIL SUIT NO S2–23–40 OF 1998 KAMALANATHAN RATNAM J 13 SEPTEMBER 2000
Civil Procedure — Amendment — Defence — Application to amend defence after summons for directions obtained — Defamation suit — Allegation of corrupt practice — Criminal conviction of plaintiff on corrupt practice — Appeal on conviction pending — Whether defendant justified in relying on criminal case
Evidence — Criminal conviction — Admissibility in civil proceedings — Defamation suit — Allegation of corrupt practice — Criminal conviction of plaintiff on corrupt practice — Appeal on conviction pending — Whether defendant justified in relying on criminal case as defence in defamation suit — Evidence Act 1950 s 43
The plaintiff was at all material times a Member of Parliament, Deputy Prime Minister and Finance Minister of Malaysia while the first defendant authored a book entitled ‘50 Dalil Mengapa Anwar Tidak Boleh Jadi PM’. The plaintiff sued the defendant for damages for libel and conspiracy. The defendants pleaded justification and averred their intention to adduce evidence to substantiate their allegations. The parties had closed pleadings and obtained an order for summons for directions. At that stage, the defendants applied to amend their defence which was opposed by the plaintiff. The defendants had dropped the plea of justification and instead had cited the reported case against the defendant, ie PP v Dato’ Seri Anwar Ibrahim (No 3) [1999] 2 MLJ 1 together with the charges and the sentence. In the reported case, the plaintiff (the accused) was charged with four counts of corrupt practices under s 2(1) of the Emergency (Essential Powers) Ordinance No 22 of 1970. Having heard all the evidence, the court found the accused guilty on all four charges and sentenced him to six years imprisonment in respect of each of the four charges with the sentences to run concurrently from the date of conviction. It was the case of the defence that since the
For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 160 contents of exh P14A in the criminal charge actually represented the contents of part of the book, they were justified in relying on the case, the charges and the conviction.
Held, allowing the application: (1) Section 43 of the Evidence Act 1950 states that judgments, orders or decrees other than those mentioned in ss 40, 41 and 42 are irrelevant unless the existence of such judgment, order or decree is a fact in issue or is relevant under some other provision of this Act. Clearly the conviction of the plaintiff herein for corruption is a fact in issue as the first defendant has accused the plaintiff of indulging in corrupt practices and the plaintiff had denied the same. The plaintiff therefore will have sufficient opportunity to ||Page 49>>explain the charges and the conviction in the civil case. Further, the character of the plaintiff is vital to the question of damages. The defendants must be given the liberty to plead all relevant facts that would be relevant towards mitigating damages (see pp 53B, 55G–H). (2) The defendants have referred to a decision of the court (and subsequently affirmed by the Court of Appeal) wherein the plaintiff had been charged and convicted of corrupt practices, the very essence of the defendants’ allegation against the plaintiff which led to the filing of the suit. The defendants ought not to be precluded from amending their defence to include the charges and the conviction (see pp 56I–57A). The argument that the appeal by the plaintiff against his conviction to the Federal Court is pending and hence the decision is not final is unacceptable. A court of competent jurisdiction had found the plaintiff guilty of four counts of corruption. An appeal to the Federal Court does not mean that the guilty verdicts are put in limbo or that the plaintiff is deemed innocent (see p 58C–D).
Bahasa Malaysia summary
Plaintif pada semua waktu material merupakan seorang ahli Parlimen, Timbalan Perdana Menteri dan Menteri Kewangan Malaysia manakala defendan pertama telah mengarang sebuah buku berjudul ‘50 Dalil Mengapa Anwar Tidak Boleh Jadi PM’. Plaintif mendakwa defendan bagi gantirugi libel dan komplot. Defendan-defendan membawa pembelaan justifikasi dan menegaskan niat mereka mengemukakan keterangan untuk mengesahkan tuduhan-tuduhan mereka. Setiap pihak telah menutup pliding dan mendapatkan perintah saman untuk arahan. Pada peringkat itu, defendan-defendan memohon untuk meminda pembelaan mereka dan ini ditentang oleh plaintif. Defendan-defendan telah menggugurkan pembelaan justifikasi dan sebaliknya memetik kes yang dilaporkan mengenai defendan, iaitu PP v Dato’ Seri Anwar Ibrahim (No 3) [1999] 2 MLJ 1 bersama dengan tuduhan-tuduhan dan hukumannya. Dalam kes yang dilaporkan itu, plaintif (tertuduh) dituduh dengan empat tuduhan kegiatan rasuah di bawah s 2(1) Ordinan Darurat (Kuasa-Kuasa Perlu) No 22 tahun
For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 161 1970. Setelah mendengar segala keterangan, mahkamah telah mendapati yang tertuduh bersalah dalam keempat-empat tuduhan dan menjatuhkan hukuman enam tahun penjara bagi setiap satu daripada empat tuduhan tersebut, dan hukuman-hukuman tersebut dijalankan serentak dari tarikh sabitan. Kes pembelaan adalah memandangkan kandungan exh P14A dalam tuduhan jenayah tersebut sebenarnya mewakili kandungan sebahagian daripada buku tersebut, adalah munasabah bagi mereke untuk bergantung kepada kes, tuduhan dan sabitan tersebut. ||Page 50>>
Diputuskan, membenarkan permohonan tersebut: (1) Seksyen 43 Akta Keterangan 1950 menyatakan bahawa penghakiman, perintah atau keputusan selain daripada apa yang disebut dalam ss 40, 41 dan 42 adalah tidak relevan kecuali jika kewujudan penghakiman, perintah atau keputusan sedemikian ialah fakta yang dipertikaikan atau relevan di bawah peruntukan lain di bawah Akta tersebut. Jelasnya, sabitan plaintif bagi rasuah merupakan fakta yang dipertikaikan kerana defendan pertama telah menuduh plaintif melakukan kegiatan rasuah dan plaintif telah menafikan tuduhan-tuduhan tersebut. Plaintif mempunyai peluang yang mencukupi untuk menerangkan tuduhan-tuduhan tersebut dan sabitan dalam kes sivil tersebut. Selain daripada itu, keperibadian plaintif juga mustahak dalam soal gantirugi. Defendan-defendan mesti diberi kebebasan membuat pembelaan bagi semua fakta yang relevan dalam meringankan ganti rugi (lihat ms 53B, 55G–H). (2) Defendan-defendan telah merujuk kepada salah satu keputusan mahkamah (yang kemudiannya disahkan oleh Mahkamah Rayuan) di mana plaintif telah dituduh dan disabit kesalahan kegiatan rasuah, intipati tuduhan defendan-defendan terhadap plaintif yang menyebabkan guaman tersebut difail. Defendan-defendan tidak harus dikecualikan dari mengubah pembelaan mereka untuk memasukkan tuduhan-tuduhan serta sabitan (lihat ms 56I–57A). Hujahan bahawa rayuan plaintif atas sabitannya ke Mahkamah Persekutuan masih menunggu keputusan dan oleh itu keputusan tersebut tidak muktamad tidak boleh diterima. Mahkamah yang mempunyai bidang kuasa telah mendapati plaintif bersalah atas empat tuduhan rasuah. Rayuan kepada Mahkamah Persekutuan tidak bermaksud bahawa keputusan bersalah itu terawang-awang atau bahawa plaintif dianggap tidak bersalah (lihat ms 58C–D).]
Notes For cases on amendment of defence, see 2(1) Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 1998 Reissue) paras 308–318 and 2(2) Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 1998 Reissue) paras 3445–3455. For a case on admissibility of criminal conviction in civil proceedings, see 7 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 1998 Reissue) para 852.
Cases referred to
For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 162 Cohen v Daily Telegraph Ltd [1968] 2 All ER 407 (refd) Dato’ Seri Anwar bin Ibrahim v PP [2000] 2 MLJ 486 (refd) DP Vijandran v Karpal Singh & Ors [2000] 3 MLJ 22 (refd) PP v Dato’ Seri Anwar Ibrahim (No 3) [1999] 2 MLJ 1 (refd) Hollington v F Hewthorn & Co. Ltd [1943] 2 All ER 35 (refd) Jorgensen v News Media (Auckland) Ltd [1969] NZLR 961 (refd) ||Page 51>> Ramanathan Chelliah v Penyunting, The Malay Mail & Anor [1998] 2 CLJ 691 (refd) Simetech (M) Sdn Bhd v Yeoh Cheng Liam Construction Sdn Bhd [1992] 1 MLJ 11 (refd)
Legislation referred to Emergency (Essential Powers) Ordinance No 22 of 1970 s 2(1) Evidence Act 1950 ss 40, 41, 42, 43 Penal Code ss 193, 354 Rules of the High Court 1980 O 34
Tuan Haji Sulaiman Abdullah (Leela J Jesuthasan with him) for the respondent/plaintiff. Shamsul-Bahrain bin Ibrahim (Skrine & Co) for the applicants/defendants.
[2001] 5 MLJ 277 Bitutech Sdn Bhd & Ors v Bosco Philip Anthony & Ors
HIGH COURT (KUALA LUMPUR) — CIVIL SUIT NO S2–(S6)–23–92 0F 1999 KAMALANATHAN RATNAM J 12 OCTOBER 2000
Civil Procedure — Striking out — Pleadings — Striking out statement of claim — Appeal against registrar’s decision in allowing application to strike out — Rules of the High Court 1980 O 18 r 19
Tort — Defamation — Libel — Libellous statement in e-mail — Allegation that plaintiff had not conformed with court order and an order from the Majlis Perbandaran Selayang — Whether first defendant acting as agent or servant for third defendant — Whether constructive knowledge can be attributed to the third defendant
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At all material times, the second, third and fourth plaintiffs were the directors of the first plaintiff, whereas the first defendant was the advocate and solicitor of the second and third defendants. On 12 July 1999, the first defendant obtained an ex parte order for an injuction to restrain the plaintiffs from manufacturing products that may pollute the surrounding area of Sungai Buloh. This order lapsed on 22 July 1999 and an application to extend the order was dismissed by the High Court in Shah Alam on 22 July 1999. On 3 August 1999, the first defendant issued an e-mail to the Yang Di-pertua Majlis Perbandaran Selayang and to the director, Department of Environment, State of Selangor stating that the first plaintiff had not ceased its operations notwithstanding the court order and an order from the Majlis Perbandaran Selayang (through a letter dated 30 June 1999) to the first plaintiff to cease operations. The plaintiffs took the words to mean that they had wilfully disobeyed the injunctive order of the court and thereby had been brought into public scandal, odium and contempt, and sued the defendants in libel. The third defendant applied to strike out the claim against him under O 18 r 19(1)(a), (b) and (c) of the Rules of the High Court 1980. In his supporting affidavit, the third defendant averred that he did not instruct the first defendant to send the e-mail and that the e-mailer was neither his agent nor his servant. The learned senior assistant registrar allowed the third defendant’s application and the plaintiffs appealed.
Held, dismissing the appeal with costs: The first defendant had expressly stated that he sent the e-mail on his own and without the instructions of the third defendant. It cannot be said then that constructive knowledge must be attributed to the third defendant. This admission must be taken together with the fact that the solicitor himself was the first defendant, and was also acting for himself with an interest in the matter in question. Once this evidence ||Page 278>>was before the court, it did not think it was necessary to hear from the respondent (see p 280G–H).
Bahasa Malaysia summary
Pada semua masa yang material, plaintif-plaintif kedua, ketiga dan keempat adalah pengarah kepada plaintif pertama, manakala defendan pertama adalah peguambela dan peguamcara kepada defendan-defendan kedua dan ketiga. Pada 12 Julai 1999, defendan pertama telah memperoleh perintah ex parte untuk injunksi untuk menghalang plaintif-plaintif daripada membuat produk-produk yang mungkin mencemarkan kawasan Sungai Buloh. Perintah tersebut luput pada 22 Julai 1999, dan Mahkamah Tinggi Shah Alam telah, pada 22 Julai 1999, menolak permohonan untuk melanjutkan perintah tersebut. Pada 3 Ogos 1999, defendan ketiga telah menulis e-mail kepada Yang di-pertua Majlis Perbandaran Selayang dan kepada pengarah Jabatan Alam Sekitar, Negeri Selangor, menyatakan bahawa plaintif pertama gagal
For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 164 menghentikan kerja-kerjanya walau apa pun perintah Mahkamah dan perintah daripada Majlis Perbandaran Selayang (melalui sepucuk surat bertarikh 30 Jun 1999) kepada plaintif supaya menghentikan kerja-kerjanya. Plaintif memaksudkan perkataan-perkataan tersebut sebagai mengatakan bahawa mereka telah mengingkar perintah injunksi Mahkamah dengan sengaja dan dengan itu telah membawa kepada skandal awam, kebencian dan penghinaan dan telah menyaman defendan-defendan dalam libel. Defendan ketiga telah membuat permohonan untuk membatalkan tuntutan plaintif dibawah A 18 k 19(1)(a), (b) dan (c) Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah Tinggi 1980. Defendan ketiga telah, didalam afidavit sokongannya, menyatakan bahawa defendan pertama bukan merupakan agen atau pengkhidmatnya dan beliau tidak pernah meminta penulis e-mail tersebut menghantar e-mail tersebut. Penolong kanan pendaftar yang arif membenarkan permohonan defendan ketiga dan pihak plaintif merayu.
Diputuskan, menolak rayuan dengan kos: Defendan pertama telah dengan nyatanya berkata bahawa beliau telah menghantar e-mail tersebut dengan sendiri tanpa arahan daripada defendan ketiga. Maka defendan ketiga tidak boleh dikatakan mempunyai notis konstruktif. Pengakuan ini mesti diambil dengan fakta bahawa peguamcara adalah defendan pertama, dan beliau juga sedang bertindak untuk dirinya sendiri dengan mempunyai kepentingan didalam hal tersebut. Mahkamah berpendapat bahawa responden tidak perlu memberi keterangan setelah keterangan itu didengar (lihat ms 280G–H).]
Notes For cases on defamation, see 2(2) Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 1998 Reissue) paras 193–409. ||Page 279>> For cases on striking out, see 2(2) Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 1998 Reissue) paras 4335–4344.
Cases referred to Boursot v Savage (1866) Vol II LR 134 (refd) Tan Ah Chim & Sons Sdn Bhd v Ooi Bee Tat & Anor [1993] 3 MLJ 633 (refd)
Legislation referred to Rules of the High Court 1980 O 18 rr 19(1)(a), (b), (c)
Edwin Lim (Y Y Ho with him) for the plaintiffs. S Vanitha (Allen & Gledhill) for the second defendant. H P Lee (H P Lee & Co) for the third defendant.
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[2001] 5 MLJ 590 Malaysian Indian Congress (suing through its public officer Tan Sri K S Nijhar) & Ors v Makkal Osai Sdn Bhd & Anor
HIGH COURT (KUALA LUMPUR) — APPLICATION NO S2(S6)-23-52 OF 1999(2) KAMALANATHAN RATNAM J 30 OCTOBER 2000
Civil Procedure — Pleadings — Further and better particulars — Application for — Defamation — Purpose of particulars — Details of malice
The plaintiffs, the first being a political party, sued the defendants in libel for publishing an article which, the plaintiffs contended, in its natural and ordinary meaning, meant and was understood to mean, that members of Wanita MIC, particularly the leaders and high officials, are women of disrepute and loose morals, that they roam nightspots, neglect their families and that they are hypocrites in that they purport to speak of high moral values but instead behave in an immoral way. In their defence, the defendant denied that the said article was published with malice and without justification, and specifically relied on s 8 of the Defamation Act 1957. Alternatively, the defendants denied that said article in its natural and ordinary meaning bore or was capable of bearing the meanings the plaintiffs attributed to the article. The defendants further contended that the plaintiff’s action in filing this suit was actuated by bad faith. The defendants also relied on fair comment upon matters of public interest and claimed that they had acted in good faith. The defendants then filed this application for further and better particulars of the articles that were published by them that were offensive and antagonistic towards the first plaintiff and particulars of the articles that expressly or impliedly attempted to discredit and/or disparage and/or vilify the good name of the first plaintiff.
Held, dismissing the application with costs: (1) Whilst the defendants themselves have referred to some of their publications without naming them or giving details of the said publications which the defendants themselves admit were not well received by the plaintiffs, the plaintiffs by their plea on which the particulars have been sought are themselves relying on what had been written in those same unnamed and unidentified publications, as conduct actuated by malice. The articles contained in those publications are clearly within the custody, control and possession of the defendants themselves and the plaintiffs can rely on a plea of malice (see p 594G–I).
For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 166 (2) Considering the tenure of the entire pleadings, the court is of the view that this application has no merits. The defendants well and truly know, as admitted in the defence, that some of their own ||Page 591>>publications have not been well received by the plaintiffs; it is these publications that the plaintiffs contend, form the basis of malicious intent (see p 595E).
Bahasa Malaysia summary
Plaintif-plainitf, sebuah parti politik, mendakwa defendan dalam libel oleh kerana defendan telah menerbitkan sebuah artikel yang dikatakan oleh plaintif-plaintif bermaksud dalam maksud yang asalnya bahawa ahli-ahli Wanita MIC, khususnya pemimpin-pemimpin dan pegawai-pegawai yang berpangkat tinggi, merupakan wanita-wanita yang tidak bermoral dan bereputasi buruk yang merayau di tempat hiburan malam, mengabaikan keluarga mereka dan merupakan hipokrit yang menggambarkan seperti mempunyai nila-nilai moral yang tinggi, walhal berkelakuan sebaliknya. Dalam pembelaannya, defendan menafikan bahawa artikel itu diterbitkan dengan niat jahat dan tanpa justifikasi dan telah menggunakan s 8 Akta Fitnah 1957. Secara alternatif, defendan menafikan bahawa artikel tersebut, dalam maksud yang asalnya, memberikan maksud seperti yang diberikan oleh plaintif-plainitf. Selanjutnya, defendan berkata bahawa tindakan pihak plaintif digerakkan oleh niat jahat. Defendan juga bergantung kepada komen berpatutan di atas perkara-perkara kepentingan awam dan berkata bahawa mereka telah bertindak dengan suci hati. Defendan kemudiannya telah memfailkan permohonan untuk butir lanjut dan jelas artikel-artikel yang dikatakan secara nyata ataupun tersirat mencemarkan nama baik plaintif pertama.
Diputuskan, permohonan ditolak dengan kos: (1) Meskipun defendan-defendan telah merujuk kepada terbitan mereka tanpa menamakan atau memberi butiran terbitan-terbitan tersebut yang mana defendan-defendan sendiri mengaku bahawa terbitan-terbitan tersebut tidak diterima dengan baik oleh pihak plaintif, pihak plaintif, melalui pli mereka dimana butir tersebut dipohon, sendiri bergantung kepada apa yang ditulis dalam terbitan-terbitan yang tidak dinamakan dan tidak dikenalpasti tersebut, sebagai kelakuan berniat jahat. Artikel-artikel di dalam terbitan tersebut jelasnya berada di dalam jagaan dan milikan defendan-defendan. Plaintif boleh bergantung ke atas pli niat jahat (lihat ms 594G–I). (2) Memandangkan tempoh keseluruhan pliding, mahkamah berpendapat bahawa permohonan ini tidak bermerit. Defendan dengan sebenarnya tahu, seperti yang diaku di dalam pembelaan, bahawa sesetengah daripada terbitan-terbitan mereka tidak diterima dengan baik oleh pihak plaintif; terbitan-terbitan inilah pihak plaintif berkata yang merupakan dasar kepada niat jahat (lihat ms 595E).] ||Page 592>>
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Notes For cases on application for further and better particulars in pleadings, see 2(2) Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 1998 Reissue) paras 3547–3548.
Legislation referred to Defamation Act 1957 s 8 Societies Act 1966
S Nanthabalan (Sujatabalan with him) (Shook Lin & Bok) for the plaintiffs. Saraswathy Kandasami (S Kandasami & Co) for the defendants.
[2001] 5 MLJ 642 Daniel KC Tan & Associates Sdn Bhd v Progressive Insurance Sdn Bhd
HIGH COURT (KUALA LUMPUR) — SUIT NO P22–34 OF 1986 KAMALANATHAN RATNAM J 14 MARCH 2001
Contract — Termination — Notice of termination — No notice given to plaintiff — Principal agency agreement, Insurance — Whether notice required to be given when plaintiff had breached agreement by not paying premiums within the time stipulated
Contract — Termination — Validity — Principal agency agreement, Insurance — Defendant terminated agreement on ground that plaintiff did not pay premiums within time stipulated — Whether termination of agreement valid
Contract — Terms — Arbitration clause — Whether plaintiff estopped from invoking arbitration clause when plaintiff had opposed to defendant’s earlier application to refer the matter to arbitration
Tort — Damages — Proof of damage — Whether plaintiff had proved its damage — Whether claim for future projected loss too remote and untenable
Tort — Defamation — Damages — Loss of business goodwill — Whether claim should be considered when plaintiff failed to plead for it
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Tort — Defamation — Libel — Defences — Justification — Whether words in notice true — Whether defendant had a legal, moral and social duty to send out notices
Tort — Defamation — Libel — Meaning of words — Whether content of notice defamatory and was made in malice
Tort — Defamation — Libel — Plaintiff did not plead advertisements as libellous — Whether could rely on advertisements to find a case
The defendant is a local insurer and the plaintiff was at all material times in the business of insurance underwriting. By a principal agency agreement (‘the agreement’) dated 2 January 1981 between the plaintiff and the defendant, the plaintiff was appointed the defendant’s principal agent and authorized to issue policies of all kinds which included motor and non-motor policies. By virtue of cl 7 of the agreement, the plaintiff was given 90 days to settle all money due to the defendant for non-motor policies and there was no credit period for motor insurance. By virtue of cl 14 of the agreement, either party was to give the other party three months’ notice in the event it wished to terminate the agreement. Clause 21 of the agreement was an arbitration clause. The plaintiff had not remitted to the defendant the premiums collected and based on the plaintiff’s auditors’ documentation itself, the plaintiff had, as of 18 December 1986 owed the defendant the sum of RM1,050,100.25 as unpaid premiums. The ||Page 643>>defendant sent out notices dated 10 November 1986 to the plaintiff’s customers or policy holders or sub-agents stating that the agreement with the plaintiff had been terminated as of 30 September 1986. The plaintiff filed a claim against the defendant for breach of the clauses in the agreement. The defendant filed an application for a stay of proceedings pending reference to arbitration (‘the said application’) but was dismissed with costs after the plaintiff had opposed the said application. The issues for determination were: (i) whether there was a three months’ notice of termination given to the plaintiff pursuant to cl 14 of the agreement; (ii) when is a notice under cl 14 of the agreement required; (iii) whether there was a breach of cl 7 of the agreement by the plaintiff; (iv) whether the defendant was required to give the three months’ notice of termination; (v) whether the defendant was in breach of cl 21 of the agreement, ie the arbitration clause; (vi) whether the defendant by sending out the notice of termination to all customers and policy holders and by placing such similar advertisement in the newspapers had defamed the plaintiff; (vii) whether the plaintiff could claim for loss of business goodwill when it failed to plead for this head of damage; and (viii) whether the plaintiff had proved its damage.
Held, dismissing the plaintiff’s claim with costs: (1) There was no notice of termination that was alleged to have been given, that had been shown to the court. In the absence of any such document the court
For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 169 must find that no such notice has been given. It is a question of fact for the court to find if such a notice of termination had indeed been given by the defendant and it was the court’s finding that no such notice was indeed given (see pp 651I–652C). (2) The requirement of the notice pursuant to cl 14 became important only in cases of either party not wanting to continue with the agreement indefinitely. It was necessary for the court to consider the agreement as a whole rather than clause by clause in order to appreciate the reason why the requirement of the three months’ notice was stipulated in cl 14. Other than what was stated in cl 14 there were no other reasons given as to when parties could terminate the agreement. Therefore it only stands to logic that the need to give a three-month notice by either party wanting to terminate the agreement was to enable them to regulate their accounts and related matters. Clause 14 therefore need not apply to an instance of a breach of cl 7 of the agreement by the plaintiff. Clause 14 should be read as if it contained the words ‘except where there has been a breach of cl 7 of this agreement’ (see pp 652D–F, 653C); Howe v Botwood [1913] 2 KB 387 followed. (3) As at 31 May 1986 the plaintiff had owed the defendant a sum of RM1,050,100.25. This was evidenced by an audit confirmation sent by the plaintiff’s auditors to the defendant. On the basis of ||Page 644>>the plaintiff’s failure to comply with cl 7 of the agreement, the defendant was entitled to terminate the agreement and that the three months’ required notice to be given pursuant to cl 14, was inapplicable in respect of a breach of cl 7. Hence, the plaintiff had failed to prove that the defendant had been in breach of the agreement (see pp 653G–I, 654F). (4) The defendant had indeed filed an application for a stay of all further proceedings pending reference to arbitration. On 23 April 1987 the said application was dismissed with costs after the plaintiff had opposed the said application. The plaintiff was bound by issue estoppel and could not invoke this provision in the agreement. Although the said application was only an interlocutory application, the issue of arbitration had indeed been decided, albeit at an interlocutory stage, yet binding upon the parties. The plaintiff had given no explanation as to why it had to oppose the said application at the interlocutory stage if its intention was to go for arbitration. Surely the plaintiff cannot approbate and reprobate (see pp 654H–655A). (5) Since in the pleadings the plaintiff had only relied on the notice to the customers as founding a case in defamation, the plaintiff could not now rely on the advertisements to found a case in defamation as this was not pleaded. In any case, the advertisements were taken out after the plaintiff had filed the statement of claim (see p 655F–G). (6) As for the notice, there was nothing defamatory about the contents. Since the plaintiff knew that in respect of motor policies at least the regulation requiring cash before cover must be complied with and since the plaintiff itself knew that
For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 170 it had collected such premiums and had not forwarded the same to the defendant, the defendant was certainly within its rights to enquire from the customers proof of payment because the defendant was not expected to carry the burden of insurance without receiving the premiums. As for the non-motor policies, the plaintiff knew well that it had not complied with the 90 day rule to settle premiums. If the plaintiff felt humiliated or defamed the plaintiff was the author of its own misfortune. In any case, the words contained in the notice were not defamatory (see pp 655G–656A). (7) It is important that the court does not put a strain or an unlikely construction upon the words used. The plaintiff called no witness nor led any evidence to show that the words complained of were defamatory. Applying the accepted objective test which is what the man in the street would think, upon reading the notice dated 10 November 1986, the said notices were merely issued for the protection of the policy holders themselves that was to ensure that the insurance policies were still in force. There was therefore no question of any malice on the part of the defendant. The ||Page 645>>defendant was under a legal duty pursuant to s 14A of the Insurance Act 1963 and reg 3 of the Insurance (Assumption of Risk and Collection of Premium) Regulations 1980 and/or social duty to publish the said notices for the necessary protection of the general public and in particular the policy holders and also in the defendant’s own interest (see pp 656D–F). (8) The plaintiff claimed a sum of RM2.5m for loss of business goodwill. However, the plaintiff had failed to plead for this head of damage. On this ground alone this claim would not be considered. The plaintiff also led no evidence to prove this head of damage (see pp 658C). (9) The plaintiff led no evidence to show what it had actually collected. The plaintiff has failed to discharge its burden of proof. It had not tendered any of its audited accounts. As for the projected income for the future, no evidence was led to show the prospects of achieving such projected income. In the light of the decision of the then Supreme Court in Bank Bumiputra Malaysia Bhd Kuala Trengganu v Mae Perkayuan Sdn Bhd & Ors [1993] 2 MLJ 76, the plaintiff’s claim for future projected loss was too remote and untenable (see pp 658G–659A).
Bahasa Malaysia summary
Defendan merupakan syarikat insurans tempatan dan plaintif, pada semua masa material menjalankan perniagaan menaja jamin. Melalui suatu perjanjian agensi yang utama (‘perjanjian tersebut’) bertarikh 2 Januari 1981 di antara plaintif dengan defendan, plaintif telah dilantik sebagai agen utama defendan dan telah diberi kuasa untuk menerbitkan polisi-polisi termasuk polisi motor dan bukan motor. Memalui kl 7 perjanjian tersebut, plaintif diberi 90 hari untuk menjelaskan segala wang yang perlu
For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 171 dibayar kepada defendan untuk polisi bukan motor dan tiada tempoh masa kredit untuk insurans motor. Melalui kl 14 perjanjian tersebut, parti-parti dikehendaki memberi notis sebanyak tiga bulan sekiranya mana-mana parti hendak membatalkan perjanjian. Klausa 21 perjanjian tersebut merupakan klausa penimbangtaraan. Plaintif belum mengirimkan premium yang dikutip kepada defendan dan berdasarkan pendokumenan juruaudit plaintif, sejak 18 Disember 1986, plaintif berhutang kepada defendan sebanyak RM1,050,100.25 sebagai premium yang belum dibayar. Defendan telah menghantar notis-notis bertarikh 10 November 1986 kepada pelanggan-pelanggan plaintif atau pemegang polisi atau subagen yang menyatakan bahawa perjanjian diantara plaintif dengan defendan telahpun ditamatkan sejak 30 September 1986. Plaintif telah memfailkan tuntutan terhadap defendan untuk pelanggaran klausa-klausa perjanjian. Defendan telah memfailkan permohonan perggantungan prosiding sementara menunggu rujukan kepada timbangtara (‘permohonan tersebut’), tetapi permohonan tersebut telah ditolak dengan kos ||Page 646>>setelah plaintif membuat bantahan terhadap permohonan tersebut. Isu-isu untuk ditentukan adalah: (i) sama ada notis penamatan perjanjian tiga bulan telah disampaikan kepada plaintif menurut kl 14 perjanjian tersebut; (ii) bila notis kl 14 perjanjian tersebut diperlukan; (iii) sama ada kl 7 telah dilanggar oleh plaintif; (iv) sama ada defendan perlu memberi notis penamatan perjanjian tiga bulan tersebut; (v) sama ada defendan telah melanggar kl 12 perjanjian tersebut, iaitu klausa timbangtara; (vi) sama ada defendan, dengan menghantar notis-notis penamatan perjanjian tersebut kepada pelanggan-pelanggan dan pemegang-pemegang polisi dan dengan memaparkan iklan sedemikian di dalam suratkhabar, telah memfitnahkan plaintif; dan (vii) sama ada plaintif boleh menuntut kehilangan nama baik perniagaannya memandangkan plaintif tidak memohon gantirugi tersebut; dan (viii) sama ada plaintif telah membuktikan kerugian tersebut.
Diputuskan, menolak tuntutan plaintif dengan kos: (1) Tiada notis penamatan perjanjian yang dikatakan telah diberi, yang dikemukan kepada mahkamah. Memandangkan demikian, mahkamah mestilah memutuskan bahawa tiada dokumen sebegitu telah dikemukakan. Ia menjadi persoalan fakta untuk mahkamah memutuskan sama ada notis penamatan perjanjian telah diberi oleh defendan dan mahkamah telah memutuskan bahawa notis sebegitu tidak diberikan (lihat ms 651I–652C). (2) Keperluan notis kl 14 menjadi penting hanya di dalam kes di mana parti hendak menamatkan perjanjian bagi tempoh masa yang tidak pasti. Mahkamah perlu menimbang perjanjian secara keseluruhan dan bukan secara klausa demi klausa untuk mengetahui kenapa notis tiga bulan tersebut diperuntukkan di dalam kl 14. Selain daripada apa yang diperuntukkan di dalam kl 14, tiada sebab yang diberi mengena dengan bila parti-parti boleh menamatkan perjanjian. Oleh itu, ia adalah logik bahawa keperluan notis penamatan tiga bulan adalah untuk membolehkan parti yang hendak menamatkan perjanjian mengawal akaun-akaun mereka dan perkara-perkara yang berkaitan. Klausa 14 tidak
For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 172 digunakan dalam perlanggaran kl 7 perjanjian tersebut oleh plaintiff. Klausa 14 sepatutnya dibaca sebagai mengandungi perkataan ‘except where there has been a breach of this agreement’ (lihat ms 652D–F, 653C); Howe v Botwood [1913] 2 KB 387 diikut. (3) Sehingga ke 31 Mei 1986, plaintif berhutang kepada defendan wang berjumlah RM1,050,100.25. Ini dibuktikan oleh pengesahan audit yang dihantar oleh juruaudit plaintif. Berdasarkan kegagalan plaintif untuk mematuhi kl 7 perjanjian tersebut, defendan berhak menamatkan perjanjian tersebut dan notis penamatan tiga bulan tersebut tidak boleh dipakai dalam perlanggaran kl 7. Oleh itu, plaintiff gagal membuktikan bahawa defendan telah melanggar perjanjian tersebut (lihat ms 653G–I, 654F). ||Page 647>> (4) Defendan sememangnya telah memfailkan satu permohonan untuk satu penggantungan terhadap kesemua prosiding lanjutan sementara menunggu rujukan kepada penimbnagtara. Pada 23 April 1987 permohonan tersebut telah ditolak dengan kos setelah plaintif membantah permohonan tersebut. Plaintif terikat oleh persoalan estopel dan tidak boleh menggunakan peruntukan ini di dalam perjanjian. Walaupun permohonan tersebut hanya satu permohonan interlokutori, persoalan timbangtara telahpun diputuskan, sungguhpun di peringkat interlokutori, tetapi mengikat ke atas pihak-pihak. Plaintif tidak memberikan apa-apa penjelasan terhadap kenapa ia hendak membantah permohonan tersebut di peringkat interlokutori jika hasratnya adalah untuk merujuk kepada timbangtara. Pastinya plaintif tidak boleh memperkenan atau mengutuk (lihat ms 654H–655A). (5) Memandangkan pliding-pliding plaintif hanya bergantung kepada notis pelanggan-pelanggan di dalam kes yang didapati mengandungi fitnah, plaintif tidak boleh sekarang bergantung kepada iklan-iklan untuk membuktikan kes berunsur fitnah keran ini tidak dipohon. Dalam apa keadaan, iklan-iklan tersebut dikeluarkan setelah plaintif memfailkan pernyataan tuntutan plaintif (lihat ms 655F–G). (6) Berhubungan notis tersebut, tiada apa yang berunsur fitnah tentang knadungannya. Memandangkan plaintif telah mengetahui berkaitan polisi-polisi motor tersebut sekurang-kurangnya peraturan yang menghendaki bayaran wang sebelum diberikan perlindungan mestilah dipenuhi dan memandangkan plaintif sendiri telah mengetahui bahawa ia telah mengutip premium sedemikian dan tidak mengengemukakan yang sama kepada defendan, defendan sememangnya mempunyai hak untuk menanyakan daripada pelanggan-pelanggan bukti pembayaran kerana defendan tidak dikehendaki memikul beban insuran tanpa menerima premium. Berhubungan polisi-polisi tidak bermotor, plaintif memang mengetahui bahawa ia tidak mematuhi peraturan 90 hari untuk menyelesaikan premium tersebut. Sekiranya plaintif terasa dimalukan atau diaibkan plaintif adalah penyebab kerugiannya sendiri. Dalam apa keadaan, perkataan-perkataan yang terkandng di dalam notis tersebut tidak berunsur fitnah (lihat ms
For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 173 655G–656A). (7) Ia adalah penting bahawa mahkamah tidak memberi erti yang tidak mungkin di atas perkataan-perkataan yang digunakan. Plaintif tidak memanggil saksi mahupun mengemukakan keterangan untuk menunjukkan bahawa perkataan-perkataan yang digunakan adalah fitnah. Menggunakan ujian objektif, iaitu apa yang difikirkan oleh orang awam, setelah membaca notis bertarikh 10 November 1986, notis tersebut hanya digunakan untuk perlindungan pemegang polisi untuk memastikan bahawa polisi insurans masih dikuatkuasakan. Tiada persoalan niat jahat oleh defendan. Defendan mempunyai kewajipan menurut ||Page 648>>undang-undang menurut s 14A Akta Insuran 1963 dan peraturan 3 Insurance (Assumption of Risk and Collection of Premium) Regulations 1980 dan/atau kewajipan sosial untuk menerbitkan notis-notis tersebut untuk perlindungan orang-orang awam dan khususnya pemegang polisi dan juga untuk kepentingan defendan sendiri (lihat ms 656D–F). (8) Plaintif menuntut RM2.5j untuk kehilangan nama baik perniagaannya. Walaubagaimanapun, plaintif tidak memohon ganti rugi tersebut. Oleh kerana itu, permohonannya tidak akan dilayan. Plaintif juga tidak mengemukakan apa-apa keterangan untuk membuktikan ganti rugi ini (lihat ms 658C). (9) Plaintif tidak mengemukakan keterangan untuk menunjukkan apa yang telah dikutip. Plaintif gagal melaksanakan beban pembuktiannya. Plaintif todak mengemukakan akaun-akaun yang telah diauditkan. Berkenaan dengan pendapatan masa depan yang dirancangkan, plaintif juga gagal mengemukakan keterangan untuk menunjukkan prospek untuk mendapatkan pendapatan yang dirancang. Menurut kes Mahkamah Agung Bank Bumiputra Malaysia Bhd Kuala Trengganu v Mae Perkayuan Sdn Bhd & Ors [1993] 2 MLJ 76, tuntutan plaintif adalah terlalu terpencil dan tidak dapat dipertahankan (lihat ms 658G–659A).
Notes For cases on termination of contract generally, see 3(2) Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2000 Reissue) paras 3885–3904. For cases on terms of contract generally, see 3(2) Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2000 Reissue) paras 3905–4048. For cases on libel generally, see 12 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2000 Reissue) paras 263–352. For cases on damages in defamation generally, see 12 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2000 Reissue) paras 216–222.
Cases referred to Bank Bumiputra Malaysia Bhd Kuala Trengganu v Mae Perkayuan Sdn Bhd & Ors [1993] 2 MLJ 76 (folld)
For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 174 Dato’ Seri Anwar bin Ibrahim v Dato’ Seri Dr Mahathir bin Mohamad [1999] 4 MLJ 58 (refd) Dato’ Seri Anwar Ibrahim v Dato’ Seri Dr Mahathir bin Mohamad [2001] 1 MLJ 305 (refd) Dato’ Seri Anwar Ibrahim v Dato’ Seri Dr Mahathir Mohamad [2001] 2 MLJ 65 (refd) Howe v Botwood [1913] 2 KB 387 (folld) Ratus Mesra Sdn Bhd v Shaik Osman Majid & Ors [1999] 3 MLJ 529 (refd) The Capital and Counties Bank Ltd v George Henty and Sons [1882] 7 AC 741 (refd) ||Page 649>>
Legislation referred to Insurance Act 1996 ss 4(1), 14(A) Insurance (Assumption of Risk and Collection of Premium) Regulations 1980 reg 3 Public Health Act 1875
Wong Kam Leong (CC Cheng and Angela Low with him) (Wong Kam Leong & Partners) for the plaintiff. Muralee Menon (Allen Miranda with him) (Jaffar & Menon) for the defendant.
[2001] 6 MLJ 353 Halim bin Arsyat v Sistem Televisyen Malaysia Bhd & Ors
HIGH COURT (KUALA LUMPUR) — SUIT NO S2–23–35 OF 1998 KAMALANATHAN RATNAM J 2 JULY 2001
Tort — Defamation — News bulletin — Broadcast concerning secretary general of political party and permit holder of newspaper — Burden on plaintiff to show he was person identified by words complained of — Whether permit holder had automatic right to claim defamation — Defence of qualified privilege — Test applicable — Defence to be defeated by proof of express malice — What amounted to plea of express malice
The plaintiff was at the material time the Secretary General of the Islamic Party of Malaysia (‘PAS’). He was also the permit holder of a PAS’s newspaper known as Harakah. By the amended statement of claim, the plaintiff claimed that the defendants falsely and maliciously broadcast or caused to be broadcast of and concerning him as
For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 175 the then Secretary General of PAS and the permit holder of Harakah, the words complained of in the said Buletin Utama which were defamatory of him and that the words viewed in the context of the said telecast were understood to refer to him. The plaintiff, thus, claimed damages in the sum of RM20m against each of the defendants with interest and costs and a further order to direct the defendants to tender their apologies by broadcasting the same in the Buletin Utama for three days consecutively. In their defence, the defendants denied that the words in the said Buletin Utama either referred to the plaintiff or bore the meanings respectively as alleged by the plaintiff.
Held, dismissing the claim with costs: (1) The burden remains on the plaintiff to show that the words complained of refer to him. It is for the plaintiff to establish objectively that he was the person to be identified by the words used. The plaintiff had failed to identify himself as the person concerned as his case was based on no more than the spectre of a mere possibility raised in answer to what the court found as a leading question. No evidence had been adduced that any reasonable person other than interested witnesses of the plaintiff himself on watching the show and hearing the words broadcast would on rational grounds have identified the said words with the plaintiff. The plaintiff’s case, that as he was the permit holder of Harakah, this itself conferred on him the automatic right to claim to have been defamed by any defamation directed at the said publication, has no support both in law and in logic (see pp 361E, 362D, F); Morgan v Odhams Press Ltd & Anor [1971] 2 All ER 1156, Knupffer v London Express Newspaper Ltd [1944] AC 116 and Australian Newspaper Co Ltd v Bennett [1894] AC 284 ||Page 354>>followed and Sandison v Malayan Times Ltd & Ors [1964] 30 MLJ 332 distinguished. (2) The purpose of the defence of qualified privilege is to prevent liability from arising for untrue statements that may have been made on protected occasions since the defence of justification already protects true statements. For the defence of qualified privilege to apply, the defendants must be under a duty to speak and the public under a corresponding interest to hear what was said. The plaintiff’s witnesses all admitted in their evidence that what was said were matters of public interest. In any case, this was clearly a case where the circumstantial test can well apply (see pp 365I–366A, F–G); Reynolds v Times Newspapers Ltd [1998] 3 WLR 863 followed. (3) Once this defence is made out, it could be defeated only by proof of express malice by virtue of O 78 r 3(3) of the Rules of the High Court 1980. Express malice must be pleaded in a reply and that particulars must be set out. Unfortunately, there was no reply filed by the plaintiff nor were there allegations of express malice. In any case, no evidence was even presented by the plaintiff on express malice. The reference in para 8 of the amended statement of claim to the words that the defendants published the words ‘falsely and maliciously’ was not a plea of express malice. Such allegations
For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 176 were meant to make out the plaintiff’s case. Thus, such words ‘falsely and maliciously’ as pleaded, did not make out a plea of express malice to negate the defence of qualified privilege (see pp 366G–H, 367A–C).
Bahasa Malaysia summary
Plaintif pada setiap masa matan adalah Ketua Setiausaha Parti Islam Malaysia (‘PAS’). Beliau juga pemegang permit akhbar PAS yang dikenali sebagai Harakah. Melalui penyataan tuntutan terpinda, plaintif menuntut bahawa defendan-defendan telah dengan salah dan niat jahat menyiarkan atau menyebabkan disiarkan berhubung dan tentang beliau yang ketika itu Ketua Setiausaha PAS dan pemegang permit Harakah, perkataan-perkataan yang diadukan dalam Buletin Utama tersebut yang memfitnah beliau dan bahawa perkataan-perkataan tersebut jika dilihat dalam konteks siaran televisyen tersebut difahami sebagai merujuk kepada beliau. Plaintif, oleh itu, menuntut ganti rugi berjumlah RM20j terhadap setiap defendan-defendan berserta faedah dan kos dan satu perintah selanjutnya mengarahkan defendan-defendan memohon maaf dengan menyiarkan yang sama dalam Buletin Utama untuk tiga hari berturut-turut. Dalam pembelaan mereka, defendan-defendan tersebut telah menafikan bahawa perkataan-perkataan dalam Buletin Utama tersebut sama ada merujuk kepada plaintif atau membawa maksud-maksud masing-masing yang didakwa oleh plaintif. ||Page 355>>
Diputuskan, menolak tuntutan tersebut dengan kos: (1) Beban masih kekal di atas plaintif untuk menunjukkan bahawa perkataan-perkataan yang diadukan merujuk kepada beliau. Adalah untuk plaintif membuktikan secara objektif bahawa beliau merupakan orang yang dikaitkan dengan perkataan-perkataan yang digunakan. Plaintif telah gagal untuk membuktikan diri beliau sebagai orang yang berkaitan kerana kes beliau berdasarkan tidak lebih daripada hanya satu bayangan kemungkinan yang ditimbulkan sebagai jawapan kepada apa yang mahkamah dapati sebagai satu soalan pimpin. Tiada keterangan telah dikemukakan di mana sesiapa yang waras selain saksi-saksi plaintif sendiri yang berkepentingan dengan menonton siaran tersebut dan mendengar perkataan-perkataan yang disiarkan akan atas alasan-alasan yang rasional mengaitkan perkataan-perkataan tersebut dengan plaintif. Kes plaintif bahawa, oleh kerana beliau adalah pemegang permit Harakah, ini dengan sendirinya memberikan beliau hak serta-merta untuk menuntut bahawa telah difitnahkan oleh mana-mana fitnah yang ditujukan kepada penerbitan tersebut, tidak disokong oleh kedua-dua undang-undang dan logik (lihat ms pp 361E, 362D, F); Morgan v Odhams Press Ltd & Anor [1971] 2 All ER 1156, Knupffer v London Express Newspaper Ltd [1944] AC 116 dan Australian Newspaper Co Ltd v Bennett [1894] AC 284 diikut dan Sandison v Malayan Times Ltd & Ors [1964] 30 MLJ 332 dibeza.
For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 177 (2) Tujuan pembelaan perlindungan bersyarat adalah untuk menghalang liabiliti daripada timbul untuk pernyataan tidak benar yang mungkin telah dibuat semasa kejadian-kejadian yang dilindungi; pembelaan justifikasi telahpun melindungi pernyataan-pernyataan yang benar. Untuk menggunakan pembelaan perlindungan bersyarat, defendan-defendan mestilah di bawah satu kewajipan untuk bersuara dan pihak awam mempunyai kepentingan yang sama untuk mendengar apa yang diperkatakan. Saksi-saksi plaintif semuanya mengaku dalam keterangan mereka bahawa apa yang diperkatakan adalah perkara-perkara yang mempunyai kepentingan awam. Dalam apa keadaan, ini dengan jelas satu kes di mana ujian mengikut keadaan sememangnya boleh terpakai (lihat ms 365I–366A, F–G); Reynolds v Times Newspapers Ltd [1998] 3 WLR 863 diikut. (3) Setelah pembelaan ini dibuat, ia boleh dikalahkan hanya dengan bukti niat jahat nyata menurut A 78 k 3(3) Kaedah-Kaedah Mahakmah Tinggi 1980. Niat jahat nyata mestilah diplikan dalam bentuk jawapan dan butiran-butiran tersebut mestilah dinyatakan. Malangnya, tiada jawapan telah difailkan oleh plaintif maupun terdapat dakwaan niat jahat nyata. Dalan apa-apa keadaan, tiada keterangan telah dikemukakan oleh plaintif tentang niat jahat nyata. Rujukan dalam perengaan 8 penyataan tuntutan terpinda terhadap perkataan-perkataan bahawa defendan-defendan telah menerbitkan perkataan-perkataan yang ||Page 356>>‘salah dan berniat jahat’ bukan satu pli niat jahat nyata. Oleh itu, perkataan-perkataan yang ‘salah dan berniat jahat’ sebagaimana yang diplikan, tidak membentuk satu pli niat jahat nyata untuk menyangkal pembelaan perlindungan bersyarat (lihat ms 366G–H, 367A–C).]
Notes For cases on defamation generally, see 12 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2000 Reissue) paras 193–409.
Cases referred to A Balakrishnan & Ors v Nirumalan K Pillay & Ors [1999] 3 SLR 22 (refd) Australian Newspaper Co Ltd v Bennett [1894] AC 284 (folld) Dato’ Seri Anwar bin Ibrahim v Dato’ Seri Dr Mahathir bin Mohamad [1999] 4 MLJ 58 (refd) Dato’ Seri Anwar bin Ibrahim v Dato’ Seri Dr Mahathir bin Mohamad [2001] 1 MLJ 305 (refd) Dato’ Seri Anwar bin Ibrahim v Dato’ Seri Dr Mahathir bin Mohamad [2001] 2 MLJ 65 (refd) Hough v London Express Newspaper Ltd [1940] 2 KB 507 (refd) Institute of Commercial Management United Kingdom v New Straits Times Press (M) Bhd [1993] 1 MLJ 408 (refd)
For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 178 Jones v Skelton [1963] 3 All ER 952 (refd) Knupffer v London Express Newspaper Ltd [1944] AC 116 (folld) Lee Kuan Yew v Davies & Ors [1989] SLR 1063 (refd) Morgan v Odhams Press Ltd & Anor [1971] 2 All ER 1156 (folld) Murugason v The Straits Times Press (1975) Ltd [1984–1985] SLR 334 (refd) Reynolds v Times Newspapers Ltd [1998] 3 WLR 863 (folld) Rubber Improvement Ltd & Anor v Daily Telegraph Ltd [1964] AC 234 (refd) Sandison v Malayan Times Ltd & Ors [1964] MLJ 332 (distd)
Legislation referred to Rules of the High Court 1980 O 78 r 3(3)
Mohamed Hanipa bin Maidin (Mohamed Hanipa & Associates) for the plaintiff. PH Looi (Zaid Ibrahim & Co) for the defendants.
[2001] 6 MLJ 368 M Prabhkaran v Salam bin Seran
HIGH COURT (TAIPING) — CIVIL APPEAL NO 11–16 OF 1997 VT SINGHAM JC 11 JUNE 2001
Civil Procedure — Amendment — Defence — Amended defence filed only after close of plaintiff’s case and after commencement of defence case — Whether plaintiff entitled to raise complaint over delayed filing at appeal
Civil Procedure — Pleadings — Defamation — Defendant filed amended statement of defence raising qualified privilege — Plaintiff intended to rely on express malice to defeat plea of qualified privilege — Whether plaintiff should have served reply to amended statement of defence providing particulars of express malice — Whether mandatory on plaintiff to serve reply with particulars of malice under Subordinate Courts Rules 1980 O 44 r 3(3)
Evidence — Documentary evidence — Admissibility of — Documents supporting defendant’s case produced only at hearing of defence case — Plaintiff failed to raise objections during submissions at trial — Whether plaintiff entitled to raise objections at appeal — Whether documents correctly held admissible at trial
For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 179
Tort — Defamation — Malice — Defendant lodged police report regarding plaintiff’s alleged threat towards him — Whether any basis on which inference may be drawn that defendant actuated with malice in making police report — Meaning of ‘malice’
Tort — Defamation — Police report — Defendant lodged police report regarding plaintiff’s alleged threat towards him — Whether defendant acted with malice or made false report in making police report against plaintiff — Whether defendant made police report with honest belief in threat of harm by plaintiff
Tort — Defamation — Qualified privilege — Defendant lodged police report regarding plaintiff’s alleged threat towards him — Defendant acting in accordance with sense of duty and in bona fide protection of legitimate interest — Whether defence of qualified privilege favoured defendant
In July 1990, an anonymous letter dated 29 June 1990 (‘IDD5’) was sent to, inter alia, the Education Department of Parit Buntar, alleging immoral conduct against a teacher (‘DW11’) who was employed at the school in which the defendant/respondent was the headmaster. On receipt of the letter, the assistant education officer of the district of Kerian, ‘DW2’, sent a copy of IDD5 to the defendant and instructed the defendant to investigate the complaint and to forward a complete report to the department. The defendant carried out an investigation and interviewed DW11, who allegedly informed the defendant that IDD5 was written by her estranged lover, the plaintiff/appellant, who had threatened to do anything possible to terminate her services at the school and had been making inquiries about the defendant’s whereabouts in contemplation of doing something to the defendant for not having terminated her employment contract. The defendant forwarded his report to the education officer of the district of Kerian. ||Page 369>>The State Deputy Director of Education Perak, Ipoh (‘DW4’), instructed the defendant to advise DW11 and a warning letter was issued to the latter. On 1 August 1990, DW11 reiterated the threat of the plaintiff against the defendant in the presence of two fellow teachers, DW7 and DW8, adding that the plaintiff had located and been to the defendant’s house when the defendant had not been there. The defendant reported the matter to his superior, DW4, who instructed him to lodge a police report, which the defendant accordingly did on 1 August 1990. The plaintiff brought an action for libel against the defendant for lodging the police report against him, wherein the defendant was alleged to have falsely stated and published the contents of the report with bad faith or malice against the plaintiff. The Magistrate’s Court, Parit Buntar, dismissed the plaintiff’s claim against the defendant and he appealed.
Held, dismissing the appeal: (1) The defendant had just cause for making his police report and he had not acted with malice or made a false report. The defendant had been worried and
For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 180 frightened, which was a natural feeling and expected of any reasonable minded person that something would happen to him after he had been told by DW11 of the threat and the intended harm by the plaintiff and he had merely passed on his fears to the police, and the police had acted independently. The defendant was not prompted by malice against the plaintiff when he lodged the police report on 1 August 1990 and there was absolutely no basis for him to falsely invent the story of the plaintiff’s threat against him and his predominant desire was purely to place his safety in the hands of the police (see p 385F–H). On the facts and circumstances of the case, the police report lodged by the defendant was held to have been made with an honest belief that he was threatened with harm by the plaintiff as told to him by DW11 (see p 385H–I). (2) On the plaintiff’s own evidence, there was no basis for the trial court or this court to draw any inference that the defendant’s police report had been actuated with malice (see p 386B); Caswell v Powell Duffryn Associated Collieries Ltd [1940] AC 168 followed. ‘Malice’ in general defamation use meant ‘any ill will, spite or some wrong which can defeat a defence of qualified privilege’ and making use of the occasion for some indirect purpose. In this case, there was no evidence that the defendant had made use of the occasion for any indirect purpose other than for a lawful purpose to secure his safety. There was also no evidence that the defendant had been actuated by some indirect motive or connected with the privilege or had made use of the occasion or had been under the influence of some indirect motive (see p 386E–F); Browne v Dunn (1893) 6 R 67 and Hoare v Jessop [1965] EA 218 followed. ||Page 370>> (3) The defendant had acted in accordance with the sense of duty and in bona fide protection of his own legitimate interest. In fact, he owed a duty, whether it was labelled as social, moral or legal duty, to draw the attention of the police to seek redress for his grievance, namely, the threat of the plaintiff which DW11 had informed him about (see p 386F–G); Adam v Ward [1917] AC 309 and Abdul Rahman Talib v Seenivasagam & Anor [1965] MLJ 142 followed. On the facts and circumstances of this case, the defence of qualified privilege was in favour of the defendant. Consequently, on the facts and on the balance of probabilities, the plaintiff had not succeeded in showing malice against the defendant when he lodged the police report (see p 387F–G). (4) In the absence of any objection raised on behalf of the plaintiff at the lower court on the amendment to the statement of defence after the close of the plaintiff’s case, which included the defence of qualified privilege, this court was unable to accept the complaint raised for the first time on appeal. A party could not be allowed to lie by until the case came up for hearing before the Court of Appeal and then raise his complaint for the first time of the amendment, when this opportunity to object was available to the party at the trial (see p 388G–H). (5) Where the plaintiff wished to rely on express malice on the part of the
For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 181 defendant in order to defeat the plea of qualified privilege, he would have to plead to this effect and give particulars of facts and matters from which he alleged the malice was to be inferred and this should have been done by way of reply and not in the statement of claim (see p 389G–H); Abdul Rahman Talib v Seenivasagam & Anor [1965] MLJ 142 and Janagi v Ong Boon Kiat [1971] 2 MLJ 196 followed. It was a mandatory requirement on the part of the plaintiff to have served a reply giving particulars of the facts and matters from which the malice was to be inferred as required under O 44 r 3(3) of the Subordinate Courts Rules 1980 (‘the SCR’). However, since the plaintiff had failed to serve a reply pleading express malice as required under O 44 r 3(3) of the SCR, he could not be allowed to rely on express malice without having served the reply to defeat the defence of qualified privilege, as only the reply would have formed the pleadings in the civil suit (see p 392A–B). (6) As to plaintiff’s counsel’s complaint that the documents produced on behalf of the defendant were only produced during the hearing of the defendant’s case, this complaint had not been specifically raised in the submissions before the magistrate to the effect that no weight or less weight should have been given to those documents, but was only raised for the first time on appeal. This should have been raised during the submissions at the trial and it was too late to raise it now. In any event, the documents complained about were clearly admissible to show the respective role and functions of DW2 and DW4, the sequence of events ||Page 371>> which made DW11 inform the defendant of the plaintiff’s threat and to corroborate the oral evidence of the defendant, and the evidence had been correctly held to be admissible by the magistrate (see p 392C–F). As for the plaintiff’s counsel’s contention that IDD5 should not have been considered by the magistrate, for the purpose of this case, all that was relevant was that such a letter existed and the magistrate was not prejudiced or clouded when he considered that such a letter existed as he did not admit the contents of the said letter (see p 393F–H).
Bahasa Malaysia summary
Pada bulan Julai 1990, satu surat tanpa nama bertarikh 29 Jun 1990 (‘IDD5’) telah dihantar ke, antara lain, Jabatan Pendidikan Parit Buntar, yang mendakwa perbuatan tidak bermoral terhadap seorang guru (‘DW11’) yang telah diambil bekerja di sekolah di mana defendan/responden adalah guru besarnya. Setelah menerima surat tersebut, penolong pegawai pendidikan daerah Kerian, ‘DW2’, telah menghantar sesalinan IDD5 kepada defendan dan mengarahkan defendan menyiasat aduan tersebut dan mengemukakan satu laporan lengkap kepada jabatan. Defendan telah menjalankan siasatan dan menemuramah DW11, yang didakwa telah memberitahu defendan bahawa
For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 182 IDD5 telah ditulis oleh kekasih beliau yang telah ditinggalkan, iaitu plaintif/perayu, yang telah mengugut berbuat apa sahaja mungkin untuk menamatkan perkhidmatan beliau di sekolah tersebut dan telah membuat pertanyaan tentang di mana defendan berada dengan harapan untuk berbuat sesuatu kepada defendan kerana tidak menamatkan kontrak pekerjaan DW11. Defendan telah mengemukakan laporan beliau kepada pegawai pendidikan daerah Kerian. Timbalan Pengarah Pendidikan Negeri Perak, Ipoh (‘DW4’), telah mengarahkan defendan menasihati DW11 dan satu surat amaran telah dikeluarkan kepadanya. Pada 1 Ogos 1990, DW11 mengulangi ugutan plaintif terhadap defendan dengan kehadiran dua orang guru, DW7 dan DW8, dan menambah bahawa plaintif telah menjumpai dan telah pergi ke rumah defendan semasa defendan tidak berada di situ. Defendan telah melaporkan perkara tersebut kepada ketua beliau, DW4, yang mangarahkan beliau membuat laporan polis, yang defendan dengan wajarnya telah lakukan pada 1 Ogos 1990. Plaintif telah memulakan satu tindakan libel terhadap defendan kerana membuat aduan polis terhadap beliau, di mana defendan didakwa telah dengan salah menyatakan dan menerbitkan kandungan laporan tersebut dengan niat jahat terhadap plaintif. Mahkamah Majistret, Parit Buntar, telah menolak tuntutan plaintif terhadap defendan dan beliau membuat rayuan.
Diputuskan, menolak rayuan tersebut: (1) Defendan mempunyai sebab yang baik untuk membuat laporan polis beliau dan beliau tidak bertindak dengan niat jahat atau ||Page 372>>membuat satu laporan palsu. Defendan risau dan takut, yang merupakan perasaan biasa dan dijangkakan oleh sesiapa yang berfikiran waras bahawa sesuatu akan berlaku ke atas dirinya setelah beliau diberitahu oleh DW11 tentang ugutan dan kecederaan yang diniatkan oleh plaintif dan beliau hanya menyampaikan rasa takut beliau kepada pihak polis, dan pihak polis telah bertindak secara bebas. Defendan tidak digalakkan oleh niat jahat terhadap plaintif semasa beliau membuat laporan polis pada 1 Ogos 1990 dan tiada sebab langsung untuk beliau mereka-reka dengan salah cerita ugutan plaintif terhadap beliau dan niat utama beliau hanyalah memikirkan keselamatan beliau dalam jagaan pihak polis (lihat ms 385F–H). Berdasarkan fakta-fakta dan keadaan-keadaan kes, laporan polis yang dibuat oleh defendan diputuskan telah dibuat dengan kepercayaan bahawa beliau diugut untuk dicederakan oleh plaintif sebagaimana yang diberitahu kepadanya oleh DW11 (lihat ms 385H–Î). (2) Berdasarkan keterangan plaintif sendiri, tidak terdapat apa-apa sebab untuk mahkamah perbicaraan atau mahkamah ini tiba kepada apa-apa inferens bahawa laporan polis defendan telah didorong oleh niat jahat (lihat ms 386B); Caswell v Powell Duffryn Associated Collieries Ltd [1940] AC 168 diikut. ‘Niat jahat’ dalam penggunaan umum fitnah bermaksud ‘apa-apa rasa jahat, busuk hati atau sesuatu yang salah yang boleh mengalahkan satu pembelaan perlindungan bersyarat’ dan menggunakan keadaan tersebut untuk suatu tujuan yang tidak langsung. Dalam kes ini, tiada keterangan bahawa defendan telah menggunakan keadaan ini untuk apa-apa tujuan yang tidak langsung selain daripada tujuan
For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 183 yang sah untuk menjamin keselamatan beliau. Tiada juga keterangan bahawa defendan telah didorong oleh suatu motif yang tidak langsung atau berkaitan dengan perlindungan tersebut atau telah menggunakan keadaan tersebut atau berada di bawah pengaruh suatu motif yang tidak langsung (lihat ms 386E–F); Browne v Dunn (1893) 6 R 67 dan Hoare v Jessop [1965] EA 218 diikut. (3) Defendan telah bertindak bersesuaian dengan sifat kewajipan dan secara bona fide untuk melindungi kepentingan sah beliau sendiri. Bahkan, beliau mempunyai satu kewajipan, sama ada ia dilabelkan sebagai kewajipan sosial, moral atau undang-undang, untuk menarik perhatian pihak polis memohon tebus rugi untuk kilanan beliau, terutamanya, ugutan plaintif yang DW11 telah beritahu kepada beliau (lihat ms 386F–G); Adam v Ward [1917] AC 309 dan Abdul Rahman Talib v Seenivasagam & Anor [1965] MLJ 142 diikut. Berdasarkan fakta-fakta dan keadaan-keadaan kes ini, pembelaan perlindungan bersyarat menyebelahi defendan. Akibatnya, berdasarkan fakta-fakta dan atas imbangan keberangkalian, plaintif gagal untuk menunjukkan niat jahat terhadap defendan semasa beliau membuat laporn polis tersebut (lihat ms 387F–G). ||Page 373>> (4) Dengan ketiadaan apa-apa bantahan yang ditimbulkan bagi pihak plaintif di mahkamah bawahan tentang pindaan kepada penyataan pembelaan selepas kes plaintif selesai, yang termasuklah pembelaan perlindungan bersyarat, mahkamah ini tidak dapat menerima aduan yang ditimbulkan buat kali pertama atas rayuan. Satu pihak tidak boleh dibenarkan mendiamkan diri sehingga kes timbul untuk dibicarakan di hadapan Mahkamah Rayuan dan masa itu barulah menimbulkan aduan beliau buat kali pertama tentang pindaan tersebut, apabila peluang untuk membantah ini sedia ada untuk pihak itu di perbicaraan tersebut (lihat ms 388G–H). (5) Di mana plaintif berhasrat untuk bergantung kepada niat jahat yang nyata di pihak defendan bagi tujuan menggagalkan pli perlindungan bersyarat, beliau harus membuat pli terhadapnya dan memberikan butiran-butiran fakta dan perkara-perkara daripada mana inferens tentang dakwaan beliau tentang niat jahat tersebut dibuat dan ini sepatutnya dibuat melalui jawapan dan bukan dalam penyataan tuntutan (lihat ms 389G–H); Abdul Rahman Talib v Seenivasagam & Anor [1965] MLJ 142 dan Janagi v Ong Boon Kiat [1971] 2 MLJ 196 diikut. Ia merupakan satu keperluan mandatori di pihak plaintif untuk menyampaikan satu jawapan yang memberikan butiran-butiran fakta dan perkara-perkara daripada mana inferens niat jahat tersebut dibuat sebagaimana yang diperuntukkan di bawah A 44 k 3(3) Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah Rendah 1980 (‘KMR’). Namun begitu, memandangkan plaintif telah gagal untuk menyampaikan jawapan memplikan niat jahat yang nyata sebagaimana yang diperuntukkan di bawah A 44 k 3(3) KMR, beliau tidak boleh dibenarkan bergantung kepada niat jahat yang nyata tanpa menyampaikan jawapan untuk menggagalkan pembelaan perlindungan bersyarat, kerana hanya jawapan tersebut akan membentuk pliding-pliding dalam guaman sivil (lihat ms
For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 184 392A–B). (6) Mengenai aduan peguan plaintif bahawa dokumen-dokumen yang dikemukakan bagi pihak defendan hanya dikemukakan semasa perbicaraan kes defendan, aduan ini tidak secara khusus ditimbulkan dalam penghujahan di hadapan majistret yang membawa kesan bahawa tiada kepentingan atau kurang kepentingan patut diberikan terhadap dokumen-dokumen tersebut, tetapi hanya ditimbulkan buat kali pertama semasa rayuan. Ini sepatutnya telah ditimbulkan semasa penghujahan di perbicaraan tersebut dan adalah terlalu lambat untuk menimbulkannya sekarang. Dalam apa-apa keadaan, dokumen-dokumen yang telah diadukan dengan jelas boleh diterima untuk menunjukkan peranan dan fungsi DW2 dan DW4, urutan kejadian-kejadian yang membuat DW11 memberitahu defendan tentang ugutan plaintif dan menyokong keterangan lisan defendan, dan keterangan tersebut telah diputuskan dengan betul untuk boleh diterima oleh majistret (lihat ms 392C–F). Perbalahan peguam plaintif bahawa ||Page 374>>IDD5 tersebut tidak sepatutnya dipertimbangkan oleh majistret, bagi tujuan kes ini, apa yang relevan adalah bahawa surat itu wujud dan majistret tidak prejudis atau kabur semasa beliau mempertimbangkan bahawa surat itu wujud kerana beliau telah tidak menerima masuk kandungan-kandungan surat tersebut (lihat ms 393F–H).]
Notes For cases on amendment of defence, see 2(1) Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2001 Reissue) paras 437–452.For cases on pleadings in a defamation case, see 2(3) Mallal’s Digest For cases on admissibility of documentary evidence, see 7 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2001 Reissue) paras 989–994.For cases on defamation generally, see 12 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2000 Reissue) paras 193–409.(4th Ed, 2001 Reissue) paras 4481–4484.
Cases referred to AB Ltd, Re [1956] MLJ 197 (refd) Abdul Rahman Talib v Seenivasagam & Anor [1965] MLJ 142 (folld) Abdul Rahman Talib v Seenivasagam & Anor [1966] 2 MLJ 66 (distd) Adam v Ward [1917] AC 309 (folld) Allied Capital Sdn Bhd v Mohamed Latiff Shah Mohd and another application [2001] 2 MLJ 305 (refd) Bank of China v Asiaweek Ltd [1991] 2 MLJ 505 (distd) Benmax v Austin Motor Co Ltd [1955] 1 All ER 326 (refd) Browne v Dunn (1893) 6 R 67 (folld) Caswell v Powell Duffryn Associated Collieries Ltd [1940] AC 152 (folld) China Airlines Ltd v Maltran Air Corp Sdn Bhd (formerly known as Maltran Air Services Corp Sdn Bhd) and another appeal 1996] 3 MLJ 517 (refd)
For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 185 Chock Kek Ling v Patt Hup Transport Co Ltd & Ors [1966] 1 MLJ 120 (refd) Clarke v Edinburgh Tramways Co 1919 SC (HL) 35 (refd) Commercial Union Assurance (M) Sdn Bhd v Ng Chek Hung and another appeal [1997] 2 MLJ 465 (refd) Croucher v Inglis (1889) 16 R (refd) Green v Chalmers (1878) 6 R 318 (refd) Hasnul bin Abdul Hadi v Bulat bin Mohamed & Anor [1978] 1 MLJ 75 (distd) Henry Wong v John Lee & Anor [1980] 2 MLJ 254 (distd) Hoare v Jessop [1965] EA 218 (folld) Horrocks v Lowe [1974] 1 All ER 662 (refd) Institute Of Commercial Management United Kingdom v New Straits Times Press (Malaysia) Bhd [1993] 1 MLJ 408 (distd) International Times & Ors v Leong Ho Yuen [1980] 2 MLJ 86 (distd) JB Jeyaretnam v Lee Kuan Yew [1979] 2 MLJ 282 (distd) Janagi v Ong Boon Kiat [1971] 2 MLJ 196 (folld) ||Page 375>> Kerry v Carter [1969] 1 WLR 1372 (refd) Lee Kuan Yew v Derek Gwyn Davies & Ors [1990] 1 MLJ 390 (distd) Lightbody v Gordon (1882) 9 R 934 (refd) Luk Kai Lam v Sim Ai Leng [1978] 1 MLJ 214 (refd) Mat Shah bin Mohamed & Anor v Foo Say Meng & Ors [1984] 1 MLJ 237 (refd) Rajagopal v Rajan [1972] 1 MLJ 45 (distd) Rasidin bin Partojo v Frederick Kiai [1976] 2 MLJ 214 (refd) Renal Link (Kl) Sdn Bhd v Dato’ Dr Harnam Singh [1997] 2 MLJ 373 (refd) Robin v Sunrise Investments (Pte) Ltd & Anor [1991] 2 MLJ 517 (folld) S Pakianathan v Jenni Ibrahim [1988] 2 MLJ 173 (distd) Samar bte Mansor v Mustafa Kamarul Ariffin [1974] 2 MLJ 71 (refd) Sandison v Malayan Times Ltd & Ors [1964] MLJ 332 (distd) Sivalingam a/l Periasamy v Periasamy & Anor [1995] 3 MLJ 395 (refd) Soong Ah Chow & Anor v Lai Kok Cheng [1986] 1 MLJ 42 (folld) Syed Husin Ali v Syarikat Penchetakan Utusan Melayu Berhad & Anor [1973] 2 MLJ 56 (distd) Tun Datuk Patinggi Haji Abdul-Rahman Ya’kub v Bre Sdn Bhd & Ors [1996] 1 MLJ 39 (distd)
Legislation referred to
For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 186 Defamation Ordinance 1957 ss 7, 7(3)(b) Evidence Act 1950 s 6 Stamp Act 1948 Sch 1 s 4 Statutory Declaration Act 1960 s 2, Sch 2 Rules of the Supreme Court 1957 O 19 r 22 Subordinate Courts Rules 1980 O 44 r 3(3)
SP Annamalai (Annamalai & Co) for the appellant. N Shanmugam (Syarikat Subbaiyah) for the respondent.
[2001] 6 MLJ 532 Doree Industries (M) Sdn Bhd & Ors v Sri Ram & Co (sued as a firm) & Ors
HIGH COURT (IPOH) — CIVIL SUITS NO 22–264 OF 1999, NO 22–265 OF 1999, NO 22–266 OF 1999 AND NO 22–267 OF 1999 SU GEOK YIAM JC 16 FEBRUARY 2001
Civil Procedure — Striking out — Statement of claim — Unconditional appearance and defence filed, whether preclude application to strike out — Delay in filing application to strike out after filing of defence — No date fixed for trial — Whether delay fatal — Whether registrar relied on evidence in supporting affidavit in allowing application to strike out
Tort — Defamation — Libel — Complaint letter copied to Central Bank alleged to be defamatory — Whether publication to third party — Privileged documents attached to letter, whether tort of defamation could be invoked — Burden on defendant to prove that defamatory reports were privileged
The first plaintiff, a limited company, made a claim against its insurers, the fourth defendant, under some policies which included a fire insurance policy. The fourth defendant denied liability and refused to pay on the ground that the cause of fire was due to arson. It relied on a forensic report prepared by the second and third defendants. The first plaintiff was denied a copy of the report by the fourth defendant. So it lodged a complaint with Bank Negara against the fourth defendant. In response to a Bank negara’s letter, the first defendant, as solicitors for the fourth defendant, issued a letter dated 6 April 1999 to the first plaintiff with copies to Bank Negara and
For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 187 several other parties. The plaintiffs alleged that the words used in the letter dated 6 April 1999 in their natural and ordinary meanings meant and by way of innuendoes were understood to mean that the plaintiffs were arsonists and had deliberately burnt the factory themselves in order to cheat the fourth defendant so as to claim the insurance money. This had not only injured the plaintiffs’ reputation but also deprived the first plaintiff of its insurance claims. More than one year after entering its defence, the second defendant applied to strike out the plaintiffs’ amended statement of claim pursuant to O 18 r 19(1) of the Rules of the High Court 1980 (‘the RHC’) on the ground that it did not disclose a reasonable cause of action; alternatively the claim by the second, third and fourth plaintiffs (the directors and manager of the first plaintiff) in this action against the second defendant be struck out as being frivolous and vexatious and an abuse of process of the court. The deputy registrar ruled in favour of the second defendant. The plaintiffs appealed. The plaintiffs submitted as follows: (i) the second defendant, having entered an unconditional appearance, was precluded or barred from applying under O 18 r 19(1) of the RHC to strike out the plaintiffs’ statement of claim; (ii) no evidence was admissible yet the second defendant filed a supporting affidavit and the deputy registrar decided on a point of substantive law without a ||Page 533>>trial; (iii) the deputy registrar erred when he decided purely on the issue of publication of the report and did not deal with authorship of the report; and (iv) this was not a plain and obvious case for striking out.
Held, allowing the appeal: (1) The words ‘at any stage of the proceedings’ in O 18 r 19 of the RHC expressly exclude any time limit for the making of an application for striking out and these words should be given effect to. The mere fact that the second defendant had filed an unconditional appearance and a statement of defence does not bar or preclude the second defendant from applying to strike out the plaintiffs’ claim under O 18 r 19(1) of the RHC because the words ‘at any stage of the proceedings’ which qualify the words ‘The court may … order to be struck out’ in the rule itself presupposes the making of such an application unless the ground relied upon is a lack of locus standi or jurisdiction (see pp 549H, 550C–D). (2) A delay of more than one year after the filing of the statement of defence was not fatal to the second defendant’s application made pursuant to O 18 r 19(1) because the trial date has not yet been fixed for the action (see p 550H–I). (3) From a perusal of the registrar’s ground of decision, the court was satisfied that the registrar did not rely at all on the second defendant’s supporting affidavit when he allowed the defendant’s application to strike out the plaintiff’s claim on the ground that it did not disclose a reasonable cause of action (see p 551B). (4) There was nothing in the second defendant’s supporting affidavit to show that the second, third and fourth plaintiffs’ claim against the second defendant was
For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 188 filed to annoy or embarrass the second defendant. Their claim could not be said to be obviously unsustainable. The second, third and fourth plaintiffs have a legitimate grievance and they have instituted the action in order to obtain a remedy provided by law (see pp 552H–I, 553F, 555F). (5) The deputy registrar erred when he decided solely on the absence of publication of the alleged defamatory letter on the part of the second defendant to the third persons concerned. He had failed to consider that there was publication by the second defendant of the alleged defamatory report. It was clear that the contents of the alleged defamatory report which were wholly or partly authored by the second and third defendants were communicated to the fourth defendant who must have relied on the truth and accuracy of their contents when the fourth defendant denied liability under the insurance policy and repudiated the first plaintiff’s insurance claim and therefore there was sufficient publication to a third party which would entitle the plaintiffs to sue the second defendant for damages for libel (see pp 557E–F, 558B–C). ||Page 534>> (6) The fact that in para 3 of the alleged defamatory letter the reports of the second and third defendants have been described by the first defendant as ‘privileged documents’ should not be construed to mean that the tort of defamation could not be invoked against the second defendant by the plaintiffs. The burden was on the second defendant to prove that the alleged defamatory reports were privileged documents (see p 558E–F).
Bahasa Malaysia summary
Plaintif pertama, sebuah syarikat berhad, telah membuat tuntutan terhadap penanggung-penanggung insuransnya, defendan keempat, di bawah polisi-polisi tertentu yang mana termasuk polisi insurans kebakaran. Defendan keempat menafikan tanggungan dan enggan membayar atas alasan bahawa kebakaran tersebut telah disebabkan oleh perbuatan sengaja. Ia bergantung pada laporan forensik yang telah disediakan oleh defendan-defendan kedua dan ketiga. Plaintif pertama tidak diberikan sesalinan laporan tersebut oleh defendan keempat. Oleh itu ia telah membuat aduan dengan Bank Negara terhadap defendan keempat. Bagi menjawab surat Bank Negara, defendan pertama, sebagai peguamcara bagi defendan keempat, telah mengeluarkan surat bertarikh 6 April 1999 kepada plaintif pertama dengan salinan-salinan kepada Bank Negara dan beberapa pihak yang lain. Plaintif mendakwa perkataan-perkataan yang digunakan dalam surat bertarikh 6 April 1999 menurut maksudnya yang biasa dan asal bermakna dan secara sindiran difahamkan sebagai bermakna bahawa plaintif-plaintif adalah orang yang sengaja membakar dan telah sengaja membakar kilang mereka sendiri demi untuk menipu defendan keempat supaya dapat menuntut wang insurans. Ini bukan sahaja menjejaskan reputasi plaintif tetapi telah melucuthak plaintif untuk menuntut insuransnya. Lebih daripada satu tahun selepas memasukkan
For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 189 pembelaannya, defendan kedua telah memohon untuk membatalkan pernyataan tuntutan terpinda plaintif-plaintif selaras dengan A 18 k 19(1) Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah Tinggi 1980 (‘KMT’) atas arahan bahawa ia tidak mendedahkan satu kausa tindakan yang wajar, secara alternatifnya, tuntutan oleh plaintif-plaintif kedua, ketiga dan keempat (pengarah-pengarah dan pengurus plaintif pertama) dalam tindakan ini terhadap defendan kedua dibatalkan kerana remeh dan menyusahkan serta suatu penyalahgunaan proses mahkamah. Timbalan pendaftar telah membuat keputusan yang memihak kepada defendan kedua. Plaintif-plaintif telah merayu. Plaintif berhujah seperti berikut: (i) defendan kedua setelah memasuki satu kehadiran tanpa bersyarat, telah dihalang atau terkecuali daripada memohon di bawah A 18 k 19(1) KMT untuk membatalkan pernyataan tuntutan plaintif-plaintif; (ii) tiada keterangan yang boleh diterima setakat ini namun defendan kedua telah memfailkan satu afidavit sokongan dan timbalan pendaftar telah membuat keputusan atas perkara undang-undang ||Page 535>>substantif tanpa suatu perbicaraan; (iii) timbalan pendaftar telah tersalah pertimbangan apabila beliau membuat keputusan semata-mata atas isu penerbitan laporan tersebut dan tidak mengendahkan asal usul penulis laporan tersebut; dan (iv) ini bukannya suatu kes yang nyata dan mudah untuk pembatalan.
Diputuskan, membenarkan rayuan tersebut: (1) Perkataan-perkataan ‘dalam mana-mana peringkat prosiding’ (at any stage of the proceedings) dalam A 18 k 19 KMT dengan nyatanya mengecualikan sebarang had masa untuk membuat sesuatu permohonan untuk pembatalan dan perkataan-perkataan ini haruslah dikuatkuasakan. Hakikat bahawa defendan kedua telah memfailkan suatu kehadiran tidak bersyarat dan pernyataan pembelaan tidak menghalang atau menghindari defendan kedua daripada memohon bagi mengetepikan tuntutan plaintif-plaintif di bawah A 18 k 19(1) KMT kerana perkataan-perkataan ‘dalam mana-mana peringkat prosiding’ (at any stage of the proceedings) yang melayakkan perkataan-perkataan ‘Mahkamah boleh ... memberi perintah untuk dibatalkan’ (The court may … order to be struck out) dalam kaedah tersebut sendiri menjangkakan terlebih dahulu pembuatan suatu permohonan yang sedemikian kecuali jika alasan yang diberi adalah ketiadaan locus standi atau bidangkuasa (lihat ms 549H, 550C–D). (2) Kelewatan selama lebih dari satu tahun selepas pemfailan pernyataan pembelaan tidak memudaratkan permohonan defendan kedua yang dibuat selaras dengan A 18 k 19(1) KMT kerana tarikh perbicaraan masih belum ditetapkan untuk tindakan tersebut (lihat ms 550H–I). (3) Daripada suatu penelitian akan alasan keputusan pendaftar, mahkamah berpuashati bahawa pendaftar tidak bergantung sama sekali kepada afidavit sokongan defendan kedua ketika beliau membenarkan permohonan defendan untuk membatalkan tuntutan plaintif atas alasan bahawa ia tidak mendedahkan suatu kausa tindakan yang wajar (lihat ms 551B). (4) Tidak terdapat apa-apa di dalam afidavit sokongan defendan kedua yang
For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 190 menunjukkan bahawa tuntutan plaintif-plaintif kedua, ketiga dan keempat terhadap defendan kedua telah difailkan untuk memalukan atau menyakitkan hati defendan kedua. Tuntutan mereka tidak boleh diperkatakan sebagai pastinya tidak boleh dipertahankan. Plaintif-plaintif kedua, ketiga dan keempat mempunyai kilanan yang sah dan mereka telah memulakan tindakan tersebut demi untuk mendapatkan satu remedi yang diperuntukkan oleh undang-undang (lihat ms 552H–I, 553F, 555F). (5) Timbalan pendaftar tersalah pertimbangan apabila beliau membuat keputusan semata-mata atas ketiadaan penerbitan surat ||Page 536>>yang dikatakan fitnah tersebut oleh defendan kedua kepada pihak-pihak ketiga berkenaan. Beliau telah gagal untuk menimbangkan bahawa terdapatnya penerbitan oleh defendan kedua akan surat memfitnah yang dikatakan tersebut. Adalah jelas bahawa kandungan laporan yang dikatakan memfitnah itu yang mana keseluruhannya atau sebahagiannya telah ditulis oleh defendan-defendan kedua dan ketiga telah disampaikan kepada defendan keempat yang telah bergantung kepada ketepatan dan kebenaran kandungannya apabila defendan keempat menafikan tanggungan di bawah polisi insurans tersebut dan menyangkal tuntutan insurans plaintif pertama dan oleh itu telah terdapat penerbitan yang secukupnya kepada pihak ketiga yang mana akan memberi plaintif hak untuk mendakwa defendan kedua bagi mendapatkan gantirugi untuk libel (lihat ms 557E–F, 558B–C). (6) Hakikat bahawa dalam perenggan 3 dari surat yang dikatakan memfitnah itu laporan-laporan oleh defendan-defendan kedua dan ketiga telah diterangkan oleh defendan pertama sebagai ‘dokumen terlindung’ tidak seharusnya bermakna bahawa tort memfitnah tidak boleh digunakan terhadap defendan kedua oleh plaintif-plaintif. Bebannya adalah terletak pada defendan kedua untuk membuktikan bahawa laporan-laporan memfitnah yang didakwa adalah dokumen-dokumen terlindung (lihat ms 558E–F).]
Notes For cases on striking out statement of claim, see 2(3) Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2001 Reissue) paras 5631–5641.For cases on libel, see 12 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2000 Reissue) paras 263–352.
Cases referred to Alor Janggus Soon Seng Trading Sdn Bhd & Ors v Sey Hoe Sdn Bhd & Ors [1995] 1 MLJ 241 (refd) Attorney General of Duchy of Lancaster v London & North Western Railway Co [1892] 3 Ch 274 (refd) Bandar Builder Sdn Bhd & Ors v United Malayan Banking Corp Bhd [1993] 3 MLJ 36 (refd) Bank Bumiputra (M) Bhd & Anor v Lorrain Esme Osman and another action [1987]
For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 191 2 MLJ 633 (refd) Bhailal Jagadish v Additional Commissioner, Akola AIR 1953 Nag 89 (refd) Brickwood Consolidated Sdn Bhd v Kenneth Teh Ah Kian & Anor [2000] 4 AMR 4853 (refd) DC Sangma v State of Assam AIR 1978 SC 17 (refd) Hatchard v Mege (1887) QBD 771 (refd) Hough v Windus (1884) 12 QBD 224 (refd) ||Page 537>> Institute of Commercial Management United Kingdom v New Straits Times Press (M) Bhd [1993] 1 MLJ 408 (refd) Jamir Hassan v Kang Min [1992] 2 MLJ 46 (refd) Jasa Keramat Sdn Bhd & Anor v Monotech (M) Sdn Bhd [1999] 4 MLJ 637 (refd) Kaye v Robertson [1991] FSR 62 (refd) Lim Seak Huat v Malayan United Realty Sdn Bhd [1997] 5 CLJ 336 (refd) Loh Holdings Sdn Bhd v Peglin Development Sdn Bhd & Anor [1984] 2 MLJ 105 (refd) Low Yat v GC Grace [1947] MLJ 115 (refd) N Caruppaiya v MBf Property Services Sdn Bhd & Anor [2000] 4 MLJ 389 (refd) Orr Ewing, Re 22 Ch D 456 (refd) Peck v Russell [1899] 1 QB 86 (refd) Pet Far Eastern (M) Sdn Bhd v Tay Young Huat & Ors [1999] 2 AMR 2553 (refd) Quebec Railway, Light, Heat & Power Co Ltd v Vandry AIR 1920 PC 181 (refd) Queen, The v Bishop of Oxford (1879) 4 QBD 245 (refd) S Manikam & Ors v Ismail bin Mohamad & Ors [1997] 2 MLJ 90 (refd) Sarjit Singh Khaira v Government of the State of Sarawak & Anor [1990] 2 MLJ 251 (refd) Sheldon v Brown Bayley’s Steel Works Ltd & Dawnways Ltd [1953] 2 QB 393; [1953] 2 All ER 894 (refd) SK Shana Ltd v State of Bihar AIR 1953 Pat 161 (refd) Wenlock v Moloney & Ors [1965] 2 All ER 871 (refd)
Legislation referred to Rules of the High Court 1980 O 18 r 19(1), O 33 r 2
Ngan Siong Hing (Angie Neoh Hooi with him) (Abbas & Ngan) for the plaintiffs. PH Looi (Zaid Ibrahim & Co) for the defendants.
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