The Bering Strait Security Interests of the United States and Its Allies

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The Bering Strait Security Interests of the United States and Its Allies USS Connecticut and USS Hartford break through ice in support of Ice Exercise 2018, Ice Camp Skate, March 9, 2018 (U.S. Navy/Michael H. Lee) corridor that is becoming increasingly vital to the economic and national The Bering Strait security interests of the United States and its allies. Once a region of coopera- An Arena for Great tion between the Soviet Union and the United States, rapidly changing envi- ronmental conditions and the resulting Power Competition increase in human activity have made the Arctic an arena for potential Great By Ryan Tice Power competition between Russia, China, and the United States. The Navy foretold the Bering Strait’s sig- nificance in 2013 when it published its aritime corridors such as the United States and the global commu- U.S. Navy Arctic Roadmap: 2014–2030, Straits of Hormuz and the nity. Now due to Russia’s and China’s asserting that M Bab al-Mandeb have long been interests and activities in the Arctic, the vitally important to the interests of the Bering Strait is an emerging maritime this 51-mile-wide strait between Russia and the United States . will become a more important security planning con- Major Ryan Tice, USMC, is a graduate student in Regional Security Studies in the Department of sideration as maritime activity continues National Security Affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School. to increase. As the Pacific gateway for 58 Commentary / The Bering Strait JFQ 96, 1st Quarter 2020 Russia’s Northern Sea Route, the Bering with Arctic interests; and ensure that U.S. countries that it seeks to assert itself as the Strait will become increasingly important for adversaries do not exploit gaps created at dominant Arctic power. seaborne trade between Europe and Asia.1 the far boundaries of the GCC areas of But Russia is not the only power with responsibility (AORs). its eyes on the Arctic. Potential economic Any threat, perceived or real, to the and ambiguous international regula- freedom of access to these maritime cor- External Challenges: tions, as well as a lack of institutional ridors usually elicits a strong and swift Russian and Chinese governance, are already enticing China to response by the United States and its Interests in the Arctic position itself as a powerful stakeholder allies. Although the importance of the To fully appreciate the exigency of in Arctic affairs. China is looking north to Bering Strait is increasingly being rec- establishing a CJTF in Alaska, it is use the Arctic sea lines of communication ognized throughout the Department of necessary to understand Russian and as a third belt in its massive infrastructure Defense (DOD), the United States still Chinese interests and activities in the network dubbed the Belt and Road faces several obstacles to achieving the Arctic. Russia’s military assertiveness Initiative.9 All Chinese maritime traffic strategic objectives outlined in the Navy’s in the region is a strong indicator of utilizing Russia’s Northern Sea route roadmap, namely to “ensure United its ambitions. In December 2015, will have to transit the Bering Strait in States Arctic sovereignty and provide President Vladimir Putin stated in his order to travel between the Chinese homeland defense,” “provide ready naval National Security Strategy that port at Dalian to the port in Rotterdam, forces to respond to crises and contingen- Netherlands. To further its economic cies,” “preserve freedom of the seas,” and leadership in exploiting the resources of the interests in the region, China is wielding “promote partnerships within the United world’s oceans and the Arctic is acquiring its soft-power weapons to gain leverage. States Government and with interna- particular significance. An entire spec- It has invested in nuclear-powered ice- tional allies and partners.”2 trum of political, financial-economic, and breakers and increased its foreign direct In particular, because the Bering Strait informational instruments have been set in investment in such countries as Finland lies at the boundary of three geographic motion in the struggle for influence in the and Norway, with ambitions to establish combatant commands (GCCs), increased international arena.4 a Chinese-Arctic corridor that connects adversary activity around the strait cre- China with European markets.10 In only a ates challenges for unity of effort among To achieve its geostrategic objectives few years, such trans-Arctic shipping will those combatant commands. Moreover, in the Arctic, Russia has established become an economically viable alternative since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the the Northern Fleet Joint Strategic to the Suez Canal and cut travel time be- United States has invested little in Arctic Command, embarked on large-scale tween Shanghai and northwestern Europe capabilities, and since 2014, the United investment in Arctic airfields and ports,5 by approximately 18 to 27 percent.11 States and its allies have focused personnel and initiated the development of dis- Thus, it was unsurprising that, after visit- and resources on deterring Russian aggres- crete Arctic military capabilities such ing with President Donald Trump in sion around northern Europe.3 as the Northern Fleet’s Arctic Motor- April 2017, Chinese President Xi Jingping As a result, the United States finds it- ized Rifle Brigade6 and “Arctic-proof” stopped in Alaska to meet with Governor self in a position of weakness in the region. drones that can withstand the region’s Bill Walker, attempting to find opportuni- If steps are not taken to correct these vul- severe climatic conditions.7 This Arctic ties for Chinese investment in Alaska.12 nerabilities, the Bering Strait will almost investment was on full display during China’s interests in the Arctic may certainly become a region like the South Russia’s strategic exercise Vostok-18, not be purely economic, however, but China Sea or the Baltic region, where when units of the Arctic Motorized might also involve national security. competition, harassment, and intimidation Rifle Brigade conducted an amphibious China views the Aleutian Islands as the threaten its status as a place of peaceful insert on the Chukotka Peninsula and northernmost extent of the first island cooperation and exploration. To meet the executed a tactical foot movement from chain, a series of islands extending from challenges posed by the rapidly changing its insertion point to an undisclosed the Aleutians in the northeast down security environment in the Arctic and the location along the Pacific coastline while through the Philippine archipelago in the Bering Strait in particular, U.S. Northern the Northern Fleet conducted multiple southwest.13 The Chinese, a historically Command (USNORTHCOM) should amphibious landings and search-and-res- seafaring nation, see these islands as barri- establish Combined Joint Task Force cue missions throughout the exercise.8 ers used by the United States and its allies (CJTF) in Alaska. A CJTF in Alaska, In addition to developing Arctic to limit their power projection capabilities like CJTFs in other parts of the world, capabilities, Russia is investing in Arctic by restricting their maneuverability.14 would enable the necessary conditions infrastructure to enable operations and Seen from this perspective, freedom of to integrate the full effects of the joint has developed a system of military facili- maneuver through the Aleutian Islands force across land, sea, air, space, and cy- ties—radar stations, air bases, and ports. and Bering Strait in order to access the berspace warfare domains; create a venue Its militarization of the Arctic sends Arctic’s natural resources and trade routes for military cooperation among partners clear signals to the other Arctic littoral is of great strategic importance for China. JFQ 96, 1st Quarter 2020 Tice 59 Crew of U.S. Coast Guard Cutter Maple follows Canadian Coast Guard Icebreaker Terry Fox through icy waters of Franklin Strait, in Nunavut Canada, August 11, 2017 (U.S. Coast Guard/Nate Littlejohn) Both China and Russia are taking Sea.16 This infrastructure, including a domains.18 With Russia’s increased invest- the long view in their Arctic strategies, military airfield, is believed to consist of ment in infrastructure in the Arctic, it has setting the necessary conditions to assert hardened facilities for the deployment the ability to create such an integrated themselves in the region. As noted in the of radars, antiship and antiair missile network of sensors and shooters in and British publication The Observer, “A great launchers, and combat aircraft. China around the Bering Strait. The Sopka-2 chess game is being played with countries uses these activities to secure its claims radar system on Wrangel Island is a three- staking claims to the Arctic to make sure to natural resources and extend its dimensional dual-use S-band air-route they are not left out. Some countries, influence over that strategic maritime radar with a range of 350 kilometers.19 like China, are looking 50 years ahead.”15 corridor in an attempt to reduce U.S. Though not a significant threat in isola- sway over what China considers to be its tion, this radar—potentially employed as External Challenges rightful area of influence.17 a part of an integrated network of Russian In other regions where they have Similar to Chinese actions in the land-based antiship cruise missiles, elec- interests, both China and Russia secure South China Sea, Russia’s deployments of tronic warfare systems, and ground-based those interests through increased A2/AD capabilities in the Black Sea and mobile air defense systems in the Bering militarization, employing antiaccess/ Kaliningrad offer operational planners Strait—would pose a formidable obstacle area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities from insight into what a Russian land-based to the United States and its allies’ ability sovereign territory to control strategic A2/AD “bubble” in the vicinity of the to access the Arctic.
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