House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee
Developments in the European Union
Sixth Report of Session 2005–06
Report, together with formal minutes, oral and written evidence
Ordered by The House of Commons to be printed 19 July 2006
HC 768 Published on 26 July 2006 by authority of the House of Commons London: The Stationery Office Limited £0.00
Foreign Affairs Committee
The Foreign Affairs Committee is appointed by the House of Commons to examine the administration, expenditure and policy of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and its associated agencies.
Current membership Mike Gapes (Labour, Ilford South), Chairman Mr Fabian Hamilton (Labour, Leeds North East) Rt Hon Mr David Heathcoat-Amory (Conservative, Wells) Mr John Horam (Conservative, Orpington) Mr Eric Illsley (Labour, Barnsley Central) Mr Paul Keetch (Liberal Democrat, Hereford) Andrew Mackinlay (Labour, Thurrock) Mr John Maples (Conservative, Stratford-on-Avon) Sandra Osborne (Labour, Ayr, Carrick and Cumnock) Mr Greg Pope (Labour, Hyndburn) Mr Ken Purchase (Labour, Wolverhampton North East) Rt Hon Sir John Stanley (Conservative, Tonbridge and Malling) Ms Gisela Stuart (Labour, Birmingham Edgbaston) Richard Younger-Ross (Liberal Democrat, Teignbridge)
The following member was also a member of the committee during the parliament.
Rt Hon Mr Andrew Mackay (Conservative, Bracknell)
Powers The committee is one of the departmental select committees, the powers of which are set out in House of Commons Standing Orders, principally in SO No 152. These are available on the Internet via www.parliament.uk.
Publication The Reports and evidence of the Committee are published by The Stationery Office by Order of the House. All publications of the Committee (including press notices) are on the Internet at http://www.parliament.uk/parliamentary_committees/foreign_affairs_committee.cfm.
Committee staff The current staff of the Committee are Steve Priestley (Clerk), Sarah Ioannou (Second Clerk), Ann Snow (Committee Specialist), Kit Dawnay, (Committee Specialist), Kevin Candy (Committee Assistant), Catherine Jackson (Secretary) and Chintan Makwana (Senior Office Clerk).
Contacts All correspondence should be addressed to the Clerk of the Foreign Affairs Committee, House of Commons, London SW1A 0AA. The telephone number for general enquiries is 020 7219 6394; the Committee’s email address is [email protected]
Developments in the European Union 1
Contents
Report Page
Conclusions and recommendations 2
1 Introduction 5
2 The UK’s relations with Europe 7 The United Kingdom Presidency, July–December 2005 7 Future financing 7 Economic reform 9 External relations 10 Enlargement 12 Conclusion 13 Post-Presidency developments 15 Transparency and openness 15 National veto 17 Energy policy 18 Ministerial appointments 19
3 The Constitutional Treaty 20 Is the Treaty dead, or just resting? 20 ‘Cherry picking’ 21 The way ahead 23
4 Enlargement 25 Bulgaria and Romania: the next stage 25 Croatia 28 Is Europe going cold on Turkey? 29 Is Turkey going cold on Europe? 30 Turkey and Cyprus 31 Conclusion 32 The EU’s ‘absorption capacity’ 33
5 Foreign, Security and Defence Policy 35 Machinery and architecture 35 Is there a distinctive role for the EU in foreign policy? 37 Keeping the neighbourhood tidy 37 An EU working in Britain’s interests 38
Formal minutes 39
List of witnesses 41
List of written evidence 42
2 Developments in the European Union
Conclusions and recommendations
The UK’s relations with Europe 1. We conclude that the British Presidency took place at a time when Europe was facing a deep and largely unforeseen crisis of confidence. We further conclude that notwithstanding this difficult context, the Presidency was on the whole well-run and achieved some important successes, along with a number of disappointing outcomes. It failed to generate the fresh thinking on democracy and reengagement with the public which the Prime Minister called for in his opening speech to the European Parliament. We recommend that the Government build on the successes and, in particular, that it work to consolidate and where necessary improve its good working relations with other member states, especially with those that broadly share the United Kingdom’s perspective on the EU. (Paragraph 33)
2. We conclude that the Government was wrong to retract its previous support for all stages of the Council’s deliberations on legislative acts to be open to the public as a general rule. We recommend that the Government support efforts by the Finnish Presidency to promote greater transparency in the Council and more generally in the proceedings of the European Union. (Paragraph 40)
3. We welcome the decision of the Council of Ministers to seek further improvements in decision-making and action in justice and home affairs on the basis of existing treaties. However, we oppose attempts to use the bridging clauses in the current treaties to introduce core objectives of the constitutional Treaty in the field of justice and home affairs. We recommend that the Government seek the views of Parliament before agreeing to any further extension of qualified majority voting. (Paragraph 46)
The Constitutional Treaty 4. We conclude that although the Treaty is not dead, it is comatose and on life support. At some point, Europe’s leaders are going to have to decide whether to switch it off. We conclude that the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe is unlikely ever to come into force, although attempts may be made to enact some of its provisions by other means. We recommend that the Government encourage its European counterparts to face up to this reality and explicitly to abandon the Treaty as a package, in the interest of making progress on some of the real and important issues which are at present caught up in the paralysis created by its rejection. (Paragraph 64)
Enlargement 5. We conclude that there are strong political reasons for the Government to maintain its support for the accession of Bulgaria and Romania in accordance with the agreed timetable. We recommend, however, that the Government be prepared to agree to the imposition of post-accession safeguards on either country, if the Commission’s reports show that these would be justified. (Paragraph 74)
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6. We conclude that Croatia’s proposed accession to the EU deserves the full support of the United Kingdom, assuming that it meets all the necessary criteria. We further conclude, and hope, that a successful accession process by Croatia could play an important role in stimulating other states in the Western Balkans to make the necessary adjustments that will enable them to qualify for full membership of the EU in due course. (Paragraph 77)
7. We conclude that the accession to the European Union of a Turkey which fully meets all the entry criteria remains in the interests of both the EU and Turkey. We recommend that the Government continue to offer strong support to Turkey in its accession process. (Paragraph 80)
8. We conclude that it is the interests of Turkey, the Turkish people and Turkish Cypriots alike that Turkey should move swiftly to accept in full its obligations under the Ankara Agreement. We further conclude that a far more constructive approach by the government of the Republic of Cyprus is necessary to assist this process. (Paragraph 87)
9. We agree with the Foreign Secretary that what is key to the enlargement debate is the rigorous application of the criteria for membership. We conclude that it is this, rather than any abstruse debate about ‘absorption capacity’, which must determine the future shape and scope of the EU. But we also conclude that popular opinion will be an important factor in deciding future enlargements and that this reinforces the need for a Union which engages the public. (Paragraph 93)
Foreign, Security and Defence Policy 10. We conclude that, whatever the merits of the proposal to establish a Foreign Minister and an external action service for the EU, it is important that the European Commission should not develop a diplomatic service or ‘embassies’ by stealth. We recommend that the Government take steps to prevent the official use of the term ‘ambassador’ to refer to the Commission’s representatives and that it ensure that, at a time when the funding of British diplomatic, consular and trade posts around the world is under great pressure, expenditure by the Commission on its overseas delegations and properties is subject to rigorous scrutiny. (Paragraph 101)
11. We conclude that foreign policy is and should remain primarily a matter for each nation state to decide for itself. We further conclude, however, that there can be real value in co-ordinating foreign policies at EU level and in undertaking joint missions on matters where the EU25 can agree and where they have a shared interest. (Paragraph 106)
4 Developments in the European Union
Developments in the European Union 5
1 Introduction
1. The Foreign Affairs Committee has maintained a continuing Inquiry into Developments in the European Union since July 2001, when it had become clear that the next wave of enlargement was going to put strain on the EU’s procedures and institutions.1 At the same time, a Convention on the Future of Europe was being formed “to consider the key issues arising for the Union's future development and try to identify the various possible responses.”2 Two of the present membership of the Committee, Gisela Stuart and David Heathcoat-Amory, were the United Kingdom Parliament’s representatives on the Convention; Ms Stuart also served on its Praesidium.
2. The Convention completed its work in July 2003, with the publication of a draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe.3 Three years later, the Treaty having been rejected in referendums by the electorates of France and the Netherlands in mid-2005, the European Union is in a ‘period of reflection’. This was initiated by the June 2005 Council4 and was extended for a further nine months in June 2006.5
3. This is the Foreign Affairs Committee’s first substantive Report on the European Union since 2001, when our predecessors produced a Report on Enlargement and the Nice Council.6 The Committee has, however, heard a great deal of evidence in the intervening period, all of which has been published.7 In the Autumn of 2005, with the future of the European Union clearly at a sensitive and important juncture just as the United Kingdom was assuming its presidency, we decided to hear further evidence and to produce a short Report.
4. Over the past seven months, we have heard oral evidence from the Foreign Secretary, Margaret Beckett; from her predecessor, Jack Straw; from the former Minister for Europe, Douglas Alexander; from Charles Grant, Director of the Centre for European Reform; and from Ruth Lea, Director of the Centre for Policy Studies.8 We have also visited European institutions in Brussels, as well as several European capitals.9 During the 2005 United Kingdom Presidency of the European Union, we hosted in Parliament a conference of the Chairmen of our counterpart committees from member states and from candidate and applicant countries. We are grateful to all those with whom we have had the opportunity to exchange views for their time and for their opinions, which we have found of great value in shaping our own conclusions. Our intention is to contribute to the ongoing debate on the
1 Foreign Affairs Committee News Release No. 3, July 2001 2 “The Laeken Declaration”, 15 December 2001, available at http://europa.eu/constitution 3 The full text of the draft Treaty may be read at http://european-convention.eu.int; the full Treaty was published by the Government as Cm 6429, available at www.fco.gov.uk/Files/ 4 Declaration by the Heads of State or Government of the Member States of the European Union on the Ratification of the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe 5 Presidency Conclusions 15–16 June 2006, para 47, available at www.consilium.europa.eu 6 Foreign Affairs Committee, Fifth Report of Session 2000–01, European Union Enlargement and Nice Follow-up, HC 318 7 The evidence is available on our website, www.parliament.uk 8 For a full list of the written and oral evidence, see pp 41–42 9 Prague, Vienna and Warsaw
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European Union and particularly—given our remit under the Standing Orders of the House—its external dimension.10
10 The remit of the Foreign Affairs Committee is to inquire into the expenditure, policy and administration of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office
Developments in the European Union 7
2 The UK’s relations with Europe
The United Kingdom Presidency, July–December 2005 5. The United Kingdom assumed the presidency of the Council of Ministers with the dust from the French and Dutch referendums yet to settle. The ‘period of reflection’ had just been declared and great expectations of continuing progress towards ratification and implementation of the Treaty had given way to a more downbeat mood of apprehension.
6. There were nonetheless many substantial issues on the new presidency’s agenda, including the budget settlement for the period to 2013; reform of the Common Agricultural Policy; Turkey’s membership aspirations; and, not least, the fate of the constitutional Treaty. The then Foreign Secretary, Jack Straw, identified four priority areas for the British Presidency in a statement to the House of Commons on 30 June 2005: future financing of the EU; economic reform; external relations; and enlargement.11 We consider in brief how the Presidency fared in relation to each of these objectives, before we discuss in greater detail those which relate most closely to our terms of reference as a Committee.
Future financing 7. In June 2005, Mr Straw described the United Kingdom’s objectives on future financing in the following terms:
Discussions on future financing will continue under the UK’s Presidency. Any new Financial Perspective must, at the very least, set out a process which leads to a more rational budget, shaping the second half of that Perspective up to 2013. We recognise our responsibilities as EU Presidency, and we will work hard to reach agreement on future financing by the end of the year.12
The Royal Institute of International Affairs (Chatham House) sympathised with the scale of the task facing the Government, noting that:
… it is unfortunate for the UK to have found itself so central to disagreement on the EU’s future finances ... Other EU member state governments will judge the UK on whether it reaches a deal on the EU budget. The British government will measure its success on this issue by its ability to reach a settlement that preserves the UK EU budget rebate on the basis of a formula that will not place the government in domestic political difficulties.13
8. Appearing before this Committee in the throes of the negotiations over the budget in December, Mr Straw said that “These are complex negotiations. They always are; they always will be.”14 He set out for us the numbers which formed the basis of the discussion in the European Council:
11 HC Deb, 30 June 2005, cols 1450–52 12 Ibid, cols 1450–51 13 “Two Cheers for the UK Presidency”, Chatham House Briefing Paper, available at www.riia.org/ 14 Q 1
8 Developments in the European Union
The Commission recommended a budget set at 1.24 per cent of what is called GNI (gross national income) of the European Union Member States, which would have been 1,025 billion euros over the seven-year period, and that was impossible. The Luxembourg Presidency recommended a budget of 1.06 per cent of GNI, which is 870 billion euros. We are proposing in last Wednesday’s negotiating box a budget of about 1.026, and it is 847 billion.15
The final settlement achieved in the European Council was for a seven-year budget of €862 billion, representing 1.045 per cent of GNI. The Council also agreed as part of the 2007–13 financial perspective to ask the Commission “to undertake a full, wide ranging review covering all aspects of EU spending, including the CAP, and of resources, including the UK rebate, to report in 2008–09.”16
9. Before the commencement of the British Presidency, the Prime Minister had declared in June 2005 that “The UK rebate will remain and we will not negotiate it away. Period.”17
10. At the December European Council, however, the Government agreed that, as part of the overall budget settlement, the United Kingdom’s rebate of total allocated expenditure— except for CAP market expenditure—in the ten new member states will cease by 2011.18 This will mean that in the period 2007–13 the United Kingdom will receive approximately £7 billion less in rebate than it would otherwise have done,19 and will be paying a net contribution to the EU budget which will rise from the present average of £3.5 billion per year to some £6 billion per year.20
11. The Prime Minister summed up the budget deal when he made a statement to the House of Commons on 19 December:
The reason it was so important to reach agreement at this European Council is as follows: as all central and eastern European leaders made clear to me, it was essential to have a December deal, to allow these countries to plan and prepare for using the EU funds when those funds start in twelve months’ time. It was clear that the prospects for a deal next year were negligible. And were there to be no deal, then in 2007, the European Parliament would take over the budget process. This would mean the Parliament setting annual budgets, on the existing financial agreements, which would have meant that countries like Poland would have lost around two thirds of their EU funds.
That is why they wanted a deal now. Of course, there is also a need for fundamental reform of the EU Budget. As I said in June, what we need is to settle the Budget on the basis of everyone paying their fair share of the costs of enlargement now; and
15 Q 15 16 Council document 15915/05, 19 December 2005, available at www.eu2005.gov.uk 17 HC Deb, 8 June 2005, col 1234 18 Council document 15915/05, 19 December 2005, available at www.eu2005.gov.uk 19 HC Deb, 19 December 2005, col 1564 20 HM Treasury, European Community Finances: Statement on the 2006 EC Budget and measures to counter fraud and financial mismanagement, May 2006, Cm 6770 Table 3; and HC Deb, 31 January 2006, col 399W
Developments in the European Union 9
then to open up the prospect of a radically reformed Budget midway through the next Budget period.21
12. Charles Grant felt that the fact that agreement had been reached on the budget was of greater importance than the agreement itself:
One would have liked a different deal, with a radical agreement to reform the CAP and so on, but I think it was the best deal that was possible in the circumstances. I part company from some commentators and my former employers at The Economist who would have said it was better to do no deal at all. The important thing is that there was a deal. The details are less important, and the fact that it is off the agenda is a good thing. It was a poisonous thing while it was on the agenda. If we had not done a deal, we would have spent the rest of this year arguing about it instead of dealing with real problems in the real world.22
However, he described the outcome as “a fair deal” for the United Kingdom.23
13. Ruth Lea acknowledged the significance of the budget settlement for 2007 to 2013, but felt that:
… arguably, of course, it was a very disadvantageous agreement in the end for Britain; and the Chancellor of the Exchequer has made it very clear that we will be losing another 7 billion over that particular period by way of our abatement. The Government was making the point that it wanted to negotiate the abatement in connection with the reform of CAP, but that, of course, did not happen and will not happen for quite some time.24
14. In May 2006, the then Minister for Europe, Douglas Alexander, told us that:
I would argue that in what was ultimately agreed among the heads of government at the December European Council and what is now being followed through in the institutional process, we achieved what many regarded as being very unlikely, which was to find the common ground and consensus on the issue of the European budget.25
The final verdict on whether the deal reached on the budget was a good one for the United Kingdom and, indeed, for the European Union as a whole, will have to await the outcome of the mid-term review of the CAP and other expenditure.
Economic reform 15. On economic reform, Mr Straw had this to say as the British Presidency began:
21 HC Deb, 19 December 2005, cols 1564–5 22 Q 91 23 Q 99 24 Q 91 25 Q 153
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At issue here is not a choice of prosperity or social justice, but rather, what combination of policies can best deliver prosperity and social justice in today’s European Union. In this context, we will continue to work for more effective European regulation. … And we will be looking to improve the policy-making process with better consultation and impact assessments. Meanwhile we will pursue discussions on the Services Directive. We will continue work on financial services, and on resolving the difficulties over the Working Time Directive in a way which preserves the freedom of individuals to work the hours they choose, and which maintains the Government’s ability to deliver high-quality health and public services. We will also pursue discussions on the review of the EU’s Sustainable Development Strategy.26
The language in this statement is very cautious: the extent of the Government’s ambition was limited to continuing previous work, “looking to improve” processes, and pursuing discussions.
16. Such caution was well-advised, as progress on deregulation and economic reform under the British presidency was unspectacular. Ruth Lea was particularly dismissive about this, although she did not blame the government for it.
I do not see anything coming from Brussels that suggests for a second that they would wish to deregulate the European economies. On the contrary, there is still the push towards bringing in extra regulation and the extra aspects of the social model and social protection.27
17. Economic reform of the European Union is not going to be achieved overnight, or even within the six-month term of a presidency. The modest aims set by the Government for its presidency were always likely to be achieved, but this does not mean that the Presidency was a success in this area; clearly, much remains to be done.
External relations 18. The former Foreign Secretary set out the Presidency’s stall on external relations as follows:
Over the next six months we will chair EU summits with India, China, Russia, Ukraine and Canada, and host a Summit jointly with Spain marking the tenth anniversary of the Euromed process. We will pursue EU work on key foreign policy issues such as the Middle East Peace Process, Iran, and EU support for Iraq. The UK will represent the EU at the United Nations Millennium Review Summit in September, and follow up Europe’s welcome new commitments on increasing aid and on developing a stronger action plan on Africa. … .28
19. The “key foreign policy issues” identified by the Government—the Middle East Peace Process, Iran and EU support for Iraq—each presented the British Presidency with huge
26 HC Deb, 30 June 2005, col 1451 27 Q 109 28 HC Deb, 30 June 2005, col 1451
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challenges. In the Middle East, the unilateral Israeli withdrawal from Gaza and the realignments in both Israeli and Palestinian politics that began in 2005 meant that the Road Map to peace appeared increasingly irrelevant. The EU did, however, make an important contribution under the international agreement on movement and access to Gaza, by sending a multinational team of police and customs officials under Italian command to the crossing point at Rafah, which members of this Committee visited in November 2005.29
20. The situation with regard to Iran deteriorated significantly in 2005, with the inflammatory statements on Israel and the Holocaust by President Ahmadinejad and a continuing failure by Iran to abide by its commitments under the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The efforts of the EU3—the United Kingdom, France and Germany—which had achieved encouraging progress in 2003 and 2004, were insufficient to bring Iran back into line. The human rights situation in Iran also failed to improve.30
21. On Iraq, the EU has been unable to make substantial progress due to the continuing insecurity in that country. Speaking almost six months after the end of the British presidency, the Foreign Secretary told us that:
… the new Iraqi Foreign Minister … was giving the Council an update on the position in Iraq. He was also seeking an expanding role for the European Union as an entity and support from Member States in the UN in order to assist in getting economic reforms and security reforms as the new Iraqi Government of National Unity is seeking, and there seems to me to be quite a warm response to that and a recognition of the importance and the value that can be achieved if we can establish a stable democratic government in Iraq.31
The security situation has remained very difficult. When members of the Committee visited Baghdad and Basrah in January we saw for ourselves the difficulties faced by international bodies such as the UN or EU working in Iraq, which are at present so great as to call into question the value of those organisations maintaining a significant presence on the ground.32 This does not mean that there is no value in continuing EU political and economic support, but it clearly imposes limitations on the effectiveness of that support.
22. The action plan on Africa, The EU and Africa: Towards a Strategic Partnership, was duly adopted at the December 2005 Council.33 In its own words, the strategy:
… sets out the steps the European Union will take with Africa between now and 2015 to support African efforts to build such a [peaceful, democratic and prosperous] future. It is a strategy of the whole of the EU for the whole of Africa. It takes into account regional and country-specific needs and African countries’ national strategies. Its primary aims are the achievement of the Millennium
29 For a fuller discussion of recent developments in the Israel/Palestine conflict, see the Committee’s Fourth Report of session 2005–06, Foreign Policy Aspects of the War against Terrorism, HC 573 30 For a fuller discussion of the situation in Iran, see the Committee’s Fourth Report of session 2005–06, Foreign Policy Aspects of the War against Terrorism, HC 573 31 Q 264 32 For a fuller discussion of the situation in Iraq, see the Committee’s Fourth Report of session 2005–06, Foreign Policy Aspects of the War against Terrorism, HC 573 33 Presidency Conclusions of the December 2005 Council, available at www.eu2005.gov.uk
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Development Goals and the promotion of sustainable development, security and good governance, in Africa.34
It is of course beyond the capacity of the EU alone to achieve the Millennium Development Goals, but so far there are few signs of real progress towards many of them.
Enlargement 23. We consider the substance of the issues relating to enlargement in the next Chapter of this Report. For the purposes of the present discussion on the British Presidency, we ask whether the United Kingdom met the goals it set itself on enlargement. These were described by Jack Straw in his statement to the House:
Bulgaria and Romania signed a joint Accession Treaty with the EU on 25 April this year, and are scheduled to join in January 2007. Both still have much to do to implement the commitments which they have made, and the European Commission will report on their readiness this autumn. Last December, the EU agreed to open accession negotiations with Turkey on 3 October this year, a decision which was reconfirmed by the European Council two weeks ago. Turkish membership of the European Union is a controversial issue for public opinion in parts of Europe. But the British Government remains strongly committed to Turkey joining the EU, and I know that we can draw on the support of Hon Members on all sides of this House. The European Commission yesterday published a draft framework for Turkey’s accession negotiations. The EU and Turkey alike stand to gain greatly from a democratic and prospering Turkey anchored in Europe, a demonstration that Islam is compatible with the values of liberal democracy which form the bedrock of the European Union. The EU also stands ready to open negotiations with Croatia, provided that it co-operates fully with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. We strongly support the membership aspirations of the other countries of the Western Balkans, but they must, like all other EU applicants, meet the necessary requirements.35
24. Bulgaria and Romania still, in the words of Mr Straw, “have much to do”, but Macedonia took its first steps as a candidate country under the British presidency. Accession negotiations with Turkey commenced on schedule in October 2005, when Croatia also opened its account.
25. Charles Grant was of the view that the EU’s decisions on enlargement were the greatest achievement of the British presidency, and that British diplomatic skills had been instrumental in this:
I think that the Turkish deal in particular was really on a knife-edge, and might not have happened. The incredibly hard work by the British politicians and diplomats really helped that to happen, perhaps, as I say, against the odds.36
34 “The EU and Africa: Towards a Strategic Partnership”, European Council, 19 December 2005, available at http://ec.europa.eu 35 HC Deb, 30 June 2005, col 1452 36 Q 91
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26. The opening of accession talks with Turkey was far from a foregone conclusion. As Douglas Alexander told us, the talks in October 2005 went “right down to the wire” and were only completed by changing the clocks to Greenwich Mean Time:
I think by almost any standard the achievement of the opening of accession talks was adjudged to be of historic significance and is therefore one of the other elements of which we are very proud in the course of the Presidency.37
We heard for ourselves when visiting Brussels just after the conclusion of the British Presidency that the negotiating skills of FCO officials had played a vitally important role in achieving the target of starting Turkey’s accession process on time.
Conclusion 27. The British Presidency got off to a well-received start when, a few days before its formal beginning, the Prime Minister addressed the European Parliament. Mr Blair said to MEPs:
It is time to give ourselves a reality check. To receive the wake-up call. The people are blowing the trumpets round the city walls. Are we listening? Have we the political will to go out and meet them so that they regard our leadership as part of the solution not the problem? … The people of Europe are speaking to us. They are posing the questions. They are wanting our leadership. It is time we gave it to them.38
Towards the end of the Presidency, a Chatham House briefing paper suggested it had not fulfilled its early promise. The authors described the Prime Minister’s speech as “a remarkable exercise in (briefly) boosting morale and raising expectations that the UK was to initiate a far-reaching debate on the future of European integration.” However, “the speech, which was universally praised across Europe, was not systematically followed up by the UK government and was an early source of disappointment for other EU member state governments.”39
28. Douglas Alexander’s overall verdict on the Presidency was, unsurprisingly, positive.
I would reflect on those six months of the British Presidency as being six months during which we did make solid and in some cases substantial achievements against a set of circumstance which did not appear propitious when we inherited the Presidency in July.40
Ruth Lea’s assessment was more downbeat; she labelled the Presidency “a rather disappointing performance”.41 She was also concerned that the way aspects of the Presidency were handled—such as the budget negotiations—had reflected badly on the United Kingdom, although the outcomes had in fact shown how conciliatory the British position had been:
37 Q 153 38 Speech by the Rt hon Tony Blair to the European Parliament, 23 June 2005, available at www.number-10.gov.uk 39 “Two Cheers for the UK Presidency”, Chatham House Briefing Paper, available at www.riia.org/ 40 Q 153 41 Q 91
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I was surprised at how badly the British image suffered during the presidency because there were a lot of negotiations. Obviously the Budget was a very poisonous affair, as Charles has said. One of the aspects discussed in relation to the Budget was the idea that money should be concentrated on the new accession states and not so much on the relatively rich Member States that still take a lot of structural funds from the EU. That, in itself, seemed wholly sensible, although it did not get anywhere, but in relation to the way the debates developed, when Britain was arguing about keeping its abatement, its rebate, it seemed as though we were ‘taking money away from the new accession states.’ The way it seemed to be handled seemed to give the British image rather a bad deal, if I may say so.42
29. Charles Grant, too, was concerned about the way some of the discussions had been handled by the FCO:
We had a very good image at the start of the British presidency. The image was very good earlier this year for the reasons we are aware of, and then it started going wrong in June, when Britain vetoed the deal that most countries were prepared to sign up to. The east Europeans were particularly unhappy with the delay on agreement on the Budget. The British diplomats were rather surprised at how badly the east Europeans took it. I think that we took them for granted and assumed they were our natural friends, that they could not stand the French and that they would follow our lead. However, when they saw their own economic interests being affected by British policy they got rather annoyed. Subsequently during the presidency I do not think we spent enough time scratching their backs and being nice to them.43
When we visited a number of European capitals in January 2006 this subject certainly came up, but we do not believe that lasting damage has been caused to other countries’ perceptions of the United Kingdom in Europe. Indeed, part of the problem may have been that some of the newer member states had unrealistic expectations of the British Presidency. Although it would be wrong for any country to take the support of another for granted, we believe that in the longer term, shared interests and values will ensure that the United Kingdom and many of the newer member states continue to work together closely in the institutions of the EU. The new Foreign Secretary, Margaret Beckett, told us that “My overall general impression … is that the EU is coming together in a way which has the potential to be very positive.”44
30. Charles Grant also pointed out that some of the non-achievements of the Presidency were good outcomes for the United Kingdom, such as the failure to make progress on removing the United Kingdom’s opt-out from the Working Time Directive.45
31. The Economist was less than overwhelmed by the British Presidency.
The score-sheet for Britain … looks poor. The British say that the start of accession talks with Turkey on October 3rd was a great achievement, but the original deal was
42 Q 92 43 Q 96 44 Q 209 45 Q 91
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struck last December. Nobody else thinks Britain has done much. … Normally, the game of assessing presidencies is just that: a game. But this time it may reflect something that is happening on the ground: Britain is becoming more isolated in the EU. This could have profound consequences for both Britain and Europe.46
32. The Chatham House paper, entitled Two Cheers for the UK Presidency, concluded that the Presidency “has been competent but uninspirational, rather than a disaster, and has a number of achievements to its credit.” 47 The Financial Times, on the other hand, reported that:
Aides to Jose Manuel Barroso, the European Commission president, say there are signs that a ‘new spring’ could be in the air, claiming that relations between the 25 member states have been steadily improving. Mr Barroso believes the British EU presidency in the second half of 2005 played a key role, and the Hampton Court summit in October could be seen as a turning point.48
33. We conclude that the British Presidency took place at a time when Europe was facing a deep and largely unforeseen crisis of confidence. We further conclude that notwithstanding this difficult context, the Presidency was on the whole well-run and achieved some important successes, along with a number of disappointing outcomes. It failed to generate the fresh thinking on democracy and reengagement with the public which the Prime Minister called for in his opening speech to the European Parliament. We recommend that the Government build on the successes and, in particular, that it work to consolidate and where necessary improve its good working relations with other member states, especially with those that broadly share the United Kingdom’s perspective on the EU.
Post-Presidency developments
Transparency and openness 34. During its Presidency, the United Kingdom proposed greater transparency for proceedings in the Council of Ministers.49 The Council has tended to meet in private, not only when negotiating on sensitive issues, but also for most routine business. Since 1992, it has met from time to time in public—that is, its proceedings have been broadcast live to the press room—to debate the Commission’s work programme or for set-piece debates. In 2000, the Council amended its rules to provide for a public debate on a major policy issue if a qualified majority of member states requested one.50
35. Following the Seville European Council in June 2002, the Council started meeting in public when some major legislative proposals subject to the co-decision procedure were presented or voted upon. This meant that discussions on foreign and security policy, and
46 “Isolation fever”, The Economist, 3 December 2005 47 “Two Cheers for the UK Presidency”, Chatham House Briefing Paper, available at www.riia.org/ 48 “Austria aims to bring EU constitution in from the cold”, Financial Times, 9 January 2006 49 Council Document 14495/05 50 For a full discussion of the history of the Council’s policy on meeting in public, see ‘Openness and transparency in the Council’ by Professor Steve Peers, University of Essex, at www.statewatch.org
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on many other important areas, were still held in private. In 2005 the EU’s Ombudsman, Nikiforos Diamandouros, ruled that by conducting most of its business in private the Council was in breach of the obligation conferred by the Treaty of Amsterdam on all EU institutions to act “as openly as possible.”51 The Council retorted that the Ombudsman had acted beyond his remit, but the European Parliament gave its unanimous support to Mr Diamandouros in April 2006.
36. Possibly in an attempt to head off calls for full transparency in its proceedings, the Council agreed under the United Kingdom Presidency in December 2005 to meet with the cameras present for the presentation and final vote on all co-decision matters, but to continue meeting in private for most other business.52 Two countries, the Netherlands and Sweden, added a declaration to the record of this decision, calling for “all stages of the Council deliberations on legislative acts open to the public as a general rule.”53
37. Our colleagues on the European Scrutiny Committee asked Mr Alexander why the United Kingdom had not supported the Netherlands and Sweden in their call for greater transparency. In March 2006, he replied that the Government’s objective “remains to push for all of the Council’s legislative business to be opened up to the public”. While the Government “fully supported” the views of the Netherlands and Sweden, “as Presidency we did not deem it appropriate for the UK to join their declaration.”54 The European Scrutiny Committee described this response as “feeble”.
38. When the new Foreign Secretary, Margaret Beckett, appeared before us in June, we asked her about the apparent difference between Mr Alexander’s previous comments and her own lack of enthusiasm for opening up Council meetings to the public. She said that the term ‘legislative business’, as used by Mr Alexander, did not include ‘legislative proceedings’.55 The former, she suggested, referred to initial discussions on the introduction of a proposal and to the final vote, whereas the latter comprised the detailed deliberations. To allow public scrutiny of these would, Mrs Beckett suggested, inhibit frank discussion in the Council and could mean that the real decisions were thrashed out elsewhere. This does not square at all with the former Europe Minister’s “full support” for all stages of the Council deliberations on legislative acts to be open to the public as a general rule. The distinction between ‘legislative business’ and ‘legislative proceedings’ is not, so far as we have been able to discover, one that he made in those terms.
39. In the event, the June 2006 European Council moved further towards a policy of openness and transparency, resolving that the Council of Ministers should hold initial meetings on all legislative matters—not just those under the co-decision procedure—in public, and providing for all stages of such proceedings to be held in public where there is agreement to that effect.56 The United Kingdom was apparently the only member state to
51 See www.ombudsman.europa.eu 52 Council document 15834/05 53 Council document 15834/05 ADD 1 54 European Scrutiny Committee, Twenty-third Report of Session 2005-06, HC 34-xxiii 55 Qq 212, 213 56 Presidency Conclusions 15–16 June 2006, Annex I, An Overall Policy on Transparency
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argue against this step.57 The Finnish Presidency in the second half of 2006 has already announced that it intends to make further progress with transparency.58
40. We conclude that the Government was wrong to retract its previous support for all stages of the Council’s deliberations on legislative acts to be open to the public as a general rule. We recommend that the Government support efforts by the Finnish Presidency to promote greater transparency in the Council and more generally in the proceedings of the European Union.
National veto 41. There has been a tendency, reflected in the constitutional Treaty, for more of the Council’s business to be conducted under the ‘co-decision’ procedure. Under this procedure, the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament have equal roles in considering legislative proposals put forward by the Commission. Decisions in the Council are taken by qualified majority vote (QMV) and no country may exercise a veto.
42. In the period leading up to the June European Council, the French government formally proposed activating the ‘passerelle’ or bridging clause in the Treaty on European Union. Activation of the ‘passerelle’ clause requires a unanimous decision of the Council. The effect of activating the clause would be to enable legislative proposals concerning police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters to be agreed by co-decision and a form of majority voting (to be determined by the Council). This would remove the United Kingdom’s veto from proposals for Europe-wide police and judicial cooperation. Early drafts of the presidency conclusions of the Council were understood to reflect this proposal.59
43. Historically, the United Kingdom has opposed moves towards greater use of QMV. In a White Paper published shortly after the draft constitutional Treaty, the Government stated that “we will insist that unanimity remain for Treaty change; and in other areas of vital national interest such as … key areas of criminal procedural law”.60 It appears that, by the time of the British Presidency, the Government’s thinking had moved on.
44. Shortly before the June Council, we asked Mrs Beckett for her views on QMV in justice and home affairs. She told us that:
… there is a legitimate argument that runs that since, unfortunately, organised crime in particular, but crime in a number of other issues in this area are themselves cross- boundary, they are pan-European, and to insist that all of this can only be dealt with on the basis of not having QMV, not having a pan-European potential approach could be an area of weakness.61
57 “UK fails to block plan on televised EU meetings”, EU Observer, 16 June 2006 58 “Improving transparency during the Finnish Presidency of the European Union”, http://presidency.finland.fi 59 “EU leaders set to bury Brussels veto reduction plan”, EU Observer, 8 June 2006 60 “A Constitutional Treaty for the EU—The British Approach to the European Union Intergovernmental Conference 2003”, Cm 5934, para 66 61 Q 214
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However, she also insisted that “there are a number of areas, certainly some areas in this dossier, where the Government could well have red lines where we are simply not prepared to consider giving up the veto.”62
45. The June European Council did discuss the decision-making process on justice and home affairs, but in its conclusions issued a relatively uncontroversial call to the Finnish Presidency “to explore, in close collaboration with the Commission, the possibilities of improving decision-making and action in the area of Freedom, Security and Justice on the basis of existing treaties.”63 On 28 June, the Commission made a new proposal to activate the ‘passerelle’ and thus to remove the national veto from a range of areas involving cooperation between national police and court services.64
46. We welcome the decision of the Council of Ministers to seek further improvements in decision-making and action in justice and home affairs on the basis of existing treaties. However, we oppose attempts to use the bridging clauses in the current treaties to introduce core objectives of the constitutional Treaty in the field of justice and home affairs. We recommend that the Government seek the views of Parliament before agreeing to any further extension of qualified majority voting.
Energy policy 47. Although the Government’s January White Paper stated that “Advancing this [the EU Energy Policy] agenda will be a real priority this year”, energy policy did not play an especially prominent part in the British Presidency.65 It has since assumed a greater prominence. The March European Council ‘invited’ the Commission to “prepare a set of actions with a clear timetable enabling the adoption of a prioritised Action Plan by the European Council at its 2007 spring session.” On 2 June, the Commission and High Representative Solana produced a joint paper, An external policy to serve Europe’s energy interests.66
48. The FCO’s pre-Council memorandum stated that:
Our aim for this Council is to maintain the momentum on this work, giving a clear mandate to the next (Finnish) Presidency to develop this work with the Commission. In addition, we want to ensure that external aspects of energy policy will be reflected fully in the Commission’s Strategic Energy Review which is due for Spring 2007.67
This work is important, not least because of the EU’s growing dependence on Russian gas supplies, and the construction of a gas pipeline from Russia to Germany. As Charles Grant
62 Q 215 63 Presidency Conclusions 15–16 June 2006, para 10 64 “Implementing The Hague Programme: the way forward”, European Commission, 28 June 2006, available at http://europa.eu 65 Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Prospects for the European Union in 2006, and retrospective of the UK’s Presidency of the EU, 1 July to 31 December 2005, Cm 6735, para 144 66 Presidency conclusions, 30 May 2006, available at http://register.consilium.europa.eu 67 EU17
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told us, “whatever we do, we in Europe will depend on Russia for gas. Whatever scenario we plan, we will need a lot of Russian gas.”68
Ministerial appointments 49. The Government’s ministerial ‘shuffle’ of 5 May 2006 brought Margaret Beckett to the FCO as Foreign Secretary and Geoff Hoon as Minister for Europe—a job Mr Hoon had previously filled for ten weeks in 1999.69 Like his predecessor, Mr Hoon attends meetings of the Cabinet, but he is not a member of the Cabinet. When Mrs Beckett gave oral evidence to us on Europe within a few weeks of taking on her new role, she told us that neither she nor the Prime Minister favoured the Minister for Europe being a member of the Cabinet.70 We look forward to continuing this Committee’s regular pre-European Council scrutiny with the new ministerial team at the FCO.
68 Q 144 69 See www.pm.gov.uk/output/Page1390.asp 70 Q 219
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3 The Constitutional Treaty
Is the Treaty dead, or just resting? 50. The Preface to the draft Constitutional Treaty prepared by the Convention sets out its genesis:
Noting that the European Union was coming to a turning point in its existence, the European Council which met in Laeken, Belgium, on 14 and 15 December 2001 convened the European Convention on the Future of Europe.
The Convention was asked to draw up proposals on three subjects: how to bring citizens closer to the European design and European Institutions; how to organise politics and the European political area in an enlarged Union; and how to develop the Union into a stabilising factor and a model in the new world order.71
51. The Treaty as agreed by the subsequent Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) also sets out the procedure which must be gone through before it can enter into force:
The Treaty establishing the Constitution shall enter into force on 1 November 2006, provided that all the instruments of ratification have been deposited, or, failing that, on the first day of the month following the deposit of the instrument of ratification by the last signatory State to take this step.72
It is clear that the target date of 1 November 2006 will not be met. The Treaty itself allows for delay in the ratification process, but it does not prescribe what should happen should ratification fail. In the terms of the Treaty itself, a failure to ratify thus means simply that the Treaty does not enter into force.73
52. However, a Declaration attached to the original draft Treaty and noted by the subsequent IGC caters for the possibility that one or more Member States will fail to ratify. This Declaration states:
If, two years after the signature of the Treaty establishing the Constitution, four fifths of the Member States have ratified it and one or more Member States have encountered difficulties in proceeding with ratification, the matter will be referred to the European Council.74
The two-year period set down in the Declaration will elapse on 29 October 2006. As of July 2006, fifteen member states had ratified the Treaty, two had rejected it and eight had yet to complete the process. For the four-fifths provision in the Declaration to be triggered, a further five states would have to ratify before 29 October 2006. No-one seriously expects this to happen, and in any case a declaration attached to a treaty which is itself unratified cannot be regarded as having any force.
71 Preface to the draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, available at http://european-convention.eu.int 72 Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, Cm 6429, October 2004, p 227. 73 See the Prime Minister’s reply to Eric Illsley MP at HC Deb, 19 June 2006, col 1078 74 Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, Cm 6429, October 2004, p 501
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53. On 31 May 2006, the Belgian Prime Minister, Guy Verhofstadt, told the European Parliament that the Declaration had been included in order to cater for the perceived likelihood that a problem of non-ratification might arise, not with France and the Netherlands, but with “une partie située de l’autre côté de la Manche.”75 Mr Verhofstadt was quite specific that the contingency envisaged was a British ‘No’. In those circumstances, the rest of Europe might have found some alternative way of proceeding, but with the “difficulties in proceeding with ratification” having arisen in countries which have traditionally been fully signed-up to ever closer union, the Council is now unable to agree on the way forward, or even on whether there is a way forward.
54. We asked our witnesses whether they felt the Treaty could be proceeded with, notwithstanding its rejection by the electorates of France and the Netherlands. Charles Grant suggested that those European politicians who think they can revive the Treaty are “out of touch with reality.”76 Ruth Lea was even blunter, describing proposals to proceed with the Treaty as “an act of extreme arrogance.”77 Mrs Beckett confirmed that she is “quite comfortable” with the extended period of reflection.78 There is clearly no likelihood that the stalled process of ratification will be restarted in the near-term.
55. This has led some, such as the Austrian Chancellor and the Italian and Belgian Prime Ministers, to propose that the electorates of Europe as a whole should be offered an opportunity to vote on the Treaty at the time of the European Parliament elections in 2009.79 Under this scenario, support for the Treaty of a majority of voters in a majority of countries across the European Union would allow it to come into force. The Treaty itself would, of course, have to be amended to allow this to happen. Since amendment of the Treaty is itself subject to ratification by all member states—in many cases, by referendum— there seems little prospect of this happening.80 Moreover, as the Foreign Secretary pointed out to us, such a procedure could be offensive to people in those member states, such as Belgium, which have already ratified the Treaty in their parliaments.81
56. If the Treaty as a whole is going nowhere, the question naturally arises, could parts of it be implemented?
‘Cherry picking’ 57. Although the Treaty has been portrayed by some as largely a consolidation measure, tidying up the existing legal base of the EU, it also embodies several important changes. Some of these are arguably necessary for an enlarged EU to function effectively (this indeed was part of the original case made for establishing a convention on the future of Europe); but others may be desirable improvements in their own right.
75 “Someone on the other side of the Channel” (unofficial translation); original text available at European Parliament debates for Wednesday 31 May 2006, www.europarl.europa.eu 76 Q 111 77 Q 112 78 Q 226 79 “Pan-European constitution referendum unlikely to fly”, EU Observer, 20 June 2006 80 Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, Cm 6429, October 2004, p 226 81 Q 228
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58. Charles Grant explained what is meant by the phrase ‘cherry picking.’
‘Cherry-picking’ as defined by you could mean two different things. It could mean implementing parts of the constitution within the framework of the existing treaties. You can do a little bit of that. You can agree to it by the subsidiarity procedure, for example, giving national parliaments more power to block EU legislation; you could agree to let the TV cameras in, which I think they have agreed to last month, at the European Council meeting. There are some things in the constitution that you can just do by governments and EU institutions saying ‘let us do it’; but only a very tiny fraction of the total constitution. The second meaning of ‘cherry-picking’ is this: can we make some very minor treaty changes to the existing treaties to do something like adopt the so-called double majority voting system or to introduce the idea of an EU foreign minister?82
So, there are parts of the Treaty which could be implemented administratively; and there are other parts which would require changes to be made to one or more of the existing treaties.
59. Mr Alexander was asked several times when he gave oral evidence to the Committee whether he ruled out any changes to the existing treaties of the EU to implement parts of the Constitution. He failed to give us a clear answer.83 We later received a written response from his successor, Geoff Hoon. Mr Hoon pointed us to the statement by Jack Straw, when Foreign Secretary, that “There is no plan, proposal or intention to slip elements of the Constitution through the back door.”84
60. Mr Hoon then set out his views on treaty changes:
It would clearly be impractical to rule out all future treaty changes simply on the basis that similar provisions exist in the Constitutional Treaty. Over time, much procedural change has taken place in the EU, some of which, such as the new arrangements for transparency of the Council of Ministers agreed under the UK Presidency, has not required Treaty change; an example of change which did require Treaty change was the extension of QMV in the Maastricht Treaty. If further such change could make the EU more effective, we would not rule it out automatically, but we would look carefully at the possible benefits to the UK on a case by case basis.85
The United Kingdom’s EU Commissioner, Peter Mandelson, however, recently suggested in an interview that he was “tempted to argue that we should identify those elements of the existing draft treaty that are the most necessary and most important and effective in meeting our institutional needs and strip away the rest.”86
82 Q 112 83 Qq 161–169 84 HC Deb, 6 June 2005, col 1000 85 Ev 60 86 “Mandelson calls for end to two-centre European Parliament”, The Independent, 6 July 2006
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61. Following a meeting of EU Foreign Ministers in late May, the Austrian Presidency appeared to rule out cherry-picking. Austrian Foreign Minister Ursula Plassnik summed up the meeting’s views on the Treaty:
The Union … was now moving from the debate on the future to the programme for the future, and there was agreement that this agenda for the future would be pursued on the basis of the existing Treaties, without any ‘cherry-picking’ from the Constitutional Treaty.87
The way ahead 62. Douglas Alexander told us in May that:
We began our Presidency, as was made clear by the speech that the Prime Minister before the European Parliament on the eve of the Presidency, determined that the period of reflection would not be seen as a period of stagnation and that was it was important to understand not simply the text and the judgment that the people in France and the Netherlands had reached on the text but also the broader context. That explains why we chose to use the informal heads of government meeting in Hampton Court in October to focus on those broader questions establishing in its broadest sense the challenges that Europe faced, embracing the very significant pressures of globalisation bearing down on the European Union and the European continent. I think, as was already manifest in the Spring Council of the Austrian Presidency, Hampton Court proved impressive both in some of the issues it addressed and the added impetus it gave to key areas of policy work of the European Union.88
63. The focus on key policy areas is one this Committee supports. However, we are also conscious that the institutional problems of the enlarged Union remain, together with the need identified in the Laeken Declaration for more democracy and transparency and a Union ‘closer to its citizens’. The draft Constitution failed to address these issues properly and the ‘period of reflection’ has so far failed to produce workable proposals.
64. We conclude that although the Treaty is not dead, it is comatose and on life support. At some point, Europe’s leaders are going to have to decide whether to switch it off. We conclude that the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe is unlikely ever to come into force, although attempts may be made to enact some of its provisions by other means. We recommend that the Government encourage its European counterparts to face up to this reality and explicitly to abandon the Treaty as a package, in the interest of making progress on some of the real and important issues which are at present caught up in the paralysis created by its rejection.
87 “Plassnik: First building blocks for new consensus on future of EU”, EU Presidency statement, 28 May 2006 88 Q 153
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Supplied by FCO Maps and Geographical Information Service © Crown Copyright 2006
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4 Enlargement
Bulgaria and Romania: the next stage 65. Bulgaria and Romania are neighbours, and their applications to join the EU are taking place within the same time frame. They are, however, very different countries and they do not regard themselves or their EU aspirations as being inextricably linked.
66. Bulgaria established diplomatic relations with the EU in 1988 and submitted its application for EU membership in December 1995. Accession negotiations began in February 2000 and were concluded in June 2004, since when Bulgaria has effectively been on probation while its preparedness for full membership is assessed.
67. Romania’s formal links with the European Community go back to 1974 and it applied to join the EU in June 1995. Its application was given the go-ahead at the Luxembourg European Council in December 1997, and at the Copenhagen Summit in December 2002, 2007 was agreed as the target date for Romania’s accession.
68. The Accession Treaty between the Member States and Bulgaria and Romania, signed in Luxembourg in April 2005, provides for both countries to join the EU on 1 January 2007. It includes a ‘safeguard clause’ for both Romania and Bulgaria, which, if activated by unanimous agreement of the Council on the recommendation of the Commission, can delay accession of one or both countries by one year if either or both show a serious risk of being “manifestly unprepared” to meet the requirements of EU membership in a number of important areas.89 Romania is additionally subject to a year’s deferral if the Council, acting by qualified majority, decides it has not met its commitments in competition policy or a number of other specified areas.90 The Council also has the option of imposing post- accession conditions on either country if they fail to implement or to meet commitments for a period of up to three years from the date of eventual accession.91
69. Charles Grant told us that he believed it had been a mistake to give Romania and Bulgaria a firm date for accession before they had complied with all the requirements for membership.
I think the problem in both those countries is one of administrative capacity. Politically I think they are fairly stable and reasonable countries these days, but do they have the administrations to administer EU rules and regulations efficiently, and do they have legal systems that can do that? The answer is probably ‘no’. They are very corrupt. There are already some countries in the EU that are quite corrupt, but I think Bulgaria and Romania are particularly bad; and I think that letting countries in a bit too soon is very bad for the EU because it will give enlargement a bad name.92
89 Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Treaty concerning the accession of the Republic of Bulgaria and Romania to the European Union, Cm 6657, August 2005, Article 39 90 Ibid., Annex IX, points I and II 91 Ibid., Articles 36–38 92 Q 126
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Ruth Lea added that Bulgaria and Romania are “very, very poor countries indeed; … so that adds extra difficulties for those countries to absorb all the changes they will be expected to absorb.”93
70. The Commission’s document of 16 May 2006, Key findings of the May 2006 monitoring reports on Bulgaria and Romania, found there were still six areas in which Bulgaria’s performance gave cause for serious concern:
• setting up a proper integrated administration and control system in agriculture— agricultural payments represent a significant part of the EU budget. Any member state must guarantee the proper spending of such funds. Any shortcoming in this respect may delay the disbursement of funds or give rise to correction or recovery of the EU taxpayers’ money;
• building-up of rendering collection and treatment facilities in line with EU acquis on TSE and animal by-products—food safety is a main concern for all EU citizens, food products must fully respect all EU requirements;
• tangible results in investigating and prosecuting organised crime networks—the existence of organised crime puts into question the rule of law in Bulgaria, it affects directly all citizens and their basic rights;
• more efficient and systematic implementation of laws for the fight against fraud and corruption—corruption undermines public and business confidence in Bulgaria. It represents ongoing risks of fraud against the EU budget and funds, indirectly it has consequences on current EU taxpayers, it also hampers the economic development of Bulgaria by deteriorating the business climate;
• intensified enforcement of anti-money laundering provisions—money laundering is a financial crime, linked to terrorist activities, tax evasion or false accounting. The fight of such a criminal activity is key for the security and financial interest of all Bulgarian and EU citizens;
• strengthened financial control over structural and cohesion funds—it is in the direct interest of all Bulgarian citizens to fully benefit from EU funds, in particular for important infrastructural projects, so as to allow Bulgaria to catch up with other Member States and to become fully integrated in the EU.94
71. The same document found four areas of serious concern in relation to Romania:
• fully operational paying agencies accredited for handling direct payments to farmers and operators under the common agricultural policy;
• setting up proper integrated administration and control systems in agriculture— agricultural payments represent a significant part of the EU budget. Any member state must guarantee the proper spending of such funds. Any shortcoming in this respect
93 Q 126 94 “Key findings of the May 2006 monitoring reports on Bulgaria and Romania”, European Commission, May 2006
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may delay the disbursement of funds or give rise to correction or recovery of the EU taxpayers money;
• building-up of rendering collection and treatment facilities in line with the EU acquis on TSE and animal by-products—food safety is a main concern for all EU citizens, food products must fully respect all EU requirements;
• tax administration IT systems ready for inter-operability with those of the rest of the Union, to enable a correct collection of VAT throughout the EU internal market—the resource based on VAT is part of the revenue of the EU budget, therefore the proper collection of VAT is key for the financial interest of the Union.95
While it believes that both countries are on course for a 2007 accession if the present rate of progress is maintained and intensified, the Commission has deferred until October 2006 its final recommendation to the Council on the preparedness of Bulgaria and Romania for accession.
72. The Foreign Secretary was clearly concerned about some of these difficulties when she gave evidence to us in June:
I think there is a very clear and strong message going from the whole of the European Union’s existing membership to Bulgaria and Romania, and because they are accession countries they are in attendance at the Council so they are not under any illusions, they hear all of this all the time, that they have to meet these standards and it is very important and crucial and if this requires a substantial increase and extension of effort then that is what will have to happen. But, of course, there is also the question because there is a timescale under the Accession Treaty, and I do not want to dwell on this too much because the emphasis has to be on ‘You must meet these standards and that is required by the European Union before you become full members’ and that has to be the emphasis for them. It is perhaps worth reminding the Committee, I am sure you are conscious of the fact, written into the Accession Treaty is the possibility of applying some post-accession measures so that, for example, access to the internal market could be restricted in some way, or there are areas on JHA issues where you could establish further monitoring. There is scope for that but obviously the pressure now wants to be on meeting them before they become members, not on a process afterwards.96
73. We had earlier discussed the position of Bulgaria and Romania with the then Minister for Europe, Douglas Alexander. He also referred to the possible application of post- accession conditions on these countries, if they join while concerns about aspects of their preparedness remain.97 Mr Alexander’s successor, Geoff Hoon, helpfully set out these provisions in a Note for the Committee:
The general economic safeguard clause is designed to deal with adjustment difficulties experienced in a particular economic sector or area following the entry of
95 “Key findings of the May 2006 monitoring reports on Bulgaria and Romania”, European Commission, May 2006 96 Q 236 97 Q 189
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a new member state into the internal market. This would normally relate to sudden strong competitive pressure in a product market. During the three years following accession, a new member state may apply for authorisation to take protective measures while adjusting its economy to the pressures of the internal market, and an old member state may apply for authorisation to take protective measures with regard to a new member state.
The internal market safeguard clause may be applied in the first three years if a new member state has not met commitments it made in the accession negotiations, or the functioning of the internal market is under serious threat. It covers the area of the four freedoms and includes sectors such as competition, energy, transport, telecommunication, agriculture and consumer and health protection—including food safety. Measures are taken on a case-by-case basis. They may be decided before accession, to be applicable as from accession, and they may be extended as long as the situation is not remedied.
The justice and home affairs safeguard clause may be applied during the first three years after accession if there are risks of serious shortcomings in the way a new member state has transposed or implemented EU rules on mutual recognition in criminal law or civil matters. They may also be applicable beyond that date if the situation is still not remedied.98
74. The Committee intends to visit both Bulgaria and Romania later this year, to hold discussions with the governments and parliaments of those countries about their preparedness for membership of the EU. If we judge it appropriate, we will make a further report to the House. Meanwhile, we conclude that there are strong political reasons for the Government to maintain its support for the accession of Bulgaria and Romania in accordance with the agreed timetable. We recommend, however, that the Government be prepared to agree to the imposition of post-accession safeguards on either country, if the Commission’s reports show that these would be justified.
Croatia 75. The decision formally to start Croatia’s process of accession was taken under the British Presidency, in October 2005. Douglas Alexander told us that:
… obviously the opening of accession negotiations under our Presidency in the second half of last year we believed to be an important step, but it is now up to Croatia to work towards meeting those European Union standards and enable them to meet the standards in full before accession can take place, and, as you would expect, both the United Kingdom and the European Union is providing assistance to the Government of Croatia in those endeavours. Obviously, not least given the importance of full co-operation, the International War Tribunal, with the former Yugoslavia, as I mentioned, welcomed the capture of Ante Gotovina back in
98 Ev 59
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December and I think we reached the right decision to open negotiations with Croatia back at that 3 October meeting.99
76. There appears to be a general consensus that Croatia’s accession is proceeding well and that Croatia will join the EU after Bulgaria and Romania. Charles Grant was particularly impressed by the way Croatia is handling the process:
The Croatians have put one chap in charge of it all and given him complete authority to boss around the various ministries and all the people around, and they have given him a huge negotiating team with the best advisors and officials, and he reports directly to the prime minister. There should not be a problem with the Croatian negotiations.100
77. We conclude that Croatia’s proposed accession to the EU deserves the full support of the United Kingdom, assuming that it meets all the necessary criteria. We further conclude, and hope, that a successful accession process by Croatia could play an important role in stimulating other states in the Western Balkans to make the necessary adjustments that will enable them to qualify for full membership of the EU in due course.
Is Europe going cold on Turkey? 78. The history of Turkey’s on/off relationship with the EU was set out by our predecessor Committee in a Report in 2002:
In a speech in 1924, Atatürk said ‘The decline of the Ottomans began when, proud of their triumphs over the West, they cut their ties with the European nations. This was a mistake which we will not repeat.’ It was this context that drove Turkey to be among the first countries to apply for membership of the European Economic Community, signing an Association Agreement as long ago as 1963. However, Turkey’s progress towards membership has been slow. The Customs Union envisaged in the Association Agreement was put in place only in 1995. Turkey’s rejection as a formal candidate for membership of the European Union at the Luxembourg European Council in December 1997, when many countries were accepted as candidates which until only a few years before had been communist dictatorships, engendered much anti-European feeling in Turkey. Turkish leaders claimed that Turkey’s candidacy was being blocked on religious grounds, following comments by the Chairman of the European People’s Party that ‘the European project is a civilisational project. Turkey’s candidature for full membership is unacceptable’, and reports that the then German Chancellor, Helmut Kohl, had described the EU as ‘a Christian club’.101
Polls have consistently shown that throughout much of Europe, there is public hostility towards Turkey’s membership. According to a Eurobarometer survey in July 2005, popular support in EU countries for Turkish membership ranged from a high of over 50 per cent in
99 Q 192 100 Q 134 101 The Foreign Affairs Committee, Sixth Report of Session 2001–02, HC 606, para 7
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Hungary, to a low of just 10 per cent in Austria. The average support across the EU was just over one third.102 The accession of Cyprus in 2004 has added a further complication for Turkey.
79. Charles Grant agreed that public opinion in the EU as a whole is not sympathetic to Turkey’s accession as things stand, but he did not rule out a change over time.
If there were referendums tomorrow the result would be in no doubt at all; there would be a resounding ‘no’. It is possible that when Turkey finishes negotiations, which I guess would be 10, 12 or possibly 15 years hence, the world will look different. … I do not think it is impossible that Turkey can join.103
Mr Alexander reflected the British Government’s enthusiasm for Turkey’s accession:
I stand by my earlier theory that I think it was of genuine historic significance that that decision was reached on 3 October. I think it is the right decision, not just for Turkey but also for Europe, and I think we would have sent a very damaging signal if we had suggested that there was not the prospect of a European future for a country like Turkey and obliged it to turn elsewhere in terms of its future economic, social and political development. All that being said, I have never hidden the fact, and nor has the British Government, that there are very considerable challenges which Turkey will have to rise to in the years, and it will be many years of work, between now and that accession being achieved.104
80. Our predecessor Committee last year reiterated its “previous strong support for Turkish membership of the European Union.”105 We conclude that the accession to the European Union of a Turkey which fully meets all the entry criteria remains in the interests of both the EU and Turkey. We recommend that the Government continue to offer strong support to Turkey in its accession process.
Is Turkey going cold on Europe? 81. Mrs Beckett was upbeat about Turkey’s chances of completing the accession process. She told us that she was “clear that Turkey is moving in the right direction.”106 Charles Grant was less impressed by Turkey’s approach to accession:
… the whole Turkish attitude to the negotiations worries me a bit. They do not really understand that negotiating to join the EU is not a negotiation; the EU tells you what to do and you do it. That is what happens, and you can argue about the timing of certain things, and right at the end when you get to the budget and you argue a bit about money there is a real negotiation; but most of the negotiations are not negotiations at all. If you are the negotiator for Turkey or Croatia, what really happens is that you have to negotiate with your domestic bureaucracy, with your
102 See “Analysis: EU views on Turkish bid”, BBC News Online, 30 September 2005, news.bbc.co.uk 103 Q 110 104 Q 193 105 Foreign Affairs Committee, Second Report of Session 2004–05, Cyprus, HC 113, para 163 106 Q 242
Developments in the European Union 31
domestic ministries, media and public opinion; and you have to persuade them that it is all good for them. One should not pre-judge Turkey because they have only just started, but I am not encouraged at the moment.107
We put this to Douglas Alexander, who observed that:
… the experience of the discussions prior to 3 October, both the weeks and the hours, suggest that the Turkish Government are strong negotiators, shall we say.108
82. Mr Grant went on to describe one possible scenario:
One thing that could easily happen is that Turkey walks away from the negotiations. A lot of people in Turkey are not going to be happy at the prospect of being bossed around by Brussels bureaucrats, if I could put it that way. The Turks are a very proud people, and they may decide that it is not worth going ahead. That is quite plausible. I know senior Turks who believe that that will happen several years down the road.109
Ruth Lea also felt that “It may be that if there are all these problems about negotiating membership, Turkey will say that it just is not worth the candle.”110
83. Our predecessors were concerned in 2002 that, if Turkey were rebuffed by the EU, it might walk away, and look to the East for its allies. They were clear, however, that the bar could not be lowered for Turkey, and that Turkey must meet the same criteria as apply to any applicant state.111
Turkey and Cyprus 84. One particular hurdle that Turkey finds more difficult to jump than do other applicant countries is the entry into a customs union with the Republic of Cyprus. Turkey does not recognise the Republic of Cyprus as a state with sovereignty over the whole of the island of Cyprus; since 1983, it has recognised the ‘Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus’ (TRNC) as the sovereign power in the northern third of the island, which is garrisoned by its own troops. The government of Cyprus has, meanwhile, successfully maintained an embargo on direct trade and transport links with the ‘TRNC’. However, Turkey is required to extend its customs union with the EU to all ten new member states, including Cyprus, under a protocol attached to the Ankara Agreement which has since 1963 formed the legal basis for Turkey’s accession. Mr Alexander referred obliquely to the need for Turkey to recognise Cyprus when he gave evidence to the Committee:
Turkey must apply the Ankara Agreement Protocol fully to all Member States and the EU will monitor this closely and evaluate full implementation in 2006; so that will be a particular challenge facing Turkey in the course of this calendar year.112
107 Q 134 108 Q 194 109 Q 134 110 Ibid 111 Foreign Affairs Committee, Sixth Report of Session 2001–02, HC 606, para 24 112 Q 195
32 Developments in the European Union
85. The Turkish Prime Minister, Recep Erdoğan, is facing re-election next year and has been unwilling to risk the electoral consequences of breaking the link between Turkish insistence on opening up the ports and airports of northern Cyprus, and Turkey opening up its ports and airports to carriers registered in the Republic of Cyprus.113 Turkey’s progress towards accession will be assessed later in 2006 and there is a strong possibility that if it has failed by then to open its ports to Cypriot-flagged vessels it will be held to be in breach of its obligations under the Ankara Agreement.
86. By no means all the obstacles to Turkey’s accession in connection with the Cyprus problem have been of Turkey’s making. Speaking in January 2006, Charles Grant told us that:
… the Greek Cypriot Government has really been very, very difficult and obstructive and has prevented the EU from giving the aid to northern Cyprus which it promised, and it has prevented flights going from Turkey to northern Cyprus, which really destroyed the northern Cyprus tourist industry. The Greek Cypriots have been very difficult indeed. I am not saying that the Turks have been that reasonable either on letting Cypriot ships into their ports, but I think the real problem at the moment is that the Greek Cypriots are getting away with blue murder and nobody is prepared to get tough on them, namely the Greeks or the Americans or the British.114
This echoes a conclusion our predecessor Committee reached in their 2005 Report on Cyprus, in which they stated, in the context of the attitude of the Republic of Cyprus towards EU plans to improve the economy of the Turkish Cypriot part of the island:
… there is as yet little evidence that the Republic of Cyprus has fully taken on board that its membership of the EU involves obligations, as well as opportunities.115
The decision of 8 July by the Greek and Turkish Cypriot leaders to resume intercommunal talks under UN auspices is evidence of a more positive approach.116
Conclusion 87. We agree with Charles Grant that Turkey has to accept the conditions under which membership of the EU is offered, and which are the same for all applicants. At the same time, existing member states, including Cyprus, should not treat Turkey’s application any differently from how they treat those of other countries. We conclude that it is the interests of Turkey, the Turkish people and Turkish Cypriots alike that Turkey should move swiftly to accept in full its obligations under the Ankara Agreement. We further conclude that a far more constructive approach by the government of the Republic of Cyprus is necessary to assist this process.
113 “Fronts between Turkey and EU harden over Cyprus”, EurActiv.com, 20 June 2006 114 Q 135 115 Foreign Affairs Committee, Second Report of Session 2004–05, HC 113, para 103 116 “Cyprus leaders agree peace moves”, BBC News Online, 8 July 2006, www.news.bbc.co.uk
Developments in the European Union 33
The EU’s ‘absorption capacity’ 88. There is of course a tension between enlarging Europe to include more members, and deepening the integration of its existing members. To make Europe both wider and deeper is a great challenge, a challenge which the Constitutional Treaty was intended to meet. Charles Grant articulated this in evidence to us:
There was an unwritten deal at the heart of the EU for the last twenty years, which has been a bit more deepening for a bit more widening. Successive waves of enlargement for the last twenty years have been matched by successive waves of treaty-based integration. If we are agreed, as perhaps we are in this room, that treaty- based integration has stopped because there is not going to be any big new treaty for a very long time, I am afraid that means that enlargement scepticism grows, and there is a great reluctance amongst political elites in Europe to enlarge. They think that more enlargement without changing the institutions significantly will lead to a looser, less effective, less efficient European Union.117
Ruth Lea said that “it was always the British strategy to widen, so they would not have deepening, but the truth is that we have got both.”118
89. We asked Mr Alexander about the EU’s ‘absorption capacity’, but he declined to suggest any limit on the Union’s expansion and was enthusiastic about the prospect of further enlargement, although he underlined the need for the conditions of membership to be fully met by candidate countries.119 Neither is the failure to adopt the Constitution seen as a bar to further enlargement; the Foreign Secretary told us that “Enlargement certainly can proceed without a constitutional change.”120
90. Mrs Beckett, too, declined to place a limit on the EU’s potential membership, preferring to stress that “what I do think is key is that the enlargement process is properly and rigorously conducted. I think that is the key and that is more likely to be a relevant factor in the pace of change or the pace of enlargement than anything else.”121 Charles Grant said that he was “rather pessimistic” that further enlargement would take place after Croatia joins, partly because France is committed to holding a referendum on any future enlargement, which Mr Grant sees as symptomatic of a wider European disenchantment.122
91. Some countries, notably Austria, which held the presidency directly after the United Kingdom in the first half of 2006, have been lukewarm or even hostile to further enlargement. The United Kingdom Government however, has maintained its enthusiasm for a widening of the EU. The FCO’s memorandum to us in advance of the June European Council stated,
117 Q 114 118 Q 118 119 Qq 183, 186 120 Q 232 121 Q 234 122 Qq 117, 118
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We want to ensure the EU sticks to its existing commitments on enlargement and to ensure that any changes to the EU’s policy do not rule out the possibility of future enlargements.123
At the Council, the United Kingdom, Sweden and other member states successfully faced down an attempt by Austria, France and Germany to define the term ‘absorption capacity’ and to include it among the criteria for deciding whether to accept new candidate states.124 However, the Council agreed to return to the issue in December, by when the Commission will have prepared,
… a special report on all relevant aspects pertaining to the Union's absorption capacity [which will] also cover the issue of present and future perception of enlargement by citizens and should take into account the need to explain the enlargement process adequately to the public within the Union.125
92. However, the United Kingdom has not clarified which countries might be in, and which might stay out in the longer term. Although some of the countries in the Maghreb have talked up their own chances of joining Europe—Morocco is no more distant from Europe than is Asiatic Turkey—North Africa is by definition not part of Europe. Are Ukraine, Moldova and even Belarus, all of which are definitely part of geographical Europe, potential members of the EU? We certainly heard views that they should be when we visited European capitals last January. But even if some of these countries were to satisfy the Copenhagen criteria and to be accepted as candidate members of the EU, there must be serious doubt concerning the EU’s capacity to absorb them, and their ability to adjust to membership given their economic and social problems.
93. We agree with the Foreign Secretary that what is key to the enlargement debate is the rigorous application of the criteria for membership. We conclude that it is this, rather than any abstruse debate about ‘absorption capacity’, which must determine the future shape and scope of the EU. But we also conclude that popular opinion will be an important factor in deciding future enlargements and that this reinforces the need for a Union which engages the public.
123 Ev 63 124 “New entry hurdle for EU hopefuls removed”, EU Observer, 16 June 2006 125 Presidency Conclusions 15–16 June 2006, para 53
Developments in the European Union 35
5 Foreign, Security and Defence Policy
Machinery and architecture 94. The Treaty establishing a Constitution makes provision for a Minister for Foreign Affairs, whose work on behalf of the Council would be supported by an external action service.126 Lacking the legal base which would have been provided had the Treaty been implemented, the EU has been unable to proceed with the establishment of the External Action Service and the appointment of the Foreign Minister. Mrs Beckett agreed that the EU External Action Service “cannot go ahead” without the Treaty that provides for it.127
95. Nonetheless, the European Commission has continued to open and to staff ‘representative offices’ overseas. And High Representative Solana—who would certainly have been appointed as the EU’s first Foreign Minister—has taken on an increasingly prominent role, as evidenced by his June 2006 mission to Iran. The Foreign Secretary referred to the “very valuable contribution” made by Mr Solana on behalf of the EU.128 It is not unusual for Mr Solana to be referred to informally, but incorrectly, as the EU’s ‘Foreign Minister’. Similarly, the Commission’s representatives in non-member states are frequently referred to as ‘ambassadors’: indeed, the Commission’s office in Washington DC refers to its representative to the USA, Mr John Bruton, as “Ambassador Bruton”.129
96. The former Minister for Europe, Douglas Alexander, confirmed that the term ‘EU Ambassador’ is a misnomer.130 In a letter following up his predecessor’s oral evidence, the new Minister for Europe, Geoff Hoon, told us that:
Douglas Alexander’s statement to the Committee that these individuals are not Ambassadors, but representatives of the European Commission, was correct. The term ‘Ambassador’ has never been correct terminology, although mention of ‘EU Ambassadors’ is common outside the Union when talking about a group of Ambassadors belonging to individual Member States. While incorrect references sometimes occur, the important issue is that neither Commission representatives nor Commission offices can represent Member States.
On the question of EU representatives’ residences overseas, the UK, with other EU Member States through the Council of Ministers, exercises significant influence on the establishment of the EC budget at the beginning of each financial period. It is from this budget that offices and residences of the Commission overseas are funded. Parliament is also given the chance to scrutinise the Government's position on the draft EC budget before its adoption in Brussels.
97. The FCO did not have immediate access to information on the cost of the European Commission’s representative offices or residences overseas. It took six weeks for the
126 Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, Cm 6429, October 2004, p 158 127 Q 243 128 Ibid 129 “New EU Ambassador John Bruton meets President Bush”, www.eurunion.org/News/press/2004/200400171.htm 130 Q 158
36 Developments in the European Union
information to be obtained by the FCO and passed to us.131 As Mrs Beckett acknowledged, “that does suggest that we are not involved in very detailed scrutiny.”132
98. In a paper submitted for consideration at the June Council, Commission President Barroso proposed a series of measures intended to make progress on CFSP and other issues in the absence of the provisions in the Treaty. The Barroso paper is entitled Europe in the World: Some Practical Proposals for Greater Coherence, Effectiveness and Visibility.133 It sets out three main factors on which, argues Mr Barroso, the success of EU ‘external action’ depends:
• first and foremost, political agreement among Member States on the goals to be achieved through the EU. This requires a strong partnership between the EU institutions and a clear focus on a limited number of strategic priorities where Europe can make the difference, rather than dispersing efforts across the board. This is the condition sine qua non;
• second, whether the available policy instruments are suited to the task at hand, are backed with the necessary resources, and present clear advantages;
• third, the role and responsibility of the EU institutions and the legal environment.134
99. Although the Foreign Secretary appeared quite relaxed about the general tenor of Mr Barroso’s paper, she was very clear that she would not countenance any attempt to give the Commission a greater role in foreign policy:
Who can quarrel with greater co-operation or perhaps greater exchange of personnel. For example, in my former department we exchanged personnel with the comparable French ministry. All of those things, better strategic planning, can be very useful. However, and there is a substantial however to this, better co-ordination within the Commission and between the High Representative and the Commission, fine, we would not quarrel with that, but I understand there is also a suggestion of perhaps full Commission participation alongside the Presidency and EU delegations. Well, no, maybe not, perhaps not even legally allowable. I stress to the Committee that the headline phrases that you have quoted are fine but if they contain within them detail which we question then we will question it.135
100. Mrs Beckett continued:
I have already, in the short time that I have been in this post, heard on a number of occasions representatives, not just of the UK but also of other Member States, talking very firmly about foreign policies being a matter for Member States, and I think you
131 Ev 58 132 Q 244 133 COM(2006) 278 final, available at http://ec.europa.eu 134 Ibid, p5 135 Q 248
Developments in the European Union 37
will find that Member States across the board are generally quite jealous of their rights.136
The Foreign Secretary conceded, however, that the appointment of a Commission special representative to Macedonia, who also reports directly to the Council, had been a bad precedent.137
101. We conclude that, whatever the merits of the proposal to establish a Foreign Minister and an external action service for the EU, it is important that the European Commission should not develop a diplomatic service or ‘embassies’ by stealth. We recommend that the Government take steps to prevent the official use of the term ‘ambassador’ to refer to the Commission’s representatives and that it ensure that, at a time when the funding of British diplomatic, consular and trade posts around the world is under great pressure, expenditure by the Commission on its overseas delegations and properties is subject to rigorous scrutiny.
Is there a distinctive role for the EU in foreign policy?
Keeping the neighbourhood tidy 102. The EU has become increasingly active as a player on the world stage. EU foreign ministers and, recently, High Representative Solana, have been actively engaged in seeking to persuade Iran to abide by its previous undertakings not to develop nuclear weapons. The EU is also a member of the Quartet, which oversees attempts to revive the Middle East Peace Process. Nearer home, the EU is heavily involved in attempts to reconstruct the Western Balkans. It has also been developing an out-of-area defence capability.
103. Charles Grant reminded us of the actual and potential scope of the EU’s current security role outside its borders:
Europe could be a serious security power. It can create peace, and is creating peace in parts of the world. I find that the British public have no idea that the EU is involved in missions in places like Aceh, where they are a key element in monitoring the peace settlements; on the Gaza–Egypt border where they are policing the border; or in Transdnistria—where they may be on their way soon. Obviously, there is an EU force keeping the peace in Bosnia. … The EU is developing so-called battle groups, which will be up and running soon. They will be forces that are supposed to be capable of going in to a crisis zone in a fairly difficult situation, not just peace- keepers.138
This work is valuable and it is by no means certain that if the EU were not doing it, it would be done as well, or at all.
104. Douglas Alexander was upbeat when speaking to us about the EU’s role in foreign policy:
136 Q 251 137 Ibid 138 Q 146
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In terms of the effectiveness of the European Union projecting itself and its values internationally, I would probably cite the most salient example, which is that of Iran. If you look at the E3 process over recent months, initiated with the full support of other European countries, it seems to me a very good example of where there has been, notwithstanding the present arrangements within the European Union, a very effective European dimension to one of the biggest single strategic challenges that we face.139
An EU working in Britain’s interests 105. The FCO’s strategy White Paper, Active Diplomacy for a Changing World confirms that the EU’s role in foreign and security policy is likely to grow.140 The White Paper continues:
As a global player, it will be in our interest to work with our EU partners, in particular France and Germany, to develop a stronger and more effective EU role in Europe and beyond.141
In similar vein, the White Paper goes on to state:
It will be in our interest that the EU becomes a more capable global actor. To achieve this, EU Member States will need to translate common external policies into effective action through practical and political commitment. Combining our economic, diplomatic and military weight better and making EU development assistance more effective will be critical to increasing the EU’s international impact and its contribution to our international security objectives in particular.142
106. We conclude that foreign policy is and should remain primarily a matter for each nation state to decide for itself. We further conclude, however, that there can be real value in co-ordinating foreign policies at EU level and in undertaking joint missions on matters where the EU25 can agree and where they have a shared interest.
139 Q 200 140 Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Active Diplomacy for a Changing World: The UK’s International Priorities, Cm 6762, March 2006, p 23 141 Ibid, p 24 142 Ibid, p 32
Developments in the European Union 39
Formal minutes
Wednesday 19 July 2006
Members present:
Mike Gapes, in the Chair
Mr Fabian Hamilton Sandra Osborne Mr David Heathcoat-Amory Mr Greg Pope Mr John Horam Mr Ken Purchase Mr Eric Illsley Sir John Stanley Mr Paul Keetch Ms Gisela Stuart Andrew Mackinlay Richard Younger-Ross
The Committee deliberated.
Draft Report (Developments in the European Union), proposed by the Chairman, brought up and read.
Ordered, That the Chairman’s draft Report be read a second time, paragraph by paragraph.
Paragraphs 1 to 9 read and agreed to.
Paragraph 10 read and postponed.
Paragraphs 11 to 13 read and agreed to.
Paragraph 14 read, as follows:
In May 2006, the then Minister for Europe, Douglas Alexander, told us that,
I would argue that in what was ultimately agreed among the heads of government at the December European Council and what is now being followed through in the institutional process, we achieved what many regarded as being very unlikely, which was to find the common ground and consensus on the issue of the European budget.
The final verdict on whether the deal reached on the budget was a good one for the United Kingdom and, indeed, for the European Union as a whole, will have to await the outcome of the mid-term review of the CAP and other expenditure.
Amendment proposed, to leave out lines 7 to 9 and to insert the words “The deal reached on the budget has not clarified the mechanism of EU funding or ended the capricious nature of national contributions. The certainty of higher UK net contributions has brought only the possibility of substantive CAP reform in the mid term review.”—(Mr David Heathcoat-Amory)
Question put, That the Amendment be made.
40 Developments in the European Union
The Committee divided.
Ayes, 3 Noes, 6
Mr David Heathcoat-Amory Mr Fabian Hamilton Mr Paul Keetch Mr Eric Illsley Sir John Stanley Andrew Mackinlay Sandra Osborne Mr Greg Pope Mr Ken Purchase
Paragraph agreed to.
Paragraphs 15 to 32 read and agreed to.
Paragraph 33 read, amended and agreed to.
Paragraphs 34 to 62 read and agreed to.
Paragraph 63 read, amended and agreed to.
Paragraphs 64 to 92 read and agreed to.
Paragraph 93 read, amended and agreed to.
Paragraphs 94 to 106 read and agreed to.
Postponed paragraph 10 again read, amended and agreed to.
Resolved, That the Report be the Sixth Report of the Committee to the House.
Ordered, That the Chairman do make the Report to the House.
Ordered, That the provisions of Standing Order No.134 (Select committees (reports)) be applied to the Report.
Several Papers were ordered to be appended to the Minutes of Evidence.
Ordered, That the appendices to the Minutes of Evidence taken before the Committee be reported to the House.—(The Chairman.)
[Adjourned till Two o’clock on Wednesday 18 October.
Developments in the European Union 41
List of witnesses
Tuesday 13 December 2005 Page
Rt Hon Jack Straw, a Member of the House, Foreign Secretary of State, Mr Tim Barrow, Deputy Political Director and Assistant Director of EU External, and Mr David Frost, Deputy Director EU, Foreign and Commonwealth Office Ev 3
Wednesday 11 January 2006
Mr Charles Grant, Director, Centre for European Reform, and Ms Ruth Lea, Director, Centre for Policy Studies Ev 29
Wednesday 3 May 2006
Mr Douglas Alexander, a Member of the House, Minister for Europe, Mr Anthony Smith, Director, European Political Affairs, and Mr Simon Manley, Former Head, Economic/Central Europe, Foreign and Commonwealth Office Ev 45
Tuesday 13 June 2006
Rt Hon Margaret Beckett, a Member of the House, Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Mr Anthony Smith, European Political Affairs, and Ms Shan Morgan, Director, EU, Foreign and Commonwealth Office Ev 65
42 Developments in the European Union
List of written evidence
Foreign and Commonwealth Office: Memoranda Ev 1, Ev 63, Ev 77 Foreign and Commonwealth Office: Correspondence Ev 19, Ev 58, Ev 77, Ev 80, Ev 81, Ev 82, Ev 83, Ev85 Charles Grant Ev 22 Ruth Lea Ev 27 Turkey–UK Parliamentary Friendship Group, Grand National Assembly to Turkey Ev 84
3335921001 Page Type [SO] 20-07-06 01:49:03 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1
Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence Ev 1 Oral evidence
Taken before the Foreign Affairs Committee
on Tuesday 13 December 2005
Members present:
Mike Gapes, in the Chair
Mr John Horam Sandra Osborne Mr Eric Illsley Mr Ken Purchase Mr Paul Keetch Sir John Stanley Andrew Mackinlay Richard Younger-Ross
Memorandum submitted by the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth AVairs
PROSPECTS FOR THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL, BRUSSELS 15–16 DECEMBER
Introduction 1. We expect the issues for the December European Council to include: financial perspectives; growth and jobs; follow-up to the Hampton Court Informal Summit; Africa; global approach to migration; counter- terrorism; sustainable development; climate change; the UN summit; Macedonia; and external relations. The European Council will meet at the same time as the meeting of WTO Ministers in Hong Kong (13–18 December) but WTO issues are not on its agenda.
Financial Perspectives 2. As Presidency we are committed to working towards a deal on Future Financing at the December European Council. We have made clear that there will need to be significant changes to the proposal issued by the Luxembourg Presidency in June, setting the path towards a more modern budget focused on priorities and making substantial changes to the Own Resources proposal made in June by the Luxembourg Presidency. We expect to issue our proposal on 5 December and this will be discussed by EU Foreign Ministers at a Ministerial Conclave on 7 December, and again at the General AVairs and External Relations Council on 12 December.
Growth and Jobs 3. We hope to use Council conclusions to lock in progress on three important strands of our economic reform agenda: Lisbon/Globalisation, Better Regulation and the Services Directive. On Services, we hope Heads might endorse the Presidency conclusions from the 28–29 November Competitiveness Council on the parameters of a liberalising Services Directive, but it may be that some Member States will prefer to await the European Parliament’s First Reading in January. 4. We also hope to embed the significant progress made on Lisbon/Globalisation and Better Regulation, and give a clear set of forward-looking messages on next steps. On Lisbon, we expect the European Council to welcome the National Reform Programmes produced by each Member State, and to recall the importance of implementing the Lisbon Strategy to delivering the jobs and growth agenda agreed at the Spring European Council. On Better Regulation, the European Council should welcome the Commission’s work on simplifying the acquis, screening pending proposals and assessing the impact and administrative burdens of new legislation.
Follow-up to the Hampton Court Informal Summit 5. At the Informal Meeting of the European Council at Hampton Court on 27 October, Heads asked the European Commission and the High Representative to take forward work in the fields of research, universities, demographics, energy policy, justice and home aVairs and CFSP/ESDP. At this European Council. Commission President Barroso and High Representative Solana will update Heads on the progress they have made on follow-up work. That follow-up will then continue under the Austrian Presidency. 6. The European Council will also take note of a joint UK-Austrian Presidency report on each Member State’s assessment of the progress of their national debate on Europe (a commitment stemming from the June European Council). One element of debate this autumn was the “Sharing Power in Europe” 3335921001 Page Type [E] 20-07-06 01:49:03 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1
Ev 2 Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence
Conference, which the UK Presidency jointly hosted with the Netherlands in The Hague on 17 November, and which discussed the application of the principle of subsidiarity amongst a range of actors including Ministers, national and European parliamentarians, academics, and representatives of the social partners and civil society drawn from across the EU. Austria has confirmed that it will hold a follow-up discussion under its Presidency in April 2006.
Africa 7. We expect the European Council formally to adopt the EU’s Strategy for Africa “Towards a Strategic Partnership”. This sets out the EU approach to Africa for the coming years, reflecting priorities identified with the UN, African Union and G8 over the course of the past year. It will particularly highlight the themes of peace and security, governance, sustainable growth, regional integration, trade, investment in people and development assistance with an underlying philosophy of African ownership and responsibility. The Strategy provides a solid and realistic foundation for the consolidation of the partnership with Africa over the next 10 years.
Global Approach to Migration 8. At the Hampton Court Summit, EU Heads of State and Government agreed on the importance of engaging more eVectively with countries outside the EU on migration issues. This requires a balanced approach, which strengthens the EU’s borders and combats illegal immigration, but also harnesses the benefits of legal migration for the EU and for developing countries. The Commission has published a paper on priority actions on migration, with a focus on Africa. This sets the agenda for operational co-operation between Member States, for instance through joint border operations, and describes how the EU will engage more closely with countries of origin in Africa and with countries neighbouring the EU to build their capacity to manage migration. The European Council will agree short conclusions, highlighting the importance of this issue.
Counter-terrorism 9. The European Council will be asked to consider the significant progress made under the UK Presidency in implementing the EU Counter Terrorism Action Plan. Achievements will include the agreement of or substantial progress on an EU Strategy on Radicalisation and Recruitment; an EU Programme on Critical Infrastructure Protection; EU Crisis Co-ordination arrangements; the European Evidence Warrant; a final report of evaluation of all Member States’ counter-terrorism arrangements and best practices; and measures on simplifying the exchange of law enforcement information. 10. The European Council will also welcome the agreement of the EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy. This is designed to complement the Action Plan by giving the EU longer-term strategic direction. It is based on four broad policy objectives: to disrupt terrorist activities; to improve our response to terrorist attack; to protect our citizens and infrastructure by reducing our vulnerability to attack; and to prevent people turning to terrorism. The strategy will underline how the EU adds value to national eVorts and will identify mechanisms to provide political oversight while facilitating progress and delivery though the appropriate working groups and committees.
Sustainable Development 11. The June European Council looked forward to the review of the EU Sustainable Development Strategy by the end of 2005, if possible. A delay in the publication of the European Commission’s communication on the review of the Strategy has meant that the UK Presidency has been unable to take forward work as planned. The Commission now anticipates publishing the communication in mid- December. If the communication is released in time, the European Council is likely to note this and look forward to progress under the Austrian Presidency.
Climate Change and Sustainable Energy 12. The European Council will meet the week after the UN Climate Change Conference in Montreal (28 November–9 December). The Council will assess progress and set priorities, based on the outcome of the Montreal Conference and other EU work to re-invigorate the international negotiations and develop a medium and longer term climate change strategy. It should endorse follow-up to the successful EU Summits with China, India, Russia and Canada, emphasise the importance of developing partnerships on climate change with all major energy-consuming countries, and aYrm EU support for climate change work under the Gleneagles Plan of Action. We also hope that the Council will endorse the need to take action to reduce the climate change impact of aviation, building on the discussion in the Environment Council on 2 December. 3335921001 Page Type [O] 20-07-06 01:49:03 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1
Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence Ev 3
UN Summit 13. We expect that the Council will welcome the extensive and balanced outcome of the UN Summit, and will reiterate the EU’s strong support for the early and full implementation of the reforms and commitments then agreed, as outlined in the extensive Conclusions on Summit follow-up agreed at the General AVairs and External Relations Council on 7 November.
Macedonia 14. The European Commission opinion of 9 November recommended that Macedonia be given Candidate Country Status but not yet a date for the opening of accession negotiations, which will depend on further progress being made in key areas. EU Foreign Ministers will discuss Macedonia at their meeting on 12 December. Depending on the decision of Foreign Ministers, the European Council may be asked to endorse it.
External Relations 15. There will be a discussion of the Middle East probably at the Foreign Ministers’ dinner on Thursday evening. Any Conclusions are likely to cover: the Middle East Peace Process and progress on the EU mission to monitor the Rafah border crossing; the EU’s overall approach towards Iran; Detlev Mehlis’ (UN Head of the UN International Independent Investigation Commission) latest report on the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafic Hariri (expected to be published by 15 December) and the situation in Syria and Lebanon; the recent EuroMed Tenth Anniversary Summit, which set out a reinvigorated agenda to strengthen the EU’s relations with its Mediterranean Partners; and the transitional process in Iraq in the light of 15 December constitutional elections.
ESDP 16. We expect the European Council to endorse the Presidency Report on European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). The report is a comprehensive record of civilian and military ESDP activity in the second half of 2005, including operations, capability development and co-operation with other international organisations. It highlights specific progress made in some areas and outlines the areas which require further work under the Austrian Presidency. Foreign and Commonwealth OYce 1 December 2005
Witnesses: Rt Hon Jack Straw, a Member of the House, Foreign Secretary of State, Mr Tim Barrow, Deputy Political Director and Assistant Director EU External, and Mr David Frost, Deputy Director EU, Foreign and Commonwealth OYce, gave evidence.
Q1 Chairman: Good afternoon everybody. just this last Wednesday, and since then there have Welcome to the Foreign Secretary and his team. We been bilateral meetings, as you will be aware, are pleased to have you here, Jack. We know you are between the Prime Minister and heads of extremely busy this week, as always. We want to government of almost every one of the other 24 obviously focus on the presidency of the European Member States. I have had a series of discussions Union and the preparations for the summit and with my colleague foreign ministers, Douglas other issues that are going on. Perhaps I could begin Alexander with his colleague Europe ministers, and by asking you about the EU budget. I know you are of course at oYcial level there has been very in the middle of negotiations, and we appreciate that intensive discussion. We are currently agreeing some sometimes you do not want to reveal everything, of the revisions to the proposals, and they will be but, nevertheless, could you tell us at this moment made available tomorrow, including, may I say, by how many other states support our position? way of written ministerial statement tomorrow Mr Straw: I am not, with respect, going to oVer a morning, so we will be publishing the statement with view about that, because we are not at a stage where the full details annexed. I am doing it tomorrow we can make that assessment. This is an iterative morning because in the afternoon there is a debate process where we put forward proposals, we listen to on the prospects of the European Council, what colleagues have to say. We are in the process of eVectively a debate about the budget, so that revising these, so the situation is this. We put colleagues on all sides of the House have an forward proposals last week and they were made opportunity to study the revisions before the debate. available to the House at the same time as they were So that is where we have got to. These are complex made available to European Member States. We negotiations. They always are; they always will be. I have been listening very carefully to reactions to have never been in a negotiation of this complexity those proposals. I ran what was delicately called a within the European Union where people disclose “conclave” of European foreign ministers to discuss their final hand until they have to, and I am not 3335921001 Page Type [E] 20-07-06 01:49:03 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1
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13 December 2005 Rt Hon Jack Straw MP, Mr Tim Barrow and Mr David Frost going to oVer a view about whether or not there is although not the whole, of CAP spending—“This is success on Thursday, Friday or Saturday. One of without prejudice to decisions on future funding in the other problems about budget negotiations, as we the financial perspective 2007 to 2013.” saw at Luxembourg, is that it is literally, to use the cliche´, a zero sum game. There is an issue about the overall size of the budget—the bigger the budget Q9 Mr Horam: So that is what you are relying on? the better it is for those who are benefiting from the Mr Straw: We are also relying—. It is never the case, budget net, the worse it is for those who are even if there had been that decision, that it is contributing net—and within that overall budget, at impossible to change subsequently a decision made the very level of budget, there are very important now getting on for four years ago, and by the time issues about new benefits from what spending, so it the review happens it would be six years ago, so it is is diYcult. For our part, we are doing everything we always the case, as with Parliament. Parliament can can to get a deal, but we are not interested in a deal decide one thing one day, and, if there is a majority, at any price. two days later it can change, but, as it happens, these were diYcult negotiations that took place in October 2002 and they went through to 2003. I was there Q2 Mr Horam: Could I come back to what you did then, I know what was decided and it was a process make public last week, i.e. your negotiating position. of reform of the Common Agricultural Policy, first Part of that was a link with the Common of all. So it is also inaccurate in its own terms to Agricultural Policy? suggest that the CAP was going to remain static, Mr Straw: Yes. because it has not. Just in the last week we have had this good news on the negotiations in respect of the Q3 Mr Horam: That is one of your points. A review Sugar Regime. So it was a process of reform, plus the conducted by the Commission to be submitted in fact that the conclusions made clear, as I said, that it 2000? was without prejudice to future decisions on the Mr Straw: The review, yes. financial perspective.
Q4 Mr Horam: Right? Q10 Mr Horam: As you have just said, we have had Mr Straw: Yes. some recent news about the Sugar Regime, for example. As I understand it, the reforms that flowed Q5 Mr Horam: You are proposing a review of the from 2002, reforms of agricultural practice, are still CAP? coming in, will come in this year, some more will Mr Straw: Yes. come in next year. One of the criticisms of your position could be that it is rather early to be having Q6 Mr Horam: It is the case, I want you to correct a review? me if I am wrong, that in 2002 the Council did agree Mr Straw: By the way, I have just had the precise that there would be no change in the funding of the wording passed to me. “It was explicitly agreed CAP until 2013? without prejudice to future decisions on the CAP Mr Straw: Not quite, is the answer. I can get you the and financing of the European Union after 2006”, exact text of what was agreed because I was there, and it set ceilings, not targets, for expenditure. I am but part of the conclusions for that section relating not in any doubt that what we are proposing is fully to the CAP began with the preamble, words to the consistent with what was agreed in 2002. It is simply eVect that, “This is without prejudice to decisions on wrong to suggest that, as I say, the decisions made in the financial perspective for 2007/2013”. I am sorry, 2002 were set in concrete. I am sorry, you were I should have introduced David Frost and Tim asking me a question about sugar. Barrow. Tim is the Deputy Political Director and David is one of the Deputy Directors Europe. But it Q11 Mr Horam: No, I do not want to talk about is words to that eVect. It related, as I recall, directly sugar. I was just saying that, given this is a to direct payments, which is a big chunk of CAP continuous process of reform of the agricultural spending. It is one of the debates we are having with system in Europe which is happening this year and the French, because they say that back in October happening next year as a consequence of decisions 2002 we set the CAP in stone between 2007 and 2013. taken in 2002, some would say it is a bit early to have It is not the case. I would be very happy to provide a review of the whole system. you with the conclusions that I, indeed, set up. Mr Straw: I do not think it is at all. I am sorry, we may just have to disagree about that. I think that it Q7 Mr Horam: You contend that is not the case? is exactly the right moment, indeed some would say Mr Straw: I do not only contend that, I was there, it is overdue, to have a review of the policies and the and, as I say, the rubric is clear. We can send out for funding of those policies of the European Union. the conclusions. Let us do so. There has been change, let me make that clear, and the proportion of the total budget spent on the CAP Q8 Mr Horam: You are saying it is subject to what has been going down in recent years—it is a process might be agreed at this Council? we have been pushing—as has the total size of the Mr Straw: I am saying that, as I recall the budget relative to Member States’ economies also paragraph, it opened with the words—and it was to been gradually reducing, and that is a process we do specifically with direct payments, which is part, want to accelerate within this budget; but if you look 3335921001 Page Type [O] 20-07-06 01:49:03 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1
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13 December 2005 Rt Hon Jack Straw MP, Mr Tim Barrow and Mr David Frost at the negotiations which opened in Hong Kong future. First of all, these are small sums compared today, which are directly linked to this, there is a big with the total, Chairman. Secondly, why they are agenda of change. necessary is because, not least under our presidency, the common foreign and security policy has been Q12 Mr Horam: Market access? made operational. It is no longer just a rhetorical Mr Straw: It is market access, essentially, so that we policy. We are operating it in negotiations, as we are open up our markets for agriculture. Let me say, we in respect of Iran, but also in respect of these get other people’s markets for agriculture opened up missions, and so we have had a mission to Aceh—we as well, and I believe that the French and the British got very little coverage, but a really important and many other farmers will be able to do very well mission there, as important in its own way as the in exporting to third countries, so this is not a decommissioning programmes undertaken in situation where we are going to impoverish rural Northern Ireland and the European Union have run areas as a result of these changes, but the balance of it entirely—we have also got the continuing mission agriculture will change and in return for that, of in Rafa, and I gather from one member informally course, what we get to is non-agricultural market that you were impressed with what was going on, but access, including manufactured goods and services, these things cost money, that is why. so it is a big agenda. I cannot predict what is going to happen in Hong Kong, nobody can, but what I Q16 Chairman: You are revising your proposal. Is it am clear about, Mr Horam, is that this pressure for likely then that the figure that you have just quoted change in the Common Agricultural Policy will not (1.026) is actually going to be significantly raised and cannot go away because there is a changing tomorrow in order to try and get an agreement that reality in the rest of the world. will end up somewhere near where the Luxembourgers were when we finally got an Q13 Mr Horam: I understand that completely. agreement. Mr Straw: It is called globalisation. It is also the Mr Straw: I am not going to, if you do not mind, called impatience by developing countries who are make predictions about where this may end up, not not going to tolerate for very much longer these very least because I cannot, but if Luxembourg had been high levels of subsidies being paid to European, acceptable to us we would have accepted it; so would American and Japanese agriculture. the other four Member States who turned it down. There will, indeed, be some revisions, but they are Q14 Mr Horam: What opinion have you formed going to be revisions around the level we have over the last six months while we have been the Chair proposed. about the reaction of other Member States to your view as expressed now? Q17 Mr Horam: Can I ask you one quick question Mr Straw: Many are happy about this; some are not. about the Luxembourg suggestion, which was, if I It is inevitable within negotiations, those that are not remember rightly, a freezing of the UK rebate, particularly happy, that you have to goad for which would mean it would be the same each year as persuasion and negotiation, and it is hardly a secret opposed to at the moment a fluctuating amount, that the French government have reservations, to which has some disadvantages because it means that put it at its mildest, about a review which could sometimes we do not bid for things because we know impact in the next financial perspective. That is that it will reduce our rebate. Would you be in another of these negotiations. favour of a steady amount rather than— Mr Straw: Look, what happened with Luxembourg, Q15 Chairman: Can I ask a specific question about Luxembourg was under pressure to meet various the detail of the proposals that we are putting expenditure claims by other Member States which forward. As I understand it, although your proposal they did, and then they eVectively gave us the bill. is for a reduction of the expenditure level that was Just to give you some of the ball park figures, our net originally proposed by the Commission and lower contribution in this financial perspective, which ends than Luxembourg, you are arguing for a substantial next year, is ƒ39 billion over the period. Without increase in some aspects of the European Union any change in any of the financial arrangements, funding, particularly common foreign and security including the rebate regulation, our net contribution policy. Why is that necessary? for the next financial perspective from 2007 to 2013 Mr Straw: Let me give you some totals here. The inclusive is due to rise to ƒ50 billion, and that is Commission recommended a budget set at 1.24% of principally but not wholly to pay for the costs of what is called GNI (gross national income) of the enlargement. What the Luxembourgers said is that, European Union Member States, which would have having risen already by 11 billion, it should rise by a been ƒ1,025 billion over the seven-year period, and further 25 billion to 75, so it was an increase of about that was impossible. The Luxembourg Presidency 93% on 39, and they were going to do that by recommended a budget of 1.06% of GNI, which is freezing the abatement, and it is simply unacceptable ƒ870 billion. We are proposing in last Wednesday’s and it is unacceptable because of the cost to us and negotiating box a budget of about 1.026, and it is 847 it is unacceptable in principle as well. What we have billion. The budget for the common foreign and said in our proposals is that we recognise, number security policy was ƒ16 million last year. It has been one, that when the rebate regulations were put up to ƒ100 million this year and there are some negotiated in 1984 there was no expectation proposals for it to increase further per year in the whatsoever that within a period of 20 years the 3335921001 Page Type [E] 20-07-06 01:49:03 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1
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13 December 2005 Rt Hon Jack Straw MP, Mr Tim Barrow and Mr David Frost
European Union would expand to take into its things that is going to happen under our proposals is membership what at that stage were Soviet satellites. that there will in future be a broad equity in spending The issue before the Union was essentially making between France, Italy and the UK for the first time up membership within Western Europe, not that, ever, something that the then Mrs Thatcher was and nobody has ever suggested that the UK, as one unable to achieve. As I say, going back to the core of the more prosperous countries, should not make of your point, I think our partners understand our a fair contribution towards the costs of enlargement position exactly. It was precisely because we were and of expanding those economies, and that is why not willing to negotiate the rebate away in June that we have made proposals in this negotiating box for the Prime Minister and I dug in and one of the an increase over the 50 billion starting point, default reasons why there was no agreement, but we were setting, of around eight billion euros, but we have joined by four other Member States, and so, far from also said very clearly that that is linked to the Member States drawing the conclusion you abatement or what would otherwise be the suggested, Sir John, they have drawn the opposite abatement, on structural and cohesion funds in the one, which is that we are tough negotiators and if we enlarged accession countries, the A10 countries. think a deal is unsatisfactory for the United Where we are adamant is that the rebate should be Kingdom, and I may say for the European Union, untouched in respect of any spending inside the pre- we will simply not agree it, and they all understand existing 15 Member States and agriculture anywhere that. in the European Union, unless and until there are the major reforms that we have been seeking. So, that is Q19 Sir John Stanley: Are you assuring the the background. Chairman, you did ask me earlier Committee that as far as the element of a rebate is about are some budget headings going to increase. It concerned which is applicable to the previous is not just the FSP which will be increased. Member States before the recent enlargement, that Structural cohesion fund spending to the accession the value of that will be wholly maintained in the ten countries will increase very significantly by a negotiation? factor of five, I think, on current levels of spending, Mr Straw: Yes, and it goes back to points the Prime and there will be corresponding reductions. Minister has made and, indeed, I note from recent debate in the House of Lords, Lord Howe, who was Q18 Sir John Stanley: Foreign Secretary, I do not there at start, has made, but the rebate is an know whether you have given consideration to yours anomaly, but it is an anomaly built on a much bigger and the Prime Minister’s negotiating strategy on anomaly, namely the distortions of spending this, but has it not been a pretty disastrous throughout the European Union. It will remain misjudgment to take up a position sustained over unamended within the existing 15 Member States months, if not years, of the British rebate as non- unless and until there is agreement to remove the negotiable only to come to a position where it is underlying causes of the rebate, and if there were and patently obvious it is now wholly negotiable and we have then got into a more rational overall pattern with a bottom line for reasons that we understand at of spending and revenue raising, then the case for the this particular moment? What credibility are you rebate would fall away, but in my judgment that will and the Foreign OYce and the British Government be a long way oV, and it is certainly not for these going to have in future EU negotiations when you negotiations. take the position that something is non-negotiable when you have been so clearly driven from that Q20 Chairman: Thank you. We have to move on. particular position on this particular occasion? Mr Straw: Can I also just say, because it may be Mr Straw: I do not accept that we have. I have helpful to the Committee, the rebate is rising as well. certainly never used the word “non negotiable”, as It has been five billion euros in this financial far as I recall. What I have said is that the rebate is perspective, on average. It is going to rise to, on fully justified and, moreover, we are not negotiating average, seven billion euros in the next financial on the rebate as it was agreed in 1984. I have just perspective. spelt out the fact that the rebate will not be aVected Andrew Mackinlay: Can I just bounce this oV the by a cent or a penny in respect of any aspect of Foreign Secretary? It is frustrating that the thing is spending within the E15 nor any aspect of going to be published tomorrow when one might agricultural spending anywhere inside the Union. have thought it might perhaps have been possible What, however, I note is that nobody in all the today—that is an aside—but what happens if there debates on accession on any side has ever said that is deadlock? We do need to understand, Chairman, the much poorer countries inside the accession ten if everyone digs in, how that funding operation goes states should eVectively pay their share towards our to the European Union. The other thing which I rebate, because the rebate was never designed like wanted to ask you. I am told that one of the that. The rebate, let us be clear, was designed to problems for the European Union ten is that they ensure that there was equity between otherwise actually have not got the machinery of government similar states, principally France, Italy and the UK, to spend some of the rebate. How true is that in in terms of our contribution to the EU. There was your view? not equity because of the imbalance in spending Mr Straw: Three points, Mr Mackinlay. First, you towards agriculture, and that was a reason why the express frustration about the fact that we have not rebate was obtained. Let me say to you that there has published the proposals to date. If they had been not been equity until very recently, and one of the ready we would have published them. Let me say, I 3335921001 Page Type [O] 20-07-06 01:49:03 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1
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13 December 2005 Rt Hon Jack Straw MP, Mr Tim Barrow and Mr David Frost do my very best to ensure that Members are given Q22 Mr Illsley: Foreign Secretary, we have seen advance notice of these things, and that is why I am positions changing slightly over the last few days. making every eVort to ensure they are made We have seen the statement by Condoleezza Rice available tomorrow morning in advance of the admitting that the US have used rendition debate. I feel perfectly confident about these previously but denying any use of rendition for the proposals. In any event, it would be totally purposes of torture, and in a reply to Ming inappropriate to try and hide them. Your second Campbell, I think, yesterday it has been indicated point was about deadlock. Decisions on the budget that in the past there have been requests to ourselves require unanimity, so, as we saw in June, if there is for rendition. This is despite previous statements to not unanimity there is no agreement. The current the contrary that we were not aware of any such budget runs until the end of next year, but if there is requests in the past. Can you give a categorical deadlock then the treaties and practice provide for statement to this Committee now that this budgets to be rolled over, and there are various government is not involved in any type of rendition, mechanisms, and Mr Frost can explain these in that we are not assisting, with the Americans, in detail, by which, if they wish, the European rendition of their suspects or their personnel and parliament can “denounce the position of the that we are definitely not involved in any rendition V European Council”. The overall e ect of all this is of anyone for the purposes of being taken to another that, roughly speaking, you run the pattern of country to a secret site, or whatever, for the purposes budget, maximum budget, at about 1.05. of torture? Mr Frost: A bit less. Mr Straw: First of all on your last point, Eric, yes, I Mr Straw: A bit less, nought four, nought five. We absolutely categorically can give you that do not want to do that though, because it becomes undertaking. On the wider issue, rendition is a term very static and we want to move forward. One of the of art which covers a variety of activities. At one end problems is that if there is no agreement it makes the problem which was mentioned in your third it could be used to include the transfer of a suspect, question about the capacity of the accession which happened on two occasions when I was Home countries to spend what has been allocated much Secretary, not Foreign Secretary, in 1998, as I drew more diYcult because they need long lead times to to Ming Campbell’s attention, where the United build up their capacity. None of them up to now, and States were transferring an individual from a third they have only been members since May of last year, country to the United States to face trial. They had have been able to spend what has been allocated. assured us that, although there was not an That is not unusual, it happens with countries being extradition concerned, the transfer took place in the European Union for a long time, and they lawfully with the agreement both of the host have had a history of under spending, monies have country—the original country—and was consistent been allocated under external aid budgets in the past with the United States’ law. Since also I was satisfied as well, so they are very anxious for a budget deal so about the potential treatment of the suspects when that they have certainty about the levels. Also some they arrived at their destination, namely that they we of them are anxious about a budget deal by were going for trial in the United States, I agreed December because of what is called the “statistical that transfer. I do not remember it being called eVect”, in other words that they benefit from the rendition, but it may have been. There was also, as I statistics which would apply to a budget currently said to Ming in answer to his question, another available, and they will lose out under next years case—we are still trying to pin down the records but statistics because their economies are growing and it is in the recollection of the oYcials concerned and so fewer areas will qualify for this spend. This is part also broadly in my recollection that there was an of our detailed discussions with the A10 colleagues. application by the United States for transfer from What we have done is this. We have reduced the the United States to a third country. I was not headline figure for structural cohesion fund satisfied in that case that one could be guaranteed spending in the A10 countries because we had to get about the potential treatment of the suspect and so the budget down from 1.06, which was unacceptable I refused the facilitation. Those three cases, there to many partners, to a lower figure, and a number of could possibly be a fourth, and the Home OYce are budget heads were reduced—SCF for the A10, rural checking, all happened under the Clinton development, for example, in the existing 15, and administration. As I said in answer to the question some other changes as well. At the same time as from Ming, and it was based on very thorough doing that we proposed a series of technical, but very research both from Foreign OYce and Home OYce important, changes which will make it easier for files and other files, there is no record whatsoever of these countries to spend so they are able to roll-over any request for what is now called rendition from the allocations from one year to the next more easily. Two countries said that they wanted to use United States’ government either to the United structural cohesion funds for social housing—so for States or to a third country which we in the UK the first time we are saying that that should be government have received either in respect of available for social housing—and there are many facilitation where the plane has landed or in respect other changes like that which will make it easier for of over flights. I also say to you two other things. them to spend. First of all, had that happened through United Kingdom airspace or on United Kingdom territory, Q21 Chairman: Now we are moving on. I expect that we would have received a request by the Mr Straw: What are we moving on to? United States’ government, because that has been Chairman: Rendition. their consistent practice, as is evidenced by what 3335921001 Page Type [E] 20-07-06 01:49:03 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1
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13 December 2005 Rt Hon Jack Straw MP, Mr Tim Barrow and Mr David Frost happened in 1998. The second thing I say is this. I those allegations that they are complete nonsense wrote to Secretary Rice at the end of November after and no United Kingdom oYcials have taken part in the General AVairs Council and the general any alleged mistreatment in Greece of any suspects discussion in the European Union raised concern whatsoever and we were not involved in the arrest or about the reports that had been received. She detention of those particular suspects. responded to that request with a very detailed statement setting out the position of the United Q24 Richard Younger-Ross: You have been very States government, and that set out, amongst many clear about oYcial requests for rendition through other things: “The United States has respected and the United Kingdom. It does raise a question, of will continue to respect the sovereignty of our course, how they managed to transfer the prisoners countries. The United States does not transport and to Guanta`namo Bay in the first place. Obviously the has not transported detainees from one country to route is being used, not through the UK in that that another for the purpose of interrogation using instance, but in terms of the requests, those requests torture. The United States does not use the airspace would only be for military or state flights, oYcial or the airports of any country for the purpose of flights, US flights? Private flights can come and go. transporting a detainee to a country where he or she Have you been made aware by any of your oYcials will be tortured.” So I hope the result both of what or any oYcial from any other department of any I have said in answer to Ming and what Secretary concerns or knowledge they have of any private Rice has said to me in answer to my enquiry should flights being used for rendition? provide serious reassurance to those who Mr Straw: No, I have not. Can I say that part of the understandably have been worried about this in search of papers conducted at the Home OYce and the reports. the Foreign OYce was not only for cases but also for policy papers—I think that is reflected in the answer Q23 Sandra Osborne: There is a great deal of worry which I gave—but those produced a nil return as around this issue, as you know, and I appreciate the well. In any event, the permission is not contingent oYcials have been carrying out quite substantial on the nature of the aeroplane, it is contingent on the research into exactly what has been happening, but nature of the activity being conducted either in the I notice that some other EU countries such as aeroplane or on the ground; so I do not think the fact Germany, Italy and Spain have actually launched that it was a private flight is relevant. I have no idea investigations at a judicial level in relation to whether it was a private flight or a military flight or extraordinary renditions. Do you not think there is a CIA flight that was involved in the 1998 transfers a case for the UK to do that, and does the EU itself which I authorised and it is not relevant. The have a responsibility to investigate any breaches of question was the United States government human rights in its airspace or territory? understood that in using our airspace and our V Mr Straw: I cannot speak for what is happening in territory they needed our permission to e ect a Germany or other countries, and they must make transfer, so they sought it. their own judgments. There may have been calls for these, but I am unaware of any such investigation. I Q25 Mr Purchase: Secretary of State, three little do not think that there is any case whatsoever for subsets to this discussion. We have heard from a such an investigation here. Ming Campbell, a very number of bodies now who seem quite clear in their distinguished parliamentarian, asked me a question minds that there are torture camps across Eastern and I did what it is my duty to do, which is to provide Europe and perhaps elsewhere. Is there any evidence a thorough comprehensive answer. That has been that you have that such camps exist, has information done. It has produced a nil return. Unless we all start been passed to you which may be thought to have to believe in conspiracy theories and that the oYcials been obtained by methods of torture, and, finally, if are lying, that I am lying, that behind this there is such information was oVered, in whatever some kind of secret state which is in league with circumstances, what would be the response of the some dark forces in the United States, and also let British government? me say, we believe that Secretary Rice is lying, there Mr Straw: On your first, I have seen no evidence. I simply is no truth in the claims that the United understand, obviously, the concerns that are Kingdom has been involved in rendition full stop, around, but, first of all, there are no secret prisons in because we have not been, and so what on earth a the United Kingdom. Fortunately, I think that is an judicial inquiry would start to do I have no idea. I do allegation that has not yet been made but unless I not think it would be justified. While we are on this deny it it quite soon will be; so you got it first, this point, Chairman, can I say this? Some of the reports denial of an allegation that is yet to be made! But which are given credibility, including one this there are no secret prisons here. I have set out the morning on the Today programme, are in the realms position so far as the United Kingdom government of the fantastic. There was a report this morning on is concerned, we are not responsible for third the Today programme suggesting that intelligence countries, but let me also make it clear that Dr Rice staV from the United Kingdom have been involved in her letter to me set out the position—I assume you in interrogation and maltreatment of detainees in have seen the letter and the statement, it is a very Greece. Normally when you get allegations, detailed statement—and she says there that the however fantastical, we choose to neither confirm United States has respected and will continue to nor deny them because that is the only way you can respect the sovereignty of other countries. So, if the protect intelligence, but let me just say in respect of United States has entered into some agreement for 3335921001 Page Type [O] 20-07-06 01:49:03 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1
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13 December 2005 Rt Hon Jack Straw MP, Mr Tim Barrow and Mr David Frost facilities with a third country, it would be with the Mr Straw: Diego Garcia. full knowledge and understanding of that country. If you ask me whether they have, whether I have information that they have, the answer to that Q30 Mr Keetch: Diego Garcia or RAF Akrotiri in question is, “No”. Your other question related to. the southern base area of Cyprus? Mr Straw: The search was related to the UK mainland, all right, and the requests that I received Q26 Mr Purchase: No evidence of torture camps elsewhere? in 1998 related to the UK mainland. What I can say Mr Straw: None whatever. to you, and I will need to make some more enquiries and come back to this Committee about your question about Diego Garcia, not in relation to any Q27 Mr Purchase: None whatever? rendition but certainly in relation to other activities Mr Straw: On the undertakings that Secretary Rice based on Diego Garcia that United States has given, nor do they exist as far as the United government does seek our permission, but I cannot States is concerned. I think if someone of the give you a specific answer on that.1 position of Secretary Rice and her integrity makes statements like this they ought to be assumed to be correct. On the issue of obtaining evidence, Q31 Mr Keetch: Because your colleague Iain intelligence, by torture, the position has been set out Pearson told the Committee in answer to a question a number of times, but let me repeat it. We are from me two weeks ago that his definition when he against the use of torture. I am against the use of sought advice from his oYcials of UK territory and torture because it is torture and it is wholly immoral. airspace did include Diego Garcia, did include There is a subsidiary reason why I am against the use Akrotiri and, indeed, did include Gibraltar—I threw of torture, which is that evidence obtained under that one in as well—so it would be very helpful if we torture is much less likely to be reliable and that is could have that direct view, particularly, obviously, why British courts have always regarded evidence on Diego Garcia. obtained in that way, whether it is obtained under Mr Straw: Can I say that had the search thrown up torture or what is called duress, as unreliable, so we examples of requests, then, of course, I would have do not seek such evidence, we do not rely on it. I have reported them to the House via the answer to Ming never had piece of paper produced before me where Campbell, but you asked me a very specific question on the rubric it says, “We believe this has been about whether what I had in mind there was UK obtained under torture.” The other problem about mainland territory. torture is that those who commit the torture deny it to themselves as much as they deny it to other people, so to track it is very diYcult, but we are alive Q32 Mr Keetch: Perhaps we can clarify that. You are to those countries where we think malpractice of all absolutely certain that the accusations made in The kinds is used and we seek to deal with it. Times and elsewhere today that British MI6 agents have been involved in the torture of 28 Pakistani Q28 Mr Purchase: The third question, if such originated detainees in Greece, we can forget that as information was oVered? being complete nonsense, as you said? Mr Straw: It comes to this. First of all, I do not think Mr Straw: Yes. it ever will be oVered, because I think, if you go through the list of countries where we and America and other leading human rights NGOs believe that Q33 Mr Keetch: Excellent. Given that and given the the mistreatment of suspects takes place, I do not growing concerns—Mrs Osborne referred to the think you will find a single one of those countries inquiries in Canada, in Spain, in Italy—also given which says it does take place. All of us, and this the fact that even now in the House we have an All applies to everybody here in this room, I am quite Party Parliamentary Group set up on this subject, sure, if we were oVered a piece of intelligence which, and I cannot speak for the Committee, but if this for example, said there was going to be a terrorist Committee were to seek to investigate this issue of outrage tomorrow and it appeared to be credible, we extraordinary rendition, would you give us an would be duty bound to act on that regardless of the assurance that any oYcials in the FCO and any provenance of it. Everybody understands that. We agency that are responsible to the FCO would be have to do that. At the same time we have to take prepared to give evidence to this Committee, if account of our suspicions as to where it has come necessary in private, so that we could once and for from and not ever either to authorise the use of all allay the fears that are quite clearly in parliament torture in the obtaining of intelligence or to suggest and elsewhere? that we are somehow complicit or accommodating Mr Straw: Mr Keech, no, I would not, and I think to this, because we are not, and I am not. I am you understand very readily why not: because that is against it. getting into the territory of the Intelligence and Security Committee. Am I ready for an appropriate Q29 Mr Keetch: Foreign Secretary, can we be clear committee of parliamentarians to investigate such about your answer yesterday to my colleague, Sir allegations? Yes. I know this is delicate territory, but Ming Campbell, when you used the expression “UK you have one role and the ISC has another. territory and airspace”. 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Q34 Chairman: We will come back to this matter. bomb attack in America, which he denies. The Mr Straw: Let me say too, so far as individuals who question I want to put to you is when you gave believe that they have suVered wrong at the hands of the Committee an assurance a moment ago that the intelligence or security agencies are concerned, they British government was in no way complicit in have a statutory right to make a complaint to the the use of torture against people who are British relevant intelligence services commissioner, who are citizens, does that extend to not being complicit in senior judicial figures who will then investigate, and the activities of the intelligence agencies? that may be helpful to Mrs Osborne when she was Mr Straw: Look, let me just say this, and again I asking me about judicial inquiry and anybody who repeat the point. In normal circumstances, and we believes they have been wronged, including these cannot, nobody could in my position, give a running people who claim that they were ill-treated by British commentary even on very extreme and totally intelligence in Greece and feel that they can make untrue allegations, but in these two cases, because of that reference. the very fevered interest in these cases and the extent of the misinformation about them, I think it appropriate to do so, but I also preface that by Q35 Chairman: But given that we have signed the V Geneva Convention, given that we have signed saying that if Mr Sta ord Smith wants to on behalf of his client, he is fully entitled to ask the Intelligence conventions against torture in 1948, 1966, 1950 and V 1984, you would confirm that any British oYcial Services Commission to investigate this and to o er employed by her Majesty’s Government in any sense whatever evidence he has. The situation is this. Mr involved in this practice or involved in the kind of al-Habashi was interviewed once by a member of the action we are talking about in terms of rendition UK Security Service while he was in detention in might well be in contradiction of the Geneva Karachi in 2002. The Security Service had no role in Convention and those other conventions we have his capture or in his transfer from Pakistan. The signed? Intelligence and Security Committee report into the Mr Straw: Plainly torture is illegal, complicity in handling of detainees by UK intelligence personnel gave details of the guidance under which such torture is also illegal—it is illegal under our law and Y under international law—and so, if anybody were interviews were conducted, and the service o cer involved, they would be committing a criminal did not observe any abuse and no instances of abuse oVence; but let us just come back to the reality of the were reported to him by Mr Habashi. I hope that way in which our intelligence and security agencies is helpful. operate. They do not do this. I have been responsible for one or other of the three intelligence and security Q37 Sir John Stanley: It is helpful. It does not agency services over the last eight and a half years, answer the question was Mr Habashi handed over Home Secretary, Foreign Secretary, and I have deliberately by the British intelligence services to never ever seen an allegation of this kind, but if there the CIA? are allegations, of course they would be investigated, Mr Straw: I have just read out, Sir John, “The and there is appropriate parliamentary oversight of service had no role in his capture or transfer from the intelligence and security services as well. Pakistan.”
Q38 Sir John Stanley: That is a diVerent question? Q36 Sir John Stanley: Foreign Secretary, you will be Mr Straw: I do not think it is; that is the same aware from the extensive coverage which this question. particular allegation has had in a number of newspapers that a UK civil rights lawyer, Mr Clive StaVord Smith, has produced a dossier of papers, if Q39 Sir John Stanley: Can you clarify it: no role in I can use that word in this committee, on behalf of his transfer to Pakistan? Mr Straw: From Pakistan. his client, Mr Benyam Mohammed al-Habashi. You said to the Committee a moment ago that the British government was in no way complicit in the use of Q40 Sir John Stanley: From Pakistan. torture as far as any individual is concerned. You Mr Straw: It is what you asked me. will be aware that in these allegations Mr Habashi has alleged that MI6 handed him over to the CIA, Q41 Sir John Stanley: No, I am sorry, the allegation Mr Habashi describes an account of someone he is that he was handed over to the CIA in Pakistan. believes to be an MI6 oYcer and details the horror Mr Straw: I know nothing about it. of his torture. Mr Habashi says the oYcer told him: “I will see what we can do with the Americans.” Q42 Sir John Stanley: Could you clarify that in a “They gave me a cup of tea with a lot sugar in it. He further letter to the Committee? said, ‘Where you are going you will need a lot of Mr Straw: I may or may not is the answer, because sugar’”, and he went on to say that he was I think basically these are matters for investigation interrogated for 18 months in a Moroccan prison, by the ISC.2 had his penis cut with a scalpel; he also claims he was chained to a wall for days, chained to the floor in a Q43 Sir John Stanley: I think it is very relevant to the pitch dark cell in Kabul and turned into a heroin broad policy point which is wholly within the remit addict. I should add that it is also alleged that the of this Committee. We are simply asking whether Americans take the view, which I believe he denies, that he is involved in some way in planning a dirty 2 Ev 19 3335921001 Page Type [O] 20-07-06 01:49:03 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1
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13 December 2005 Rt Hon Jack Straw MP, Mr Tim Barrow and Mr David Frost you have knowledge that MI6 were aware of this made it absolutely clear that the prohibition against particular case. The question I am putting to you is: United States personnel being involved in torture Was he handed over in Pakistan to the CIA? not only applied within the United States but across Mr Straw: As I say, I will consider your question and the rest of the world as well. She was absolutely oVer a reply. explicit about this. She provided that clarification when she was in Kiev last Wednesday morning. Our Q44 Mr Illsley: Given that Condoleezza Rice has position is the overriding moral position that torture stated that America does use rendition, and some is wrong. Leaving aside any international other countries actually use rendition, will we now obligations we are under, I have made that position insist on records of flights in and out of this country clear. Secondly, however, there is the Convention which are taking part in rendition and will we allow Against Torture. We apply it to its letter and its this to continue? spirit. Mr Straw: First of all, other countries do. That is pointed out in Condoleezza Rice’s statement, and Q47 Richard Younger-Ross: I ask you the question this includes France which has used this practice. If because if next week you had a communication from it is lawful, and it happens not to be lawful in this the US saying that they wished to transfer someone country—Sir John will remember when that was through the UK, at the moment, our ground would established—it was as a result of a decision which be if they are substantial they would not be followed an arrest in Zambia of a Provisional IRA transferred, but the US definition seems to be that it suspect called Mullen in 1988 where there was a is more than likely not to occur. transfer from that country by arrangement with the Mr Straw: The judgment on that particular issue local authorities which by-passed the extradition would be based on the way we treat it. When I arrangements and Mullen spent ten years in prison, looked at these cases seven years ago, that was how properly convicted, but later, when information you judged this. Anybody making a decision, being came out about the circumstances in which the placed in the position of the Home Secretary or the transfer took place, the Court of Appeal, in 1999, Foreign Secretary where the UK government is decided to overturn his conviction on the grounds of asked for its permission, has to apply himself or abuse of the process, and that decision in the Court herself on the basis of UK law. That of course of Appeal established the parameters of what we call includes considerations about Article 3 of the “rendition” in UK law, but it could be lawful here if European Convention on Human Rights and what Parliament so decided. There is nothing in is in the jurisprudence of the 1996 Jahal case from international law which says that transfers between the European Court of Human Rights. Whatever two countries which, provided they meet other position the United States took about it, about standards of human rights and treatment, are whether it was substantial risk, real risk or a higher unlawful. On the issue of flights, Mr Illsley, your probability than not, we would apply ourselves on question pre-supposes that there are scores and the basis of UK law which is very careful indeed, scores and scores of people being transferred properly, not to allow for anybody to be transferred through the UK without proper extradition or where there is a real risk of torture. rendition. I have sought to answer that. Q48 Richard Younger-Ross: There are countries Q45 Mr Illsley: Some. where we have an agreement now, where we can Mr Straw: When we are moving around the world in deport people, where we have an understanding they military planes and in private planes we are not will not be tortured. Will we assume that the required by our allies to give a lot of detail about understanding would apply to American transfers to what is happening on those planes or the purpose, that country or not? because these are normal facilitations of flights and Mr Straw: These agreements are specific. They I do not think there is a case for changing that. The concern countries where there has been concern in Committee can propose it and we can consider it, the past about their treatment of prisoners. It may but I have seen no paper suggesting there is a case for have been torture; it may have been ill treatment. changing it. Under these agreements, we gave specific undertakings in respect of the specific prisoners who Q46 Richard Younger-Ross: You were very clear in would be transferred. Were it to be the case that we your answer to my colleague, Paul Keetch, in were invited to agree to a facilitation of a transfer to regarding complicity as an oVence as much as a Third country whose human rights record was torture. The US seem to have changed the definition questionable, the law applies in the same way as it of what is a risk and international law, I understand, does in respect of a transfer or deportation of a says that you shall not transfer someone to a country prisoner. If it is our responsibility, it is our where there is a substantial ground to believe that responsibility. The fact that there was an MOU in there is torture. Can you say whether you support respect of asylum deportees or prisoners who had that as the correct definition? been subject to a deportation order would have some Mr Straw: If you want to ask the United States relevance in the case but it would very much depend government questions, ask them. I am responsible on what the MOU said and what undertakings you for our practice here. I thought Secretary Rice’s could gain in respect of that particular transferee. I statement, however, was very comprehensive and I think it is pretty academic, by the way, but if it were invite you to read it. It sets out the position. She to happen that would be the situation. 3335921001 Page Type [E] 20-07-06 01:49:03 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1
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Q49 Andrew Mackinlay: When you were Home Mr Straw: I think I know what you are talking Secretary the requests came under the auspices of the about. I do not think either would be described as Justice Department, I assume, and certainly not the torture. I think it is about unfair treatment, less than CIA, so I do not think we are necessarily comparing torture. It is certainly the case that we pride like with like. I do feel that all of us, journalists and ourselves in this country in being punctilious in the politicians, are conflating two things. People who way in which we treat suspects and rightly so. I can are being transferred on a Gulfstream jet are not get you a note on this.3 necessarily going for torture. There could be torture without travelling on a Gulfstream aeroplane. Q52 Chairman: It would be very important for Richard Younger-Ross earlier asked you about clarification. Can we move on to issues relating to private flights and just a few moments ago you the European Union and other areas? Can you say volunteered the fact that we do not know, because something about the progress made with regard to that is the international arrangement, who is being the counter-terrorism strategy? What is that likely to moved in private jets. I put it to you that this is the include when it is agreed? great problem you and we have and maybe even Mr Straw: There was an extraordinary JHA Council Condoleezza Rice has. If I am an intelligence agency on 12 July at which it was agreed to accelerate in the United States or whatever, if I transfer people implementation of the EU action plan for in “private jets” I can do that without presumably combating terrorism which had been first agreed much more reference in their administrations. after the Madrid bombings. At the JHA Council on United Kingdom authorities do not know. That is 1 and 2 September, a new EU counter-terrorism the way I understood your evidence a few moments strategy set out common division for counter ago. You were saying, “If it is a private jet, we do terrorism work, identified specific priorities, and it is not know.” a framework for policy and work for the future. It Mr Straw: What I was saying was that, as a matter adopted a common position on the Data Retention of routine when we are travelling, the UK moves its Directive which we believe will pass its first reading RAF transport aircraft around the world. These are in the European Parliament tomorrow, a new not the subject of detailed scrutiny by the local strategy for combating radicalisation and authorities concerned. Indeed, since I travel on RAF recruitment, a report on the EU crisis coordination planes, I can confirm that when we are refuelling in arrangements, principles for protecting critical Bari in Italy, which we sometimes do, the local infrastructure, an evaluation of national counter- authorities do not come on board because terrorism arrangements and a measure to improve maintaining the integrity of the planes is very exchange of law enforcement information. important. There are military policemen on the planes to ensure that. That practice applies, for Q53 Chairman: Does that also have implications for example, for all our members of NATO. I think it is the external relations of the European Union or is part of the arrangements of NATO. That does not that separate? mean that there is carte blanche for a private plane Mr Straw: It is separate really. A lot of our external hired in by a government that is a member of NATO relations have implications for the fight against to undertake activities which require the permission terrorism, of course. of the domestic government but to avoid that permission. I go back to the answers I gave earlier. The answer I gave to Menzies Campbell could not Q54 Chairman: Was there not discussion also of have been more comprehensive than it was. Coupled developing a counter-terrorism strategy with regard with the assurances from Condoleezza Rice, I to the external relations? believe it is extremely improbable that any such Mr Straw: At Barcelona we agreed. A very flights have taken place through United Kingdom important product of the Barcelona European airspace or landing in British airports. If you are agreement was the statement on terrorism. For the asking me to prove a negative, none of us can prove first time ever, the Arab states and Israel agreed to negatives. That is the nature of life. If you are asking counter terrorism, full stop. There was none of the me to make assessments of the world in which we usual equivocation that we have seen. Secondly, an live, I have done that. action plan was agreed.
Q55 Chairman: Is that the responsibility of the Q50 Chairman: We have been using the word V Commission under its 2006 programme or is it “torture” here. It is said that we have a di erent view something which is being pursued within the in this country about rendition to the United States. V Council of Ministers with Mr Solana? Do we have a di erent definition of torture? Mr Frost: There has been some work done during Mr Straw: No. “Torture” is clearly defined. There is our presidency and beforehand on the external also cruel and unusual punishment and general ill aspects of JHA which go much wider than just treatment. counter-terrorism. For example, the migration papers which come to this European Council. There Q51 Chairman: It has been reported that certain is an external angle, in a way, to a good deal of justice activities are permissible in the United States in and home aVairs work. As to who is responsible, it interrogations which are not permissible in our depends on the particular bit of business you are definitions because the things done by the US are not defined by them as being torture. 3 Ev 20 3335921001 Page Type [O] 20-07-06 01:49:03 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1
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13 December 2005 Rt Hon Jack Straw MP, Mr Tim Barrow and Mr David Frost talking about, whether it is the Council, the possible plan to allow Russia to conduct low grade Commission, how the Parliament is involved and enrichment of uranium been accepted by Iran? Will so on. that go forward? Mr Straw: That particular plan has not been accepted by the Iranians but nor has it been rejected. Q56 Andrew Mackinlay: I understand the European It is one of the possibilities on the table. In the Union has a list of products which require export September board, Iran was declared non-compliant licences. It has been put to me that this is flawed with its safeguard obligations in a number of because it has a catch all phrase which says, “If the respects. That was by a larger margin than we had things are not listed above, there is a burden on anticipated. It was 22 of the 35 members of the board exporters to flag this up with the authorities.” It has of governors. There was a further report from Dr been put to me that that is wholly unsatisfactory ElBaradei at the meeting on 24 November. No because it puts the burden on people who are resolution was taken. We listened very carefully to exporting and there is disparity within the European what Dr ElBaradei and others had proposed which Union, partly because of this ambiguity. Is this a is that the Iranians should be given a further period big lacuna? of time to bring themselves into compliance. As Dr Mr Straw: Are you talking about dual use products? ElBaradei said in interviews which he did at the time of his installation for the Peace Prize, what that does Q57 Andrew Mackinlay: Yes. is give Iran and the E3 until March hopefully to Mr Straw: I am not aware of it being a great lacuna. reach some agreement because the next meeting of We have the EU common position on arms control the board will be in March. That is the procedural and that sets out a series of common criteria. I think situation. There was a lot of hope after that there are eight. We have all signed up to that and we agreement which we reached on 21 October 2003 in all apply it. There are ways in which the procedure Tehran and that continued through last year when could be improved. At the moment, if say we receive we got the Paris agreement made in November and an application for an arms control licence and we even ran through to the meeting in Geneva that was refuse it, we are under an obligation to tell our held at the end of May of this year. Since then there partners we have refused it but we are not under a has been no action. There is a new president, a new corresponding obligation to our partners when we government and they have taken a diVerent agree it. When the debate about the lifting of the approach to these negotiations whilst at the same China arms embargo was more current, we time saying that they are not developing a nuclear proposed that there ought to be symmetry here so weapon system and they will be compliant. Also, the that there was a much better sharing of information personalities have changed. Dr Rajani, who was and other improvements in the way the arms control head of the National Security Council, has been system operates. I am not aware of that. replaced by Mr Larijani. Meanwhile on 2 August, the day before Mahmoud Ahmadinejad formally took oYce, the government announced that it was Q58 Sir John Stanley: Has your department sought restarting conversion at Isfahan which we regret and any information from other EU Member States as to deplore. What I hope will happen is that the Iranians the existing legislation in their countries as to the will make use of this opportunity that they have. maximum period of days people can be detained on They have sought a delay. That has been granted but suspicion of terrorism—in other words comparable it is very important for them to understand that the to the debate we have been having in this country international community has a very clear red line over the 90 days? Have you sought comparative and that is the restarting of enrichment or related information from other countries? activities. We have made it clear time and time again Mr Straw: Yes, and I published it to Parliament that Iran, like any other signatory to the Non- going on six or seven weeks ago or maybe earlier. Y Proliferation Treaty, has every right to develop O cials both in London and in posts did a great deal nuclear power plants but also, like every non- of work on this and I published it as a command nuclear weapon state which is all but five of the paper. signatories to the NPT, they are under very explicit obligations under Article 2 of the Non-Proliferation Q59 Sir John Stanley: Have you sought information Treaty not to do anything which could lead to the about any Europol view on that particular point? development of a capability towards nuclear Mr Straw: I have not but it would be a matter for the weapons. They have been found non-compliant with Home Secretary anyway. safeguard agreements which relate to those obligations. It is very important that they bring themselves back into compliance. If they were to Q60 Mr Illsley: It is just over two years now since restart enrichment, they would place themselves in you led the E3 mission to Tehran when this very serious diYculties. Committee was in that city on a visit to begin this process of dialogue on Iran’s nuclear programme. Since then, Iran’s stance has hardened somewhat Q61 Mr Illsley: Is there any realistic prospect of Iran and it has been revealed that they perhaps did have coming back into compliance? the technology to begin enriching uranium. Could Mr Straw: I hope so. We are trying to assist them to you tell us what the current situation is with regard do so. They say that they wish to be compliant with to that? Have the negotiations with Russia on the the NPT. That is good. They also say that they are 3335921001 Page Type [E] 20-07-06 01:49:03 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1
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13 December 2005 Rt Hon Jack Straw MP, Mr Tim Barrow and Mr David Frost not developing a nuclear weapon system and that is radically aVect the balance of power within the not the purpose of their fuel cycle. What we are Middle East and more widely and could well lead to seeking to do is to provide the Iranian Government some Arab states deciding it was necessary for them with a reassurance about its nuclear power to develop nuclear weapons. We could see a cycle of programme in a way that provides objective proliferation. My private conversations with people guarantees to the rest of the world that it is indeed across the Arab world do not suggest that they are the case that they are not developing a nuclear relaxed about the idea of Iran being a nuclear weapons capability. weapon state.
Q62 Mr Hamilton: A few week ago, as you know, Q63 Mr Hamilton: I do not think they are for one this Committee went to Israel and to Saudi Arabia. minute. What we heard from the Saudis was that I was on the Saudi Arabian leg of the trip but before they were extremely concerned but you could not that I was on a private visit to Israel where I met a answer the question which they put to us which was, senior military intelligence source who expressed “You let the Israelis develop these nuclear weapons very deep concern about what was going on in Iran so why should not the Iranians?” and expressed the view that the Israeli Government Mr Straw: Not us principally. The technology came was quite content with the Iranians developing, as from the French. First of all, the Non-Proliferation you have quite rightly said, nuclear power for Treaty separates states into nuclear weapon states peaceful use but was very worried about their secret and non-nuclear weapon states. I do not regard that plans for enrichment. That may be an expected as hypocritical. It was part of a real eVort made in response from the Israeli Government but when we the late 1960s to stop the proliferation of nuclear were in Saudi Arabia and we asked our interlocutors weapons. President Kennedy made a speech in there what their view was, knowing that relations 1960–61 saying that if we go on as we are there will between Saudi Arabia and Iran are not particularly be 20 or 30 countries with nuclear weapon systems brilliant, about the possibility of weaponised by the end of the century. Everybody recognised that uranium/plutonium and therefore the development this could lead to the destruction of the planet. What of a weapons programme by the Iranians, their view was eVected by the NPT was a deal between the five was, firstly, the United Kingdom has nuclear permanent members of the Security Council who weapons so who are you to tell people to stop each happened to have or have had nuclear weapon producing nuclear weapons and, secondly, you did systems and the rest of the world, in which the not stop Israel. How do we respond to that? Your bargain was that no other country would develop trip two years with the foreign ministers of Germany nuclear weapon systems. It was not in their interests and France was widely praised. What more can you to do so. At the same time, every country had a right do as part of the European Union, the tripartite to develop or to run nuclear power plants and the group of three, to carry on that dialogue and stop the nuclear weapon states would seek to facilitate that development without appearing to be hypocritical to without running against the obligations that non- the rest of the world? nuclear weapon states had not to develop nuclear Mr Straw: We are carrying on the dialogue. There weapon systems. That is the bargain and it is one were meetings held at the United Nations General that, on the whole, has worked. The three countries Assembly at the end of September with Mr Larijani which have nuclear weapon systems, India, Pakistan and President Ahmadinejad. I put out feelers to and Israel, are not signatories to the NPT. In respect them in advance of that and we hope that there will of all three of them, we wish them to become be scope of a restart of formal negotiations but there members of the NPT. As far as Israel is concerned, have to be negotiations about something. The what we also want to see is a nuclear free Middle Iranians signed up to the Paris agreement which they East. We are making progress on that. There were a subsequently broke. That is the problem we have. few years ago four states who, it was thought, had The only way in which Iran will be able to come back nuclear weapons capabilities at various stages of into compliance and see a pathway in which over advancement: Libya, Iraq, Iran and Israel. Two of time their relationship with all the rest of the world, those have gone, Iraq following the Gulf War and including the United States, can be normalised, in Libya as a direct result of US and UK secret my judgment, is through this process. There is no diplomacy. People forget this but it was not a other process on oVer. One of the things we have coincidence that we had indications of earnest been able to achieve in the last two years, although intentions from the Libyans that they wished to we are responsible, the E3 and the EU alone, for the negotiate with us on 18 March 2003, having had a policy decisions we make about the negotiations, is series of shadow negotiations before that. We were that we have had benign support for our position able to conclude those negotiations on 19 December both from the United States and from the Russian 2003. They have abandoned their nuclear weapons federation and China. We are grateful to them for programme, which was more advanced than we had that. They will make their own judgments at each thought, lock, stock and barrel. You have Iran stage about what we are doing. I note what you which I have dealt with and you have Israel. It is for report about the reaction of the Saudi Government Israel to defend its decisions, not for me, but Israel but one of the reasons why it is so important to get is the only state in the world whose very existence is these objective guarantees that Iran is not aggressively denied by some of its neighbours. developing a nuclear weapons system is because, if Gradually some of the Arab states are coming round Iran did have a nuclear weapons system, this would and recognising they have to co-exist with Israel but 3335921001 Page Type [O] 20-07-06 01:49:03 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1
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13 December 2005 Rt Hon Jack Straw MP, Mr Tim Barrow and Mr David Frost
Iran does not and we all know what President Court summit which took place at the end of Ahmadinejad said of Israel, that it should be wiped October was to do that. It is perfectly obvious that oV the face of the map. I look forward to a situation there was a decreasing appetite for major where Iran’s relations with the rest of the world are constitutional change inside the European Union. normalised. We are satisfied through objective What we need to do is to concentrate on delivering guarantees that Iran has no nuclear weapons tangible changes through those real benefits to our capability or intentions and Iran recognises Israel’s citizens. I also happen to think, by the way, there are right to exist and to exist in peace and security. When some modest changes in the governance of the we get there, all of us can exert the strongest possible European Union which we will need to agree, but pressure on Israel not to continue with a nuclear some of this might be able to be agreed without big weapon system, but we have to get there first. treaty changes.
Q64 Sir John Stanley: From what we read, the Q67 Chairman: Some aspects of the Constitution Americans appear to be going down the policy route will go ahead, even though it was rejected? of saying that the Iranians may be able to have Mr Straw: Not necessarily, but things like how the enrichment provided the enrichment is carried out presidencies are run, which do not require by the Russians. Does the British Government constitutional change, do require changes agreed by support that policy and, if so, could you explain the Council. Some may require treaty changes. We why? Mr Straw: You would have to ask the American will have to wait and see what the appetite is for that. Government their position. From recollection, I do not think that is a full statement of their position. We Q68 Chairman: There have been a number of have supported ideas such as the Russian proposal changes in governments recently. How do you see for a joint venture in uranium enrichment outside the German Government’s position changing as a Iran. It goes without saying that if countries have a result of Chancellor Merkel? right to run a nuclear power plant obviously they Mr Straw: In respect of what? have to have fuel to run it. The issue here in respect of Iran is not whether they have fuel but who produces the fuel and with what safeguards. We are Q69 Chairman: Their attitude to the European very benign towards the Russian proposal and Union. believe that such ideas could be important elements Mr Straw: There is a very wide consensus in in any solution. What I do not want to do is get Germany towards the European Union. After all, involved in detailed negotiations about, “If the Germany was one of the founder members and sees Iranians say this, will you say that?” because that is its security and prosperity inextricably linked to not the way to conduct a negotiation, but I think we membership of the European Union. That will not are all clear about the overall objective. change. They were strong supporters of the Constitutional Treaty. You now have a grand Q65 Mr Purchase: I was interested in the defence of coalition led by a Christian Democrat Chancellor Israel in possessing nuclear weapons, that they were but with many of the senior members of the Cabinet threatened with their own existence as it were. That, drawn from the Social Democrats. That is obviously I assume, is a general principle and may be adopted going to change the mix. by the Ethiopians or the Eritreans? Mr Straw: It is for them to defend it. I am just V Q70 Chairman: What about Poland? Do you have o ering that if you talk to the Israelis that is the any view about the new Polish Government? explanation they will give. I oVer that as an Mr Straw: It is our job to relate to whichever explanation of the position. Everybody in the government is in power so I tend not to oVer views Middle East understands that full well. We have no about governments publicly. I think it would be very interest in seeing the proliferation of nuclear unwise to do so. The great thing about members of weapons. the European Union is that they are all democracies. It is for their electorates to elect governments, for us Q66 Chairman: We have a number of questions to respect that choice and to relate to those elected relating to the future of the European Union. We are governments. supposed to be in a period of reflection. Can you tell us what has been achieved in this period of reflection? Q71 Richard Younger-Ross: There are two countries Mr Straw: The period of reflection was a term of art which are due to join the EU in just over a year’s developed after the diYculties which the European time, Romania and Bulgaria. The European Union ran into in respect of the ratification of the Scrutiny Committee visited Bulgaria last week as EU treaties. Part of that period of reflection has led well as Austria and Turkey. I will be very careful not to an almost unspoken consensus that the European to tread on their privileges over what was said on Union Constitutional Treaty is not going to run for those visits. However, on visiting Bulgaria, it is very a long period, so it has been put on the back burner, clear that there is still a lot to be done. The roads are but there is other work going on about trying to steer very uneven and the houses are in poor condition. the European Union in the right direction in Do you believe that Bulgaria and Romania will practical terms. Part of the purpose of the Hampton make the grade by 2007? 3335921001 Page Type [E] 20-07-06 01:49:03 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1
Ev 16 Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence
13 December 2005 Rt Hon Jack Straw MP, Mr Tim Barrow and Mr David Frost
Mr Straw: I think they will. I think they understand Q74 Richard Younger-Ross: Policing of that is the importance of making very significant progress crucial. over the next 13 months and their governments Mr Barrow: Yes. One of the areas in which there is understand that, but it is up to them. If they do not, work on capacity building and putting in place it would be sad because their membership would be eVective, modern systems is border management just delayed. There was a brief exchange about this like others use with regard to Romania. yesterday between the Commission and members of the Council. Commissioner Olli Rehn, who is the Commissioner for enlargement, is very clear about Q75 Mr Purchase: I want to get to the principles of the need for the Commission to be objective in its enlargement again and tie that in with our current analysis about progress. It is because of the rigour of thoughts and negotiations on budgets. Do the two Commissioner Rehn and his colleagues that we have things cause some diYculties, particularly in the had the reports which have said, “Hang on, progress messages that are going out to Bulgaria, Romania is not going as quickly as it should” and if they feel and other applicants? it necessary they will produce further reports. Mr Straw: One of the reasons why there is pressure on the budget is because of enlargement. You call it diYculties; I call it consequences. We agreed with Q72 Richard Younger-Ross: If they fail for 1 January enlargement. We were in the vanguard for calling for 2007, it is automatic that on 1 January 2008 they will enlargement, all parties. Enlargement has to be paid join. They are obviously making strides and putting for. If we want these countries fully to transform and V a lot of e ort into complying at the moment. How become full members of the European Union with would you keep that pressure up during 2007 if they good, liberal economies and stable societies, we need do not make it by 1 January? to help them invest in their countries and we need Mr Straw: The pressure on them will be very intense. to do essentially in the accession 10 countries, I understand what you are saying about the default particularly the eight former Soviet countries, what setting but I think it would still be open to the the European Union has done very successfully, for Council to say no if they thought something terrible example, in Spain, Portugal and Ireland. We have to had happened. spend a bit but we get much more back and I am sure Mr Barrow: Although it would go forward in terms you do not disagree. of 2008, there are transition periods, safeguards and other things which could be put in place. At the moment, there is a ratification process going Q76 Mr Purchase: I do not disagree but I wonder forward with regard to the treaties with Bulgaria and why we are making all the fuss now. Romania. That is still happening in this country and Mr Straw: There has never been any disagreement others, has not yet been completed and until that is about this across the political divide either. The fact completed and everybody has signed oV on that it is of enlargement is a pressure. There are some still in doubt. I do not think that Bulgaria and countries which are looking further down the track, Romania are feeling a diminution of pressure at the not to the next financial perspective but the one after moment or up to the point when they accede. that and the one after that, to the possibility of Turkey coming into membership of the European Union, saying that unless we pin down every Q73 Richard Younger-Ross: Moving on to mechanism we will have to go slow on Turkey. That Romania, Moldovans at the moment do not require is certainly not our position. a visa to travel, just a passport. They are looking for visa-free travel into Romania after accession. Moldova is known as a centre for people smuggling. Q77 Andrew Mackinlay: The French have indicated How will the EU restrict policing of the Romania’s to you about Macedonia. border with Moldova after accession? Mr Straw: There was discussion yesterday on Mr Barrow: The situation with regard to Moldova is Macedonia. The French Government’s position was exacerbated by the position of Transnica and the EU that they looked forward to the day when is already taking a greater role with regard to that Macedonia was a member of the European Union issue through the special representative and through but also said that they were not willing, as of the newly published border mission on the Ukraine/ yesterday, to ordain Macedonia as a candidate Transnica border. With regard to visas, when country. That is going to the European Council on Romania enters, it is my understanding that visa Thursday but there may or may not be a decision travel will change with regard to Moldovans, there. certainly with regard to Schengen accession. We have already seen that in the last wave of membership there have been changes in the Q78 Mr Purchase: It surprises me that we are relationship between some of the newly acceding making such a fuss at the present time. states and their neighbours on visas and sometimes Mr Straw: Who is making a fuss? this can cause diYculties, but it is a consequence of joining that you have to take on board the acquis across the board. My understanding is that would Q79 Mr Purchase: We are. include visas. Mr Straw: Who is “we”? 3335921001 Page Type [O] 20-07-06 01:49:03 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1
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13 December 2005 Rt Hon Jack Straw MP, Mr Tim Barrow and Mr David Frost
Q80 Mr Purchase: Britain. 3 October for Turkey to join. I regard that as one of Mr Straw: About? the best things we have done in our presidency. It took a huge amount of eVort but we got there in the small hours of 4 October. One of the things I said to Q81 Mr Purchase: About the budget negotiations our Cypriot colleagues was that, if they ever wanted and the consequences of enlargement. Surely we there to be a united Cyprus, they had to make it knew these things? possible for Turkey to come into the European Mr Straw: We are not making a fuss but we are right Union because unless they did so the island of to call for budgetary restraint. We did so in company Cyprus would remain divided and Turkey would with five other Member States. We want to see real carry on with some thousands of troops on the island investment in the infrastructures of the new and there would be no resolution of the disputes and accession ten countries. We also want to see reform, so on. The Republic of Cyprus representing these particularly of the Common Agricultural Policy and days the Greek Cypriot community understood other wasteful policies. Our judgment is you can get that, although it is quite hard for them because they the investment through structural and cohesion meanwhile have some arguments with the Turkish funds in the A10 and you can increase the pressure Cypriots and with Turkey. The Republic of Greece however had a clearer strategic sense about this all for reform within the budget in the ballpark of the the way through. That is the first thing we have been one that we have set. If we had agreed to a very much doing for the resolution of the Cyprus issue. The higher budget we might have achieved the first progress in terms of meeting the requirements of objective but not the second. Moreover, since there Security Council resolution 1250 and others which is such an imbalance in the net position of otherwise set in train the good oYces of the Secretary General similar countries inside the European Union, this otherwise has been limited in the last six months. would have increased costs to a relatively small Instead, the situation has become bogged down on number of Member States, including Sweden, the some other dossier, particularly on the aid and trade Netherlands, Germany and ourselves. regulations. I am very anxious to see progress resume but it is not going to happen before Christmas. Q82 Mr Horam: You are therefore saying that there is an increasing financial restraint on the speed of enlargement? Q84 Richard Younger-Ross: There are cases like Mr Straw: No, I am not. I do not believe that to be Orhan Pamuk who is being tried for being insulting the case. There are some who are saying that but it to Turkishness because he stated that Turkey had in is not us at all. We have been in the vanguard of the past happened to kill a few Kurds and a few pushing for enlargement. I remember the Prime Armenians. We would probably take that as a Minister making a speech in Warsaw in 2000, calling statement of fact but the Turks have not. The EU for a firm decision on enlargement in 2002 with a Commission believes that if the laws governing this view to accession in 2004. Some people thought that are interpreted so strictly at the moment then those he was being unrealistic but that was his position. It laws need to be revised. The Turkish justification is to say that in the UK or in other parts of Europe they was the position of my predecessor, the late Robin have equally restrictive laws. Do you see a way of Cook, and they were right about this and rather going forward, helping Turkey through that process visionary. With luck, we will see the same happening of reviewing its regulation on human rights, being in respect of the other states in the Western Balkans aware that they think we are setting the hurdles and with Turkey. All of us in Europe have a big, higher for them than anyone else? strategic choice: do we want these countries in the Mr Straw: Yes. They have to meet clear human Western Balkans with their chequered and violent rights standards and they understand that. I think past? Do we separately want Turkey in its strategic they also understand that the prosecution of people position to come towards Europe or to go away like Orhan Pamuk has been very embarrassing, to from it? put it at its least. I understand that Abdullah Gul, the Turkish Foreign Minister, said publicly that he expects the courts to clear Mr Pamuk. Mr Pamuk Q83 Richard Younger-Ross: One of the successes has also said that he does not want his case to be used which I am sure the government is planning for its as a reason to delay the progress on Turkey’s presidency will be progress on Turkey. There is a accession. As you have said, the Commission said long way to go and a lot of questions but the Turks that if the Turkish penal code continues to be are singing Britain’s praises for all we have done to interpreted in a restrictive manner it may need to be support them. However, there are two key issues— amended in order to safeguard freedom of one is Cyprus and one is human rights—which need expression in Turkey. I think that will be true but to be resolved. On the first one, are you able to say this is a situation which can evolve over time. In the what progress has been made under the UK four and a half years that I have been doing this job, presidency towards resolution of the Cyprus Turkey has changed dramatically in terms of its problem? human rights record and much else besides. Even Mr Straw: On Cyprus, what I did with colleagues four and a half years ago it was a country where it was to ensure that there was a satisfactory outcome would be hard to say that it was fully democratic. It in respect of the negotiations for a start to be set of has made a lot of progress since then. It is interesting 3335921001 Page Type [E] 20-07-06 01:49:03 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1
Ev 18 Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence
13 December 2005 Rt Hon Jack Straw MP, Mr Tim Barrow and Mr David Frost in my view that although the party of government, You will see our views in the debate we had in the AKP, is a secular party it is the one which gives Westminster Hall last week, of extreme depression the greatest respect to Islam of all the mainstream as to the ever growing extent to which fundamental political parties in Turkey. rights of Palestinians are being violated on a daily basis. We all totally understand the security Q85 Chairman: Can I take you to an issue which was dimension and we totally respect and support quite controversial a few months ago, before the Israel’s right to take proper measures within its own British presidency? It seems to have gone very quiet. boundaries to protect its people. Given the ever It is the question about relations with China in growing degree of chronic and in some cases regard to the lifting of the EU arms embargo. Could catastrophic disruption of the ordinary daily lives of you update us on whether there are plans to revisit Palestinians, is the British Government going to do that? anything with its EU partners to not merely Mr Straw: It has gone quiet because there is not a lot remonstrate but take some specific action to ensure to report on it. It is raised by the Chinese that the Israeli Government gives a higher priority to Government and in various bilateral and allowing the Palestinians to emerge as a viable state, multilateral fora. There is at the moment no which is our policy, and also to reduce the degree of consensus for lifting the embargo. We have also chronic, catastrophic disruption of the every day collectively in the European Union explained to our lives of Palestinians? Chinese colleagues that although they resist the Mr Straw: Yes, and we have made very positive notion of a linkage between the arms embargo and progress on this. I know the situation is terrible in human rights—I understand why they say that—at many parts of the West Bank. I have seen it myself. the same time there is in people’s minds a linkage of It is also terrible for many Israelis because of the these two. In national parliaments and the European gratuitous terrorism which they have suVered. It is Parliament it is there and if they were to make moves the terrorism, I am afraid, which is the mother and towards ratifying various international instruments father of the fear, deprivation and everything else which they have signed or said they have approved which is suVered by the Palestinians and by the and make other moves, that would maybe ease the Israelis. What have we done? What we have done— overall political environment in which there could be discussion about the lifting of the arms embargo. and this is a dramatic change in terms of the position of the European Union, even in the space of a year— is, alongside the United States almost as equal Q86 Chairman: We visited Israel, Gaza and the West partners, we have helped to facilitate the beginnings Bank two weeks ago and we saw the very positive of the transformation of Gaza from being an work being done by the carabinieri and Danish and occupied territory, occupied by Israel, to being what Romanian people with them in Rafah. Those of us amounted almost to a prison, now to opening its who went to Rafah were very impressed by the way that was being dealt with. The people there were of borders with Egypt through Rafah and more and extremely high quality. There have however been more with Israel and then building up its economy. some suggestions of diYculty since then with regard The ties into the Wolfeson plan. That change is to the reaction of the Israelis to what has been going extraordinary. I have always believed that you have on at that crossing point. How do you see the EU’s to start somewhere with this vision of a separate and assessment of what has been going on? In the context viable state of Palestine. You have to give the of the discussion within the European Union Palestinians the opportunity to prove that they can Council about what has been going on with regard run part of their state and give them the support to to Israel and the Palestinians, could you give us a do so. That is exactly what we are doing and, bit by brief assessment of how you see this being taken bit, I think it is moving forward. We have the forward? Palestinian council elections taking place in January. Mr Straw: I had a meeting yesterday at the General We are very anxious that they should operate AVairs Council with Javier Solana and Benito properly and that there should be freedom of Ferraro-Warner and Mark Ott, who is our EU movement for candidates, particularly on the West representative in that area. They were positive about Bank. That is very important and we are working on progress at Rafah. There was a bit of a frisson with that. We are also anxious to ensure that East the government of Israel over the possible Jerusalem is not cut oV from the rest of the West publication of a draft paper about East Jerusalem Bank which is why we have all made such strong but there was no consensus in favour of its representations about the possibility of the Israelis publication yesterday so it has not been published. building on the E1 area. You shake your head, Sir John. Q87 Chairman: Having played a big role in its writing, we are keen to have it published, are we? Mr Straw: There was much to be said on all sides on Q89 Sir John Stanley: I am shaking my head because the matter but without a consensus it could not be East Jerusalem is being cut oV totally. published. Mr Straw: We have to work with what we have. Everybody knows the history there but, compared to Q88 Sir John Stanley: The whole party went at one the way in which things were going during the arms point to the West Bank and Ken Purchase and intifada when Chairman Arafat was in control, myself spent a further whole day on the West Bank. things are now moving forward from a low base, I 3335921001 Page Type [O] 20-07-06 01:49:03 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1
Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence Ev 19
13 December 2005 Rt Hon Jack Straw MP, Mr Tim Barrow and Mr David Frost accept, but none of us would have wished to have Q90 Mr Illsley: Is there any progress on the started from where we are. That is where we are and Bulgarian nurses imprisoned in Libya? with Mahmoud Abbas, the President of the Mr Straw: Not a lot. I will write to you.4 Palestinian Authority, and Ariel Sharon who has Chairman: Thank you for coming. We will see you surprised us all with both his determination and his next year and good luck in the negotiations. courage, there are grounds for hope. Maybe this is a moment of seasonal sentiment on which to finish. 4 Ev 20
Letter to the Parliamentary Relations and Devolution Team, Foreign and Commonwealth OYce from the Second Clerk of the Committee The Foreign Secretary promised the Committee a note in response to various questions raised during the evidence session on 13 December. I would be grateful for a reply by 16 January. 1. At Q30 in the transcript, Mr Keetch asked whether British Overseas Territories including Diego Garcia and RAF Akrotiri in the Sovereign Base Areas of Cyprus had been used for the purposes of rendition of suspects by the USA. 2. At Q42 the Foreign Secretary undertook to oVer a reply to Sir John Stanley’s question about whether Mr Benyam Mohammed Al Habashi was handed over deliberately by the British intelligence services to the CIA in Pakistan. 3. At Q51 Mr Straw oVered to send the Committee a note on “unfair treatment, less than torture” and the way in which suspects are treated in the UK, in answer to a question from the Chairman on whether certain interrogation techniques permitted in the USA would fall within UK definitions of torture. 4. At Q90 Mr Illsley asked whether there had been any progress regarding the Bulgarian nurses imprisoned in Libya. The Chairman has also asked for replies to a number of questions which were not reached in the session: The EU is fielding an increasing number of missions abroad, with varying functions. Is this a deliberate trend and are there any further such missions on the way? Is the Rafah monitoring mission a model which the EU hopes to replicate, if all goes well? Does the EU have any plans to intensify relations with India, given its growing importance on the global stage? Sarah Ioannou Second Clerk of the Committee 19 December 2005
Letter to the Chairman of the Committee from the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth AVairs
When I met your Committee on 13 December, I undertook to provide more detailed answers to some of the questions raised in the discussion. I attach answers to these questions, and to the questions that the Committee didn’t reach during the session.
At Q30 in the transcript, Mr Keetch asked whether British Overseas Territories including Diego Garcia and RAF Akrotiri in the Sovereign Base Areas of Cyprus had been used for the purposes of rendition of suspects by the USA. The answer is “no”, as I made clear in my Written Ministerial Statement of 20 January. At Q42 the Foreign Secretary undertook to oVer a reply to Sir John Stanley’s question about whether Mr Benyam Mohammed Al Habashi was handed over deliberately by the British intelligence services to the CIA in Pakistan. As I stated at the time, these are matters for the Intelligence and Security Committee to investigate. I therefore feel it would be inappropriate to go into further details in this letter. 3335921003 Page Type [E] 20-07-06 01:49:03 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1
Ev 20 Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence
At Q51 Mr Straw oVered to send the Committee a note on “unfair treatment, less than torture” and the way in which suspects are treated in the UK, in answer to a question from the Chairman on whether certain interrogation techniques permitted in the USA would fail within UK definitions of torture.
At Q51 you expressed concerns that certain activities may be permissible in the US in interrogations, which are not permissible in the UK, because they are not defined as torture by the US. I indicated that led us towards a consideration of cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment, on which I undertook to send the Committee a note. First of all, it is important to note that the US Detainee Treatment Act, enacted on 30 December 2005, provides that no individual in the custody or under the physical control of the US Government, regardless of nationality or physical location, shall be subject to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment of punishment. This legislation makes a matter of statute what President Bush has made clear was already US Government policy. We have welcomed this. We will keep in close touch with the US Government on the implementation of the Detainee Treatment Act. On the question of definitions, the United Kingdom understands the term “torture” to have the meaning set out in Article 1 of the UN Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT). Article 1 CAT defines torture as “any act by which severe pain or suVering whether physical or mental is intentionally inflicted . . . ”. It does not, however, give specific examples of what constitutes torture. The understanding of the definition of torture made by the US on ratifying CAT specifies the meaning of “mental pain or suVering” in more detail than Article 1 CAT. The UK made no reservations or understandings on ratification and has not adopted a formal definition of what constitutes mental pain or suVering for the purposes of Article 1. Section 134 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 provides that a public oYcial commits torture if he intentionally inflicts severe pain or suVering on another in the performance of his duties, and does not define “severe pain or suVering”. I would add that the US Secretary of State made clear, again, in her statement of 5 December 2005 that: — the US does not authorise or condone torture of detainees; — torture, and conspiracy to commit torture, are crimes under US law; wherever they may occur in the world. On the question of definitions, I would also note that under US legislation, the term “cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment” is to be interpreted according to the US Constitution. But the essential fact is that “cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment” of any detainees held by the US Government anywhere is legally banned under US law.
At Q90 Mr Illsley asked whether there had been any progress regarding the Bulgarian nurses imprisoned In Libya.
We remain concerned about their situation and want to see them released. With EU Partners we have made clear to Libya that we want it to resolve remaining EU concerns, including this case, as part of developing our engagement. We have repeatedly raised this diYcult and longstanding issue at all levels with Libya, both bilaterally and in our role as EU Presidency. With our EU Partners, the European Commission, and the US, we have been actively encouraging the parties to identify a solution acceptable to them both, including through inter- governmental meetings, held in confidence. Following such a meeting in Tripoli on 21–22 December the UK issued a press release on behalf of representatives of the British, Libyan, Bulgarian and US governments, and of the European Commission, about the establishment of an International Benghazi Families Support Fund. It will collect and allocate financial and in-kind assistance to the Benghazi families, including continuing medical care to the HIV- infected patients, help to upgrade to international standards the medical facilities at which they receive treatment in Benghazi, and provision of financial assistance to the families. More details about the Fund are set out in the press release.1
Following this progress, we welcome the ruling by the Libyan Supreme Court on 25 December to overturn the death sentences on the medical staV and return the case to the lower court for a fresh hearing. We have encouraged Libya to ensure this takes place soon. In addition, the UK is providing assistance to alleviate the HIV crisis in Benghazi through the EU’s “HIV Action Plan for Benghazi”. The focus of this assistance is to upgrade the Benghazi Centre to become an HIV/AIDS centre meeting international standards. The assistance will take the form of training and in particular by sharing relevant European expertise.
1 Not printed. 3335921003 Page Type [O] 20-07-06 01:49:03 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1
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The EU is fielding an increasing number of missions abroad, with varying functions. Is this a deliberate trend and are there any further such missions on the way? The increase in the number of CFSP missions is a natural progression. ESDP began a few years ago from a UK-French initiative with the vision that it would grow into an important tool that could be used in a variety of situations internationally. It is now beginning to fulfil that role. The current missions in Rafah and Aceh in particular show that the EU is now considered by the international community as a key organisation for supporting eVorts to improve peace and security around the world. ESDP has always had a number of priority areas, but it is only more recently that it has started to activate them having gained necessary experience and capabilities. The only mission potentially on the horizon is in Kosovo. There is broad agreement amongst EU partners that some of the niche areas that the EU could fill in Kosovo include an EU policing mission as well as justice and the rule of law. This though is dependent on the outcome of the final status process. The UK would expect to see ESDP play a role within its remit wherever it made sense and it had the right capabilities to act—always coordinating with other international actors to try to achieve best added value and ensure the appropriate instruments are deployed for each situation.
Is the Rafah monitoring mission a model which the EU hopes to replicate, if all goes well? The Rafah Border Assistance Mission is the EU’s second monitoring mission. The EU also has a monitoring mission in Aceh, and the Commission runs a customs border monitoring mission in Moldova. Monitoring is one of the priority areas for the EU’s security and defence policy and it is possible that the EU could carry out a similar role elsewhere. However, each mission will diVer according to the task and the environment in which it is operating. We will always be looking to ensure added value and that EU capabilities are utilised where they make best sense and make a real contribution.
Does the EU have any plans to intensify relations with India, given its growing importance on the global stage? The EU recognises absolutely the growing importance of India. At the EU-India Summit in The Hague in November 2004 the EU and India established a strategic partnership. This was followed up at the EU- India Summit in New Delhi in September 2005, during the UK Presidency. The main focus was the agreement of a wide ranging and ambitious EU-India Joint Action Plan, which will form the framework for future EU-India engagement. This Joint Action Plan was the product of close co-operation with India over a number of months leading up to the Summit. Both sides hailed this achievement, emphasising shared values and a common interest in working together. Highlights of the Action Plan include closer collaboration on counter-terrorism; the establishment of an EU-India security dialogue covering regional security issues, disarmament and nonproliferation; the launch of an EU-India Initiative on Clean Development and Climate Change; establishing a High Level Trade Group; and establishment of dialogues on migration and consular issues, as well as on human rights. The Prime Minister was accompanied at the Summit by a large delegation of senior European CEOs who attended a parallel annual Business Summit. EU and Indian CEOs registered a strong level of interest in their respective business communities for strengthening trade and investment opportunities. Manmohan Singh, Tony Blair and Mr Barroso all addressed the Business Summit. The general spirit of co-operation received an additional boost with the announcement by Manmohan Singh at the Summit press conference of an order by Indian Airlines for the purchase of 43 Airbus, worth USD 2.2 billion. Since the Summit the UK Presidency has taken forward a number of initiatives. The UK chaired the first meeting of the new counter-terrorism working group; and led an EU team in Delhi for an exchange under the dialogue on human rights. In the run up to the Summit the UK worked hard with EU partners to secure support for India’s membership of the ITER international nuclear fusion project. Since the Summit India has formally become a member of ITER. India’s importance to the EU will continue to grow, especially as India’s own understanding of the EU expands on greater engagement with the EU (the UK Presidency organised a well received briefing seminar on the EU in Delhi for senior Indian policy makers). At the Summit there was common recognition that India’s young, growing population makes it an indispensable partner for the EU. Both sides are committed to report on progress under the Joint Action Plan at the next EU-India Summit under the Finnish Presidency in Helsinki in autumn 2006. In the meantime, we expect that the Austrian Presidency will take forward other elements of the Action Plan, including by hosting a Foreign Ministerial Troika. The UK will continue to work with the Indians, Presidency and Commission to further boost the EU-India relationship. I hope all this is helpful to the Committee. Rt Hon Jack Straw MP Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth AVairs 31 January 2006 3335921004 Page Type [E] 20-07-06 01:49:03 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1
Ev 22 Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence
Wednesday 11 January 2006
Members present:
Mike Gapes, in the Chair
Mr Fabian Hamilton Mr John Maples Mr David Heathcoat-Amory Sandra Osborne Mr John Horam Sir John Stanley Mr Eric Illsley Ms Gisela Stuart Andrew Mackinlay Richard Younger-Ross
Written evidence submitted by Charles Grant, Director, Centre for European Reform
The strategic implications of the EU malaise: Enlargement, variable geometry and a stronger Neighbourhood policy. The EU’s malaise in 2005 is the result of at least four problems: economic failure, institutional blockage, diminishing legitimacy and lack of leadership. The poor performance of the core euroland economies has made many people fearful of change, whether it comes in the form of new EU treaties or fresh rounds of enlargement. The failure of the constitutional treaty has left a cloud of uncertainty over the EU’s institutions. Partly as a consequence of those economic and institutional problems, the legitimacy of the EU has diminished among many sections of European public opinion. And finally, in all its history the EU has never experienced such a striking leadership vacuum: the Commission is weak, while most of the large member-states have leaders who appear to care little about the fate of the European Union. This essay examines the strategic consequences of the EU’s malaise, and in particular the threat to further EU enlargement. It suggests that an extension of the principle of “variable geometry” could help to revive prospects for enlargement. And it proposes a form of associate membership for countries that have no hope of joining the EU. Ever since the 1970s, there has been a close link between “deepening”, the movement towards a more integrated Union, and “widening”, the enlargement of the Union. Political elites in core countries such as France have always been reluctant to widen the EU, understanding that a larger Union would find it diYcult to integrate. They feared that the British wanted enlargement in order to fulfil the Thatcherite dream of an EU that was little more a glorified free trade area, with weaker institutions and a diminished sense of solidarity. A wider Europe, of course, would also reduce the influence of France, Germany and the Benelux countries. But despite these reservations, the EU has continued to enlarge—in 1981, 1986, 1995 and 2004. The French and others sceptical of enlargement, such as federalists, swallowed their reservations. They did so because they extracted a price: a series of treaties that created a more integrated Europe—those negotiated in 1985, 1991, 1997, 2000 and finally the constitutional treaty, signed in 2004 but unlikely to ever enter into force. The British, Nordics and some other enthusiasts for enlargement were never particularly keen on treaty-based integration, but put up with it in return for widening. (The Germans sat in the middle of this debate, pro-deepening, because of their generally federalist approach to the EU, but also pro-widening, so that their neighbours could join the club.) This implicit bargain between deepeners and wideners has driven the EU forward for the past 20 years. The demise of the constitutional treaty has therefore done much more than bring an end to treaty-based integration for the foreseeable future: it has also created major obstacles to further enlargement of the EU. The climate for enlargement was deteriorating even before the French and Dutch referendums. France had changed its constitution in March 2005 so that any country wishing to join after Bulgaria, Romania and Croatia cannot do so without a positive referendum in France. Indeed one reason why French people voted No to the constitutional treaty was to protest against the 2004 enlargement, which had been unpopular in France. In both France and the Netherlands some of those voting no did so because they opposed Turkish membership (although the treaty had nothing to do with Turkey). Evidently, there are many reasons why people oppose further enlargement, in addition to the apparent end of deepening. Some voters fear that people from accession countries will steal their jobs; others do not want Muslim countries in the EU. But there is no doubt that the French and Dutch referendums have darkened the prospect of a much wider Europe. Since the referendums most of the serious contenders for the French presidency—including Nicolas Sarkozy, Dominique de Villepin and Laurent Fabius— have spoken out strongly against Turkish accession. So have Angela Merkel, Edmund Stoiber and other senior German Christian Democrats. Austrian leaders have been especially hostile to Turkey, almost vetoing the opening of accession talks in October 2005. In many EU countries, senior oYcials, politicians and pundits are arguing that the EU should not expand into the Balkans, Turkey or elsewhere until and unless it can strengthen its institutions. 3335921004 Page Type [O] 20-07-06 01:49:03 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1
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That argument is not unreasonable. Proponents of enlargement need to show that the EU’s policies and institutions could function eVectively in a wider Union. Nevertheless, for the EU to postpone indefinitely further enlargement would be a tragedy. The Union’s greatest success has been to spread democracy, prosperity, security and stability across most of the continent. Of course, there has to be a geographical limit at some point—North African countries are not in Europe and so cannot join. But for the EU to define precisely its future borders for all time would have a disastrous impact on would- be members beyond those borders. If the EU ended talks with Turkey, the extreme nationalist and Islamist elements within Turkish politics and society would be strengthened. The impact of the EU shutting the door on the Western Balkans would be worse still. Would fragile constructions such as Bosnia and Macedonia hold together? Would Serbia ever be able to swallow the bitter pill of independence for Kosovo without the prospect of EU membership for itself? And if the EU said “never” to countries further afield, such as Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus and Georgia, how could it hope to influence their development?
Can Variable Geometry Save Enlargement? Despite enlargement’s gloomy prospects, Europe’s leaders could, if determined, resuscitate the process. First, they should boost Europe’s economic growth. As long as millions of Europeans are unemployed, or fear for their jobs, they will naturally be reluctant to welcome new EU members and their workers. Second, EU leaders should lead, explaining to electorates that extending the single market and good governance across the continent enhances their prosperity and security. Third, politicians should work to revive the EU’s legitimacy, in two ways. They should ensure that the EU focuses on policies and actions that appear relevant to citizens’ lives, such as encouraging educational exchanges, making it easier for people to live and work outside their home country, or helping to retrain those who lose from globalisation. And they should improve the way the institutions work, for example by giving national parliaments a bigger role in decision-making, and by allowing the media into the Council of Ministers. Much can be done without changing the current treaties. This essay concerns itself not with these three points, but rather a fourth way of promoting the cause of enlargement. EU leaders should make better use of variable geometry, the idea that not every member- state need take part in every EU policy area. Already, of course, some EU countries opt out of the euro, the Schengen agreement or EU defence policy. The current treaties allow groups of member-states to move ahead in certain policy areas, under the so far unused “enhanced co-operation procedure”. An avant-garde group could also emerge independently of the EU institutions: Schengen started as an inter- governmental accord, before being folded into the EU treaties. More variable geometry could help enlargement in three ways. — If the countries that aspire to a “political union” were able to build avant-gardes in certain policy areas, and thus revive a sense of forward motion, they would be less likely to oppose further widening of the Union. — EU governments should also try to persuade EU applicants to accept long or possibly indefinite transition periods that would postpone their full participation in some EU policies. Again, that would make enlargement more palatable for some doubters. — For neighbours of the EU that are unlikely to join in the foreseeable future, the EU should oVer a tighter form of association than its current neighbourhood policy. The EU should hold out the possibility of neighbours being able to join the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) as “security partners”. Such a scheme, if successful, could reduce the number of countries seeking full membership.
Greater use of Avant-Garde Groups The current trend towards variable geometry is unmistakable. For example, seven member-states signed the Treaty of Pru¨m in May 2005, a kind of super-Schengen agreement that among other things enables the signatories to share information on finger-prints and DNA, and to co-operate on aircraft security. More informally, the interior ministers of Britain, France, Germany, Italy and Spain—the “G-5”— collaborate on counter-terrorism. And then there are issue-based sub-groups of members, such as that of Britain, France and Germany—the “EU3”—that leads EU policy on Iran. All these groupings promote European interests or integration. In a wider, more diverse EU, it is inevitable that some countries will not take part in every policy area. This trend should be welcomed, not resisted. Any forum that has 25 or 27 governments represented around a table is seldom likely to be useful or eVective. The variable geometry envisaged here is diVerent to the idea of a “hard core” or “concentric circles” that is periodically floated by senior French politicians, including Jacques Chirac, Vale´rie Giscard d’Estaing and Dominique Strauss-Kahn. Their idea is that France and Germany should lead a group of 3335921004 Page Type [E] 20-07-06 01:49:03 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1
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integrationist members into a new organisation that would establish closer co-operation across a broad range of policy areas, rather than one particular area. Those left in the outer circle would be in the EU but not the new core. This scenario has never been very plausible, because of the institutional, political and judicial diYculties that would ensue, and because few German leaders fancy the idea. It has become even less plausible in recent years, because Franco–German leadership has gained a poor reputation among many other members, and because of the weakness of the governments in Paris and Berlin.
This essay suggests an alternative scenario, based on the current situation, in which several avant-garde groups, each with a diVerent membership, would overlap with each other. Evidently, variable geometry—whether in the form of treaty-based enhanced co-operation, clubs established outside the treaties, or informal groups focused on particular policies—entails risks. However, most of the potential pitfalls can be dealt with. — The danger of exclusion. The British government has traditionally opposed variable geometry, fearing that if it stayed out of a group it would lose influence in the EU—and that if it later tried to join it might find the door bolted. Any avant-garde group is entitled to establish entry criteria for those who wish to join. But these criteria need to be interpreted in an objective manner, to ensure a member-state is not excluded for the wrong reasons. The Nice treaty’s rules on enhanced co-operation give the Commission such a policing role. The countries that signed the Treaty of Pru¨m have said explicitly that, if their venture is a success, they will invite other member-states to sign in 2008. The problem of exclusion is more pronounced for informal groupings. When the “EU-3” began their Iranian diplomacy, other member-states resented being left out. However, the subsequent involvement of Javier Solana, the EU’s foreign policy chief, who reports back to the other governments, has reassured most of them. — Avant-garde groups could weaken EU institutions. Groups established outside the framework of the treaties, whether formal or informal, risk undermining the role of the Commission, Parliament and Court of Justice, to the extent that inter-governmental arrangements do not involve EU institutions. But precautions can be taken to ensure that such groups mesh smoothly with the institutions. For example, when the Schengen agreement was established—initially, outside the EU treaties—the Commission was invited along as an observer. The signatories of the Treaty of Priim have taken care to ensure that it is compatible with EU law. — Variable geometry is “undemocratic”. That is true, to the extent that neither the European nor national parliaments have oversight of inter-governmental organisations. However, avant-garde groups are only as undemocratic as governments choose to make them. If a group of member- states created an enhanced co-operation, the European Parliament would play a role (for normal Community business, the Parliament’s consent would required; on foreign policy the Parliament would merely be informed; and on Justice and Home AVairs it would be asked for an opinion.) Other sorts of avant-garde grouping need not be unaccountable. Thus the president of the European Central Bank appears before the European Parliament’s monetary aVairs committee. The Western European Union, a defence sub-group that has largely merged with the EU, still has its own parliamentary assembly, consisting of representatives from national parliaments. Other intergovernmental groupings could create their own systems of parliamentary oversight. — Variable geometry could lead to the unravelling of the acquis communautaire. The more you allow some countries to pick and choose, the greater the risk that others will demand the right to opt out of existing policies they dislike. British Conservatives, for example, talk of using variable geometry to pull Britain out of the common farm, fisheries and foreign policies. The EU therefore needs to define the set of policies that every member must take part in. This should include trade, competition, the single market and its four freedoms (of goods, services, capital and people), fisheries, regional policy, overseas aid, some common rules on agriculture, some environmental rules, some co-operation on borders and policing, and a common foreign policy. That leaves subjects such as the euro, the co-ordination of budgetary and tax policy, border controls, the harmonisation of criminal justice, and defence policy, as suitable for variable geometry.
The countries in the euro may well see virtue in co-ordinating their economic policies more closely. They are already talking of harmonising corporate tax bases (though not rates). They may wish to create a stronger external representation for the eurozone. Jean Pisani-Ferry, of the Bruegel think-tank, has suggested that there is a much stronger case for eurozone members to co-ordinate their structural reforms than there is for the wider EU membership to do so. At some point the euro countries may even wish to simplify and strengthen the currently ragged rules of the Stability and Growth Pact.
The other area where a growth of variable geometry is likely is in the domain of justice and home aVairs. The Schengen agreement was a successful piece of variable geometry, conceived outside the treaties but later shifted into them. The recent treaty of Pru¨m suggests that more variability is on the way, as do the “G-5” meetings of interior ministers. 3335921004 Page Type [O] 20-07-06 01:49:03 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1
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Transitional Arrangements When a country joins the EU, it is normally subject to “transitional arrangements” that exclude it from full participation from certain policies for a number of years. Sometimes these work to the benefit of the new member: East Europeans who joined the EU in 2004 will not have to apply all the (very costly) environmental rules for up to seven years. Sometimes the transitional arrangements work, supposedly, in the interests of the old members. Thus 22 of the old member-states have insisted on limiting the right to work of citizens from the new member-states for seven years. Most applicants naturally resist that kind of measure, resenting the implication of a status that is “membership minus”. However, some applicants and future applicants should think very seriously about tolerating some long or even indefinite transitional periods. The biggest reason why many people fear Turkish membership is that they fear its workers will take their jobs. Free movement of labour would be good for Turkey, and in most respects good for the existing member-states. But given Turkey’s current poverty—with per capita GDP at around 30% of the EU average—fears of Turkish immigration are understandable. Turkey should be prepared to envisage a provision that would, for example, allow a member-state to limit inflows of Turkish labour indefinitely—but only for as long as Turkey’s per capita GDP was below 50% of the EU average. Once Turkey had been in the Union for a few years, many member-states would probably not wish to apply such restrictions. After all, the Turkey that joins the EU, if it does, will be very diVerent to, and much richer than, the Turkey of today. Some Turks would see membership with limits on free movement of labour as an insult. But Turkish negotiators should, as a last resort, be prepared to accept such limits. Turkey would be much better oV inside the EU, with restrictions, than outside. This would be a kind of variable geometry, in the sense of not every member taking part in every policy. Like the other kinds, it should make enlargement less threatening to those who fear it.
Associate Membership of the CFSP Turkey and Croatia have started accession negotiations. Macedonia, Serbia, Bosnia and Albania are likely to start negotiations at some point. If Montenegro and Kosovo become independent, they too will probably become candidates. Such countries are currently far from being ready for membership. However, if these Balkan states make good progress, and if they can convince the French electorate that their people share European values, they may be able to join the EU in the long run. But there are other countries, further afield, that have very little prospect of joining. Ukraine, a large country with a lot of farmers, has enhanced its democratic credentials over the past year. But apart from Poland and Lithuania, very few member-states are keen to see it join the Union. Belarus and Moldova are unquestionably in Europe, but are very far from meeting the basic conditions for membership. Georgia believes itself in Europe, as do its neighbours Armenia and Azerbaijan, though many Europeans would disagree. Unlike Armenia and Azerbaijan, Georgia has undergone a quasi-democratic revolution and is keen to move closer to the EU. Over the past two years the EU has started to implement a new European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), which aims to enhance ties with the countries that have no prospect of joining in the foreseeable future. The point of the policy is to turn the countries of North Africa, the Middle East, the South Caucasus, and the EU’s eastern hinterland into a “ring of friends”. The EU has already negotiated bespoke “action plans” with Ukraine, Moldova, Israel, Palestine, Tunisia, Jordan and Morocco. Others, such as the three Caucasus countries, Egypt and Libya are now starting to negotiate action plans. Each plan sets out the reforms the neighbour intends to undertake, in order to align its economic and political system with European norms; and its sets out what the EU can oVer in terms of trade, aid, political contacts and participation in its programmes. The neighbourhood policy is a sensible initiative, and it is too soon to judge its eVectiveness. But the EU seems to be having diYculty in fleshing out the promises that it has made in the action plans. Several Commission directorates-general have moved to slowly to deliver on commitments made under the ENP (DG Relex being an exception). And many of the member-states appear unenthusiastic: some of those most hostile to enlargement are in no hurry to deepen ties with countries just beyond the EU’s borders. For their part, the neighbours have moved very slowly to fulfil their promises. In time, hopefully, both the EU and its neighbours will make a real eVort to implement the action plans. But even if they do, a more fundamental problem will remain. Most of the neighbours believe that the neighbourhood policy does not go far enough in oVering to integrate them with the EU. Nothing in the policy or the action plans mentions the possibility of the neighbours ultimately joining the EU. This limits the EU’s ability to influence its neighbours. The EU probably needs to oVer juicier carrots in order to wield meaningful influence. It should therefore beef up the ENP by rewarding the best- performing neighbours with security partnerships’—in eVect, much closer ties to the CFSP. This author owes this idea to a conversation with Salome Zurabashvili, the former Georgian foreign minister. She said that while Georgia was not yet ready for the rigours of the single market, it would benefit hugely from being part of EU foreign policy. As far as she was concerned, Georgian involvement in the CFSP would bring with it an implicit security guarantee. 3335921004 Page Type [E] 20-07-06 01:49:03 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1
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She is right that the neighbours should not try to adopt most of the acquis communautaire. Their economies are too backward to thrive in the single market, and their administrative systems are not capable of enforcing the EU’s 80,000 page rule-book. However, the neighbours could adopt the foreign policy acquis, which is mostly declarations rather than legislation, without much diYculty. Adopting policies is much easier than enacting laws—both technically and politically. Candidate countries often find the implementation of EU law very painful politically. But aligning a country’s foreign policy with that of the EU is seldom so sensitive. The European Economic Area could oVer a kind of analogy for neighbours becoming “security partners” of the EU. In the EEA, Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein are consulted on the shaping of single market rules, but cannot take part in the formal decision-taking. When the EU takes a decision, the EEA countries have to accept it. But while the EBA is about economics, and has no bearing on foreign policy, the proposed security partnerships would work the other way round: these partners would engage in the CSFP but not the single market. Suppose that Georgia and Ukraine make good progress with reform, and the EU asks them to become security partners. How might this work? The EU governments and those of Georgia and Ukraine would agree that they had common interests on certain subjects. The security partners would then join in discussions on those issues. But while they would help to shape EU policy, they would not take part in decision-making. When the EU decided on a common policy, the associates would have the right to sign up to it—opting in—or not. Each partner would have a small team of diplomats in the Council of Ministers’ Justus Lipsius building, sending representatives to the relevant committees and working groups. The partner would also send a senior diplomat to attend and speak at the Political and Security Committee, when the subjects covered by the security partnership were discussed. With such arrangements, the security partners would be more intimately involved in the CFSP’s institutions than are current candidate countries such as Croatia and Turkey (Bulgaria and Romania, having signed accession treaties, are allowed to take part in EU meetings). Candidates have the right to associate themselves with EU foreign policy, but they do not have diplomats in the CFSP machinery. Therefore the concept of security partnerships could not work unless candidates for full membership were included in discussions on foreign policy (that in itself could have a positive impact on the EU’s accession talks with these countries). Security partnerships should not be just about procedures and institutions. The point should be for the EU and its partners to help each other to deal with real problems. The flow of benefits should not be just one-way, from the EU to the partners, but in both directions. For example, some neighbours could help the EU to stabilise some of the very problematic regions that adjoin them. Suitable areas for collaboration between the EU and its security partners could be, for example, the Caucasus, the Balkans, counter-terrorism, non-proliferation and the Middle East Peace Process. The partnership should also extend to the European Security and Defence Policy. Already, some countries in the ENP send troops on EU military missions, but their involvement should be extended. Security partners should be encouraged not only to send troops and other essential personnel on ESDP operations, but also to take part in their management. This kind of link to the EU would probably have a beneficial impact on the neighbours concerned. Their diplomats would learn how the EU made policy. Their governments would be socialised into European ways of working. The model proposed is very diVerent to the NATO-Russia council, which treats the NATO countries and Russia as two distinct entities. In contrast, this idea would aim to integrate neighbours into EU foreign policy, as a way of bringing them closer to the EU more generally. There is a risk that the arrival of security partners in the Council of Ministers would make the EU’s diplomatic machinery more complicated, and slow it down. Therefore it would be wise for the EU and its partners to start oV by working together on only a limited range of issues. And if the EU did find the partners a drag, it would have the right to press ahead and decide its own policies. Conversely, if the partners found that their views were disregarded, and that their presence was merely token, they could pull out of discussions on a particular subject. Or they could resign from their security partner status. One obvious criticism of this concept is that it would fail to deter neighbours from applying for membership. After all, Jacques Delors designed the EBA to prevent EFTA countries from seeking EU membership, but most of them did so anyway. However, faced with a choice between no membership and CFSP membership, some neighbours might prefer the latter. If a large group of member-states suddenly started campaigning for full Ukrainian membership, the government in Kiev would of course have no incentive to pursue membership of the CFSP. But in the current climate that seems unlikely. In any case, the point of the proposed security partnerships is not to dissuade neighbours from applying to join the EU, but rather to encourage mutually beneficial co-operation. As with the action plans that exist under the ENP, the security partnerships should contain implicit conditionality: the partners that were most helpful to the EU could expect more economic and political dividends in their broader relationship with the EU. In the long run, if Russia becomes a truer democracy and a better respecter of civil liberties than it is today, the EU should consider oVering it this kind of scheme. Some analysts will argue that member- states such as Poland and Latvia would never agree to such an embrace of Russia. But if at the same 3335921004 Page Type [O] 20-07-06 01:49:03 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1
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time the EU extended the same oVer to the countries such as Moldova, Armenia and Azerbaijan— assuming that political and economic freedom were firmly entrenched in those countries, and in Russia— would Poles and Latvians really be so hostile? Other analysts will say that Russia is too proud to ever agree to be treated in the same way as Ukraine and Georgia. Today that is the case, but one may imagine that, at some point in the future, Russia might see that participation in a broader CFSP zone could help it to build friendly relations with its neighbours. In any case, the prize of involvement in EU policy-making would be attractive to many liberal Russians, who may one day be more influential than they arc today. If the EU could extend its CFSP across the entire continent its members and Russia and the countries between than would probably all get along better. Charles Grant November 2005
Written evidence submitted by Ruth Lea, Director, Centre for Policy Studies
The Austrian Presidency Several key issues have been identified for the Austrian Presidency. They are: — The budget for 2007–13. — Enlargement. — The Constitution. — Political popularity and the economic agenda, including the Services Directive.
The Budget for 2007–13 The EU budget for the seven-year period was agreed by the EU25 at the December 2005 EU summit, in the dying days of the British presidency. It amounted to ƒ862 billion. There are three aspects of particular note: — The UK will lose some £7 billion of the abatement over the period which will be back-end loaded. According to a written answer from Gordon Brown, the estimated extra costs will be £500 million (0.09% of public spending) for 2007–08; zero for 2008–09; £1.0 billion (0.16%) for 2009–10 and between £1.6 billion and £1.9 billion (0.23% to 0.26%) for 2010–11 to 2012–13.1 — The Prime Minister had originally claimed that any negotiation of the UK’s rebate would be contingent on reform to the CAP. But the CAP was fundamentally agreed in 2002 for the budget period. The CAP remains a wholly indefensible policy, not least of all because it is one of the main obstructions to a constructive settlement of the WTO’s Doha Round of trade talks. This was clear at the recent WTO Ministerial Conference in Hong Kong. — Despite the Government’s wholly sensible suggestion that Structural and Cohesion Funds (SCF) should be concentrated on the poorest EU countries (the 10 new member states as well as Romania and Bulgaria),2 this policy suggestion was not implemented in the face of determined opposition from wealthy EU15 recipients of substantial SCF (including Ireland and Spain). Even though the budget was agreed in December, Austria must still negotiate a final agreement with the Commission and the Parliament.
Enlargement Candidates for EU membership are: — Bulgaria and Romania, which are expected to join in January 2007, making EU27. Austria must decide on these country’s memberships. — It was agreed in October 2005 to start accession negotiations with Turkey during the British presidency, amid much scepticism (not least of all from Austria). Austria will be expected to make progress. — It was also agreed in October 2005 to start accession negotiations with Croatia which hopes to join by 2009. Croatia’s membership has been strongly supported by Austria. — Macedonia (The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, FYROM) applied for EU membership in February 2004. It is awaiting oYcial candidate status. Austria and other member states have expressed doubts about Macedonia’s preparedness. 3335921005 Page Type [E] 20-07-06 01:49:03 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1
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The Constitution The Austrian presidency will preside over a period in which “The Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe” (the “Constitution”) will be “actively discussed”. The “pause for reflection”, following the French and Dutch no votes, is apparently meant to finish over in the next six months. There are currently, arguably, three main options for dealing with the Constitution: — The EU could abandon the whole exercise in the light of the French and Dutch no votes. — The EU could try to revise the treaty without losing support from one of the 25. — The EU could merely cherry-pick its most useful parts. Cherry-picking currently looks to be the most likely way forward. In particular there are speculations that the Constitution’s key institutional proposals will be “back on the cards”. These include: — The creation of an EU foreign minister. — Changes to the voting rules. — The abolition of the rotating presidency; ie the establishment of a semi-permanent presidency. Austria’s presidency will not be the end of this reappraisal of the Constitution, however. At the very minimum the reappraisal will run into the Finnish presidency (2006H2) and, probably, into the German presidency (2007H1).
Political Popularity and the Economic Agenda The Austrian presidency needs to address the EU’s lack of popularity and rebuild public confidence in the EU. The priorities are surely: — A pick up in economic growth and more buoyant jobs markets. — A recognition that the EU political e´lites must listen to the voice of the people. Economic success is of uttermost significance to any political enterprise. The EU is no exception. Economic issues beat the other issues into a corner (and this includes the Common Foreign and Security Policy)—by a mile. There are now some signs that the French and German economies are picking up. But their progress will continue to be hampered by the protectionist, heavily-regulated and big state European Social Model which was, incidentally, explicitly enshrined in the Constitution. Given that the tectonic plates of the world economy are shifting inexorably with the rise of China and India changing the global economic landscape, the EU’s response to this historic phenomenon is, to date, quite inadequate. It is lamentable. Wake up, and smell the coVee. There are, moreover, many economic studies that show the EU’s position as a global economic player (and hence global political player) will decline significantly during the 21st century. Without economic power the EU will simply cease to have any global political significance. This is a cruel reality that all too few people have grasped. In order to stay this decline the EU Commission should be thinking of a serious agenda of de-regulation and it must turn the Single Market into a truly open cross-border market, with the lightest of regulatory touches. This is not happening despite the brave intentions of the re-launched Lisbon agenda. Specifically, the pro-competition Services Directive, which is a step in the right direction, was blocked last year by President Chirac. The Austrian presidency is expected to return to the Directive—but to dilute its pro- competitive thrust. This would be a retrograde step. Apparently, a March 2006 summit is planned to discuss jobs “n” growth. It will, apparently, also discuss the development of a common energy policy, as mooted at Hampton Court during the British presidency. These are issues of the greatest importance. The EU must stop grandstanding in the world stage and get down to reality.
References 1. Hansard, 20 December 2005, UK Parliament. 2. House of Lords: EU Committee, Future Financing of the European Union, 6th Report of Session 2004–05, HL Paper 62, March 2005. Ruth Lea January 2006 3335921006 Page Type [O] 20-07-06 01:49:03 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1
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Witnesses: Mr Charles Grant, Director, Centre for European Reform, and Ms Ruth Lea, Director, Centre for Policy Studies, gave evidence.
Q91 Chairman: Welcome. We are delighted that you get very far with the Services Directive, but that have been able to come along to our first session in was not the Government’s fault. There was an 2006 about developments in the European Union. agreement on the so-called REACH Directive Can I ask you for your assessment of the British on chemicals testing, which was a sensible Presidency and what you think it meant both for the compromise. There was a lot of progress on European Union and resolving the internal crises liberalising aviation between Europe and America, and also for the British position within the which was encouraging. From a British point of European Union. view they succeeded in stalling any attempt to reach Ms Lea: It did seem to be a rather disappointing an agreement on a working time directive that performance, but two or three things of supreme would have taken away British opt-out. From the importance were decided. Firstly, there clearly was British point of view, on the single market side they the Budget for 2007 to 2013, and arguably, of course, did all right. it was a very disadvantageous agreement in the end for Britain; and the Chancellor of the Exchequer Q92 John Horam: How has that left the perception has made it very clear that we will be losing another of the UK’s role in the European Union? What 7 billion over that particular period by way of our do people now think about the UK following abatement. The Government was making the point the presidency? that it wanted to negotiate the abatement in Ms Lea: I was surprised at how badly the British connection with the reform of CAP, but that, of image suVered during the presidency because there course, did not happen and will not happen for quite were a lot of negotiations. Obviously the Budget some time. The other point I would make is on the was a very poisonous aVair, as Charles has said. talks about enlargement. Turkey is now a candidate One of the aspects discussed in relation to the country, which was agreed in October, as it should Budget was the idea that money should be be; similarly Croatia. Those are the two major concentrated on the new accession states and not achievements—if “achievements” is the right word so much on the relatively rich Member States that to use—of the British presidency. still take a lot of structural funds from the EU. Mr Grant: I would agree with some of that. I agree That, in itself, seemed wholly sensible, although it about enlargement. I think that the Turkish deal in did not get anywhere, but in relation to the way the particular was really on a knife-edge, and might not debates developed, when Britain was arguing about have happened. The incredibly hard work by the keeping its abatement, its rebate, it seemed as British politicians and diplomats really helped that though we were “taking money away from the new to happen, perhaps, as I say, against the odds. It accession states”. The way it seemed to be handled is not just Turkey and Croatia but the whole of the seemed to give the British image rather a bad deal, Balkans has a prospective for membership now, if I may say so. thanks to the achievements of the last six months. It was not at all certain that the EU would agree Q93 John Horam: Do you think it stuck? that Macedonia should be a candidate, which they Ms Lea: The image did get stuck, and it did not have now agreed; nor was it certain that the EU look particularly impressive. would agree to start talks on stabilisation agreements with Serbia and Bosnia, both of which Q94 John Horam: Has the result modified that are very important for giving them a perspective of perception or is it still the feeling that somehow modernisation and reform. The whole western Britain rather mismanaged it? Balkans has done rather nicely out of the British Ms Lea: I think now, because the Budget has been presidency, and none of that was certain to happen. settled, it has been hugely to our disadvantage. I On the Budget I take a diVerent view from Ruth. say that because the cuts in the abatement are quite One would have liked a diVerent deal, with a substantial. I suspect that from the Brussels radical agreement to reform the CAP and so on, perspective, at the end of the day, because a deal but I think it was the best deal that was possible was done—and, if I may say so, Britain did in the in the circumstances. I part company from some end give up rather a lot—that probably did commentators and my former employers at The improve its image. Economist who would have said it was better to do Mr Grant: I would agree with some of that. I had no deal at all. The important thing is that there was thought that when the deal was done the east a deal. The details are less important, and the fact Europeans, who had been so annoyed with us when that it is oV the agenda is a good thing. It was a we were trying to cut their money, would be quite poisonous thing while it was on the agenda. If we relaxed and happy and go back to being friends had not done a deal, we would have spent the rest with us. It is not actually true. From my own of this year arguing about it instead of dealing with conversations— real problems in the real world. Today we can worry about the Lisbon process of economic Q95 John Horam: They are still annoyed, do you reform; we can worry about enlargement, and we think? can worry about the Services Directive or whatever, Mr Grant: They are, more than I thought they so I am very happy that it is out of the way. On would be. I think that although on the substance the single market generally, I think there were some of the major issues we have already discussed the modest successes in the presidency. 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11 January 2006 Mr Charles Grant and Ms Ruth Lea the style. I am a little concerned myself that we still Ms Lea: Which 14 billion is this? Can I just say have a bad image in east European countries. This where I got the 7 billion from? That was in a is partly the natural British arrogance towards written statement to the House of Commons on 20 dealing with smaller countries. December. It was a question by John McFall to Gordon Brown. I have got the numbers here, and according to Gordon Brown the estimated extra Q96 John Horam: We tried rather hard to have a costs would be 500 million in the financial year good image with east European countries. 2007; nothing in 2008; a billion in 2009; and Mr Grant: We had a very good image at the start between 1.6 and 1.9 for 2010 to 2012. That is where of the British presidency. The image was very good I got the figure of 7 billion from. I am not quite earlier this year for the reasons we are aware of, sure what the 14 billion is. and then it started going wrong in June, when Britain vetoed the deal that most countries were Q98 Mr Illsley: I was looking at newspaper reports prepared to sign up to. The east Europeans were at the time, the more extreme newspaper reports at particularly unhappy with the delay on agreement the time. on the Budget. The British diplomats were rather Ms Lea: These are Treasury figures. The surprised at how badly the east Europeans took it. significance for Mr Brown is that they are very I think that we took them for granted and assumed much back-end loaded. The withdrawal of the they were our natural friends, that they could not abatement is very much back-end loaded into the stand the French and that they would follow our further period into the Budget. That is at a time lead. However, when they saw their own economic indeed when you do have a slow-down in public V interests being a ected by British policy they got expenditure, so clearly it has quite serious rather annoyed. Subsequently during the implications for the Treasury’s budgets. presidency I do not think we spent enough time scratching their backs and being nice to them. Of Y Q99 Mr Illsley: Is there any significance in the course it is di cult: the presidency is so busy. I increase in the UK rebate, the increases you are heard, for example, complaints that during the talking about? night when we finally did the deal on the Turkish Ms Lea: Again, I do not have those particular accession that the east European foreign ministers numbers; all I have is the Treasury estimates of the were upset at being left waiting in a room, and extra costs of the final negotiations and positions nobody talked to them for twelve hours and told they thought they were in. I must say that I did them what was happening. Maybe if Jack Straw trawl through the website to find some extra had spent half an hour with them, he would not numbers to get the breakdown but without a great have had that extra half hour with the Austrians deal of positive reaction. Those are just the that did the deal. I am not saying the British numbers that I have got. necessarily got it wrong, but there is a perception Mr Grant: I would disagree that the deal we got amongst the east Europeans that we are arrogant was particularly unfair. As far as I understand, and haughty, and that we take them for granted. British net payments into the EU Budget over the Ms Lea: Can I add to that, because I think that next seven years will be about the same as France, what Charles has said is of great interest and great and much less than Germany. That sounds to me significance. When there was the accession of the a fair deal. Britain is a net contributor, but it is one 10 new countries Britain felt very much that they of the richest countries in Europe. I am not saying were in their camp, and they no longer appear to that the Budget deal was perfect; I think the be in their camp. That is one of the real outcomes Spanish and the Irish did too well out of it: they of the British presidency. Britain, of course, had are rich countries that have ridiculously high net always pushed for widening because they wanted payments to them. However, if you look at the big extra people on their side, so to speak, who would countries of the EU, we did pretty well. The rebate be economic reformers and who wanted to have gets bigger every year automatically: because the more free markets. There was the feeling when the Budget gets bigger every year the rebate itself gets new countries came in that these were reform bigger every year, and it is harder and harder to countries; these were the ones that were friends justify it given that we are so rich and that there with America. Britain was, if I may say so, feeling are so many poor countries in the EU. Of course, rather complacent about the idea that they would we should not give it away until there is a total be their natural allies. I suspect that the situation reform of the CAP but I think that will come, over the last six months has changed quite hopefully. The discussion on that will come in 2008. significantly. Ms Lea: I would question that we will be paying the same as France. I would be very surprised if that were the case. Q97 Mr Illsley: I want to ask you one or two questions on the Budget, in particular our Q100 Mr Illsley: Jack Straw has actually told this involvement in the rebate. You mentioned in your Committee— opening statement that the Chancellor of the Ms Lea: I would just like to see the figures. Forgive Exchequer has said it will cost an extra 7 billion me, I do not wish to say anything that I cannot over the period. Is that on top of the reported back up with the data, but I would be very amount of 14 billion? surprised if that is the case. 3335921006 Page Type [O] 20-07-06 01:49:03 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1
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11 January 2006 Mr Charles Grant and Ms Ruth Lea
Chairman: We had figures before Christmas that 15 it is only possibly Greece and Portugal that are were circulated. poor enough to justify having these structural funds. Mr Grant: I would agree with that. Q101 Mr Illsley: One of the things that the Foreign Secretary told this Committee was that the UK rebate was designed to ensure that there was equity Q104 Mr Illsley: You have already mentioned the between otherwise similar states, principally impact on the new entrant states of the British France, Italy and the UK in terms of our negotiations: what impact do you think the British contribution. In other words, the issue in terms of negotiations have had on the existing Member the rebate was for us to get parity with the other States—France, Italy and Germany? Have you any major players in Europe, not simply an argument opinion as to whether it has left us in a good light between France and the CAP but to get parity of or a bad light? contribution. Mr Grant: The British behaviour? Ms Lea: All I can say is that I would like to see the numbers. Without the numbers in front of me, Q105 Mr Illsley: The British presidency, the if I may say so, this is a rather sterile conversation. negotiations, and our position on the Budget If somebody shows me the numbers, then I am very throughout the negotiations. happy to comment on them, but I could not get Mr Grant: As I said, I think it is a problem with them oV the website; I could not find them and I the east Europeans, but I do not think there has tried very hard. been a particular problem with others. I think they know that the British always play hard when it comes to these talks. I saw that Mr Chirac said this Q102 Mr Illsley: Would you agree with me on the week that the Budget deal had cleared the air and principle that Jack Straw was saying, that the that now we can move forward. He does not seem whole idea behind maintaining the rebate was this to bear any particular animus against the British question of parity? because of the way things are happening, nor does Ms Lea: I have no doubt about it; and that was Mrs Merkel, who seems to be very optimistic about why it was initially arranged way back in 1984 at a lot of things at the moment. Unlike Ruth Fontainebleau with Mrs Thatcher, because it was perhaps, I do not think that we were ridiculously quite clear at that point that we were paying far generous, but whatever balance of generosity or more than we should be doing; so it was quite meanness came under the British presidency, I correct to keep the abatement. If we had not done think most countries expected it. They were so, then our net contributions would have become perhaps a little surprised there was a deal. The completely disproportionate. It was right to do it, general perception of most governments until the but the question is whether it was right to give away actual night of the summit was that there probably so much of the abatement. would not be a deal because Britain had given very little reason to expect a compromise, and in the end perhaps it would be fair comment that Blair was a Q103 Mr Illsley: You mentioned in your first little more generous than some people expected. answer the review of the whole Budget—this idea Ms Lea: It was interesting because Mrs Merkel of a review of the EU Budget by the Commission. clearly was in some ways a power-broker over the How significant is that? Is that likely to come Budget as well. I suspect that the atmosphere about, the idea that we are going to look at the between Britain and France is still fairly poisonous, whole thing once again in terms of the CAP? if I may say so; and it is not just a matter of the Ms Lea: The review coming up during the Austrian British presidency, but it was way back with the presidency? referendum on the constitution, where it was very Mr Grant: In 2008. much the Prime Minister, Mr Blair, who persuaded Ms Lea: The 2008 review. There are two major Mr Chirac to have a referendum, and who said we things they will need to look at at that particular would have a referendum too on the constitution. point. Clearly, there is the point on the Common And the rest was history because the French people Agricultural Policy, which still is a great block to voted “no”. That must have been an incredible the negotiations within the World Trade shock to Mr Chirac, and he must have not been negotiations, as we saw at the time of Hong Kong. very pleased with Mr Blair at the time. I suspect Second, if there are to be considerable structural that some of that animosity will remain to this date. and cohesion funds, then they must be directed Mr Grant: Can I come back to the point you raised towards the relatively poor accession states, the earlier about the 2008 review? I think it is likely to new 10 countries, of course Bulgaria and Romania be quite significant. The very fact that Mr Chirac as will be then; and, who knows, by then Turkey will have left the scene before the review begins is may have joined, although I personally doubt it; going to be significant. He has made a personal Macedonia may have joined, although again I crusade of being obstructive on CAP reform. Most personally doubt it—and away from the relatively other senior figures in French politics take a more rich countries such as Italy, and Ireland in moderate line than him, particularly on the left but particular and Spain that still take a lot of these to some extent on the right. When he is removed, structural funds. That is absolutely of supreme the balance of the argument in favour of some importance. In fact, you could argue that of the EU significant re-nationalisation of the CAP through 3335921006 Page Type [E] 20-07-06 01:49:03 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1
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11 January 2006 Mr Charles Grant and Ms Ruth Lea some mechanism such as co-financing, whereby she has to trim her sails to some extent. I feel that national governments have to meet part of the cost, within Germany and even with the parties of is highly likely. The Germans are very keen on it. France, however “right wing” they are meant to be If the French stop resisting so much as they have and however pro-business they are meant to be, done, then I do not think that the Irish and the however free market they are meant to be, in our Spanish on their own will be enough to prevent language, they are not what we would regard as movement towards quite a radical CAP reform. Anglo-Saxon in that sense of the word, because Remember that this is not just a review of the CAP; they are still basically attached very much, as I it is a review of the Budget generally. The perceive it, to the continental Rhine model of the Commission and others will, as always, propose social market. That tends to emphasise some sort of European tax that many countries, not protectionism, perhaps more so in France than only Britain, will say is ridiculous. The interesting Germany. It tends to emphasise social regulations, question is whether we can do what the Sapir a big welfare state, and the big state, which are very Committee recommended in the report that Andre´ anti-Anglo-Saxon; so it was always a bit of a myth Sapir drew up and presented to Mr Prodi in 2003, that somehow Mrs Merkel would change the when he said that we should use the Budget to agenda within Europe when it came to business and promote growth and try and devote spending to economic matters. It is very interesting that this things like R&D and education, rather than week she has been talking about bringing back functions such as agriculture, which do not do a lot parts of the constitution. She was talking about to help the European economy. The real question having more of a social aspect to it because she is whether we can generally re-shape the Budget. It thought that this somehow would make it more will not be easy, but I think there will be a real attractive to the peoples of the continent. It does argument in 2008–09 on that. not make it more attractive to us, but it makes it more attractive to the peoples of the continent. That, to me, almost said it all, because however Q106 Ms Stuart: If we hold on to the rotating right-wing she is perceived in continental Europe’s presidency we will not hold it until 2017, by which eyes, or in German eyes, that is not how we see it time our reputation will be slightly better. I am not here in Britain. surprised to hear you say that the French are not terribly upset with us because essentially we dug them out of a hole. France would have been the Q107 Ms Stuart: What about Poland? great stop of European integration, having said Ms Lea: I follow Poland in less detail, but I suspect “no”, and then complained that Britain were the that it would be very much the same there. I am ones who really wanted to go back. One of our not trying to be dismissive of Poland, but it is a problems was that there were not actually the relatively new country and it simply does not have people to negotiate with. The German Government the clout of Germany. Clearly, Germany has major was not formed as a negotiating partner until the clout within the European Union. I am afraid to second half of our presidency. I would like to know say that at the moment I suspect Poland does not. from Ruth Lea whether she thinks the change of Mr Grant: I think it is too early to tell what impact governments in Germany and in Poland will bring the new Polish Government will have on the about a change in not just lip-service to the Lisbon dynamics of European policy because it is still agenda, but bring about economic reform; or do finding its feet. This week they sacked the gaV- the Anglo-Saxons delude themselves because there prone finance minister who told Tesco to get out. are no Anglo-Saxon liberal market economies on It is unclear to me how they are going to shape up. the continent, even when they call themselves right- I suspect that they will be rather more Atlanticist wing governments, and can those in the Eurozone than the previous government; they have decided deliver if they wanted to? I would like to know to keep their troops in Iraq and they will probably from Charles Grant whether he thinks the change be a bit more stroppy and diYcult to deal with in in governments in Germany and in Poland changes EU negotiations and be a bit more nationalistic the dynamic of the power bases. Britain has always than the previous government, but it is too early to resisted the European Union being run by a group tell yet. As Ruth says, they are not yet a very of large countries, but both France and Germany significant actor at the highest level of EU politics. have traditionally done—like the Weimar Triangle, On Germany, I am much more pro-Merkel than which would bring in Poland, and sometimes Ruth is. I read Merkel as trying to go back to a Germany talks about the Weimar Triangle plus the Helmut Kohl type of foreign policy, in the sense UK. Has that kind of dynamic changed, of balance between being fairly pro-American and particularly with Mrs Merkel’s Chancellorship, and fairly pro-French; a balance between working with given her background? Britain and France as big members, but also having Ms Lea: I was always a tad sceptical, if I may say good relations with the small members and the east so, about Angela Merkel making a really major Europeans. I think that politically she is trying to diVerence to the German approach to economic achieve that balance, whilst Schro¨der clearly did models. As you know, she is CDU and there this not; Schro¨der wanted, at least at the end, to be very perception in this country that it is a centre-right close to France and not at all close to Britain or party, but this is not the same thing as the Anglo- America or the Poles. On economic reform, I agree Saxon idea of the free markets; and also she is in with Ruth that her instincts are very liberal in the grand coalition with the SPD, which means that continental terms but that her own party barons 3335921006 Page Type [O] 20-07-06 01:49:03 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1
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11 January 2006 Mr Charles Grant and Ms Ruth Lea are much less liberal than she is, let alone her SPD On the contrary, there is still the push towards coalition partners, so I doubt that she can have a bringing in extra regulation and the extra aspects huge impact on economic reform. The fact that she of the social model and social protection. The latest herself believes in it is better than having someone one, if you look at the Charter of Fundamental like Schro¨der who did not seem to believe in it at Rights—which we were told is no more binding least some of the time. than the Beano—that was Keith Vaz—a communication has now come out of the European Q108 Ms Stuart: What about the core Europe Union which says that every single piece of emerging, with a couple of large countries legislation that goes through the Commission must supporting small ones and trying to— be in accordance with the Charter of Fundamental Rights. These are early days, but like many things Mr Grant: I think that one consequence of Merkel’s V arrival is that the noyau dur (the core Europe) idea in the European Union, things start o as early is right oV the agenda for now. The French keep days but then they develop. When you look at what on pushing it. It has been a long-standing French they are doing, as opposed to what they might be reflex for decades. One of the reasons that it has saying, there is always this tendency to bring in never happened is because the Germans do not more and more regulation, more and more really believe in the idea of an inner group and protection and more and more rights. I see nothing inner sanctum built around Benelux, France and by way of a major deregulation programme at all. Germany. I think that Merkel is much keener to It is interesting that when you look at the Lisbon have close relations with east Europeans and the agenda, which was initially launched back in 2000 Brits, and will be much more hostile to the idea with the idea of making the European Union the than Schro¨der. Schro¨der was quite keen on this most competitive economy by 2010, when it was re- idea. He floated this informally several times in the launched last year they were talking about last few years, but without the Germans the French emphasising jobs and growth, and asking each will not get anywhere, so core Europe is oV the country to come up with national policies and agenda for now. national frameworks. There was nothing behind it Ms Lea: Can I comment on that, please? For a that said: “Look, what we have got to do, if we are start, I am not anti Mrs Merkel; I was just really going to meet the China challenge that the commenting on her reaction to the Anglo-Saxon Chancellor of Exchequer talks about, is get some model of economics. There is a core Europe serious deregulation in here, and get the single already, and that is called the Eurozone. I think market and make it a much more free-trade area that sometimes we forget just how significant that than an area where there is a lot of regulation and is. Do not forget that there are now 12 countries a lot of compliance”. within the European Union that meet monthly to decide what the interest rates should be, what the Q110 Mr Heathcoat-Amory: Can I ask Charles economic policies should be. If this is not Grant a diVerent question, but still on the Austrian something approaching a core as a part of the presidency, and that is about attitudes to Turkey. We European Union, I honestly do not know what is. have heard that it was a British achievement to get Mr Grant: Ruth is absolutely right. The question Turkey’s accession talks going again, but that there is is whether the Euro Group becomes a true hard entrenched and widespread popular opposition in core in the sense that the Euro Group countries Austria to Turkish accession. The same is true in have their own foreign policies and their own France, and probably in Germany. I think I am right justice policies or whatever. I do not see any that Austria and France have both promised evidence of that yet; it may happen one day, but it referendums on the issue, so are we not in danger here is not happening at the moment. of opening up another gap between what politicians want, which is Turkish accession, and what the Q109 Mr Heathcoat-Amory: It was a declared aim people want, which is that they do not? This could be of the British presidency to get the European a cruel deception for the Turks and create popular economies moving again and to simplify and discontent in Europe. remove unnecessary regulations; but the Austrians Mr Grant: I do not think we are opening up a gap have now taken over and they have talked because of the referendums. At the moment, you are approvingly of a more social Europe. I should like absolutely right that public opinion, particularly in to ask Ruth Lea whether she has noted today any Austria, France and the Netherlands, is very hostile deregulatory drive from Brussels as a result of the to Turkish membership. If there were referendums British presidency, and, secondly, whether that tomorrow the result would be in no doubt at all; might be threatened by an Austrian presidency that there would be a resounding “no”. It is possible that obviously does not believe in it. when Turkey finishes negotiations, which I guess Ms Lea: Commissioner Barroso, of course, came would be 10, 12 or possibly 15 years hence, the world up with an announcement two or three months ago will look diVerent. Turkey will look diVerent and of 68 would-be directives, but they were either France will have overcome the kind of crisis of moribund or they were irrelevant to business, so I confidence and malaise from which it suVers today. think that was the sum total of Barroso’s I do not think it is impossible that Turkey can join. deregulation drive. I do not see anything coming As for this gap, surely the whole point about from Brussels that suggests for a second that they referendums is that you make sure there is not a gap. would wish to deregulate the European economies. Nobody is going to impose Turkey on the wishes of 3335921006 Page Type [E] 20-07-06 01:49:03 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1
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11 January 2006 Mr Charles Grant and Ms Ruth Lea the Austrian or French people; it is up to them to of that going on. I do not think that it would be vote “yes” or “no”. What is happening is that the EU dangerous, as you put it, because I think that some is becoming more populist, and it is now impossible of the changes promised by the treaty would help the to change the treaties or to enlarge the EU without EU to work better, and I would welcome it if there referendums, which may or may not be a good thing. were a prospect of having a minor treaty change, for I do not see a gap opening up there. example attached to the Croatian accession treaty, in that way. I do not think it is very likely at the Q111 Mr Heathcoat-Amory: Can I probe this moment, however, because you now have a assumption that a referendum closes the gap blockage. There are three groups of countries: the between the politicians and the people? There was a Germans and the Austrians, who say, “let us clear rejection of the European constitution in implement the treaty, the whole thing and nothing France and Holland by referendum, but I notice that but the whole thing”; and you have people like the the Austrian Foreign Minister has said: “The British and Swedes who do not want to do anything; constitution is covered in snow and is waiting for and then you have Jacques Chirac and others in the spring.” Surely the 15 million French voters who middle, saying, “let us cherry-pick and do a few bits said “no” thought they were doing more to the and pieces here and there”. So long as they cannot constitution than just covering it by a layer of snow? agree on the next step forward, nothing will happen. Mr Grant: I think that the Austrian Foreign I myself am very sad that the Germans particularly Minister is living in cloud-cuckoo land. As you are still saying, “we want the whole treaty”, because know, David, there is absolutely no way you can as long as they go on saying that, we cannot cherry- adopt a constitution without every country ratifying pick, and I would like to cherry-pick. it, and so long as no senior politician in France or the Ms Lea: The mere fact that so many political elites Netherlands is prepared to jump up and say, “let us in Europe want to bring back the constitution is an have another referendum on the late-lamented act of extreme arrogance and just shows the absolute constitution” there is no chance of it passing. I just nonsense in the refusal to take notice of what the say, “dream on” to the Austrian Foreign Minister. electorate think. It was quite clear from the French She is out of touch with reality, as are those in the vote and the Dutch vote that they did not like the German Government who say a similar thing—and way the European Union was going. They did not indeed the Belgian and Spanish governments are like the idea of more and more power going to the also out of touch with reality. The truth will bite centre; and yet here are the politicians, the great home eventually because you simply cannot adopt political elites, saying, “These people voted ‘no’ but the constitution without roughly half the members really they are a little bit mistaken—and here we are, having ratified it, which is where we are today. we just want to push ahead with this constitution”. The mere fact that they are now discussing it again I think is hugely arrogant, and it is the Austrian Q112 Mr Heathcoat-Amory: There are moves in the Chancellor, Wolfgang Schuessel, who has been European Parliament to so-called cherry-pick the saying, “the ratification process is still going on”. constitution and pick out bits that are supposedly Which planet is he living on; is it Narnia or non-contentious. Indeed, there is some evidence that wherever? In the meantime the forces of integration this has started at Council of Ministers level in the within Europe are still going on and nothing is being European Scrutiny Committee from which we have stopped. It is not as if the politicians are saying, seen some proposals that appear to come from the “well, this ‘no’ vote should tell us something, that constitution and not from the treaty. Do you not see people do not want integration to go on, whatever that as a danger; that again the European politician the niceties of the particular aspects of the class can bypass the popular will by starting to constitution”; they are just carrying on with implement parts of the constitution by manipulating integration regardless. The final thing I was saying and extending treaty powers? Do you think this is here is that one aspect of the constitution was a new happening, and is it a danger? shared competence on energy, and that was very Mr Grant: Let me be precise. “Cherry-picking” as specifically in the constitution; and yet at Hampton defined by you could mean two diVerent things. It Court they begin to discuss energy, and we are going could mean implementing parts of the constitution to discuss energy again under the Austrian within the framework of the existing treaties. You presidency, irrespective of whether the constitution can do a little bit of that. You can agree to it by the has been passed or not. subsidiarity procedure, for example, giving national parliaments more power to block EU legislation; you could agree to let the TV cameras in, which I Q113 Mr Maples: It seems to me that these issues think they have agreed to last month, at the throw up two tensions, perhaps amongst lots of European Council meeting. There are some things in others, within the European Union. One is over the the constitution that you can just do by governments constitution, between the integrators and the “either and EU institutions saying “let us do it”; but only a stay where it is or roll it back a bit”; and the other on very tiny fraction of the total constitution. The the economic model. Do we want a social protective, second meaning of “cherry-picking” is this: can we probably an economic protective; or do we want to make some very minor treaty changes to the existing join the real world and compete in a low-tariV, low- treaties to do something like adopt the so-called tax, well-regulated economy? You have both talked double majority voting system or to introduce the in your papers about flexibility. Ruth, you have idea of an EU foreign minister? There is a discussion called it a` la carte and Charles has called it “variable 3335921006 Page Type [O] 20-07-06 01:49:03 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1
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11 January 2006 Mr Charles Grant and Ms Ruth Lea geometry”. It is not a new concept, but I am Italy. Italy has been losing competitiveness quite interested that you have both, from rather diVerent badly over the last few years. The one-size-fits-all points of view, articulated it. I can see this as a interest rate does not fit. Within a usual currency solution that could be bought by all the partners to union, whether it is the United States or the United the constitution issue, because it would allow those Kingdom, you have all sorts of other economic who want to integrate more to go out and do it and policies that ensure the integration of the economy, those of us who do not, not to, or presumably there not least of all funds going between the well- would be a core of economic issues—the single performing areas of the currency union to the less market and this sort of stuV—trade—which we well-performing areas of the currency union. At the would be bound by and not voting on, but other moment, that cannot happen. We talked about the things we could opt in and out of as we wanted to, Budget earlier, but the Budget does not do any of but using the European Union framework to do these things at all. In other words, you do not have those things, presumably on an inter-governmental these automatic stabilisers; you do not have the basis. Do you both think this is alive? It is something government policies that oVset the problems of that some of us here have been talking about here for having a single interest rate when you have diVerent a long time as well. Is this a practical proposition types of successful and a lot less successful aspects of which is worth pushing and worth trying to get the this currency union. I have argued for quite a long British Government to push? Suppose it were time that the Eurozone somehow has to go further successful; does it resolve or help to resolve the other down the road of political union. Under those issue about which kind of economic model we are circumstances, it is for those countries that are not in getting, because I assume that if we did have a Eurozone to say, “Fine, oV you go; do it; we will not flexible or variable geometry in Europe that the stand in your way; if you want to go for genuine economic competences would stay pretty well where political reasons, you go ahead.” In those they are at the moment with the Commission having circumstances you will inevitably get some sort of a` the primary role, being bound by a majority vote, la carte model, even more clearly defined than it is and that is where the blockage—or where the anti- now. Then there is the question of whether those globalisers are fighting their last stand, which is countries in the outer ring, so to speak, would say another battle that I would have thought, they wished to disassociate from some of the other irrespective of the ones about further integration or policies that are already coming out of Brussels. For not, that those of us who have accepted globalisation this country I would like to see us disassociate from and can live with the consequences, as we can in this a lot of the policies that are to do with the single country—that we have to win that battle or we are market. The single market, for me, means going to fall horribly behind India, China, South regulation, and regulation means lack of East Asia and the United States. I am sorry it is a competitiveness. At that stage you are actually rambling question but is the variable geometry a getting to a situation where you are saying that each runner on a constitutional basis, as the solution to country that is within the European Union, for their the problem, and does it help to deal with the economic futures, should be able to decide which economic tensions? policies they think are particularly suitable for them. Ms Lea: What drives my analysis of this is my concern about the economic lack of competitiveness Q114 Mr Maples: So the flexibility or the variable of a lot of European countries. Indeed, I said earlier geometry, or whatever one wants to call it—Europe that it strikes me that the Commission is still locked a` la carte—would have to go to the heart of the single in a mindset of regulation and the social market market/free trade issues. model, which I personally think is uncompetitive in Ms Lea: I think so. I think some people have got it this new globalised world, where we have got China in their minds that the single market is nothing more and India and indeed a still highly competitive than a free-trade area or a customs union: it is not, United States of America. The other thing that because the single market is about compliance with drives me of course is what is happening in regulations. It is, if I may say, a very continental Eurozone. It seems to me that without further attitude to markets and not an Anglo-Saxon attitude political integration within the Eurozone there are to markets. You really are talking about getting to going to be tensions within it that could well lead to the very fundament of policies within the all sorts of disruption in it. Time and time again— European Union. and this is one of the major arguments I used all the Mr Grant: Let me try and answer your question. I time as to why we should not join the euro—the would like to debate with Ruth many of the issues, single interest rate policy does not suit every single but time is short. I would like to see more variable member of the Eurozone. These are absolutely geometry policies—it is an unpleasant phrase but I crystal-clear economic facts now. For a long time the cannot think of a better one. I do not think we will interest rates that the European Central Bank has to see very much of it in the near future. My particular decide—and I do not blame the European Central reason for being so favourable to it is to do with Bank for having to do this because that is what it has enlargement because I am really committed to more to do—tended to be too low for countries like EU enlargement. I think there has always been a Ireland and Spain, which have been growing very very strong link throughout the EU’s history quickly for a variety of reasons, but they have been between so-called deepening and widening, and too high, on the other hand, for a country like countries like Britain have always wanted to enlarge Germany or to a lesser extent France, or indeed for obvious reasons: it creates a less political Europe, 3335921006 Page Type [E] 20-07-06 01:49:03 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1
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11 January 2006 Mr Charles Grant and Ms Ruth Lea a looser Europe, more of a free-trading Europe. Ms Lea: I am not an expert on trade, but I think the Countries like France never really wanted to enlarge biggest problem still is agriculture, is it not? That is for those reasons, but they did agree to enlarge. where you get the biggest protectionism. Why? There was an unwritten deal at the heart of the EU for the last twenty years, which has been a bit V more deepening for a bit more widening. Successive Q116 Mr Maples: Is that where most of the tari s waves of enlargement for the last twenty years have are? been matched by successive waves of treaty-based Ms Lea: As I understand it, but I am open to integration. If we are agreed, as perhaps we are in correction; I am not an expert on this. The biggest this room, that treaty-based integration has stopped problem with protection is in the agricultural sector. because there is not going to be any big new treaty As we have all suggested before, we would like to see for a very long time, I am afraid that means that some very major liberalisation of agriculture, and it enlargement scepticism grows, and there is a great would obviously be stopping one of the great reluctance amongst political elites in Europe to stumbling blocks to getting a decent agreement at enlarge. They think that more enlargement without the World Trade talks as well. However, as we have changing the institutions significantly will lead to a already discussed, that is a matter for 2008 and looser, less eVective, less eYcient European Union. beyond. Mr Grant: I bought a Chinese T-shirt the other day As I say, I am keen on enlargement, and therefore I V want to encourage the more integrationalist for £1; I do not think the EU has very high tari son countries to move ahead with little avant garde most industrial goods now. As Ruth says, the groups integrating here, there or wherever—and we problem is agricultural goods, but also where the EU will come back to the subjects where they might do should be criticised is on re-processed agricultural goods. We have low tariVsoncoVee beans, but it—so that they feel that Europe is becoming more V V V integrated, at least for them and their friends. Then higher tari s on instant co ee or packaged co ee, I think they will be much less hostile to the concept which discourages some of the poorer countries of a wider Europe. The Germans, for example, or the from developing processing and packaging industries. You could criticise the EU there, but, French, might feel less reluctant to allow Turkey in, V or Macedonia, if they are perhaps using the euro agriculture excepted, generally the tari s I do not group, as Ruth suggests, to create a closer economic think are particularly high these days. union amongst themselves. Where would it happen? As Ruth says, the Euro Group is an obvious area Q117 Mr Horam: You have just been talking, where you might see some greater tightening of ties very interestingly, about enlargement and the through external representation. through rules of disagreement between the wideners and the fiscal policy, possibly some harmonisation of tax deepeners, and you feel that treaty deepening is now bases or areas like that. The other area where you halting, and that widening may have stopped as well. may get it is justice and home aVairs. You already I wonder why you are so pessimistic. Could one see have the Shengen Agreement, which not everybody that now a widening may have a momentum, for is a full member of—not ourselves and the Irish— other reasons than may have been behind it so far in and there is no reason as far as I can see why some countries like Romania, Bulgaria and Ukraine? The countries should not co-operate on border guards or European Union may want to take those on board public prosecutors without taking everybody with eventually for geopolitical reasons—keeping them them. Those are the two areas where we might see it. out of the hands of Russia—a revived Russian Finally, on economics, I would like to see the British empire. If there is a battle over Ukraine, for example, propose an enhanced co-operation on services it might be part of that. Do you not think there are liberalisation. This would be political and it would other reasons, other than the traditional ones, be tactical. At the moment, as you know, France, whereby the widening might continue? Germany and some others are blocking Mr Grant: I would like to agree with you. Romania liberalisation of the service industries, and I think and Bulgaria will join in either 2007 or 2008. Croatia that we should frighten them by saying that we are is highly likely to join and has started negotiations. going to go ahead. I have asked legal experts whether But then you run against the French constitution, you can do this within the framework of the existing which has been changed. The French constitution treaties, and they tend to disagree: some think it says words to the eVect: “No country can join the would breach the laws of the single market, but some EU after Croatia without a referendum in France.” of them certainly think you could do it. I think we That is really important. I am not sure that the should take the east Europeans, the Irish and other Balkan countries will get in that easily, especially willing hands with us and go for complete those with Muslim populations like Macedonia and liberalisation of services and shame the French and Bosnia and Albania. As for the geo-strategic reasons the Germans into therefore stop blocking the for letting in, say, Ukraine—politicians and think- Services Directive. tankers and academics might agree with them, but I Ms Lea: It is very radical, if I may say so! am not sure they matter so much to the average French voter in referendums. I am therefore rather Q115 Mr Maples: It is a very interesting idea. We pessimistic on enlargement. still have a huge amount of external tariVs. I do not know if it was as many as it was last time I looked at it, but thousands, from biscuits to ski boots. Are we Q118 Mr Horam: Maybe on that one point about seeing any way of starting to reduce these? the referendum in France. 3335921006 Page Type [O] 20-07-06 01:49:03 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1
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11 January 2006 Mr Charles Grant and Ms Ruth Lea
Mr Grant: It is not just that because, obviously, constitution, even though the French and the Dutch Austria has talked about a referendum on Turkey have said “no” to it, was a huge arrogance. There is and will have one, and maybe the Netherlands could a huge democratic gap. have a referendum on enlargement; and other countries, conceivably Britain, could do so one day. Q121 Mr Horam: In your view, they have no It is not just the French problem, but the French perception that they are being arrogant. issue I mentioned is symptomatic of a bigger Ms Lea: I do not know whether they realise it or problem, which is that the EU itself is really have any self-awareness about their arrogance, but I unpopular in many European countries—not all but think they are jolly arrogant. many—and therefore if you want to add to it through a treaty change or just through Q122 Mr Horam: Do you agree with that, that they enlargement, that is giving people more Europe, in a are aware of this problem, Charles? way. Ruth has talked about the reasons why the Mr Grant: I agree with Ruth that they are being silly. French voted “no” to the constitutional treaty, and I would use the word “silly” rather than “arrogant”. there are many reasons of course. One thing that I think they are just out of touch with reality. undoubtedly had an impact was the Services Whether they know they are, I do not know. I find it Directive. There was a big discussion about very hard to explain why some politicians still say, liberalisation of services and Polish plumbers taking “we are going to keep going with this constitution”. French jobs, and this just made people in France— I cannot give you any insight into the psychology of a country with high unemployment—very the leaders we are referring to. frightened of change. People associate the EU with globalisation—not in Britain but in France and Q123 Mr Illsley: On the French 2005 referendum other countries. If globalisation makes you fear for change, of all the reasons you have listed in your your job and makes you dislike immigrants, you variable geometry essay and what you have said, is associate the EU with that—the EU is all about there any particular one that stands out as the main opening up frontiers and letting in more foreign reason for that change in the constitution—Turkey, people with funny names! I am generally quite the Services Directive, the unpopular enlargement— pessimistic about enlargement. If the European Mr Grant: Why France changed its constitution? economy really picks up, then I think this whole discussion will be diVerent. If there is low Q124 Mr Illsley: Yes. Is it a combination of all unemployment in France and Germany and the those? Netherlands, then the whole climate could change Mr Grant: I think the French constitution—the and we could be much more positive about move to change was set in motion before the enlargement. referendum. (Our friend from the French Embassy Ms Lea: I think that Charles is right. Charles was confirms that that is the case.) As the representative talking about widening versus deepening; of course from the French Embassy knows, I can be as critical it was always the British strategy to widen, so they of Jacques Chirac as anybody has been, and I am no would not have deepening, but the truth is that we fan of his, but I would give him credit on Turkey for have got both. There has been a lot of deepening in standing up for his principles. Although he is a recent years. Whether the constitution or the populist politician, he thought it was right to start remnants or cherry-picked bits of the constitution talks with Turkey for strategic reasons. Therefore, to survive is neither here nor there. Integration and satisfy or placate those in France who were really common European policies are advancing all the hostile to Turkey, which is more than half the time, right across the board, whether it is foreign people, he therefore said, “we will have a referendum policy, defence policy, asylum policy or immigration when Turkey joins”. I think he did it to provide policy—they are all moving ahead. The truth is that reassurance. He was going to start talks with Turkey we are getting further and further into a highly but some successor of his would have to pass a integrated European Union. referendum. I think that was tactically quite a clever move by Chirac. Q119 Mr Horam: Where does this leave the European Union project? Q125 Sandra Osborne: I am quite interested in what Ms Lea: The whole project? They are aiming for a you have been saying about enlargement as well, and united states of Europe; I have no doubt in my mind. the British people’s attitude to enlargement of the EU. You talk about other countries being fearful about liberalisation of services. Do you think that is Q120 Mr Horam: No, since this gap between public starting to happen in Britain as well? We do hear opinion that has been expressed in referendums, and comments about Polish workers coming here too. might be expressed in referendums in the future, Mr Grant: That is an interesting question! Your first about Europe, and what might be conceived as the and general point on enlargement—I think the Commission—the elite—point of view, there is now British people are not particularly sold on such a wide gap that something has to happen to enlargement. If there had been a referendum in resolve it. Britain before May 2004, I wonder what the result Ms Lea: It is a huge gap. As I was saying earlier, the would have been. I am not sure we the British would fact that I found the fact that a lot of the political have voted to take in east Europeans. I am not sure elites are now talking about resuscitating the they would have voted “yes” at all. However, since 3335921006 Page Type [E] 20-07-06 01:49:03 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1
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11 January 2006 Mr Charles Grant and Ms Ruth Lea that enlargement, and although, as we now know, rules and regulations eYciently, and do they have we have several hundred thousand workers from legal systems that can do that? The answer is eastern Europe in Britain, I do not myself detect a probably “no”. They are very corrupt. There are great popular up swell of opposition to those already some countries in the EU that are quite workers. Maybe some of you in your constituencies corrupt, but I think Bulgaria and Romania are have, and I would like to hear if you have, but I think particularly bad; and I think that letting countries in that most people realise that the Poles and others a bit too soon is very bad for the EU because it will who are here are working hard, not scrounging oV give enlargement a bad name. If we get criminal the state, and that they want to go back and live in gangs operating out of these countries—I am not their countries eventually. If you had a referendum saying that we will—then people will be very on the enlargement that has happened now, it would reluctant to let in other countries in the future that be quite easy to pass it, but it would have been very should be let in. We have moved too quickly, but we diYcult beforehand. As for Turkey, it is interesting are where we are, and we just have to do everything because Turkish membership has not really become we can to encourage them to improve their act. To an issue in Britain. I do not know quite why that is, be fair to them, both those countries are working compared to Netherlands or France or Germany. very, very hard to try and improve their performance Perhaps it is because we do not have a very large but from a fairly low level. Turkish population in this country; that may be part Ms Lea: They are very, very poor countries indeed; of the answer. If there was a referendum on when you look at the GDP per capita they are way, Albanian membership of the EU, I suspect that there way down on the EU average, and considerably would be a lot of hostility. I do not think the poorer than a country like Poland, so that adds extra Albanians have a very good image in this country. diYculties for those countries to absorb all the Ms Lea: I would agree with Charles that there is very changes they will be expected to absorb. I must little hostility to the several thousands of people admit that I do permit myself a wry smile when from central and eastern Europe that are here, but people talk about corruption in Romania and one of the main reasons for that is that we do have a Bulgaria, when we know that the Court of Auditors growing economy, or at least we had a growing has not passed the EU’s budget for the last eleven economy, and that we have low unemployment. This years—but there you go! is something that Charles referred to earlier; that if there were more economic prosperity and dynamism Q127 Chairman: Can I ask you about the prospects in France and Germany, then perhaps you would of invoking this so-called super safeguard clause and find less hostility to having the Polish plumber, for the emergency brake, as it was referred to by example. I did smile when he mentioned the Polish Douglas Alexander when speaking in the European plumber because I think the equivalent in Germany Accessions Bill debate. What would be necessary to was the Polish abattoir—the idea that they were bring about that? I understand it would have to be going to shift these poor dead animals over to done in the middle of this year to slow down the Poland to be dealt with because they were so much process of accession. Who would invoke that? Will cheaper to deal with there than they were in it be politically impossible for the 25 to make a Germany. If you could get some economic judgment that would clearly have serious dynamism into these core countries—and Italy is ramifications to halt the process if they felt that another country that is not doing well, and in fact is either Romania or Bulgaria or both are not meeting doing worse than Germany and France—if you the conditions? could genuinely get some economic growth into Mr Grant: This is to 2008? these countries, I suspect a lot of these tensions would disappear. Q128 Chairman: Yes, if they feel that they would not be ready by 2008, what could potentially happen Q126 Chairman: Can we move the discussion on to then? the imminent enlargement of Bulgaria and Ms Lea: I must admit I have not heard of this, but Romania? You mentioned 2007 or 2008; how close my feeling is that Romania and Bulgaria will become economically are those two countries to being able members over the next two or three years. The to cope with joining in 2007 or 2008, and are they processes look fairly advanced already. Croatia, I politically at EU standards in the context of things suspect, will get in under the wire, but beyond that, like governance, corruption and other issues? for the reasons we have discussed earlier about Mr Grant: I myself believe it was a mistake to give having referenda in France and Austria, I think that them a definite promise of membership in 2007 or is where the enlargement process will stop. I must 2008; I think we should have made it conditional on admit that I was not aware of this particular super them making certain reforms. It was done for safeguard procedure. political reasons. The French Government was right Mr Grant: I am not aware of a procedure that allows behind that. The British Government accepted it so us to delay beyond 2008. the Commission was bullied to accept it, but we are where we are and they will join in 2007 or 2008. I Q129 Chairman: From 2007 to 2008 has to be done think the problem in both those countries is one of this year. administrative capacity. Politically I think they are Mr Grant: I am afraid I do not know the fairly stable and reasonable countries these days, but technicalities. I imagine the Commission has to do they have the administrations to administer EU make a report, and that would have to be approved 3335921006 Page Type [O] 20-07-06 01:49:03 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1
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11 January 2006 Mr Charles Grant and Ms Ruth Lea by the Council of Ministers. It is always diYcult for the Croatians—I happened to see the Croatians governments to stand up and bash an applicant in today—is evident. The Croatians have put one chap this way because they are probably trying to sell in charge of it all and given him complete authority some export deal to the country concerned. I would to boss around the various ministries and all the hope that there is a delay, but I am rather sceptical people around, and they have given him a huge that there will be. negotiating team with the best advisors and oYcials, and he reports directly to the prime minister. There Q130 Chairman: But there is no provision for should not be a problem with the Croatian stopping it beyond 2008. negotiations. The Turks have done none of that. Mr Mr Grant: I am not aware of that. I think the Ali Babacan, the chief negotiator, is a very accession treaty, as it is phrased, says 2007 or 2008, intelligent, good man, but he has, as far as I can tell, so if there was some crisis or some military coup in very little authority over the relevant ministries. He Bulgaria you could always do something, but unless has not been able to knock heads together. That is something very dramatic happens I do not see how just one example, but the whole Turkish attitude to you could delay it beyond 2008. the negotiations worries me a bit. They do not really understand that negotiating to join the EU is not a Q131 Ms Stuart: Surely, they would have had to negotiation; the EU tells you what to do and you do have closed all the chapters for accession which they it. That is what happens, and you can argue about had not yet closed, and if those chapters are not the timing of certain things, and right at the end closed— when you get to the budget and you argue a bit about Ms Lea: That would be the case for any country, money there is a real negotiation; but most of the would it not? That is a more general problem. negotiations are not negotiations at all. If you are the negotiator for Turkey or Croatia, what really Q132 Ms Stuart: I did not think Romania and happens is that you have to negotiate with your Bulgaria— domestic bureaucracy, with your domestic Mr Grant: They have signed the treaties so they have ministries, media and public opinion; and you have been ratified now. to persuade them that it is all good for them. One Ms Lea: That would have been the same for Poland, should not pre-judge Turkey because they have only would it not? just started, but I am not encouraged at the moment. Mr Grant: As far as I am aware, the chapters have Several things can go wrong. One thing that could been closed. easily happen is that Turkey walks away from the negotiations. A lot of people in Turkey are not going Q133 Chairman: Is there any prospect that one will to be happy at the prospect of being bossed around be in and the other not, in 2007; or are they going to by Brussels bureaucrats, if I could put it that way. be taken together? The Turks are a very proud people, and they may Ms Lea: I am just speculating, but if I were a betting decide that it is not worth going ahead. That is quite person I would say they will both be in together in plausible. I know senior Turks who believe that that 2007. will happen several years down the road. That is not Mr Grant: I would agree with that. Unless necessarily a disaster if it does happen because a something very dreadful happens in one country period of several years of negotiation is itself that does not happen in the other, they will be kept modernising and reforming the country, which is together. It is just easier for everybody. very good for Turkey and very good for Europe. The other thing that could happen is that at some point Q134 Mr Hamilton: May I bring you back to Austria or the Netherlands or France or Cyprus will Turkey? Obviously it is a very hot subject at the just refuse to close a chapter, because every single moment! Charles, you said earlier that you thought chapter, either 33 or 35, has to be closed it may be 10 or 15 years before Turkey is ready to unanimously by every member of the Council of join the EU. Four years ago we went to Turkey and Ministers. If one country wants to block things and Y did a report on Turkey, part of which included be di cult or bloody-minded, it can just do so at any prospects for accession to the European Union. At point during the negotiations. There could be a that time their senior ministry oYcial who was problem on the Turkish side or the EU side before responsible for negotiations with the EU, said, “It is we get to the end of the negotiations. going to be at least 10 or 15 years”. Do you Ms Lea: I agree with that. I have already expressed realistically think there is a prospect that Turkey will my scepticism that Turkey will ever join the be ready in 10 or 15 years, leaving aside France, European Union. It may be that if there are all these because, as you said quite rightly, many things can problems about negotiating membership, Turkey change on the ground as far as a referendum is will say that it just is not worth the candle. I am an concerned? Will they be politically ready to join? economist and always tend to look at things from an Will they have closed all the chapters? How far do we economic point of view, but if this country is have to go? developing and is getting in investment from other Mr Grant: I think it is possible that Turkey will countries, not least from other European countries conclude its negotiations within 10 to 15 years, but I and the States—if it looks as if it is in a very happy have to say that the obstacles are enormous. I am not position between whatever is happening in the encouraged by the way the Turks are approaching Middle East and in Europe, it may say, “We are the negotiations at the moment. The contrast with developing very nicely, thank you; we do not need 3335921006 Page Type [E] 20-07-06 01:49:03 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1
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11 January 2006 Mr Charles Grant and Ms Ruth Lea the acquis communautaire or the deliberations from western Balkans there is a very variable pattern. Brussels holding us back. We want to be left to There is a substantial non-Muslim population in develop as we are doing.” They may well say that BiH and in Macedonia; and there is virtually a total there are more minuses than pluses in joining; and non-Muslim population in Serbia, and a very the more the debates and the negotiations go on, substantial non-Muslim majority in Montenegro. they may come to that conclusion. Can you clarify for us why, on the grounds of the French referendum, so pessimistic, particularly in Q135 Mr Hamilton: As well as the likelihood, as relation to the countries I have been referring to? In Charles said, of the French rejecting in a referendum the western Balkans it is only Kosovo and Albania the Turks’ accession, surely there is a thorny issue of that are Muslim, virtually a hundred per cent. substance? In spite of agreements that have been Ms Lea: I do not think it is just because the countries signed by Turkey in relation to customs negotiations are necessarily Muslim; that is not the only issue. with Cyprus now that it is a member of the EU, they There is the issue of whether they will “take our have completely disregarded them. In fact their money”. Obviously, at the moment France gets Deputy Prime Minister, Abdul Latif Sener, said that money from Brussels, not least through the Turkey will not open its ports and airports to agricultural system. That may well change after 2008 Cypriot-flag ships and aircraft, which is totally or after the negotiations that start then; but against what they have already agree. How do we get nevertheless there is this idea that if you have more around that? Cyprus has got to be one of the key poor countries coming in to the European Union issues as far as opening the door is concerned. then, clearly, whatever funds there may be for Mr Grant: I do not claim to be a great expert on the whatever reason, they will be more thinly spread and Cyprus problem, but my reading of it is that at least obviously will go more towards the poorer areas. In for the last year or two the main problem has been other words, economically we may miss out, and I Cyprus and not Turkey. You can certainly say that suspect it is that economic aspect too; it is the until recently Turkey, and in particular Mr “looking after me” aspect that leads to a lot of the Denktash, the Turkish Cypriot leader, was a huge populations of France and other developed western part of the problem, the bigger part of the problem. European countries saying that they do not want You have to remember that the year before last the further enlargement, taking in very poor countries. Turks agreed to support the Annan plan. The Mr Grant: I would agree with that. I think that the Turkish Cypriots voted in favour; the Turkish Islamic factor is only one reason why France is Government was in favour; and the Greek Cypriots hostile to enlargement. It is a reason though, which blocked it with their referendum. Since then, the is why the chances of a French referendum going in Greek Cypriot Government has really been very, favour of Serbian membership, for example, would very diYcult and obstructive and has prevented the be much higher than one in favour of, say, Turkish EU from giving the aid to northern Cyprus which it membership. As Ruth said, there is a general promised, and it has prevented flights going from hostility to further enlargement because of people Turkey to northern Cyprus, which really destroyed coming to take their jobs and because of the the northern Cyprus tourist industry. The Greek corruption and the criminal gangs and whatever. I Cypriots have been very diYcult indeed. I am not am perhaps a little more pessimistic than Ruth. I do saying that the Turks have been that reasonable not think Croatia will necessarily be the last country either on letting Cypriot ships into their ports, but I to join the EU, but I think it might be. I hope that it think the real problem at the moment is that the is not. As long as the west European economy picks Greek Cypriots are getting away with blue murder up and we get some inspired political leadership, and nobody is prepared to get tough on them, then there is a good chance that some of these namely the Greeks or the Americans or the British. Balkan countries will join in the long run. There is a clear obvious package deal to be done; that the Turks agree to open their ports with the Q137 Sir John Stanley: As far as the British customs union, and the Greek Cypriots agree to stop Government’s policy towards the western Balkans blocking aid for northern Cyprus. There is a package applicants is concerned, can you give us any news as deal to be done but nobody seems to be getting their to what you think the priorities should be for the act together at the moment. British Government in trying to press on at a good Mr Hamilton: I was going to ask; who is going to do speed with the entry of the western Balkan countries, it? We are aware of that because 14 months ago we either generally or in relation to specific points on were in Cyprus ourselves and we saw exactly what particular countries? was going on; it was very clear to us at the time. Mr Grant: We do not have any specific points. I just think that the British Government has really tried Q136 Sir John Stanley: I was somewhat surprised very hard to keep prospective membership open for that you were both so pessimistic about the these countries. They have had success there. I think prospects of enlargement in the western Balkans they were right to be tough on the Croatians and to beyond Croatia. It seemed to me that you were hold out on the Gotovina business, and that has putting extremely heavy weight on the French turned out very nicely with Gotovina being arrested. Government’s decision to hold a referendum on the They were quite right to say that they must try to entry of further countries. If your thinking is that the arrest Gotovina before agreeing to start talks. The French people will vote against the entry of a British Government has a very enlightened view on country that is predominantly Muslim, in the the western Balkans and understands the strategic 3335921006 Page Type [O] 20-07-06 01:49:03 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1
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11 January 2006 Mr Charles Grant and Ms Ruth Lea significance. To be fair, I think the French I think it is a step too far for most EU governments Government understands that as well, and whatever at the moment, however much they may regret the public opinion may be in France it also has an Russia bullying Ukraine. That said, the action plan enlightened view of that. Most of the governments drawn up between the EU and Ukraine under its do because they remember the Balkans wars. That is neighbourhood policy was a start. It was drawn up why I am much more optimistic about these before Yuschenko became president, and they countries joining than Turkey. Although I would wanted a bigger and better action plan with more like Turkey to join I just think that all the reasons goodies for Ukraine, and the EU said to them: “Not that make political leaders in western Europe think for now, but we can go beyond it in certain ways.” that we must get the Balkans in, namely the Bosnian On visa facilitation, for example, the EU is talking war, the Kosovo bombing et cetera, do not really about going quite a lot further than was initially apply to Turkey. Turkey will be all right if it never promised. The Ukrainians like to use the argument: joins the EU. Ukraine will still be a proper “Unless we are promised membership, we will not functioning country if it never joins the EU. reform.” That is not good enough; they jolly well However, will Macedonia or Bosnia ever be proper have to reform because it is good for them to reform; countries if they do not join the EU? They will it is in the interests of the Ukrainian people that probably not be, and are potentially politically Ukraine modernises its political and economic unstable if they do not join. system. In the long run the carrot of potential Ms Lea: I think that is true. I just allowed myself to membership may help them a bit, and in the short smile that Ukraine was still functioning providing it and medium-term the carrots that we can oVer under can get Russian gas, but that is another point the action plan in terms of trade, aid and political entirely! I agree with Charles: it is right and proper to dialogue may help to some extent. However, it is take an enlightened view of bringing in the western important to get the message to the Ukrainians that Balkans. Again, I would make the point that this it is good for them to reform; they are not doing it as should not be the greatest priority facing the a favour for us, and they should be able to do it even European Union because economic reform is a without the prospect of immediate membership. bigger issue, and, at the end of the day, whether the European Union can be a strong economic area, as Q140 Mr Hamilton: Over the Christmas and New to whether it really will be a happy place for these Year period we had this soap opera played out countries to come to. between Russia and Ukraine on gas supply or Gazprom quadrupling the price. I accept everything Q138 Sandra Osborne: I would like to ask about you say about Ukraine, but this has a knock-on Ukraine. Relations between Ukraine and the EU eVect for the European countries. How do you think seem to be going from strength to strength with the we are going to reduce our dependency on Russian recent summit addressing closer co-operation. What gas, or are we doomed to be ever more dependent on do you think would be the costs and benefits of their huge reserves? closer co-operation with Ukraine? Ms Lea: “We” Europe, or “we” the United Ms Lea: I am not sure whether I quite read it that Kingdom? way. The events over the last fortnight have shown Y the truth, the di culty and the dilemma of Ukraine’s Q141 Mr Hamilton: The European Union and the position because of its dependence, for want of a UK. better word, on Russian gas. Russia has this huge Ms Lea: And the UK in particular, because I have resource that the Ukrainian economy depends on, been looking at the UK situation on energy, and in and it comes down to economics at the end of the my opinion it is quite dire. At the moment obviously day. If you have economic dependency like that, we have a mix of energy sources for electricity then I am afraid Ukraine is almost economically generation; we have nuclear power; we have coal; we dependent on Russia. Russia is clearly in a position, have gas, most of which we get from the North Sea under Mr Putin, to play every power game that it at the moment; and then there is a bit of renewables. wants to play. Although it looks as though Ukraine Down the road, in 2020, a lot of the nuclear power wants to move more to the West, I suspect it will find will have gone, a lot of the coal power will have gone, itself very restricted in being able to do that. and we will be even more dependent on gas. By then, Mr Grant: I do not know if there are going to be any about 80% of it could well be imported from Russia, questions on the European Neighbourhood Policy, unless something else happens, which is an but this leads on to it. absolutely dire situation to be in. The reaction for all the countries, but perhaps the UK in particular, is Q139 Chairman: Yes. that we do have to think very hard about alternative Mr Grant: The first thing to say is that Ukraine’s energy sources for electricity generation. Clearly, we chance of joining the EU in the next 15 years is are trying to build up the renewables, but there are extremely bleak. At the moment Poland and limitations to what we can do with renewables. In Lithuania would love Ukraine in, but nobody else this country the Government is looking for a 20% does because it is a big, complicated, very poor target by 2020 but I think we will be very lucky to country. Whatever the strategic reasons we referred meet that. At the end of the day, it is the “N” word, to earlier, it would be diYcult to digest, and nuclear power. France has a lot of nuclear power especially if there were no more treaties that already; they have nuclear power stations very much succeeded in making EU institutions more eYcient. on their rivers, and they hope that the rivers do not 3335921006 Page Type [E] 20-07-06 01:49:03 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1
Ev 42 Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence
11 January 2006 Mr Charles Grant and Ms Ruth Lea dry up because they will lose the water supply. his subsequent speech to the European Parliament Finland is looking to have nuclear power stations. If that if we are negotiating with Russia, we might have the countries of western Europe are serious about a bit more clout if we negotiate together. It is a fairly not being dependent on imported gas from Russia, obvious point. If it is Russia plus the Germans or then they really do have to build up indigenous Russia plus the Italians or whatever, the Russians supplies, and that means nuclear. tend to be the bigger and more powerful partner, but if the EU countries that do take Russian gas concert V Q142 Mr Hamilton: Are you saying that nuclear their e orts, maybe we will get a better deal from energy is the only alternative to Russian gas? Russia. Ms Lea: It is not the only alternative because obviously there are renewables, but renewables tend Q145 Chairman: There was a big argument between to be very energy dilute; you need an awful lot of some of the Baltic States and Germany about the them. You need to have an awful lot of windmills to route of that Russian pipeline, which was going generate the electricity. If you are serious about under the Baltic Sea. The Lithuanian delegation generating intensively, then it is mainly nuclear came to see us a few months ago and they were power. extremely unhappy about the fact that Russia was doing a deal with Germany and putting it under the Q143 Mr Hamilton: You say you do not place any sea rather than putting it across. Is the potential for credence in the Government’s White Paper of a few Russia playing oV one EU state against another years ago on oVshore wind generation, which could putting it in the best possible position, by having supply all our energy needs within 30 or 40 years. deals with one country to the detriment of others? Ms Lea: To be fair to the 2003 White Paper, which Mr Grant: On this issue I think we should not I read the other day, they were obviously talking criticise the Russians for building a direct pipeline to about massively expanding wind power both their biggest market, which is Germany, and which onshore and oVshore. Even then, they were only may come on to Britain. I can understand, if I were looking at an aspiration of 20% of total energy needs a Ukrainian or a Pole, that I would be a bit upset for electricity generation by 2020, and it was an about that. It is better for us that there is a direct aspiration. Even for that there was a very, very good route that cannot be interfered with by political question mark against it. It is interesting that the disputes between Russia and Ukraine. If a big DTI has set up an energy review, which will report supplier wants to bring a direct link to a big in the middle of this year; and the nuclear word was consumer, it is not our business to tell them where back on the agenda. I am not saying that nuclear they should build their pipeline. The Baltic power is the complete solution to the whole thing but argument to me is not compelling on that point. it is clearly part of the solution to being less Ms Lea: Indeed not. I have a couple of observations dependent on imports. on what Charles was saying earlier. We have had energy eYciency as a policy for the last thirty years Q144 Mr Hamilton: Charles, is it nuclear or and yet energy demand goes up almost inexorably Russian gas? 1.5% a year. We just like our computers and our Mr Grant: I happen to share Ruth’s views on nuclear toys, and even with little windmills sticking on the power; I think it will help a lot. However, there are roof I do not know how you are going to cut back on many other ways of reducing dependence: just using energy demand. When Charles mentioned Algeria a energy more eYciently is the easiest thing to do. The slight shudder went down my spine. Do we really emissions trading scheme that the EU has set up is want to be dependent on Algeria? Answer: no. helpful in encouraging us to use energy more Chairman: We can obviously go on for a long time eYciently. It should be extended to aviation. with this, but we are not just looking at energy. Diversity of supply is important. We can get liquefied natural gas from Algeria and possibly other Q146 Ms Stuart: This is a complete change of places. But whatever we do, we in Europe will subject. Let us see where we are at the moment. We depend on Russia for gas. Whatever scenario we can always come back to cherry-picking of the plan, we will need a lot of Russian gas. I do not think constitution. We suggested such things as an that that is a dreadful proposition. I am no great fan external action service and a foreign minister. I want of the Putin regime, but it is not in Russia’s interests to quote to you something that a former NATO to cut oV our gas supply too often anyway. Some of Deputy Supreme Allied Command Europe, Sir you may have seen a very interesting paper by Dieter Robert Smith, said. “Ultimately the EU is Helm, which was presented to the Hampton Court potentially the most eVective organisation for Summit, the last EU summit but one, on the need for nations to use force collectively, more eVective than greater co-ordination of EU policy on energy. It was NATO or the UN.” I wanted to focus on the word not proposing lots more powers to the Brussels “force”. Do you see any real progress in relation to Commission but just proposing better connections the EU becoming a power that is prepared to use between the various national gas markets, and force, or will it simply increase its presence and proposing a European storage system so that people peacekeeping, which is quite a diVerent approach to who have too little gas can get it from people who what Sir Robert Smith would say? have more gas. There were some very interesting Ms Lea: Can I speak as a complete non-expert on ideas in that very short paper. The other thing is that this? I cannot see the European Union ever being a Blair himself mentioned at Hampton Court and in serious force when it comes to a defence force 3335921006 Page Type [O] 20-07-06 01:49:03 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1
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11 January 2006 Mr Charles Grant and Ms Ruth Lea because their whole expenditure on defence is it does not pass new treaties. The EU is doing more minute in comparison with the United States of in defence. The European Defence Agency that was America. Clearly, America, within NATO, will have set up last year—these battle groups are potentially supreme clout when compared with the European quite interesting. It is too early to tell whether or not Union. The idea of the European Union being a they are going to be eVective, but the EU’s increasing serious defence power is something that simply role in peacekeeping all over the world shows that it cannot happen unless the countries of Europe are is something that is growing rather than anything prepared to put a great deal more money into their else, and we should not write it oV therefore. defence expenditure. Mr Grant: What Ruth says is undoubtedly true, but Q148 Ms Stuart: Would I be right in saying that all Europe could be a serious security power. It can this is happening on the ground in spite of the create peace, and is creating peace in parts of the politicians but because of the politicians? world. I find that the British public have no idea that Mr Grant: Yes. the EU is involved in missions in places like Aceh, where they are a key element in monitoring the peace Q149 Ms Stuart: And things like the EDA are settlements; on the Gaza/Egypt border where they happening outside the treaties. are policing the border; or in Transdnistria—where Ms Lea: It is happening in the second pillar. It is all they may be on their way soon. Obviously, there is happening through the second pillar. an EU force keeping the peace in Bosnia. This is Mr Grant: Yes, that is right. peacekeeping, not going into a war zone with all Ms Lea: Through Maastricht. guns blazing, although they did that once in Bunia in the Congo two or three years ago. A small EU spearhead force went in to create stability before the Q150 Chairman: Do you envisage any expansion? UN peace force went in. The EU is developing so- You have referred to these increasing missions that called battle groups, which will be up and running have taken place in the last two or three years. Do soon. They will be forces that are supposed to be you envisage any expansion of an EU role to assist capable of going in to a crisis zone in a fairly diYcult some of the former Soviet Union conflicts, for situation, not just peace-keepers. I do not think the example potentially Moldova? When Romania EU will ever be the kind of organisation that will do comes into the EU will we then have an EU the bombing of Kosovo that NATO did. When there requirement to start moving up to the Russian border and getting engaged in some of those very is a serious military conflict most of us will use Y NATO. What the EU is good at is having the whole di cult issues? spectrum of peace-building capabilities under one Mr Grant: We have already gone there in a sense. umbrella. There is a force of 5,000 policemen that The EU has approved a plan to send not soldiers but can be sent to diVerent places; there are legal oYcers some kind of border policing force to Transdnistria/ in Georgia, for example; and of course we have the Ukraine border. They may not have gone yet, but aid and humanitarian assistance, which is all under the plan has been approved. That is something that is sensitive to the Russians because Transdnistria is the EU umbrella. What the EU in theory at least is V able to do very well, which no other organisation can e ectively dominated by Russia. We have the other do, is combine together these diVerent elements to frozen conflicts in Abkhazia, South Ossetia and help nation-building. Interestingly, I notice that Jim Nagorno Karabakh, and in those parts of the world Dobbins, a very experienced former US diplomat, use of EU peacekeepers or observers is a highly who was the chief diplomat covering the Balkans likely way of making everybody feel happy about and Afghanistan, has said that the problem today in some peace settlement. When there is a peace Afghanistan is that NATO needs to borrow EU settlement there, I bet you that the EU is involved in assets. We have all talked about the EU borrowing policing it. NATO military assets in terms of transport, planes or whatever, but the problem in Afghanistan is that Q151 Sir John Stanley: Turning to counter- NATO is in there with 15,000 troops, but they do not terrorism, the universal view being expressed by have the soft power capabilities that the EU does. police and security people who are in a position to They do not have the policemen and judicial oYcers know is that we face still an extremely serious and the aid workers. They need help from the EU in counter-terrorist threat over all the EU countries. that kind of place. I apologise for the long-winded We seem to have got most of the procedural and answer! paper blocks in place. We have the EU Counter- Terrorism Strategy, the EU Counter Terrorism Action Plan, and we have an EU Counter-Terrorism Q147 Gisela Stuart: Charles, there is a question of Co-ordinator producing six-monthly reports. We assets and there is a question of political will. Will we now have an eVective working of the new counter- go on wishing to use NATO because we do not have terrorist extradition arrangements, and we saw that assets, or is it because the EU will lack the combined in relation to the alleged bomber who went to Italy political will? after the July 21 bombing, who was successfully Mr Grant: I think it is a bit of both, but we should extradited back to the UK. Do you both think that be aware that EU defence policy, despite the total in relation to the threat the EU, and particularly the lack of interest of most heads of government and British Government, are doing all they reasonably most defence ministries, is building up. In that sense can in this area, or are there things that should be Ruth is right: the EU continues to integrate even if done and which have been glaringly omitted so far? 3335921006 Page Type [E] 20-07-06 01:49:03 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1
Ev 44 Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence
11 January 2006 Mr Charles Grant and Ms Ruth Lea
Ms Lea: I have to admit that I have no particular between the European Union and these various expertise in this area, to be completely frank. countries, I always have a slight feeling of disquiet, Mr Grant: I do not have great expertise either, but I I must say, because very often the French have a would make a couple of points. The problem for the diVerent set of interests to the British, say, with some EU as an actor in counter-terrorism is simply that it of these countries, and they have a diVerent history is such a big organisation with so many diVerent with some of them. You have to ask yourself, committees and departments that getting them all to depending on how the thing develops, just how talk to each other is a real challenge. That is why the much the British interests in these particular areas appointment of Gijs de Vries as the Anti-Terrorism will be overridden by European Union interests. Co-ordinator is good news, but he has no power; his That is always the problem when you have an job is to co-ordinate the diVerent bits of the Council increasingly integrated European Union that is of Ministers. That does not count the European subsuming the diVerent Member States. Commission, which is also involved in some Mr Grant: I think that the neighbourhood policy is a important aspects. There is a lot more that could be brave attempt to try and find a way of bringing these done in terms of streamlining those committees and neighbours closer to us without oVering them departments that are involved. It is a boring membership. It is too early to judge it but at the bureaucratic point, but despite all that there has moment I am not that impressed by how it is been some real success. The most important working out. The EU Commission and the Member intelligence co-operation of course is always States have moved rather too slowly to oVer bilateral and not at EU level. It will never be at EU suYcient carrots to persuade the neighbours to level and it should not be, because the British and the make the reforms we would like them to make, in French always say more to each other than they particular on trade access where we have not been as would say to 27 other countries. EU/US co- generous as we should have been. Equally, there is operation, both between individual Member States an issue of conditionality that is important. I and the US, and between the EU as an institution personally think that the neighbourhood policy will and the US, has been very good. John Ashcroft had not work unless we apply conditionality and unless a very good relationship with his European we say, “You will get this trade concession if you do counterparts, and the EU and the US have reached the following things”. The Egyptians do not like important agreements on extradition and other that; they say something rather rude if you say that kinds of judicial co-operation in counter-terrorism. to them. They do not want to be talked down to in Just recently we saw the British presidency reach an that way and they find the whole concept of EU agreement on data retention, which is a useful conditionality very patronising. Some smaller, step forward, with all 25 countries agreeing to new weaker countries may accept it, but there is a whole rules on that. There is a lot that is being done, but issue to think about as to what extent one should probably a lot more could be done. The most apply conditionality. In the little paper I sent round important thing is to try and get the diVerent bits of before this session I suggested that we may have to V V the EU machine to work together in sync, which has o er something more than we are o ering at the not really been the case until now. moment in order to give these countries incentives to reform and improve their ways. I floated the idea of allowing some of them into parts of our foreign Q152 Chairman: Can I take you back to the policy. Ukraine and Georgia perhaps should be European Neighbourhood Policy. The EU has a lot included in EU foreign policy without being EU of action plans now with diVerent neighbouring members, to the extent that they are allowed to send countries, including Moldova and Ukraine but also representatives along to meetings and help take part many in North Africa—Morocco, Tunisia—as well in shaping foreign policy. That is probably as with Jordan, Israel and the Palestinian authority. unrealistic for now but the basic issue will come How do you see these developing? Is there a danger back: we need to find ways of oVering something that certain countries, even those that are not more to our neighbours than we are oVering at the geographically in Europe, for example Morocco, moment, which is less than membership. If we oVer would have some kind of aspiration that would be them nothing more than what is in the current action unrealistic, that this is the first step on a conveyor plans—a little bit of aid and a little bit of trade—that belt to joining the European Union? At the same is not enough to bind them into our family, which is time, how can we use this relationship to pursue what we need to do. policies of economic liberalisation or good Ms Lea: I would question whether we do need to governance in the neighbourhood of the European bind them into our families. I suspect that a lot of Union? these countries would do better by themselves. Ms Lea: Again, it is not an area of expertise, but in Chairman: That is a debate for another day. Thank a country like Morocco, it clearly sees this as a first you, Charles and Ruth, for coming along. This has step towards membership of the European Union. I been a really useful session, and we have covered all think it is a fantasy, quite honestly; I could never see the areas we wanted to ask you about, which is quite that happening. When I hear of the relationship remarkable! 3393671001 Page Type [SO] 20-07-06 01:51:27 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1
Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence Ev 45
Wednesday 3 May 2006
Members present:
Mike Gapes, in the Chair
Mr David Heathcoat-Amory Sandra Osborne Mr John Horam Sir John Stanley Andrew Mackinlay Ms Gisela Stuart Mr John Maples
Witnesses: Mr Douglas Alexander, a Member of the House, Minister for Europe, Mr Anthony Smith, Director, European Political AVairs, and Mr Simon Manley, Former Head, Economic/Central Europe, Foreign and Commonwealth OYce, gave evidence.
Q153 Chairman: Good afternoon everybody. seen as a period of stagnation and that it was Douglas, thank you for coming along today and important to understand not simply the text and the agreeing to discuss the European Union in general. judgment that the people in France and the We have got quite a big agenda that we want to Netherlands had reached on the text but also the touch on. I would like to begin by going back to the broader context. That explains why we chose to use British Presidency and asking you to give an the informal heads of government meeting in assessment of how you think it worked out in the end Hampton Court in October to focus on those and what the achievements were and what the broader questions establishing in its broadest sense failures were. the challenges that Europe faced, embracing the very Mr Alexander: Firstly, can I say it is a pleasure to be significant pressures of globalisation bearing down with the Foreign AVairs Committee. Perhaps I could on the European Union and the European just in the briefest sense introduce Simon Manley, continent. I think, as was already manifest in the who has served as Head of Economic/Central Spring Council of the Austrian Presidency, Europe within the Foreign OYce, and Anthony Hampton Court proved impressive both in some of Smith, who is our Director of European and the issues it addressed and the added impetus it gave Political AVairs. With your permission, Chairman, to key areas of policy work of the European Union. at appropriate points in the course of the evidence I There was the important and delicate work of may call on them for support. Reflecting back on the securing the opening of accession talks with Turkey Presidency now just over four months since its on 3 October. It is no secret that I came to the conclusion, I would essentially begin at the Europe job immediately after the election so it was beginning: what did we inherit? We inherited a my first exposure to negotiations of that sort. I have Europe that was divided on the issue of the to say I learned a great deal working closely with European budget after the June European Council Jack Straw in the course of September, the weeks under the Luxembourg Presidency, a Europe that immediately preceding the 3 October deal, and it is was still coming to terms with the scale and honest to say that there were various points, both in significance of the rejection of the Draft the preceding weeks and the preceding hours, where Constitutional Treaty by voters respectively in the barriers at times seemed insuperable. In that France and in the Netherlands, and a Europe that sense it turned out to be a negotiation that went was under an obligation, agreed previously at a literally down to the wire and the claim that the European Council in December 2004, to open accession talks began on 3 October was achieved by accession talks with Turkey on 3 October. The using Greenwich Mean Time rather than Luxembourg time where the negotiations were circumstance dictated that we had a fairly taking place. I think by almost any standard the challenging agenda. If we take each of those issues in achievement of the opening of accession talks was turn, I would argue that in what was ultimately adjudged to be of historic significance and is agreed among the heads of government at the therefore one of the other elements of which we are December European Council and what is now being very proud in the course of the Presidency. Along followed through in the institutional process, we with those specific challenges that were dictated to us achieved what many regarded as being very unlikely, by circumstance, there were of course dossiers and which was to find the common ground and areas of work which we inherited from the consensus on the issue of the European budget, a Luxembourg Presidency and that we were keen to matter I am sure you will wish to question me over see progress on, areas for example such as better this afternoon. On the issue of the broader regulation, advancing the Lisbon Agenda, and the constitutional future of Europe, given the rejection other areas of work which no doubt we will have the of the Draft Constitutional Treaty, I think there was opportunity to cover in the course of this afternoon’s clearly a consensus back in the June Council of 2005 session. I would reflect on those six months of the that there needed to be a period of reflection. We British Presidency as being six months during which began our Presidency, as was made clear by the we did make solid and in some cases substantial speech that the Prime Minister gave before the achievements against a set of circumstance which European Parliament on the eve of the Presidency, did not appear propitious when we inherited the determined that the period of reflection would not be Presidency in July. 3393671001 Page Type [E] 20-07-06 01:51:27 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1
Ev 46 Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence
3 May 2006 Mr Douglas Alexander MP, Mr Anthony Smith and Mr Simon Manley
Q154 Chairman: I recall being in the European other 24 members, indeed 26 including Bulgaria and Parliament on 4 October and in fact you were not Romania, to establish what were the parameters and able to come and speak to us at that time because the ground on which a deal could potentially be you were still in the early hours doing the deal. As a struck. That process continued through the autumn. Committee we have travelled quite a bit earlier this On reflection, Hampton Court played a useful role year and certainly when we were in Warsaw we got in again giving a greater degree of commonalty of from the Polish parliamentarians a sense of some view as to the challenges that Europe faced in the irritation, I think is probably the best way of future. Had we followed conventional orthodoxy describing it. There was a sense perhaps that they and tabled Presidency proposals on the future had bigger expectations of the British Presidency financing very early in our Presidency, I am not being more congenial to the newer Member States convinced it would have made it any more likely that and they seemed to have some sense of we would have succeeded. There is one issue in terms disappointment. I would be interested in your take of other Member States in terms of the tactics that on how other Member States saw the outcome. Was we deployed in terms of negotiation. Ultimately, the our standing improved, was it raised as a result of the real test is not the tactics but the outcome and in that budget deal or Turkey, or did actually we in the sense both on Turkey and on the budget I feel there process have to do things which meant we came out has been a vindication by results. In terms of other of it not as at the centre of Europe as we might have aspects of our relationships with Eastern Europe, wanted to be? There was some press comment about certainly the scale of funds that have been that as well in some articles. It would be interesting committed, the broad transfer of resource from west to hear your take on that. to east, has been achieved under the British Mr Alexander: Perhaps as the British Government Presidency proposals that were agreed. The Minister for Europe I am not the best person to oVer consensus was secured back in December. Of course, Y an objective judgment on how others perceive our these negotiations are inherently di cult. Every eVorts. With the greatest of respect to our colleagues country is seeking to defend its national interests and in the third estate, I do not take the metric of our every country is prone to see the negotiations simply success as being how some of the British newspapers in terms of a zero sum game. In that sense, rather report our performance. I think it is right to akin to coming into government, you do not enter recognise that particularly amongst the new government simply to win the popularity stakes; you accession countries, the A10, there was a high level enter government to try and achieve important of concern after the failure to reach agreement on the undertakings and I think there is a parallel there with future financing deal back in June under the the European Union. Luxembourg Presidency and that concern continued in the course of the British Presidency. Again, there Q155 Ms Stuart: Can I take you back to the budget. is something of a parallel here with the progress of I am interested in what you said about tactics and negotiations on Turkey. I read with interest the the tactics being justified by the outcome, but was evidence that Charles Grant gave before your not part of the problem that there were 24 Member Committee on the issue of the Turkish negotiations States who said the British must give up their rebate saying that there was some irritation amongst new and for a very long moment we said it was non- Member States’ foreign ministers (such as Poland) negotiable and then we did give up the rebate? that there was not a greater level of consultation. Mr Alexander: Non-negotiable, as I recollect, was During the 30 hours that we spent in Luxembourg I never language I used as the Europe Minister. We would simply say that it reflects well, I believe, on the did claim that the rebate was justified on the basis of experience and judgment of the Foreign Secretary the prior anomaly, the fact of the structure of the how managed the paper flow was during those very European budget, both in terms of net receipts to the delicate hours. Speaking candidly on the basis of the United Kingdom and also the continuing existence success that was achieved, I genuinely believe that of the Common Agricultural Policy, we argued had there been a more open process by which every strongly and continue to argue and make the case for iteration of papers was shared with every European a British rebate. Of course, there was a focus, not foreign minister almost at any point preceding the least in the British papers, on the issue of the rebate, final hours of negotiations, I would not be able to but I would point out that in June prior to the British celebrate the fact that the opening of accession talks Presidency it was not, as some would have you with Turkey was achieved on 3 October. The reason believe, the United Kingdom standing alone against I cite that example was also it was a judgment to go a broad consensus of the European Union. There late in terms of the future financing negotiations. were five Member States who were unable to accept That partly reflects the fact that the June European the Luxembourg proposals, but the consequence of Council, which I attended, certainly manifested the final proposals that were tabled by the division and came close at times to manifesting Luxembourg Presidency late in the night in June was animus. I think it was right to have a period that the bar was set pretty high for both our immediately following the failure of the politicians and our diplomats to argue that there Luxembourg Presidency to secure agreement to should be a fundamentally diVerent basis on which have a pause during which oYcials such as Simon agreement should be reached. Essentially the and others from the Treasury engaged in a detailed previous Presidency proposals had involved a very and unglamorous, but nonetheless ultimately significant contribution of funds in the context of a important, task of speaking bilaterally to each of the larger budget being contributed by the United 3393671001 Page Type [O] 20-07-06 01:51:27 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1
Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence Ev 47
3 May 2006 Mr Douglas Alexander MP, Mr Anthony Smith and Mr Simon Manley
Kingdom, although there was a significant share on terms of the reported comments of the Budget the basis of radical changes to the rebate. As a Commissioner, we are clear that the budget set out consequence of that, part of our endeavours in the in the IIA will amount to ƒ864 billion. We did not months following the failure to reach agreement in recognise, and, as you can imagine, when it was June was both to explain the correlation and the brought to my attention I tasked my oYcials very linkage between the abatement and the reason why quickly to establish the basis on which our colleague the abatement came into existence, but equally to in the Commission had come up with this figure of argue—and the Prime Minister was very clear on ƒ900 billion. Frankly, we do not regard that as an that as early as that speech he made before the accurate reflection of the budget. Our best eVorts Europe Parliament—that all the time he recognised within the Foreign OYce and speaking with we had a responsibility to make a fair contribution colleagues in the Treasury to at least understand the towards the costs of enlargement. I think that basis on which this figure emerged, reflects, in our reflects the final settlement that we reached in judgment, an attempt to say that certain items which December. have never been part of the main European budget, principally the European Development Fund, which I understand is ƒ19.9 billion for the period 2008–13, Q156 Ms Stuart: There is a counter-argument that should be added on to the European Budget. Other we should have put CAP reform on the table about aspects—the annual flexibility instrument, the two years before our Presidency and we could have Solidarity Fund and the Emergency Aid Reserve— negotiated earlier but that is as may be. Has which no British Government, indeed the European agreement been reached now about what the size of Union itself has regarded at any point in any terms the budget is between the Budget Commissioner and of our discussions either bilaterally with other the European Parliament? Member States or indeed with the Commission as Mr Alexander: Let me come to your first point in being part of the European budget as being lumped terms of the CAP and then I will come on to the together in order to try reach a figure as high as reported comments of the Budget Commissioner. ƒ900 billion. Again there is a judgment to be reached in terms of how best to eVect the scale of reform that certainly we in the United Kingdom would like to see in Q157 Ms Stuart: Finally, you seem quite hopeful relation to the Common Agricultural Policy. It was about the reviewing process by the Commission on clear that we would not be able to secure the the budget. If during those discussions in 2007–08 it consensus that ideally I would have wished to see, was put on the table that the only way would be for which would have been for more radical reform of the EU to raise its own resources, what would the the Common Agricultural Policy. Undoubtedly, British Government’s position be on that? under Margaret Beckett’s stewardship we did see Mr Alexander: We have long argued that taxation is significant progress on the sugar regime, which was a matter for Member States rather than for the one of the most anomalous aspects of the Common European Union. I know there was flurry of Agricultural Policy. I would argue that the publicity at the turn of the year, there were certain achievement in relation to fundamental reform was reported comments, if I recollect, from the Austrian not the final word but rather a platform on which Chancellor, but we have not changed our position those of us who remain committed to seeing during the Presidency or post the Presidency. As a fundamental reform of agriculture can build. The matter of principle we regard taxation as a establishment of the review for 2008–09, which will competence of Member States. look at all aspects of how the European Union raises its resources and then allocates them, provides us Q158 Sir John Stanley: Minister, perhaps I could with a real opportunity in the course of the turn to a housekeeping bit of the EU budget, one Presidency. There was a British Government paper directly relevant to the Foreign and Commonwealth tabled at the beginning of December which argued OYce. I expect your attention was drawn to the for the kind of agricultural policy that we would like extended piece in The Sunday Times of 23 April to see Europe have in the future. I intend to make a under the heading “High Life of the EU ‘stealth speech in the weeks to come in Berlin on exactly that ambassadors’”. It drew attention to the rising and issue. It is an issue that we will continue to work and substantial expenditure of EU taxpayers’ money on argue the case for but we have to secure the support the provision of ambassadorial residences for EU of allies in that endeavour. That partly reflects the ambassadors. It says: “Houses are part of a growing importance we attached not simply to the policy property portfolio, housing a cadre of ambassadors benefits of economic development in Eastern who include Tim Clarke, the brother of the Home Europe which would be secured through the budget Secretary and John Bruton the former Irish Prime deal but also in terms of those countries in Eastern Minister . . .” and it refers to the fact that there are Europe which we would regard as being potentially now apparently 122 EU ambassadorial residences. natural allies in the cause of reform not just on Mr Bruton’s 16-bedroomed mansion in Washington agriculture but more generally in the European is featured and Tim Clarke’s accommodation in Union. I think it would have been contrary to our Addis Ababa is described as “a splendid residence. national interest to lose that potential alliance for The grounds can easily take 300 to 400 people.” The reform within the Union by prejudicing their ability question I would like to put to you is what degree of to access European funds, which of course is a very control is being exercised by our Foreign OYce and central focus of their concern at the moment. In our Foreign Secretary and our Foreign OYce 3393671001 Page Type [E] 20-07-06 01:51:27 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1
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3 May 2006 Mr Douglas Alexander MP, Mr Anthony Smith and Mr Simon Manley ministers about this burgeoning expenditure? As would like to follow this up with a note because you you are well aware, in this Committee we are taking said it is misleading but it is the term which has been a very close interest in the regrettable reductions of used by the Foreign OYce for years. It has been used ambassadorial posts and ambassadorial residences by other Foreign OYce ministers in front of this as far as the United Kingdom is concerned, and it Committee and it is used by FCO oYcials and certainly goes against the grain, as far as I am ambassadors and high commissioners wherever we concerned and perhaps for other members of the go. Would you like to let us have a further note as Committee, to see this huge expansion of both to whether Britain will take the lead in changing the ambassadorial positions and ambassadorial terminology from “EU ambassador “to “EU residences by the EU. representative”? Perhaps you can also give us a Mr Alexander: Firstly let me say I think it is further note as to what is the degree of control the something of a misnomer to describe these as UK can have over the endless increasing designation ambassadorial residences and these individuals as of individuals as EU ambassadors and also over ambassadors. It raises of course the question of the the increasing proliferation of EU so-called European External Action Service and we are very ambassadorial residences. It would be helpful to clear that the European External Action Service have further information.1 cannot come into eVect without a Constitutional Mr Alexander: Of course I will be happy to write to Treaty which would provide it with a legal base. you. Let me be very clear, the context in which this Indeed, a European Foreign Minister was evidence session takes place is continuing discussion anticipated as part of the Constitutional Treaty. and continuing questioning as to whether the Given the status of the Constitutional Treaty at the European Union intends on the basis of the Draft moment that is not where we are. My understanding Constitutional Treaty to establish an External in terms of John Bruton—and indeed I cannot deal Action Service. I would make clear the context in with all of the individuals, but many of the which I make the remarks reflects the fact that, individuals that I am sure the piece reflects are notwithstanding the manner in which those Commission representatives. Do I believe that there particular posts were reported in The Sunday Times, is a role for having Commission representatives that should not be seen as prejudging the important working internationally? Yes, I do accept that there issue which is dependent and consequential upon the is a role for the European Commission to be ratification of the Draft Constitutional Treaty. represented internationally in certain locations, but Y that raises an important question both of e ciency Q160 Andrew Mackinlay: Just to pick up on this. I and of principle, which is do we in perpetuity hold on do not want to trespass into the issue of the external to a clear distinction between the Council of representation service or what it is at the present Minister and the European Commission. I have Y time, but it does seem to me that the article itself argued very strongly within the Foreign O ce and justifies a little bit of probing. We all recognise that elsewhere that it is important that we maintain people should have residences which are not clarity as to those inter-governmental aspects, demeaning; they should be appropriate and CFSP, where it is appropriate for the Council of proportionate. On the face of it, it does seem that at Minister to be represented discretely and separately least some of them—and I know the press choose the from the European Commission. On the other hand, best examples for their story—is disproportionate. I there is one particular case (which has been the wonder if in either that note or a separate note we subject of discussions with other committees in the could have a note of what the accommodation is and House) where I am sensitive on the grounds of Y Y whether or not it doubles up as the o ce as well. I do e ciency as to avoiding a situation in the Former find it painful at a time when we have not got Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia of having an V any representation in a number of key parts of the e ective duplication of exactly the kind of residences world that the EU might have a disproportionate and support infrastructure that the piece describes. residence facility and/or highly prestigious oYce In that sense I think it is an area where we do accommodation. I do think we are entitled to have continue to examine the matter closely. I will take that. If you can look into it, it would be useful, not back the point that you have raised both for myself that you could turf a person out, but it does seem to and also for the Foreign Secretary, but it is me that you or your successors may be able to important to recognise that there is both counsel a little bit of restraint. Commission competence in certain areas of work Mr Alexander: The Council budget is scrutinised and discretely and appropriately separate areas of both by the European Parliament and the Council of responsibility for the Council of Ministers. Ministers. I will certainly make enquiry at a higher level. Q159 Sir John Stanley: Minister, may I say how absolutely delighted I was, you are the first Minister Q161 Mr Heathcoat-Amory: One’s thoughts at this in my experience on this Committee either under this time of the year turn towards the European Government or under the previous Conservative Constitution because the so-called period of Government who has been willing to describe the reflection is about to end. I and some other members term “EU ambassador” as misleading. I am are going to Brussels next week to attend the Inter- delighted you have used that description, which is Parliamentary Conference which is transparently one I would entirely share as of course the EU is not a national state or a national entity. Perhaps you 1 Ev 58 3393671001 Page Type [O] 20-07-06 01:51:27 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1
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3 May 2006 Mr Douglas Alexander MP, Mr Anthony Smith and Mr Simon Manley about trying to revive all or part of the European improvements, sensible rule improvements, on the Constitution. What is the British Government’s basis of existing treaties? No, we have not. However, attitude to widespread calls to revive at least part of are we proposing at this stage such changes during the Constitution, given that the Prime Minister the period of reflection? No, we are not. At the signed it and therefore presumably is still in favour moment we are continuing to reflect, as befits a of the Constitution? Are you sympathetic to such a government during a period of reflection, on where device? the Constitutional Treaty now lies in the light of the Mr Alexander: You are right, of course, that the decisions reached in France and in the Netherlands. Prime Minister signed it in Rome and the position of the British Government has not changed. In terms of Q166 Mr Heathcoat-Amory: Please, I understand the process of ratification in the United Kingdom you have not ruled out non-treaty changes as a way our approach has also not changed. The means by of improving matters but what we want to know is which the draft constitution would be ratified here in whether you are contemplating treaty changes of the UK would be by means of a referendum. That any sort at all, or is your attitude towards those being said, it is uncertain as to what would be the demands from, say, the French Government that outcome of the period of reflection which takes place you will not allow any part of the Draft European this June. We are in discussion with partners, Constitution to be brought in if it involves changes particularly now post the Presidency, to establish the to the existing treaties? Is that your position? views of other Member States as well. Mr Alexander: No, the focus of discussions in relation to treaty change, not just with the French Q162 Mr Heathcoat-Amory: I want your views. Do but with other European partners, continues to be not please speculate on others’ views; you are not about the treaty changes anticipated by the Draft responsible for them. We want your views on what Constitutional Treaty. That is the focus and the British Government thinks is right, particularly substance of our discussions. That being said, given towards calls to so-call “cherry-pick” bits of the the decisions that were reached both in France and European Constitution. the Netherlands respectively in referendums, I think Mr Alexander: Let’s take this issue of cherry- the right response is not simply to carry on as if picking. There are two possible constructions that nothing had altered but instead to have a period of can be placed on that term of art. One description reflection. As I say, my personal view, and indeed the would be to say are there any elements of the Draft view of the Government, is that there may be cause Constitutional Treaty which we would consider as for continuing that period of reflection, but that will being potentially important in and of themselves on be a matter to be discussed with our partners ahead the basis of the existing treaties, that is they do not of the June European Council, and that is the focus require further treaty change? Have we ruled out any of our discussions at the moment. possibility of incremental improvements on the basis of existing treaty change? No, we have not. So, for example, on the issue of transparency or for example Q167 Mr Heathcoat-Amory: Sorry, you must give a the issue of subsidiarity we have never said that we clear answer. You have said that you are would be unwilling to look at further improvements contemplating non-treaty changes, in other words consistent with Britain’s national interests to the rule changes that do not require amending the rules operating in the European Union. On the other existing treaties. We all understand that. What I hand, would we countenance at this stage seeking to want to know is your attitude towards modifying, implement elements of the Draft Constitutional amending or changing the existing treaties in order Treaty requiring an alternative treaty base than the to bring in parts of the Constitution. I take it from Draft Constitutional Treaty? No, that is not the your answer just now that you are looking at this in discussion that we are having. an overall context but you have not ruled it out, or have you? Mr Alexander: Let me try and explain. The context Q163 Mr Heathcoat-Amory: So you have said you is the period of reflection. The focus of our work will contemplate making treaty changes but during the period of reflection—and this was stopping short of the Constitution? reflected in the Prime Minister’s speech at St Mr Alexander: With the greatest of respect, that is Antony’s College at the turn of the year—is the not what I have said. What I said was— practical improvements to the lives of European citizens. That was why we started the Hampton Q164 Mr Heathcoat-Amory: So you are ruling that Court process and why we welcomed the fact that out, are you? there was such a focus on Hampton Court at the last Mr Alexander: If you will allow me to chose my European Council meeting that took place in own words. February. As a consequence of that, we believe and continue to argue to our European partners that the Q165 Mr Heathcoat-Amory: One or the other, best use of this period of reflection is not simply to please. deliberate together as to why French and Dutch Mr Alexander: If you will allow me to answer the voters rejected the Draft Constitutional Treaty or question, I will endeavour to do so. What we have the lessons that should be drawn from that, but said is the period of reflection continues. I anticipate instead saying as well as issues related to the text that it may be that the period of reflection continues there are issues, undoubtedly as anyone with a beyond June. Have we ruled out any incremental passing familiarity with the French and Dutch 3393671001 Page Type [E] 20-07-06 01:51:27 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1
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3 May 2006 Mr Douglas Alexander MP, Mr Anthony Smith and Mr Simon Manley campaigns will know, about the context. That is why you have had three times now. I am going to ask a we need to use this period to work with partners, diVerent question. Thirteen Members States have including the French and others, to see what now ratified. We are in a potential position where, by practically we can look to to meet challenges such as later in the year, another three or four states might the challenges of diversity of supply and security of have done that. At what point does the procedure supply and a genuinely open European energy come into eVect whereby 80% of the states have market. ratified and at that point we might be in a diVerent position with regard to the status of the Q168 Mr Heathcoat-Amory: You must answer my Constitutional Treaty? question otherwise this is a completely fruitless Mr Alexander: Candidly, I cannot anticipate where exchange. I am talking about the suggestion very all of the other Member States who have not yet widespread from many Member States to amend the ratified the Draft Constitutional Treaty will go in existing treaties in order to bring into eVect parts of terms of their own process of ratification. This will the Constitution. Please will you answer the be a subject, I would expect, that will be discussed at question: are you ruling that out? Are you saying to the next informal foreign ministers meeting, which is the French and others, “We will not allow that due to take place later this month under the Austrian incremental bringing in of the Constitution” and will Presidency, where they have asked that this issue of we therefore confine ourselves to non-treaty based the future of Europe be one of the main issues under changes? discussion. I think probably we will have a clearer Mr Alexander: I am being clear with you that while sense as to where we will be ahead of June and where we could contemplate non-treaty change, the process of ratification rests after that meeting incremental improvements of the rules—and that under the Austrian Presidency. was made clear as early as the initial discussions immediately following the French and Dutch Q171 Sandra Osborne: Douglas, part of the period referenda—the focus of our work during this period of reflection and the necessary changes that should of reflection, as reflected in our discussions with be made must surely be to engender a more positive other European partners, is firstly the status of the view of Europe in the eyes of the people of Europe, Draft Constitutional Treaty in the light of the including our own people. I notice that it has been rejection of it by the French and Dutch voters and, reported that a British firm has been hired to look at secondly, the necessary practical changes that how the EU could be re-branded. If I refer to your Europe needs to make—and, as I say, you do not pamphlet, suggesting that that there has been a kind need to take my word for it, read the speech the of malaise building up in Europe with regard to Prime Minister made to the European Parliament, Europe over a 20-year period, would you agree that read the speech he made to St Antony’s College, certainly in the public eye credibility is at a fairly all Oxford, or the contributions the Foreign Secretary time low? What do you see is the problem with the and others have made during our Presidency. We are branding of the EU and how could it be improved? absolutely sincere in saying, as the Prime Minister Mr Alexander: With the greatest of respect, said back in February, “Don’t start with the rules”— whichever British firm has been hired, I do not think and with respect your question addresses the rules— it is an issue of branding, I think it is more one of “start with the reasons they are needed.” That politics. I find in my meetings, discussions, debates explains the approach we have taken to the period of here in Britain that if you argue the pro-European reflection, which is an analysis of why the proposal cause which I espouse and base that case was rejected, focusing not simply on a textual predominantly on past achievements of the context. That is why during the period of reflection European Union, considerable though I would the main focus of our work has been driving forward argue that they are, all too quickly you end up with that Hampton Court agenda. discussions of deregulation about the curvature of cucumbers, the sustainability of the British pint of Q169 Mr Heathcoat-Amory: I am not interested in milk or the British loaf of bread. I think, on the other the main focus of your work. I am trying to get you hand, if you start the conversation from somewhere to answer a simple question. I really think this is a diVerent, which is to say, are there certain challenges fruitless exchange. I must say, I am very which any Member State, however eVective and disappointed that this Committee cannot get a however powerful, can better meet by working straight answer on the European Union. It is really eVectively with partners in the 21st century, issues quite a simple point which is extremely urgent, that I would say would include how to secure because the period of reflection is about to end.2 national prosperity in the globalising markets that Chairman: We have other members who want to we see, how to deal with the issue of monetisation, come in and we have other questions to ask. how to deal with the issue of counter-terrorism, even Mr Heathcoat-Amory: Can I ask you to try and help how to deal with the issue of environmental me to get some answers? derogation, then I do not think it is diYcult to bring these challenges to the fore, but if the European Q170 Chairman: I trying to help the Committee to Union did not exist we would need to develop move through an agenda, and it is quite clear that something akin to the European Union to allow us you are not going to get a diVerent answer to what to work eVectively and collaboratively together in addressing those challenges. In that sense, I think the 2 Also see Ev 60 case to be made for the European Union should be 3393671001 Page Type [O] 20-07-06 01:51:27 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1
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3 May 2006 Mr Douglas Alexander MP, Mr Anthony Smith and Mr Simon Manley based not simply on past achievements but on its Constitution. Are you aware of any bits of the capacity to address future challenges. I also think, Treaty that have been used to implement the and this is reflected in the priority we attach to key Constitution? areas of work coming out of Hampton Court, that it Mr Alexander: I am not aware, on the basis of your is vital that we meet citizens of the European Union description, but maybe you could give me some on the common ground of issues that they are more detail. concerned about. A good example of that is the energy policy. There is no doubt that, prior to the Hampton Court meeting in October, there was some Q174 Mr Maples: There was an Article in the Treaty, scepticism about the point of having an approach to Article 308 of the TEC (Treaty Establishing the energy that was European. I think fewer people, Community), which, in furtherance of pursuing the frankly, after the events in January where you saw common market, allows the Council to be the Russian/Ukraine dispute over gas, believed that unanimous, on the recommendation of the it was not sensible for Europe to seek to work Commission, to do things which are not otherwise eVectively together given the challenges that we face provided for in the Treaty. That seems to me to be around security of supply and diversity of supply; so an Article which could be used, or might be used to I am optimistic that a strong case can be made for implement bits of the Constitutional Treaty Europe based not just on past achievements but on piecemeal. I wondered if you were aware of any parts those future challenges. Of course, there is always of it that have been used. more that can be done to make that case, but Mr Alexander: No. fundamentally I do not believe it is as much about branding as about the arguments for why Europe matters in the 21st century. Q175 Mr Maples: Is the view of the British Government that that Article is for the furtherance of the common market, by which I think most of us Q172 Sandra Osborne: Yes, but do you think that mean the internal market, free trade, those sorts of people have felt in the past that the EU has dealt with aspects, the free movement of goods and people? Is far too many things, some of which are irrelevant to the view of the British Government that that is what their every day lives, and that is why there is less that Article is there to do and it is restricted to the credibility than perhaps there could be? furtherance of the common market? Mr Alexander: I think there is a paradox here, in the Mr Alexander: My own background as a lawyer sense that if you take some of the major decisions makes me somewhat hesitant in oVering an oral that are reached by, for example, the Commissioner answer to you, given as I do not have the around competition policy, there is no doubt that technological theory in front of me, so perhaps I these are very significant decisions that have a very could write to you on that one.3 major impact on the lives and economies of Europe, but I tend to find that there is not a great deal of resiling from those decisions being taken at a Q176 Mr Maples: Would you, because the Article European level, because I think people basically was, I think, used to sort of implement the Charter understand that, if you are going to have a single of Fundamental Rights which was in the Treaty and, market with 460 million people, you need to have I am sure you will recognise, whether or not it was a strong and eVective competition policies to be able good idea or a bad idea, it was certainly one of the V to police that market e ectively. By contrast, I think big things that was in the Treaty and one of the most there are, certainly in the way these issues are controversial debates that we have had in the House. reported in the British newspapers, certain decisions My understanding is that a European Union Agency where people do not have as clear a sense as to why for Fundamental Rights has been set up under Europe is engaged in the matter in the first place, and Article 308 of the Treaty. Is that correct? that is where, I think, in the past Europe has been Mr Alexander: My understanding was that the vulnerable to some very bad publicity. It is, Fundamental Rights Agency did not have a legal therefore, not a matter of the scale of the decision as base which was contingent on the Draft much as people understanding the why of the Constitutional Treaty, but I will certainly check that decision as well as the outcome itself. matter for you. Mr Maples: It seems that your oYcial perhaps Q173 Mr Maples: I wanted to ask you, going back knows the answer to this question. to this question of cherry-picking or piecemeal Ms Stuart: Article 308 is a current article. implementation of bits of the Constitution, about the use of Article 308 of the Treaty, which, if I remember rightly, allows the Council, on the Q177 Mr Maples: I do not want to describe it as a unanimous recommendation of the Commission, to flexibility clause if there is another flexibility clause, do things which the Treaty does not provide for. If but there is a catch-all article which allows European in the course of the operation of the common market legislation to be brought. My understanding is that it is necessary to attain the objectives of the it was used to change the Racism and Xenophobia community, they can use this catch-all phrase, which Institute to a European Union Agency for is very wide and allows legislation outside the Fundamental Rights last summer. Is that correct? Treaty. What I am concerned about is that that is being, or might be used, to implement bits of the 3 Ev 59 3393671001 Page Type [E] 20-07-06 01:51:27 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1
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3 May 2006 Mr Douglas Alexander MP, Mr Anthony Smith and Mr Simon Manley
Mr Alexander: It reinforces my point, but I would be but what there will clearly be, and you would cautious of oVering you an answer without being encourage it because it is good governance, are able both to look at the issue of the Fundamental sensible and agreed changes and they will inevitably Rights Agency and also— involve some treaty changes. Mr Alexander: I suppose our exchange reflected the Q178 Mr Maples: I think I am going to ask you to extent to which, with no disrespect to our absent tell us in writing, but I want to ask one more colleague, the debate has moved on, in the sense that question. If it requires unanimity, then presumably, when I read the comment of the Prime Minister if this Article were used to implement anything, saying, “Don’t start with the rules, start with the whether it is part of the Constitutional Treaty or reasons; they are needed”, I think perhaps the Y something else, then it would require the British honourable gentleman had di culty believing that Government’s approval. Unanimity is something we were sincere in saying the focus of the Union’s that we could veto readily if we wanted to? work should not be continually and exclusively Mr Alexander: We will wait and set it out for you. institutional change. We actually made it worse for him than he imagines. We actually believed what we said during the British Presidency that you should Q179 Mr Maples: I would be grateful. You are start with whatever are the reasons but sensible rule obviously not briefed to answer these questions, fair changes are necessary and have an appropriate focus enough, but I would be grateful if you could set out on those issues, and that is why the work that we to the Committee firstly what is the United initiated at Hampton Court did not conclude at the Kingdom’s view of the remit of Article 308 and, end of the British Presidency, but we are pleased to secondly, on what occasions has it been used. You see it being continued in entering the next period of can go back as far as you like, but I am particularly European policy-making, and so we are absolutely interested in the last year or two, but I would also be sincere in saying the focus of any reflection should interested in previous uses of the Article as to not be a period of simple institutional internal whether or not the British Government (either this conversation but instead the opportunity to say why Government or the previous one) took a view as to is it that there are questions of eYciency in the minds exactly its ability. If we were to find that for 40 years of citizens cross Europe about the added value of the it was only ever used for economic things to do with European Union? What practical steps can we take, the common market and then suddenly it is used, for both as the Presidency and as a Member of the example, for fundamental rights, then that would European Union, to advance those practical show a diVerence in policy. So, if you could set it out issues—for example, the issue of energy that I have for us. I just want to make sure these things are clear, spoken of? As I say, I think the exchange perhaps because sometimes we say these things and then we reflected a certain degree of scepticism in his mind get a letter answering a diVerent question. Could you that the Europe Minister could be sitting in front of set out what is the British Government’s view of its him telling us that the first known priority of the remit and on how many occasions it has it been used. British Government was not institutional change. In particular, was it used to establish or to change Our authority is actually practical policies which the name of an existing agency to the European aVect and benefit the lives of citizens across Europe. Union Agency for Fundamental Rights? Chairman: We move on to enlargement. Mr Alexander: We will endeavour to do that.
Q180 Andrew Mackinlay: I listened carefully to Q181 Mr Horam: Fascinating and eclectic as the David Heathcoat-Amory’s questioning of you Constitution Treaty may be to aficionados, of which which I actually enjoyed. I am completely at the I take it you are not one— other end of the pole to him, but I certainly deem Mr Alexander: You know me fairly well. myself to be pro-European, enthusiastically so, similar to yourself, but it did seem to me, listening Q182 Mr Horam: —perhaps we can go on to and watching you, that were you were handicapped broader themes, and particularly the issue of by one thing. The British Government had gone enlargement, because even there, a very important along with this is fiction that the Constitution was issue which Britain has played a major role in, there needed, whereas what you probably would have are slightly contrasting views. The Dutch wanted to say to David Heathcoat-Amory, which I Commissioner, for example, said the European invite you to agree with, is basically, “Come oV it. Union should maximise at 27 members—it has 25 at You are not suggesting that there should not be any the moment—which is a very small change, whereas, more treaty changes.” The history of the European perhaps understandably, the Enlargement Union is organic change. There have to be treaties Commission is talking about not having a break, let from time to time to deal with circumstances to us carry on with this process. Where does the UK make the thing work. Surely that should be the Government stand on this? response, that you cannot rule out treaty changes to Mr Alexander: We have solidly continued to be meet what is sensible and agreed negotiated strong advocates of enlargement. Let me explain arrangements to facilitate the good management why. I think, if you were to again take a broader view and stewardship of the European Union. What you and take perhaps the most recent example, the do not need is all the paraphernalia and hype of the accession of 10 predominantly former Soviet Constitution, which, I put to you, is actually now a countries in the European Union in 2004, handicap to you, because we went down that road, championed initially by the British Government and 3393671001 Page Type [O] 20-07-06 01:51:27 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1
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3 May 2006 Mr Douglas Alexander MP, Mr Anthony Smith and Mr Simon Manley by our Prime Minister, by any reckoning, that would Q186 Mr Horam: You recognise that that could be judged to be of genuine historic significance. Why mean a very large number of countries being added is that judged to be of such historical significance? to the European Union, for example there are five in Because what we have managed to do is not simply the former Soviet Union countries as well as grow the European Union and the single market but Romania, Bulgaria and Serbia. That is a lot of eVectively helped change those societies and those countries. economies for the better. I do not believe that we Mr Alexander: Of course, this is a discussion which have concluded the capacity of the European Union we continue to have with our partners, but it is hard to undertake that important work. I was to envisage any enlargement as large, strengthened in that conviction by the visit I paid to simultaneously, as the enlargement which took place the Western Balkans during the Presidency where it in 2004 when 10 came in. If you talk about was made very clear to me repeatedly, in country enlargement then, in the light of the decisions that after country, that Membership of the European were reached on 3 October, you would also discuss Union in those states has come to be seen as the Turkey, but on the Turkish Government’s own equivalent to both modernity and normality. estimation, it will be upwards of 10 years before Whether, in fact, their revelation is to be part of the accession could be possible; so in that sense I think world’s largest single market or to uphold the there is plenty of time both for the necessary democratic norms of the European Union, it conditionality to be achieved. You mentioned the succours anything is as important as the changes Enlargement Commissioner. I think all your aids that the prospect of European Union Membership working at the Commission has done a great deal to can eVect in those countries. strengthen the sense that there is a very clear sense of conditionality, rightly, around which countries have to work if they want to secure membership of the Q183 Mr Horam: Good for them, but what about European Union. The way I described it when I was this question of the absorption capacity of the in the Western Balkans was to say that the bar on existing European Union? European Union membership has not been raised. Mr Alexander: The absorption capacity has been On the other hand, the tolerance, I think, within the there—if I recollect, it was part of the convening European Union (and I think your question reflects criteria—for many years, and, of course, that is one this) of countries slipping under that level of element of the conversation; but if you are saying is conditionality in order to secure membership has it good for Europe to have grown, for example, in undoubtedly dissipated, and that is why I stand with the 10 accession countries that I mentioned who the Commission in saying that we should have joined in 2004, look at the respective rates of growth rigorous transparent procedures but that that have been achieved by those countries, look at conditionality needs to be a central element of that the dynamism and vigour that they have brought to discussion about enlargement. questions of the need for economic reform within the European Union, or, indeed, look at the diplomatic Q187 Chairman: How close are Romania and reach that a country such as Poland has brought to Bulgaria to meeting the bar, the threshold, the our engagement with a country like Ukraine at the criterion? Is there not a danger that they will not time of the Orange revolution. I categorically believe meet it in 2007 and that you will have to bring the that enlargement has strengthened and helped emergency procedure next month for at least one Europe in recent years, and I believe that the of them? progress of future enlargement continues to hold out Mr Alexander: To use a football term: the ball is at those potential positive gains in the future. their feet. I was in Bulgaria on Thursday and Friday of last week. I met the Bulgarian Foreign Minister and discussed with him the progress that he and his Q184 Mr Horam: I am sorry to go back to the issue government have been making, but all of us will be of the Constitution, but can we continue to expand looking very carefully at the next Commission Europe without any changes in the Constitution? Report, which I understand is due out later this Mr Alexander: The basis on which those countries month on the 16th, and that will give us the basis on entered in 2004 was, of course, not the Draft which a decision will be reached at the June Constitutional Treaty, and, as somebody who took European Council. Of course there was a previous through the Bill in the Commons in the autumn in Commission Report which identified particular relation to Bulgaria and Romania, there are areas of work. I do not, frankly, believe it benefits mechanisms outside of the Draft Constitutional exactly the transparency and conditionality that I Treaty by which enlargement can take place. was just describing to your colleague for us to get into a running commentary on what the next report of the Commission is going to say. Frankly, I have Q185 Mr Horam: So you are in favour of that not seen the report and I will give it very careful happening even if there is no constitutional change? attention, as will my colleagues in the Foreign OYce, Mr Alexander: I have not ever argued that the issue when we receive it. of enlargement should be seen as a mechanistic link to the fate of the Draft Constitutional Treaty. I think Q188 Chairman: Can I put it to you that, if there is that the merits of enlargement stand on their own insuYcient progress and it either becomes clear that terms. one or both of them are not able to meet the criteria 3393671001 Page Type [E] 20-07-06 01:51:27 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1
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3 May 2006 Mr Douglas Alexander MP, Mr Anthony Smith and Mr Simon Manley by 2008, that we would then be facing a very diYcult Union has closed talks with Serbia—I assume it is situation within the European Union, given that Serbia and not Serbia Montenegro; it is a bit there is an implicit assumption that automatically unclear—on the question of Mladic. I wonder if you one or both of them will be— could give us a view of where we are at with regard Mr Alexander: A Treaty obligation? Croatia. If Montenegro goes independent, presumably there will be at least an open invitation Q189 Chairman: Exactly. Where will we be if that is for them to fast-track meeting the criteria. What is V the situation, if Bulgaria or Romania or both of the position regarding the breaking o of talks them are in some important respects, whether it is to today, and is that with Serbia or is that the Serbia do with judicial systems or whether it is to with and Montenegro federation? corruption, whether it is to do with some other Mr Alexander: I will start with the last point, matters, not meeting the criteria? because I issued a statement in response to the Mr Alexander: You are right in imposing the so- Commission decision today, which is available and called super safeguard clause, which means that is on the FCO website, in which I support fully the V there could be a delay of 12 months from 1 January Enlargement Commissioner’s decision to e ectively 2007 to 2008, but, notwithstanding the existence of disrupt the SAE talks, which is both for Serbia and the super safeguard clause, and this was a matter Montenegro, not to give them the Constitutional that was discussed on the floor of the House in the position of a state of the Union ahead of the course of the Bill here, there are considerable powers referendum. We fully support that, given that we available to the Commission which would provide a believe Serbia and Montenegro have missed a degree of comfort to the rest of the Union if there number of self-imposed deadlines for full co- were specific areas of concern still identified, operation and it is a longstanding position with the notwithstanding the fact that the threshold had been British Government that we want to see Mladic and reached for full membership. If it would be helpful, Karadzic brought to justice, and in that sense that I will certainly set out for you our understanding of explains the decision, which is one the British the powers the Commission have available to them.4 Government fully supports. In terms of if My understanding is that those powers were not Montenegro gains independence from the State used in 2004 against the A10 countries, but that does Union following the referendum, which I think is on not diminish the fact that there are still powers 21 May, later this month, it is hoped that both available to the European Commission whatever the countries will continue their commitment to make area of concern they continue to have. progress towards European Union integration. The current twin-track mechanism for the Serbia and Chairman: That would be helpful. Can we move on Montenegro EU accession should facilitate this, but to the Balkans? I cannot anticipate what will be out outcome of the referendum. Q190 Andrew Mackinlay: After disagreeing with you, Chairman, I am very grateful you raised it. Of Q192 Andrew Mackinlay: I am genuinely surprised course, in 2004 there was the ultimate sanction that by your response there. Presumably if Montenegro they might not come in. The diVerence between 2004 re-establishes its sovereign independence, it is a new folk and Bulgaria and Romania is that under the ball game and they can apply and they can Treaty Obligation they shall be in at 2008. There is presumably anticipate, with regard to the British a qualitative diVerence? Government’s reaction, the same facilities which are Mr Alexander: In response to that, I would make a aVorded to any other applicant or potential couple of points. One is, I think, partly through the applicant? I think it is important for Montenegro to experience of the 2004 accession there has been a know that the British Government will not strengthening of capacity within the Commission to discriminate against an independent Montenegro. If actually benchmark and to judge candidate they knock on the door, we will say, “Copenhagen countries transparently, rigorously and eVectively criteria”, and presumably there should be an and, secondly, I think there is also an issue, not least opportunity to open negotiations? because the potential membership involves both Mr Alexander: I can assure you we do not have a Bulgaria and Romania, where neither of the policy of discrimination towards anyone. What I countries in question, and this is on the basis of will say is that I think it would be ill-judged of a discussions I have had with colleague ministers from Foreign OYce minister at this stage, only a matter of both of these countries, want to be the country that days and weeks before the referendum, to anticipate finds they have not reached the deadline as quickly what will be the judgment that will be reached by the as the other country; so I think there are factors people of Montenegro. In terms of other countries driving performance which were not there at the that you asked about, in terms of Croatia, obviously time of the 2004 accession. the opening of accession negotiations under our Presidency in the second half of last year we believed Q191 Andrew Mackinlay: For speed, can I say to be an important step, but it is now up to Croatia Croatia, Serbia, Montenegro and Serbia to work towards meeting those European Union Montenegro: because there are three potential standards and enable them to meet the standards in scenarios. Also news this afternoon, the European full before accession can take place, and, as you would expect, both the United Kingdom and the 4 Ev 59 European Union is providing assistance to the 3393671001 Page Type [O] 20-07-06 01:51:27 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1
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3 May 2006 Mr Douglas Alexander MP, Mr Anthony Smith and Mr Simon Manley
Government of Croatia in those endeavours. case was declared in September 2005 that Turkey Obviously, not least given the importance of full co- must apply the Ankara Agreement Protocol fully to operation, the International War Tribunal, with the all Member States and the EU will monitor this former Yugoslavia, as I mentioned, welcomed the closely and evaluate full implementation in 2006; so capture of Ante Gotovina back in December and I that will be a particular challenge facing Turkey in think we reached the right decision to open the course of this calendar year, but my negotiations with Croatia back at that 3 October understanding, and I spoke to oYcials in meeting. anticipation of appearing before you today, is that progress does continue to be made in terms of the Q193 Mr Horam: On Turkey briefly, which you formal processes of membership being taken regard as one of the two major tests of the forward essentially through European Chapters. Presidency, Charles Grant on European reform, when he came before the Committee, was very Q196 Mr Maples: I want to pick up the Cyprus angle pessimistic about the situation there. He said on the of Turkish membership issues. We have tail wagging one hand he did not think the Turks entirely the dog situation here in a really serious way and this appreciated this was not a negotiation—“The Committee has taken quite an interest in Cyprus European Union says what it wants and either the over the years, and we have produced a couple of country applicant agrees with it or not”—and, reports on it. I wonder if you can tell us what is the equally, it is clear there is opposition to Turkey state at the moment of the package that we have amongst several countries and they could at any supported of both aid and transport links, trade moment simply block any further progress under the links, physical trade links, I mean sea and air, into various treaties. What is your view? Northern Cyprus. Is that still stuck on a Cyprus veto Mr Alexander: I stand by my earlier theory that I or a threat of a Cyprus veto? think it was of genuine historic significance that that Mr Alexander: In terms of the financial aid decision was reached on 3 October. I think it is the regulation, that has now been agreed and was an right decision, not just for Turkey but also for important first step forwards lifting Turkish/Cypriot Europe, and I think we would have sent a very isolation. There were concerns in terms of the timing damaging signal if we had suggested that there was of that, but in February that decision was reached in not the prospect of a European future for a country terms of aid. During the British Presidency, as I like Turkey and obliged it to turn elsewhere in terms recollect, there had been continued discussions of its future economic, social and political about our capacity to hold together the aid development. All that being said, I have never regulation with the trade regulation, but ultimately hidden the fact, and nor has the British Government, we were unable to secure consensus on that and the that there are very considerable challenges which two were decoupled so that the aid regulation has Turkey will have to rise to in the years, and it will be gone through but the trade regulation still continues many years of work, between now and that accession to be a matter for discussion. being achieved. Q197 Mr Maples: When we had the Foreign Q194 Mr Horam: Would you agree with Charles Secretary giving evidence some time in the last 12 Grant that they do not entirely appreciate these are months, and I cannot remember exactly when, we not negotiations? split the trade links issue into area C1, C1B and E Mr Alexander: I am not sure it is always helpful to was, as I understand it, an EU issue, at least under pass comment on the conduct of other governments. EU competence and jurisdiction, air links having As I say, the experience of the discussions prior to 3 nothing to do with the European Union at all, and October, both the weeks and the hours, suggest that there was some confusion, I think, both among us the Turkish Government are strong negotiators, and among those who were giving evidence to us as shall we say. That being said, the obligations under to whether countries could establish bilateral air which they now operate are clear, and in that sense links with Northern Cyprus or whether that had to I would recognise that perhaps the sentiment be done multilaterally, and I think that confusion underpinning Charles’ statement, which is that, as a still exists. What I think is clear to most of us who country that has been granted accession talks, the have taken an interest in this issue, and I am not process for Turkey is exactly the same as for any asking you to clarify it, but if you want to you are other prospective Member of the European Union, welcome to, was that the trade link was much more the initial screening process, the opening of chapters important to Northern Cyprus than the aid. I am and also the closing of chapters. sure that aid will be very welcome, but what Northern Cyprus needs is direct links to the outside Q195 Mr Horam: I think the underlying thought of world for its tourist business. I wonder if you can tell Charles Grant (to limit your response) was that they us if that is something that the British Government are a proud nation and that when they realise what is pushing for and whether or not we have is happening, and the process may be very long, they considered, and if so would be prepared to, allow may object? bilateral air links to be established between the Mr Alexander: Well, let us not prejudge where the United Kingdom and Northern Cyprus? process will go. My understanding is that the Mr Alexander: I hesitate to add to the gloom that screening process has now begun under the Austrian clearly descended the last time this issue was raised presidency. There are obligations, in particular the on the Committee but my understanding of the key 3393671001 Page Type [E] 20-07-06 01:51:27 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1
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3 May 2006 Mr Douglas Alexander MP, Mr Anthony Smith and Mr Simon Manley issue here is not so much the issue of individual leaders there. The reason that the Foreign Secretary countries as the designation of the airport, air carrier made that visit was to reflect the concern that we do port, and can it be designated as an international feel about finding a way forward in the dispute. airport, essentially, in order to be able to provide the Clearly, there was genuine disappointment in necessary criteria for the arrangements which relation to the failure to achieve support on both multilaterally are in place for international air sides of the island to Annan 5 in terms of the travel. So the question turns in part on the referendums, but nonetheless we continue to work designation of the airport as an international with the Secretary General on this matter. Indeed, airport. Given that that has not been designated as prior to the Foreign Secretary’s visit there was a an international airport there remain very complex statement made by Kofi Annan welcoming the visit legal diYculties, frankly, for any country, certainly and encouraging the sides to participate therein. multilaterally but, also, individually, in terms of Since that visit that has been made by the Foreign flights operating internationally to the airport. Secretary there has been an agreement and I think this followed the meeting between Papadopoulos Q198 Mr Maples: If you can answer the next and Kofi Annan and by communal discussions on question now that is fine but if you cannot I would common concerns, and obviously we welcome that. be very happy to take yet another note from you on The reason I cite that is that, as you recognise, this what are the procedures for authorising the airport is not simply an issue for the European Union. The as an international airport for these purposes. It process, in terms of a settlement, has been led through the good oYces of Javier Solana and we would be ironic if Greece, of all countries, with its air V safety record, were allowed to veto whether or not an continue to support the Secretary General’s e orts airport in Northern Cyprus was designated for in that regard. On your subsidiary point in terms of international travel. If you can answer the question the role of Northern Cyprus within the European now that is fine, but if you cannot— Union, I suppose again I would return to October 3 Mr Alexander: I will resist the temptation to even as rather a counter-point to the one made in the implicitly criticise one of our European partners, sense that it is no secret that there were concerns and provide a note.5 raised by the country of Cyprus in the course of those negotiations, even in the final hours, but nonetheless on the basis of a great deal of hard work Q199 Mr Maples: Certainly, as Members of this and eVort both by our diplomats and, also, by the Committee who did these two visits to Cyprus, we Foreign Secretary we were able to prevail and secure felt that the Greek-Cypriot Government did not an opening of accession talks. I do think, given what negotiate in good faith with the Annan proposals, I have said in terms of the need for transparency, certainly after Papadopoulos became President and conditionality and rigour in the process, Turkey we have been comprehensively hoodwinked or taken deserves to be treated in exactly the same way—no for a ride over this and we have now got a situation more favourably and no less favourably—than any where we have, inside the cabinet somebody who other candidate country, and that will continue to be ought to have been firmly outside it until the Cyprus our position and we will continue to argue that case issue was resolved. Now inside they are in a position within the European Union. not just to use the EU in pursuit of its problems and the issues it has with Northern Cyprus but, also, to pursue, frankly, much more importantly from our Q200 Chairman: We have about 10 minutes left and point of view, over the negotiations for Turkish there are three areas that I want to touch on. You accession. It seems to me, and I would be grateful if have touched on it already when you talked about we could have your response to this, that unless we the discussion about the external action service and start winning some of these arguments with Cyprus developments, but can I put it to you that, in the and we continue to allow the smallest countries in absence of the constitution, with this arrangement the European Union to dictate very important whereby Mr Solana is in this strange position as aspects of its policy and progress, we are simply being responsible to the Council of Ministers that storing up trouble of, at some stage, them stopping putatively we would have had a diVerent role if the negotiations for Turkish entry. Whether you are things had been diVerent, is the eVectiveness of the in favour of Turkish entry or not it ought to be European Union and its external policy generally decided on its merits and not because of some very weakened or hampered by the current institutional small, regional, ethnic dispute on a little island in the arrangements? Mediterranean. If we do not get tough with Cyprus, Mr Alexander: There is no question of Javier Solana that, I suggest to you, is what is going to happen. It becoming, whoever is successful as high may not be you or this Government but somebody representative, a new foreign minister without is going to have to pick up the pieces of this. addressing that issue of the draft constitutional Mr Alexander: Let me begin with where we stand in treaty. In terms of the eVectiveness of the European terms of the Annan 5. The Foreign Secretary, I Union projecting itself and its values understand, following his appearance before your internationally, I would probably cite the most Committee in December, at the turn of the year salient example, which is that of Iran. If you look at travelled to the Republic of Cyprus and, indeed, the E3 process over recent months, initiated with the then visited the so-called TRNC and met with Turk full support of other European countries, it seems to me a very good example of where there has been, 5 Ev 60 notwithstanding the present arrangements within 3393671001 Page Type [O] 20-07-06 01:51:27 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1
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3 May 2006 Mr Douglas Alexander MP, Mr Anthony Smith and Mr Simon Manley the European Union, a very eVective European surface at all but they should be only allowed to dimension to one of the biggest single strategic proceed by tunnel between Gaza and the West Bank. challenges that we face. Can you assure us that the British Government and the EU have as a very high priority the policy of Q201 Chairman: The EU policy is coming to a ensuring that the communication link between Gaza failure, really, with regard to Iran, despite all the and the West Bank is going to be by road and that great eVorts and the fact that you are working the Palestinians, to create the viable Palestinian together with the French and German State, must have ease of access, freedom of access, Governments; ultimately, it has not succeeded. along that road, particularly given the fact that it is Mr Alexander: I have to say it is the first time it has now Israeli government policy to hermetically seal V been suggested to me that it is the fault of the o Israel from the occupied territories and are no European Union. longer going to be allowing Palestinians even to work in the State of Israel. Mr Alexander: Let me make clear, first of all, that Q202 Chairman: I did not say that. I am not saying it given my European responsibilities this is a matter is the fault of the European Union, I am saying that that is covered within the OYce by my colleague despite all the prodigious eVorts that went in it has Kim Howells as Minister for the Middle East, not succeeded. primarily, and, also, of course, by the Foreign Mr Alexander: I would not recognise that Secretary. So it would not be for me in any way to characterisation of the E3 process. I think if you alter the British Government’s position. Of course, look at the fact that since its initiation not just the we have been very supportive both of the Quartet British Foreign OYce but, also, the German and and, indeed, of James Wolfensohn’s work and have French foreign ministries, not just the United States valued the contribution he has made in recent but, also, Russia and China, have come behind that months. In terms of our position in relation to the diplomatic eVort, it is evidence of the fact that others barrier, in terms of your description of hermetically recognise the importance of the process. Of course sealing areas, the position is long-standing and clear that process is not concluded, of course there is a and we have made representations directly to the long way still to go but, nonetheless, I think it is an Israeli Government on that matter. Equally, it is important contribution to a very diYcult clear that we continue to believe that via the road international issue. As I say, the fact that political map procedure the aspiration should be a viable directors, or P5!1, now are meeting in Paris today Palestinian State, alongside a secure and safe Israel. (they started meeting yesterday and they will Beyond that, it would really be a matter better continue to meet tomorrow) and there will be further directed to the Foreign Secretary or, indeed, my discussions at ministerial level in New York next colleague Kim Howells, the Minister with direct week evidences the fact that not just the United responsibility for the Middle East. Kingdom but other countries recognise the E3 process as an important part of a continuing, developing issue in the international community. Q204 Sir John Stanley: Minister, I fully appreciate the departmental problems and that Ministers have Q203 Sir John Stanley: Minister, I want to turn to specific issues, but you are here to represent the a specific EU issue in connection with the occupied whole of your department. I fully understand you territories of Gaza and the West Bank. As you are cannot address my specific question and we will be aware, the White Paper said that during the UK grateful for a full written note from you on the Presidency the main objective for the European specific issue of British Government policy towards establishing a viable and easily accessed road link Union in the Middle East peace process was to 6 support the work of James Wolfensohn, Special between Gaza and the occupied territories. Envoy for Disengagement for the Quartet. A Mr Alexander: It would be even more appropriate if number of us, Minister, had an opportunity of I get such a letter from Kim Howells, the Minister having direct discussions with members of the with responsibility. Wolfensohn team when we were in Israel and the occupied territories at the end of last year, and if Q205 Chairman: Can you also update us now on there is going to be, ultimately, a viable Palestinian where we are with regard to assistance to the State, which is the objective of the Government and Palestinian people, given the EU decisions about the EU, and I think there are grounds for huge Hamas, and how we can avoid mass starvation or doubts as to whether that is going to be achieved, but deprivation in the Palestinian territories whilst, at if it is going to be achievable at all it will require an the same time, not supporting Hamas? eYcient and easily usable crossing for Palestinians Mr Alexander: Again, our position remains that as between Gaza and the West Bank. As you will know, set out in terms of the three key criteria set down by that was an issue which was a matter of very, very the Quartet: the adherence to prior international detailed consideration by the Wolfensohn team. obligations; the renunciation of violence and the Predictably, I have to say, the Israelis were putting a recognition of the State of Israel. It was the case that great deal of diYculties in the way; they were making either at the end of last year or at the beginning of the suggestion that the transit between Gaza and the this year, during the period that the administration West Bank should perhaps only be by rail and they was being formed, there was additional support have even come up with a fantastical proposal that Palestinians should not be allowed to go on the 6 Ev 60 3393671001 Page Type [E] 20-07-06 01:51:27 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1
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3 May 2006 Mr Douglas Alexander MP, Mr Anthony Smith and Mr Simon Manley provided by the European Union,7 if I recollect That being said, and accepting, as I say, that since correctly, agreed with the General AVairs Council, then funding has been provided from the European to support the Palestinian Authority, but we are very Union in support of the Palestinian Authority, now clear that the onus of responsibility now rests with that you have a Hamas-led government we are the Palestinian Authority and the Hamas leadership equally clear that the obligations set down on that to reach their own judgment in terms of those Palestinian Authority by the Quartet continue to criteria that are set down. That being said, I have to be answered, and in that sense, with respect, understand that there will continue to be discussions we have already made sure that there was within the Union and, principally, amongst foreign transitional assistance provided immediately after ministers on this issue of the need for potential the election. So I hope that we have answered the humanitarian support notwithstanding the fact that charge that you put to me. On the other hand, the we do not want in any way to remove the onus of question has still to be answered by the Hamas responsibility from Hamas leadership to reach what leadership of the Palestinian Authority as to whether we believe is the necessary judgment to adhere to they accept their responsibilities and the those international norms and those international responsibilities contingent on being a democratic standards. government. Chairman: I am conscious of time and there were a number of other areas we wanted to ask but you Q206 Chairman: Do you not accept that there is a have to get away, I know that. Can I just touch on potential problem, in that the diYculties that will be two or three areas and ask, perhaps, if you could caused to the Palestinian people will, instead of send us a note on them. Firstly, the current position being blamed upon Hamas itself, be blamed upon with regard to the neighbourhood policy and, the international community and may actually specifically, Ukraine, in light of the political changes reinforce Hamas’s hold and its political support there. Secondly, the security of energy supply within within the Palestinian territories when, in fact, only the European Union, and what the British 44% of people voted for it? Government’s position is on that, including the Mr Alexander: Yes, and we have been very clear and, German-Russian pipeline issue. Thirdly, on the indeed, the Foreign Secretary has been very clear, at point we have just been touching on, we also visited the time of the elections in the Palestinian Authority, Rafah when we were there in November/December to make clear that our motivation was in no way to and saw the Italian-led EU operation there, which suggest that, as the Foreign Secretary said: the was doing an excellent job, and I would be “wrong” decision had been reached. It is not for us grateful—8 to make those decisions; the right democratic way Andrew Mackinlay: And Belarus. for those decisions to be reached is for a fair and free choice to be exercised by the Palestinian people. Q207 Chairman:—for your update on the position with regard to where Rafah is in this current situation between Mahmoud Abbas and Hamas. 7 The UK made a £5 million contribution to the World Bank My colleague has mentioned Belarus as well. I am Trust fund to help stabilise the Fatah-led interim Palestinian Authority’s finances. Of the ƒ120 million Commissioner very sorry we have not had time to go through all Ferrero-Waldner announced on 27 February for the interim those matters, and I am sure we will see you again at (Fatah-led) Palestinian Authority , ƒ40 million was for some point in the future. Thank you very much. essential public utilities, ƒ64 million for health and Mr Alexander: Thank you very much. education services channelled through the UN relief and works agency (UNWRA) and ƒ17.5 million as budget support for the World Bank administered Trust. 8 Ev 62
Letter from Rt Hon GeoV Hoon MP, Minister of State for Europe, to the Chairman of the Committee Following Douglas Alexander’s Evidence Session before the Committee on Wednesday 3 May, he promised to follow up in writing on the following issues. I am responding as his successor as Minister for Europe.
Titles of EU Overseas Representatives and their Residences Douglas Alexander’s statement to the Committee that these individuals are not Ambassadors, but representatives of the European Commission, was correct. The term “Ambassador” has never been correct terminology, although mention of “EU Ambassadors” is common outside the Union when talking about a group of Ambassadors belonging to individual Member States. While incorrect references sometimes occur, the important issue is that neither Commission representatives nor Commission oYces can represent Member States. On the question of EU representatives’ residences overseas, the UK, with other EU Member States through the Council of Ministers, exercises significant influence on the establishment of the EC budget at the beginning of each financial period. It is from this budget that oYces and residences of the Commission overseas are funded. Parliament is also given the chance to scrutinise the Government’s position on the draft 3393671002 Page Type [O] 20-07-06 01:51:27 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1
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EC budget before its adoption in Brussels. I shall write separately with the information you requested on the residences of Commission representatives in Moscow, Washington, Tokyo and Addis Ababa.1
Article 308 of the TEC John Maples MP asked the Government to clarify a number of issues relating to Article 308 of the Treaty Establishing the European Community. Recourse to Article 308 as the legal base for action is subject to two conditions: first the action must be necessary to attain one of the objectives of the Community in the course of the operation of the common market; and, second, there must be no other specific legal base which confers on the Community the powers to carry out the action concerned. In practice, the phrase “in the course of the operation of the common market” has been interpreted broadly by the European Court of Justice, in the sense that the proposed action must come within the general framework of the EC Treaty. Article 308 does not therefore require that every proposal using it as a legal basis should relate in a narrow and restrictive sense to the functioning of the internal market. In keeping with this approach there has, in recent years, been a trend towards using Article 308 for measures on general external matters and some institutional and financial matters. Some examples are as follows: — In 1981, a Regulation to grant exceptional food aid to the least developed countries (Council Regulation (EEC) No 3723/81 of 21 December 1981); — In 1983, a Regulation to introduce an exceptional Community measure to promote urban renewal in Northern Ireland (Council Regulation (EEC) No 1739/83 of 21 June 1983); — In 1994, a Regulation to set up a Translation Centre for bodies of the European Union. (Council Regulation (EC) No 2965/94 of 28 November 1994); — In 1996, a Regulation to provide assistance to economic reform and recovery in the New Independent States and Mongolia (Council Regulation (Euratom, EC) No 1279/96 of 25 June 1996); — In 2000, a Regulation on support for the United Nations interim Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) and the OYce of the High Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina (OHR) (Council Regulation (EC) No 1080/2000 of 22 May 2000); and — In 2001, a Regulation creating a rapid-reaction mechanism (Council Regulation (EC) No 381/ 2001). Article 308 is the legal base for the Fundamental Rights Agency and the Government and all other Member States are clear that this is the appropriate legal base. As noted above, Article 308 provides the Council with the means to attain the objectives of the Community if the Treaty has not provided the necessary powers. While ensuring respect for fundamental rights is not specifically listed as a Community objective in Articles 2 and 3 TEC, the European Court of Justice has found that this is a condition for the lawfulness of Community acts, and thus it forms an underlying or implied objective of the Community.
Position of Romania and Bulgaria Regarding Accession Negotiations In addition to the super safeguard clause, the Accession Treaty lists three provisions which allow the EU to remedy diYculties encountered as a result of accession (Articles 36–38): a general economic safeguard clause; a specific internal market safeguard clause; and a justice and home aVairs safeguard clause. These safeguards were included in the Accession Treaty for the new member states that joined in 2004, but were never activated. The general economic safeguard clause is designed to deal with adjustment diYculties experienced in a particular economic sector or area following the entry of a new member state into the internal market. This would normally relate to sudden strong competitive pressure in a product market. During the three years following accession, a new member state may apply for authorisation to take protective measures while adjusting its economy to the pressures of the internal market, and an old member state may apply for authorisation to take protective measures with regard to a new member state. The internal market safeguard clause may be applied in the first three years if a new member state has not met commitments it made in the accession negotiations, or the functioning of the internal market is under serious threat. It covers the area of the four freedoms and includes sectors such as competition, energy, transport, telecommunication, agriculture and consumer and health protection—including food safety. Measures are taken on a case-by-case basis. They may be decided before accession, to be applicable as from accession, and they may be extended as long as the situation is not remedied.
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The justice and home aVairs safeguard clause may be applied during the first three years after accession if there are risks of serious shortcomings in the way a new member state has transposed or implemented EU rules on mutual recognition in criminal law or civil matters. They may also be applicable beyond that date if the situation is still not remedied.
Air Links with Northern Cyprus The UK and the Republic of Cyprus are both contracting States to the Convention on International Civil Aviation, commonly referred to as the Chicago Convention. Article 10 of the Chicago Convention provides for each contracting State to designate the airports at which international civil flights may arrive and depart for the purposes of customs and other examinations. Under Article 68, contracting States may designate the routes to be followed by international civil flights and the airports they may use. Article 10 further provides for the publication of the details of designated airports by the contracting State and the transmission of these details to the International Civil Aviation Organisation which may in turn pass them on to other contracting States. The Republic of Cyprus has never designated Ercan as an airport for these purposes. We do not understand safety to be the principle obstacle to this. We already have an interest in the safety of Ercan airport given the large numbers of British tourists flying into it via Turkey. Inspections indicate safety standards at the airport are satisfactory. The circumstances under which non-state entities, or a contracting State which is in eVective control of territory over which it has no sovereignty, may be competent to designate an airport for these purposes have not been comprehensively put to the test.
Gaza and the West Bank We regret that Quartet Special Envoy for Disengagement, James Wolfensohn, was unable to continue his excellent work. He played a significant role in several key areas. He worked extremely hard to ensure that Israeli disengagement from Gaza and parts of the West Bank delivered results for the Palestinian people. He was instrumental in securing the 15 November Agreement on Movement and Access. He worked with both parties to help build the Palestinian economy. We commend his eVorts. Secure and reliable links between Gaza and the West Bank are crucial for the success of the Palestinian economy. Dr Howells has taken a close interest in this. Sir John Stanley is right that there is a strong case for constructing a road link between Gaza and the West Bank. The European Commission, USAID and the World Bank are scoping the prospects for doing this, along with the various alternatives, such as a rail link and/or tunnel. A safe and permanent connection between Gaza and the West Bank will make a lasting impact on the prospects for a viable Palestinian state. We are concerned that the United Nations OYce for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian AVairs has reported an increase in the number of obstacles to movement in the West Bank and that the deadlines for the introduction of bus convoys by 15 December 2005 and truck convoys by 15 January 2006 were missed. We continue to urge Israel and President Abbas, bilaterally and through the Quartet, to work on the Gaza–West Bank link and other issues as set out in the 15 November Movement and Access Agreement relating to the Gaza Strip. This includes Gaza/Israel crossing points; freedom of movement in the West Bank; and the construction of an airport and seaport in Gaza. The Committee has also written asking for two further written answers:
Treaty Change David Heathcoat-Amory asked about the Government’s attitude towards modifying, amending or changing existing treaties in order to bring in parts of the Constitutional Treaty. Douglas Alexander made clear our views when he addressed the Committee on 3 May, that there is no such proposal under discussion with partners. As the former Foreign Secretary said “There is no plan, proposal or intention to slip elements of the Constitution through the back door.” (Commons Debate, 6 June, Hansard Col 1000). Douglas Alexander told the Committee on 3 May, “We could contemplate non-treaty change, incremental improvements of the rules”. It would clearly be impractical to rule out all future treaty changes simply on the basis that similar provisions exist in the Constitutional Treaty. Over time, much procedural change has taken place in the EU, some of which, such as the new arrangements for transparency of the Council of Ministers agreed under the UK Presidency, has not required Treaty change; an example of change which did require Treaty change was the extension of QMV in the Maastricht Treaty. If further such change could make the EU more eVective, we would not rule it out automatically, but we would look carefully at the possible benefits to the UK on a case by case basis. 3393671002 Page Type [O] 20-07-06 01:51:27 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1
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European Foundation for Democracy A reply from the Foreign Secretary to Denis MacShane regarding the latter’s question in the House of Commons on a European Foundation for Democracy (27 March 2006, col 561) has not yet been issued but will be shortly. I will ensure that a copy of the correspondence is forwarded to the Clerk of the Committee.2 You asked that notes be provided on topics the Committee was unable to reach due to time constraints (the European Neighbourhood Policy, Ukraine, Belarus, security of energy supplies and EU monitoring at Rafah). These are provided at Annex A. Rt Hon GeoV Hoon MP, Minister of State for Europe Foreign and Commonwealth OYce 22 May 2006
Annex A
European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) The ENP covers both the EU’s eastern and southern neighbours. The UK Government supports the ENP as a means of encouraging political and economic reform in countries that wish to move closer to European standards. Action Plans for the first wave of countries (Ukraine, Moldova, Israel, Palestinian Authority, Tunisia, Morocco and Jordan) are now being implemented. The Action Plans identify areas for reform linked to closer co-operation with the EU. The first formal review of Action Plans for Moldova and Ukraine will take place this year. Action plans for Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Egypt and Lebanon are now being negotiated and we hope these will be completed as quickly as possible.
Ukraine An interim report in late November 2005 showed that Ukraine was making good progress under its ENP Action Plan. Since then it has conducted largely free and fair parliamentary elections (as recognised by the OSCE’s OYce of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights which monitored them) and entrenched media freedoms— both priorities under the Action Plan. The 26 March parliamentary election in Ukraine returned a majority for the pro-reform “Orange” parties and cut the number of parties represented in the new parliament to just five. However, President Yushchenko’s Our Ukraine Party came third behind that of his former Prime Minister, Yuli Tymoshenko. Victor Yanukovych’s Party of the Regions came first in the popular vote with 33%, but lost ground in its eastern heartlands. Coalition negotiations are currently under way between Our Ukraine, Blok Yulia Tymoshenko and the Socialists and are focussed on negotiating a government programme as mandated by the revised constitution. The UK remains strongly supportive of political and economic reform and the Prime Minister sent a letter to Yushchenko in March congratulating him on Ukraine holding largely free and fair elections and underlining our willingness to work with any government that emerges from coalition negotiations in support of reform.
Belarus The OSCE’s observation mission to Belarus’ Presidential election on 19 March characterised it as “severely flawed due to the arbitrary use of state power and restrictions on basic rights”. The election was followed by a further crackdown on the opposition and the arrest of over 800 individuals, including Alexander Milinkevich and Alexander Kozulin (candidates in the presidential election and opposing leaders). The UK and EU have responded strongly, including by issuing tough statements condemning election fraud, the subsequent crackdown on peaceful demonstrations, and the arrest of demonstrators. A travel ban against thirty-one individuals (including Lukashenko) was agreed by EU foreign ministers on 10 April. (This was reinforced on 18 May by the Council agreeing to impose asset freezes against those responsible for the election fraud and actions against the opposition, civil society, and the independent media). The EU remains open to developing relations with Belarus, including through to ENP, provided that the Belarusian authorities prove a sincere willingness to respect human rights, the rule of law and democratic freedoms, and initiate democratic reforms. This position was repeated by the GAERC in Conclusions on 6 April.
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Security of Energy Supplies The European Council in March this year asked the Commission and the Council to prepare a strategic review of EU energy policy by 2007, with work beginning this year. This builds on the Commission’s Green Paper of 8 March and will look at security of energy supply, which should be achieved through full implementation of the single market in energy, diversification of supply into the EU, improved energy eYciency, and a coherent external strategy for EU dealings with source and transit countries. In the meantime, the June European Council will consider more closely external aspects of EU policy. The UK is working with EU partners to influence the outcomes both of the June Council and the Strategic Energy Review.
EU Monitoring at Rafah We are pleased that the EU Border Assistance Mission at Rafah continues to allow the Palestinians to operate the border between Gaza and Egypt following Israeli disengagement The EU’s presence provides reassurance to all parties that the border is being properly operated. This makes a real diVerence to the lives of people in Gaza by improving their economic prospects and by allowing them greater freedom of movement The EU takes the security of its monitors seriously and has recently increased the size of the Specialist Security Team (to ten personnel) on the advice of the Head of Mission. In terms of the future prospects of the mission, we expect that it will continue to operate as long as the parties continue to support and meet their obligations under the Agreement for the border’s operation. 3419051001 Page Type [SO] 20-07-06 01:53:06 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1
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Tuesday 13 June 2006
Members present:
Mike Gapes, in the Chair
Mr David Heathcoat-Amory Andrew Mackinlay Mr John Horam Mr Ken Purchase Mr Eric Illsley Sir John Stanley Mr Paul Keetch Richard Younger-Ross
Memorandum submitted by the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth AVairs
PROSPECTS FOR THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL, BRUSSELS, 15–16 JUNE 2006 Introduction 1. We expect the June European Council to focus on the Constitutional Treaty, enlargement and Hampton Court follow-up, including energy and climate change.
Constitutional Treaty 2. 15 Member States have now approved the Constitutional Treaty. However it is not currently on track to enter into force because of the French and Dutch no votes last summer. This, and the diversity of opinion expressed in the “national debates” on the Future of Europe, mean that we expect the European Council to take stock of and extend the period of reflection. 3. We also expect the European Council to discuss the question of a target date for taking decisions on institutional reform. 2009 has been floated by the Austrian Presidency following the Informal Meeting of Foreign Ministers in Klosterneuburg last month. 4. Separately the Commission’s “Citizens’ Agenda” paper also proposes launching a “process leading to an institutional settlement”. This would include a political declaration, probably to coincide with the anniversary of the Treaty of Rome in spring 2007, on Europe’s “values and ambitions”.
Enlargement 5. In December 2005 the Council agreed to hold a fundamental debate this year on the future of enlargement. The June European Council will discuss aspects of enlargement, but we expect the full debate will come later, after the Commission has submitted its report on enlargement this autumn. 6. We want to ensure the EU sticks to its existing commitments on enlargement and to ensure that any changes to the EU’s policy do not rule out the possibility of future enlargements. Equally we want to make sure that the accession negotiation process is implemented rigorously and that all candidates meet the EU’s standards. 7. The European Council was also due to take a decision on whether Bulgaria and Romania should accede to the Union in 2007, as scheduled, or whether to delay accession until 2008. The Commission has now recommended deferring the decision until October, given their concerns about the readiness of both countries. The European Council is therefore likely simply to endorse the 16 May Commission report, welcoming progress to date, but urging more before October.
Hampton Court 8. We want the European Council to agree good, forward-looking Conclusions which maintain the momentum and profile of the outcome of the Informal Meeting of the European Council at Hampton Court on 27 October 2005. This covers work on research, universities, demographics, energy policy, Justice and Home AVairs and CFSP/ESDP. It is an agenda which focuses on the concrete issues that matter to people throughout the European Union.
Energy 9. The European Council will discuss the external aspects of EU energy policy, as agreed by the Spring European Council. The basis for the discussion will be a short joint Commission/Solana paper. Our aim for this Council is to maintain the momentum on this work, giving a clear mandate to the next (Finnish) Presidency to develop this work with the Commission. In addition, we want to ensure that external aspects of energy policy will be reflected fully in the Commission’s Strategic Energy Review which is due for Spring 2007. 3419051001 Page Type [E] 20-07-06 01:53:06 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1
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Climate Change 10. We are working to secure Conclusions which call for a global consensus on the scale of action needed to avoid dangerous climate change, including a long term stabilisation goal , as well as a truly global debate on climate change, involving all stakeholders. We also feel the European Council should reiterate the EU’s commitment to an eVective Emissions Trading Scheme, and the importance of establishing long-term certainty for it.
Sustainable Development 11. The European Council should adopt the EU’s revised Sustainable Development Strategy. The Strategy outlines objectives under seven key challenges including climate change and clean energy. Our aim is to see a single, coherent and accessible Strategy that eVectively communicates the Community’s internal and external sustainable development objectives.
Justice and Home Affairs 12. The European Commission’s “Citizens’ Agenda” paper makes explicit reference to the possibility of using the Qualified Majority Voting provisions of Article 42 of the Treaty on European Union (known as the “passerelle”) “to improve decision taking and accountability in areas such as police and judicial cooperation and legal migration”. This would have the eVect of moving some JHA matters from unanimity to QMV, without treaty change. But the UK would preserve its “opt-in” in this area. While we expect some initial discussion, no decisions will be taken on the use of the passerelle at the June Council. This issue will be discussed further during the Finnish Presidency.
Western Balkans 13. The European Council will also consider the Western Balkans. We hope the final Conclusions will note the continued need for Serbia to co-operate with ICTY, will acknowledge Montenegro’s recent declaration of independence (following its referendum) and note the ongoing EU preparations for contributing to the implementation of a status settlement in Kosovo.
External Relations 14. We can expect Iran to be the main topic. The Council is also likely to consider other Middle East issues and Africa.
Crisis Response 15. The Presidency is expected to present a paper on Crisis Response, drawing in part from a paper by former European Commissioner Michel Barnier “Pour uneforceeuropeenedeprotectioncivile:europeaid”.
Coherence of External Policy 16. The Council will discuss a paper from Commission President Barroso on greater coherence of the EU’s external policies. We expect this will contain proposals to improve internal Commission coordination, to develop co-operation between Member States, the Commission, the High Representative and the Council, and to enhance the visibility and accountability of the EU’s external actions.
Transparency 17. Presidency proposals for greater transparency of co-decision debates will also be on the Council agenda. Foreign and Commonwealth OYce 7 June 2006 3419051002 Page Type [O] 20-07-06 01:53:06 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1
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Witnesses: Rt Hon Margaret Beckett, a Member of the House, Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth AVairs, Mr Anthony Smith, European Political AVairs, and Ms Shan Morgan, Director, EU, Foreign and Commonwealth OYce, gave evidence.
Q208 Chairman: Good afternoon, everybody. honestly do not know what the view of the Secretary of State, welcome back. I am not sure if opposition whips was because, as you may or may you will be before us every week but at least two not know, Mr Mackinlay, speaking as a former weeks running! whip, the relationship between the whips’ oYces is Margaret Beckett: It would be a pleasure, often very good but they regard it as a pearl of great Chairman. price from the point of view of information, so I have no idea what the attitude of the opposition whips Q209 Chairman: Can I begin by asking you how you was, but I do know there was a considerable see our policy as a Government on Europe at this willingness to see how we could improve scrutiny, moment? and I will come back to that in a second, but a Margaret Beckett: First, Chairman, perhaps I could nervousness that was either too complex or could be introduce my colleagues. On my left is Anthony unworkable in terms of the timing and demands it Smith, who is the Director of European Political would make on Members. Indeed, as you will AVairs, and on my right is Shan Morgan who is now appreciate, perhaps this Committee more than many Director, EU. I think the European Union itself, others, often the EU is quite a fast moving situation despite the obvious diYculties with which you are all and what no-one wanted was to end up in a position familiar, is entering into a period of an increased where you were either having continuous scrutiny degree of mutual confidence, I think I would put it reserves that impeded progress in the direction like that, and hopefully mutual eVectiveness. I think Member States wanted or, alternatively, that you we are getting the beginnings of a clearer balance were continually lifting scrutiny reserves in a way between what the EU can do, where the EU can add which made it look as if there was not the regard for value, and what Member States can contribute. My the views of Parliament that there ought to be just perception, even after quite a short time in this post, because of the practicalities. That is the first thing I building on my experience in my previous capacity, would say. Second, I am aware that President is that there is an ever closer understanding between Barroso has produced some proposals. I cannot Member States and their representatives on many recall whether this is part of his proposals but I do issues. That does not leave out the fact that there are know that there has been some general thinking also lots of diYculties and diVerent nuances of about whether or not there are ways of directly points of view, all of which you will be familiar with. helping with the work of the national parliaments in My overall general impression, if you want the sense of making documents and proposals more something as general as that, is that the EU is readily and more speedily available directly to coming together in a way which has the potential to national parliaments themselves so that members of be very positive. the diVerent parliaments can follow things through from an early stage. I think things along those lines would be extremely helpful. On the issue of Q210 Andrew Mackinlay: Secretary of State, I transparency, I think one of the things with which we apologise, I have got to leave early for a funeral. all deal as politicians is the media wish to deal only When the Minister for Europe was Leader of the in extremes because that is so much more interesting House it is well-known that he tried to develop than boring shades of opinion. Actually, I am not interest in the Government whips’ oYce, it might have been in the opposition whips as well, I do not opposed to transparency at all. Indeed, like all of the know, about reviewing how we do parliamentary Government, I very much support it. It was a scrutiny of European legislation, and it came to proposal of the British Presidency that we should nothing. I wonder if you could elaborate on what look for ways of having greater transparency. Where your vision of that is. That is bound up with the we are at present is that the present Presidency has General AVairs Council in the past week which had proposed what seems to me to be quite a substantial this paper from Barroso, COM 278, Europe in the move forward on what was proposed in the British World: Some Practical Proposals for Greater Presidency in the sense of suggesting that all Coherence, EVectiveness and Visibility, which talked deliberations on legislative proposals that are to be about engaging Member States and national taken by co-decision should be in open Council. I parliaments but did not go on to elaborate in any have spent seven out of the last nine years dealing way. I wonder if you could see how fairly with negotiations in subject Councils and, frankly, I immediately the democratic deficit could be take the view, and I have said this to my colleagues in addressed involving national parliaments in greater open Council and also in private session over lunch, scrutiny and openness. The final part of this is all because of course the General AVairs Council does these press reports where you are identified as being have a private session over lunch, it is important to opposed to television access, press access, to Council get the balance of this right. I have urged my meetings, which I do not judge about but it seems to colleagues to consider, and it remains to be seen me there is a burden on you as ministers to say where whether or not they will do so, that we adopt an we go from here on transparency, openness and approach which we have been urging on all addressing the democratic deficit. European Union business and approaches, which is Margaret Beckett: I do not completely recall all the of an impact assessment. Not saying, “no, this would details of what GeoV Hoon considered and thought not work”, although personally I have great doubts about, but I do know that there were concerns. I about whether it would work, but saying, “Let us 3419051002 Page Type [E] 20-07-06 01:53:06 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1
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13 June 2006 Rt Hon Margaret Beckett MP, Mr Anthony Smith and Ms Shan Morgan move forward to greater transparency as we all 5 and Germany to talk to the Iranians, it was decided agreed. Let us then assess how that works and see to ask Javier Solana to take on that role. The policy whether, on the basis of that experience, we judge he was conveying, communicating if you like, was that we could do more”. I am uneasy about the idea the policy of Member States and, indeed, of the that all processes of negotiation on legislation and, Americans, the Russians and the Chinese. indeed, on other areas perhaps, or in terms of this case where there is co-decision, would all have to be Q212 Mr Heathcoat-Amory: The European Scrutiny in full Council. I cannot think of a single negotiation Y Committee, which I am on, did actually resolve to I have been involved in of any di culty or delicacy meet in public but the then Leader of the House did that has not ultimately had to be resolved, at least to absolutely nothing to implement that, so the a substantial degree, behind closed doors because Government has not got a good record on openness you have to have very frank exchanges. Indeed, I can and transparency as regards proceedings of this recall saying to colleagues on one occasion when we House. Foreign Secretary, you are perhaps more were in the Presidency, “We understand that there responsible for the Council of Ministers and you are particular concerns that you may have that you have explained your caution about allowing the may not want to disclose in full Council, but if you public to see what is going on. Can I remind you that share them with us we can see if we can meet your the last Minister for Europe wrote to the European main concerns”. I am nervous because something Scrutiny Committee on 13 March this year saying like that is bound to continue and it would be a pity that the UK objective “remains to push for all of the if we got the balance of that wrong. Council’s legislative business to be opened up to the public”. In your new role, why have rowed back Q211 Andrew Mackinlay: The Barroso paper is itself from that and are now expressing problems with this indicative of one of the deficiencies because it exists, rather modest measure to allow people into this it has not been furnished to the United Kingdom hallowed event of legislating in private? Parliament, it is not national security. We are Margaret Beckett: First of all, it is not clear to me scrutinising yourself and the executive today and it that I have rowed back from what Douglas has not been made available, and I think that is Alexander said because the proposal that he made, regrettable. I have had the benefit of seeing a copy, with which I have no quarrel at all, was that the key not via London. It says that it is not intended to parts of that process, any opening part of the process reopen the Treaty, which in a sense I would have and, indeed, the final issue, the votes and thought a lot of people, whatever our perspective on explanation of votes, all of that should be in the the European Union, would be very relieved to hear. public domain. It was not part of the proposal that You might want to amplify upon that. That is point was agreed in December that all deliberations, every A. Point B is that there is this proposal that there bit of it on such proposals, would be in the public should be “double-hatting” of diplomats. The way I domain. You refer to it as “allowing” the public to understand it, for instance, is that a United see what is going on but I feel confident—you were Kingdom diplomat may also formally provide for at one time, if I recall correctly, on your party’s front the European Union External AVairs Service, or bench—there are times when people need to thrash whatever it is called. Again, I have no objection to out issues frankly in a way which is not always easy that in principle but it seems to me a major departure to explain when there are really diYcult issues and or institutional change which we ought to hear you diVerences to be resolved. That is equally true on. among politicians of all parties, it is true at national Margaret Beckett: First of all, on reopening the level, it is true in the European Union and, indeed, Treaty, let me say straight away that I detect no in any other gathering of ministers. I am totally in desire among colleagues at this moment in time to favour, as I said earlier, of much greater openness start to reopen all the detailed areas of the Treaty. than we have had hitherto; what I am not in favour Indeed, as you will know, a decision has just been of is moving to a process which I personally feel taken to extend the period of reflection. I do not might be somewhat unworkable and which I fear think there is any question of something along those may mean simply that issues that could and should lines taking place. I am not sure what wide have been aired in that forum will not be aired in that circulation the Barroso document has had, I just forum, they will be aired somewhere else outside it. know that it exists. We submitted some comments of That is my concern. It is just a practical one based on our own. With regard to the issue of double-hatting, several years of experience in doing this. it will not work in every respect, it is just an issue of whether there are occasions when there is merit in Q213 Mr Heathcoat-Amory: I am sorry but what someone who is involved in an area being the person you have said does not accord with what the Europe who deals with it in the round. I do not think there Minister said quite unambiguously. He was is any suggestion, and certainly it is a suggestion that unconditional. He said, the objective “remains to we would approach with great caution, that push for all of the Council’s legislative business to be someone who is speaking for the EU would speak on opened up”, he did not refer to the end position to behalf of the UK, except in circumstances like those be published, he was referring to all of the Council’s that we had in Iran last week where policy was legislative business. There is a clear diVerence agreed by Member States and because of the wish to between what the Foreign OYce was saying a couple have a similar interlocutor on behalf of not just the of months ago and what it is saying now. Surely European Union but on behalf of all the Permanent there is an issue here of the public’s right to know. 3419051002 Page Type [O] 20-07-06 01:53:06 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1
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13 June 2006 Rt Hon Margaret Beckett MP, Mr Anthony Smith and Ms Shan Morgan
One of the suspicions, even the hostilities, towards and the Commission has indicated this is something Europe is that there is this secretive body that passes that they think perhaps we, the European Union, laws which are binding on us all. Would it not help should consider. I am well aware that whenever it is break that down if they could see Member State suggested that we should move towards Qualified representatives arguing between themselves and Majority Voting in any area new area there are reaching a compromise? Does that not enrich the always, quite rightly, anxieties and people want to democratic process? Forgive me, but you have given know what it would mean and what would be the a very bureaucratic insider’s view of keeping it all benefit of it and so on. Can I simply say the reason away from the children which is precisely the that I assume a spokesman from our Government problem we are grappling with with this enormous said that we did not have a closed mind on it is gap that has opened up between the rulers and the because we recognise that there is a legitimate ruled in Europe. I am really dismayed that in your argument. We are a long way from any decision on first few weeks you have resiled from a position this, there is not even a proposal yet, but there is a which was quite clearly put by the Minister for legitimate argument that runs that since, Europe so very recently. unfortunately, organised crime in particular, but Margaret Beckett: I think perhaps there is a crime in a number of other issues in this area are misunderstanding here because what Douglas was themselves cross-boundary, they are pan-European, talking about was the legislative business, not the and to insist that all of this can only be dealt with on legislative proceedings. I repeat, what was in the the basis of not having QMV, not having a pan- proposal which Douglas put forward, and which European potential approach could be an area of was accepted by the European Union, was that there weakness. I repeat, there is not a proposal, there is should be as much as possible, certainly the opening, not yet a decision and it will all be aired to a greater even if that was an oral presentation by the extent than before in public. Commission, and there should be a clear view of what positions diVerent Member States were taking, a clear and open public acceptance of where Q215 Sir John Stanley: Foreign Secretary, as you Member States stood, an explanation of that, all of know, there have been specific areas which the that I do not have any quarrel with. When he talked present Government and, indeed, its predecessor about all the business I think you will find that what have made very clear are non-negotiable as far as the he was talking about was all of the legislative surrender of the right to veto is concerned. Treaty business however it arose, whether it was initially change is one I give as an illustration and, of course, from an oral presentation by the Commission or there have been others. What you are saying to the whatever, not, if I can make that distinction, all of Committee is this is not an area in which the the proceedings because that was not the UK Government is absolutely firm on its position and Government’s proposal, and I have not changed the the Government is ready to make concessions if it UK Government’s proposal. Secondly, you say can be persuaded to the merits of doing so, is that the right to know where Member States stand because position? we are passing laws binding on us all. Of course, Margaret Beckett: I am not saying anything very giving public access to how Member States have put exciting, I do not think, Sir John. I am saying that if their decision and what decision it is in the public such a proposal comes forward, and I repeat no such domain, the explanation of why they have taken that proposal has yet come forward, we will look at it stance, all of that is much greater openness than we very carefully to see whether there is anything in it have now and all of that, you are quite right, is which we believe is in the interests of the United something to which the public should have access, Kingdom, and that I think is what you would wish and under the proposals that are in front of the us to do. You are absolutely right, there are a European Union can have access. I merely repeat, number of areas, certainly some areas in this dossier, and maybe I should not say this to you, maybe it will where the Government could well have red lines give you comfort given what I rather think to be where we are simply not prepared to consider giving your views, getting the balance of this wrong could up the veto. Given the pan-European nature of some make the processes of decision-making in the of these problems—I do not wish to prejudge the European Union almost unworkable. That might Committee’s view—you might well be equally suit you but I am not sure it would be of benefit to critical of us were we to say we would never consider the peoples of Europe. such a thing no matter how much it looked to be in our interests. Q214 Sir John Stanley: Foreign Secretary, as you know there have been widespread reports that Q216 Mr Keetch: Foreign Secretary, will Mr Britain is preparing to give up the national veto on GeoVrey Hoon be joining you at the next European Y EU law and order legislation. I noted that an o cial Council meeting? Government spokesman when asked to respond to Margaret Beckett: I have not the faintest idea. I do this said: “We are not going to close the door on it”. not know what his diary is. It is possible. The matter Can you tell the Committee, is Britain preparing to has not come up. Do you mean the one that is just give up the veto on law and order legislation? coming? Margaret Beckett: First, can I say my understanding is that there is no formal proposal yet in this respect but there have been various observations about it Q217 Mr Keetch: Yes. 3419051002 Page Type [E] 20-07-06 01:53:06 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1
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Margaret Beckett: No, he definitely will not. I am finally identify what are the things that people sorry, Chairman, I was thinking you meant the one cannot live with and what are the things that they after that. If I could just say to the Committee his cannot go home without, and you hope that out of father died very recently so, no, he will not be there. that a pattern of mutual compatibility emerges and if it does you have a success and you all go home, and Q218 Mr Keetch: I am very sorry to hear that. Can if it does not you have a failure. You are never going I just ask about his role in terms of his predecessors’ to be able to do that in public. It may be sad but it roles. Is his role as Minister for Europe the same as, is life. for example, his immediate predecessor, Mr Douglas Alexander? Do they have the same Q221 Richard Younger-Ross: Yes, but should not responsibilities within your Department? the Members of this House be able to influence its Margaret Beckett: I believe so. In fact, I think he ministers representing it in Europe on what they say may have a few more because there are one or two and positions they take in those discussions because areas where we now want to give a little greater at the moment they do not, Minister? emphasis because there are issues that are arising in Margaret Beckett: Yes, they do. With respect, Mr a way that they did not and we do not have the Younger-Ross, how do you think that members of Presidency now so there is a little bit more room for these negotiations come to the view about what it is him to take on some other things. that they cannot go home without. It is precisely on the basis of what their national parliaments say, Q219 Mr Keetch: Do you agree with Mr Denis what the interests are they are trying to defend and MacShane, another former holder of that post, that represent, and what the impact would be on people an opportunity was missed by not having a Secretary within their communities. That is exactly how you of State for Europe? There certainly was some come to the list of what you could just about stand discussion on the morning of the reshuZe that that and what you cannot possibly live with. was what Mr Hoon might have been oVered or might have been seeking. Do you think it is time for Q222 Richard Younger-Ross: Minister, that is why Britain to have a Secretary of State for Europe? GeoV Hoon wished to change the process to open up Margaret Beckett: No, I do not, and, what is more scrutiny to make it more accountable to this House, to the point, neither did the Prime Minister. a process which was closed down by the Cabinet. Margaret Beckett: I am not sure that is an accurate Q220 Richard Younger-Ross: On the European description of what happened but, to be honest, I do not remember because it was some time ago. It is scrutiny you referred to earlier, is not the risk that Y legislation comes forward, you meet in smoke-filled di cult to get the balance right between how one can rooms because you deem that part of this process has practically bring forward sets of proposals, often, as you are all very well aware, substantial numbers of to be done in smoke-filled rooms, those proposals V then come to the light of day and are brought to this di erent proposals and get time and space and House, by which point Members of this House, the opportunity for Members to scrutinise without, for European Scrutiny Committee, which I am also a example, wiping out the rest of their workload. I Member of along with David Heathcoat-Amory, or doubt if the Members of this Committee would be this Committee will be told, “We have made a happy to have a degree of scrutiny required of them decision on that now because we have done the deal on, say, European documents which meant that it behind closed doors”. What kind of democratic wiped out an awful lot of their other work. There is process is that? a balance to be struck for everybody and that Margaret Beckett: I think there is a very important balance is not always easy. One of the things that I think in the long-term, or even hopefully, please distinction between general debate, general issues, V broad policy areas and so on that are explored in a God, in the short-term that could make a di erence variety of Councils. My impression is—I do not is the insistence that we put in the Presidency, and want to do my colleagues an injustice—it is quite a which I think has got increasing acceptance, of small number of specific subject Councils where impact assessments at an early stage for proposals there will be issues which arise which are extremely coming forward from the European Union. One of concrete and practical and where the detail is arcane the things that would certainly help is if some of very often and Member States have to consider how these ideas are explored more fully before they come within the broad parameters that they negotiate, either to national parliaments or, indeed, to the usually in public and that are known, their particular European Council and the European Parliament. national circumstances sit and what it is they feel they can live with and what they feel they cannot live Q223 Mr Illsley: Foreign Secretary, you mentioned with. I suppose one could say that in an ideal world a few moments ago that the period of reflection in all of these conversations could take place but they relation to the Constitution has now been extended never have and they probably never will if anybody and I just wondered whether the British is to reach agreement. I have had a certain Government were comfortable with that extension. experience of doing this, as I say, and in the end what Margaret Beckett: Yes. happens is you sit down in a room, invariably in private, with a relatively small number of the Q224 Mr Illsley: Or whether you have any other ministers who are most aVected or in some way views on the constitutional issues bearing in mind ought to be the ones that can reach a view, and you the calls for further votes in France. 3419051002 Page Type [O] 20-07-06 01:53:06 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1
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Margaret Beckett: Further votes in France? I have Q229 Mr Illsley: Including some of us who have not not heard— voted. Finally, GeoV Hoon has already told the Committee that he would not rule out Treaty changes in order to bring in parts of the Q225 Mr Illsley: Giscard d’Estaing recently said he Constitution. Does the Government have in mind at thought France should vote again on the the moment any specific areas of change or will we Constitution. assess this as the issues relating to the Constitution Margaret Beckett: I am sure the French progress? Government was very grateful for that. Margaret Beckett: We are not thinking about Treaty changes at the present time. Certainly there are Q226 Mr Illsley: I am sure they were. various people, among them our French colleagues, Margaret Beckett: No, we are quite comfortable. It who are suggesting that we should all think about reflects the reality. There is a period of reflection. In whether there are things that could be done like, as that initial period of reflection I think Member I said to Mr Mackinlay, improving the flow of States have thought through more and more fully information and documents to national parliaments some of the implications of the position in which the on the basis of current treaties. That is something Union finds itself and I do not recall anybody much that is sometimes described here as “cherry- suggesting that they objected to the extension of the picking”. I think generally across the European period. I think there is a general feeling that is the Union from all sorts of quarters there is a resistance right thing to do at this point in time. to the idea of cherry-picking from the Constitutional Treaty. By that is meant bringing forward some elements of that Treaty which would require a new Q227 Mr Illsley: We have also heard Belgium’s legal basis. I think it is a diVerent matter, although Prime Minister recently say if four or more Member nobody is involved in much discussion about this States ratify the Treaty that would bring the yet, but the French, as I say, have put forward some numbers to 20, which is four-fifths, and that would suggestions which are at a very early stage of create a totally new situation which under the terms discussion, that there are ideas around which would of the Constitution would allow for the matter to be not require a Treaty-based change which could be referred back to the Council, as I understand it. Do done on the basis of current treaties, like better you have any views on that? Do you feel the matter involvement and involvement of parliaments and is should be referred back to the Council if four-fifths this something we ought to be prepared to consider. of the states do ratify? That is about as far as it has gone. I am not conscious Margaret Beckett: To be honest, Mr Illsley, I do not of people talking about Treaty change. see any real likelihood of that happening at the present time. Belgium is one of the countries that ratifies by parliamentary process. There are a Q230 Mr Purchase: Just to follow on that general number of Member States who have not yet ratified pattern, Secretary of State, I guess the term “period who are committed to having a referendum should of reflection” could be read as procrastination. In the proposal come forward, or had the Treaty come the meantime, we have now lived without a serious forward. I think he is entitled to have and to express change in the Constitutional Treaty for some little his point of view, and no doubt it is an area that can time. Do you see the lack of progress on that as any be discussed, but I do not see much likelihood of that impediment whatsoever to our prime aim of happening at this moment in time. improving prosperity across Europe? If not, are we making much ado about nothing? Margaret Beckett: No, I do not see it as an Q228 Mr Illsley: This brings me on to my next impediment, certainly not at the present time. I think question. There have been suggestions of a Europe- it would be unwise to assume that it could not wide referendum which would obviously circumvent become an impediment at some stage, especially as the idea of individual states voting against Europe continues to be enlarged. It is not an ratification. Do you rule that out as a possibility? Do impediment at the present time. In fact, one of the you agree with a Europe-wide referendum? things that I think is particularly interesting and Margaret Beckett: It is not for me to rule it out on quite encouraging, which partly influenced my behalf of the whole of the EU. Given that there are response at first to the Chairman, is there is a 15 Member States who have ratified in one way or growing welcome for the ideas that were put forward another, mostly not by referendum, suppose you and discussed at Hampton Court, what some people were one of the Member States like Belgium, say, call the Hampton Court process and others call the who has ratified by parliamentary process and then Europa projects, that what we should be doing is someone comes along and says, “Now you have looking for ways in which we can produce concrete ratified by parliamentary process, let’s have a improvement on areas like economic reform, and Europe-wide referendum” in which, no doubt, the that should be the emphasis at the present time. votes would be counted at a national level. This There is no impediment in our present governing would be an interesting exercise in public democracy circumstances to doing that, and a lot of interest and but one which those who have already ratified might goodwill towards doing it. not be thrilled about. It is a very interesting idea but Chairman: Thank you very much. That takes us on I cannot see it flying. nicely to enlargement. 3419051002 Page Type [E] 20-07-06 01:53:06 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1
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Q231 Mr Horam: Foreign Secretary, do you think all the time, that they have to meet these standards that enlargement does depend on constitutional and it is very important and crucial and if this change of the kind we are discussing inside the requires a substantial increase and extension of European Union? eVort then that is what will have to happen. But, of Margaret Beckett: No, I do not think it does. course, there is also the question because there is a Whether you could get to a stage, which we are by no timescale under the Accession Treaty, and I do not means at yet, when enlargement means that people want to dwell on this too much because the emphasis would have to consider whether there are ways in has to be on “You must meet these standards and which we could improve our administrative that is required by the European Union before you operations is another matter. become full members” and that has to be the emphasis for them. It is perhaps worth reminding Q232 Mr Horam: So enlargement can proceed the Committee, I am sure you are conscious of the without a constitutional change? fact, written into the Accession Treaty is the Margaret Beckett: Enlargement certainly can possibility of applying some post-accession proceed without a constitutional change. measures so that, for example, access to the internal market could be restricted in some way, or there are Q233 Mr Horam: Where do you stand on areas on JHA issues where you could establish enlargement? There seem to be widely diVering further monitoring. There is scope for that but views. For example, the Prime Minister of Poland obviously the pressure now wants to be on meeting recently said that he could not conceive of a full them before they become members, not on a process European family without Belarus, Ukraine and afterwards. Moldova and so forth, whereas Commissioner Kroes has said that 27 is the maximum as far as she Q237 Mr Keetch: You mentioned the Western is concerned. There seem to be widely diVering views Balkans, can I ask about a few countries in that and I wonder where you stand on all that. general area starting with Kosovo. Are there any Margaret Beckett: I was not aware of what the signs of progress being made at the Contact Group Commissioner had said. We recognised Macedonia on the future status of Kosovo that you are aware as a candidate country quite recently. of? Margaret Beckett: I know that their discussions are Q234 Mr Horam: She is blunt about the number. ongoing. I think there is a certain amount of Margaret Beckett: That is clearly her view. It is a progress. I am hunting unsuccessfully for my notes. matter for discussion in the future. Obviously there I am not up to speed with what is coming out of the is a feeling that one of the things that could help to Contact Group at this moment in time. I do know bring about real improvement in the Western though that there are very strong diVerences of view Balkans and around the edges of the European about the way forward for Kosovo. Everyone is Union, and it exists, is the prospect of association or, trying very hard to get an agreement about the way in time, membership of the European Union. You forward, but that has not yet been achieved and the asked me if I thought lack of Treaty change was an discussions are ongoing. I think we are hoping for a impediment, and no I do not, but what I do think is report later this year from President Ahtisaari but I key is that the enlargement process is properly and do not have a date for that. The Special Envoy and rigorously conducted. I think that is the key and that the Contact Group are continuing to work on it. is more likely to be a relevant factor in the pace of change or the pace of enlargement than anything Q238 Mr Keetch: Let me ask you something that you else. are going to be discussing on 12 June, and that is Montenegro, because Montenegro, as you know, on Q235 Mr Horam: So you would welcome countries 22 May voted narrowly in favour of independence. like Ukraine and Moldova, providing they were Commissioner Rehn has already said that it might properly handled, into the European Union? be possible by the end of this year to conclude a Margaret Beckett: I certainly think that it could be Stabilisation and Association Agreement with an error to close the door on them and say never but Montenegro. Do you believe it would be possible to we are quite a long way from such a process. do that by the end of the year, and what is going to be the British Government’s view on that general Q236 Mr Horam: On the other hand, we are quite a Stabilisation and Association Agreement? short way from countries like Bulgaria and Romania Margaret Beckett: As Commissioner Rehn said, where, as you know, there are concerns about there is the hope that might be possible. Obviously ineYciency and corruption, especially in Bulgaria. in general terms we are in favour of such agreements How do you feel that the Europeans should handle being reached. As you quite rightly say, it is very this if we cannot overcome these problems in the recent. Yesterday we made the written statement timescale that is envisaged? that the UK is going to recognise Montenegro as, Margaret Beckett: First of all, I think there is a very indeed, I think are fellow Member States, and are clear and strong message going from the whole of the seeking to establish diplomatic relations. It is a little European Union’s existing membership to Bulgaria early to be absolutely confident but I think the and Romania, and because they are accession feeling is that, first of all, it is not necessarily likely countries they are in attendance at the Council so to be so very diYcult to establish such an agreement they are not under any illusions, they hear all of this with Montenegro and, second, it is partly because of 3419051002 Page Type [O] 20-07-06 01:53:06 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1
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13 June 2006 Rt Hon Margaret Beckett MP, Mr Anthony Smith and Ms Shan Morgan their key place in the Balkans region itself, the issues we should be looking to try and progress some form that there are across that region about crime and of agreement as, indeed, was proposed by the United there are already, and we rather anticipate there may Nations’ Secretary-General some time ago because be a substantial increase in the number of British all of these things do represent an area of diYculty visitors going to Montenegro. Anything that can be for the European Union as a whole and one which it done to improve relations could be beneficial. would be helpful to all concerned to see resolved.
Q239 Mr Keetch: It is, indeed, a very beautiful Q242 Mr Illsley: Given the obstacles that Turkey country, as you have mentioned. In the absence of faces—opposition from existing members of the Mr Mackinlay, who has long sought to increase the European Union, not just Cyprus itself but there diplomatic representation of the United Kingdom in have been doubts expressed in Germany and France, Podgorica, I understand a statement has been made and its own internal diYculties in terms of human today about that. Could you just tell the Committee rights issues, the influence of the military, of the so- what is the change of our diplomatic post in called deep state—is there any realistic prospect of Podgorica? Turkey being able to join the European Union? Margaret Beckett: We are changing our oYce in Margaret Beckett: Oh, yes, I think so. Obviously we Montenegro to an embassy. That will be as soon as will get an updated report on issues like the Ankara is practicable, and we will be appointing a resident Protocol in October, I believe, when the ambassador in Podgorica. Commission makes its next report on the progress of the talks in general. It was not so long ago—I am not Q240 Sir John Stanley: Foreign Secretary, that carrying the date in my head—that Turkey set up an decision I know will be very widely welcomed in the independent body to look at human rights. They Committee. Before we finish the Western Balkans know very well that there is concern about issues can we turn to Serbia. When the Committee was last such as domestic reform, human rights, freedom of in Belgrade there clearly was a widespread and expression, the role of women, and so on, and are strong perception of the benefits for Serbia, a former very mindful of the fact that this is an area in which republic of Yugoslavia, to start down the process of people hope that they will move forward. The EU accession, and clearly that would have a very, reform package that set up the independent human very beneficial internal eVect in what is now Serbia rights body has also included measures to improve in modernising the system of criminal justice and minority religious rights and to give tighter civilian performing to the standards expected by EU control on military expenditure. I think it is clear Member States. Can you tell us, and indeed give the that Turkey is moving in the right direction but assurance, that providing Serbia can satisfy ICTY obviously that has to continue. that it is co-operating fully with ICTY, once that hurdle has been overcome the way is open in Q243 Chairman: Can I ask you about the impact of principle for Serbia to start down the accession the failure to have a Constitutional Treaty on the process into the EU? external aVairs work of the European Union. I was Margaret Beckett: Yes, I can certainly give the at a meeting in the European Parliament about three Committee that assurance. I think it is a source of weeks ago when Mr Solana said that although he considerable disappointment to a great many people was not impeded in doing his job now, he might be that Serbia was not willing, as appears to be the from November when the Constitutional Treaty problem, to comply with ICTY. That is why the would have come into eVect. We have been told by Commission, quite rightly, suspended discussions Douglas Alexander that the European External with them. I understand the Commissioner has said Action Service cannot come into eVect without the that should Serbia decide after all to comply he Constitutional Treaty which would provide it with a stands ready to proceed with those discussions as legal base, but the European Union continues to soon as possible. have oYces in various places around the world where sometimes the people are called ambassadors, Q241 Mr Illsley: Foreign Secretary, an incident was although we had a very helpful memo pointing out averted as late as yesterday when Cyprus relented that they are not ambassadors. Could you clarify, in and allowed the first chapter of the Turkish the absence of the European Union having the accession negotiations to go ahead, but there will be Constitutional Treaty, what is exactly the position of problems in the future as a consequence of Turkey’s the external representation both in terms of refusal to recognise the Republic of Cyprus. Do you representatives and also the role of Mr Solana. see that as an ongoing obstacle? Do you see any Margaret Beckett: First of all, in terms of the resolution to that issue of recognition? external representation, that is quite correct, it Margaret Beckett: Certainly, as you say, yesterday cannot go ahead. As you say, it is sometimes an area of diYculty was averted. Until those issues reported that various people call EU representatives can be resolved it will continue to be a source of “ambassadors”, but not us, and not, I rather think, diYculty during the negotiations with Turkey. The any Member States. It is absolutely clear that that Member States and the Commission continue to cannot go ahead. I am slightly surprised to learn, I urge the full application of the Ankara Agreement must talk to Javier, about the fact that he feels his Protocol and to move forward in the way that we all position may be more diYcult after October. That know is necessary. I should say though perhaps that may be a point of view he expressed before he got we also continue to urge the Republic of Cyprus that involved in the communications and discussions 3419051002 Page Type [E] 20-07-06 01:53:06 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1
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13 June 2006 Rt Hon Margaret Beckett MP, Mr Anthony Smith and Ms Shan Morgan with Iran where I think he has not faced any Representative Unit and the Commission’s external diYculties and, indeed, is making a very valuable relation commissioners. Is there anything here you contribution. With regard to the oYces, obviously do not agree with? this is Commission business, it is the Commission’s Margaret Beckett: No. The phrases that you have budget. I know that some concerns have been aired quoted seem unexceptional. but they are for them to answer rather than for me. Q248 Mr Horam: Unexceptional. Q244 Chairman: Although we welcome steps to Margaret Beckett: However, there is a caveat to open some embassies, which you have already that. Who can quarrel with greater co-operation or referred to, nevertheless there are embassies that perhaps greater exchange of personnel. For have been closed in several parts of the world, example, in my former department we exchanged including a number of Commonwealth countries personnel with the comparable French ministry. All and other posts have had restrictions and of those things, better strategic planning, can be very reductions. What scrutiny do we carry out of the useful. However, and there is a substantial however Commission’s representative oYces in other to this, better co-ordination within the Commission countries? Do Member States have any control and between the High Representative and the over this? Commission, fine, we would not quarrel with that, Margaret Beckett: We carry out the ordinary kind of but I understand there is also a suggestion of perhaps scrutiny that goes with the budget process, in which full Commission participation alongside the this Parliament is involved, as is the European Presidency and EU delegations. Well, no, maybe Parliament. I think I can fairly confidently say we do not, perhaps not even legally allowable. I stress to not have a great deal of involvement in scrutiny the Committee that the headline phrases that you other than that because I understand that Mr have quoted are fine but if they contain within them Mackinlay asked for some information about those detail which we question then we will question it. oYces the last time Douglas Alexander came to this Committee and we are endeavouring to find it out, Q249 Mr Horam: The general objective, which is Chairman, but we have not yet totally succeeded. clearly working towards a more coherent European Perhaps I should apologise to Mr Mackinlay in his Union Foreign Policy, the general direction of absence but I can assure him that as soon as we do travel, are you content with that? You would like to have that information it will be before this see a more coherent European Foreign and Security Committee. Since we have not got that information Policy, would you? I think that does suggest that we are not involved in Margaret Beckett: There will be times when diVerent very detailed scrutiny. Member States simply cannot see eye-to-eye on particular issues but it must always be of benefit if Q245 Chairman: Who has got the information that there is genuine common ground on particular you need to get? issues. Tribute was paid at the General AVairs Margaret Beckett: The Commission presumably has Council yesterday to the work of my predecessor, got it. I do not think the feeling is that this is an issue Jack Straw, and to Dominique de Villepin and of, how can I put this, less than full transparency, I Joschka Fischer for starting oV the process of think it is maybe an issue of whether or not they can engagement with Iran. Whatever is the outcome of lay their hands on it. where we now find ourselves on those negotiations there can be no question that the fact that those three Member States found common ground and worked Q246 Chairman: It is quite worrying, is it not, together and co-ordinated together to move things because there is a serious amount of money being forward is potentially of substantial benefit to Iran, spent here. to Europe, to the Middle East and to the wider Margaret Beckett: As I say, it is a budget to which world. we contribute but no doubt the Court of Auditors is apprised of this and should we continue to be in a position that there is no move forward on any of Q250 Mr Horam: To do that on a more consistent V these areas then no doubt that is something people basis than just a one-o like Iran we do have to have, will look at in the future. do we not, closer institutional arrangements than we have now of the kind that Mr Barroso is talking about? Q247 Mr Horam: Nonetheless, this is probably an Margaret Beckett: I am not sure. Possibly. If I can indication that the European Commission does give you a diVerent example from some of my want to strengthen its Foreign and Security Policy experience in my former department. There is really and to make it more coherent. I have not seen this very good co-operation between Member States on paper by Mr Barroso but I understand that he the world stage, if I can put it that way, in terms of talks about improved co-operation between the negotiations on issues like climate change, very, very Commission and the Council Secretariat. He wants good. People do not have identical views but there is personnel between nation states’ foreign services a coherence and consistency of purpose and a and the Commission to be more interchangeable willingness to work together, and that is beneficial than they are and he wants better strategic planning and is part of what fed my response to the between, no doubt, Mr Solana’s High Chairman’s first question. 3419051002 Page Type [O] 20-07-06 01:53:06 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1
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Q251 Mr Heathcoat-Amory: Foreign Secretary, as process of saying where they have the oYces and you know, it was a proposition in the European why they have the oYces and what is the benefit of Constitution that EU representatives, most notably having those oYces in such places. the proposed EU Foreign Minister but also others, Margaret Beckett: I agree entirely with your should report both to the Commission and to the contention and that is a matter for the institutions of Council of Ministers. This was a form of so-called the European Union and the Court of Auditors, the double-hatting designed to strengthen the European Parliament and so on. I am simply saying Commission’s position in foreign policy and dilute to you that I would have thought—and I am pretty that of Member States. Can I put it to you that this confident in that—that such a process is gone is already happening and give you an example? The through at EU level just as it is, as you quite rightly EU Special Representative in Macedonia is a say, at national level here. I am simply saying we are Commission appointment but also reports to the not part of that process because we are not running Council of Ministers. When this was set up the the European Union. British Government complained and made a Chairman: Can I switch focus and ask you about declaration that it should not be a precedent for the EU–US relations? future. Does it alarm you though that the European Constitution is being brought in incrementally by Q254 Mr Purchase: We know that relations are the back door, and this is just one small example, ongoing, and we hope strengthening, as they go and can you give us an assurance that you will block between Europe and the US but there are any repetition such as similar people being proposed diVerences, as one would expect, between two for Kosovo and elsewhere in the Balkans which continents. What are the main areas of diYculty that would undermine the crucial involvement and you see, Secretary of State, in the EU–US accountability and primacy of Member States in relationship? Do we need a little distance perhaps foreign policy? between the two or should we be coming ever closer Margaret Beckett: It would alarm me if I thought together and almost indistinguishable? that that was happening in any serious way. I do not Margaret Beckett: I am sure it will be a long time think it is. You have quoted the example of before we are indistinguishable, if ever. I think it is Macedonia and I believe that is the only example, pretty clear that where there is understanding and and as you identified, quite rightly, we did protest acceptance between, for example, the United States about it at the time and insisted that it must not be and the countries of the European Union that is a seen as a precedent. I have already, in the short time strength to both and that we can each be even more that I have been in this post, heard on a number of eVective, and again I quote the example of Iran occasions representatives, not just of the UK but where the fact that there is a lot of common ground also of other Member States, talking very firmly between the United States and the other players has about foreign policies being a matter for Member been beneficial so far and we must hope that it will States, and I think you will find that Member States be beneficial in the future, but there are other areas across the board are generally quite jealous of their where there will undoubtedly be diVerences of view. rights. Sometimes it is a matter of diVerences within a broad common approach. For example, in the Middle East Q252 Mr Heathcoat-Amory: So this will not happen both the United States and the European Union are in Bosnia and Kosovo and elsewhere? This is a one- committed to a two-state solution. Sometimes we do oV and not a precedent? not wholly see eye to eye on the tactics of what will Margaret Beckett: You are asking me to give you an help to advance the peace process in the Middle East undertaking as to what will happen. I will simply at a given point in time but obviously one area, and give you an undertaking that this is certainly not a again the things that spring to my mind are mostly precedent that the United Kingdom Government things where we do see eye to eye, is the Doha would wish to see repeated and we would resist it. Round. There is common ground on how important and beneficial and ambitious outcomes in the Doha V Q253 Mr Keetch: Can I just return, Foreign Round could be. Where the di erences arise is that Secretary, to the point that our Chairman made we think the United States should be making some about the location and number of EU posts, more moves and they think we should be making representatives, call them what you like, overseas? some more moves, and it is repeated, of course, with This Committee has been very critical of the Foreign the G20 and all the other players and we are on the OYce in the past for closing embassies in places like brink more or less of discussions in Geneva where Madagascar or consul-generals in Seattle or people hope that this can all be moved forward. There are areas of diVerence and where there are whatever because presumably somebody in the V Foreign OYce has done a cost/benefit analysis as to such areas of di erence it is likely that there will be whether it is necessary to have that post there; we a degree of distance. may not agree with it but at least that process has begun. Are you saying to us that you are unable to Q255 Mr Purchase: Can I put to you that there is a find out if there is a similar process for EU diVerence in the way in which mainland Europe representative oYces throughout the world because, considers its relationship with the USA and that if that is the case, it is no criticism of you but I would which appears to be British policy, of ever closer have thought that the EU, who after all are spending relations with the USA? There does seem to be a European taxpayers’ money, ought to have a perception there of a diVerence between mainland 3419051002 Page Type [E] 20-07-06 01:53:06 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1
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13 June 2006 Rt Hon Margaret Beckett MP, Mr Anthony Smith and Ms Shan Morgan
Europe and the UK. In Vienna next week many of their meeting. It is not quite clear to me just how these arguments will be rehearsed and rehearsed close they are because there are a whole lot of again. Are they creating any tension between Britain practical issues and diYculties, but what I think does and its approach to the US and Europe more emerge from the discussions yesterday and the generally in its approach to the US? report of the Commissioner is that there is a clear Margaret Beckett: There have been times, and no agreement that there should be a relatively small doubt there will be times again, when diVerent number of areas where we seek to put funding. We Member States take a diVerent view and have more in the UK are inclined to the view that it would be concerns about the relationship with the United best to concentrate on support for health care. Some States. Yesterday, in the General AVairs Council— other Member States do not want to restrict it just and I am sorry to keep going back to it but it is such to health care. That discussion is ongoing. Also, of an unusual but hopefully encouraging example— course, should such a mechanism be successfully set when there was a report back on the issue of Iran, I up there is then the issue of whether or not other had fully expected (I think we had all fully expected) players would contribute through it in order exactly a certain amount—I am just trying to think of the to not breach the Quartet principles by funding the right word; I was going to say “critical” but I do not Hamas Government directly at a time when they mean unpleasantly critical—of critical scrutiny and show no indication that they are prepared to move anxiety and so on, but actually there was an towards those principles. What was reported extremely positive mood in the General AVairs yesterday was that work is ongoing with some Council and a recognition and very warm words said urgency. There is anxiety to get this up and running about the contribution made by those who had as soon as possible in order to try to stave oV the participated and a recognition of the contribution development of substantial humanitarian problems made by the United States. There are growing and, of course, the Israeli Government itself is using relationships between other Member States as well some of the revenues that they have on utility bills, as the United Kingdom and the United States and a water, I think, as well, and has oVered to pay for greater degree of multilateral engagement. Yes, medicines but that oVer has been rejected. I do not there have been issues but I can only repeat what our recall getting a deadline or a clear indication from Prime Minister has always said, that it is in the her as to how long she thinks it will take but they are interests of this country and, we would argue, moving as fast as they can. probably in the interests of every Member State that there should be good relationships within the Q257 Chairman: Foreign Secretary, in January I European Union and good relationships with the Y United States. think it was, when there were the di culties in Jericho, there was then an attack on the British Council facilities in the West Bank and on the Q256 Mr Keetch: Secretary of State, you have met building in Gaza which was set fire to. In this current the Israeli Prime Minister, I think this morning, and situation of potential conflict and violence between indeed the Chairman and I and further members of Hamas people and Al Aqsa people and other people, the Committee were also present at a meeting with how secure are our people in those facilities and is him earlier today. Can I ask you about the situation there any consideration that you have to give at the and specifically about EU aid going into the moment to what might need to be done if this Palestinian Authority because, as you know, in 2005 situation deteriorates further? that was some ƒ280 million. That has been Margaret Beckett: I think, Chairman, I will have to suspended following the election of Hamas, oVer to write to the Committee about that.1 although obviously we do not want to do anything to undermine the position of President Mahmoud Abbas. The Quartet has talked about the creation of Q258 Chairman: I would be grateful. a temporary international mechanism for Margaret Beckett: Obviously, this is an issue that channelling these funds in to ensure that they get to people do keep under review; you are quite right to say, and we always try to have a duty of care towards the people but do not in some way bankroll Hamas. V V Can you tell us what progress has been made on the our sta and people like the British Council sta , but creation of this mechanism, either discussed at if I may I will come back to you on that point. yesterday’s meeting or in terms of the discussions Chairman: Certainly. you have had so far today with the Israeli Prime Minister? Q259 Sir John Stanley: Foreign Secretary, as you are Margaret Beckett: We discussed it briefly. To a aware, neither the British Government nor, so far as certain extent I was reporting to the Israeli Prime I am aware, any other EU Member State regards any Minister—I met the Israeli Foreign Minister territory beyond Israel’s 1967 borders as being part yesterday in Luxembourg and the Prime Minister of the internationally recognised state of Israel. today—where we are in terms of the EU’s approach. Given what has been said by the Israeli Prime As you quite rightly say, of course, substantial Minister in the last few weeks, indeed the last few funding has gone into Palestine from this country days, will the UK, along with the EU, be making it and also from the EU and work is proceeding with quite clear to the Israeli Government that any urgency to try to develop this temporary unilateral, as opposed to negotiated, annexation of international mechanism. We, the EU, were, of course, commissioned to do that by the Quartet at 1 Ev 85 3419051002 Page Type [O] 20-07-06 01:53:06 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1
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13 June 2006 Rt Hon Margaret Beckett MP, Mr Anthony Smith and Ms Shan Morgan part of the West Bank or east Jerusalem would be negotiated”, which is all we appear to be saying. The internationally unacceptable and unacceptable to EU has oVered Israel a number of carrots in the past the EU? to try and encourage it along that process. If it is not Margaret Beckett: We have made it extremely clear prepared to go along that process and play the to the Israeli Government, and the Prime Minister negotiating game perhaps some of those carrots we did to the Israeli Prime Minister yesterday, that we have given it in terms of trade arrangements should are looking for negotiations and for a negotiated be withdrawn. settlement and that we would view any unilateral Margaret Beckett: Nobody is saying that it would be action by the Israeli Government as—I was going to very nice. What is being said to the Israeli say very much second best, but we would be Government is that there must be a return to the reluctant to see such unilateral action because we negotiating process. However, what one has to believe that negotiation is the right way forward. recognise is the forceful reservation by the Prime You will know that the Prime Minister has given an Minister of Israel that he wants someone to undertaking to the President and to the Prime negotiate with. No-one is suggesting that he can Minister publicly that he will do everything he can to negotiate with the Hamas Government unless that pursue the process of negotiation and I think the Hamas Government recognises the Quartet international community will want to see that that is principles. Yes, there is absolutely very clear, very what happens. firm and very strong pressure on the Israeli Government that there must be a process of Q260 Sir John Stanley: Foreign Secretary, is not negotiation but there have to be two parties to that saying it is “second best” or “reluctant to see” an negotiation and Hamas is not at present shouldering incredibly weak stance against what would be, in the the responsibilities which mean that it can be such previous view of the British Government and the a party. EU, an illegal act by the Israeli Government, to acquire territory unilaterally to which it has no legal Q263 Richard Younger-Ross: I accept that, but that entitlement? does not necessarily mean that they should Margaret Beckett: I certainly do not intend the view unilaterally go ahead, does it? of the British Government to sound weak. I would Margaret Beckett: I am not saying that. I am simply say to you though, Sir John, that although describing to you what the Israeli Government is there were strong reservations about moves that saying to the international community and I am were made unilaterally on Gaza there was saying that what the international community is nevertheless a rather grudging recognition in the end saying back is negotiation and the road map. that some of these were moves in the right direction although there was obviously much preference for Q264 Chairman: In January, Foreign Secretary, the there to be negotiation. I think it is not insignificant Government published a White Paper on the that when Mr Olmert made his remarks about the European Union and in that there is a section about possibility of what I think they were calling Iraq, talking about expanding the European convergence in the first place the reaction from so Union’s role in Iraq. In the light of the current many players in the international community, security situation could you update us? Has including the European and the UK, was to say, anything happened on that front or is it now “No. What we are looking for is a resumption of unrealistic to envisage an imminent expansion of the negotiations and a return to the process of the road EU role in Iraq? map”. Equally, what happened in the context of the Margaret Beckett: No, I hope it is not at all Gaza changes was that there was, as I say, a unrealistic. The Committee may not have been told grudging recognition that this was at least going in yet that one of the other people who came to the the right direction rather than the wrong direction. Council in Luxembourg yesterday was indeed the We have made and will continue to make it new Iraqi Foreign Minister and he was made very extremely clear that there has to be a serious attempt welcome. He was giving the Council an update on to return to the process of negotiation and that that the position in Iraq. He was also seeking an in the long term is the only sound basis for a way expanding role for the European Union as an entity forward. and support from Member States in the UN in order to assist in getting economic reforms and security Q261 Sir John Stanley: As you mentioned Gaza I am reforms as the new Iraqi Government of National sure you would recognise that there is all the world Unity is seeking, and there seems to me to be quite a of diVerence between a decision by the Israeli warm response to that and a recognition of the Government unilaterally to give land back to the importance and the value that can be achieved if we Palestinians and unilaterally to take it away from can establish a stable democratic government in them. Iraq. Margaret Beckett: I totally accept that. Q265 Chairman: You have already touched on this Q262 Richard Younger-Ross: Just following on from in several previous answers but I would like to ask Sir John Stanley’s point, I have to say that it does another question about Iran. I know last week you sound rather weak and the EU’s position sounds gave us quite a comprehensive statement and said rather weak to say, “You should not do that. It you were reluctant to go any further given the really would be very nice if you came and sensitivities, and I think we all understand that, but 3419051002 Page Type [E] 20-07-06 01:53:06 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1
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13 June 2006 Rt Hon Margaret Beckett MP, Mr Anthony Smith and Ms Shan Morgan in a general sense the fact that we are where we are Margaret Beckett: I think there is quite a reasonable and that these talks are taking place is undoubtedly prospect for agreement on energy. Obviously, due to a shift in the position of the US Government. people are looking at an exploring the implications, How much does this American shift really represent? but I have not heard any great cries of pain or Is it a tactical move or does it actually foreshadow anxiety or concern, so on the basis of what is being a shift towards a policy of, if you like, constructive proposed now I think there is quite a good prospect engagement rather than containment or hostility of agreement. towards Iran? Margaret Beckett: First can I say in fairness to our Q267 Mr Illsley: Is not the prospect of an agreement predecessors as Foreign Ministers that although you being undermined by individual countries agreeing are right in saying that the present process of pipeline deals with Russia, for example the one that engagement has been contributed to massively by has been achieved by Germany which gives an this very substantial shift in the position of the importance to Russia over and above its status, if United States of America, actually there would not you like? Also, what role do you see within the have been anything to shift on, there would have European Union for the new priority you have been no foundations laid, had it not been for those established on achieving a low carbon global three EU Foreign Ministers and their initiative and economy? I think that the credit belongs to them in starting that Margaret Beckett: First and quite briefly, obviously, process, but then, of course, all credit is due to those people are looking at the implications of things like in the United States for making a substantial shift. I the decision and the relationship that has been do believe that we would be in much the same agreed between Germany and Russia but that is a position at this moment in time even if the United matter for them. I do not think that it is of such States had not moved as far as they have, but import that it undermines the possibility of a wider obviously it is a huge encouragement to the EU agreement. On the issue of our new strategic Government of Iran to recognise what we were all priority on climate change, it was the chief thing that seeking to make plain to them, that there is a choice the Prime Minister said to me when he asked me to of path open to them and that one of those paths is take this post, that he was very keen to put emphasis on this area this year, just as we did last year through one of real opportunity for a better future for the our Presidencies, and to move it forward through Iranian people. Obviously, the move by the United diplomatic channels, not merely through the States is one of the major contributory factors in familiar channels of engagement for environmental fleshing out, if I can put it that way, the sheer scale ministers, and that is something that we hope to take of that opportunity because it is now an opportunity forward. Even those who remain, bizarrely I would that does not just relate to their wish to have access say, somewhat sceptical about some of the to civil nuclear power but also much more widely to implications and to what degree there is an issue on their relationships with the whole international climate change, are becoming reluctant to run the community. That is why, I think, everyone is risks that they might be wrong. Apart from all the conscious of the fact that it could foreshadow—over other straws in the wind, I would take considerable time, obviously,—a quite dramatic change in the encouragement from the increased anxiety among position of Iran in the international community and the insurance industry, both in the UK and more the opportunities open to the Iranian people. widely across the world, because I think few things Equally, however, if someone is oVered what one concentrate the mind more or make people recognise could call a golden opportunity to move away from risks and practicalities more than when your a path of isolation and to move forward for the insurers ask you what you are doing about things that they say they are seeking and that something. I am not saying that it will be easy to opportunity is not taken, then that does make quite reach agreement but we do believe that it is a matter adiVerence. I say to you, hand on heart, no, I do not of some urgency to try to get agreement that we believe it is a matter of tactics by the United States. should have an international community establish I think it signals a willingness by the United States to some kind of broad, long term goal; in principle that have a changed relationship with Iran if that is what is what we all signed up to when we joined the Iran wants. Convention on Climate Change, and that we should make a more urgent eVort to identify such a goal over the months and the year or so that is ahead. It Q266 Mr Illsley: Foreign Secretary, what prospect is a little early to say how that will proceed but we do you see for an agreement amongst European shall continue to work on it. Member States on energy on the basis of the Solana Chairman: Thank you, Foreign Secretary, and thank Commission paper, bearing in mind the fears that you, colleagues. We have had a very wide range of were engendered earlier this year when the Russians questions but there are remaining some other issues disconnected the supplies to the Ukraine and the that we will write to you on. We look forward to the fears which that created amongst other Member outcome of the summit and no doubt any statement States for their own security of supply? that comes next week. 3419052001 Page Type [SO] 20-07-06 01:54:19 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG2
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PARLIAMENTARY BRIEFING NOTE
College of Commissioners’Visit,1July 2005 The Commission visit on 1 July marked the start of the UK Presidency of the EU. The Prime Minister said that he was delighted that the Scottish and Welsh First Ministers were participating as well as UK Ministers. HMG told Commissioners it would use the Presidency to: — Try to reach a future financing deal. — Make progress on the Services and Working Time Directives, as well as the Better Regulation Agenda. — Take forward the G8 Africa and climate change agenda, as well as the Middle East Peace Process. — Build on the EU’s work to counter terrorism, organised crime and illegal migration. — Take eVective collective action on foreign policy and development issues, showing the EU’s relevance to its citizens. — Uphold the EU’s existing commitments on enlargement. The Prime Minister announced that the UK would host an informal meeting of Heads of Government in the UK to build greater consensus on what constitutes an appropriate and competitive modern European social model. The meeting is likely to be at the end of October. No venue has yet been selected but the style of the meeting is likely to be country retreat. The Prime Minister agreed to hold a Tripartite Social Summit before the informal Heads of Government meeting to inform discussion. The Commission will also produce a paper. The Commission noted that the new Structural Funds Regulations would come to the Council for approval in October at the earliest and depended on agreement of the budget. Working up guidelines, frameworks and programmes could take up to two years. The Commission would do all it could to enable programmes to be put in place and expenditure made as quickly as possible. HMG underlined its commitment to agreeing the Regulations during the UK Presidency so that detailed planning could get underway as soon as agreement was reached on future financing. The Commission undertook fully to support the UK Presidency and looked forward to it being a success. The Scottish First Minister noted Scotland’s important constitutional role on EU issues. The First Minister for Wales noted Wales’ strong interest in an early budget settlement and speedy implementation of new structural funds programmes. Foreign and Commonwealth OYce 21 July 2005
Letter from the Minister of State for Europe, Foreign and Commonwealth OYce to the Chairman of the Committee
I am sending this letter to highlight the UK’s Presidency priorities for the General AVairs and External Relations Council (GAERC) and to include a brief forward look of the work expected to be taken forward and discussed at the 3 October GAERC. This GAERC falls during recess (21 July to 10 October). We have, as do all incoming Presidencies, to continue work on all pending business. That is a heavy workload at any time, but we also have to take on the EU budget negotiations (“Future Financing”) after the inconclusive outcome of the European Council on 16–17 June. The Prime Minister has made clear that we take our Presidency responsibilities seriously and will seek to make progress towards agreement during our Presidency. In the first instance, we will be conducting bilateral consultations with the other 24 Member States and the two Accession States to ascertain their views on the future financing of the Union and on how we should take forward the negotiations. We will consider next steps in the light of those consultations. Much wider than that, and building on the Prime Minister’s speech to the European Parliament on 23 June, we also want to use this period of reflection for public debate about the future political and economic direction of the EU. The Prime Minister announced on 1 July 2005 that we will host an informal Summit in the autumn to discuss the challenges for the European social model in the 21st Century. The main policy priorities for the UK Presidency reflect the issues identified in the cross-Presidency Multi- annual Strategic Programme for 2004–06 published in December 2003, the Luxembourg-UK work programme published in December 2004, and the White Paper on prospects for the EU under the UK Presidency published in June 2005. All three papers are in the Libraries of the House. In the field of external relations, including CFSP, the UK Presidency hopes to take forward: 3419052002 Page Type [E] 20-07-06 01:54:19 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG2
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Doha Development Agenda The WTO Ministerial meeting in Hong Kong in December 2005 will aim to take forward the current round of trade talks. The WTO Round is an important priority for the EU. Our objective is to conclude the Round by 2006, and to this end, we need to make progress in the lead up to the Hong Kong Ministerial. We have scheduled two informal EU trade ministers’ meetings during our Presidency, where the WTO Round will be on the agenda. We will work with our EU Partners, the EU institutions and other WTO members to achieve a successful outcome at Hong Kong.
Africa/G8 The Summit at Gleneagles produced the most detailed and ambitious package on Africa ever agreed by the G8. We will now be looking to implement these commitments, including through our EU Presidency. At the Summit, heads agreed to strengthen the Africa Partnership Forum, including by establishing an Action Plan between all the major donors and Africa. The June European Council asked for a long-term strategy for Africa to be agreed at the December 2005 European Council. We will be working with our EU partners to produce this, and look forward in particular to the Commission’s Communication which is due to come out in October. On aid, the G8 agreed that the commitments made before and at the Summit would increase aid to Africa by $25 billion a year over 2004 levels by 2010 (a doubling), as part of a wider package to increase overall aid by $50 billion a year by the same date. The EU agreement at the May GAERC to double aid to Africa clearly set the bar high and shows the EU making a leading contribution. We will be working to implement these commitments. We will also continue discussions on innovative finance mechanisms with our Partners. On debt, the G8 agreed a proposal to cancel 100% of the debts of qualifying countries to the International Development Association (IDA), the IMF and African Development Fund. European Partners welcomed the proposal at the Council Meeting of 16–17 June. We will now work to secure agreement for the proposal at the World Bank and IMF Annual Meetings in September.
Peace,Stability and Reform in the Middle East The EU will continue to work with the US and other international Partners to play a major role in the Middle East, in particular as a member of the Quartet for the Middle East Peace Process. The EU will continue to play, through the Quartet, a key role in supporting the Palestinian Authority’s eVorts at institutional reform and Prime Minister Sharon’s disengagement plan. Stronger Palestinian institutions and a successful disengagement are necessary for Roadmap implementation.
Iraq During the UK Presidency, we will be looking for the EU to continue to increase its engagement with Iraq. In particular, for the EU to continue to support the political transitional process, including for the constitutional process, elections, referendum and subsequent elections. We also want to build up the current EU Rule of Law and Police Training mission, including moving towards some training being undertaken in Iraq; to lay the foundations for negotiations to commence on a Third Country Agreement to increase EU/Iraq political and trade cooperation; and see the Commission establish a permanent presence in Iraq.
EuroMed Summit The Presidency will use the 10th anniversary of the Barcelona Process, on 27–28 November 2005, to deepen the EU’s partnership with the Mediterranean region, supporting reform eVorts. We want Partners to endorse at the EuroMed Summit a Declaration and an outcomes-orientated Action Plan (AP) which meets our Arab Reform objectives. We hope that the Action Plan contains medium-term targets in key areas including governance, education and economic reform.
Russia and Ukraine The EU will continue to build its partnership with Russia. The UK Presidency will take this forward in a way that is based on common European values and reflective of the EU’s interests in the common neighbourhood. Events in Ukraine last year marked a watershed for democracy there. The UK Presidency will continue to develop the EU’s relationship with Ukraine on the basis agreed earlier this year, reflecting Ukraine’s progress in implementing reform. The Prime Minister will chair Summit meetings with both Russia and Ukraine. 3419052002 Page Type [O] 20-07-06 01:54:19 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG2
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UN Millennium Review Summit
The Summit will take place on 14–16 September. We are strongly committed to a balanced and ambitious Summit outcome to enable the UN to comprehensively tackle today’s inter-related challenges of development, security and human rights. As Presidency we will further co-ordinate the EU’s contribution to Summit preparations.
EU-China and EU-India Summits
As Presidency we are working towards a successful EU-China Summit on 5 September and EU-India Summit on 7 September, both of which the Prime Minister will chair. The focus for the EU-China Summit will be on long-term objectives such as a timetable for negotiating a new EU/China framework agreement. We also hope to agree to strengthen and deepen co-operation on climate-friendly technologies. The key output of the EU-India Summit will be the launch of a comprehensive Action Plan which covers key objectives across the range of our strategic partnership over the next 10 years—from counter-terrorism work to cooperation in the fields of science and technology.
Enlargement
As Presidency we will work to deliver on the EU’s existing enlargement commitments. This includes: continuing preparations for Bulgarian and Romanian accession due in January 2007; opening accession negotiations with Turkey on 3 October; and opening accession negotiations with Croatia as soon as it is cooperating fully with the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia. We will also take forward consideration of Macedonia’s membership application once the Commission have issued an opinion. We will also consider Commission papers on agreeing a Stabilisation and Association Agreement with Serbia and Montenegro and Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Western Balkans
The Presidency will take forward the EU’s clear commitment to the further European integration of the Western Balkan countries as they move towards meeting the necessary political and economic criteria. In particular we hope to develop the EU’s role in support of the UN’s work to create a stable and multi-ethnic Kosovo, and encourage further moves on the part of Serbia and Montenegro and Bosnia and Herzegovina to justify the opening of Stabilisation and Association Agreement negotiations during our Presidency.
Counter-Terrorism and Security
Counter-terrorism was already a Presidency priority prior to 7 July. But the Emergency JHA Council of 13 July saw a renewed commitment from all Member States to deliver the EU’s Counter-Terrorism action plan and to work to more ambitious deadlines. As Presidency we are encouraging Member States to enhance their own national eVorts, to work more closely together and through EU bodies, and to enhance co- operation with other countries, in the fight against terrorism, within the framework of the Hague Work Programme and the Counter-Terrorism Action Plan. The UK Presidency will also take forward work to reinforce security within and outside the EU, focusing on organised crime and illegal immigration.
European Security and Defence Policy
The UK Presidency will continue to develop an active, coherent and capable ESDP. We will ensure the eVective management of the EUFOR Bosnia mission, the policing missions in Bosnia, Macedonia and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), the security sector reform mission also in DRC, and the training mission for Iraq. We will deliver the EU’s commitments to support the African Union mission in Darfur, working closely with NATO, and look at potential missions in Aceh, Palestine and Georgia. We will also drive forward work on civil-military co-ordination, which is both the most needed capability in many security crises today and an area where, with its wide range of instruments, the EU has the potential to take a leading role. Finally, through further development of the EU Battlegroups initiative, the European Defence Agency and the Civilian Headline Goal, we will continue to focus on improving European capability to take action either within NATO or, where NATO chooses not to take part, without it. 3419052002 Page Type [E] 20-07-06 01:54:19 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG2
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The EU’s Relationship with the US Within a wider framework of a renewed transatlantic agenda, strengthening the economic partnership will be a particular priority for the Presidency.
October GAERC At present, the General AVairs and External Relations Council (GAERC) will meet on 18 July, 3 October, 7 November, 21–22 November, and 12 December. On current plans, key priorities at the 3 October GAERC will be Turkey (the opening of negotiations has been scheduled for 3 October), Financial Perspectives 2007–13 (a continuation of the debate on the EU’s long term budget), Western Balkans (appointment of an EU member to the UN envoy’s team), Afghanistan (elections to be held on 18 September), and preparation for the EU-Russia Summit on 6 October and the EU-Ukraine Summit in w/b 17 October. The following items may feature for political agreement or adoption as “A” points: — Belarus—restrictive measures (renewal of the Common Position imposing a travel ban). — ICTY—asset freeze against indictees (renewal of the Common Position). — ESDP—EU COPPS (new Joint Action to establish an ESDP mission—dependent on the outcome of a fact finding mission). — ESDP—Aceh (new Joint Action—dependent on the outcome of a fact finding mission). — ESOP—EIJPM (renewal of the Joint Action). — ESDP—EUPOL Kinshasa (renewal of the Joint Action). — Turkey—Commission Communication Strategy. — Small Arms and Light Weapons in Cambodia (renewal of the Joint Action). — Small Arms and Light Weapons in SE Europe (renewal of the Joint Action). — Small Arms and Light Weapons in Albania (renewal of the Joint Action). — Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (renewal of the Joint Action) Palestinian refugees (renewal of the Common Position). The EU Foreign Ministers informal (Gymnich) will take place on 1–2 September in Newport, Wales. The agenda has yet to be agreed. I will provide the EU Committees with further information on Gymnich discussions after the event. I look forward to working with your Committee during the UK Presidency of the EU. The Government recognises the important role of your Committee in relation to the Presidency and sees your Committee, and Parliament more widely, as holding a key stake in the Presidency and its success. The Government also recognises that examination of Presidency priorities will place an extra burden on the Committee and is grateful for the Committee’s willingness to undertake this important role. It is important for me to remain in close contact with your Committee, as eYcient working between the FCO and Parliament will be crucial in delivering a business-like, professional Presidency that enhances the UK’s reputation among our European and global Partners. I have written in similar terms to Jimmy Hood MP, Chairman of the House of Commons European Scrutiny Committee, and to Lord Grenfell, Chairman of the House of Lords Select Committee on the European Union. I am copying this letter to the Clerks of both Committees; James Eke, FCO Scrutiny Coordinator; Philip Kendall, FCO Parliamentary Relations Coordinator; and to the Cabinet OYce European Secretariat. Douglas Alexander MP Minister of State for Europe Foreign and Commonwealth OYce 28 July 2005
Letter to the Chairman of the Committee from the Minister of State for Europe, Foreign and Commonwealth OYce I am writing to let you know about a decision the FCO has recently taken to phase out grant-in-aid funding for the British Association for Central and Eastern Europe (BACEE). In view of the current debate surrounding the future of enlargement I felt it important to set out the reasons for our decision, and to reassure the members of your Committee that it in no way represents any diminishing of our support for the enlargement process. 3419052003 Page Type [O] 20-07-06 01:54:19 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG2
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BACEE is a Non-Departmental Public Body (NDPB) chaired by Lord Radice. Two FAC members— Gisela Stuart and Paul Keetch—are also members of BACEE’s board. BACEE was established in 1967 to promote democracy, human rights and the rule of law in Central and Eastern Europe, and its project activities have helped to underpin the remarkable reforms that we have witnessed in the region in recent years. In recent years their focus has shifted towards the Balkans and the enlarged EU’s Eastern neighbours. Grant-in-aid in the current financial year is £267,440. NDPBs have come under increasing scrutiny in recent years, reflecting government policy to keep their numbers to a minimum. There are two criteria for determining whether or not the status is justified: that there is a clear continuing need for their work, and that an NDPB can be shown to be the best way of carrying out that work. BACEE clearly meets the first criterion: there is a continuing need for project work to support HMG objectives in the EU candidate countries, Western Balkans and Eastern neighbours. The growth in FCO programme funds directed at this region illustrates this. But BACEE no longer meets the second criterion. Now that relationships with the target countries have been normalised it is much easier for our Embassies to operate directly to promote stability and democracy. Similarly, there is now a plethora of organisations which can implement projects on the FCO’s behalf: NGOs, Other Government Departments and agencies, universities, trades unions and consultancies. Increasingly we are working directly through indigenous NGOs or through organisations in new member states, who are eager to share their experience of reform and integrationwithEUnorms. AlloftheseoVergood,cost-eVectivechannelsfortheFCOtopursueitsobjectives. BACEE have been aware for some time now that the climate surrounding their future has been uncertain. In a letter to the Chairman in December 2002 the Foreign Secretaty made clear that no guarantees could be made about future levels of funding and a review of BACEE in summer 2004 noted that in retaining its grant- in-aid BACEE was swimming against the tide. There is already one precedent: the Britain–Russia Centre/ British East-West Centre lost its NDPB status two years ago. Other FCO-sponsored NDPBs are also under regular review. The FCO proposes to phase out BACEE’s grant-in-aid funding gradually over the next two financial years. We hope this will allow BACEE suYcient time to consider its position and make any necessary arrangements to handle the transition to independent status, if that is what its board and membership chooses. It is important to underline that this decision in no way represents any lessening of the Government’s commitment to the enlargement process. We remain among the foremost proponents of further enlargement, which we see as the EU’s most successful foreign policy tool. Aspirant countries are well aware of our support which is evidenced on both a political and a practical level, including our emphasis on the issue during our Presidency, increased levels of programme funding and a redoubling of our eVorts on twinning. We believe that a gradual, planned transition for BACEE from government sponsorship is compatible with our overall stance. We stand ready to assist BACEE in explaining the move to its stakeholders, including in the beneficiary countries. FCO oYcials are already closely involved in explaining the decision to BACEE’s staV, board and membership and will do all they can to facilitate discussion on BACEE’s future and to handle the practical implications of the move away from NDPB status. Should members of your Committee require any further information or clarification I will be glad to oblige. Douglas Alexander MP Minister of State for Europe Foreign and Commonwealth OYce 30 September 2005
Letter to the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth AVairs from the Chairman of the Committee The Committee this week considered the Government’s Response to the Report on Cyprus, published in February. We will wish to follow up a number of the specific responses at the end of the UK Presidency. Meanwhile, however, my colleagues and I are anxious to ensure that there is no loss of momentum in eVorts to resolve the two communities’ diVerences. I would be grateful, therefore, to learn what the Government has been doing to, in the words of your response, “place a high emphasis on the successful resolution of Cyprus- related issues during our own EU Presidency” and whether any new initiative is planned, be it in the context of the EU, the UN or some other forum. Mike Gapes MP Chairman of the Committee 26 October 2005 3419052004 Page Type [E] 20-07-06 01:54:19 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG2
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Letter from the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth AVairs to the Chairman of the Committee Thank you for your letter of 26 October. I welcome the continuing interest of the Committee in the Government’s work on Cyprus issues, and I look forward to answering any points you will wish to raise at the end of our term as Presidency of the European Union. In the meantime, let me reassure you that the successful resolution of Cyprus-related issues remains a major priority. One of the most significant achievements of our Presidency so far has been the successful opening of EU accession negotiations with Turkey on 3 October. This is of key importance in the search for a Cyprus settlement. I believe that, as part of Turkey’s accession process, a steady normalisation of relations between Turkey and Cyprus will in turn help increase trust and interaction between the parties and provide a surer context for a resumption of negotiations. And ultimately a comprehensive settlement will have to be reached before Turkey can eventually accede to the Union. Naturally I hope that a settlement can be reached long before that. I fully agree with the Committee’s conclusions that we must seize any opportunities to make progress. Time is not on our side — indeed, the problems are becoming more intractable as time passes. I spoke to UN Secretary General Kofi Annan on 5 October to discuss the prospects for progress. We are also in contact with other members of the UN Security Council. But ultimately the impetus for renewed eVorts has to come from the parties on the island demonstrating their readiness to re-engage and their willingness to make the necessary compromises and commitments that a successful resumption of negotiations would require. This was a message that both the Prime Minister and I reinforced to President Papadopoulos and Foreign Minister George Iacovou during their visit in July. The Deputy Prime Minister also took the same message to representatives of both communities during his visit to Cyprus last month. In this context, I would like to see President Papadopoulos agreeing to face to face meetings with Mr Talat, which must surely be a necessary condition for recreating the conditions in which progress towards a settlement might be made. I also agree with the conclusion reached by the Committee that the EU must honour the undertakings it made to the Turkish Cypriots. We were in close contact with the Luxembourg Presidency on this issue. The Luxembourg Presidency made eVorts to reach agreement on a package of measures including a trading arrangement through the port of Famagusta. In the end these eVorts proved unsuccessful, but nonetheless I believe the process of trying to establish common ground through direct negotiation involving both sides and the Commission was useful. In our own Presidency, it remains our intention to adopt the aid regulation as soon as possible, in order to preserve the flow of EU assistance to the north of the island. The related issue of trade for the Turkish Cypriots remains diYcult—as Presidency our challenge will be to find consensus between those Member States who wish to see the Commission’s trade proposal adopted quickly, and others, including the Republic of Cyprus, who remain opposed to this regulation. Whilst I cannot predict the outcome at this stage, I will say that we continue to believe that allowing the Turkish Cypriots to trade freely with the rest of the EU would make a settlement more likely, less costly and easier to consolidate. The Government is also continuing its support for eVorts to promote reconciliation and interaction between the two communities in Cyprus in other areas. Both our High Commission in Nicosia and the British contingent of UN peacekeeping forces have been active in this regard, on issues such as preparations for opening new crossing points on the Green Line, and finding facilities in the buVer zone to assist in work by the Committee for Missing Persons. I would be glad to discuss or provide further information on any points of interest in greater detail. Rt Hon Jack Straw MP Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth AVairs 16 November 2005
Letter to the Parliamentary Relations and Devolution Team from the Clerk of the Committee You now have the uncorrected transcript of Douglas Alexander’s evidence to the Committee on 3 May, and I have agreed with Mark Turner a number of points on which the Minister was asked for or volunteered further material. I am writing to request answers on two further points. First, the Committee discussed after the evidence session Mr Heathcoat-Amory’s questions to the Minister at Qq 163–169. The Committee resolved to seek a full written answer to Mr Heatchcoat-Amory’s question about treaty changes. I would be grateful if that answer could be included with the notes already promised. 3419052005 Page Type [O] 20-07-06 01:54:19 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG2
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Second, had the Committee had more time with the Minister, it would have asked about the proposal of a prominent German politican, Markus Meckel, to create a European Foundation for Democracy. On 27 March, the then Foreign Secretary told Denis MacShane MP that he would “follow up” this question (HC Deb, 27 March 2006, col 561). The Committee would like to know what was the outcome of this follow-up. I would be grateful for a response not later than Monday 5 June. Steve Priestley Clerk of the Committee 8 May 2006
Letter to the Chairman of the Committee from Rt Hon GeoV Hoon MP, Minister of State for Europe, Foreign and Commonwealth OYce In my letter of 22 May 2006, I addressed some of your points about European Commission oYces and residences. I promised to write separately with information on Commission residences in Moscow, Washington, Tokyo and Addis Ababa. Please accept my apologies for the time taken to respond to this point. As you are aware from your discussion with the Foreign Secretary during the evidence session of 13 June, this was due to the timing of the Commission’s response to the FCO. The Head of Delegation’s residence in Washington totals 891 sq metres. 354 sq meters of this is used for oYcial business (including representational duties and trade promotion) and 216 sq metres for private use by the Head of Delegation. The remainder is made up of a garage and “service and technical” rooms (laundry, cellars, technical installations, corridors, etc). The residence is owned by the European Commission. In Tokyo, the residence is 705 sq metres, of which 331 sq metres are for private use by the Head of Delegation, with the remaining 374 sq metres used for oYcial business. The residence is rented and is smaller than the average for an EU (Member State) Ambassador’s residence in Tokyo, and a third of the size of the British Ambassador’s residence. The Commission delegation in Addis Ababa is 448 sq metres, of which 219 sq metres is used for oYcial business, 141 square metres is used for private purposes, and the remainder for “service and technical” services. The size of this delegation in Ethiopia is partly due to the fact that the Commission also leads on administering spending from the European Development Fund, through which many Member States channel their funding for Africa. The size of the residence also reflects the diYculty of finding suitably secure premises in the city. The Foreign Secretary agreed to write to Denis MacShane regarding his question in the House of Commons on a European Foundation for Democracy (27 March 2006). In my letter of 22 May, I undertook to forward you a copy of the response. I responded to the query myself after a further written request from Mr. MacShane. I attach a copy of the correspondence. 22 June 2006
Letter to Rt Hon Denis MacShane MP, from Rt Hon GeoV Hoon MP, Minister of State for Europe, Foreign and Commonwealth OYce Thank you for your letter of 8 May enclosing proposals by Edward McMillan-Scott MEP to improve the EU’s promotion of democracy in third countries. I entirely agree that the promotion of democracy, good governance and human rights should be at the heart of the EU’s external policies. So I share Edward’s and your desire to explore ways in which the EU could do more in this field, both in its immediate neighbourhood and the wider world. Detailed discussions are currently underway between the EU institutions to agree legislative instruments to bring the next Financial Perspective (FP) into eVect, including in relation to the place of democracy and human rights in the new Heading 4 Instruments. This provides an opportunity to look critically at the impact and eVectiveness of existing mechanisms, such as the European Initiative on Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR). The UK is keen to support successor arrangements that will enhance the EU’s ability to encourage democracy-building around the world. In the meantime I have asked oYcials to examine in more detail how the kind of Foundation proposed by Edward McMillan-Scott might be established and funded, and to consider the read across to existing institutions. As part of this assessment we will also seek the views of other European governments. Rt Hon GeoV Hoon MP Minister of State for Europe Foreign and Commonwealth OYce 22 June 2006 3419052007 Page Type [E] 20-07-06 01:54:19 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG2
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Letter from Nevin Gaye Erbatur, Turkey–UK Parliamentary Friendship Group, Grand National Assembly of Turkey, to the Chairman of the Committee
I am writing to congratulate you on your election to the Chair of the Foreign AVairs Committee and to request your valuable support for Turkey’s accession process to the European Union.
As you are aware, at its Summit meeting in Brussels on 17 December 2004, the European Union decided to begin accession negotiations with Turkey. Negotiations will begin on 3 October 2005, during UK’s Presidency. This decision, which is the culmination of a process going back to 1963, has been hailed around the world as a historic step. The EU’s decision reflects strategic visit, the positive eVects of which will be felt far beyond the borders of the EU and Turkey.
Turkey, a vibrant regional power with a vigorous multi-party democracy, a pluralist political system, a pivotal geo-strategic role, a dynamic private sector, an energy terminal country and the 20th largest economy in the world, is uniquely placed to make an invaluable contribution to the peace, security and prosperity of Europe in the period ahead.
Turkey and Europe have been in close interaction for over 700 years. The relationship today is as vibrant as it is complex. Turkey’s annual trade volume with EU Member states has approached 100 billion USD, making Turkey the EU’s 6th largest trading partner. Over 10 million EU citizens visit Turkey every year. The Turkish community in Europe has significant economic power; Turkish-owned businesses provide hundreds of thousands of jobs.
Turkey’s membership in the EU will be a powerful symbol of the harmonious co-existence of cultures. The accession of Turkey, a modern, secular and prosperous country with a predominantly Muslim population to the EU will be a reconfirmation of the universalitv of the European Idea. It will prove that Europe is defined not by religion or geography, but by values.
Second, Turkey’s membership to the EU will enhance the Union’s global reach, be it strategic or economic, and thus its influence. As a key regional actor and ally located in close proximity to many existing or potential hot spots of tension that are high on the European and international agenda, and with the second largest armed forces in NATO, Turkey can help enhance peace and stability and promote welfare in the Balkans, the Caucasus, Central Asia, the Middle East and beyond.
Third, Turkey’s accession process will contribute to the appeal of secular values among Muslim communities of Europe. This could assist in the marginalisation of Muslim extremism in EU countries.
Fourth, the integration of the European Turks and their contribution to the economies of Europe will be further advanced
Fifth, EU membership will put Turkey firmly and irreversibly on the path to pluralism, modernity and progress, thereby proving once and for all that Islam can, and must, co-exist with modern universal values
All of us in Turkey recognise that many additional adjustments will be required before membership can happen. Turkey will have ample time to deal with any remaining shortcomings while the accession negotiations are underway.
We are optimistic that the accession process will be brought to a speedy and successful conclusion with the end result of full membership, entailing the same rights and obligations for Turkey as for all other Member States. We have every confidence that EU leaders will show genuine statesmanship to achieve a truly historic moment when Turkey joins the EU.
Britain has been a strong supporter of Turkey’s EU membership, for which we are deeply thankful. Britain’s continued commitment and support to Turkey’s EU accession process will be crucial. The role of the British Parliament will be particularly important.
In this regard, my colleagues and I, in the Turkish Parliament will highly appreciate your personal support to Turkey’s accession process. I am very keen to explore further contact and cooperation with the British Parliament on this matter in the period ahead. Nevin Gaye Erbatur Chairman Turkey–UK Parliamentary Friendship Group Grand National Assembly of Turkey, Ankara” 29 September 2005 3419052008 Page Type [O] 20-07-06 01:54:19 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG2
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Letter to the Chairman of the Committee from the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth AVairs
Palestinian Territories Following the recent evidence session of 13 June, I am writing as promised to provide a response to Question 257 about the British Council. The British Council is keenly aware of its duty of care towards its staV and visitors in the Palestinian Territories, as elsewhere, and gives high priority to ensuring their safety. In mid-February of this year it delivered two courses on security for its staV in the Middle East: three staV from the Palestinian Territories participated and followed the guidance they had been given, during the attacks on their oYces in March. Feedback from individuals showed that training helped them in this crisis situation. Since the attacks, the British Council has decided to move to new premises in Gaza and Ramallah. The aim is to re-open the Council’s physical presence as a matter of priority. A security specialist has visited both cities and identified premises which would be suitable both from a security and from an operational point of view, and the Council is currently in the process of agreeing terms with landlords. The Council keeps in daily contact with the Consulate General on security and travel movements. Over the last few months, staV have worked from temporary premises in Gaza but, with the current diYculties, are now working from home. Core services, including running examinations, educational enquiries and events, are being maintained by staV working from a temporary location in Ramallah and from the East Jerusalem oYce. The Council is currently reviewing its strategy for the longer term in order to maintain services while minimising risk to staV and visitors. This will include a greater emphasis on indirect and virtual services. Sir David Green, the Director General of the British Council, has stated: “Our centres in both Gaza and Ramallah provide an important service for students and young people who otherwise have little access to educational opportunities. We are determined to ensure that we can find ways of continuing our valuable work in the Palestinian Territories. While security at the oYces had been reinforced in recent years, having open access to the public has been an important principle for our operations in the Palestinian Territories.” Rt Hon Margaret Beckett MP Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth AVairs 18 July 2006
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