USS Connecticut and USS Hartford break through ice in support of Ice Exercise 2018, Ice Camp Skate, March 9, 2018 (U.S. Navy/Michael H. Lee)
corridor that is becoming increasingly vital to the economic and national The Bering Strait security interests of the United States and its allies. Once a region of coopera- An Arena for Great tion between the Soviet Union and the United States, rapidly changing envi- ronmental conditions and the resulting Power Competition increase in human activity have made the Arctic an arena for potential Great By Ryan Tice Power competition between Russia, China, and the United States. The Navy foretold the Bering Strait’s sig- nificance in 2013 when it published its aritime corridors such as the United States and the global commu- U.S. Navy Arctic Roadmap: 2014–2030, Straits of Hormuz and the nity. Now due to Russia’s and China’s asserting that M Bab al-Mandeb have long been interests and activities in the Arctic, the vitally important to the interests of the Bering Strait is an emerging maritime this 51-mile-wide strait between Russia and the United States . . . will become a more important security planning con- Major Ryan Tice, USMC, is a graduate student in Regional Security Studies in the Department of sideration as maritime activity continues National Security Affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School. to increase. . . . As the Pacific gateway for
58 Commentary / The Bering Strait JFQ 96, 1st Quarter 2020 Russia’s Northern Sea Route, the Bering with Arctic interests; and ensure that U.S. countries that it seeks to assert itself as the Strait will become increasingly important for adversaries do not exploit gaps created at dominant Arctic power. seaborne trade between Europe and Asia.1 the far boundaries of the GCC areas of But Russia is not the only power with responsibility (AORs). its eyes on the Arctic. Potential economic Any threat, perceived or real, to the and ambiguous international regula- freedom of access to these maritime cor- External Challenges: tions, as well as a lack of institutional ridors usually elicits a strong and swift Russian and Chinese governance, are already enticing China to response by the United States and its Interests in the Arctic position itself as a powerful stakeholder allies. Although the importance of the To fully appreciate the exigency of in Arctic affairs. China is looking north to Bering Strait is increasingly being rec- establishing a CJTF in Alaska, it is use the Arctic sea lines of communication ognized throughout the Department of necessary to understand Russian and as a third belt in its massive infrastructure Defense (DOD), the United States still Chinese interests and activities in the network dubbed the Belt and Road faces several obstacles to achieving the Arctic. Russia’s military assertiveness Initiative.9 All Chinese maritime traffic strategic objectives outlined in the Navy’s in the region is a strong indicator of utilizing Russia’s Northern Sea route roadmap, namely to “ensure United its ambitions. In December 2015, will have to transit the Bering Strait in States Arctic sovereignty and provide President Vladimir Putin stated in his order to travel between the Chinese homeland defense,” “provide ready naval National Security Strategy that port at Dalian to the port in Rotterdam, forces to respond to crises and contingen- Netherlands. To further its economic cies,” “preserve freedom of the seas,” and leadership in exploiting the resources of the interests in the region, China is wielding “promote partnerships within the United world’s oceans and the Arctic is acquiring its soft-power weapons to gain leverage. States Government and with interna- particular significance. . . . An entire spec- It has invested in nuclear-powered ice- tional allies and partners.”2 trum of political, financial-economic, and breakers and increased its foreign direct In particular, because the Bering Strait informational instruments have been set in investment in such countries as Finland lies at the boundary of three geographic motion in the struggle for influence in the and Norway, with ambitions to establish combatant commands (GCCs), increased international arena.4 a Chinese-Arctic corridor that connects adversary activity around the strait cre- China with European markets.10 In only a ates challenges for unity of effort among To achieve its geostrategic objectives few years, such trans-Arctic shipping will those combatant commands. Moreover, in the Arctic, Russia has established become an economically viable alternative since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the the Northern Fleet Joint Strategic to the Suez Canal and cut travel time be- United States has invested little in Arctic Command, embarked on large-scale tween Shanghai and northwestern Europe capabilities, and since 2014, the United investment in Arctic airfields and ports,5 by approximately 18 to 27 percent.11 States and its allies have focused personnel and initiated the development of dis- Thus, it was unsurprising that, after visit- and resources on deterring Russian aggres- crete Arctic military capabilities such ing with President Donald Trump in sion around northern Europe.3 as the Northern Fleet’s Arctic Motor- April 2017, Chinese President Xi Jingping As a result, the United States finds it- ized Rifle Brigade6 and “Arctic-proof” stopped in Alaska to meet with Governor self in a position of weakness in the region. drones that can withstand the region’s Bill Walker, attempting to find opportuni- If steps are not taken to correct these vul- severe climatic conditions.7 This Arctic ties for Chinese investment in Alaska.12 nerabilities, the Bering Strait will almost investment was on full display during China’s interests in the Arctic may certainly become a region like the South Russia’s strategic exercise Vostok-18, not be purely economic, however, but China Sea or the Baltic region, where when units of the Arctic Motorized might also involve national security. competition, harassment, and intimidation Rifle Brigade conducted an amphibious China views the Aleutian Islands as the threaten its status as a place of peaceful insert on the Chukotka Peninsula and northernmost extent of the first island cooperation and exploration. To meet the executed a tactical foot movement from chain, a series of islands extending from challenges posed by the rapidly changing its insertion point to an undisclosed the Aleutians in the northeast down security environment in the Arctic and the location along the Pacific coastline while through the Philippine archipelago in the Bering Strait in particular, U.S. Northern the Northern Fleet conducted multiple southwest.13 The Chinese, a historically Command (USNORTHCOM) should amphibious landings and search-and-res- seafaring nation, see these islands as barri- establish Combined Joint Task Force cue missions throughout the exercise.8 ers used by the United States and its allies (CJTF) in Alaska. A CJTF in Alaska, In addition to developing Arctic to limit their power projection capabilities like CJTFs in other parts of the world, capabilities, Russia is investing in Arctic by restricting their maneuverability.14 would enable the necessary conditions infrastructure to enable operations and Seen from this perspective, freedom of to integrate the full effects of the joint has developed a system of military facili- maneuver through the Aleutian Islands force across land, sea, air, space, and cy- ties—radar stations, air bases, and ports. and Bering Strait in order to access the berspace warfare domains; create a venue Its militarization of the Arctic sends Arctic’s natural resources and trade routes for military cooperation among partners clear signals to the other Arctic littoral is of great strategic importance for China.
JFQ 96, 1st Quarter 2020 Tice 59 Crew of U.S. Coast Guard Cutter Maple follows Canadian Coast Guard Icebreaker Terry Fox through icy waters of Franklin Strait, in Nunavut Canada, August 11, 2017 (U.S. Coast Guard/Nate Littlejohn)
Both China and Russia are taking Sea.16 This infrastructure, including a domains.18 With Russia’s increased invest- the long view in their Arctic strategies, military airfield, is believed to consist of ment in infrastructure in the Arctic, it has setting the necessary conditions to assert hardened facilities for the deployment the ability to create such an integrated themselves in the region. As noted in the of radars, antiship and antiair missile network of sensors and shooters in and British publication The Observer, “A great launchers, and combat aircraft. China around the Bering Strait. The Sopka-2 chess game is being played with countries uses these activities to secure its claims radar system on Wrangel Island is a three- staking claims to the Arctic to make sure to natural resources and extend its dimensional dual-use S-band air-route they are not left out. . . . Some countries, influence over that strategic maritime radar with a range of 350 kilometers.19 like China, are looking 50 years ahead.”15 corridor in an attempt to reduce U.S. Though not a significant threat in isola- sway over what China considers to be its tion, this radar—potentially employed as External Challenges rightful area of influence.17 a part of an integrated network of Russian In other regions where they have Similar to Chinese actions in the land-based antiship cruise missiles, elec- interests, both China and Russia secure South China Sea, Russia’s deployments of tronic warfare systems, and ground-based those interests through increased A2/AD capabilities in the Black Sea and mobile air defense systems in the Bering militarization, employing antiaccess/ Kaliningrad offer operational planners Strait—would pose a formidable obstacle area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities from insight into what a Russian land-based to the United States and its allies’ ability sovereign territory to control strategic A2/AD “bubble” in the vicinity of the to access the Arctic. maritime corridors, and they could take Bering Strait might look like: a nearly im- That said, given the concentration of the same approach around the Bering. penetrable, three-dimensional area where Russian A2/AD assets being employed In late 2017, China constructed military the United States and its allies would be elsewhere, it is unlikely that Russia will infrastructure on Subi, Mischief, and under the threat of attack across surface, employ them around the Bering Strait in Fiery Cross reefs in the South China sub-surface, air, and electromagnetic the near term. Instead, Russia will likely
60 Commentary / The Bering Strait JFQ 96, 1st Quarter 2020 adopt the role of Arctic intimidator, For example, a Russian navy surface Europe.24 In 2018, the U.S. Navy rees- using a complement of electromagnetic combatant traveling from the North- tablished Second Fleet with the stated sensors and electronic warfare capabilities ern Fleet port at Murmansk along the mission to develop and dynamically to collect information about and probe Northern Sea route toward Vladivostok employ maritime forces ready to fight and harass countries it deems competi- to link up with the Russian Pacific Fleet across multiple domains in the Atlantic tors in the region. There is evidence that would have to pass through the Bering and Arctic in order to ensure access; deter this is already happening. During the Strait and the maritime waters of three aggression; and defend U.S., allied, and North Atlantic Treaty Organization GCCs. An individual GCC has the partner interests.25 This surge of person- (NATO) multinational large-scale ex- authority to plan operations and operate nel and resources toward Europe has left ercise Trident Juncture-18, Russia was its forces whenever and wherever little capacity to devote forces to address accused of employing global positioning they are required to accomplish their emerging threats in and around the system jamming measures from the Kola mission. However, any cross-AOR oper- Bering Strait. With little to no Navy or Peninsula, a border region with Norway ations or activities require coordination Marine Corps forces stationed in Alaska, and Finland, on NATO aircraft flying with the affected GCC.22 Russia and the United States finds itself unbalanced in support of the exercise.20 The former China know well the Unified Command across the Pacific and Atlantic sides of the head of NATO’s Emerging Threats Plan and will look to exploit the gaps at Arctic. Division characterized Russia’s behavior the AOR boundaries. The current U.S. The United States will have to de- as follows: “We’ve seen transmitters institutional conception of geographic velop an Arctic strategy that views the going down mysteriously in Sweden, responsibility will thus challenge the Bering Strait as a strategic maritime hacking of soldiers’ personal devices unity of effort required to respond to corridor serving as the bridge between in the Baltics, disruptions to mobile security issues in the Bering Strait. the growing threats in Asia and Europe. phone networks in Lithuania during Another challenge to U.S. efforts The critical task will be to balance forces maritime exercises and so on.”21 Without in the Arctic is that the Euro-centric across the Arctic region to ensure that a complement of responses from the focus on the Russian threat has diverted China and Russia do not exploit the United States and its allies, the sum ef- personnel and resources away from the physical gaps and organizational seams fect of these more aggressive tactics in growing threats that Russia and China created by the current imbalances be- the Bering Strait is a normalization of pose in and around the Bering Strait. The tween forces assigned to the European bad behavior that threatens access to eight littoral Arctic countries (Canada, and Asian regions of the Arctic and the the region, potentially creating a situa- Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, combatant command boundaries. tion in which the United States and its Russia, Sweden, and the United States) allies would only be able to access this are either NATO or European powers Combined Joint Task maritime corridor under the threat of and, as a result, have drawn U.S. atten- Force–Alaska: Leveraging nonkinetic or even kinetic attack. tion and resources toward the European Partnerships to Win Early Arctic to meet their collective defense Ensuring access to the Arctic by con- Internal Challenges: Command needs. trolling the Bering Strait is a global and Control and Balanced Forces Since the annexation of Crimea issue, one that requires participation In addition to the challenges China and and invasion of Ukraine by Russia, the from U.S. Asian and European allies, Russia pose in the Arctic, the United Pentagon has responded by initiating including NATO, Japan, and South States faces a number of internal chal- Operation Atlantic Resolve, which has Korea, which have commercial and lenges. One is that the Bering Strait established enduring rotational units security interests in the Arctic. There- exposes a potential seam at the edges and commands to reassure the Alliance fore, we need a CJTF; it has a track of three GCC AOR boundaries: U.S. and deter further Russian aggression in record of success in addressing the Indo-Pacific Command, U.S. European Europe. Recognizing Norway’s strategic very institutional issues and foreseeable Command, and USNORTHCOM. As position and unique security challenges, threats emerging in the Bering Strait. human activity increases and China and the U.S. Marine Corps has prioritized Alaska is an ideal location to establish Russia seek to further assert themselves support to contingency operations in a CJTF to demonstrate to China and in the Arctic, the task of effectively NATO’s northern flank by eliminating Russia that the United States takes identifying and tracking potential rotational forces to the Black Sea region access to the Arctic seriously. threats across multiple warfare domains and reallocating forces to Norway as One reason a CJTF would be effective will challenge the coordination and Marine Rotational Force–Europe.23 The is that it would necessitate establishing a unity of effort of these commands. U.S. Army has committed a regionally combined joint operation area (CJOA) The 2011 update of the U.S. Unified aligned division headquarters in Poland with sufficient land, sea, and air space—a Command Plan boundaries illumi- with armored and aviation brigade com- critical first step toward ensuring unity nates the command and control (C2) bat teams with support from logistics task of effort when conducting operations at challenges the Bering Strait presents. forces on 9-month rotations in Northern the geographic boundaries of contiguous
JFQ 96, 1st Quarter 2020 Tice 61 areas of operation. As defined in Joint their military interoperability, specifically Accredited a Joint National Training Publication 3-0, Operations, “A CJOA is by planning and executing joint training Capability, JPARC is a resource that en- an area of land, sea, and airspace, defined exercises.29 Increasing this allied presence sures training is conducted under realistic by a geographic combatant commander in Alaska would balance the force posture conditions across warfare domains.31 The or subordinate unified commander, in on both sides of the Arctic and bring port of Alaska in Anchorage is another which a joint force commander . . . con- much needed Arctic capabilities to bear. ready-to-use capability that the state has ducts military operations to accomplish CJTF-Alaska is not merely an effec- to offer. During the height of combat a specific mission.”26 In the case of the tive but hypothetical solution; it is an operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Bering Strait, this CJOA would create an altogether logistically achievable one, as port supported more than 20 military area owned by one commander, thereby it could capitalize on the existing facilities deployments and the onward movement streamlining decisionmaking by routing it and personnel force structure of Alaska of 18,000 pieces of military equipment.32 through only one GCC. Command (ALCOM), a sub-unified joint It has direct access via secure rail lines Another virtue of the CJTF as a command of USNORTHCOM head- to major military installations and year- solution to the Bering Strait problem quartered in Anchorage and commanded round accessibility, allowing the United is that it would create an institutional by an Air Force three-star general. States and its allies to deploy rotational platform for cooperation among allied ALCOM could readily serve as the foun- forces and equipment with ease. and partner nations, thereby providing dation of a CJTF headquarters. The rest Redesignating ALCOM as a standing the necessary balance of forces across the of the personnel needed could be globally CJTF headquarters and inviting countries Arctic region. Japan and South Korea, sourced by USNORTHCOM through to participate in a coalition come with both seafaring nations and close allies the Request for Forces process. Both the little opportunity cost in the near term; of the United States, look to the Arctic Air Force and the Army have significant serve to demonstrate U.S. resolve to for access to hydrocarbons, minerals, capabilities in Alaska and would not deter malign activity in the Bering Strait; and fisheries.27 Their participation in require additional forces above discrete set a strategic anchor on the Pacific side CJTF–Alaska would serve to enhance capabilities needed to compete across of the Arctic sea lines of communication; their ability to protect their economic warfare domains. With little Navy and and complement the military planning and security interests in the North Pacific Marine Corps presence, the CJTF might and security cooperation that has hereto- and the Arctic, while the CJTF could be better served employing rotational fore been focused on the threats on the leverage their icebreakers and ice-class Navy and Marine Corps forces. As noted European side of the Arctic. ships to bolster the coalition’s presence in by Walker Mills, shorter “deployment for the Arctic. Both Japan and South Korea training periods of one or two months The CJTF headquarters is a proven could increase rotational training oppor- to Alaska would still offer much better model that fosters cooperation and collab- tunities for their air forces and armies at training opportunities while limiting the oration. Establishing a CJTF headquarters the Joint Pacific Alaska Range Complex impact to our global force model and in Alaska would signal to U.S. partners and further develop their amphibious current deployment commitments.”30 across the globe that Washington is taking capabilities in partnership with the U.S. This concept of rotational forces would the necessary steps to address the growing Marines at Adak Island in the Aleutian also apply to U.S. multinational partners security challenges in the Arctic. The CJTF Island chain.28 and would go a long way toward enhanc- is not a novel idea but rather a time-tested As with Asian allies, a CJTF in Alaska ing multinational interoperability. model that fosters integration and unity would likely draw interest from NATO Alaska also serves as an ideal loca- of effort and clearly signals U.S. resolve and our European allies, serving as a tion for a standing CJTF headquarters to adversaries. Controlling the Bering welcome opportunity for Europe’s non- because it has the established military Strait, in concert with sea control efforts NATO members to contribute to global infrastructure, including 32 military in the European Arctic, would provide the security and cooperation outside the facilities and 12 major bases and stations, essential security necessary to deter aggres- auspices of NATO. Finland and Sweden, to meet the military demands of the sion so the Arctic remains a place where non-NATO Arctic countries, would rapidly increasing human activity in the peaceful nations can coexist without fear of benefit greatly from cooperating with the Arctic region. With well-established and interference or intimidation. JFQ Alliance in a non-NATO military struc- ready-to-use resources, Alaska would ture. Likewise, inviting both countries to facilitate security cooperation training participate in CJTF-Alaska would bring across all warfare domains with coalition Notes valuable Arctic military experience to the partners. Alaska’s Joint Pacific Alaska 1 team. Recognizing the growing threats to Range Complex (JPARC) has 65,000 U.S. Navy Arctic Roadmap: 2014–2030 (Washington, DC: Headquarters Department their security, the United States, Sweden, square miles of airspace, 2,560 square of Navy, February 2014), available at
62 Commentary / The Bering Strait JFQ 96, 1st Quarter 2020 Enhanced Deterrence Initiative Fact Sheet,” Race,” The National Interest, March 5, 2017, 2019, available at
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