ISLAMIST MILITANCY IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA OCTOBER 2016

Executive Summary ...... 3

West Africa ...... 5

Lake Chad Region ...... 11

East Africa ...... 15

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When it comes to the threat of Islamist militancy, most tend to focus their attention on the Middle East and North Africa, and increasingly as of late on Europe and Asia. However, Sub-Saharan Africa has long been a Jihadist hotspot. In fact, Nigerian-based - just one of the three main jihadist groups in Africa - holds the title of deadliest terrorist organization of 2015. Apart from Boko Haram, the two main Islamist militant organizations in the continent are al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), and its affiliates, based out of , and the -based al-Shabaab.

Each of the above groups operate in unique environments and pose unique threats to the countries that they operate in, and in the surrounding region, but they all do pose a serious threat, essentially making operating prohibitively dangerous in vast swathes of territory in the continent, forcing local, regional, and international actors to direct substantial efforts to combat them, all the while leaving scores dead every month.

Additionally, all of the groups experience the same jihadist trends taking place globally, namely the current competition between al-Qaeda and Islamic State, which has led to factionalism, in-fighting, and an overall ramping up of efforts by the rival groups to illustrate prowess. It is noteworthy that the more local-oriented “al-Qaeda model” of global has in many ways proven more successful in Africa than the Islamic State’s (IS) approach. Overall, despite some forays into all three of the above regions, IS has found Sub-Saharan Africa to be a challenging operational environment. The most "noteworthy” success for IS has been Boko Haram’s pledge of allegiance to leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, but this has been wrought with failures, and what some consider to be “buyer’s remorse” as IS has had to disown Boko’s leader, replacing him against his will with his former spokesman and leading to infighting between the two. In addition, Boko Haram is in a far weaker position than in previous years. Meanwhile, IS efforts to attract al-Shabaab members has been a major failure, with similarly poor results in Mali thus far. Regardless, the pressure from IS’s growing global influence has been a catalyst for the other groups to demonstrate their capacity through high- profile attacks, operations in unprecedented areas, and improved messaging.

Almost needless to say, the Islamist militant groups in Africa are not going anywhere anytime soon, despite likely gains and losses. Generally speaking, the governments are far too weak to deal with the threats in their countries, requiring persistent intervention and support from neighboring countries and the international community. Additionally, the poverty, instability, and the vast ungoverned areas in the affected regions has created a vacuum for militant groups to fill, while creating a fertile ground for recruitment.

This report was written by: Alex Fielding - MAX Security’s Senior Analyst on Central Africa Alexander Bladt-Cohen – MAX Security’s Senior Analyst on West Africa

And reviewed by: Tzahi Shraga - MAX Security's Chief Intelligence Officer, ret. LTC from the Israeli intelligence community Lev Yuriditsky - MAX Security's Regional Director of Intelligence, Sub-Saharan Africa

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AQIM and Affiliates in the Western Sahel The western Sahel region, particularly central and northern Mali, acts as the nexus for militancy in west Africa; a vast, largely ungoverned area, which offers a hospitable environment for Islamist organizations to recruit, train, and carry out operations with little interference from domestic or foreign forces. The predominant militant actor within this area remains al- Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), an organization borne out of the Algerian Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC), and it’s various affiliates. Whilst the organization has had a presence in the region since its inception in 2007, it was able to firmly establish its foothold in northern Mali during the 2012 Tuareg Rebellion, and has since gone through numerous changes with splinter groups, mergers, and developing affiliations with a number of local groups, including the Still from February 2016 AQIM video “From the Depths of the Desert predominantly Tuareg , the mostly Fulani 2”, which called for attacks against France and its allies (MLF), and former AQIM breakaway group, al-Mourabitoun. From their hub in Mali, these organizations have repeatedly demonstrated their capacity to stage attacks both within the country, and increasingly over the past year - across its notoriously porous borders into Burkina Faso and Niger, along with one noteworthy attack in Ivory Coast, while threatening to attack other countries in West Africa, specifically those that are known for close cooperation with France.

AQIM’s successful entrenchment in the western Sahel comes as a result of several ideological and economic factors. In the case of the former, the organization has effectively framed its global jihadist views in regional terms, coopting local animosity towards the Malian state, which is regarded as having marginalized local ethnic communities, and international actors. With regard to economic factors, the group’s presence, and those of its affiliates, brings financial opportunities to an area plagued by high unemployment rates and poverty. Illicit trafficking of drugs, weapons and people remains a key source of income, despite the disruptive effect of the 2013 French intervention. Cocaine trafficking alone is estimated to account for roughly 1.25 billion USD per year, whilst the collapse of Libya created a new source of arms for transport and sale. Meanwhile, kidnapping for ransom is estimated to bring in millions of dollars per year. Finally, bridging the abovementioned twin dynamics, AQIM has integrated into the local populace through various tactics, such as marriage and displays of generosity and largess, thus embedding itself within the fabric of the communities.

Security forces, including domestic soldiers, French Barkhane troops, or members of the UN Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) in northern Mali are the most common targets for Islamist groups operating in the region. Such attacks come in multiple forms, including mortar fire and IED, small-arms fire, as well as ambushes that incorporate the use of IED and gunfire. These tend to target security force bases, but also frequently aim for security convoys in outlying areas. Occasionally, although less frequently, these groups do utilize suicide attacks against security forces in the north.

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That said, more high-profile attacks against foreigners and foreign interests are occasionally recorded, such as the November 2015 raid on the Radisson Blu hotel in Bamako, as well as numerous abductions of foreigners in recent years, namely aid workers in outlying areas of the country.

Additionally, while attacks are mostly carried out in Mali, there has been an increase in militant operations in neighboring countries over the past year. Most notable among these are the January attack against the Splendid Hotel in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso, which left 30 dead, and the March attack against the Grand Bassam resort in Ivory Coast, which killed 15 civilians and marked the first Islamist militant operation in the country. The attacks in areas outside of the groups’ traditional zones of operation, although rare, are usually carried out in high-profile fashion, starting with a grenade toss and followed with gunmen entering with assault rifles shooting at those in the immediate area, and then seeking hostages. The assailants are known to separate between Muslims and non-Muslims in determining who to free and who to execute or keep as hostage. AQIM claim for Ouagadougou Attack, titled “When Muslim Africa takes Revenge for its Victims” While most jihadist activity in the Western Sahel takes place in Mali, there has been a relative increase in attacks in neighboring countries. This includes seven attacks in Niger this year, when compared to zero in 2015. Among these are a claimed rocket attack by AQIM against the Areva mine in Arlit in May, as well as the October kidnapping of a US aid worker in Abalak, Tahoua Region approximately one week after an assault on Nigerien soldiers at a UN refugee camp in the same region, which involved 40 militants and led to the death of 22 Nigerien soldiers. In Burkina Faso, outside of the Ouagadougou attack, there have been six militant incidents in the country’s northeast as of writing in 2016, compared to three in 2015.

Relationship with Ethnic Rebel Groups As mentioned above, an important aspect of al-Qaeda groups in Mali is the organization’s ability to present itself as a local face of Jihad. Indeed, this has long been a strategy of al-Qaeda in general, and AQIM is no exception. The ability for AQIM to navigate the local landscape is an important quality, given the complex dynamics that exist therein. Interestingly, while al-Qaeda’s ability to insert itself into the local narrative has worked to its benefit, it also poses a weakness as local actors view cooperation with al- Qaeda as a means to address their own local grievances rather than genuinely being interested in the global jihadist struggle. This has resulted in unstable alliances and unreliable partners.

In this context, as al-Qaeda tries to merge its local efforts with its global cause, it finds that for many members and leaders of these groups, the local context and grievances take precedent, and their affiliation with a global organization is just an alliance of convenience. Or, in other cases, these groups find that they are better positioned to address their grievances if they shed their jihadist affiliations. Such was the case during the 2012 northern Mali crisis, when the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA), which sought an independent Azawad state in northern Mali, began capturing territory. Soon after, the well- known Tuareg leader, Iyad ag Ghali formed the al-Qaeda affiliated, majority Tuareg Ansar Dine and, taking advantage of MNLA successes, began cooperating with the secularist group. MUJAO also joined in the fight. After taking control of northern Mali together, the MNLA and their Islamist erstwhile allies began fighting with each other, with the latter quickly achieving victory, and taking the territory for itself.

When the Islamists lost to the French intervention, factions of Ansar Dine defected to form the Higher Council for the Unity of Azawad (HCUA), as they then saw potential in joining the formal negotiations with the government, for which they would have to

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shed their jihadist affiliation. Similar patterns of mergers, splits, defections to the other side, etcetera define the situation in northern Mali to this day and may substantially impact the jihadist landscape.

In this context, there has been an increase in clashes between the anti-government and former separatist Coordination of Movements of Azawad (CMA) and the pro-government Platform in the Kidal region. The seemingly crumbling peace between the CMA and Platform also potentially offers an opportunity for AQIM and its partner organizations new opportunities to expand their membership and affiliations. All three of the CMA’s core organizations have witnessed significant splintering over the past two months, amid growing disillusionment with both the Malian government and the Algiers Peace Accord which governs relations between the CMA and Platform. This fragmentation and clashes, in conjunction with existing personal, ethnic and tribal ties between the CMA and AQIM, may therefore create either a direct source of combat-ready recruits, or the basis for strategic partnerships predicated on striking at the pro-government Platform forces. The clashes have also necessitated additional security deployments in the area, and thus potentially reduced the resources available to target the Islamist threat.

Regarding Fulani’s and the Macina Liberation Front (MLF), the situation is not much different. The MLF, an offshoot of Ansar Dine, was established in mid-2015 on the back of a sense of marginalization among Fulani’s in northern Mali. Fulani grievances have only grown since then due to the security forces heavy handed response against Fulani communities. This led to the formation of National Alliance for Safeguarding Fulani Identity and Restoration of Justice (ANSIPRJ) in June 2016. ANSIPRJ emphasized its non-Jihadist character, while emphasizing that the military is its primary target. That said, in September, and within months of its formation, there was a split in the upper ranks of the organization over an apparent disagreement regarding cooperation with the MLF. One faction instead saw it more befitting to join the negotiations with the government.

Thus, the status and shifting dynamics of the northern ethnic conflicts are liable to have an impact on Islamist rebel groups in the same area, working both in favor and in opposition to the latter.

Islamic State in the Greater Sahel (ISGS) While al-Qaeda and its affiliates in the western Sahel are by far the most potent groups in the area, and the most relevant, there are two noteworthy examples of Islamic State’s attempted and potential influence in the area.

The first pertains to Abu Walid al-Sahraoui, a former leader within al-Mourabitoun, which was a merger between two AQIM breakaways, MUJAO, and ’s al-Mulathameen (Masked) brigade. In May 2015, al-Sahraoui pledged allegiance to IS, forming Islamic State in the Greater Sahel (ISGS), claiming to do so on behalf of all of al-Mourabitoun. Weeks later, the claim was denied by Mokhtar Belmokhtar, another leader of al-Mourabitoun, who reiterated that al-Mourabitoun is loyal to al- Qaeda. Shortly afterwards, fighting was reported between the two groups, with reports that al-Sahraoui was severely wounded.

The reason for the split within the organization is itself a reflection of the Jihadist trends worldwide, which certainly have not escaped Mali. Al-Sahraoui was the spokesperson for the Movement for Oneness (Tawhid) and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO), which itself was a breakaway from AQIM. Eventually, MUJAO and Belmokhtar’s al-Mulathamun Brigade joined forces to form al- Mourabitoun. Belmokhtar and MUJAO leader Ahmed Tilemsi agreed that Abu Bakr al-Masri will be the emir of al-Mourabitoun, which led to tensions with al-Sahraoui, who initially refused to pledge allegiance to al-Masri. After al-Masri was killed in April 2014, Tilemsi took over the organization, but was also killed in December 2014, which eventually put al-Sahraoui in charge, leading to frictions with Belmokhtar, who refused to pledge allegiance to al-Sahraoui for various reasons. During this period,

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Belmokhtar began discussions with AQIM to reintegrate al-Mourabitoun with the organization, which further aggravated the situation with al-Sahraoui, who had a history of conflict with al-Qaeda. This scenario played a major role in al-Sahraoui’s defection.

As is the case with most pledges of allegiance to IS, al-Sahraoui’s pledge drew substantial international attention over concerns that IS can gain a foothold in traditionally AQIM territory in the western Sahel, which will mark a significant development for Islamist militancy in West Africa. So far, al-Sahraoui’s group has shown limited success. For starters, al-Sahraoui’s pledge (bay’ah) was not recognized by IS or even broadly acknowledged widely by IS supporters on social media. This stands in marked contrast with other groups, even relatively smaller ones in or Somalia, that pledged allegiance to IS, which often receive substantial attention and even articles dedicated to the group in IS propaganda.

Thus far, the group has had few noteworthy attacks to speak of. That said, they did claim an October 17 attack on the Koutoukale Prison outside of Niamey, Niger. The prison was known to hold Islamist militants, and had ISGS succeeded, this could have been a game changer for them. The group reportedly claimed an attack on October 12 against a Burkina Faso army position in the town of Intangom, killing three soldiers. In September, the group also claimed an attack against a Burkinabe gendarmerie post in Markoye, near Intangom. It is also believed that the group holds one captive, a Romanian national, who was kidnapped in Tambao, Burkina Faso in April 2015.

Given the aforementioned attacks attributed to ISGS, as well as the fact that they trace their roots to MUJAO, which aspired to be a more “black African” focused Islamist militant group, we assess that further attacks by al-Sahraoui’s group will likely be recorded in Burkina Faso, largely in the northeast, as well as in Niger.

With regards to Islamic State’s central organization and their ambitions in the western Sahel, it is interesting to note that the group has made very little forays into the area, and as recently as May 2016, despite the existence of ISGS, encouraged locals from the western Sahel to join “the Caliphate” in Sirte, Libya. Essentially, it appears that IS has not placed focus on the western Sahel as a region to expand into at this time. There are several factors that may explain IS’ calculation in this matter. For one, IS, especially in its weakened state globally, and specifically in Africa, is not interested in challenging AQIM and its allies in their own backyard, where they are firmly established and rooted. In addition, unlike other areas that have been highly attractive battlegrounds for foreign fighters, the Sahel is less appealing for outsiders, and mostly attracts individuals from the region. This is related, in part, to the fact that jihadist militancy in the area is more tied in with the local narrative than the global narrative preached in other areas, such as and Syria. In addition, groups that focus on the global jihadist narrative are not as appealing to the local population. Furthermore to this is the generally inhospitable environment of the Sahel region, which likely deters foreigners from joining.

That said, we assess that the organization’s overall emergence as a counter to al-Qaeda in the world, and in the region, has encouraged al-Qaeda affiliated organizations in West Africa to “up the ante” so to speak, and improve their messaging strategy, while demonstrating their legitimacy through successful operations and an expansion in the geographical scope of their attacks.

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Promotion of Islamic State video, calling on West Africans to join the organization in Sirte, Libya.

Forecast Looking forward, and with these trends in mind, we note that military elements operating within Mali have thus far been ineffective in posing a challenge to militants operating in the region, allowing them to considerably re-entrench themselves following the setback of the 2013 intervention, and subsequently develop a measure of regional momentum. Although both the US and Germany have recently announced plans to develop bases in northern Niger, due in part to the current militant threat, and despite France’s continued presence, it is unlikely that current counterinsurgency efforts will be sufficient to drastically alter the current threat landscape in the short term. The scope of the area to be secured, the absence of effective government institutions or alternative economic opportunities, and the incorporation of militant elements within the very structure of the region’s communities means that their presence is very likely to persist, and thus their activities will continue unabated.

In this context, we assess that the trends witnessed over the past year are liable to persist. Namely, the majority of attacks will continue to target security forces in northern Mali, while also expanding into northeastern Burkina Faso, and western Niger, albeit not becoming as frequent in these countries as they are in Mali. At the same time, we assess that further high-profile attacks against areas frequented by foreigners in neighboring West African countries, in the vein of those carried out in Grand Bassam and Ouagadougou are also liable to be witnessed over the coming year, as are such assaults in Bamako. Countries with close relations to the West, and France in particular, are therefore assessed to be at the greatest risk, with capital cities and other major urban centers continuing the represent the most attractive targets, despite also being the most heavily secured. With that said, given the absence of evidence of an entrenched militant presence or established infrastructure outside of the core theater of operations in the Sahel, we assess that these are likely to remain one-shot operations, rather than broader campaigns involving repeated attacks.

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‘Boko Haram’ In the ongoing battle for jihadist supremacy in Africa between al-Qaeda and the Islamic State (IS), ’s Islamist movement known commonly as Boko Haram has moved firmly within the IS orbit since its pledge of allegiance (Bay’ah) in March 2015 and the establishment of Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP). While beneficial to both groups in terms of publicity and legitimacy, this marriage of convenience appears to have failed to translate into operational support or financing for Boko Haram, something which was previously afforded to it by al-Qaeda in 2012-2013. This absence of IS support comes at a time when Boko Haram’s capacity continues to be degraded by a potent mixture of local vigilante fighters, improved regional coordination, and renewed support for counter-militancy efforts from the US and Western allies. Meanwhile, an ongoing leadership battle driven by IS between two main rival factions has further fragmented the already divided group, putting the deadliest terrorist group in 2015 firmly on the back foot. However, the socio-economic marginalization of many in the northeast, lack of effective state institutions or security infrastructure, and recruitment potential among poor, illiterate Muslim youth points to a resilient, long-term militant threat, particularly when considering Boko Haram’s proven ability to adapt tactically and renew its insurgency campaign.

ISWAP Emergence and Fragmentation Boko Haram, which was originally founded in 2002 by Mohammed Yusuf as the “Jamatu Ahlis Sunna Lidawatti wal Jihad” in 2002. Yusuf attracted a large following by “marketing” towards poor Muslim families in Nigeria and neighboring countries and denouncing the Nigerian government as corrupt as a result of its Western influence. Indeed, Boko Haram translates from the local to “Western Education is a Sin”. Initially, the group was largely peaceful and cooperated with other conservative Islamic sects.

The evolution to a violent sect took place in the summer of 2009 when security forces arrested nine members of Boko Haram, which eventually led to rioting and attacks on police, and in turn garnered a police response that resulted in the death of hundreds of Boko Haram members and the destruction of prisons, police stations, churches, schools, and government institutions. Yusuf was arrested, and died in custody, leading his deputy Abubakr Shekau to take over leadership. The following year, Boko Haram freed hundreds of its members from prison, and began launching attacks in northern Nigeria. In the years that followed, the group grew to hold 50,000 square km at its peak in 2014, and was ranked the deadliest terror organization in 2015. The group was notorious for its propensity to attack civilian population centers in northeastern Nigeria, including markets, mosques, schools, and villages. These attacks often involved convoys of armed men entering a village with machine guns and RPGs, indiscriminately targeting locals, forcing them to flee before burning down their homes. In addition, the group often conducted suicide bomb attacks against civilian populations in towns, market places, and IED camps.

Following Islamic State’s ascendancy to become one of the two primary Islamic State-appointed ISWAP leader, Abu Musab global Islamic militant organizations, and after a brief courtship process, al-Barnawi (Left), AbuBakr Shekau (Right) Boko Haram’s then leader Abubakr Shekau pledged allegiance to IS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, changing its name to Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) in March 2015. However, the allegiance did not prove to be an especially effective one as ISWAP did not appear to gain much more than improved propaganda. There

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was not a noteworthy increase in attacks, nor in the geographical scope of Boko operations, or the group’s ability to carry out attacks in major cities, despite multiple bombings on October 2, 2015 on the outskirts of . Additionally, IS was clearly not happy with Shekau as ISWAP’s leader, eventually replacing him in August 2016 with Abu Musab al-Barnawi, son of Boko Haram founder Muhammad Yusuf. Al-Barnawi was formerly aligned with the al-Qaeda-linked Ansaru group which split from Shekau in 2012 over his continued targeting of Muslim civilians.

There are notable differences in al-Barnawi’s ideological and operational approach from Shekau, which hold greater propaganda value for IS and form a more cohesive jihadist philosophy. For example, al-Barnawi has announced an end to targeting Muslims in mosques and marketplace in favor of attacks on government, military, and Christian targets. Unlike Shekau, al-Barnawi seems less interested in acquiring territory from his stronghold in the Lake Chad Region. Looking at al-Barnawi’s record as leader so far, since August IS has claimed large-scale attacks in that we assess to have been carried out by the al-Barnawi faction, namely the killing of 40 alleged MNJTF troops in Malam Fatori on September 21 and another 20 in Abadam on September 24. As such, we assess this pattern is likely to continue in the Lake Chad region, through more high-profile ambushes of military targets, including the use of suicide bombs and multi-pronged attacks that utilized suicide vehicle based IED (SVBIED) followed by several, if not a convoy, of gunmen. Al-Barnawi has also attempted to frame the insurgency in religious terms, decrying the “Christianization” of Nigeria and calling on attacks against churches and Christian worshippers. A September 18 attack on a church in Kwamjilari, Borno State reportedly killed eight worshippers, although it remains to be seen whether this develops into a consistent pattern of religiously-targeted killings.

Improved Response Nigerian President continues to face an array of security, political, economic and crime-related challenges since his victory in the March 2015 election, with the country officially entering into recession in August 2016 following a second consecutive quarter of negative growth. However, one notable success has been his renewed counterinsurgency campaign against Boko Haram in the northeastern states of Borno, Adamawa and Yola states. As a whole, the Boko Haram conflict is forecast to claim approximately 3,500 lives in 2016, a third the number of fatalities in 2015 and the conflict’s lowest total since 2012. A northern Muslim, Buhari has transformed the military response to Boko Haram to great effect in a number of ways.

First, following years of failed attempts at regional operation planning and intelligence sharing, Buhari has worked far more effectively with his Chadian, Nigerien and Cameroonian neighbors. Through the once dormant regional Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) framework, joint operations have been led, and Nigeria has allowed Chadian and Nigerien troops to intervene on Nigerian territory in the Lake Chad area, most notably from February to March 2015. This resulted in the gradual recapture of nearly all of Boko Haram-controlled territory, which at its peak in late 2014 covered a roughly 50,000 square km area the size of Belgium. While independently corroborated information is scarce in the northeast, claims of Boko Haram’s last remaining strongholds being the relatively small areas in the Sambisa Forest and Lake Chad Region are plausible.

Second, Buhari has reformed the military hierarchy, moved its command headquarters from Abuja to Maiduguri, in Borno State, and investigated more than 300 companies and officers for corruption in the security budget, even detaining some individuals. Buhari’s reformist agenda has also prompted the US to renew its military aid, which was suspended for human rights concerns under the rule of Buhari’s predecessor, Goodluck Jonathan. Military aid from the US, France, the UK and other allies has also taken the form of training, equipment and intelligence for Niger, Chad, and Cameroon, including US drones operating out of northern Cameroon. This has undoubtedly boosted morale and improved the capabilities of Nigerian and regional MNJTF troops in the fight against Boko Haram. That said, and despite these successes, while there is no relationship between Boko Haram and the myriad Christian militant groups in the Niger Delta, such as the (NDA), the government’s need to

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dedicate resources to combating the latter, as well as the impact that the Niger Delta situation has on oil production and the government’s income is likely limiting Nigeria’s ability to tackle the conflict in the northeast.

Third, more effective cooperation with local vigilante groups, known as the Civilian Joint Task Forces (CJTF), has increased the army’s intelligence gathering capabilities, operational reach, and overall momentum. These groups have been fueled by the increasingly brutal attacks against any civilians deemed to be in opposition to erstwhile Boko Haram leader Abubakr Shekau. Indeed, large-scale attacks against Muslim civilians in mosques, marketplaces and village raids sparked the kind of local backlash disapproved of by IS, leading to Shekau’s marginalization and eventual replacement by IS, which by itself is a major factor likely to harm the group in the immediate to medium term.

Forecast Looking ahead, neither of the “Boko Haram” factions not have the capacity or strategic interest in controlling large swaths of territory as a kind of Nigerian caliphate, which is too vulnerable to the robust counterinsurgency campaign. It is more likely to continue engaging in asymmetric attacks, a blueprint of which can be glimpsed in the ideological and operational differences between the two main rival factions, one loyal to IS-backed Abu Musab al-Barnawi, and previous longstanding leader Abubakr Shekau. As noted above, Shekau had become too erratic, unreliable and unpopular with IS, laying the groundwork for the group to replace him in August 2016 with Abu Musab al-Barnawi.

Broadly speaking, the one-upmanship between Shekau and al-Barnawi also increase the intent to stage a high profile attack in Abuja, Lagos or other major cities, although neither faction has shown the capability thus far. The leadership battle also portends clashes between the two groups, as witnessed in the Monguno area of Borno State on August 30, September 1, and September 8. While disunity amidst Boko Haram ranks will likely assist the counterinsurgency campaign in the immediate term, it can also trigger a kind of rivalry in which the factions attempt to “outbid” their rivals for support of the local population.

Overall, we assess that the current trend of attacks will continue over the coming months, namely centered on the Lake Chad Basin, and targeting security forces in the area, including in Nigeria, Chad, Cameroon, and Niger. Raids on villages will also continue to be a defining aspect of the . Major security operations will also be witnessed, at times resulting in heavy clashes with Boko Haram. While we do not assess an expansion by the organization at this time, given the challenges from security forces, the fragmentation of the militant group, and the weakening of Islamic State as a global enterprise, which will likely dissuade the central leadership from investing increased resources to ISWAP, the group will likely remain a significant challenge for Nigeria and the Lake Chad countries over the coming year.

At the same time, developments with IS elsewhere, namely in Libya, can have a significant impact on the group. On the one hand, the severe weakening of IS in Libya may lead the organization to send some of its cadres from there to the Lake Chad Region, especially those who are native to the region, who previously deployed to Libya to assist in the fighting there. Reports indicate that Senegalese and Nigerian IS members are already migrating from Sirte, Libya to Niger. On the other hand, given IS’ weakened position globally, the fact that al-Qaeda networks in Africa or more powerful and entrenched than IS, and can likely provide more support for Boko Haram, as well as the fact that al-Barnawi has such close personal and ideological relations with al-Qaeda, there is a realistic potential for a re-alignment with the organization, at the very least – his faction.

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Al-Shabaab in Somalia In East Africa, the most prominent Islamist militant group has long been, and remains, the al-Qaeda affiliated, Somalia-based Mujahideen Youth Movement, commonly known as al-Shabaab ( for “The Youth”). This infamy is well deserved, as al- Shabaab at different points in time and in different manifestations controlled significant portions of, and at one point all of, Mogadishu, being driven from the capital in 2011. The group also had full control over the strategic port city of Kismayo, and it’s nearly 700,000 inhabitants, until being forced out in September 2012 by the Somali National Army (SNA) and African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) troops. In areas under its control, al-Shabaab was known as a brutal administrator, enforcing the most extreme forms of Islamic law (Shariah), including via the amputation of limbs for stealing, and stoning for adultery.

Although less powerful and controlling less territory than in previous years, al-Shabaab is still a force to be reckoned with in Somalia. On average, the group carries out more than one attack per day in the country. Most commonly, these involve IEDs and shootings against security force bases and convoys, but suicide vehicle-borne IED (SVBIED) and mortar fire is not uncommon. Al- Shabaab also occasionally demonstrates the ability to overrun security force bases and towns held by security forces via large- scale, sophisticated ambushes.

Furthermore, al-Shabaab is a resilient and savvy organization, genuinely rooted in the local narrative. The group operates out of its own backyard and despite losing the strategic urban centers and ports it once controlled, they still administer territory in parts of the country, operating sharia courts, collecting and distributing taxes, being involved in resolving clan disputes, running schools and providing aid to the population. This firmly cements al-Shabaab in Somalia, and we can expect the group to continue its guerilla warfare in the south and center of the country and being a primary driver of instability, while seeking to recapture territory when an opportunity presents itself, such as in recent months as Ethiopian troops withdrew from numerous towns in order to redeploy back home.

In this way, al-Shabaab has proven wise in adapting its strategy to changes on the battlefield. The organization has capitalized on the weaknesses of its rivals, while also playing to their own strengths, and choosing when to conduct hit-and-run attacks, when to capture territory, and when to retreat. As another example, reports indicate that at this time, in response to pressure from US air strikes and the overall counterinsurgency measures against the group, al-Shabaab has increasingly deployed its fighters to Mogadishu, which - among other factors, such as the desire to disrupt the upcoming elections - has led to a noticeable increase in high casualty attacks in the capital, including regular attacks against the airport, SNA and AMISOM bases, luxury hotels, and the Presidential Palace (Villa Somalia), among others. These attacks usually involve multi-pronged strategies utilizing suicide vehicle-borne IED (SVBIED) and gunmen, as well as mortar fire. Furthermore, it takes significant local and international effort to keep al-Shabaab even at this relatively weakened level. Additionally, and as will be elaborated on below, the group has responded to less tangible changes, such as the growing global influence of Islamic State, which has placed considerable focus on expanding its reach in Somalia. In response, al-Shabaab has arrested suspected Islamic State sympathizers, while also enhancing its messaging strategy to meet the appealing levels used by IS.

Overall al-Shabaab is not going away anytime soon. The organization is deeply entrenched in Somalia, holding sway over much of the rural areas in the south and center, having influence among local clans, not to mention possessing a deep understanding of the physical and human terrain, and a vast supply of both light and heavy arms. There is a fair deal of popular support for al- Shabaab as well, in light of the perceived corruption of the government and the burdensome clannism that dominates the country, as well as the view among some of the population that al-Shabaab stands against foreign intrusion in the country, something not afforded to IS. The situation will likely be fluid over the coming year, with al-Shabaab gaining and losing territory, mostly in southern and central Somalia, while continuing their asymmetric attacks in Mogadishu, both small-scale and high- profile, but the insurgency and counter-insurgency will most certainly persist over the coming year.

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Pressure from Islamic State Despite its efforts, Islamic State (IS) has made very limited, almost negligible gains in Somalia thus far. That said, much like other al-Qaeda groups in Africa, al-Shabaab has had to respond swiftly to pressure from IS’ growing influence, including via arrests of suspected IS supporters, and adapting its messaging and propaganda tactics to the style popularized by IS, with nasheeds (Islamic vocal songs), high quality videos and effects, along with interviews with captives.

Islamic State’s courtship of Somalis has manifested in numerous ways. For one, Somali members of IS have called on their “brothers” within al-Shabaab and for the organization as a whole to join IS in several videos.

Promotion of video by IS in Yemen, calling on Somalis to join the organization (top) – October 2015 Promotion of video by ISWAP, calling on Somalis to join the organization – October 2015

As a result of IS’ growing influence worldwide, pressure within the group started to build with reports of members within al-

Shabaab showing support for IS and al-Baghdadi, resulting in a purge by al-Shabaab’s leadership, which used its Amniyat - internal intelligence unit - to seek out and arrest those perceived as supporting IS. During this time, in late 2015, Abdiqadir Mumin, a former spokesperson and recruiter for al-Shabaab to defect from the organization and pledge allegiance to al- Baghdadi, taking approximately 20 fighters from his Galgala mountains base in Puntland, along with him. Approximately six months later, in April 2016, another group of al-Shabaab defectors pledged allegiance to IS, declaring the establishment of Jabha East Africa and being comprised of East African former members of al-Shabaab, including Tanzanians and Kenyans, but also some European nationals. Thus far, only a few attacks have been claimed by IS in Mogadishu.

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Still from video advertising the “bay’ah” (pledge of allegiance) from Abdiqadir Mumin, former spokesperson for al-Shabaab, to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi

Much like with other areas of Sub-Saharan Africa facing the threat from Islamist militancy, IS has found Somalia to be a challenging terrain for expanding their global presence. As mentioned above, al-Shabaab’s roots are burrowed deeply in the grounds of Somalia, and despite the organization holding al-Qaeda’s slow-burning aspirations for a global Islamic Caliphate, the context of the battle in Somalia is framed largely as a local struggle, and it appears that this is the primary focus of the majority of its members and support base, and certainly of its leaders. The appeal of IS is in many ways weakened by this, as well as the fact that they are competing against an established organization with an entrenched administration and capabilities. In addition to al-Shabaab’s strengths and history in Somalia, the country by itself has been known to be difficult for foreigners to compete, as they are unfamiliar with complex clan dynamics, while finding trustworthy Somali groups and individuals to work with is challenging, as was the case for al-Qaeda in the past. Defections to IS are likely, and with the US’ continued targeting of high profile al-Shabaab leaders, this schism may grow deeper, but beyond that, we assess that the threat will likely remain largely from al-Shabaab.

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Al-Shabaab in East Africa While rooted in Somalia’s recent history, al-Shabaab does have regional ambitions, although there have been lengthy conflicts within the organization over whether or not to pursue such objectives. At this time, al-Shabaab’s activities in East Africa are predominantly related to recruiting and financing, despite countless attacks in Kenya, and a major twin bombing in Kampala, Uganda in 2010. We assess that, despite al-Shabaab’s ambitions, they will remain a largely Somalia-focused group, at least for the coming year. Additional high profile attacks are anticipated in Kenya over the coming year, while remaining a much less likely scenario, albeit possible, in other countries, such as Ethiopia, Uganda, and Tanzania, where al-Shabaab sympathizers have carried out minor attacks in recent years. Al-Shabaab’s motive for attacks in these countries, especially in the latter three is by and large meant at forcing public opinion to turn against their governments’ involvement in the fight against al-Shabaab, rather than portending an expansion into these countries. To this end, in addition to attacks, al-Shabaab implements creative messaging strategies aimed at threatening and intimidating neighboring countries, including via emphasizing the deaths or capture of foreign soldiers fighting in Somalia. The editing used in these videos bear notable similarities to those used by Islamic State.

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Captures from al-Shabaab video, detailing their hostages from Kenyan, Ugandan military

Kenya As stated above, outside of Somalia, the country hardest hit by al-Shabaab is without a doubt, Kenya. Al-Shabaab carries out regular cross-border incursions into Kenya’s eastern border area, at times attacking local security forces, and other times simply arriving in a town, forcing the locals to gather, preaching to them about their cause, and asking for their support. Although less frequently, the group does occasionally attack civilians in the area, especially Christians. Additionally, some of al-Shabaab’s most high-profile attacks have been in Kenya, such as the Westgate Mall attack in Nairobi in September 2013 and the Garissa University attack of April 2015. Furthermore, al-Shabaab supporters in Nairobi and Kenya have carried out small-scale attacks in these cities, namely via small-scale grenades.

At the same time, Kenya is a major hub for recruitment into al-Shabaab. Kenya’s population is approximately ten percent Muslim, including a sizeable ethnic Somali community in the country, and Al-Shabaab has been successful in recruiting from both the ethnic Kenyan Muslims, and the ethnic Somalis, with reports that Mombasa and Nairobi are central bases for these efforts. In fact, Kenyans are the second largest demographic in al-Shabaab after Somalis.

It should be noted that al-Shabaab, especially under its previous leader Godane, placed considerable effort Swahili-language al-Shabaab video, threatening violence in Kenya into becoming more of a regional militant organization than just a Somali-focused one. To this end, al-Shabaab established its Kenyan affiliate al-Hijra in 2008, and later - after the first did not prove successful - Jaysh Ayman, in 2013. Jaysh Ayman was meant by Godane to be al-Shabaab’s East African force. While both still exist, Jaysh Ayman has proven more successful, being responsible for most of the attacks in northeastern and coastal Kenya.

As al-Shabaab’s fight in Somalia is still largely local in nature, the Kenyan recruits are more likely to have been attracted to a nearby fight that fits into the global jihadist narrative of oppressed Muslims fighting against the Crusaders and Western invasions into Muslim lands. In this context, it is likely that these same recruits who were enticed by the general oppression of Muslims, are more susceptible to joining the more globalist IS cause than are Somalis. Furthermore, and as stated earlier, al- Shabaab has been able to suppress the pro-IS voices within its ranks in Somalia, but this is much harder to do in Kenya. Due to these factors, IS seems to have a greater recruiting potential in Kenya, where according to the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), various cells in the country have already been recruiting individuals to join IS. According to IGAD, al-

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Shabaab’s Kenyan affiliate al-Hijrah has been increasingly recruiting for individuals to join IS. One group in Mombasa is reported to recruit on behalf of both organizations. The IGAD report, citing government security agency surveillance, indicated that as East African countries increase their pressure on al- Shabaab, the organization’s networks have begun to subdivide, with some being linked to al-Shabaab, and others to Islamic State. In fact, Islamic State claimed its first attack in Kenya on September 11, when three women threw a petrol bomb into Mombasa’s central police station, and attacked officers with knives, before being subdued.

That said, at this time, it is unclear what the future of IS will be in Kenya. Islamic State has a much harder time operating in stable countries, and Kenya is one of the more stable in Africa. While the IS group in Somalia is still miniscule, reports indicate that one of the assailants from the September 11 attack in Mombasa did travel to northern Somalia, presumably communicating with Mumin’s IS group, others have instead shown a desire to travel to Iraq or Syria. At this time, IS has been significantly weakened, and is backpedaling in these countries, so it likely lost its appeal to some degree as a destination for would-be jihadists. Meanwhile, the ideal operating spaces for IS in Kenya are already occupied by Jaysh Ayman. It is possible that there will be more small-scale isolated attacks in Kenya by pro-IS individuals, but at this time there has only been one and we do not anticipate that this will emerge to be the trend.

Forecast Al-Shabaab’s strengths are in Somalia; the group’s popular support, its networks, and know-how are based in the country. Indeed, being a Somali-focused militant group is part of its popular appeal locally, while its globalist narrative was what drew in recruits and allowed for the establishment of affiliated groups in neighboring Kenya and other countries, such as Tanzania. In this way, al-Shabaab faces a dilemma: as a local organization, it will find it harder to recruit from neighboring countries, who previously saw Somalia as the near fight to build an Islamic society. Now, some of those potential recruits may be more attracted to IS’ global cause. At the same time, IS being on the back foot, may in some ways improve al-Shabaab’s lot.

Regardless, al-Shabaab will likely continue with its strategy in Kenya, namely recruiting from the local population, and carrying out attacks against in northeastern Kenya and in Lamu County. Additional large scale attacks directed at Kenya, both within Somalia, such as that which targeted a Kenyan-run AMISOM base in El Adde, killing and capturing over 100, should be anticipated, but not at an increased pace. In this context, no major attack has taken place in Nairobi since the Westgate Mall in September 2013, while the Garissa University massacre took place in April 2015.

With regards to other countries, such as Uganda, Tanzania, Djibouti, and Ethiopia, al-Shabaab has been far less successful. The group attempted a high-profile twin suicide bombing in Addis Ababa in October 2013, but the would-be bombers accidentally detonated their explosives prior to reaching their destination, a stadium during Ethiopia’s World Cup qualifying match against Nigeria. The group was more successful in Uganda, but still only managed to carry out one attack, a twin bombing that killed 70 people watching screenings of the 2010 World Cup Final. In Tanzania, no major attacks have been conducted by al-Shabaab, but radical Islamists and supporters of al-Shabaab have carried out numerous small-scale attacks in the country, largely targeting moderate Muslim preachers, however. In Djibouti, al-Shabaab also carried out an attack in May 2014, killing three.

Regardless of its poor success in other regional countries outside of Somalia and Kenya, al-Shabaab will still like build local pressure against AMISOM’s troop contributing countries from deploying their soldiers to Somalia. While we do not anticipate attacks in these countries by al-Shabaab, they cannot be entirely ruled out. In the meantime, the group will likely have more success in targeting these soldiers in Somalia. Back to Table of Contents

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