Photo Credit: Veo Luego Aprendo
RAPID EDUCATION AND RISK ANALYSIS COLOMBIA July 2020
This publication was produced at the request of the United States Agency for International Development. It was prepared independently by DevTech Systems, Inc., and was authored by James Rogan (Team Leader), Ana Daza Arevalo, Ana María Restrepo-Sáenz, and Daniel Agudelo Navarro.
RAPID EDUCATION AND RISK ANALYSIS COLOMBIA July 2020
Submitted to: USAID Bureau for Latin America and the Caribbean, Office of Regional Sustainable Development (LAC/RSD)
Submitted by: DevTech Systems, Inc. Contract GS-10F-0048L/7200AA18M00024 (October 1, 2018–September 30, 2023)
Cover Photo: Students of the Diego Luis Córdoba School in the municipality of Acandí, Chocó, Colombia Photo by Veo Luego Aprendo Courtesy of Daniel Agudelo-Navarro
Disclaimer This report is made possible by the support of the American people through the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) under Contract Number GS-10F-0048L/7200AA18M00024. The contents of this report are the sole responsibility of DevTech Systems, Inc., and do not necessarily reflect the views of USAID or the United States Government.
CONTENTS Acronyms ...... iv Acknowledgements ...... v Executive Summary ...... vi Purpose ...... vi Methodology ...... vi Context ...... vi Key Conclusions ...... vii Key Recommendations ...... ix Introduction ...... 1 RERA Methodology ...... 1 Research Questions ...... 1 Timeframe ...... 2 RERA Team ...... 2 Fieldwork Planning ...... 3 Fieldwork ...... 8 Limitations ...... 10 Country Context ...... 11 Country Snapshot ...... 11 Main Contextual Risks ...... 12 The Education Sector ...... 34 Overview ...... 34 Public Budget Expenditures ...... 35 Education access and Quality ...... 36 Education and COVID-19 ...... 39 Venezuelan Migrant Students ...... 42 Emergency Education and Risk Reduction ...... 44 RERA Findings and Analysis ...... 45 Contextual Risks ...... 46 Education ...... 55 School Community Resilience ...... 76 Medellín Case Study ...... 83 Conclusions ...... 85 Contextual Risk ...... 85 Education ...... 85 School Community Resilience ...... 89 Recommendations ...... 91 Education ...... 91 School Community Resilience ...... 94 Annex I: Quantitative Survey Results ...... 95 Annex II: RERA Sample Secretariat Profiles ...... 133
i | COLOMBIA RAPID EDUCATION AND RISK ANALYSIS USAID.GOV TABLES Table 1. Data Collection Tools ...... 3 Table 2. RERA Sample Sites ...... 5 Table 3. Sample respondents for each school community included: ...... 6 Table 4. Survey Response Rate ...... 8 Table 5. Interview Response Totals ...... 9 Table 6. Colombia Roadmap to Self-Reliance (USAID), Selected Indicators ...... 16 Table 7. Colombia’s Natural Hazard Risk Rankings ...... 17 Table 8. Any Drug Use Prevalence, 2004, 2011, and 2016, by sex ...... 22 Table 9. Any Drug Use Prevalence, 2004, 2011, and 2016, by grade ...... 22 Table 10. Homicide Cases and Rates, by Year ...... 25 Table 11. Intimate Partner Violence Cases and Rate per 100,000 ...... 27 Table 12. Rate of Violence by Selected Categories and Secretariat (2018) ...... 28 Table 13. Venezuelan Migration to Colombia FROM 2010 to 2019 ...... 29 Table 14. COVID-19 Status in RERA Secretariat Municipalities ...... 32 Table 15. Venezuelan Students in RERA Sample Schools, by Number and Percentage ...... 43 Table 16. Categories and Main Research Questions ...... 46 Table 17. Natural Hazard Risk, by Secretariat...... 47 Table 18. Ecosystem of Drug Use, by Secretariat ...... 48 Table 19. Types of Gang Insecurity, by Secretariat ...... 50 Table 20. Types of Violence in the Community, by Secretariat ...... 51 Table 21. Types of Domestic Violence in the Community, by Secretariat ...... 52 Table 22. Perceptions of Police Actions, by Secretariat...... 54 Table 23. Safety inside School, by Respondent Type ...... 55 Table 24. Safety inside School, by Student Gender ...... 56 Table 25. Safety inside School, by Secretariat ...... 56 Table 26. Safety inside School, by Respondent Nationality ...... 57 Table 27. Safety outside School, by Secretariat ...... 58 Table 28. Safety outside School, by Respondent Type ...... 58 Table 29. Safety outside School, by Student Gender ...... 59 Table 30. How Safe Are You Outside School, by Student Nationality ...... 59 Table 31. How Much Do You Like School, by Secretariat ...... 60 Table 32. How Much Do You Like School, by Respondent Type ...... 60 Table 33. How Much Do You Like Your Teachers, by Secretariat ...... 61 Table 34. Student Interest in School, by Nationality and Age ...... 62 Table 35. Student Interest in School, by Secretariat ...... 62 Table 36. Types of School Violence, All Respondents ...... 63 Table 37. Types of School Violence, by Student Nationality ...... 64 Table 38. Types of School Violence, by Secretariat ...... 65 Table 39. Sufficient School Materials, by Secretariat ...... 66 Table 40. Route to School Difficulty, by Secretariat ...... 67 Table 41. Reasons Why Out of School, by Gender ...... 68 Table 42. Reasons Why Out of School, by Nationality ...... 68 Table 43. Reasons Children and Adolescents are Out of School, by Secretariat ...... 69 Table 44. Extent of Remote Learning Continuity, by Secretariat ...... 72 Table 45. School Meal Frequency, All Respondents ...... 75
USAID.GOV COLOMBIA RAPID EDUCATION AND RISK ANALYSIS | ii Table 46. Types of Domestic Violence, by Respondent Gender ...... 75 Table 47. What Unites the Community, by Secretariat ...... 76 Table 48. Extent Community Joined Together During COVID-19, by Secretariat ...... 77 Table 49. School Community Collaboration, by Secretariat ...... 79 Table 50. School Building Safety, by Secretariat ...... 80 Table 51. School Preparedness Plan, by Secretariat ...... 81 Table 52. Frequency of School Disaster Drills, by Secretariat ...... 82
FIGURES Figure 1. RERA Sample Secretariats ...... 5 Figure 2. Gini Coefficient of Inequality in Colombia, by Regional Peers ...... 14 Figure 3. Gini Coefficient of Inequality in Colombia, by Regional Peers and by Department...... 14 Figure 4. Government Transparency, by Department ...... 15 Figure 5. Venezuelan Migration and RERA Sites ...... 31
iii | COLOMBIA RAPID EDUCATION AND RISK ANALYSIS USAID.GOV ACRONYMS
BACRIM Bandas Criminales CNC Centro Nacional de Consultoría COVID-19 Coronavirus Disease 2019 DANE Departamento Nacional del Estadística ELN Ejército de Liberación Nacional EP Ejército Popular EPL Ejército Popular de Liberación FARC Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia GDP Gross Domestic Product ICBF Instituto Colombiano de Bienestar Familiar INFORM Index for Risk Management MEN Ministerio de Educación Nacional PAE Programa de Alimentación Escolar PISA Program for International Student Assessment OECD Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development RERA Rapid Education and Risk Analysis SISBEN Sistema de Identificación de Potenciales Beneficiarios de Programas Sociales SIMAT Sistema Integrado de Matrícula UNGRD Unidad Nacional de Gestión al Riesgo de Desastres USAID United States Agency for International Development UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund UNODC United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
USAID.GOV COLOMBIA RAPID EDUCATION AND RISK ANALYSIS | iv ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This Rapid Education and Risk Analysis (RERA): Colombia final report draws on a unique collaboration between USAID/Colombia, USAID/Washington, the Ministry of Education, local Education Secretariats, and selected school communities.
Several people played key roles in the RERA exercise and made important contributions to this report. At USAID/Colombia, Education Specialist Kevin Roberts and Elisa Zogbi, Director of the Venezuelan Response and Integration Office, provided strategic direction to the exercise, from conceptualization and design to facilitating outreach to partners and contributing substantive comments to the final report. Alejandro Anaya Sedán and Santiago Fernández de Soto at the Ministry of Education served as crucial liaisons at the ministry, lending guidance and helping orchestrate the RERA team’s collaboration with officials at the Ministry and Education Secretariats.
The RERA was implemented under USAID’s Latin American and Caribbean Education Support Contract, managed by DevTech Systems, Inc. Jamie Salazar, Sr. Program Manager, and Dr. Randy Hatfield, Director of DevTech’s Education, Gender, and Youth Practice, played central roles overseeing the RERA.
Finally, the process benefited from the advice of Gwendolyn Heaner, who provided support on remote data collection design and implementation.
v | COLOMBIA RAPID EDUCATION AND RISK ANALYSIS USAID.GOV EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
PURPOSE USAID/Colombia commissioned a Rapid Education and Risk Analysis (RERA) to:
1. Gain a “snapshot” of Colombia’s education system, its interaction with contextual risks, and key challenges to providing equitable, quality education to all school-aged children, including native Colombians, Venezuelan migrants, and Colombian-Venezuelans in receptor communities impacted by the Venezuelan migrant crisis; and 2. Obtain a broader understanding of the resilience of affected school communities, including their main risks, needs, assets, and capacities.
This RERA will inform the design of future USAID education activities to support affected school communities.
METHODOLOGY A RERA is a “good enough” qualitative situation analysis that uses resilience concepts to examine the education sector, learners, and the school community1 as a dynamic system of multiple contextual risks and assets. This RERA in Colombia was conducted fully remotely in late May 2020 and focused on a limited, purposive primary data sample of 457 respondents. The RERA reached 457 respondents through a quantitative survey held from May 12 to 19, 2020, and 201 respondents through follow-up, qualitative interviews conducted from May 14 to 27, 2020.
CONTEXT A middle-income country and one of the oldest democracies in Latin America, Colombia endured nearly half a century of intense armed conflict. Longstanding violence and instability rooted in territorial control by illegal armed groups and terrorist organizations have resulted in a large internally displaced population. The 2016 peace process has demobilized the largest and longest-standing guerrilla group, but rival armed actors now seek control of isolated communities and territories. Conflict, violence, and crime often exacerbate Colombia’s high vulnerability to a range of natural hazard impacts. Inequality, extreme poverty, and corruption remain key challenges. Amidst these ongoing stresses, the country underwent the double shock of 1.8 million Venezuelan migrants arriving by 20192 and the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020. The government has a tall order to balance measures to curb the spread of pandemic, protect citizens, deliver basic services to the most vulnerable, and stave off economic fallout and social unrest.
1 The term “school community” refers to a school and the surrounding neighborhoods it serves, constituting a network of relationships among various individuals, groups, organizations, and institutions. 2 The Refugee Brief, 1 April 2020, UNHCR. https://www.unhcr.org/refugeebrief/the-refugee-brief-1-april-2020/.
USAID.GOV COLOMBIA RAPID EDUCATION AND RISK ANALYSIS | vi KEY CONCLUSIONS
CONTEXTUAL RISKS All school communities in the sample are multi-hazard realities, beset by the recent shock of a major pandemic.
• Respondents in all schools identified a variety of contextual risks in their communities. • Quarantined due to COVID-19, epidemics emerged as the priority disaster risk, followed by flooding and earthquakes. • A majority of respondents identified drugs, gangs, and violence as the principal threats in their communities. • A lack of food was also regularly cited by respondents across the sample.
The sale of drugs constitutes the most critical social risk faced by school communities and signals wider organized criminal activity.
• There is a generalized and normalized sale and consumption of drugs in school communities. • Respondents in nearly all secretariats identified groups with different levels of organization that can be considered forms of gangs and involved in micro-trafficking drugs. • Violence against women and girls seemed invisible in respondent interviews.
Across all sites in the sample, the majority of respondents cited positive relations between Venezuelan migrants and Colombians—but a significant minority reported tension and violence as well.
• In interviews, the majority of responses—including from Venezuelan respondents—generally described how Venezuelan migrants and Colombian communities coexisted peacefully and even pointed to a sense of solidarity. • Some respondents also cited some form of discrimination and violence against Venezuelans.
EDUCATION Schools are positively valued by a majority of respondents across the sample, and teachers are particularly esteemed.
• Respondents described schools as the most local extension of the state, relative islands of safety amidst insecure surroundings where different people can come together peacefully. • Students are generally interested in school—with Venezuelan students showing slightly more interest than their Colombian peers, and teachers are recognized particularly for their efforts during COVID- 19.
Schools are seen as fair environments—but bullying and discrimination persist.
• Most respondents mentioned positive interaction between Colombian and Venezuelan students. • Respondents pointed to equal treatment as an important asset of the school environment. • However, bullying among students and particularly against Venezuelans was commonly reported— and dismissed as normal by some respondents.
vii | COLOMBIA RAPID EDUCATION AND RISK ANALYSIS USAID.GOV
Costs, insecurity, and drugs are cited as the main reasons why children and adolescents in the sample are out of school.
• Uninvolved parents, limited household income, insecurity and student employment influenced dropout. • Documentation problems were cited as the main reason why Venezuelan children and adolescents were out of school. • Schools are working to address drug use, which is viewed also as a precursor to dropout.
Venezuelan migrant students face a variety of challenges to integrate into the Colombian education system, but many appear also to thrive.
• Venezuelan students have problems integrating into the Colombian education system due to different academic content and calendars, different pedagogical approaches, school space availability, and different forms of spoken Spanish. • Respondents described how Venezuelan students can be very good in school, disciplined, and respectful.
Remote learning has led to increased involvement of many families in education, but it is also accentuating inequalities in education access.
• Respondents described how parents have become more involved in helping their children with remote learning, supporting assignments, and interacting with their teachers. • However, many families lack the technological resources for remote learning.
SCHOOL COMMUNITY RESILIENCE School community resilience to the COVID-19 crisis critically needs government action.
• Regional and national governments need to address underlying vulnerabilities that hamper the resilience of school communities. • Findings show the two most marginalized towns in the sample—Riohacha and Maicao—have higher levels of risk and vulnerability, as well as lower education quality. • Several schools do not have water and sanitation, critical to any school reopening scenario. • Ungoverned areas help the growth of drugs, gangs, organized crime, and armed groups.
All schools in the sample have made impressive efforts to adapt to remote learning—and teachers are playing a central role.
• Remote learning has turned teachers into heroes, as described by some respondents, as they adapted teaching methodologies and accommodated student needs to keep children engaged. • Teachers were often left to their own devices and called for more training and support.
Overall, the COVID-19 crisis has enhanced school community cohesion and collaboration, but the risk of tension is real.
USAID.GOV COLOMBIA RAPID EDUCATION AND RISK ANALYSIS | viii • During COVID-19, communities have come together through a sense of humanitarian solidarity, including Colombians and Venezuelans, and respondents described numerous ways schools work with communities. • However, the pandemic and the mobility restrictions have dealt a blow to already struggling household livelihoods, exacerbating inequalities, and potentially increasing inter-group grievance.
Schools in the sample are not sufficiently prepared for a new emergency—particularly one occurring during the COVID-19 crisis.
• Respondents in all schools called into question the safety of their school buildings. • Most schools in the sample report having preparedness or risk management plans, but due to COVID- 19, these plans will be outdated. • Simulations and evacuation drills appear to be implemented infrequently and inconsistently.
KEY RECOMMENDATIONS • Explore opportunities for flexibility in pedagogical models and teacher training to accommodate the needs of Venezuelan migrant students.
• Recruit, train, and assign psychological counsellors to all schools to handle social-emotional issues relating to migration, threats in the community, and COVID-19.
• Retool in-service teacher training programs to include modules adapted to distance learning, emergencies, and social-emotional well-being.
• Learn from ongoing efforts, such as in Bogotá, to work with the private sector, service providers, and donors to facilitate low-cost or no-cost access to the internet and cellular service for student families in the poorest and most remote areas.
• Document and share teacher good practices regarding COVID-19 remote learning strategies and special follow-up methods for Venezuelan students.
• Design and implement student leadership programs (including Venezuelan students).
• Inventory school building infrastructure to identify and prioritize physical plant improvements to improve the overall learning environment.
• Explore place-based strategies to reduce crime and micro-trafficking in school environments to establish schools and the surrounding perimeter as a safe, drug-free zone.
• Develop a school resilience diagnostic tool with key indicators on the status of infrastructure and materials, as well as school management, community participation, and threats and risks.
ix | COLOMBIA RAPID EDUCATION AND RISK ANALYSIS USAID.GOV
INTRODUCTION
USAID/Colombia is responding to the medium-to-long-term challenges of the Venezuelan migration crisis through its new Venezuela Response and Integration Office (VRIO), which supports integration of the continuing influx of Venezuelan migrants in Colombia in receptor communities. VRIO programming strengthens Colombian systems to promote health and education service delivery, access to justice, and economic and financial inclusion for Venezuelan migrants.
Historically, USAID/Colombia has conducted limited education programming. However, it is in the early stages of a focused effort to support the Government of Colombia to provide flexible, effective models of education for both migrant and receptor communities, strengthening stressed systems, making school communities more resilient, and guaranteeing effective, tailored attention to support access to and permanence in the schooling system.
To better focus its resources to support the Government of Colombia and other education stakeholders, USAID/Colombia commissioned this Rapid Education and Risk Analysis (RERA) to learn more about school communities receiving migrant Venezuelans and the needs of the education system accommodating them as it continues to serve all school-aged children.
This RERA aims to:
• Provide USAID/Colombia a “snapshot” of Colombia’s education system, its interaction with contextual risks, and key challenges to providing equitable, quality education to all school-aged children, including, but not limited to, native Colombian, Venezuelan migrant and Colombian- Venezuelans3 in receptor communities impacted by the Venezuelan migrant crisis; • Gain a broader understanding of the resilience of affected school communities, including their main risks, needs, assets, and capacities; • Identify barriers and opportunities to better integrate migrants and other school-aged children who are not accessing education into the Colombia education system; and • Inform future USAID education activities to support affected school communities, including suggestions for potential areas where USAID programming can interact with current actors, programs, and strategies to have the greatest impact to provide quality education programming to all children in receptor communities.
RERA METHODOLOGY
RESEARCH QUESTIONS Four main research questions guided this RERA:
• What is the two-way interaction between the education system and the main contextual risks in migration-affected areas?
3 As a category in the RERA sample, Colombian-Venezuelans are dual citizens and not necessarily Colombian returnees.
1 | COLOMBIA RAPID EDUCATION AND RISK ANALYSIS USAID.GOV • What is the impact of Venezuelan migration on government and non-government school communities at the primary and secondary levels? • What is the status of equitable education access (including gender and disability), the learning environment, teaching, and learning in migration-affected areas? • What are the resilience factors of school communities in affected areas, including with regard to access to and safety of quality education? How can these factors be strengthened?
During research, the RERA team added an investigative lens relating to COVID-19.
These research questions provided a framework for designing more specific questions for focus group discussions and key informant interviews. The RERA team prioritized and adapted questions from the RERA Toolkit, based on a desk review and attention to the main contextual risks in Colombia, adapting these questions for interviews and a quantitative survey. The team refined the questions in consultation with USAID, translated them to Spanish, tested them with data collectors, and piloted them in the field.
TIMEFRAME Planning for the RERA ran from March 10 to May 5, 2020, followed by remote RERA team training and simulations from May 6 to 11. Remote fieldwork involved two phases: a quantitative survey administered from May 12 to 19, and follow-up, qualitative interviews from May 14 to 27. The RERA team organized a debriefing on preliminary results with USAID/Colombia, select implementing partners, and the Ministry of Education during a co-design workshop on June 5 and held an additional briefing with Education Cluster partners on June 12. The team analyzed and synthesized data and drafted the final report from late May through early July.
RERA TEAM The RERA team involved remote collaboration between USAID/Colombia, the Ministry of Education, and international and local partners. The core members of the RERA team were James Rogan (Team Leader, Exterion LLC), Ana Daza Arevalo (Violence Specialist), Ana María Restrepo-Sáenz (Education Specialist), and Daniel Agudelo-Navarro (Local Consultant), with Gwendolyn Heaner as a Remote Advisor.
Jamie Salazar provided oversight of the RERA, including contract management, procurement, recruitment, financial management, and technical backstopping through the USAID LAC Education Support Contract. DevTech Systems, Inc. coordinated the RERA and Exterion LLC provided technical leadership.
The Centro Nacional de Consultoría (CNC) provided additional remote data collection and data entry services, and, in particular, administered the survey. CNC’s team was led by Laura Castro and Carlos Castro. Survey administrators were Isay Estrada Villarraga, Lizeth Viviana Carvajal, Yuletzi Andrea Galindo, Lina Tatiana Diaz, Jhonatan Diaz, Carolina Cangrejo, Leidy Gras, Marlon Mayorga, Laura Pinzon, Ruth Lopez, Jackelin Medina, Yarley Lozano, Laura Cañón, Diana Guayazán, Karen Suarez, Sayda Guzmán, Yoanna Rodriguez, Norma Cruz, Yeimi Vanegas, Martha Diaz, Lorena Enciso, and Maria Camila Solorzano. Interview facilitators were Silvana Calle, Maria Cecilia Alfonso, Lizeth Tatiana Rubio, and Francisco Quiroz. Data entry was provided by Alejandra Campuzano, Maria Alejandra Pedrero, Andrea Alarcón, Francesca Fame, Natalia Angulo, Paula Chavarro, Carlos Herrera, and Frank Ramirez.
USAID.GOV COLOMBIA RAPID EDUCATION AND RISK ANALYSIS | 2 FIELDWORK PLANNING
REMOTE IMPLEMENTATION This was the first RERA implemented fully remotely. USAID, DevTech, and the Ministry of Education initially planned to carry out in-person data collection. However, the onset of COVID-19 and the resulting social distancing policies instituted in March and April 2020, both in the United States and in Colombia, prevented in-person fieldwork. Therefore, USAID, DevTech, and the Ministry agreed to conduct the RERA remotely, with the team operating from Colombia, New York, Washington D.C., and Massachusetts. RERA team management, training, data collection and final report writing were carried out virtually using a variety of technologies, including platforms like Ring Central, Skype, and KoboToolBox.
All fieldwork was conducted by telephone. The survey was administered by Centro Nacional de Consultoría, which used its own call center capability. Interviews were carried out by both DevTech consultants and Centro Nacional de Consultoría staff using Skype to call respondents’ cell phones. All interviews were recorded to document verbal consent by the respondent or the respondent’s parent and to support note taking accuracy.
DATA COLLECTION TOOLS The RERA used quantitative and qualitative data collection approaches with the methods detailed in Table 1.
TABLE 1. DATA COLLECTION TOOLS
TOOL OR METHOD DESCRIPTION RESPONDENTS AND SOURCES
Quantitative Quantitative, closed-ended questions to gather numerical data to School principals, teachers, Survey determine statistical results. Administered to a selected number students, parents, community and type of respondents in order to gain specific insights into members perceptions of key themes. When respondents are selected randomly and reflect a large enough number and distribution, results can be considered representative within the sample.
Open ended Open ended, qualitative interviews involve facilitated discussions School principals, teachers, Interviews using questions that invite all respondents who participated in the students, parents, community quantitative survey to answer openly using their own words. These members interviews provide in-depth insights into respondents’ perceptions. Purposive sampling was used to reach certain categories of school community respondents. Open ended discussions are structured around the same group of focused questions and follow-up questions.
3 | COLOMBIA RAPID EDUCATION AND RISK ANALYSIS USAID.GOV TOOL OR METHOD DESCRIPTION RESPONDENTS AND SOURCES
Key informant Key informant interviews provide an overview of the situation and Secretariat officials, government interviews in-depth expertise. Purposive sampling was used to reach officials, school principal (Medellín), respondents who hold particular expertise and who could offer teachers (Medellín), parents divergent and diverse views. Key informant interviews also allowed (Medellín), international and local snowball sampling to identify additional informants, background NGOs, international organizations, documents, and verification of findings from interviews. The RERA experts team developed open ended discussion questions for the interviews, but the format also allowed flexibility for in-depth probing.
Desk review Desk review refers to the identification and analysis of secondary Existing violence prevention sources to adapt the design and methodology to the RERA reports, resilience analyses, purpose and local context. This includes identifying the primary disaster risk assessments, situation data collection sites, prioritizing and adjusting the main research assessments, political economy questions and specific research questions for focus group analyses, humanitarian assessments, discussions and key informant interviews, and drafting key sections response plans, development plans, of the final report. Desk review also helps identify key informants country analytical reports, and triangulates primary data collection responses. government reports and data, disaster data, program and project reports, journal articles
SAMPLE SITE SELECTION USAID/Colombia, the Ministry of Education, DevTech and the RERA team collaborated to select the cities and sites. The selection of sample sites prioritized:
• High numbers of Venezuelan migrants, • Multiple levels of schools, including primary and secondary levels, • High numbers of Venezuelan migrant students, • Medium to high levels of contextual risk, including natural hazards and violence, and • A combination of urban and peri-urban or rural locations.
The RERA sample included Colombia’s five largest cities—Bogotá, Medellín, Cali, Cartagena, and Barranquilla, along with neighboring smaller towns (except for Cartagena). The towns of Riohacha and Maicao are comparatively smaller in size, are characterized by high levels of poverty and vulnerability, and have sizeable indigenous populations.
Contextual profiles of sample secretariats4 are included as Annex II.
The sample did not include some municipalities along the border with the highest levels of Venezuelan migrants and migrant students, since USAID already had enough contextual information on those areas.
Nearly all schools were oficial, or public, with only two non-official, or private, schools included in the sample.
4 Secretariats are the Ministry of Education units at the sites selected for the RERA.
USAID.GOV COLOMBIA RAPID EDUCATION AND RISK ANALYSIS | 4 Data collection took place in schools in 6 cities and 5 neighboring municipalities, representing 11 local education secretariats (see Figure 1). In all, 23 primary and secondary schools were selected.
FIGURE 1. RERA SAMPLE SECRETARIATS
Source: yourfreetemplates.com
Initial planning anticipated including two schools from Medellín. However, the secretariat requested additional data privacy assurances. DevTech complied with these requests, but the time this process took prevented the survey and qualitative interviews from being conducted in two schools there. Therefore, one school in Medellín was included as a case study with fewer respondents in order to still include insights from that context.
TABLE 2. RERA SAMPLE SITES
OFFICIAL/ VENEZUELAN SECRETARY/ NON- SCHOOL STUDENT STUDENT MUNICIPALITY SCHOOL NAME OFFICIAL5 LEVEL ENROLLMENT ENROLLMENT
Barranquilla Institución Educativa América Official Primary/ 552 179 Latina Secondary
5 Non-official schools are private schools.
5 | COLOMBIA RAPID EDUCATION AND RISK ANALYSIS USAID.GOV OFFICIAL/ VENEZUELAN SECRETARY/ NON- SCHOOL STUDENT STUDENT MUNICIPALITY SCHOOL NAME OFFICIAL5 LEVEL ENROLLMENT ENROLLMENT
Institución Educativa Distrital Official Primary/ 2,724 486 Carlos Meisel Secondary
Bello Colegio Universidad Virtual Non-Official Primary/ 2,215 128 de Colombia Secondary
Bogotá Colegio INEM Francisco de Official Primary/ 6,998 667 Paula Santander Secondary
Cali Institución Educativa Técnico Official Primary/ 5,511 347 Industrial Pedro Antonio Secondary Molina
Cartagena Institución Educativa Antonio Official Primary/ 1,336 366 Nariño Secondary
Institución Educativa Omaira Official Primary/ 851 151 Sánchez Garzón Secondary
Institución Educativa Tierra Official Primary/ 1,026 97 Bomba Secondary
Maicao Institución Educativa Nº 15 Official Primary/ 2,714 393 Secondary
Institución Educativa Indígena Official Primary/ 3,868 576 Nº 3 Secondary
Palmira Institución Educativa María Official Primary/ 2,315 214 Penagos Secondary
Riohacha Centro Etnoeducativo Nº 14 Official Primary/ 1,926 341 Kamuchasain Secondary
Soacha Institución Educativa Official Primary/ 4,307 289 Compartir Secondary
Institución Educativa Buenos Official Primary/ 2,759 194 Aíres Secondary
Soledad Institución Educativa Gabriel Official Primary/ 2,989 323 Escorcia Gravini Secondary
Institución Educativa Técnica Non-Official Primary/ 1,610 302 Los Colombianos Secondary
RESPONDENT SELECTION
TABLE 3. SAMPLE RESPONDENTS FOR EACH SCHOOL COMMUNITY INCLUDED:
TYPE NUMBER
School director 1
Teachers (M/F) 6/6
USAID.GOV COLOMBIA RAPID EDUCATION AND RISK ANALYSIS | 6 Students (M/F) 6/6
Parents 6
Community Members 4
Total per school 35
The RERA team asked secretariats and school principals to randomize the selection of respondents as much as possible.
Respondents for the quantitative survey and qualitative interviews were selected using the following process:
• The RERA team explained the RERA and shared guidance on the number and types of respondents with the Ministry of Education and each education secretariat in the sample. • Each education secretariat provided the RERA team with contact details for school principals. The RERA team members then spoke, often several times, with school principals about the RERA and the number and types of respondents sought. • School principals provided lists of respondents to the RERA team, which the RERA team vetted to ensure that contact numbers were included and that there was an appropriate distribution of respondent types.
Key informants were selected in two steps:
• The first group was identified by the RERA team, USAID, and partners to provide contextual information for the desk review, seeking a diverse group of experts to cover key domains, including education, resilience, crime, violence, and out of school children and youth. • The team selected additional key informants in conversations with local and international partners before and during fieldwork.
RESPONDENT DEMOGRAPHICS Complete data tables on respondent demographics is included at the beginning of Annex 1. Several key data are offered here. The average age of student respondents was 13, while the average age of all respondents was 32. When broken down by sex, 61 percent of respondents were female. Of all respondents, 77 percent were Colombian, 18 percent were dual Venezuelan migrants, and 5 percent were dual Colombian-Venezuelan nationals. Indigenous groups constituted 5 percent of all respondents, with 23 percent and 40 percent of respondents coming from Maicao and Riohacha, respectively. The vast majority of Black/Afro-Colombian/Raizal/Palenquero respondents came from the Caribbean coast, representing 47 percent of respondents in Cartagena.
Respondents in the sample are overwhelmingly poor. Using self-reported socioeconomic “stratum” data,6 with 1 being the lowest and poorest and 6 representing the least poor, 40 percent of respondents are in
6 According to the Dirección Nacional de Estadística or National Statistics Office, houses and/or properties can be classified into one of six socioeconomic strata:1. Low-Low; 2. Low; 3. Medium-Low; 4. Medium; 5. Medium-
7 | COLOMBIA RAPID EDUCATION AND RISK ANALYSIS USAID.GOV Stratum 1, 38 percent in Stratum 2 and 17 percent in Stratum 3. Only 1 percent claimed Strata 4 and 5, respectively. The sample sites with the highest reported classification of Stratum 1 are Riohacha (93 percent), Soledad (65 percent) and Cartagena (51 percent).
DATA COLLECTOR SELECTION Local data collectors with qualitative data collection experience were contracted through the Centro Nacional de Consultoría, a local firm, to support the RERA team. Data collectors worked as both facilitators and note-takers; they included males and females, and many were bilingual in Spanish and English. The Centro Nacional de Consultoría administered the survey in its entirety and joined the RERA team to conduct open-ended interviews. They also provided data entry specialists to upload fieldwork notes into the RERA database.
RERA TEAM TRAINING The RERA team conducted a remote training May 5 to 7, with additional simulation exercises continuing into May 11. Training covered the RERA background and methodology, survey and interview protocols, note taking, data entry, and simulated surveys and interviews. The training used a mixture of synchronous and asynchronous modalities. Key presentations and documents were made available before each day, and a live question-and-answer session was created using Google Documents. Live telephone sessions were made available for remaining questions. Plenary discussions covered key themes, and the team simulated surveys and interviews remotely, with evaluations and feedback provided to certify data collectors. Suggestions and comments from the data collectors further refined the RERA questions.
FIELDWORK Survey fieldwork was carried out from May 12 to 19. A total of 635 respondents in 10 municipalities were initially contacted to administer the survey. Ultimately, 484 surveys were conducted, representing a 76 percent response rate. After cleaning the data for reliability, a total of 457 valid survey responses were retained, representing a final response rate of 72 percent.
TABLE 4. SURVEY RESPONSE RATE
SECRETARIAT RESPONDENTS SUCCESSFUL RESPONSE RATE SURVEYS
Barranquilla 84 68 81%
Bello 48 27 58%
Bogotá 32 25 78%
High; 6. High. Of these strata, 1, 2 and 3 include occupants with fewer resources, who are beneficiaries of subsidies in home public services; Strata 5 and 6 correspond to occupants with greater economic resources, who must pay cost overruns (contributions) on the value of home public services. Stratum 4 occupants are not beneficiaries of subsidies, nor do they pay cost overruns; they pay exactly the value defined as the cost of providing the service. Indigenous communities are not classified. DANE, https://www.dane.gov.co/files/geoestadistica/Preguntas_frecuentes_estratificacion.pdf.
USAID.GOV COLOMBIA RAPID EDUCATION AND RISK ANALYSIS | 8 SUCCESSFUL SECRETARIAT RESPONDENTS SURVEYS RESPONSE RATE
Cali 38 27 76%
Cartagena 134 92 73%
Maicao 54 35 78%
Riohacha 23 15 70%
Soacha 70 48 71%
Soledad 92 74 86%
Palmira 60 46 77%
Total 635 457 72%
Open-ended, qualitative interviews were scheduled with each survey respondent. Interviews were conducted from May 14 to 27. Ultimately, interviews were successfully held with 201 respondents, representing a success rate of 44 percent. Of the 201 interview respondents, 45 were of Venezuelan nationality, including 43 migrants.
TABLE 5. INTERVIEW RESPONSE TOTALS
SUCCESSFUL RESPONSE SECRETARIAT RESPONDENTS INTERVIEWS RATE
Barranquilla 68 33 49%
Bello 27 9 33%
Bogotá 25 8 32%
Cali 27 9 33%
Cartagena 92 36 39%
Maicao 35 13 37%
Riohacha 15 5 33%
Soacha 48 19 40%
Soledad 74 43 58%
Palmira 46 26 57%
Total 457 201 44%
9 | COLOMBIA RAPID EDUCATION AND RISK ANALYSIS USAID.GOV DATA ENTRY Given the timeframe of the RERA, a team of data entry specialists was contracted to enter data daily. The data entry team received notes from the data collection fieldwork teams each day, translated the notes into English, and entered them into an Excel spreadsheet.
ETHICS Because the RERA engaged young people, often from vulnerable populations, the RERA team used a two- step informed consent process. During the planning stage, the RERA team members explained the informed consent protocols and requirements with education secretariats and, in the case of Medellín, signed additional agreements assuring data privacy. The RERA team discussed ethics and informed consent protocols and requirements with school principals.
During data collection, the RERA team began each survey and interview telephone call with informed consent protocols. Each call explained up front the background to the RERA, how respondent telephone contact information was obtained, the voluntary and confidential nature of the call, and how information from the call would be controlled, followed by audio recording of the respondent’s verbal consent. In the case of students, data collectors spoke with a parent and obtained their verbal consent before proceeding. This was repeated for the follow-up interview telephone call. The RERA team also identified an independent psychologist to advise on situations where a discussion or interview surfaced cases of violence or abuse.
Given the limited timeline to plan the RERA, the RERA team opted to form an ad hoc ethics review panel to review its protocols and plans and make recommendations for any corrective action. Two esteemed education-in-emergencies researchers constituted the panel and offered feedback to the RERA team on its ethical approach.7
All data, including anonymized participant data, were securely stored under the control of the RERA Team.
LIMITATIONS As a “good enough” rapid situation analysis, the RERA methodology makes deliberate tradeoffs between speed and rigor. Due to its rapid nature, the methodology does not allow for generalizable, statistically representative findings of the wider population but instead provides stakeholders with a targeted snapshot of the interaction between the education sector and contextual risks. As an overall qualitative exercise, the RERA’s findings cannot determine causal relationships, such as those that could exist between the challenges and risks in the area and the learning outcomes of students. But a RERA is systematic enough to inform decisions about education programming, particularly in volatile and complex contexts.
The RERA uses a purposive, limited primary data sample to provide in-depth information on a targeted group.8 This means that the RERA’s selection of locations and informants was vulnerable to bias. The
7 The two researchers who participated on the ad hoc panel were Ash Hartwell of the University of Massachusetts – Amherst and James Williams of George Washington University. 8 Purposive sampling, also known as judgmental, selective, or subjective sampling, is a form of non-probability sampling in which researchers rely on their own judgment and expert input when choosing members of the population to participate in their study. This method focuses on the depth of information sought. Informants are
USAID.GOV COLOMBIA RAPID EDUCATION AND RISK ANALYSIS | 10 sample was limited to 23 school communities across 11 secretariats and was therefore small enough that the data cannot be considered representative of the wider population.
The RERA team could not randomly select respondents. While the RERA team made every effort to explain the necessity of randomizing the selection of respondents to secretariat and school interlocutors, and while the interlocutors made assurances that they would randomly select respondents, the RERA team ultimately did not have control over the selection process. It must be expected that bias entered into the selection process.
The RERA used a closed-ended survey administered as a first wave of data collection. The survey sought to obtain quantitative information from within the sample. A total of 457 responses were obtained, and these were distributed across sample sites and respondent types. This was followed by open-ended, qualitative interviews on subsequent telephone calls to the same respondents who were interested in continuing with the second phase of the exercise. While all interview calls were scheduled with respondents, there was a lower response rate for the second calls. The lower response rate might be attributable to the fact that respondents did not recognize the caller identification number or that they did not want to answer more questions.
Responses to questions may have been subject to social desirability or “halo” bias—the tendency among respondents to under-report socially undesirable answers and alter their responses to approximate what they perceive as the social norm. This might have been heightened because the survey and interviews were conducted over the phone.
Sixteen responses were deemed unreliable because of parental interference in the interviews of their children or respondents who could not understand the questions.
COUNTRY CONTEXT
COUNTRY SNAPSHOT A middle-income country and one of the oldest democracies in Latin America, Colombia endured nearly half a century of intense armed conflict. Longstanding violence and instability rooted in territorial control by illegal armed groups and terrorist organizations have resulted in a large internally displaced population. The 2016 peace process has demobilized the largest and longest-standing guerrilla group, but rival armed actors now seek control of isolated communities and territories, particularly in areas along the coasts and the border with Venezuela. Conflict, violence, and crime exacerbate Colombia’s vulnerability to a range of natural hazard impacts. Inequality, extreme poverty, and corruption remain key challenges over the
selected specifically, rather than randomly, based on certain characteristics and availability. For more on purposive sampling, see: • USAID. Comparing Probability, Purposive and Mixed Method Sampling Strategies. Washington, DC: USAID, January 20, 2015. https://usaidlearninglab.org/sites/default/files/resource/files/mod16_comparing_probability_purposive_and _mixed_method_sampling_strategies.pdf. • USAID. USAID Rapid Needs Assessment Guide for Education in Countries Affected by Crisis and Conflict. Washington, DC: USAID, 2014. Retrieved from https://www.usaid.gov/what-we-do/education/educating- children-and-youth-crisis-and-conflict-situations/Rapid-Needs-Assessment-Guide-Education.
11 | COLOMBIA RAPID EDUCATION AND RISK ANALYSIS USAID.GOV next few years. Amidst these ongoing stresses, the country underwent the double shock of 1.8 million Venezuelan migrants arriving in 20199 and the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020. The government has a tall order to balance measures to curb the spread of pandemic, protect its citizens, deliver basic services to its most vulnerable populations, and stave off economic fallout and social unrest.
MAIN CONTEXTUAL RISKS
GOVERNANCE CONTEXT Colombia is the region’s oldest democracy. Colombian governments have, with very few exceptions, been civilian regimes chosen by popular election. Over time, these electoral contests have had flaws and have had to coexist with a climate of violence—with candidates and voters often targeted—but they are held regularly and conducted in a more or less fair manner.10
The Colombian political party landscape has undergone a dramatic shift since 2002. From 1900 until 2002, Colombia’s competitive party politics alternated mainly between two traditional parties, the Liberals and Conservatives. However, mismanagement of the security situation by both traditional parties fostered deep changes in competition for the presidency. Since the early 2000s, the party system has become more deinstitutionalized, with new entrants and a decline of the two traditional parties nationally.11 Reflecting a political shift to the right, the last presidential election was won by Iván Duque from the Democratic Center Party. Duque ran on a campaign that was openly critical of the peace agreement forged by his predecessor, Juan Santos, of the Social Party of National Unity (Party of the U).12
Partisan loyalty is now low, and party organizations have weakened. Public trust in political parties has suffered. According to a Latinobarómetro poll, 59 percent of Colombians did not trust their political parties. This level of distrust was greater only in Mexico (61 percent), Chile (61 percent), Haiti (64 percent) and Brazil (70 percent).13 Recent public sentiment in Colombia about democracy is also on the wane: while a
9 The Refugee Brief – 1 April 2020, UNHCR. https://www.unhcr.org/refugeebrief/the-refugee-brief-1-april-2020/. 10 There is evidence that criminal organizations, especially paramilitary groups, have been interfering with elections for at least the last 10 years. Many congresspeople and regional political leaders, based especially (though not exclusively) in the north, made illegal pacts under which various armed groups coerced citizens to vote for politicians who subsequently acted as the organizations’ allies and protectors. The extent of this parapolitics phenomenon was far reaching and implied profound transformation of the political landscape. For instance, an investigation concluded that in multiple regions, at least one out of every three local politicians had some relations with illegal armed groups. Rodrigo Uprimny, “Countries at the Crossroads 2011: Colombia.” Freedom House. https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/inline_images/COLOMBIAFINAL.pdf. 11 Juan Albarracín, Laura Gamboa, and Scott Mainwaring, Deinstitutionalization without Collapse: Colombia’s Party System, in Scott Mainwaring, ed., Party Systems in Latin America: Institutionalization, Decay, and Collapse. Cambridge University Press, 2018. 12 This outcome reflected party-system deinstitutionalization and polarization around the peace process, which hindered centrist candidates on both the left and the right. The peace process, combined with the influx of Venezuelan migrants and refugees, pushed extreme right- and left-wing populists—Duque and Gustavo Petro, respectively—into the runoff. In the second round, the Venezuelan crisis tipped the scale against the leftist candidate. Supporters successfully presented Duque as the lesser of two evils. Scared that Colombia would suffer Venezuela’s fate, a majority of citizens voted against Petro. See Laura Gamboa, Latin America’s Shifting Politics: The Peace Process and Colombia’s Elections. Journal of Democracy, November 2018. 13 Cited in How Does Trust Impact Your Quality of Life? Inter-American Development Bank, 2017. https://www.iadb.org/en/improvinglives/how-does-trust-impact-your-quality-life.
USAID.GOV COLOMBIA RAPID EDUCATION AND RISK ANALYSIS | 12 majority (79 percent) of Colombians agree that democracy is the best system, most (73 percent) felt it functioned poorly in Colombia.14
Discriminatory social norms tend to limit women’s roles in exercising power and decision making, with men generally dominating political leadership. Colombia has laws establishing quota requirements for the participation of women, Afro-Colombians, and indigenous persons on electoral lists. Women represent 51 percent of the population, and in the 2018 Congress elections, women represented 52 percent of voters. Still, Colombia has one of the lowest rates of women’s leadership in politics in Latin America.15
The Colombian state has historically struggled to exercise complete jurisdiction over its territory and protect its citizens. The Political Constitution of 1991 created a centralized Presidential system and provides for a decentralized exercise of administrative powers. Over the last 50 years or more, effective state presence and administrative control have partly depended on the extent of insurgent and paramilitary group control over remote territories. This has resulted in weak governance and local administrative capacity16 in some regions. Consequently, one of Colombia’s main governance challenges is to strengthen subnational government administrative capacity to design and deliver policies and services that reflect national standards and quality.17
Although inequality has declined, Colombia remains one of the world’s most unequal countries, with low income mobility. Among Latin American peers, it is second only to Haiti in terms of inequality. The wealthiest one percent of the population holds 20 percent of national income.18
14 Latinobarómetro 2011, 2015, 2018. Cited in Julián Arévalo-Bencardino, Capacidad del Estado y apoyo a la democracia: retos y oportunidades para la Colombia del postconflicto, Revista de Economía Institucional, July/December 2018. http://www.scielo.org.co/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0124-59962018000200159. 15 This has been attributed to obstacles such as: limited efforts to promote and recognize women’s leadership; limited access to resources; heavier workload than male counterparts (domestic responsibilities); fewer opportunities for further professional development; persistent gaps in the labor market; and stereotypes regarding women’s capacity. Gender Analysis and Assessment Final Report. USAID/Colombia, April 2018. 16 There is a lack of accountability for corrupt actors and inconsistent access to justice for citizens. Colombia has a solid body of laws on paper, but governing according to these laws is challenged, in part due to a lack of resources (an estimated half of the economy does not pay taxes) and capacity. But corruption plays a big role even in places where the government is present. Colombia at a Stabilization Crossroads, CSIS Briefs, March 5, 2020. https://www.csis.org/analysis/colombia-stabilization-crossroads. 17 OECD Public Governance Scan, 2018 (?). https://www.oecd.org/gov/Colombia-Scan-Final-English.pdf 18 CEPAL, 2017.
13 | COLOMBIA RAPID EDUCATION AND RISK ANALYSIS USAID.GOV FIGURE 2. GINI COEFFICIENT OF INEQUALITY IN COLOMBIA, BY REGIONAL PEERS
Source: World Development Indicators and DANE, 2015, quoted in World Bank Colombia Policy Notes (2018)
Regional disparities also persist, with regional inequalities higher than in most neighboring Latin American countries.19 These differences are most notable between urban and rural areas (especially those regions not benefiting from natural resources), within urban areas (where the number and size of stressed neighborhoods resulting from the massive influx of displaced populations is growing), and between border regions most affected by the conflict and the rest of the country.20 The peripheral departments (those on the territorial borders) are home to 60 percent of the country’s unmet basic needs.21 Data on armed conflict shows a concentration of violence in these peripheral states.22
FIGURE 3. GINI COEFFICIENT OF INEQUALITY IN COLOMBIA, BY REGIONAL PEERS AND BY DEPARTMENT
Cartagena 9.3 Palmira 8.5 Bello 7.0 Soacha 6.5 Soledad 6.5 Maicao 3.9 Riohacha 3.5 Barranquilla 2.4 Bogotá, D.C. 0.0 Cali 0.0 Medellín 0.0
Source: INFORM Subnational Risk Assessment 2015
19 Colombia Policy Notes, World Bank, 2018. 20 OECD Public Governance Scan, 2018 (?). https://www.oecd.org/gov/Colombia-Scan-Final-English.pdf 21 Banco de la República, 2010. 22 Departamento Nacional de Planeación, 2016.
USAID.GOV COLOMBIA RAPID EDUCATION AND RISK ANALYSIS | 14 Colombia has long grappled with entrenched corruption. Colombia had a score of 36 out of 100 on Transparency International’s 2018 Corruption Perceptions Index and was ranked 99th out of 180 countries (with one being the most transparent and 180 signifying the least transparent). In 2016, seven out of 10 Colombians believed more than half the public servants were corrupt.23 Figure 4 illustrates how perceived corruption can be differentiated by departments.
FIGURE 4. GOVERNMENT TRANSPARENCY, BY DEPARTMENT
Source: Uribe et. al., “Corruption Trap: The Case of Colombian Regions,” OECD
USAID’s own Roadmap to Self-Reliance for Colombia includes key measures of good governance, inclusive development, and civil society capacity. Overall, the roadmap gives positive marks to Colombia in comparison with low- and middle-income country peers, with two notable exceptions. The domains of Social Group Equality and Safety and Security both received lower, below peer average scores (.45 and .42, respectively).
23 Observatorio de la Democracia, 2016.
15 | COLOMBIA RAPID EDUCATION AND RISK ANALYSIS USAID.GOV TABLE 6. COLOMBIA ROADMAP TO SELF-RELIANCE (USAID), SELECTED INDICATORS
SELF-RELIANCE DOMAIN SCORE (0-1)
Liberal Democracy 0.51
Open Government 0.57
Social Group Equality 0.45
Economic Gender Gap 0.75
Government Effectiveness 0.51
Tax System Effectiveness 0.5
Safety and Security 0.42
Civil Society and Media Effectiveness 0.77
Poverty Rate ($5/day) 0.76
Education Quality 0.58
Child Health 0.88
*0-1, least to most advanced globally Source: USAID Country Roadmap to Self-Reliance FY 2020
NATURAL HAZARDS AND CLIMATE CHANGE Colombia is a country with high exposure to natural hazards, including cyclones, coastal and river flooding, earthquakes, landslides, and volcanoes. It has the highest recurrence of extreme hazard events in South America, with an estimated 90 percent of Colombia’s population and assets exposed to at least one hazard and over 80 percent exposed to two or more.24 Hydrometeorological phenomena have been the most recurrent cause of disasters, making up 85 percent of all recorded disaster events since 1998.25 Large parts of Colombia’s territory are susceptible to flooding, especially in the lower basins and valleys of the principal rivers: the Magdalena, Cauca, Sinú, Atrato, and Putumayo. Locations in the RERA sample are highly prone to flooding.
Landslides are the most frequently occurring disasters in the country. The Natural Disaster Hotspot study by the World Bank26 indicates that Colombia has the highest landslide risk in the South American region in terms of the number of fatalities per year per square kilometer. Landslides are a medium to high risk in the RERA sample locations.
24 Colombia Country Note. Global Facility for Disaster Risk Reduction, World Bank. 2009. https://www.gfdrr.org/en/publication/country-note-colombia. Risk Governance Scan, OECD. July 9, 2019. https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/sites/eeb81954-en/index.html?itemId=/content/publication/eeb81954-en. 25 Risk Governance Scan, OECD. July 9, 2019. https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/sites/eeb81954- en/index.html?itemId=/content/publication/eeb81954-en. 26 Dilley, et al., 2005, in GFDRR Country Note: Colombia 2009.
USAID.GOV COLOMBIA RAPID EDUCATION AND RISK ANALYSIS | 16 TABLE 7. COLOMBIA’S NATURAL HAZARD RISK RANKINGS
EARTHQUAKE FLOOD TSUNAMI CYCLONE DROUGHT EPIDEMIC
9.6* 6.8 7.9 4.1 1.9 5.9 1 = low risk, 10 = high risk Source: INFORM (Index for Risk Management), 2020
Most of Colombia, including all major urban areas included in the RERA sample, have high or very high seismic activity. Colombia is situated on the confluence of three tectonic plates—the Nazca Plate, the Caribbean Plate, and the South American plate—and is traversed by various geological fault lines.27
Colombia’s unplanned urban growth has disproportionately increased disaster risk. Colombia has one of the highest urbanization rates in Latin America. With over 20,000 citizens per square kilometer, the three biggest cities—Bogotá, Medellín, and Cali—have among the highest population densities in South America.28 Significant portions of the population live in poorly planned urban areas, informal settlements, and densely populated coastal areas. This, coupled with the effects of climate change, is exacerbating damages and losses caused by flooding and landslides. Forced displacement caused by decades of armed conflict and the recent influx of Venezuelan migrants have also contributed to rapid urbanization.29
Climate variability will increase the country’s future disaster events, with differential impacts across geographic regions. By 2060, the sea level on both coastlines (Caribbean Sea and Pacific Ocean) could increase by 40–60 centimeters from 1961–90 levels, putting millions of coastal inhabitants and significant gross domestic product at greater risk from flooding, storm surge and other natural hazards.30 Andean glaciers are expected to shrink, which in turn increases the risk of landslides as slope stability is reduced. The risk of flooding may increase as glacial water is released at faster rates. Deglaciation along Colombia’s several glacier-clad volcanoes is expected to drive volcanic activity and associated hazards.31
It is critical to understand both Colombia’s lack of capacity to cope with risks and the intersection of natural and human-made or social risks from violence, insecurity, and armed conflict. Colombia has a multi-hazard risk ranking of 5.4 (high) on the Index for Risk Management.32 Sites in the RERA sample confront multiple hazards and threats, along with high levels of vulnerability.
CONFLICT AND PEACE Colombia is emerging from a 50-year internal armed conflict. The conflict was characterized by multiple armed groups, murders, torture, rape, disappearances, and nearly 9 million displaced (19 percent of the
27 Colombia Country Note: Global Facility for Disaster Risk Reduction, World Bank. 2009. 28 World Bank, 2012, cited in Risk Governance Scan, OECD. July 9, 2019. https://www.oecd- ilibrary.org/sites/eeb81954-en/index.html?itemId=/content/publication/eeb81954-en. 29 The pressure to expand urban areas to accommodate citizens has forced construction to take place in unsuitable areas, and especially vulnerable people end up living in informal, hazard-prone housing. 30 Colombia Country Note, Global Facility for Disaster Risk Reduction, https://www.gfdrr.org/en/colombia. 31 Risk Governance Scan, OECD. July 9, 2019. https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/sites/eeb81954- en/index.html?itemId=/content/publication/eeb81954-en. 32 INFORM Global Risk Index 2019: Colombia Country Profile. https://drmkc.jrc.ec.europa.eu/inform- index/Portals/0/InfoRM/2019/Country_Profiles/COL.pdf.
17 | COLOMBIA RAPID EDUCATION AND RISK ANALYSIS USAID.GOV country’s population), 220,000 dead, and 25,000 disappeared.33 The scale of violence and dislocation took its toll on the social cohesion of Colombian society: According to a poll by Latinobarómetro, 37 percent of Colombians say they have low trust in the people of their own communities.34
In November 2016, the Colombian government, led by then-President Juan Manuel Santos, and the country’s largest and longest standing guerrilla group, the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia- Ejército Popular (FARC-EP) agreed to stop fighting and start addressing the underlying causes of the conflict—rural poverty, marginalization, insecurity, and lawlessness. The Final Agreement for the Termination of the Conflict and the Construction of a Stable and Lasting Peace sought to address long-neglected territories and socioeconomic and political problems through long-term solutions. Notably, the agreement called on the government to, among other things, develop and implement a rural education strategy, addressing infrastructure, quality, and access and ensure access to demobilized fighters.35 It is important to note that although the peace agreement settled the most significant of Colombia’s conflicts, five others continue.36
President Iván Duque, elected in 2018, campaigned as a critic of the peace accord. His party objected to measures concerning justice and political representation of the FARC after its demobilization. Shortly after taking office, Duque suspended peace talks with the National Liberation Army (ELN)—Colombia’s second- largest rebel group.37
Nonetheless, official monitors of the accord38 report that implementation of the peace agreement has continued to progress as of late 2019.39 Some of the highest levels of implementation have concerned ending the armed conflict and transforming the FARC-EP into a democratic political party. Implementation has varied geographically, with delays in the socioeconomic reincorporation of ex-combatants—generating dissatisfaction and distrust among some ex-FARC-EP fighters40—the absence of guarantees for security, a
33 https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2016/08/24/the-staggering-toll-of-colombias-war-with- farc-rebels-explained-in-numbers/?utm_term=.3938d59c7d1f. 34 Cited in How Does Trust Impact Your Quality of Life? Inter-American Development Bank, 2017. 35 Paragraph 1.3.2.1, Final Agreement for Ending the Conflict and Building a Stable and Lasting Peace, Letter dated March 29, 2017, from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council, S/2017/272, April 21, 2017. https://colombia.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/s-2017-272_e.pdf. 36 The ICRC in 2019 identified five ongoing armed conflicts in Colombia. Four involve the Colombian army against illegal armed groups: the ELN, the EPL, the Clan de Golfo, and successor FARC-EP groups. The fifth refers to a conflict between the EPL and the ELN. These five conflicts are in addition to the “other situations of violence” identified in numerous cities, such as Medellín, Buenaventura, Cali, and Tumaco. See Colombia: Five armed conflicts — What’s happening? ICRC 2019. https://www.icrc.org/en/document/colombia-five-armed-conflicts-whats- happening. 37 Colombia: Background and U.S. Relations, Congressional Research Service, updated November 29, 2019. https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R43813.pdf. 38 The agreement gives the University of Notre Dame’s Kroc Institute primary responsibility for technical verification and monitoring of implementation through the Colombia Barometer Initiative. See https://peaceaccords.nd.edu/barometer. 39 They indicate that comparative studies of peace processes show that passing the two-year mark without the resumption of armed conflict is an important barometer for the Colombian peace process. State of Implementation of the Colombian Final Accord, Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, December 2016 – April 2019. https://kroc.nd.edu/assets/333274/executive_summary_colombia_print_single_2_.pdf. 40 Ensuring the reincorporation of former guerrillas back into civilian life is essential for preventing a return to violence. Communities, leaders (communal, indigenous, Afro-descendant, land claimants, victims of armed conflict), journalists, human rights defenders, promoters of the implementation of peace policies (mainly linked to the substitution of illicit crops), and former members of the FARC-EP continue to be severely affected by the
USAID.GOV COLOMBIA RAPID EDUCATION AND RISK ANALYSIS | 18 growing number of murders of social leaders, and a need to protect and further transitional justice mechanisms, including the Special Jurisdiction for Peace.41
Other observers consider the peace fragile.42 With the power vacuum left by the former FARC-EP in areas with low state presence, rival armed actors have taken their place. PARES reports that 107 of the 242 municipalities vacated by the FARC suffered a significant incursion by other criminal actors by August 2019.43 In these municipalities, homicides increased sufficiently in 2018 to offset reductions elsewhere and raise the national homicide rate for the first time since the peace talks started in 2012.44
Armed groups now battle for control of isolated communities and territories, many rich in illicit business. Clashes have occurred between armed groups, such as the Ejército de Liberación Nacional (National Liberation Army, ELN) and the Ejército Popular de Liberación (People's Liberation Army, EPL). Some of those confrontations appear to be increasing in intensity and could eventually form new armed conflicts.45 There is a worrying trend that former conflict actors are becoming organized crime actors seeking to
presence and actions of illegal armed groups. Forced displacement, confinement, homicides, threats, the installation of antipersonnel mines (MAP) and improvised explosive devices (AEI) continue, as does the involvement and recruitment of children and adolescents, among other human rights violations. See Misión de Apoyo al Proceso de Paz en Colombia de la Organización de los Estados Americanos, MAPP/OEA (2020). Vigésimo Octavo Informe del Secretario General al Consejo Permanente sobre la Misión de Apoyo al Proceso de Paz en Colombia de la Organización de los Estados Americanos (MAPP/OEA), October 30, 2019. On June 18, 2020, the director of the Institute of Studies for Development and Peace (Indepaz), Camilo González Poso, indicated that during the first semester of the year 2020, 137 homicides of social leaders and 201 of ex-combatants from the FARC have occurred. 41 Inter-American Commission for Human Rights IACHR (2019). Annual Report 2019. Chapter V: Follow-Up on Recommendations made by the IACHR in the report Truth, Justice, and Reparation: Fifth Report on the Human Rights Situation in Colombia. 42 In 2020, Colombia saw its worst year-on-year change in the history of the Fragile States Index (FSI), breaking a trend of almost uninterrupted improvement since the Index’s inauguration. “The 2016 peace deal between Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the Colombian government is looking increasingly fragile, with faith in the process failing amongst the government, the former rebels, and the Colombian public. Membership in armed groups has grown, coca cultivation has rebounded, and social leaders have been targeted in increasing numbers. While there were failures in the implementation of the peace deal under the preceding Santos administration, the deterioration of the agreement has accelerated under President Duque, who has been openly hostile towards it. The resulting erosion of the peace deal has been felt primarily in five provinces in Colombia’s north and southwest.” See Charles Fiertz, Colombia’s Peace Deal Unravels. Fragile States Index/Fund for Peace. May 2020. https://fragilestatesindex.org/2020/05/10/colombias-peace-deal-unravels/. 43 Mas sombras que luces: un análisis de seguridad en Colombia (More shadows than lights: an analysis of security in Colombia). Fundación Paz y Reconciliación (PARES) 2019. https://pares.com.co/2019/08/28/mas-sombras-que- luces-un-analisis-de-seguridad-en-colombia. 44 Castillo, J, Lleras, M and Suarez, M. Sin política publica contra los homicidios no es posible proteger la vida en Colombia (Without a public policy against homicides it is not possible to protect life in Colombia). FIP 2018. http://ideas-paz.org/media/website/FIP_NE_Homicidios_Diciembre.pdf. 45 The flows of Venezuelan migrants pose a particular threat to the peace process because they have been concentrated along border zones that are notoriously unruly and rife with armed ELN, FARC, and criminal groups trafficking in gold, oil, and drugs. Former FARC-EP commanders have created a new dissident faction from a location close to the Colombia-Venezuela border, raising tensions between the Colombian and Venezuelan governments. See: Broken Ties, Frozen Borders: Colombia and Venezuela Face COVID-19. International Crisis Group, https://www.crisisgroup.org/latin-america-caribbean/andes/colombiavenezuela/b040-containing-border-fallout- colombias-new-guerrilla-schism; and Colombia: Five Armed Conflicts--What’s Happening? ICRC. January 30, 2019, https://www.icrc.org/en/document/colombia-five-armed-conflicts-whats-happeningj.
19 | COLOMBIA RAPID EDUCATION AND RISK ANALYSIS USAID.GOV govern locally and provide services to rural populations.46 Thus, the state must enter these zones as fields of competition with irregular forces attempting to establish parallel systems of service and justice.47
Armed groups have reacted to COVID-19 and social restrictions with opportunism. Violence continued unabated in the country’s southwest, while the military conducted operations against ELN guerrillas, and FARC dissident fronts attempted to expand and consolidate territory. In March 2020, the ELN declared a unilateral one-month ceasefire with the government as a humanitarian gesture.48 There were even reports of ex-FARC fighters helping to restrict public gatherings and enforcing lockdowns.49
ILLICIT DRUGS Colombia is the world’s largest producer of cocaine.50 Coca is grown across Colombia but most intensely in areas where there has been a chronic state abandonment, either due to state neglect or control by illegal armed groups with an interest in the drug trade. Coca production increased throughout the peace talks and the start of peace implementation, breaking historic records in 2016 and again in 2017.51 In recent years, coca cultivation has increased while utilizing less territory.52
The increased concentration of coca cultivation may affect prospects for peace in key municipalities. In 2018, 80 percent of victims of homicides related to armed conflict lived in municipalities affected by coca crops, and 76 percent lived in municipalities home to peace agreement local development programs (development programs with a territorial approach, or PDET).53 In addition, a significant presence of coca
46 Piccone, T. Peace with Justice: The Colombian Experience with Transitional Justice. Brookings, https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/FP_20190708_colombia.pdf 47 Piccone, T. Peace with Justice: The Colombian Experience with Transitional Justice. Brookings, https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/FP_20190708_colombia.pdf 48 Broken Ties, Frozen Borders: Colombia and Venezuela Face COVID-19. International Crisis Group, April 14, 2020, https://www.crisisgroup.org/latin-america-caribbean/andes/colombia/b24-broken-ties-frozen-borders-colombia- and-venezuela-face-covid-19. 49 Asmann, P., What Does Coronavirus Mean for Criminal Governance in Latin America? InSight Crime, 31 March 2020. https://www.insightcrime.org/news/analysis/criminal-governance-latin-america-coronavirus/. Sieff, K. et al., “Now Joining the Fight against Coronavirus: The World’s Armed Rebels, Drug Cartels and Gangs”, The Washington Post, 15 April 2020. 50 According to both the United Nations’ Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and the U.S. Department of State. 51 Asmann, P. Colombia Coca Production Hits New Record High, US Figures Say, InSight Crime. June 26, 2018 52 According to U.S. government estimates, Colombia’s potential production of pure cocaine fell to 170 metric tons in 2012, the lowest level in two decades. However, it started to rise slightly in 2013 and more dramatically from 2014 through 2017. Colombia: Background and U.S. Relations, Congressional Research Service, Updated November 29, 2019. According to the latest UNODC report (published in 2019, referring to 2018), the territory affected by coca in 2018 reached 141,125 square kilometers. This area represents 63 percent of the traditional territory affected by coca (in the last ten years) and 51 percent compared to the entire period from 2001 to 2018. The reduction of the territory affected by coca contrasts with the increase of the planted area in the last five years, which means that there is more coca in less territory. See UNODC report. 53 The Development Programs with a Territorial Approach (PDETs) were created by Decree 893 of 2017 within the framework of the Peace Agreement between FARC and the national government. They aim to implement the aspects of the peace agreement related to rural development. The decree establishes 16 territories where PDETs are supposed to be designed. The PDETs will be developed only once, with a planning horizon of 10 years. The PDETs are to be integrated into the National Development Plan (NDP) for 2019–2023. See: Public Governance Scan, OECD, 2018 (est.). https://www.oecd.org/gov/Colombia-Scan-Final-English.pdf
USAID.GOV COLOMBIA RAPID EDUCATION AND RISK ANALYSIS | 20 crops directly correlates to internal forced displacement, murders, terrorist acts, attacks, and armed confrontations.54
Coca cultivation and increasing exports to the United States also put peace at risk through a nexus with organized crime, corruption, and extortion.55 Former FARC fighters who never agreed to demobilize have regrouped to operate as a loose association of cartels conducting low-cost criminal operations.56 The recent increase in coca production has coincided with a heightened presence of Mexican cartels that ship the drug from relatively uncontrolled Pacific ports. These criminal interests are also threatening and attacking social movement leaders and rural farmers who are attempting to cooperate with the peace process.57 With the onset of COVID-19, law enforcement officials and trafficking experts report that lockdowns have disrupted supply chains of Colombian cartels.58
Micro-trafficking59 of drugs is concentrated in specific urban areas and is associated with places of sale (trap houses) and consumption. These locations are typically located in areas of urban and social deterioration. Micro-trafficking of drugs is also linked to other crimes, including homicide, theft, and personal injury.60 Criminal organizations behind micro-trafficking aim to control territory by limiting action by the government and controlling the activities of the residents who live there to maximize their drug economy. Most of the schools and communities included in this RERA inhabit such territories.61
By 2016, there were signs that drug consumption in schools was on the increase. The most recent National Study of Consumption of Psychoactive Substances in School Populations (2016) carried out by the Ministries of Justice, Education, and Health, looked into the use of the most common substances, such as marijuana, cocaine, basuco (cocaine paste), alcohol, and tobacco. The study’s review of trends since 2004 (excluding alcohol and tobacco) found that drug use, particularly by girls and women, is on the rise (see Table 8).62
54 World Drug Report, UNODC, 2019. 55 Colombia: Background and U.S. Relations, Congressional Research Service, updated November 29, 2019. 56 Piccone, T. Peace with Justice: The Colombian Experience with Transitional Justice. Brookings, https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/FP_20190708_colombia.pdf 57 Piccone, T. Peace with Justice: The Colombian Experience with Transitional Justice. Brookings, https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/FP_20190708_colombia.pdf 58 Mustian, J., and Bleiberg, J., Cartels Are Scrambling’: Virus Snarls Global Drug Trade, AP NEWS, April 19, 2020. https://apnews.com/4f0a4ca93cc2fee94d386efb13db31a0. 59 Micro-trafficking refers to the smaller scale transport and sale of drugs, such as within a region or municipality. 60 Ministerio de Justicia y del Derecho - Observatorio de Drogas de Colombia y Fundación Ideas para la Paz. 2016. Microtráfico y comercialización de Sustancias psicoactivas en pequeñas cantidades en contextos urbanos: Insumos para la elaboración de política pública con perspectiva territorial. 61 Ministerio de Justicia y del Derecho - Observatorio de Drogas de Colombia y Fundación Ideas para la Paz. 2016. Microtráfico y comercialización de Sustancias psicoactivas en pequeñas cantidades en contextos urbanos: Insumos para la elaboración de política pública con perspectiva territorial. 62 Estudio Nacional de consumo de sustancias psicoactivas en población escolar: Colombia 2016. Ministerio de Justicia y del Derecho: Observatorio de Drogas de Colombia, Ministerio de Educación Nacional y Ministerio de Salud y Protección Social, Bogotá, 2016, http://www.odc.gov.co/Portals/1/publicaciones/pdf/consumo/estudios/nacionales/CO03142016_estudio_consumo _escolares_2016.pdf.
21 | COLOMBIA RAPID EDUCATION AND RISK ANALYSIS USAID.GOV TABLE 8. ANY DRUG USE PREVALENCE, 2004, 2011, AND 2016, BY SEX
LAST MONTH LIFE PREVALENCE LAST YEAR PREVALENCE PREVALENCE
SEX 2004 2011 2016 2004 2011 2016 2004 2011 2016
Male 16% 14% 15% 14% 11% 10% 6% 6% 6%
Female 9% 10% 14% 8% 7% 9% 3% 4% 4%
Total 12% 12% 14% 11% 9% 10% 4% 5% 5%
Table 9 reveals that drug use was higher in grade 11 than in grades 7 and 9. Drug use trends showed a decline over the longer term, but use during the last month indicated a slight increase in all grades.
TABLE 9. ANY DRUG USE PREVALENCE, 2004, 2011, AND 2016, BY GRADE
LAST MONTH LIFE PREVALENCE LAST YEAR PREVALENCE PREVALENCE
GRADE 2004 2011 2016 2004 2011 2016 2004 2011 2016
7th 8% 7% 10% 8% 5% 7% 3% 3% 4%
9th 13% 13% 15% 12% 10% 10% 5% 6% 6%
11th 18% 16% 20% 16% 11% 13% 4% 6% 7%
Total 12% 12% 14% 11% 9% 10% 4% 5% 5%
CRIME AND VIOLENCE
Organized Crime
The main criminal threat facing the Colombian justice system is the emergence of criminal organizations from the remnants of paramilitary organizations, drug trafficking groups, and armed insurgent groups.63 This emergence highlights the complex relationship between drug cultivation and sale, transnational criminal groups, and insurgent and non-state armed groups. Examples of this nexus are becoming well documented: gangs or bandas extract people from cities and hand them over to guerrillas;64 arms are sold by narcotraffickers to guerrillas and gangs;65 gangs offer services in car theft to guerrillas, paramilitaries,
63 The involvement of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) in the drug trade in Colombia goes back decades. At various times, they have provided security for coca crops, taxed the introduction of precursor chemicals and the use of landing strips, sold coca paste, and become involved in the intraregional cocaine trade. FARC agreed in 2016 to halt its involvement in the drug business after the peace agreement signed with the Government. See World Drug Report 2017: The Drug Problem and Organized Crime, Illicit Financial Flows, Corruption and Terrorism. UNODC. 2017. https://www.unodc.org/wdr2017/field/Booklet_5_NEXUS.pdf. 64 Una sociedad secuestrada. Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica, 2013. 65 Mafias y Narcos que Ingresan Armas a Colombia de Brasil y México. El Tiempo, November 17, 2019, https://www.eltiempo.com/unidad-investigativa/mafias-y-narcos-que-ingresan-armas-a-colombia-de-brasil-y- mexico-434334).
USAID.GOV COLOMBIA RAPID EDUCATION AND RISK ANALYSIS | 22 and narcos;66 and paramilitaries and guerrillas coordinate actions to guarantee delivery of drugs to narcotraffickers.67 These organizations have also developed high-risk relationships in vulnerable areas of Colombian cities were schools are seen as a platform to expand their market. In Colombia, organized criminal groups have stepped into the void of the paramilitary organizations and are responsible for much of the increased violence and drug trafficking throughout the country.68
There are signs that Colombian organized criminal groups are growing stronger. Although data are scarce (in part due to the pandemic), there are indications that the downward trend in homicides belies the reality that many victims are activists or leaders who were targeted for working against illicit activities and violence. Some groups have used the pandemic to impose their own social restriction measures in certain communities, demonstrating their control over territories and residents.69 These groups are emboldened further by their growing alliance with Mexican cartels which invest to access arms from former guerrilla fighters and higher cocaine production, take advantage of the reduced presence of the FARC, and launder money. The growing relationship with transnational cartels signals that Colombian organized criminal groups may increase their own capabilities and ambitions.
Gangs
Gangs70 in Colombia have undergone continuous transformations for decades and vary from one city to another, depending largely on the city’s relationship with armed conflict, organized crime, and illicit economies. Disadvantaged urban neighborhoods in Colombia are vulnerable to increased gang activity in light of their prolonged exposure to violence, marginalization, social disorganization, and the strength of illicit economies.
66 El Tiempo, November 23, 2001, https://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-690486. 67 Sentencia en primera Instancia. Magistrada Ponente: Uldi Teresa Jiménez López. Radicación: 110016000253200680450. Postulados: Guillermo Pérez Alzate y otros, Bogotá, September 29, 2014, 163– 65; La guerrilla trae la coca a Cartagena y busca socios para sacarla, El Tiempo, November 2, 2017, https://www.eltiempo.com/justicia/conflicto-y-narcotrafico/entrevista-de-salud-hernadez-mora-a-un-traqueto- encargado-de-sacar-droga-de-los-puertos-147230). 68 Organized Crime Organizations. U.S. Department of Justice, https://co.usembassy.gov/embassy/bogota/sections- offices/department-of-justice/organized-crime-organizations/. 69 Colombia: Brutales medidas de grupos armados contra Covid-19, Human Rights Watch, July 2020. https://www.hrw.org/es/news/2020/07/15/colombia-brutales-medidas-de-grupos-armados-contra-covid-19. See also: Zonas Sin Control el Estado, PARES, July 17, 2020, https://pares.com.co/2020/07/17/zonas-sin-control-del- state/. 70 Different social organizations can be categorized under the term “gang.” Parche or pandilla is a free association gang, mainly of young people, dedicated to minor and low-intensity crimes. Due to the aggressiveness, the continuous professional crimes, and the higher number of connections, they can lead to combos. See: Perea, C., Con el diablo Adentro: Pandillas, Mercado y Pánico, Tesis Doctorado, Filosofía y Letras, UNAM, México, 2005, 70–71; Jaramillo, A., Perea, C., eds., 2014, Ciudades en la encrucijada: violencia y poder criminal en Río de Janeiro, Medellín, Bogotá y Ciudad Juárez. IEPRI, UNAL y Corporación Región. Medellín – Colombia, 61. Pandillas and combos are called gangs and are associated with invisible borders or the delineation of territories and markets. In the RERA, the use of blades and confrontations with stones is associated with pandillas, while firearms are linked to combos. It is common for combos to provide services to organized crime groups. Bandas criminales or BACRIM refers to a form of organized crime group that comes from the restructuring of narcotics value chains after the demobilization of the paramilitary groups.
23 | COLOMBIA RAPID EDUCATION AND RISK ANALYSIS USAID.GOV The number of gangs has increased over time, but gangs generally have fewer members and control smaller territories than before.71 Colombian street gangs can combine criminal activity with social, identity, and noncriminal interests that set them apart from criminal bands and drug-trafficking organizations.72 Gangs have become more violent, more criminal, and better armed, especially in cities where links to the criminal world are strongest.73 This has contributed to the normalization of violence in Colombian society.
Colombian Gangs versus Central American Maras
Colombian gangs are generally distinct from the Central American maras. But are they headed in that direction? Here are five development phases of U.S. gangs which influenced the development of the maras:
Phase 1: Social disorganization Phase 2: Low neighborhood and family control Phase 3: Gang formation Phase 4: Interaction with “gang violence facilitators” Phase 5: Widespread, transformed gangs
Nationally, the major gang violence facilitators have been adult armed groups that bring drugs and weapons and foster conditions for violence. Some observers argue Colombian gangs are in phase 3 or 4, and almost all gangs in Medellín and some in Cali are in phase 5.
Sources: J. C. Howell, “The History of Street Gangs in the United States: Their Origins and Transformations” (2015); Katie Kerr, “Assessing Gang Risks in Post-War Environments: The Case of Colombia,” in Stability: International Journal of Security and Development. (2020)
Organized criminal activity around the production and distribution of cocaine and other illegal markets is the most concerning driver behind the growth of gangs. In many Colombian cities, criminal bands and drug-trafficking organizations hire gang members for a variety of criminal roles. Gang members provide labor for local drug sales and “act as messengers, lookouts, transporters, dealers, debt collectors, and contract killers, but generally do not play leadership roles in domestic or international markets.”74 In the most advanced cases, as in Medellín, entire gangs are coopted by criminal organizations.75 A result of this
71 La otra cara de las pandillas. Semana, June 2, 2018. 72 Giraldo, et al., ¿Por qué las personas ingresan a la delincuencia organizada? Análisis del fenómeno en Santiago de Cali. Revista Criminalidad. 2015. 73 Resource Center for Conflict Analysis (CERAC), 2014. 74 Resource Center for Conflict Analysis (CERAC), 2014; Ordóñez Valverde, J. De la pandilla a la banda. Transformaciones de la violencia pandillera en barrios marginales de Cali. Revista Sociedad y Economía. 2017. The process is most advanced in Medellín, where the majority of combos are dedicated to criminal purposes and subordinate to older, more powerful actors in organized crime. See: Blattman, et al., unpublished, 2019, cited in Kerr, K. Assessing Gang Risks in Post-War Environments: The Case of Colombia. Stability: International Journal of Security & Development). 2020. Gangs in other cities are less attached to adult criminal networks, such as in Cartagena, where gangs are minimally related to organized crime. Álvarez, W. Jóvenes, violencia y pandillas en las periferias de Cartagena- Colombia: Aproximaciones teóricas y fragmentos etnográficos. Universitas, XIV(25), cited in Kerr, Assessing Gang Risks. In Cali, where gangs and adult groups have likewise coexisted for several decades, the police believe that 31 of an estimated 104 gangs city-wide have been co-opted by criminal organizations, while others retain some autonomy. Kerr, Assessing Gang Risks. 75 Ávila, A. Detrás de la guerra en Colombia. Editorial Planeta Colombiana. 2019.
USAID.GOV COLOMBIA RAPID EDUCATION AND RISK ANALYSIS | 24 outsourcing, gangs is may become more violent, harmful, and criminal as they continue to strengthen ties to illicit economies and criminal networks. 76
Colombian youth are disproportionately impacted by violence. Almost half of all murder victims in 2016 and 2017 were between 15 and 29 years of age.77 Children and youth coming from disadvantaged backgrounds (single-headed households, incomplete education, and low economic status) are often recruited by gangs and drug trafficking groups. Residents in Colombian cities and towns perceive themselves as highly insecure: in a national survey from 2017, 78 percent of respondents reported feeling fearful of being murdered, more by common criminals than by conflict actors.78 A report by Fundación Redes estimates that between 60 and 70 percent of members in certain Colombian gangs, such as Los Rastrojos, are Venezuelans aged 16 to 25.
Colombia made considerable gains in reducing violence over the last two decades. For example, between 2000 and 2016, Colombia saw a 94 percent decrease in kidnappings and a 53 percent reduction in homicides (below 25 per 100,000 in 2017—a 42-year low).79 However, in 2019, homicides went up 2 percent between January and November 2019 as compared to the same period the year before, rising for a second consecutive year after reaching an all-time low in 2017. The vast majority of homicide victims, 92 percent, were male, while more than half of victims were between 14 and 29 years of age. Cali had the highest levels of violence, followed by Medellín and Bogotá, though each of these urban areas saw decreases during this period.80
TABLE 10. HOMICIDE CASES AND RATES, BY YEAR
TOTAL HOMICIDES BY YEAR
UNIT 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Cases 17,459 16,554 15,727 14,294 12,626 11,585 11,532 11,373 12,130
Rate 38.36 35.95 33.76 30.33 26.49 24.03 23.66 23.07 24.34 Source: Instituto Nacional de Medicina Legal y Ciencias Forenses, June 2019
Colombian cities have been recognized for their crime and violence reduction efforts. While the Duque administration has pursued a more militaristic approach to organized criminal groups,81 street gangs are considered issues of urban crime and youth development that fall under the authority of cities and local
76 Durán-Martínez, A. The Politics of Drug Violence: Criminals, Cops, and Politicians in Colombia and Mexico. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. 2018. Cited in Kerr, Assessing Gang Risks. 77 Castillo, J. ¿Podemos perder el miedo a morir violentamente en Colombia? Fundación Ideas para la Paz (FIP). 2018. http://www.ideaspaz.org/publications/posts/1679. 78 Percepción sobre los homicidios en Colombia. Fundación Ideas para la Paz (FIP). 2017. http://cdn.ideaspaz.org/media/website/document/59ee323332887.pdf. 79 Statistics from Embassy of Colombia in the United States; see also Chris Dalby and Camilo Carranza, InSight Crime’s 2018 Homicide Round-Up, InSight Crime, January 22, 2019. 80 Instituto Nacional de Medicina Legal y Ciencias Forenses, June 2019. 81 Alonso, LA and Robbins, A blast from the past: The Duque security plan for Colombia. InSight Crime, February 26, 2019. https://www.insightcrime.org/news/analysis/duque-security-plan-colombia/.
25 | COLOMBIA RAPID EDUCATION AND RISK ANALYSIS USAID.GOV police departments.82 Colombia was the first country in Latin America to launch citizen security programming, with a heavy focus on rights, civic engagement, and government responsibility, and cities like Medellín, Cali, and Bogotá were recognized for their innovative preventive measures.83 It is noteworthy that a large majority of Colombians (70 percent) prefer that the government pursue preventive measures, such as job and education opportunities, rather than increasing punishment (28 percent) in order to reduce homicides.84
Violence against Women
Although Colombia has developed and established legal and institutional frameworks to address the issue, gender-based violence—in particular violence against women—continues to be widespread.85 The plight of women is worsened by Colombia’s broader context of armed conflict and violence.86 Colombian women are affected by different forms of violence, particularly domestic violence and violence related to conflict. Indigenous and Afro-Colombian women are disproportionately affected. Between 60 and 70 percent of Colombian women have experienced physical, psychological, sexual, or political violence.87
Since 2010, intimate partner violence in Colombia has been on a slight decline. In 2018, the Instituto Nacional de Medicina Legal y Ciencias Forenses (INMLCF) reported 49,669 cases of intimate partner violence, of which 86 percent (42,753) of the cases involved women victims. Nearly half (49 percent) of the cases (24,456) occurred in adolescent and young couples between 10 and 29 years old, with the highest rate per 100,000 inhabitants occurring in the 25–29 age group.88
82Peace and security in Bogotá: Transformations and perspectives after armed conflict. International Institute for Strategic Studies. 2018. https://www.iiss.org/blogs/analysis/2018/07/peace-and-security-in-bogota.2018. 83 In its recent report on gangs, the foremost recommendation from Ministry of Justice to the government was to reduce the factors that make young people vulnerable to crime and violence by investing in education and economic opportunities in problem neighborhoods. Law 1622 on Youth Citizenship calls for intervention in the social and political lives of youths to prevent their engagement in violence and crime. Law 1577—the first national law dealing expressly with gangs—seeks to rehabilitate young people at risk of joining or already involved in gangs and foster their social and economic inclusion. Kerr, Assessing Gang Risks. 84 Percepción sobre los homicidios en Colombia. Fundación Ideas para la Paz. 2017. http://cdn.ideaspaz.org/media/website/document/59ee323332887.pdf. . 85 Overcoming Gender-Based Violence Activity, USAID https://2012- 2017.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1862/OGBV_FactSheet_030717.pdf. 86 According to the National Victim’s Unit, as of March 1, 2019, the total number of victims of the armed conflict was 8,418,405, including 4,212,278 women (50 percent) and 3,308 LGBTI. In addition, 27,360 victims of conflict- related sexual violence were registered. Sexual violence is one of the drivers of forced displacement, affecting not only communities but also women’s rights defenders, and especially indigenous or Afro-Colombian women. Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict. Report of the Secretary- General to the Security Council (S/2018/250), April 16, 2018. 87 Gender Analysis and Assessment Final Report, USAID, April 2019, https://banyanglobal.com/wp- content/uploads/2019/05/USAID-Colombia-Gender-Analysis-and-Assessment.pdf. 88 Instituto Nacional de Medicina Legal y Ciencias Forenses, June 2019.
USAID.GOV COLOMBIA RAPID EDUCATION AND RISK ANALYSIS | 26 TABLE 11. INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE CASES AND RATE PER 100,000
YEARS
UNIT 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Cases 57,875 57,761 54,399 44,743 48,849 47,248 50,707 50,072 49,669
Rate 156.75 154.14 143.1 116.04 124.96 119.24 126.3 123.11 120.57
Sexual violence has been slowly climbing since 2009. From 2009 through 2018, the Colombian medical- legal system carried out 221,128 legal medical examinations for alleged sexual offenses in men, women, and children, averaging 22,112 cases per year. The highest rate for every 100,000 people was in 2018 (52). Of the 49,669 surveyed cases of intimate partner violence carried out in 2018, men were the main alleged aggressor, and 86 percent of the victims were women.89 The risk of sexual violence is alarmingly high for girls between the ages of 10 and 13. This age group represented 42 percent of all medical cases carried out on women in 2018 and also represented the highest incidence over the last 10 years (562.50).90
The high incidence of violence against women is exacerbated by the very low level of response from the authorities.91 Colombia has laws to protect women, but some observers question the extent they are implemented. Some 24 percent of victims who declined to report their attackers to the authorities did so out of fear of reprisals.92
Violence against Children and Adolescents
Ending violence against children and adolescents has become a national priority93 for Colombia. A 2018 Violence Against Children and Youth Survey94 revealed that more than two out of five males and females— 41 percent of males and 42 percent of females—experienced sexual, physical, or psychological violence at some point during their childhood. Violence against children and adolescents slightly increased in 2018 (70 cases per 100,000). Trends in the incidence of violence against children and adolescents had declined from 2011 (90 per 100,000) to 2013 (63 per 100,000), only to largely level off in 2017 (67 per 100,000). During 2018, girls were most affected by violence (52 percent). The most affected age group during that year was
89 Instituto Nacional de Medicina Legal y Ciencias Forenses, June 2019. 90 Instituto Nacional de Medicina Legal y Ciencias Forenses, June 2019. 91 Gender Analysis and Assessment Final Report, USAID, April 2019. https://banyanglobal.com/wp- content/uploads/2019/05/USAID-Colombia-Gender-Analysis-and-Assessment.pdf. 92 Law 1257 of the Colombian Penal Code, for example, passed in 2008, states that the punishment for “violent physical access” is 12 to 20 years in prison. But very rarely does a rapist go to jail, so it is hardly surprising that women do not want to talk. 93 Within the Sustainable Development Goals Framework, Colombia became a pathfinder country as part of the End Violence Against Children Partnership in 2019. This initiative is supported by the United Nations and bilateral, multilateral, and civil society organizations. 94 This survey is the product of work led by the Ministry of Health and Social Protection of Colombia (MoHSP), with technical and methodological support from the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), financial support from USAID, and partnership support from Together for Girls (TfG). VACS is part of a strategy promoted by the World Health Organization aimed at preventing violence against children through INSPIRE, an approach that includes seven strategies that have shown success in reducing violence against children, adolescents, and youth.
27 | COLOMBIA RAPID EDUCATION AND RISK ANALYSIS USAID.GOV young people between 15 and 17 years of age (32 percent), followed by 10- to 14-year-olds (26 percent) and 5- to 9-year-olds (26 percent). It should be highlighted that children from birth to 4 years of age constituted 16 percent of the violence cases, and boys from 5 to 9 years of age were the group most affected by violence.95
The suicide rate for adolescents and young people has been on the rise since 2014. The number of suicides for the 10 to 14 age group rose the most—from 57 in 2014 to 112 in 2018, an increase of 49 percent. The number of suicides reported in the 15 to 17 age group rose from 124 in 2014 to 170 in 2018, an increase of 27 percent.96
TABLE 12. RATE OF VIOLENCE BY SELECTED CATEGORIES AND SECRETARIAT (2018)
RATE OF VIOLENCE BY CATEGORY (PER 100,000) (2018)
INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE VIOLENCE SEXUAL VIOLENCE AGAINST AGAINST VIOLENCE INTERPERSONAL AGAINST CHILDREN/ WOMEN AGAINST SECRETARIAT HOMICIDE VIOLENCE WOMEN ADOLESCENTS (PARTNER) WOMEN
Barranquilla 47 318 200 51 215 88
Soledad 30 148 115 35 140 67
Bogotá 30 359 223 175 288 83
Soacha 53 448 408 148 531 116
Cali 79 193 148 36 167 81
Palmira 95 236 173 72 238 73
Cartagena 41 221 159 35 196 108
Riohacha 48 195 144 23 204 62
Maicao 99 215 144 16 153 103
Medellín 50 233 138 108 213 95
Bello 36 132 99 49 178 74 Source: Instituto Nacional de Medicina Legal y Ciencias Forenses, 2018
When comparing the rates of several key categories of violence by secretariat (Table 12), the peri-urban towns of the RERA sample stand out for their high rates of violence compared to their neighboring cities. In particular, Soacha emerges with most of the highest rates of violence. These include interpersonal violence, interpersonal violence against women, violence against women within couples, and sexual violence against women. Bogotá has the next highest rates overall. Maicao and Palmira had the highest homicide rates.
95 Instituto Nacional de Medicina Legal y Ciencias Forenses, June 2019. 96 Instituto Nacional de Medicina Legal y Ciencias Forenses, June 2019.
USAID.GOV COLOMBIA RAPID EDUCATION AND RISK ANALYSIS | 28 VENEZUELAN MIGRANT AND REFUGEE INFLUX The influx of nearly 1.8 million97 Venezuelan migrants and refugees, along with 400,000 Colombian returnees in the years leading to and including 2019 was unprecedented for both its size and speed.98 Migration has been highly concentrated with nearly 80 percent of migrants settling in 8 of the 32 departments. As of April, the total number of Venezuelans was 1,788,380, with 763,544 considered “regular”99 and 1,024,836 “irregular.”100 Over 80,000 have returned to Venezuela and 30,000 are waiting to return. The capital region of Bogotá is home to 20 percent of the Venezuelan population, followed by the border regions of Norte de Santander and La Guajira, with 11 percent and 10 percent, respectively.101 The least educated, poorer and more vulnerable migrants are disproportionately concentrated in border areas.102
The crisis represented considerable challenges for Colombia’s central and local governments. There has been differential local impact, with reports of increases in unemployment and poverty among migrants in border areas, such as Cúcuta and Riohacha, and in Bogotá. Other cities such as Barranquilla and Medellín demonstrated greater resilience in assimilating the migratory inflow.103 At the same time, Colombia is experiencing another migration-related challenge: the return of more than 500,000 Colombian nationals who were living in Venezuela, many of them for decades, after the onset of political turmoil and economic collapse there starting in 2014. As of April 2020, UNHCR estimated the total number of Venezuelan migrants and refugees living in Colombia at 1,788,380.104
TABLE 13. VENEZUELAN MIGRATION TO COLOMBIA FROM 2010 TO 2019
YEAR
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
Number of Venezuelan Migrants 5,304 5,016 5,550 5,954 6,403 10,642 39,311 184,087 769,726 738,007 Sources: UNHCR and Migración Colombia
Colombia has been recognized for its extensive and innovative efforts to accommodate the roughly 1.8 million Venezuelan migrants and refugees.105 In addition to providing humanitarian assistance, the government also made civil documentation requirements more flexible to facilitate access to services,
97 UNHCR/R4V Situational Report, January 2020, https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/download/74829 98 The migrants resulting from the Venezuelan crisis can be divided in four types: Colombian returnees, pendular migrants (those who come back and forth over time), transit migrants and migrants seeking residence permits. 99 Those who possess a visa, identity card, or special permit and remain within the time allowed in Colombia. 100 Those who have exceeded the time allowed in Colombia, or entered the country through an unauthorized entry point. 101 Total de Venezolanos en Colombia corte a 31 de abril de 2020, Migration Colombia. https://www.migracioncolombia.gov.co/infografias/venezolanos-en-colombia-corte-a-30-de-abril-de-2020. 102 Performance and Learning Review of the Country Partnership Framework for the Republic of Colombia for the Period FY 2016-21. World Bank. April 23, 2019. 103 Policy Note on the Venezuelan migration shock in Colombia and its fiscal implications, OECD, https://www.oecd.org/economy/surveys/Colombia-migration-shock-note-english-2019.pdf. 104 R4V Coordination Platform hosted by UNHCR, https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/platform/location/7511. 105 Approximately 1.8 million refugees and migrants arrived from Venezuela in 2019 as a result of the political turmoil, socio-economic instability, and the ongoing humanitarian crisis there.
29 | COLOMBIA RAPID EDUCATION AND RISK ANALYSIS USAID.GOV including education. Colombia began issuing a Special Stay Permit (Permiso Especial de Permanencia, or PEP) in August 2017 to Venezuelans who had entered legally.106 As of February 2020, 598,000 Venezuelans hold this document.107 Since August 2016, Venezuelans have been able opt for a Border Mobility Card, which allows migrants to enter and exit Colombia throughout the day and carry out activities such as trade, business, and the purchase of groceries and medicines unavailable in Venezuela. In 2018, approximately 2.7 million people had a border mobility card.108
Over time, the cross-border movement of people between Colombia and Venezuela has led to families with dual citizenship through marriage or children born in Colombia. This category of Colombian- Venezuelan dual nationality is important for the purposes of this RERA since respondents could have both nationalities . As Venezuelan migrants in Colombia do not enjoy the same rights as Colombian citizens (such as access to services, including education, and labor rights), their lack of rights in Colombia can affect child’s well-being and household livelihoods and resilience.
Rural youth and young migrants from Venezuela are the most vulnerable youth subgroups. Estimates indicate that 27 percent of Venezuelan migrants that arrived in Colombia during 2018 are between the ages of 15 and 24 and arrive accompanied by their children and entire families. More than 80 percent of employed Venezuelan respondents indicated that they worked in the informal sector. Those who do not find employment opportunities are highly vulnerable to human trafficking, prostitution in mining areas, or recruitment by organized armed groups.
106 The permit lasts two years without the possibility of transitioning to a permanent visa. The first round of PEP covered any Venezuelan who had entered Colombia with a passport before July 28, 2017. The permit also allows migrants access to certain services, such as education and health. 107 An Uneven Welcome: Latin American and Caribbean Responses to Venezuelan and Nicaraguan Migration, Migration Policy Institute, February 2020. The authors note that one of the three rounds covered Venezuelans who had entered the country irregularly as long as they had subsequently registered with the government between April and June 2018; the two subsequent rounds applied only to Venezuelans who had their passports stamped upon entry in a specific time frame. The ongoing round, which began January 23, 2020, allows Venezuelans who entered Colombia legally and were present as of November 29, 2019, to apply for PEP through April 23, 2020. The two smaller scale rounds of PEP consisted of one round for former members of the Venezuelan military who entered Colombia by May 13, 2019, and one for Venezuelans who have had their asylum applications denied. 108 Gender Analysis and Assessment, USAID, April 2018.
USAID.GOV COLOMBIA RAPID EDUCATION AND RISK ANALYSIS | 30 FIGURE 5. VENEZUELAN MIGRATION AND RERA SITES
Source: Revista Semana/Migración Colombia
The COVID-19 pandemic puts Venezuelan migrants and refugees in an even more dire situation. Many depend on insufficient daily wages to cover basic needs such as shelter, food, and healthcare. With social distancing, growing fear, and potential for social unrest, Venezuelan refugees and migrants are also at risk of being stigmatized.109 Those who are in transit through Colombia and headed to other Latin American countries have found road shelters closed due to the pandemic, therefore rest, water and food are scarce. Thus, hundreds of Venezuelan migrants have opted to return home.110 Nonetheless, it is expected that most Venezuelan migrants and refugees will prefer to stay in Colombia for a long period of time, if not permanently.111
As in other situations involving a massive influx of refugees or migrants, the humanitarian sentiment of the recipient community can reach its limits. Colombians have held changing, ambivalent, and even contradictory opinions about the Venezuelan migrants. A survey by Oxfam in 2019 revealed that Colombians feel empathy and a desire to welcome migrants, while also harboring fears and concerns. For
109 See UNHCR, https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/news/press/2020/4/5e844e354/refugees-migrants-venezuela-during- covid-19-crisis-needs-soar-inclusive.html. 110 Luis Jaime Acosta, Venezuelan migrants flee Colombian quarantine for their shattered homeland, Reuters, April 3, 2020. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-colombia-migrants/venezuelan-migrants-flee- colombian-quarantine-for-their-shattered-homeland-idUSKBN21L31C. 111 An Uneven Welcome: Latin American and Caribbean Responses to Venezuelan and Nicaraguan Migration, Migration Policy Institute, February 2020.
31 | COLOMBIA RAPID EDUCATION AND RISK ANALYSIS USAID.GOV example, more than 80 percent of Colombians surveyed empathize with the situation of the people coming from Venezuela, although around 70 percent stated that they would like stricter border policies to be enforced. About 70 percent of people in Colombia surveyed believed that immigration led to lower salaries and poorer working conditions, and 80 percent felt that migrants were causing social services to collapse.112 A separate survey found that 62 percent of Colombians disagreed with the government position of allowing Venezuelan migrants to stay. At the same time, the survey found that the majority of Colombians surveyed associated the word “migrant” with “admiration.”113
COVID-19 Like nearly all countries, Colombia is grappling with the spread of the COVID-19 pandemic. As of July 13, 154,277 positive cases of COVID-19 have been confirmed in the 32 departments of Colombia, of which 54 percent are active (82,681), 65,809 (43 percent) recovered, 5,455 dead, and 8,881 hospitalized.114 The current public health emergency has compounded an already desperate situation for many refugees and migrants from Venezuela and their recipient communities.
The government responded in March 2020 with strict stay-at-home measures115 to mitigate the rate and spread of infection. Restrictions on mobility were initially based on gender; while this was a measure to prevent the spread of COVID-19, it also presented a potentially viable escape valve for women in situations of domestic violence.116 Schools were ordered closed immediately and remote learning instituted (see Education Context). However, concerns grew about the plight of the most vulnerable communities.117 There were also worries that armed groups, including criminal organizations and guerrillas, would take advantage of quarantine to consolidate their influence.118
TABLE 14. COVID-19 STATUS IN RERA SECRETARIAT MUNICIPALITIES
COVID-19 STATUS
CITY POSITIVE CASES ACTIVE CASES RECOVERED DEATHS
Bogotá 35,266 11,853 10,044 797
112 See Pablo Andrés Rivero, Yes but Not Here: Perceptions of Xenophobia and Discrimination towards Venezuelan Migrants in Colombia, Ecuador and Peru (Oxford: Oxfam International, 2019), 3, 8–9. 113 See “El rechazo a los venezolanos que muestra la encuesta de Invamer,” El Espectador, December 5, 2019. 114 Colombia: Impacto humanitario por el COVID-19 - Informe de Situación No. 10 (15/07/2020). UN OCHA. July 15, 2020. https://reliefweb.int/report/colombia/colombia-impacto-humanitario-por-el-covid-19-informe-de- situaci-n-no-10-15072020. 115 In March, President Iván Duque announced a nationwide preventative “quarantine” that is still in effect. The quarantine requires all non-essential workers to stay home except to seek medical care, buy groceries, or visit pharmacies. 116 Domestic Violence in the Context of Covid-19: State Responses & Alliances in Latin America, Inter-American Dialogue, June 15, 2020. https://www.thedialogue.org/blogs/2020/06/domestic-violence-in-the-context-of-covid-19-state- responses-alliances-in-latin-america/. 117 Preliminary projections indicate that up to 3 million people could be severely food insecure in the country. World Food Programme. 118 Broken Ties, Frozen Borders. International Crisis Group. April 2020. https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/b042- broken-ties-frozen-borders.pdf.
USAID.GOV COLOMBIA RAPID EDUCATION AND RISK ANALYSIS | 32 COVID-19 STATUS
CITY POSITIVE CASES ACTIVE CASES RECOVERED DEATHS
Cartagena 6,583 3,383 2,954 454
Barranquilla 9,259 6,434 2,394 422
Cali 5,821 3,126 2,479 216
Soledad 4,330 2,735 1,415 180
Soacha 783 431 341 11
Palmira 119 49 62 8
Medellín 1,332 718 607 7
Maicao 106 69 31 6
Bello 224 118 102 4
Riohacha 39 26 12 1
Source: Instituto Nacional de Salud
Table 14 reveals that the greatest numbers of COVID-19-related cases and deaths are in Bogotá, Cartagena, and Barranquilla. Each of these cities has high numbers of Venezuelan migrants.
NATIONAL DISASTER RISK REDUCTION EFFORTS In 2012, Colombia began an ambitious reform process to establish an effective disaster risk governance framework, with resilience placed at the center of the national policy agenda.119 Colombia’s National Unit for Disaster Risk Management (UNGRD) steers and coordinates stakeholder engagement, through inter- institutional platforms, toward a shared culture of risk. Several channels for whole-of-society participation in policymaking and a commitment to transparency strengthen inclusiveness and accountability in Colombia’s disaster risk governance.120 The National Strategy for Disaster Response sets forth clear roles and responsibilities in emergency preparedness and response and identifies policy priorities. Regular crisis management exercises and drills are organized by the UNGRD, together with stakeholders and a National Crisis Room, which enables effective cooperation in case of a disaster.121
119 In Colombia, the national policy priorities are laid out in the National Development Plan (Plan Nacional de Desarollo, PND); the most recent version of the PND covers 2014-18. The current PND contains five overall policy objectives and a transversal priority on green growth. Disaster risk management is prominently placed in this transversal component of the PND, which demonstrates the government’s recognition of the cross-cutting nature of disaster risk management and the need for embedding it in national sectoral as well as territorial development plans. Plan Nacional de Desarrollo, 2014, and OECD Risk. 120 Risk Governance Scan, OECD. July 9, 2019. https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/sites/eeb81954- en/index.html?itemId=/content/publication/eeb81954-en. 121 Risk Governance Scan, OECD. July 9, 2019. https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/sites/eeb81954- en/index.html?itemId=/content/publication/eeb81954-en.
33 | COLOMBIA RAPID EDUCATION AND RISK ANALYSIS USAID.GOV The OECD found that while Colombia has gained much ground in understanding the risks faced by its communities and economic activities, more granular knowledge and risk assessments could be developed at subnational levels and leveraged in the risk management decisions of municipalities.122
THE EDUCATION SECTOR
OVERVIEW The education sector in Colombia is highly centralized in public budget expenditure, but strongly decentralized in terms of management and administration.123 The Ministry of Education in Bogotá sets overall education policy and school curricula and monitors education quality. At the local level, administrative responsibilities are determined by certification process. All 32 departments and all municipalities of at least 100,000 inhabitants, as well as some smaller municipalities “judged to have sufficient technical, financial, and administrative capacity” have been designated as Certified Territorial Entities.124 These entities implement education policies and oversee public and private schools within their jurisdictions, including the autonomous management of funding and teaching staff. Non-certified municipalities have less autonomy; they fall mostly under the purview of the departments.
In 2016, 90 percent of all public funds for education came from the national budget, and the remaining 10 percent from local and regional budgets. On the other hand, the preschool, basic, and secondary education system is managed by 96 local governments, mostly divided into 32 departments and 64 cities with more than 100,000 inhabitants.125
Similar to many countries, the education system in Colombia is organized into higher education, understood as universities and tertiary education institutions, and preschool, basic, and secondary education, meaning early childhood programs and public and private schools.126
According to official statistics from the Ministry of Education, in March 2020, nearly 9.6 million students were enrolled in preschool, basic, and secondary education in Colombia; 80 percent in public institutions, and 20 percent in private schools.127 The preschool, basic, and secondary education system in Colombia is constituted by almost 19,000 educational institutions and 60,000 school buildings. One school can
122 OECD Public Governance Scan, 2018 (?). https://www.oecd.org/gov/Colombia-Scan-Final-English.pdf 123 School calendars are defined by local education secretariats but approved and monitored by the Ministry. Colombia does not have a national curriculum. Instead, the Ministry of Education defines general guidelines, which teachers adapt to their context, monitored by local education secretariats. As to exams, Colombia has one mandatory national test at grade 11 (mandated by the Ministry and a requirement to finish school and access higher education), and three complementary national tests at grades 3, 5, and 9 (mandated by the Ministry as a policy strategy to measure education quality but not a requirement to continue school studies). 124 Education System Profile: Colombia, WENR, June 23, 2020. https://wenr.wes.org/2020/06/education-in- colombia-2. 125 PISA 2018 Results; Combined Executive Summaries, Volumes I, II & III. Organisation for Economic Co- operation and Development, 2019, https://www.oecd.org/pisa/Combined_Executive_Summaries_PISA_2018.pdf. 126 The organization of these levels is reflected in the organization of the Ministry of Education, which has a Vice Ministry for tertiary education and a Vice Ministry for preschool, basic, and secondary education. 127 “Estadísticas sectoriales de educación preescolar, básica y media, Datos Abiertos MEN”. Colombian National Ministry of Education. Bogotá, Colombia, May 14, 2020, https://www.mineducacion.gov.co/1759/w3- propertyvalue-57277.html?_noredirect=1.
USAID.GOV COLOMBIA RAPID EDUCATION AND RISK ANALYSIS | 34 consist of various school buildings, often due to the geographic location of students. This is particularly true for most of the rural schools in Colombia, which represent 80 percent of the public school buildings, but only 24 percent of the national enrollment. Of the nearly 35,000 rural public schools in the country, more than 29,000 serve between 1 and 50 students, and only 2,000 serve more than 1,000 students.128
PUBLIC BUDGET EXPENDITURES Education is a national priority in Colombia. Since 2016, the Colombian government has maintained the policy of investing the highest public expenditures in the education sector above other sectors.129 In 2016, the public investment in education represented 9.8 percent of the total government expenditures, of which 7.4 percentage points were allocated to preschool, basic, and secondary school, and the remaining 2.4 points to higher education. In 2020, the public investment in the education sector was established at nearly $12 billion, which is the highest value invested in education from public resources in the history of the country.130
Public expenditure on teachers is comparatively high, leaving less for other education investments. In terms of distribution across the education system, the Colombian government allocates 84 percent for public school teacher salaries—far higher than the OECD average of 63 percent—and 7 percent for other educational staff, leaving 9 percent for education expenses depending on national, regional, and local governments policies. More than 90 percent of the total public expenditure in education is invested in staff, and less than 10 percent is allocated to investing in education resources, such as infrastructure, nutrition, teacher training, pedagogic resources, connectivity, etc.131
When considering control over education resources, schools in Colombia have less autonomy than the average schools in OECD countries. In a 2015 PISA study, Colombian principals and teachers had 24 percent of the responsibility for resources, compared to 42 percent for other OECD countries; 61 percent of the responsibility for the curriculum, compared to 66 percent across OECD countries; and 31 percent of the responsibility for student assessment, compared to 68 percent across OECD countries.132 It is worth noting, however, that in this study Colombia was ranked just under Singapore (slightly more autonomy) and just above France (slightly less autonomy).
128 “Orientaciones para la prestación del servicio educativo en el marco de la emergencia sanitaria por el COVID- 19.” Directiva Ministerial #011, Colombian National Ministry of Education. Bogotá, May 29, 2020, https://www.mineducacion.gov.co/1759/articles-398622_recurso_1.pdf. 129 “Entre 2010 y 2018 inversión en educación pasó de $20,8 billones a $37,5 billones y se convirtió en el primer rubro del Presupuesto Nacional,” Colombian National Ministry of Education. Bogotá, June 12, 2018, http://es.presidencia.gov.co/noticia/180612-Entre-2010-y-2018-inversion-en-Educacion-paso-de-20-8-billones-a-37- 5-billones-y-se-convirtio-en-el-primer-rubro-del-Presupuesto-Nacional. 130 “Aprobado presupuesto de educación 2020: honrando los acuerdos y siendo el más alto presupuesto de la historia para el sector.” Colombian National Ministry of Education. Bogotá, October 17, 2019, https://www.mineducacion.gov.co/1759/w3-article-389254.html?_noredirect=1. 131 PISA 2018 Results; Combined Executive Summaries”, Volumes I, II & III. Organisation for Economic Co- operation and Development, 2019, https://www.oecd.org/pisa/Combined_Executive_Summaries_PISA_2018.pdf. 132 PISA 2015 Results (Volume II): Policies and Practices for Successful Schools, PISA. Paris: OECD Publishing, http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264267510-en. Cited in Laura Heras Recuero and Eduardo Olaberría, “Public spending in education and students’ performance in Colombia.” OECD, February 2018, https://www.oecd- ilibrary.org/docserver/282d9700- en.pdf?expires=1594948368&id=id&accname=guest&checksum=7136E1B09B3622E409FCA6D340DF0DC0.
35 | COLOMBIA RAPID EDUCATION AND RISK ANALYSIS USAID.GOV Spending inefficiencies in the education sector remain. Per-student spending is in line with Colombia’s income level, but expenditure on early childhood education is still low, and the enrollment rate (at age 4) is lower than in peer countries. It is particularly low among poor families and in rural areas. Staff spending on preschool, primary, and secondary education contributes to reducing inequality. However, spending on tertiary education is regressive.133
EDUCATION ACCESS AND QUALITY Colombia has made notable progress over the last two decades increasing student enrollment rates.134 Moreover, it has done so alongside improving learning outcomes. Colombia has expanded access to secondary and upper secondary education. Since 2011, public education is free in Colombia. Between 2006 and 2016, gross coverage in upper secondary (grades 10 and 11) and secondary (grades 6 to 9) education increased by 10.6 and 7.37 percent, respectively.135 However, improvement in education outcomes have not kept up. Educational achievements as measured by the PISA results remain low, with students underperforming in math, science, and reading tests.136 Based on 2018 PISA results, Colombia’s performance in reading (412 points) and math (391 points) ranks only slightly above the Latin American averages of 407 and 388 points, respectively, and quite far from the OECD averages of 487 and 489 points.137 Furthermore, educational achievements vary greatly across the income distribution, limiting income mobility across generations.138
The World Bank has found that the Colombian education system exacerbates early childhood socioeconomic inequalities. This results in large inequalities in youth skills, which in turn lead to poor labor market outcomes. The World Bank further reported that the upper secondary education system does not equip graduates with the right skills for productive employment, and, despite progress in access and equity, only a limited share of youth reach tertiary education and attend programs of certified quality.139
Based on the National 10-year Education Plan 2016–2026,140 during the last decade, the urban-rural net coverage gap was reduced by 11 percent. This came as a result of national education policies such as the
133 Colombia Policy Notes, World Bank, 2018. 134 Education in Colombia, Reviews of National Policies for Education, OECD, http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264250604-en. 135 Plan Nacional Decenal de Educación 2016–2026; “El camino hacia la calidad y la equidad,” Colombian National Ministry of Education, Bogotá, October 11, 2019, http://www.plandecenal.edu.co/cms/media/herramientas/PNDE%20FINAL_ISBN%20web.pdf. 136 Colombia has a strong culture of learning assessments with annual assessments of 3rd, 5th, and 9th grade students since 2012. 137 For comparison, the highest reading scores were 555 (China) and 549 (Singapore); the highest scores in math were 591 (China) and 569 (Singapore). U.S. scores were 505 (reading) and 478 (math). Informe Nacional de Resultados para Colombia – PISA 2018, Instituto Colombiano para la Evaluación de la Educación – ICFES, Bogotá, January 2020, https://www.icfes.gov.co/documents/20143/1529295/Informe%20nacional%20de%20resultados%20PISA%202018.p df 138 Colombia Policy Notes, World Bank, 2018. 139 Colombia Policy Notes, World Bank, 2018. 140 Plan Nacional Decenal de Educación 2016–2026; “El camino hacia la calidad y la equidad,” Colombian National Ministry of Education, Bogotá, October 11, 2019, http://www.plandecenal.edu.co/cms/media/herramientas/PNDE%20FINAL_ISBN%20web.pdf.
USAID.GOV COLOMBIA RAPID EDUCATION AND RISK ANALYSIS | 36 free public school policy implemented through grade 9 since 2008 and extended through grade 11 in 2011. Although Colombia has increased its education coverage indicators during recent years, the main gaps and challenges are mostly related to quality education access within urban and rural communities and socioeconomic groups.
Dropout rates in Colombia have been declining in recent years. Based on Ministry of Education data, in 2010, national school dropout indicators were 5 percent for secondary, 5 percent for primary, and 4 percent for early childhood students. In 2017, those numbers were 4 percent for secondary, 2 percent for primary, and 4 percent for early childhood students.141 The World Bank reported that in 2018, 17 percent of students who completed grade 5 (primary) dropped out in the transition to grade 6.142
Youth report that the main reasons why they drop out are their lack of interest and a perceived lack of relevance of education. The World Bank found the two most commonly cited reasons for males to drop out are lack of interest (36 percent) and a reported need to work (17 percent). For 11 percent of females who dropped out, pregnancy was the main reason. For an additional 18 percent, the main reason was taking care of the family.143 United Way also found that 26 percent of students who drop out do so because they are not interested in their studies.
Out of School Children and Youth: A Snapshot
• Approximately 1.2 million Colombian children (11 percent of all school age children) currently do not receive any formal education. • Only about 88 percent of those who enroll in primary school stay there until the final primary grade. • Children in rural Colombia are far more likely to drop out of school early than students in urban settings. On average, rural children receive 5.5 years of education, while children from urban areas stay in school for 9.2 years. Illiteracy rates among children over 15 years old are 12.5 percent— almost four times higher than those in urban areas (3.3 percent). • Some of the many reasons why children drop out of school include barriers to access, such as the stigma surrounding disability and special educational needs, the invisible borders faced by children living in neighborhoods controlled by gangs, or the long distances and lack of infrastructure children in rural areas face when travelling to their nearest school. • Factors such as family breakdown, the pressure to work or care for younger siblings, the costs of books and uniforms, early pregnancy or marriage, or violence in schools and the local community also force children to drop out of school early.
Source: Children Change Colombia: Exclusion from Education
Colombia has also taken important steps to professionalize its teaching workforce. The 2002 teaching statute (1278) and subsequent regulations have introduced a centrally managed, fair, and transparent
141 The 4 percent school dropout rate for early childhood students represents both children that leave early childhood but enroll in primary school and children who never go on to primary school. In Colombia, it is not mandatory to finish early childhood programs in order to enroll in primary school. Publicación Datos registrados en el Sistema de Información de la Educación para el Trabajo y el Desarrollo Humano – SIET, Colombian National Ministry of Education, June 24, 2020. https://www.mineducacion.gov.co/1759/w3-article-353023.html?_noredirect=1. 142 Colombia Policy Notes, World Bank, 2018. 143 Colombia Policy Notes, World Bank, 2018.
37 | COLOMBIA RAPID EDUCATION AND RISK ANALYSIS USAID.GOV teacher selection process. Previously, recruitment was conducted by secretariats.144 The statute also raised entrance requirements (all teachers must have a degree from a higher teaching school),145 made the salary structure more attractive, made entry into subject teaching more open and flexible, and introduced teacher evaluations.
The organization and management of professional development is largely the responsibility of the local education secretariats. The Ministry of Education has developed and implemented national initiatives to strengthen the quality of education through its budget for investment projects. It should be noted that schools have considerable freedom in making pedagogical and curricular decisions, as well as established platforms for participation in school governance. Teachers have a prominent role in school decision- making through their participation in the school’s directive and academic councils (consejo directivo and consejo académico).146
The majority of Colombian public school teachers are male (66 percent).147 The majority of the 330,000 Colombian teachers (65 percent) work in urban areas, while 35 percent are located in rural communities.148 Compared to other countries, teachers in Colombia have a relatively large teaching load.149 The salaries of Colombian teachers compare favorably to the labor market overall.
Colombia is a multicultural society with more than 102 ethnic groups and some 64 spoken indigenous languages. However, Spanish is the official language and predominant language of instruction. In some
144 Since 2006, the recruitment process has been administered centrally by the National Civil Service Commission in collaboration with the Ministry of Education and ICFES, the institute responsible for educational evaluation. The process is based on a score system and entails a written knowledge and competency examination, a psychometric test, a check of credentials, and an interview. The process is highly competitive and selective (approximately 9 percent of applicants passed the process in 2016). “The Development of the Teaching Profession in Colombia,” in OECD Reviews of School Resources: Colombia 2018, https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/docserver/9789264303751-8- en.pdf?expires=1594962193&id=id&accname=guest&checksum=32940C31D1E5A1E7395ED936CB0786D8. 145 Data from international surveys show that teachers in Colombia are relatively highly qualified. According to data from the UNESCO TERCE, more than 8 in 10 Colombian teachers have a post-secondary degree, above the Latin American average. See: Tercer Estudio Regional Comparativo y Explicativo (TERCE) Informe de Resultados Factores Asociados. Data from the OECD PISA 2015 also reveal that, in the schools attended by 15-year-olds, 82 percent of science teachers in Colombia have a university degree with a major in science, above the OECD average (74 percent) and countries in the region. See: PISA 2015 Results (Volume II): Policies and Practices for Successful Schools, PISA, OECD, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264267510-en. 146 “The Development of the Teaching Profession in Colombia,” in OECD Reviews of School Resources: Colombia 2018, https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/docserver/9789264303751-8- en.pdf?expires=1594962193&id=id&accname=guest&checksum=32940C31D1E5A1E7395ED936CB0786D8. 147 “The Development of the Teaching Profession in Colombia,” in OECD Reviews of School Resources: Colombia 2018, https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/docserver/9789264303751-8- en.pdf?expires=1594962193&id=id&accname=guest&checksum=32940C31D1E5A1E7395ED936CB0786D8. 148 “Estadísticas sectoriales de educación preescolar, básica y media, Datos Abiertos MEN.” Colombian National Ministry of Education, Bogotá, May 14, 2020. https://www.mineducacion.gov.co/1759/w3-propertyvalue- 57277.html?_noredirect=1. 149 For example, primary teachers are required to teach at least 1,000 hours annually, placing them only behind Chile, Costa Rica, and Switzerland among countries with available data. They also teach 40 weeks per year, above most OECD countries except Australia, Germany, Japan, and Mexico, as well as Brazil and Costa Rica in the region. OECD, Education at a Glance 2017: OECD Indicators, http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/eag-2017-en.
USAID.GOV COLOMBIA RAPID EDUCATION AND RISK ANALYSIS | 38 regions, indigenous and other languages are used as the medium of instruction alongside Spanish. A new native language law, adopted in 2010, strengthened etnoeducación and bilingualism.150
There are three types of teachers in Colombia for ethnic minorities, including Raizal, Afro-Colombian, and indigenous. According to Ministry of Education data, in 2017, students from ethnic minorities represented 11 percent of enrollment in compulsory education (820,337 students). About half of these students were Afro-Colombian, and the other half were indigenous (52 percent and 48 percent, respectively). Teachers for these ethnic groups should be recruited in negotiation between the ethnic communities and the responsible secretariat, with preference given to members of the local community.151
Student-to-teacher ratios in Colombia are high. There are 24 students for every teacher in primary education, 9 more than on average for OECD countries. At the secondary level, the ratio of children to teachers is 26, double the OECD average of 13. In public secondary schools in Colombia, there are as many as 27 children per teacher, whereas there are only 22 students for every teacher in private secondary schools.152 A 2018 OECD report found that 5 percent of students were in schools where principals reported teacher absenteeism.153
Major gender gaps are not found in education, but they are found in the transition to work. The World Bank notes that gaps in enrollment are negligible, while a small reverse gender gap is seen in attainment at the secondary and higher educational levels. Gender segregation by field of study exists, but it is not as marked as in most OECD countries. However, the share of women not in education, employment, or training (NEETs, i.e., youth aged 16 to 24 out-of-school and not working) is twice that of men.154
EDUCATION AND COVID-19 Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, the Colombian government declared a national public health emergency on March 16, 2020, closing all private and public schools and suspending physical school attendance across
150 Education System Profile: Colombia, WENR, June 23, 2020, https://wenr.wes.org/2020/06/education-in- colombia-2. 151 The decree on ethnic education also establishes objectives for the preparation of teachers of these groups, which should be specified through guidelines provided by the Ministry of Education. Educators in communities with their own linguistic tradition need to be bilingual. “The Development of the Teaching Profession in Colombia,” in OECD Reviews of School Resources: Colombia 2018, https://www.oecd- ilibrary.org/docserver/9789264303751-8- en.pdf?expires=1594962193&id=id&accname=guest&checksum=32940C31D1E5A1E7395ED936CB0786D8. 152 Education at a Glance: Colombia. OECD. 2019. https://read.oecd-ilibrary.org/education/education-at-a-glance- 2019_f8d7880d-en#page1 153 The Development of the Teaching Profession in Colombia. Chapter in OECD Reviews of School Resources: Colombia. 2018 154 In 2017, 34 percent of women that age were NEETs compared to 14 percent of men. In rural areas, the percentage of women NEETs is nearly 5 times that of men (48 percent of women compared to 10 percent of young men in 2017). Performance and Learning Review of the Country Partnership Framework for the Republic of Colombia FY 2016-21, World Bank, April 23, 2019, http://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/976431558749696878/pdf/Colombia-Performance-and-Learning- Review-of-the-Country-Partnership-Framework-for-the-Period-FY16-21.pdf.
39 | COLOMBIA RAPID EDUCATION AND RISK ANALYSIS USAID.GOV the country.155 Nationally, all schools were directed to conduct distance learning, whether or not students had access to the necessary technology. On March 25, 2020, the ministry instituted the Aprende en Casa (learn at home) strategy.156 Aprende en Casa aims to give flexible pedagogical tools to the educational community to ensure student learning at home. Aprende en Casa includes four communication channels: television, radio, digital, and physical.
While more than 60 percent of urban school students have internet connections to engage in distance learning strategies, only 15 percent of rural school students have the same access. Furthermore, in nearly 96 percent of the country’s municipalities, fewer than half of the students have access to technological resources for virtual education programs, and the southeast region of the country appears the worst off.157 According to DANE, of the Colombian households with children between 5 and 18 years of age who attend school, only 18 percent of students from socio-economic strata 1, 52 percent from strata 2 and 73.9 percent from strata 3 have an internet connection.158 Colombia has long developed radio and TV education strategies, and the Ministry of Education is currently developing strategies to respond to the COVID-19 crisis.159
In April, the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Information Technology and Communications announced three initiatives to facilitate connectivity access for teachers, parents, and students in rural and urban areas of the country. The first was the creation of a free mobile portal, which integrates text, animations, and images, according to each school level. The second was a strategy called Última Milla (the last mile) program, which brings internet connectivity at low cost to the most disadvantaged homes (strata 1 and 2). The third initiative involves the targeted delivery of 77,000 computers with preloaded educational content, which work with or without internet connectivity, to be distributed to teachers in 637 schools in rural areas.160
The Ministry of Education also trained teachers for home study. The ministry trained 4,000 tutors from the Todos por Aprender (PTA) Program to advise teachers on learning from home approaches. The tutors were accompanied by 80 trainers, who accompanied them in the preparation of learning guides in May and June. This year, the PTA has a presence in 14,476 schools in 798 municipalities in Colombia, 74 percent of which are in rural areas.161
Most local governments decided to declare early school vacations from March 16 to April 1 to have time to create remote learning strategies. A limited number of local governments, such as Bogotá, opted to
155 Reimers, Forero, Jaramillo “Colombia: Alianza Educativa (AE) (Educational Alliance): Education continuity during the Coronavirus crisis,” 2020, https://oecdedutoday.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/Colombia-Alianza- Educativa.pdf?fbclid=IwAR0OsXdGotnzdA2lcuwIObsjoy6k69zn08cKNekHcsNZYf4-VzBXjD6CvWk. 156 Directiva No. 5 del 25 de marzo de 2020, Ministerio de Educación. 157 Abadía, 2020, “El Reto que el Sector Educativo en Colombia debe Superar tras la Pandemia”. Revista “Hoy en la Javeriana,” Universidad Javeriana, Bogotá, March 2020, https://www.javeriana.edu.co/documents/12789/11569759/P%C3%A1g.+9.+El+ reto+del+sector+educativo.+HJ+marzo+2020+web.pdf/bf0db075-be31-413f-8496-e6d72ec72bf9. 158 DANE Twitter Page, available at: https://twitter.com/dane_colombia/status/1272185036054441987?lang=en. 159 https://www.mineducacion.gov.co/1759/w3-article-394102.html?_noredirect=1. 160 “Aprende en Casa, la estrategia de la educación en Bogotá,” El Tiempo, April 27, 2020, https://www.eltiempo.com/mas-contenido/aprende-en-casa-la-estrategia-de-la-educacion-en-bogota-488534. 161 Ministerio de Educación capacita a 4 mil tutores en el desarrollo de estrategias para el estudio en casa de niños, niñas y jóvenes durante el Aislamiento Preventivo Obligatorio. Ministry of Education, May 13, 2020.
USAID.GOV COLOMBIA RAPID EDUCATION AND RISK ANALYSIS | 40 implement diverse educational continuity strategies during this time.162 The government made an initial allocation of $92.5 million to Territorial Entities Certified in Education through an emergency mitigation fund. These resources supported sanitizing schools and obtaining personal protective equipment for students, teachers, directors, and administrative personnel to help start school under the alternative scheme.163
COVID-19 Adaptation Case Study: Bogotá164
The Bogotá Municipal Secretary of Education did not close schools but chose to implement a strategy of educational continuity called Aprende en Casa (Learn at Home).
The strategy comprises five components:
1. The creation of a web portal with curated education resources to support learning at home. This site (Edusitio) includes over 600 resources, such as class videos for all subjects and grades, webinars, social media interactions, and resources for reading aloud with BibloRed en Mi Casa, a project in association with the Ministry of Culture. 2. Educational television and radio programs, which are broadcast twice a day on national TV channels and radio stations with content for all ages and subjects. 3. Aprende en Casa Toca Tu Puerta, which distributes printed educational materials for homes with no internet access, including books, worksheets, games, and brochures for games and activities and a Kit en Casa, which includes science study guides, games, and family activities for preschool and primary students. 4. Programa de Alimentación Escolar en Casa, which offers school meals distributed to each house through different strategies. 5. Mesas de Apoyo Técnico y Pedagógico to support offices available from 7 a.m. to 4 p.m. for the entire education community looking for advice on technological or pedagogical issues.
Aprende en Casa also forged partnerships with the private sector to provide internet and mobile data and to loan computers and devices to families without access.
Source: Santamaría and Reimers, “Colombia: Aprende en Casa” (2020)
The mayor of Bogotá has also called on business leaders, foundations, organizations, and citizens in general to support the most vulnerable students in the city who lacks devices and internet connectivity. A #DonatónPorLosNiños will be held from June 29 to July 31 and seeks to collect a large number of new and
162 Reimers, Sanz de Santamaría, 2020. “Colombia: Aprende en Casa (Learning at home): Education continuity during the Coronavirus crisis,” https://oecdedutoday.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/Colombia-Bogota- Aprende-en-Casa.pdf?fbclid=IwAR1UA8-N30oy3jztqhl46_BBAp0BseEKwzqAmdU65GBCyJ-3_W-HSpsTPTM. 163 Ministry of Education, El Gobierno Nacional avanza con las Secretarías de Educación del País en la generación de condiciones que fortalezcan los procesos educativos con trabajo académico en casa y en presencialidad bajo el esquema de alternancia, July 13, 2020, https://www.mineducacion.gov.co/portal/micrositios-institucionales/COVID- 19/393903:Informacion-de-interes. 164 Santamaría, M., and Reimers, F. Colombia: Aprende en Casa. World Bank/OECD, 2020. https://oecdedutoday.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/Colombia-Bogota-Aprende-en- Casa.pdf?fbclid=IwAR1UA8-N30oy3jztqhl46_BBAp0BseEKwzqAmdU65GBCyJ-3_W-HSpsTPTM.
41 | COLOMBIA RAPID EDUCATION AND RISK ANALYSIS USAID.GOV used tablets, desktops, and laptops, donating them to the most vulnerable students, identified and georeferenced by the local education secretariat. The government will guarantee connectivity in beneficiary households with devices donated by citizens.
On May 29, 2020, the Ministry of Education presented a series of protocols for local governments to analyze the viability of reopening of schools, following the guidelines of the national and local public health institutions as part of the efforts to contain the COVID-19 pandemic.165 The ministry recently stated that schools in 34 territorial entities166 will advance their implementation of the partial, gradual, and progressive alternating education scheme. In these territories, academic activities will begin in municipalities that have no cases or minimal cases of COVID-19. Other schools will continue to implement home-based learning.
In parallel, 62 Territorial Entities Certified in Education will continue during August with academic work at home. These territories will continue preparing protocols and constantly evaluating the situation.
Indigenous communities have decided, in conjunction with secretariats of education and the ministry, to return to the alternating school scheme.
VENEZUELAN MIGRANT STUDENTS Venezuelan migration to Colombia has had a significant impact on the country’s education system. In 2019, more than 200,000 Venezuelan children and adolescents were enrolled in Colombian schools, most of them studying in public schools. Additionally, estimates conclude that the out-of-school Venezuelan population in Colombia could total more than 120,000 children and adolescents.167 Key barriers to Venezuelan migrant student access to school in Colombia are reported to be distance to school, availability of transport, available school places, the need to work (for adolescent children), indirect school costs, and Colombian documentation requirements.
A UNICEF-Child Resilience Alliance study offers important insights into the perspectives of Venezuelan students in Colombia. A general misalignment between the education systems of the two countries is a central factor in Venezuelan student performance and the risk of over-ageing. Language is reported to be an important challenge, as well, with respondents in the study reporting they have difficulty understanding their Colombian teachers.168 Nearly all (96 percent) of male adolescents and 89 percent of female
165 “Orientaciones para la prestación del servicio educativo en el marco de la emergencia sanitaria por el COVID- 19”. Directiva Ministerial #011, Colombian National Ministry of Education. Bogotá, May 29, 2020, https://www.mineducacion.gov.co/1759/articles-398622_recurso_1.pdf. 166 Apartadó, Arauca, Barrancabermeja, Boyacá, Bucaramanga, Buenaventura, Caldas, Casanare, Cesar, Chocó, Ciénaga, Dosquebradas , Guainía, Guaviare, Itagüí, Jamundí, La Guajira, Magdalena, Medellín, Meta, Neiva, Norte de Santander, Palmira, Pereira, Putumayo, Sabaneta, San Andres de Tumaco, Santa Marta, Sogamoso, Sucre, Valle del Cauca, Valledupar, Vichada, and Villavicencio. 167 Impact of the Migratory Flow of Venezuelan Children and Adolescents on the Colombian System, Child Resilience Alliance and UNICEF, February 2020. 168 The UNICEF-Child Resilience Alliance study found that 89 percent of Venezuelan adolescent female students and 73 percent of Venezuelan male adolescent students had difficulty understanding their Colombian teachers. Impact of the Migratory Flow of Venezuelan Children and Adolescents on the Colombian System, Child Resilience Alliance and UNICEF, February 2020.
USAID.GOV COLOMBIA RAPID EDUCATION AND RISK ANALYSIS | 42 adolescents explain that they are victims of bullying related to the way they speak, their origin, their economic situation, and stereotypes about migrants’ conditions.
Given the traumatic experience of migration, the social-emotional well-being of Venezuelan students is under strain. While nearly half of migrant teenagers feel that they are being supported by teachers, few Venezuelan respondents claimed to have friends to help them (11 percent for females, 16 percent for males). According to the study, psychosocial care is one of the principal needs of Venezuelan students in Colombian schools.169
Attending to the needs of these students has been a major concern for the Colombian government, which in 2018 allocated between 0.19 and 0.42 percent of GDP to social programs for Venezuelan students. As of September 2019, the influx of Venezuelan students represented an increase in enrollment of more than 498 percent.170 Based on figures provided by SIMAT, as of September 2019, 145,088 Venezuelan migrant children were enrolled in preschool and primary school, and 50,705 in secondary and media/technical education, out of a total of 203,606.171
TABLE 15. VENEZUELAN STUDENTS IN RERA SAMPLE SCHOOLS, BY NUMBER AND PERCENTAGE
COLOMBIAN/ VENEZUELANS OTHER AS % OF SECRETARIAT VENEZUELANS NATIONALITIES TOTAL STUDENTS
Maicao 5,045 45,524 50,569 10%
Riohacha 4,773 54,723 59,496 8%
Cartagena 13,915 202,768 216,683 6%
Soledad 6,897 106,057 112,954 6%
Medellín 21,628 403,387 425,015 5%
Barranquilla 13,186 246,266 259,452 5%
Bello 3,614 78,834 82,448 4%
Cali 13,963 344,290 358,253 4%
Bogotá 46,758 1,220,505 1,267,263 4%
Palmira 2,020 56,364 58,384 3%
Soacha 4,290 122,936 127,226 3% Source: Ministry of Education
169 Impact of the Migratory Flow of Venezuelan Children and Adolescents on the Colombian System, Child Resilience Alliance and UNICEF, February 2020. 170 SIMAT, quoted in Impact of the Migratory Flow of Venezuelan Children and Adolescents on the Colombian System, Child Resilience Alliance and UNICEF, February 2020. 171 SIMAT data, quoted in Impact of the Migratory Flow of Venezuelan Children and Adolescents on the Colombian System, Child Resilience Alliance and UNICEF, February 2020.
43 | COLOMBIA RAPID EDUCATION AND RISK ANALYSIS USAID.GOV Table 15 above shows that the highest percentages of Venezuelan students are found in Maicao, Riohacha, Cartagena, and Soledad.
Colombia has made significant efforts to innovate and adapt its education systems to accommodate Venezuelan migrant students. Initially the law required migrants to have a Special Permission to Reside (PEP) an identification number or a foreign identity card (Joint Circular No. 01 of 2017) in order to be granted a place in school.172 Colombia issues unique identification numbers for school-aged children with irregular immigration status. Possession of an Identity Number Established by the Secretariat (Número de Identificación Establecido por la Secretaría, or NES) allows these children, who otherwise would not have a valid Colombian form of identification, to enroll in school.173 The only requirement to receive a NES is for the child’s parents to swear they are in the process of trying to regularize the child’s status, as children cannot graduate from high school (grade 11) if they are in irregular status. Generally, Venezuelan students should also provide an apostilled certificate of past studies. If they do not have one, they can take an exam to determine their grade level.174
Often teachers and school staff developed strategies on their own initiative to make admission requirements more flexible. Lessons from having to manage years of displacement helped equip teachers and staff to find ways to accommodate the migrants.175
EMERGENCY EDUCATION AND RISK REDUCTION The Colombian education system has an established institutional regulatory framework for education in emergencies and risk management. However, challenges have persisted in the development and implementation of disaster preparedness and disaster risk reduction programs. The National Office for Disaster Risk Management (Unidad Nacional de Gestión al Riesgo de Desastres) is the public institution that leads the emergency response system, defining the national guidelines to be used for other public institutions, including the ministry of education and regional and local governments.
The regulatory framework on risk and disaster management was created more than 30 years ago and has shifted from focusing on disaster response to managing conflict and violence risks. In 1988, the national system for preparedness and response to disasters was established, and in 1992, disaster prevention guidelines were incorporated, for the first time, in the education sector.176 In 2011, risks related to
172 Impact of the Migratory Flow of Venezuelan Children and Adolescents on the Colombian System, Child Resilience Alliance and UNICEF, February 2020. 173 Migration Colombia, Circular Conjunta Nº 16. 174 The exams are given at certain schools designated by the education secretariat, and they cover math, language, and social sciences, but not history. Migration Policy Institute. 175 In the event migrant families lack documentation, some teachers have allowed migrant students to enroll using a letter from families promising to obtain the documentation. However, only 50% of surveyed Venezuelan parents said that they had received information on school enrollment procedures, and for 22% of the parents, the problems they experienced most in attempting to enroll their children were the lack of necessary documentation and lack of knowledge about how to register their child. Impact of the Migratory Flow of Venezuelan Children and Adolescents on the Colombian System, Child Resilience Alliance and UNICEF, February 2020. 176 “Marco legal del sistema nacional para la atención y prevención de desastres,” Unidad Nacional para la Gestión del Riesgo de Desastres – UNGRD. Bogotá, 2014, http://www.gestiondelriesgo.gov.co/snigrd/pagina.aspx?id=13.
USAID.GOV COLOMBIA RAPID EDUCATION AND RISK ANALYSIS | 44 violence and armed conflict were included in school plans for emergency education response and prevention, as part of the national law of victims and land restitution.177
Emergency education and risk management policies are mostly defined and financed by the Ministry of Education and implemented by local governments. Consequently, schools are in charge of developing their disaster preparedness and disaster risk reduction plans, following the national guidelines, monitored by local governments, and supported by the Education Cluster.
There are multiple programs that support schools in preventing drug use and delinquency. These include: the DARE program of the Colombian National Police, Future Colombia of the Office of the Attorney General of the Nation, the Laboratories of Listening and Citizen Coexistence Strategy Security RED of the Ministry of Interior, the Strong Families program, Love and Limits of the Ministry of Justice, the Healthy Schools program of the Ministry of Health, and various programs with community-based approaches. Many of these programs are centralized in design and management and lack continuity and evaluation.178
RERA FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS
This section presents and analyzes the findings from the closed-ended, quantitative survey and open- ended, qualitative interviews conducted remotely with school communities, in particular students, teachers, principals, parents, and community members. Findings are not representative of or generalizable to the sampling frame or wider Colombian society. Instead, they offer insights into the range of opinions and ideas of those who were purposefully selected to participate in the RERA.
Responses to the survey are presented in tables. The number (n) of survey responses for each table is 457, unless otherwise indicated when respondents could select more than one response. For interviews, numerical counts or percentages refer to responses given during interviews, not the number of interviews or respondents. Responses to open-ended interview questions were coded and analyzed across and within groups (for example, disaggregating by respondent type, community, and gender), as well as across locations.
The findings are broadly organized around the RERA’s main research questions, which are organized into three broad categories, as shown in Table 16.
177“Ley de Víctimas y Restitución de Tierras,” Ley 1448 de 2011. Colombian Ministry of Justice. Bogotá, 2011, http://www.justiciatransicional.gov.co/Normatividad/Ley-de-V%C3%ADctimas-y-Restituci%C3%B3n-de- Tierras#:~:text=Ley%201448%20de%202011%20(Ley,y%20se%20dictan%20otras%20disposiciones. 178 Expert interview.
45 | COLOMBIA RAPID EDUCATION AND RISK ANALYSIS USAID.GOV TABLE 16. CATEGORIES AND MAIN RESEARCH QUESTIONS
CATEGORY RERA RESEARCH QUESTIONS
What is the two-way interaction between the education system and the main contextual Contextual Risk and risks in migration-affected areas? Education Interaction What is the status of equitable education access (including gender and disability), the learning environment, teaching, and learning in migration-affected areas?
Impact of Venezuelan What is the impact of Venezuelan migration on government and non-government school Migration communities at the primary and secondary levels?
School Community What resilience factors positively influence access to and the safety and quality of Resilience education, and how can these factors be strengthened?
CONTEXTUAL RISKS
NATURAL HAZARDS Quarantined due to COVID-19, respondents unsurprisingly cited epidemics as the priority disaster risk. As this RERA was conducted while COVID-19 infections were still growing in Colombia, all sample locations were under quarantine or mobility restrictions. In the survey, 31 percent of respondents across all locations pointed to epidemics as the main risk (Table 17). The highest risk of epidemic was perceived by respondents to be in Barranquilla (40 percent), Palmira (39 percent), and Bogotá (36 percent).
The other most-cited disaster risks across secretariats were flooding (21 percent) and earthquakes (20 percent). Respondents in Cali alone cited a different disaster risk—flooding—as their highest disaster (34 percent). Secretariats on the Caribbean coast reported flooding as their next highest risk—in Cartagena (28 percent), Soledad (27 percent), Riohacha (24 percent), and Maicao (20 percent).
According to Table 17, the highest reports of epidemic risk were in Cali, Cartagena, Riohacha, and Soledad; earthquake risk was cited mostly in Soacha, Cali, Palmira, and Bogotá; storms (gales) were noted the most in Soledad and Barranquilla; and landslides were mainly mentioned by respondents in Bello, Riohacha, Maicao, and Soacha. It is important to note that each school community cited all of these risk categories.
There were 12 interview mentions of earthquake risk in the sample, coming from respondents in seven secretariats, with only one respondent recalling a previous earthquake event.
USAID.GOV COLOMBIA RAPID EDUCATION AND RISK ANALYSIS | 46 TABLE 17. NATURAL HAZARD RISK, BY SECRETARIAT
NATURAL HAZARD RISK
DON’T KNOW/ NO SECRETARIAT EPIDEMIC FLOODING EARTHQUAKE STORMS LANDSLIDES RESPONSE
Barranquilla 40% 16% 11% 23% 10% 0%
Bello 32% 13% 18% 18% 20% 0%
Bogotá 36% 16% 29% 13% 7% 0%
Cali 26% 34% 28% 9% 3% 0%
Cartagena 29% 28% 17% 16% 11% 0%
Maicao 27% 20% 21% 16% 15% 0%
Palmira 39% 13% 29% 14% 5% 0%
Riohacha 27% 24% 14% 22% 14% 0%
Soacha 29% 18% 32% 7% 14% 0%
Soledad 27% 27% 11% 30% 5% 0%
Total* 31% 21% 20% 17% 10% 0% *Respondents could select more than one type.
Food insecurity emerged as a significant concern among respondents in all towns. The lack of food is closely associated with the COVID-19 crisis. The socioeconomic strata of the RERA sample communities indicate high levels of poverty, which have been exacerbated by the social restrictions imposed to curb the outbreak and the loss of livelihoods. Respondents described a lack of food or the need to seek food assistance 72 times in interviews. Many respondents cited neighborhood efforts to share and distribute food for those in need, and explained how a lack of food played a role in keeping children out of school (see the discussion on out-of-school children and youth under Access). Often, school feeding programs serve as the principal source of food for entire families. A Venezuelan parent said, “The coronavirus has caused many problems—people are in need because they haven't been able to go out to work, and there is a lot of desperation for food in the community where I live.” A Colombian student put it bluntly: “If we don’t have money for food, we won’t have money for computers.” In one school community, the school provides food assistance to all families irrespective of nationality, which is crucial for Venezuelan migrants who are not in SISBEN, but may be registered in SIMAT.
Respondents in several secretariats described how their schools flood or how flooding prevents access to school. In interviews, 25 mentions from 6 secretariats referred to how schools were regularly flooded, and another 10 respondents recalled how flooding in the surrounding areas prevented students from accessing school. Flooding occurs either due to the vulnerable location of the school, for instance near streams and sewers, or vulnerabilities in the school building itself. As one student in Soledad said, “The school is affected because it floods when it rains. The water is almost up to our hips. There is glass and mud, and we have to walk around without shoes.” A teacher in Soledad said, “The land
47 | COLOMBIA RAPID EDUCATION AND RISK ANALYSIS USAID.GOV where the school is located floods totally—it is not possible to walk when it is raining; outside the door of the school becomes a creek.”
Gales were cited as the principal disaster risk in school communities along the Caribbean coast. Several respondents in secretariats on the Caribbean coast spoke of the gales that buffet their school communities, which affected access. Respondents described how the force of gale winds tear roofing off school buildings. A teacher in Soledad said: “The risk that affects us most is gales. Those are something that left a mark on the community. There was one today. We are prepared because we do the drills, we explain how to deal with a gale if it happens when children are at home. It happened to me in 2001, when there was a big disaster here in Soledad. The school children did what they had learned, and we managed to save ourselves.”
DRUGS, GANGS, AND VIOLENCE A majority of respondents identified drugs, gangs, and violence as the principal threats in their communities. In every school consulted, the sale and consumption of drugs was the most prevalent and worrisome social risk. Interviews registered 217 mentions of the subject, mainly conveyed by teachers (37 percent), followed by parents and caregivers (33 percent), and then by students (19 percent).
People who shared comments related to the drug problem mainly mentioned use in the school’s surroundings, followed by a relationship with crime. Table 18 lays out the main issues related to drugs as stated by respondents in interviews (note that more than one topic may appear in the same comment). Attached to the priority issue of drug use in school surroundings is its use “everywhere,” “in public places,” and even by “parents,” making drugs a ubiquitous and integral part of students’ daily reality.
It is noteworthy that respondents did not link the drug problem with Venezuelan migrants.
TABLE 18. ECOSYSTEM OF DRUG USE, BY SECRETARIAT
USE + PARENTS
SECRETARIAT DRUG USE OUTSIDE SCHOOLS DRUGS + CRIME OUTSIDE SELLING DRUGS SCHOOL DRUGS + BAD PEOPLE (GANGS) GANGS + DRUG DRUG PREVENTION DRUGS EVERYWHERE DRUG USE IN SCHOOLS DRUGS + PUBLIC PLACES IN SELLING DRUG SCHOOLS + SCHOOL DRUGS DROPOUT DRUG VENEZUELANS + DRUGS Barranquilla 11 5 7 5 7 5 4 5 1 5 1 1 0
Bello 3 - 2 1 3 - 2 2 1 1 - - -
Bogotá 3 1 1 1 2 1 1 - - 1 - 1 -
Cali 8 4 1 3 5 2 - 2 1 - 1 - -
Cartagena 19 8 4 8 3 6 6 4 2 1 5 2 -
Maicao 6 3 - 2 1 - 2 - 2 - 2 - 3
USAID.GOV COLOMBIA RAPID EDUCATION AND RISK ANALYSIS | 48
USE + PARENTS
SECRETARIAT DRUG USE OUTSIDE SCHOOLS DRUGS + CRIME OUTSIDE SELLING DRUGS SCHOOL DRUGS + BAD PEOPLE (GANGS) GANGS + DRUG DRUG PREVENTION DRUGS EVERYWHERE DRUG USE IN SCHOOLS DRUGS + PUBLIC PLACES IN SELLING DRUG SCHOOLS + SCHOOL DRUGS DROPOUT DRUG VENEZUELANS + DRUGS Palmira 18 9 12 1 1 8 4 2 5 2 1 3 1
Riohacha 1 ------
Soacha 25 16 10 13 8 8 9 5 6 3 3 3 1
Soledad 20 16 12 13 13 10 10 5 4 6 2 5 -
Total responses 114 62 49 47 43 40 38 25 22 19 15 15 5
Percentage of 23% 12% 10% 9% 9% 8% 8% 5% 5% 4% 3% 3% 1% responses
The prevalence of drugs in school communities signals wider criminal activity. With the exception of Riohacha, respondents in all secretariats identified groups with different levels of organization that can be considered a form of gang—parches, pandillas, combos, and BACRIM—all of which are directly involved in selling drugs. Respondents also considered these groups responsible for other security and social problems.
Table 18 expands on interview responses to show the variety of ways drugs were mentioned. Drug use outside of school was mentioned the most (114 mentions), followed by the link between drugs and crime (62 mentions), drugs and “bad” people (47 reports), and drugs and gangs (43 times). Fortunately, drug use (25 mentions) and sale (19 instances) in school were both cited fewer times in interviews.
Table 19 lays out the various ways in which gangs were brought up in interviews, totaling 288 mentions. Teachers (50 percent) and students (24 percent) mentioned gangs the most among all respondent categories. They elaborated how gangs produce community insecurity in myriad manifestations—general insecurity from their presence and agency, insecurity arising from inter-gang confrontations and fighting, and insecurity related to threats and intimidation of non-gang members who might violate invisible borders to go to school, by moving between neighborhoods, having the wrong friends, and being victims of theft.
49 | COLOMBIA RAPID EDUCATION AND RISK ANALYSIS USAID.GOV TABLE 19. TYPES OF GANG INSECURITY, BY SECRETARIAT
SECRETARIAT GANGS + INSECURITY + GANGS FIGHTS + GANGS BORDERS + GANGS ROBBERY + GANGS PREVENTION + GANGS VIOLENCE + GANGS DROPOUTS + GANGS IN MEMBERS GANG SCHOOLS CRIME + GANGS KNIVES + GANGS FIREARMS + GANGS ROCKS + GANGS VENEZUELANS + GANGS Barranquilla 19 10 7 6 3 4 5 8 2 3 3 2
Bello 4 4 3 - - 2 2 2 1 - - - -
Bogotá 7 2 3 4 4 2 2 3 1 - - - -
Cali 1 1 1 1 ------
Cartagena 5 13 3 3 5 7 4 - 1 1 - 2 -
Maicao 1 - - - - - 2 - - - 3 - -
Palmira 3 1 4 1 1 - 1 - 2 1 - - -
Riohacha ------
Soacha 4 6 8 5 5 2 2 2 3 1 2 - 1
Soledad 5 11 8 5 6 5 4 5 7 2 2 1 -
Total Answers 49 48 37 25 24 22 22 20 17 8 7 6 3
Percentage of all answers 17% 17% 13% 9% 9% 8% 8% 7% 6% 3% 2% 2% 1% Gang activity outside of schools was cited in nearly all schools. Just over 37 percent of sampled locations where interviews were conducted report territorial and population controls by gangs dedicated to the sale of drugs. The groups linked to trap houses pressured students, mainly young men, to create new clientele, with the aim of expanding the drug market through schools. This pressure involves making them consumers and providing mechanisms for bringing drugs into the school (for example, throwing it over the walls). In Table 19, gang members in schools are mentioned 20 times, mainly in Barranquilla and Soledad. Interviews revealed that gang activity inside schools is limited and that the school remains a safe and neutral haven, but gangs appear to have an interest in gaining access.
It is worth underscoring that interviews surfaced very little relationship between Venezuelan migrants and gangs.
The vertical networks of organized crime reach locally to become a threat to children. Secondary source research and expert interviews reveal how narcos identify and organize pandillas, combos, and bandas through payments and violence, with support from larger criminal organizations. Gangs offer a source of income in contexts of limited resources and poverty and market a sense of life that children feel they lack—popularity, power, belonging, respect, and excitement. Gangs typically approach children and adolescents that reside in areas the gangs consider their territory.
USAID.GOV COLOMBIA RAPID EDUCATION AND RISK ANALYSIS | 50 The prevalence of drug sales and usage in the sample suggests that a form of community cooptation by narcos and gangs may be occurring. This means that groups determine the level and type of drug use, exercise territorial and mobility control, force people into predatory loans (gota a gota), control a large part of the economic activities in the area, and link entire families to their illegal activities. None of the schools or communities consulted indicated that the police or other public authorities maintain full control over the area.
TABLE 20. TYPES OF VIOLENCE IN THE COMMUNITY, BY SECRETARIAT
SECRETARIAT
TYPE OF COMMUNITY
VIOLENCE
BARRANQUILLA BELLO BOGOTÁ CALI CARTAGENA MAICAO PALMIRA RIOHACHA SOACHA SOLEDAD TOTAL
Fighting 30% 21% 22% 18% 27% 16% 21% 15% 31% 39% 26%
Domestic Violence 19% 18% 22% 23% 17% 18% 21% 17% 21% 24% 20%
Violence against Venezuelans 16% 16% 14% 15% 17% 14% 26% 15% 15% 13% 16%
Discrimination 13% 12% 14% 17% 11% 15% 14% 15% 11% 8% 12%
Gender-Based Violence 11% 13% 14% 10% 12% 13% 9% 11% 11% 9% 11%
Violence against Afro- Colombians 7% 10% 9% 8% 10% 10% 4% 11% 7% 3% 8%
Violence against Indigenous 4% 10% 6% 8% 6% 12% 4% 17% 4% 3% 7%
None 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Don’t Know/No Response 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% *Respondents could select more than one response
Respondents indicate that the most common forms of community violence are fighting, domestic violence, and violence against Venezuelans. Table 20 shows how varied community violence can be in the RERA sample sites. Survey respondents indicated fighting (26 percent), domestic violence (20 percent) and violence against Venezuelans (16 percent) as the most common types of violence in the community. Fighting—interpreted primarily as confrontations involving gangs and criminal organizations—was most cited in Soledad (39 percent), Soacha (31 percent) and Barranquilla (30 percent). Domestic violence was reported the most in Soledad (24 percent) and Cali (23 percent). Reports of violence against Venezuelans appeared the most in Palmira (26 percent), Cartagena (17 percent), Barranquilla (16 percent) and Bello (16 percent). Violence against indigenous people was mentioned in Riohacha (17 percent) and Maicao (12 percent).
Domestic violence occurs in many forms and throughout school communities in the sample, as well. Table 21 shows that in 8 of the 10 cities where information was collected, and particularly in Maicao, the primary manifestations of domestic violence were insults and humiliation. These forms of
51 | COLOMBIA RAPID EDUCATION AND RISK ANALYSIS USAID.GOV domestic violence were cited most by students (32 percent of the total). These are followed by blows and hits, reported most in Cartagena, and physical punishment and abandonment (a family member leaving the family helpless), isolation, or confinement. One teacher commented: “I observe the effects of domestic violence. Students who arrive sad at school are those who have difficulties at home, and their emotions and learning are affected.” Only 9 percent of interview responses by Venezuelans in the sample mentioned a sense of fear or insecurity from the various contextual risks.
TABLE 21. TYPES OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IN THE COMMUNITY, BY SECRETARIAT
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE TYPE
DON’T SUPPRESSION KNOW/ INSULTS/ PHYSICAL OF MONEY, DESTRUCTION NO SECRETARIAT HUMILIATION PUNISHMENT ABANDONMENT FOOD OF PROPERTY RESPONSE
Barranquilla 29% 19% 19% 18% 14% 0%
Bello 18% 20% 23% 23% 15% 0%
Bogotá 26% 23% 20% 18% 12% 0%
Cali 33% 28% 15% 15% 9% 0%
Cartagena 22% 23% 21% 19% 15% 0%
Maicao 30% 18% 18% 18% 15% 0%
Palmira 26% 28% 28% 10% 9% 0%
Riohacha 25% 20% 23% 18% 15% 0%
Soacha 25% 28% 22% 14% 11% 0%
Soledad 27% 18% 23% 18% 14% 0%
Total* 26% 22% 21% 17% 13% 0% *Respondents could select more than one response.
Abandonment, isolation, or confinement is a violence category that is especially important, as interviews confirmed the primacy of female-headed households due to the death of males, their incarceration, or divorce. Many teachers consulted indicated that, amidst the economic vulnerability of the sample communities, domestic violence greatly influences children’s socio-emotional well-being and their willingness to learn. Not all schools have a psychologist, and where they do, they typically have one professional for more than a thousand students.
Yet violence against girls and women seemed invisible in interviews. The gender distinctions respondents most commonly identified related to pregnancy, relationships with members of criminal groups, and the risk of being recruited by criminal groups. In all, only 14 percent of interview responses considered that women and girls could be affected differently by contextual risks, such as violence. That interview respondents could not easily identify the unique vulnerabilities of women and girls in these high- risk contexts is notable.
USAID.GOV COLOMBIA RAPID EDUCATION AND RISK ANALYSIS | 52 Schools in the sample have developed capabilities to address rising drug use. Schools address drug use as a matter of individual choice. Interview respondents in 11 schools stated that there were strategies to monitor students, detect consumption, and intervene. In some schools, they have agreements on the intolerance of consumption within the school and focus their prevention actions on counseling to avoid consumption. Few actions address consumption outside schools. Among the 40 registered actions to address or prevent consumption, the following stand out:
SCHOOL PROGRAMS AND PROTOCOLS
• School psychologists do prevention workshops and campaigns on drugs. • Schools have protocols to respond if they detect drug use and drug sales on their premises, including intervention from Children and Adolescent Police (Policía de Infancia y Adolescencia) and the Family Welfare Institute (ICBF). • Schools avoid activities that involve outside people to prevent access to physical spaces where they could hide drugs. • To prevent children from seeing drug consumers and selling of drugs, schools do not take them outside school grounds. • Schools teach children to avoid strangers. • Working with parents, children can learn to say no to drugs. If there are parents who are consumers, they report them to the Family Welfare Institute (ICBF) and follow up on the response. In some cases, children can be placed for adoption or given to surrogate mothers. • Schools make internal laws and agreements. Serious offenses are hitting a teacher and selling or consuming drugs inside school. Selling drugs in the school is a criminal offense, and the child would be considered as participating in micro-trafficking; by law, there is a prohibition against consuming drugs near a school zone.
POLICE SUPPORT
• Placing police at the school entrance during entry and exit of students to prevent and deter buying and selling of drugs to children. • Implementation of “Say No to Drugs” programs and other police prevention programs. • Teachers and administrative staff attend police training on how to handle drug problems. • The school maintains a constant communication channel with the police.
Despite these efforts, drug use continues as a daily reality for students. A teacher recalled, “[A student told me] ‘I came to a house to play and found that they have drugs there. When I went to this boy's house, I saw some men who were buying drugs and selling from the house.’” Another teacher said, “We had two girls, and I cannot denounce their parents because they have seen me at their houses, visiting them to know about the girls and their school absence. If I accuse them of selling drugs, they will know that it was me, and I cannot expose myself that way.” One principal in the sample received threats for intervening to stop a student’s links with illegal groups and selling drugs.
Police are viewed positively overall and are central to school community safety. Police were mentioned in interviews in all sample cities and municipalities. Over half (58 percent) of these mentions came from Soacha, Palmira, and Barranquilla. As seen in Table 22, most comments related to what can be considered normal procedural actions by the police. Often, these instances were related to the question concerning schools’ gender-based violence response. However, police receive a positive evaluation of
53 | COLOMBIA RAPID EDUCATION AND RISK ANALYSIS USAID.GOV their actions in 43 responses (41 percent). Insufficient police action was cited by respondents in interviews 29 times (22 percent) and primarily in Soacha (25 percent of mentions there) and Palmira (14 percent of mentions there).
TABLE 22. PERCEPTIONS OF POLICE ACTIONS, BY SECRETARIAT
POLICE POLICE: ALL POLICE ACTION: ACTION: POLICE ACTION: POLICE ACTION: SECRETARIAT COMMENTS PROCEDURAL POSITIVE INSUFFICIENT NEGATIVE
Barranquilla 26 10 13 2 -
Bello 4 1 2 1 -
Bogotá 8 5 1 2 -
Cali 3 - 2 1 -
Cartagena 15 8 6 - 1
Maicao 2 1 - - 1
Palmira 25 9 9 6 1
Riohacha 2 1 - 1 -
Soacha 24 9 3 11 1
Soledad 21 9 7 5 -
Total responses 130 53 43 29 4
Percent of all responses 100% 41% 33% 22% 3% Some examples of positive police actions mentioned by respondents related to drugs (13 mentions) and gangs (14 comments). Some examples of drug-related police activity include
• maintaining a presence at school doors when children, teachers, and staff enter and exit; • organizing prevention plans and programs on drug use; • conducting training on how to respond to domestic violence, including relating to drugs; • attending to cases of sexual abuse, taking children out of trap houses, stopping drug sales inside the school, and controlling drug consumption near school premises; and • patrolling around the school, which makes drug dealers move further away from the school.
Mentions of police activity in relation to gangs include
• stopping fights between gangs, including around school, • arresting gang members, • guarding school entrances, • patrolling and surveilling the community to prevent gangs from fighting and from taking control of the area, • deterring gang members from robbing the school, and
USAID.GOV COLOMBIA RAPID EDUCATION AND RISK ANALYSIS | 54 • stopping drug users near parks and playgrounds.
Other positive references include treating people in the community fairly, including Venezuelans. Respondent complaints about the police included delayed response time or inadequate presence, sometimes related to respondents living in more remote neighborhoods. In no interview were the police represented in a light where they were a threat or corrupt.
It must be noted that interviews surfaced scant reference to national or local government efforts to reduce risk. Secondary literature reviews and expert interviews indicate programs do exist. However, in the eyes of respondents, the school and the police appeared to be the principal manifestations of the local government and the state in RERA sample sites.
A limited number of respondents in the sample revealed how different contextual risks are influencing each other. Several respondents in different secretariats described scenarios where crime and violence would surge during times of natural hazard impacts and health emergencies. A teacher in Soledad noted, “when there are floods, it is then that the community is a little more distant because the thieves take advantage and make a blockade.” There were also reports of criminals taking advantage of the COVID-19 quarantine. A student in Soledad said, “As the streets are empty because of the pandemic and it is very quiet, then people can get mugged, near the school too. Supermarkets have been robbed.” A teacher in Barranquilla explained, “In the case of storms, the school is affected, especially when it is raining—because that is when the gangs come out. Kids get nervous.”
EDUCATION
SAFETY Students in the sample report feeling generally safe in school. As shown in Table 23, 45 percent of students reported feeling very safe inside school and 45 percent reported feeling “somewhat” safe in school. Notably, teachers feel less safe than students, with only 29 percent feeling “very” safe in school.
TABLE 23. SAFETY INSIDE SCHOOL, BY RESPONDENT TYPE
HOW SAFE ARE YOU INSIDE SCHOOL?
DON’T KNOW/ RESPONDENT TYPE VERY SOMEWHAT A LITTLE NOT AT ALL NO RESPONSE
Community Member 38% 53% 10% 0% 0%
Parent/Caregiver 35% 57% 6% 1% 0%
School Principal 30% 50% 0% 20% 0%
Student 45% 45% 10% 0% 0%
Teacher 29% 61% 9% 1% 0%
Total 36% 55% 8% 1% 0%
55 | COLOMBIA RAPID EDUCATION AND RISK ANALYSIS USAID.GOV When broken down by gender, female and male students feel similarly safe in school. Female students report feeling slightly less safe in school than their male counterparts, with 40 percent indicating they feel “very” safe, compared to 50 percent of male students. Similarly, 49 percent of female students feel “somewhat” safe, while 41 percent of male students feel “somewhat” safe. Taking reports of feeling “very” and “somewhat” safe together, 89 percent of female students and 91 percent of male students feel generally safe in school.
TABLE 24. SAFETY INSIDE SCHOOL, BY STUDENT GENDER
HOW SAFE ARE YOU INSIDE SCHOOL?
DON’T KNOW/ STUDENT GENDER VERY SOMEWHAT A LITTLE NOT AT ALL NO RESPONSE
Female 40% 49% 11% 0% 0%
Male 50% 41% 9% 0% 0%
Total 45% 45% 10% 0% 0%
Broken down by Secretariat, of respondents who reported feeling “very” safe in school, most were in Palmira (61 percent), Soledad (43 percent), and Bello (41 percent). Of those who indicated feeling “somewhat safe,” the most came from Riohacha (80 percent) and Bogotá (68 percent). Respondents in Bogotá (16 percent) and Cartagena (17 percent) mentioned feeling least safe the most (combining feeling “a little” and “not at all”).
TABLE 25. SAFETY INSIDE SCHOOL, BY SECRETARIAT
HOW SAFE ARE YOU INSIDE SCHOOL?
DON’T KNOW/ SECRETARIAT VERY SOMEWHAT A LITTLE NOT AT ALL NO RESPONSE
Barranquilla 31% 62% 7% 0% 0%
Bello 41% 56% 4% 0% 0%
Bogotá 16% 68% 12% 4% 0%
Cali 30% 63% 7% 0% 0%
Cartagena 35% 48% 14% 3% 0%
Maicao 34% 57% 6% 3% 0%
Palmira 61% 35% 2% 2% 0%
Riohacha 20% 80% 0% 0% 0%
Soacha 25% 63% 13% 0% 0%
Soledad 43% 50% 7% 0% 0%
Total 36% 55% 8% 1% 0%
USAID.GOV COLOMBIA RAPID EDUCATION AND RISK ANALYSIS | 56 When broken down by nationality (Table 26), Colombian-Venezuelan students felt the most safe, with 55 percent selecting “very” safe, followed by Venezuelan students (46 percent feeling “very” safe) and Colombian students (44 percent feeling “very” safe). This largely conforms with the Child Resilience Alliance-UNICEF study, which also found Venezuelan students feeling safe at school. Each category felt similarly “somewhat” safe—Colombian students (46 percent), Colombian-Venezuelan students (45 percent), and Venezuelan students (41 percent). However, the students who felt only “a little” safe were the Venezuelan students (14 percent) and Colombian students (10 percent).
TABLE 26. SAFETY INSIDE SCHOOL, BY RESPONDENT NATIONALITY
HOW SAFE ARE YOU INSIDE SCHOOL?
DON’T KNOW/ RESPONDENT NO NATIONALITY VERY SOMEWHAT NOT SAFE RESPONSE
Colombian 43% 29% 27% 0%
Colombian-Venezuelan179 41% 41% 18% 0%
Other 0% 100% 0% 0%
Venezuelan 64% 22% 14% 0%
Total 47% 29% 25% 0%
Respondents report feeling less safe outside their schools. As shown in Table 27, overall, 50 percent of respondents felt only “somewhat” safe in their school’s surrounding area. A mere 16 percent felt “very” safe outside their school. When these response options are combined, 66 percent of respondents felt generally safe outside school, compared to 91 percent inside school.
Schools that have no walls, fences, or any type or physical limitation from the surrounding neighborhood featured in 6 percent of interviews. In these less secure locations, respondents explained how strangers could enter the school grounds and school building themselves and make students, teachers, and parents feel unsafe. In interviews, respondents regularly shared their fear about having to enter or, worse, leave school and enter the surrounding area where they would encounter gang members, drug traffickers, and confrontations between gangs. In the event of storms or floods, access to the school is often cut off.
179 For the purposes of the RERA, “Colombian-Venezuelan” nationality simply refers to those respondents who report having dual nationality, such as a child with one Colombian parent and one Venezuelan parent.
57 | COLOMBIA RAPID EDUCATION AND RISK ANALYSIS USAID.GOV TABLE 27. SAFETY OUTSIDE SCHOOL, BY SECRETARIAT
HOW SAFE ARE YOU OUTSIDE SCHOOL?
DON’T KNOW/ SECRETARIAT VERY SOMEWHAT A LITTLE NOT AT ALL NO RESPONSE
Barranquilla 15% 51% 28% 6% 0%
Bello 26% 63% 7% 4% 0%
Bogotá 8% 40% 48% 4% 0%
Cali 7% 56% 30% 7% 0%
Cartagena 19% 47% 26% 8% 0%
Maicao 14% 49% 37% 0% 0%
Palmira 24% 63% 13% 0% 0%
Riohacha 13% 67% 20% 0% 0%
Soacha 4% 31% 52% 13% 0%
Soledad 22% 50% 23% 5% 0%
Total 16% 50% 28% 5% 0%
Respondents reported feeling generally safe (“very” and “somewhat” safe) outside their schools the most in Bello (26 percent), Palmira (24 percent), and Soledad (22 percent) (Table 27). The locations where respondents felt least safe (“a little” and “not at all”) were Soacha (65 percent) and Bogotá (52 percent), which are broadly consistent with violence levels in those locations.
TABLE 28. SAFETY OUTSIDE SCHOOL, BY RESPONDENT TYPE
HOW SAFE ARE YOU OUTSIDE SCHOOL?
DON’T KNOW/ RESPONDENT TYPE VERY SOMEWHAT A LITTLE NOT AT ALL NO RESPONSE
Community Member 21% 56% 21% 3% 0%
Parent/Caregiver 23% 52% 20% 5% 0%
School Principal 10% 50% 40% 0% 0%
Student 20% 48% 28% 4% 0%
Teacher 6% 48% 38% 8% 0%
Total 16% 50% 28% 5% 0%
USAID.GOV COLOMBIA RAPID EDUCATION AND RISK ANALYSIS | 58 As seen in Table 28, teachers reported feeling the least safe outside of school of all respondent types. Only 6 percent felt “very” safe, and 48 percent felt “somewhat” safe. Teachers also felt “a little” and “not at all” safe the most, at 38 percent and 8 percent, respectively.
TABLE 29. SAFETY OUTSIDE SCHOOL, BY STUDENT GENDER
HOW SAFE ARE YOU OUTSIDE SCHOOL?
DON’T KNOW/ RESPONDENT GENDER VERY SOMEWHAT A LITTLE NOT AT ALL NO RESPONSE
Female 11% 51% 32% 6% 0%
Male 27% 45% 24% 3% 0%
Total 20% 48% 28% 4% 0%
Students also felt considerably less safe outside school, with 16 percent feeling “very” safe, 50 percent feeling “somewhat” safe and 28 percent feeling “a little safe. Five percent felt “not at all” safe. Table 29 reveals that female students felt less safe outside their schools than their male peers, with only 11 percent feeling “very” safe, compared to 27 percent of male students. Moreover, 38 percent of female students felt “a little” or “not at all” safe, compared to 27 percent of male students.
TABLE 30. HOW SAFE ARE YOU OUTSIDE SCHOOL, BY STUDENT NATIONALITY
HOW SAFE ARE YOU OUTSIDE SCHOOL?
DON’T KNOW/ STUDENT NATIONALITY VERY SOMEWHAT A LITTLE NOT AT ALL NO RESPONSE
Colombian 17% 52% 25% 6% 0%
Colombian-Venezuelan 9% 64% 27% 0% 0%
Venezuelan 30% 35% 32% 3% 0%
Total 20% 48% 28% 4% 0%
When broken down by student nationality (Table 30), only 9 percent of Colombian-Venezuelan students felt “very” safe, while 30 percent of Venezuelan students felt “very” safe—more than their Colombian counterparts (17 percent). But Venezuelan students also felt unsafe the most, when combining “a little” (32 percent) and “not at all” (3 percent). Most of each category of students felt “somewhat” safe.
QUALITY Schools are positively valued by a majority of respondents across the sample, and teachers were particularly esteemed. In all secretariats, at least 65 percent of participants have very good perceptions of their schools (Table 31), with 74 percent of all respondents valuing their school “a lot.” In interviews, respondents described schools as the most local extension of the state, the one location in the community where different people and groups could come together peacefully. Respondents in
59 | COLOMBIA RAPID EDUCATION AND RISK ANALYSIS USAID.GOV Cartagena (65 percent) and Riohacha (67 percent) had the lowest perceptions of their schools, perhaps reflecting their overall risk profiles and Riohacha’s higher levels of vulnerability and perceived shortcomings in education quality (see Quality).
TABLE 31. HOW MUCH DO YOU LIKE SCHOOL, BY SECRETARIAT
HOW MUCH DO YOU LIKE SCHOOL?
DON’T KNOW/ SECRETARIAT A LOT SOMEWHAT A LITTLE NOT AT ALL NO RESPONSE
Barranquilla 68% 31% 1% 0% 0%
Bello 74% 26% 0% 0% 0%
Bogotá 80% 20% 0% 0% 0%
Cali 89% 11% 0% 0% 0%
Cartagena 65% 30% 3% 0% 1%
Maicao 77% 23% 0% 0% 0%
Palmira 78% 20% 2% 0% 0%
Riohacha 67% 33% 0% 0% 0%
Soacha 81% 19% 0% 0% 0%
Soledad 76% 24% 0% 0% 0%
Total 74% 25% 1% 0% 0%
Teachers (91 percent) and principals (80 percent) valued their schools “a lot” the most (Table 32).
TABLE 32. HOW MUCH DO YOU LIKE SCHOOL, BY RESPONDENT TYPE
HOW MUCH DO YOU LIKE SCHOOL?
DON’T KNOW/ RESPONDENT TYPE A LOT SOMEWHAT A LITTLE NOT AT ALL NO RESPONSE
Community Member 55% 40% 3% 0% 3%
Parent/Caregiver 66% 34% 0% 0% 0%
School Principal 80% 10% 10% 0% 0%
Student 68% 29% 3% 0% 0%
Teacher 91% 9% 0% 0% 0%
Total 74% 25% 1% 0% 0%
USAID.GOV COLOMBIA RAPID EDUCATION AND RISK ANALYSIS | 60 The majority (66 percent) of respondents surveyed liked their teachers “a lot,” and nearly the full remainder liked their teachers “somewhat.” Cali, Bogotá, and Palmira had the most “a lot” responses of the secretariats. In most of the participants’ categories, teachers were mostly valued (“a lot”) (Table 33). In 47 percent of interviews, respondents described various teachers are patient, take time to help students, explain topics clearly, answer questions, and in general make students feel comfortable. Nearly all (94 percent) comments by Venezuelan respondents concerning teacher performance and conduct were positive.
Responses in Riohacha stand out for liking their teachers only 33 percent. Again, this may be due to Riohacha’s unique situation of vulnerability and indigenous education requirements.
TABLE 33. HOW MUCH DO YOU LIKE YOUR TEACHERS, BY SECRETARIAT
HOW MUCH DO YOU LIKE YOUR TEACHERS?
SECRETARIAT A LOT SOMEWHAT A LITTLE NOT AT ALL
Barranquilla 63% 35% 1% 0%
Bello 56% 44% 0% 0%
Bogotá 76% 24% 0% 0%
Cali 81% 19% 0% 0%
Cartagena 59% 39% 2% 0%
Maicao 66% 34% 0% 0%
Palmira 76% 24% 0% 0%
Riohacha 33% 60% 0% 7%
Soacha 65% 33% 2% 0%
Soledad 73% 27% 0% 0%
Total 66% 33% 1% 0%
Students are generally interested in school, with Venezuelan students showing slightly more interest than their Colombian peers. Respondents in the survey described student interest in school differently across the sample. Overall, 78 percent of Venezuelan student respondents and 66 percent of Colombian Students indicated they liked school “a lot” (Table 34). Taken together with the “somewhat” responses, Venezuelan and Colombian students like school practically the same (100 percent and 97 percent, respectively). Students with dual Colombian-Venezuelan nationality revealed less interest in school, with 64 percent indicating “a lot” and 36 percent indicating “somewhat.”
Generally, Colombian and Colombian-Venezuelan adults—parents, community members, and principals— felt students were “somewhat” interested in school, while Venezuelan parents thought students were interested in school “a lot.” Notably, Venezuelan adults report “a lot” of student interest (61 percent), similar to the students themselves (78 percent), while Colombian and Colombian-Venezuelan adults
61 | COLOMBIA RAPID EDUCATION AND RISK ANALYSIS USAID.GOV perceive “a lot” of student interest much less (37 percent and 27 percent, respectively) than as reported by students themselves (66 percent and 64 percent, respectively).
TABLE 34. STUDENT INTEREST IN SCHOOL, BY NATIONALITY AND AGE
STUDENT INTEREST IN SCHOOL
DON’T KNOW/ NATIONALITY A LOT SOMEWHAT A LITTLE NOT AT ALL NO RESPONSE
Colombian 43% 50% 7% 0% 0%
Adult 37% 55% 8% 0% 0%
Student 66% 31% 3% 0% 0%
Colombian-Venezuelan 45% 55% 0% 0% 0%
Adult 27% 73% 0% 0% 0%
Student 64% 36% 0% 0% 0%
Venezuelan 69% 29% 2% 0% 0%
Adult 61% 35% 4% 0% 0%
Student 78% 22% 0% 0% 0%
Other 0% 100% 0% 0% 0%
Adult 0% 100% 0% 0% 0%
Total 47% 47% 6% 0% 0%
Reports of the highest student interest (“a lot”) came from respondents in Soledad, Palmira, and Cali (Table 35). The lowest percentage of respondents indicating “a lot” of interest was in Riohacha, while in Barranquilla, respondents had the highest mention of “a little” student interest.
TABLE 35. STUDENT INTEREST IN SCHOOL, BY SECRETARIAT
STUDENT INTEREST IN SCHOOL
DON’T KNOW/ SECRETARIAT A LOT SOMEWHAT A LITTLE NOT AT ALL NO RESPONSE
Barranquilla 31% 57% 12% 0% 0%
Bello 52% 48% 0% 0% 0%
Bogotá 32% 60% 8% 0% 0%
Cali 56% 37% 7% 0% 0%
Cartagena 42% 50% 8% 0% 0%
USAID.GOV COLOMBIA RAPID EDUCATION AND RISK ANALYSIS | 62 STUDENT INTEREST IN SCHOOL
DON’T KNOW/ SECRETARIAT A LOT SOMEWHAT A LITTLE NOT AT ALL NO RESPONSE
Maicao 51% 43% 6% 0% 0%
Palmira 67% 30% 2% 0% 0%
Riohacha 20% 80% 0% 0% 0%
Soacha 44% 50% 6% 0% 0%
Soledad 64% 35% 1% 0% 0%
Total 47% 47% 6% 0% 0%
Respondents believed that schools treat all students, including Venezuelan students, fairly, but also cited cases of bullying and discrimination towards Venezuelan students. The constructive integration and positive relationships between Venezuelan and Colombian students were mentioned in 73 percent of interview responses. As one school principal mentioned, “There is a pretty warm environment there. The human part is handled quite well—the students, teachers, workers. The kids do not want to go home but stay in school, because of the good treatment. That is the positive thing I see at school.” In fact, equal treatment of students in school was mentioned 217 times in interviews, and discriminatory or unfair treatment of students was mentioned only 12 times.
Respondents pointed to equal treatment as an important asset of the school environment and specifically mentioned the importance of empathy—to treat each student through a recognition of their unique path and challenges, what they have experienced, and their own particular needs. As a Venezuelan mother mentioned, referring to her daughter’s teacher, “She knows how to handle them, she knows how to treat each child, she knows how to explain. My daughter is in second grade, and they are in a difficult age, apart from the fact that there are many of them, and the teacher has control, I see her prepared.”
However, bullying among students was reported in 23 percent of responses, and bullying or discrimination specifically toward Venezuelan students was mentioned in 25 percent of responses. Similarly, the survey indicated that 25 percent of the violence that occurred in schools was bullying (see Table 36).
TABLE 36. TYPES OF SCHOOL VIOLENCE, ALL RESPONDENTS
% OF TYPES OF SCHOOL VIOLENCE RESPONSES*
Bullying 25%
None 16%
Violence Against Students 11%
Violence Against Venezuelans 11%
Violence Against Teachers 10%
63 | COLOMBIA RAPID EDUCATION AND RISK ANALYSIS USAID.GOV % OF TYPES OF SCHOOL VIOLENCE RESPONSES*
Violence Against Girls 8%
Violence Against Afro-Colombians 7%
Violence Against Indigenous 6%
Don’t Know/No Response 5%
Total 100% *Respondents could select more than one response.
The Child Resilience Alliance and UNICEF (2020) report highlights xenophobic attitudes toward Venezuelan students as one of the most recurrent complaints and factors behind dropout. They also validated the importance of empathy toward the social emotional duress the Venezuelan students endured. In their sample, 73 percent of teachers and principals reported that Venezuelan migrant students needed psychosocial help.180
TABLE 37. TYPES OF SCHOOL VIOLENCE, BY STUDENT NATIONALITY
STUDENT NATIONALITY
COLOMBIAN COLOMBIAN- VENEZUELAN TYPE OF SCHOOL VIOLENCE STUDENTS VENEZUELAN STUDENTS STUDENTS TOTAL*
Bullying 29% 57% 16% 25%
None 19% 14% 16% 17%
Violence against Students 11% 7% 11% 11%
Violence against Venezuelans 9% 14% 15% 12%
Violence against Teachers 9% 0% 11% 9%
Violence against Girls 8% 7% 9% 8%
Violence against Afro-Colombians 6% 0% 8% 7%
Violence against Indigenous 6% 0% 7% 6%
Don’t Know/No Response 4% 0% 6% 5% * Respondents could select more than one response
Disaggregating perceptions of school violence by student nationality reveals only minor differences from those of all respondents. The principal difference is that the 14 Colombian-Venezuelan students felt that bullying was a much more significant problem (57 percent) (Table 37). Venezuelan students themselves
180 Child Resilience Alliance and UNICEF, Impacto del flujo migratorio de NNA venezolanos en el sistema educativo colombiano: Respuesta actual y recomendaciones, 2020. Extracted from https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/details/75762.
USAID.GOV COLOMBIA RAPID EDUCATION AND RISK ANALYSIS | 64 perceive violence against Venezuelans to be slightly worse (16 percent), while Colombian students felt violence against Venezuelan students was less severe (9 percent).
TABLE 38. TYPES OF SCHOOL VIOLENCE, BY SECRETARIAT
SECRETARIAT
TYPES OF SCHOOL VIOLENCE BARRANQUILLA BELLO BOGOTÁ CALI CARTAGENA MAICAO PALMIRA RIOHACHA SOACHA SOLEDAD TOTAL*
Bullying 24% 19% 27% 36% 20% 21% 37% 14% 32% 35% 25%
None 17% 18% 9% 8% 15% 14% 16% 16% 12% 34% 16%
Violence against Students 14% 12% 15% 8% 11% 9% 11% 11% 16% 6% 11%
Violence against Venezuelans 11% 9% 15% 12% 16% 10% 9% 11% 9% 5% 11%
Violence against Teachers 12% 9% 7% 12% 11% 9% 6% 9% 13% 5% 10%
Violence against Girls 9% 9% 11% 8% 9% 9% 5% 11% 8% 5% 8%
Violence against Afro-Colombians 6% 8% 5% 7% 8% 9% 7% 9% 4% 3% 7%
Violence against Indigenous 5% 8% 5% 5% 5% 9% 5% 11% 4% 4% 6%
Don’t Know/No Response 3% 8% 5% 3% 6% 9% 4% 8% 1% 4% 5% * Respondents could select more than one response
As Table 38 indicates, perceptions of school violence broken down by secretariat shows that reports of bullying are highest in Palmira (37 percent), Cali (36 percent), and Soledad (35 percent). Violence against indigenous was understandably salient in Riohacha (11 percent), with its sizeable indigenous community. Violence against Venezuelans was reported highest in Cartagena (16 percent) and Bogotá (15 percent). Violence against students stood out in Soacha (16 percent) and Bogotá (15 percent).
Respondents in all locations cite inadequate school conditions and materials, with schools on the Caribbean coast faring the worst. The lack of educational materials and space, such as equipped labs, computer rooms with computers and connectivity, chairs, classrooms, electricity, working bathrooms, and books, were mentioned by students, parents, teachers, school principals, and community members as challenges to the quality of the education. In the survey, 53 percent of the respondents reported “little” amount of materials, compared to the 41 percent who reported “a lot”. In interviews, 63 percent of responses mentioned such shortcomings in their schools.
Respondents from secretariats on the Caribbean coast (Riohacha, Cartagena, Maicao, and Barranquilla) reported the fewest school materials, while those in the Andean region of the country (Bogotá, Cali, Bello, and Palmira) were more consistent in mentioning more school materials, as shown in Table 39.
65 | COLOMBIA RAPID EDUCATION AND RISK ANALYSIS USAID.GOV In interviews, 35 percent of responses spoke of a lack of materials, specifying a lack of computers, computer rooms, and internet connections for appropriate teaching and learning.
TABLE 39. SUFFICIENT SCHOOL MATERIALS, BY SECRETARIAT
SUFFICIENT SCHOOL MATERIALS
DON’T KNOW/ SECRETARIAT A LOT A LITTLE NOT AT ALL NO RESPONSE
Barranquilla 34% 66% 0% 0%
Bello 74% 19% 4% 4%
Bogotá 68% 32% 0% 0%
Cali 52% 41% 7% 0%
Cartagena 21% 70% 8% 2%
Maicao 31% 63% 6% 0%
Palmira 59% 39% 0% 2%
Riohacha 13% 80% 7% 0%
Soacha 35% 56% 8% 0%
Soledad 51% 43% 5% 0%
Total 41% 53% 5% 1%
Some participants spoke of the high student-teacher ratios in classrooms (5 percent of interview responses). The Child Resilience Alliance and UNICEF (2020) report mentions this as a key finding and elaborates on how overwhelmed teachers can be. The report also mentions a lack of space in classrooms, which they found has driven schools to use alternative, non-educationally purposed spaces as classrooms.
School quality and access are negatively affected by disaster risks and insecurity in the surrounding school environment. Insecurity outside and, at times, inside schools, including thefts, gangs, drug micro-trafficking or consumption, and fighting, was cited by respondents in 20 percent of interviews as factors influencing dropout, absenteeism, and student and teacher social-emotional well- being. For instance, 18 percent of those responses mentioned situations in which parents or students threatened teachers because of a grade or comment or where students or teachers were robbed inside schools.
Floods, landslides, heavy rains, and other natural disasters appeared in 21 percent of interviews as a threat to education quality, since, when any of those occurred, classes were stopped, students were sent back home, or the school was even closed. As one parent mentioned, “when floods occur, children must help to take out water. When it rains hard, the classrooms inundate.”
USAID.GOV COLOMBIA RAPID EDUCATION AND RISK ANALYSIS | 66 ACCESS Most survey respondents felt that the route to and from school was “easy,” but several factors negatively affected access for many respondents—particularly on the Caribbean coast. In the survey (Table 40), the majority of respondents (61 percent) considered their route to and from school to be easy. The majority of male and female students equally felt the route was easy (65 and 64 percent, respectively). The hardest routes were reported in Riohacha (60 percent) and Maicao (31 percent). In interviews, Maicao, Riohacha, Soacha, and Soledad have the highest reports of school accessibility difficulties.
TABLE 40. ROUTE TO SCHOOL DIFFICULTY, BY SECRETARIAT
ROUTE TO SCHOOL
DON’T KNOW/ SECRETARIAT HARD MODERATE EASY NO RESPONSE
Barranquilla 9% 19% 72% 0%
Bello 15% 11% 74% 0%
Bogotá 8% 24% 68% 0%
Cali 0% 11% 89% 0%
Cartagena 17% 20% 63% 0%
Maicao 31% 37% 31% 0%
Palmira 9% 22% 70% 0%
Riohacha 60% 20% 20% 0%
Soacha 17% 29% 54% 0%
Soledad 15% 30% 55% 0%
Total 16% 23% 61% 0% Long distances to and from school, the lack of safe, inexpensive, and recurring transportation, and the insecurity of roads were raised in 29 percent of interviews as factors affecting the social-emotional well- being of students and teachers. Interviewees also linked these factors to dropout and absenteeism.
Respondents cite costs, insecurity, and drugs as the main reasons why children and adolescents in the sample are out of school. School communities included in the sample belong mainly to the first and second socioeconomic strata, which indicate high levels of poverty. Respondents interviewed conveyed a situation of unemployment, lack of access to services, resources, and lack of food. As seen in Table 41, cost (25 percent) was unsurprisingly the most cited reason for being out of school, followed by insecurity (18 percent), and drugs (18 percent).
67 | COLOMBIA RAPID EDUCATION AND RISK ANALYSIS USAID.GOV TABLE 41. REASONS WHY OUT OF SCHOOL, BY GENDER
GENDER
REASONS OUT OF SCHOOL FEMALE MALE TOTAL
Cost 23% 28% 25%
Insecurity 18% 19% 18%
Drugs 19% 16% 18%
Must Work 14% 10% 12%
Pregnancy 6% 8% 7%
Join Illegal Armed Groups 3% 2% 3%
Identity 1% 2% 2%
Don’t Know/No Response 15% 15% 15%
It deserves mention that since 2011, public schools are free of student fees, which means that “costs” can be related to school materials, supplies, uniforms, or even transportation to and from school. The Child Resilience Alliance and UNICEF (2020) report also discusses how uniforms, materials, books, school transportation, costs of validation exams, photocopies, and medical examinations, among other costs, might affect student access to education. Table 41 reveals that male and female respondents perceived these reasons very similarly.
TABLE 42. REASONS WHY OUT OF SCHOOL, BY NATIONALITY
NATIONALITY
REASONS OUT OF COLOMBIAN- SCHOOL COLOMBIAN VENEZUELAN VENEZUELAN OTHER TOTAL
Cost 22% 50% 30% 100% 25%
Insecurity 21% 9% 12% 0% 18%
Drugs 18% 18% 18% 0% 18%
Must Work 12% 9% 16% 0% 12%
Pregnancy 8% 5% 2% 0% 7%
Join Illegal Armed Groups 3% 0% 2% 0% 3%
Identity 2% 0% 1% 0% 2%
Don’t Know/No Response 15% 9% 18% 0% 15%
USAID.GOV COLOMBIA RAPID EDUCATION AND RISK ANALYSIS | 68 When broken down by nationality (Table 43), survey responses reveal that costs were cited most by Colombian-Venezuelan respondents (50 percent)—more than double the reports by Colombian nationals, followed by Venezuelan respondents (30 percent). Insecurity was identified most by Colombian respondents (21 percent)—roughly double the responses of Colombian-Venezuelan and Venezuelan respondents. Drugs were noted equally by all respondent nationalities (18 percent).
TABLE 43. REASONS CHILDREN AND ADOLESCENTS ARE OUT OF SCHOOL, BY SECRETARIAT
SECRETARIAT
REASONS OUT OF SCHOOL TOTAL BARRANQUILLA BELLO BOGOTÁ CALI CARTAGENA MAICAO PALMIRA RIOHACHA SOACHA SOLEDAD Cost 28% 26% 16% 11% 13% 40% 37% 27% 21% 32% 25%
Insecurity 16% 22% 32% 22% 16% 17% 13% 7% 19% 22% 18%
Drugs 24% 22% 16% 19% 17% 3% 13% 7% 29% 18% 18%
Must Work 9% 15% 20% 15% 11% 23% 13% 7% 6% 14% 12%
Pregnancy 6% 0% 0% 4% 15% 11% 2% 33% 4% 1% 7%
Join Illegal Armed Groups 3% 7% 0% 4% 4% 0% 2% 0% 4% 1% 3%
Identity 1% 0% 0% 0% 3% 0% 0% 0% 0% 4% 2%
Don’t Know/No Response 13% 7% 16% 26% 20% 6% 20% 20% 17% 8% 15%
Looking at the geographic distribution of these survey results is instructive (Table 43). Costs were the most significant factor in Maicao (40 percent) and Palmira (37 percent). Insecurity was the factor prioritized by respondents in Bogotá (32 percent) and Cali (22 percent). Pregnancy was the principal factor in Riohacha (33 percent). Drugs were the main factor according to respondents in Soacha (29 percent) and Cartagena (17 percent).
Interviews further revealed that uninterested parents, limited household income, and student employment influenced whether Colombian and Venezuelan children and adolescents could be out of school. Respondents explained that parental disengagement could be due to a mere lack of interest or lack of knowledge about how to assist their children (20 percent). Some respondents (12 percent) described how students had jobs to help their families financially, while others were concerned about parents who took their children to the streets to ask for money. According to the Child Resilience Alliance and UNICEF (2020) report, the distance to school was one of the most recurring reasons why Venezuelan children are out of school.
Respondents pointed to documentation problems as the main reason why Venezuelan children and adolescents were out of school. Interviews revealed that discrimination and school places (13 percent), delays in parental job attainment (19 percent), and documentation (40 percent) were the most common barriers Venezuelan students faced when trying to enter the Colombian education
69 | COLOMBIA RAPID EDUCATION AND RISK ANALYSIS USAID.GOV system. Respondents described 27 cases in which Venezuelans were denied places based upon their nationality. A Venezuelan parent recalled, “It is a matter of places in schools. It cost me a lot to get a place for my son.” Another parent explained, “It was difficult to get a place in school. But schools helped us. In my case, teacher helped me, and explained how things were, and told me that these documents are a basis, but in reality, they had to evaluate the student’s performance to see whether or not the student was prepared.” One Venezuelan parent further said, “Venezuelan migrant students are left out because they did not pass the test and there were no more places in schools.”
A school principal described the approach of the school in welcoming the migrants:
The challenge with the Venezuelans is that we have to give them even a uniform, since they come with nothing. In terms of teaching, they are given a psychological and written evaluation to see how the child is doing. Even if they do not have the money to pay for anything, they are received. Here we are helping 100 children, and it is customary for the school. It is an institution not only for profit but for community service. They receive uniforms and food aid. We have had it rough— it has been two years since Venezuelan children started to come here. We also help the parents.
A lack of documentation played a central role in the ability of Venezuelans to access school. A lack of legal documentation181 was cited 81 times as the main reason for delays (or, in some cases, impossibility) in student enrollment. A Venezuelan mother said, “They ask for a birth certificate and proof that they have studied before. I know some children who are 6 and 12 years old, they do not have the papers, so the school cannot accept them. Yet they know how to read, write and so on, but they do not have the papers and so they still cannot study. Nothing has been done to fix this issue.” Another Venezuelan parent explained, “I have nieces who have not been able to enroll in school because they don’t have the papers, the medical insurance and the civil registry. My sister hasn’t had any money to take the photos either, because she doesn’t have a job.”
Venezuelan parents also encountered delays in finding jobs in Colombia, which delayed their children’s enrollment.
According to the Child Resilience Alliance and UNICEF (2020) report, insufficient school places drive higher dropout rates. The report does not focus on discrimination but mentions that the issue of quotas is handled by each secretariat, some of which are better equipped to adapt than others. The report also found that school administrators were unable to interpret ministry or secretariat guidelines concerning documentation requirements.
Once enrolled, Venezuelan migrant students face a variety of challenges integrating into the Colombian education system—but many appear also to thrive. Challenges to the integration of Venezuelan students emerged in 25 percent of interview responses. Of these, 13 percent corresponded to a lack of familiarity with the Colombian culture and language barriers, 42 percent to gaps in the academic trajectory of the students (due to having changed schools many times because of their migrant status),
181 While the law initially required migrants to have a Special Permission to Reside (a “PEP”), an identification number, or a foreigners’ identity card (Joint Circular No. 01 of 2017) to be granted a place in school, all these requirements were made more flexible.
USAID.GOV COLOMBIA RAPID EDUCATION AND RISK ANALYSIS | 70 and 43 percent to the differences in the content, levels of subjects, and cycles between schools in Colombia and Venezuela. Several insights from Venezuelan interview respondents are included below:
• A Venezuelan mother stated, “The way of studying there in Venezuela is very different from the one here. The study model is very different. First, I had to adapt to it myself, as a mother to then be able to explain to the children. The change is that the educational process, the subjects, the content and the way they are evaluated are all very different.” • A Venezuelan student said, “When I was in Venezuela there was only one teacher. Here, I feel a little lost because here there are many teachers. And that scares me, it makes me want to cry because when I don’t understand something, I don't know whom to ask.” • A Venezuelan parent said, “Education here is more intense than there. Here they have to try harder. Education was not as strict there as it is here. There are subjects that our students have not studied. My child in second grade is seeing subjects I did not think he would see. In Venezuela you would wait a few more years before studying them.”
The Child Resilience Alliance and UNICEF (2020) report found that differences between content taught in Colombia and in Venezuela represent a major constraint for Venezuelan students. The report further found that there is no curricular adaptation taking place, that there are no tools for adaptation, and that some principals were reluctant to do so. Furthermore, the report argues for the importance of identifying strategies to accompany Venezuelan children when they are in transit in and out of the education system.
In interviews, 6 percent of responses described individual or school-specific efforts to adapt to the situation of Venezuelan students. Some schools and teachers have come up with follow-up plans or specialized approaches for Venezuelan students so they can be leveled-up to the rest of the students. According to one teacher: “As they enter a new methodology, one has to be flexible. The second challenge is in the conceptual and knowledge part as such, they come at a slightly lower level. So what the teacher has to do is not discriminate, but make a leveling plan. And students must do other things at home to catch up with the rest. Teachers have to use a flexible methodology and a leveling plan. We must make a leveling plan for everyone.”
A limited number of interviews described how some Venezuelan students are respectful, disciplined, interested, and doing well academically. One secretariat official remarked, “they are more respectful and disciplined than many of their Colombian peers.”
All schools in the sample have implemented remote learning approaches during the closure in varying ways and varying degrees. The majority of respondents across all school communities reported that their schools were implementing remote learning approaches for students once schools had to close. However, several respondents reported that there were no measures for education continuity (Table 44).
Efforts to continue learning at home were reported slightly less in Riohacha, Maicao, and Soacha. It is important to note that the question was not addressed specifically to the COVID-19 contingency; however, it is reasonable to think that participants generally answered with the current situation in mind.
71 | COLOMBIA RAPID EDUCATION AND RISK ANALYSIS USAID.GOV TABLE 44. EXTENT OF REMOTE LEARNING CONTINUITY, BY SECRETARIAT
EXTENT OF REMOTE LEARNING
DON’T KNOW/ SECRETARIAT ALWAYS SOMETIMES NOT AT ALL NO RESPONSE
Barranquilla 65% 21% 12% 3%
Bello 78% 11% 11% 0%
Bogotá 56% 36% 8% 0%
Cali 70% 19% 11% 0%
Cartagena 59% 29% 12% 0%
Maicao 46% 29% 26% 0%
Palmira 59% 28% 11% 2%
Riohacha 40% 40% 13% 7%
Soacha 52% 33% 13% 2%
Soledad 65% 26% 9% 0%
Total 60% 27% 12% 1%
Valued for their dedication before COVID-19, teachers are making notable adaptations to implement remote learning during the crisis—but they need support. Many teachers have adapted to the unprecedented remote learning requirements caused by COVID-19, often by their own devices. In 85 percent of interviews, respondents mentioned strategies such as reaching out to individual students and parents at their homes (even those without an internet connection), retraining their skill sets in virtual learning, creating and distributing guides, phone calls, using open source websites to obtain learning materials, starting Facebook and Instagram websites for assignments, text messages, and organizing Facebook or WhatsApp groups. Teachers typically paid all the costs of their cellphone and internet use in support of remote learning, often sharing their resources with families.
As one teacher explained, “All students are helped who don't have forms to access, many don't have a way to see them digitally. For example, I print the guides for the students who live near me and the parents come and buy the guides. I have to do very didactic activities so that they can do the activities with what they have at home.”
A teacher shared her experience creating networks to help families in need:
The students have established themselves as support networks. My students are tenth and eleventh graders, already grown up, and while 60 percent have had connectivity, the other 40 percent have had financial difficulties that have not allowed them to continue with the process. They have had difficulties connecting because they do not have equipment at home or because they do not have money to pay for internet and so on. Then a support network has been established among the students and that
USAID.GOV COLOMBIA RAPID EDUCATION AND RISK ANALYSIS | 72 allows them to organize the activities, tell them what the teachers have said, or help them with activities. I have students who have served as mediators with the teachers because the students who live nearby have been able to communicate with them in some way, so they have served as mediators to make the delivery of homework. In addition, a support network was established among teachers to also attend to those students who are going through a very difficult situation. For example, those whose parents were street vendors, they were informal sellers and because of the quarantine they have not been able to continue with their products and their enterprises. So, they have found themselves in a rather complex economic situation. So, the community has united.
An absence of teacher training emerged in 25 percent of interviews. When talking about the lack of training, respondents also referred to the importance of receiving training related to online teaching (as in the COVID-19 crisis), education in crisis scenarios (as in the Venezuelan influx), among other contextual situations. As one teacher said, “Right now we haven't been able to do anything because we don't have information, they have not given us training, there are no protocols, the government hasn't given us anything. Just what we know about the sanitary protocols, the mask, soap and alcohol, distance and hygiene.” However, 18 percent of interview responses mentioned that teacher training was taking place or had happened recently in collaboration with local universities, the secretariats, and/or the Ministry of Education.
These findings echo those of the Child Resilience Alliance and UNICEF (2020) report, which also mentions that teachers identified a lack of training to adequately support migrant students, as well as students with disabilities. Another aspect that the report highlights is the importance of working with teachers in their capacity to deal with the problematics inherent to migrant students: teachers are overwhelmed by having to both attend to these situations and teach with limited resources. According to the report, 71 percent of the teachers were unaware of existing psychosocial or mental health resources for teachers.
FAMILY Remote learning has led to increased involvement of many families in education, but it is also accentuating inequalities in education access. Interviews revealed how, in a number of ways, many families had been involved in their children’s education before COVID-19: during an emergency in school or in the community, helping with homework, addressing problems at school between students, engaging in parental groups like Consejo de Padres, and participating in conferences or activities that help them improve their parenting skills. However, poorer families who had an interest in their children’s education either lacked access to devices such as smartphones and computers, or, when there was such access, they were unable to pay for the necessary internet or data services. In other instances, a parent who works has to share one smartphone with multiple children in order for them to complete their schoolwork. One mother described her own trials to access connectivity:
In my case, I don't have a computer or internet. I had to make an agreement with the teacher because my husband is working, and he is the one with the internet on his cell phone. She sends the guides in the morning every day and I only have internet access at night, which is when my husband comes home from work and can lend me his cell phone to download the guides. So, I download the guides out at night and work on them the next day, so my son is always late with his work. He also cannot research or watch videos online. There are many parents in a similar situation, because in addition there are many people unemployed due to the pandemic.
73 | COLOMBIA RAPID EDUCATION AND RISK ANALYSIS USAID.GOV Many respondents noted that there were parents who were not engaged in their children’s education. There were 41 mentions in interviews (20 percent) of parents not being interested in participating or even enrolling children in schools. The onset of COVID-19 and the extraordinary circumstances requiring learning from home have pushed parents to get more involved. According to a teacher in Soledad:
Most parents are very receptive and are becoming teachers at home. Most of them are studying at home and are trying to do as teachers says, and that has been very good. As I say, it has been difficult, but it is good because we also work the relationship between the parent and the child, which was broken due to many family circumstances. The parents are getting closer to the children, they are dedicating more time and they are really trying because they are realizing that the responsibility is not only on the teacher, but also on them. That is the positive side of the pandemic.
Parents are using the COVID-19 situation as a learning opportunity, as mentioned by a mother: “it is a lesson for teachers and for parents, because we can see the mistakes of our children, and we can help them. Some of us are becoming aware, but others are not. I like what is happening in school, despite the fact many of us don’t have a smartphone or computer to download the information, the principal gives us photocopies. This is great.” A teacher in Bogotá also said:
No one expected it, and we didn’t have the virtual means to communicate. It was very difficult at first. I had to call parent by parent and open a WhatsApp group. There are parents who have several children with a single cell phone and pay data reloads. At first, it was super difficult; now, as time goes by, parents open emails and find ways to help their children get along. When I talk to the children, I feel that the parents are very willing to support the children’s work. That struck me as interesting. I have seen some parents get closer to their children and the school than before the pandemic.
A teacher in Soledad reports cooperation between parents and families where they call each other to complete homework and share WIFI connections among the neighborhoods. Another teacher reported that the government provided laptops to give on loan to families without computers.
Some respondents are skeptical about how much students are in fact learning from home. One parent said, “With regard to school, it is not the same. For example, the tasks are sent by WhatsApp, they make a page or blog so the students can download the workshops, but in reality, they are all working on WhatsApp, but this is not the same, now it is worse. Children are not learning the same. This is all a lie. It is really each student making her/his own workshops, each one on her/his own.” Respondents conveyed the situation of poorer families that did not have the resources to engage the remote learning approach.
Student social-emotional well-being and academic achievement are negatively shaped by a variety of household factors. In 59 percent of the interviews, limited family financial capacity was reported by parents, students, community members, teachers, and school principals as having a negative impact on students’ academic performance, school assistance, and homework. Given the prevailing concern over livelihoods and social restrictions resulting from COVID-19, families are concerned about food. Thus, food was very present in their answers: they reported that some students arrived at school not having had breakfast or even dinner the night before, and the only meals they received were the school’s own meal plan (PAE)—when there was one offered. As one teacher said, “there are boys who tell me, ‘teacher, I know that stealing is bad, but who gives me food.’” Another teacher said, “Adolescents really suffer because in their homes there is no food, they do not have shoes or money for their snack.”
USAID.GOV COLOMBIA RAPID EDUCATION AND RISK ANALYSIS | 74 Thus, a school meal program can be critical. As shown in Table 45 below, only 42 percent of respondents report that meals are “always” served.
TABLE 45. SCHOOL MEAL FREQUENCY, ALL RESPONDENTS
SCHOOL MEAL % OF FREQUENCY RESPONDENTS
Always 42%
Sometimes 28%
Never 26%
Don’t Know/No Response 4%
Family finances were cited in 29 percent of interview responses, and this was manifested in the lack of equipment (smartphones, computers, tablets) and internet connectivity. These are, of course, crucial assets during the COVID-19 pandemic that allow students to learn remotely. As one parent mentioned, “we are behind because we don’t have internet or resources to see the study guides, the school doesn’t provide us with solutions, so my children are behind the others and we don’t know how to do the workshops. Those workshops must be bought, and we have no money.”
A number of interview responses (20 percent) described how family dynamics can have a negative impact on a student’s social-emotional well-being and academic performance. Situations like neglect, sexual abuse, and domestic violence were mentioned. As seen in the survey, respondents identified several types of domestic violence that took place in their communities. As shown in Table 46, insults and humiliation, physical punishment, and abandonment were most often cited, and most were reported by female respondents (girls or women).
TABLE 46. TYPES OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, BY RESPONDENT GENDER
RESPONDENT GENDER
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE TYPE FEMALE MALE TOTAL*
Insults/Humiliation 26% 27% 26%
Physical Punishment 23% 21% 22%
Abandonment 20% 22% 21%
Suppression of Money, Food 18% 16% 17%
Destruction of Property 13% 13% 13%
Don’t Know/No Response 0% 0% 0% * Respondents could select more than one response
Around 10 percent of the interview responses talked about how children and adolescents emulate and imitate behaviors and values at home and in their neighborhoods. A teacher said, “these characters [at
75 | COLOMBIA RAPID EDUCATION AND RISK ANALYSIS USAID.GOV home and in the neighborhood] become their idols or role models—drinking, good clothing, good food— that’s what the children lack so they give more importance to those things than education.”
SCHOOL COMMUNITY RESILIENCE
SOCIAL COHESION Respondents cited sports as the activity that unites the community the most. Respondents in the survey report that sports stand out in their ability to bring communities together (32 percent), followed by local identity (21 percent) and education (20 percent). Sports are especially crucial in Soledad (43 percent), Soacha (39 percent), and Barranquilla (36 percent). Local identity was particularly key to community solidarity in Barranquilla (27 percent) and in Riohacha (24 percent). Education is most important in Soacha (29 percent) and least important in Riohacha (16 percent).
TABLE 47. WHAT UNITES THE COMMUNITY, BY SECRETARIAT
SECRETARIAT
WHAT UNITES
COMMUNITY TOTAL* BARRANQUILLA BELLO BOGOTÁ CALI CARTAGENA MAICAO PALMIRA RIOHACHA SOACHA SOLEDAD Sports 36% 22% 27% 32% 32% 25% 30% 27% 39% 43% 32%
Local Identity 27% 12% 23% 16% 22% 22% 18% 24% 20% 16% 21%
Education 19% 20% 20% 24% 17% 19% 20% 16% 29% 24% 20%
Religion 12% 22% 12% 15% 13% 15% 15% 12% 6% 10% 13%
Plazas 4% 12% 12% 9% 9% 10% 10% 10% 4% 4% 8%
Don’t Know/No Response 4% 12% 5% 4% 7% 9% 6% 10% 2% 3% 6% * Respondents could select more than one response
While 139 survey respondents (13 percent of all responses) cited religion as key to bringing people together, the church was mentioned only 11 times in interviews. Several (4) mentions related to the positive role churches played in holding talks or courses with the community on topics from art to coexistence.
COVID-19 has, overall, enhanced social cohesion in the sample. Participants in the survey reported that during COVID-19 the community had united “a lot” (56 percent), followed by “a little” (35 percent), as shown in Table 48. The lowest report of cohesion came from respondents in Soacha, who noted “a lot” only 29 percent and “not at all” 10 percent.
USAID.GOV COLOMBIA RAPID EDUCATION AND RISK ANALYSIS | 76 TABLE 48. EXTENT COMMUNITY JOINED TOGETHER DURING COVID-19, BY SECRETARIAT
EXTENT COMMUNITY UNITED DURING COVID-19
DON’T KNOW/ SECRETARIAT A LOT A LITTLE NOT AT ALL NO RESPONSE
Barranquilla 57% 38% 3% 1%
Bello 63% 30% 4% 4%
Bogotá 60% 24% 16% 0%
Cali 63% 22% 15% 0%
Cartagena 55% 36% 7% 2%
Maicao 57% 37% 6% 0%
Palmira 63% 26% 11% 0%
Riohacha 53% 47% 0% 0%
Soacha 29% 58% 10% 2%
Soledad 62% 30% 7% 1%
Total 56% 35% 7% 1%
Interviews with respondents surfaced insights into how communities are adapting and coping with the social restrictions, economic hardship, and health risks. Many of the interviewed participants said that humanitarian need during the actual contingency was what united them as a community: for example, helping students without computers or internet connections or giving food to those who lost their jobs. As one parent said, “most of us around here are Venezuelans, we are united. In this neighborhood we get united by nationality but also with Colombians.” A teacher in Cali recounted how Colombian students made a campaign to collect clothes, toys, and markers to bring to marginalized Venezuelan migrant settlements in the city.
Another Venezuelan parent said:
Yes, we are all united. In spite of the low resources that we all have, we are all helping, this situation is not easy for anyone. There are no nationalities in this situation. I have seen union. I have seen that the streets have been cleaned, each of us gathers to clean up their things. Some people give away masks. There is solidarity.
However, the pandemic and movement restrictions have put added pressure on household livelihoods, particularly for poorer families who could not work and had few assets to fall back on. One parent in Maicao explained, “The coronavirus has caused many problems, people are in need because they haven't been able to go out to work, there is a lot of desperation for food in the community where I live. It is hard because people are locked up now, there is no dialogue, it has affected us in the sense that it is not the same life, there are no resources, there is no work. So, yes, tension has increased.” Another
77 | COLOMBIA RAPID EDUCATION AND RISK ANALYSIS USAID.GOV respondent said, “We are divided by the difficulties outside the school, such as the sale of drugs.” A limited number of Venezuelan respondents cited harassment or discrimination by their Colombian peers for allegedly taking lower-paying jobs away. The loss of employment opportunities, generally, generates competition over reduced resources between Colombians and Venezuelans.
To a limited number of respondents, the pandemic has enhanced individualism. A parent in Soacha said, “Each person is looking after his own. He’s at his home and I’m at mine. Here, there is no union of anything.” A teacher in Barranquilla lamented, “What the community does is look for a way to take advantage of the situation. Rather than collaborate, they see what they can take from the school. There was no help from the community.”
Respondents reported multiple ways in which the wider community has collaborated to get through the COVID-19 crisis. In addition to the school community collaboration on remote learning, respondents in interviews described an array of ways members of the school community help each other manage the crisis. Some examples include:
• neighbors cooking and offering food—in one community, a lady sets her tables out front of her house, and the neighbors each bring a dish (of rice, lentils, beans, etc.) to make a meal for everyone; • using food brigades to distribute food; • holding community feeding days; • closing off streets to keep traffic down and prevent vendors and others from coming in; • helping neighbors wash the front of their homes; • using an action board to canvass the neighborhood and find out who has needs, locate them, and give them what they can; • in one neighborhood, a leader distributes alcohol, sanitizing gel, and walks the street with a megaphone asking people not to leave their houses; • using red flags for people to signal that they need food so neighbors can shop for them or take them shopping; and • sharing internet access.
A community member in Bello said:
The community is in trouble. Everyone lives on what they can earn every day. It is difficult with this situation. We are close to 28,000 population, and we only have received 449 cash bonuses, a bottle of antibacterial soap, and shampoo from the government. We have partnered with other institutions, like the Universidad de Antioquia, who has been a big supporter. We have received help from the Techo para mi País organization, friends, lawyers, foundations. We have not been able to cover all our needs, but we are trying.
SCHOOL COMMUNITY COLLABORATION Schools and their communities collaborate in a variety of ways, and the COVID-19 crisis has enhanced this collaboration. In the survey, 23 percent of respondents indicated that their schools and communities collaborated “a lot,” while 54 percent claimed “somewhat,” and 20 percent “a little.” The most collaboration (“a lot”) was reported in Soledad (36 percent) and Bello (30 percent). When combining the responses for “a lot” and “somewhat,” the secretariats with the most responses are Palmira (86
USAID.GOV COLOMBIA RAPID EDUCATION AND RISK ANALYSIS | 78 percent), Soledad (83 percent), and Cali (82 percent). Respondents in Bello reported “not at all” the most (11 percent).
TABLE 49. SCHOOL COMMUNITY COLLABORATION, BY SECRETARIAT
SCHOOL COMMUNITY COLLABORATION
DON’T KNOW/ SECRETARIAT A LOT SOMEWHAT A LITTLE NOT AT ALL NO RESPONSE
Barranquilla 21% 55% 21% 3% 0%
Bello 30% 48% 11% 11% 0%
Bogotá 13% 54% 29% 4% 0%
Cali 19% 63% 19% 0% 0%
Cartagena 26% 51% 19% 4% 0%
Maicao 11% 60% 29% 0% 0%
Palmira 26% 60% 12% 2% 0%
Riohacha 13% 67% 20% 0% 0%
Soacha 10% 52% 31% 6% 0%
Soledad 36% 47% 12% 4% 0%
Total 23% 54% 20% 4% 0%
School and community collaboration was mentioned in 72 percent of interview responses. These instances included the following examples:
• joint celebration of holidays, • joint campaigns on issues, like respect and tolerance, • joint talks with local churches, • jointly organized conferences or discussions, • Community Action Boards (Juntas de Acción Comunal), • Red Brigade and Red Cross support on disaster preparedness, • community forums to reduce violence and drug use, • community volunteer help on specific school needs, such as flood cleaning and building repair, and • various community meetings with the police.
One respondent described a discussion with their local police: “On one occasion, gang members were called because the fighting was in front of the school, and later it improved a little.”
As a teacher said, “The community, which agrees with their children and is not so involved in the drug thing, is watching and collaborating with the school. They keep the school informed of what is happening in the community.”
79 | COLOMBIA RAPID EDUCATION AND RISK ANALYSIS USAID.GOV Joint efforts between schools and partners to benefit learners and the community were mentioned in 21 percent of interview responses. Partners included the ICBF, the police, international organizations, NGOs, local universities, and the Ministry of Education, among others. These alliances are used for teacher training, special activities, and to handle problematic situations with students. As one teacher recounted, “we maintain direct communication with ICBF regarding this, we are very aware of the children, anything that you see they have at home, a bruise, if we see them sleepy, hungry, we start a process, a route.” It is important to recall that many of these routes or joint actions are required by law, but school principals, students, teachers, and parents are recognizing these as important actions for the well-being of the school community.
Collaboration within schools is also important to point out. Joint efforts among school personnel— teachers, academic directors, social workers, psychologists, and school principals—to better attend to students was mentioned in 9 percent of interview responses.
Four percent mentioned no collaboration at all between the community and the school.
DISASTER PREPAREDNESS AND RISK REDUCTION Respondents in all schools called into question the safety of their school buildings. Respondent perceptions of the safety of their school buildings showed significant variance across sample sites, posing questions about the resilience of these structures to natural hazard impacts. Less than half of respondents (47 percent) felt very safe in their buildings; 29 percent felt somewhat safe, and 25 percent felt unsafe (Table 50 ). The overall low confidence in building safety and the variance across secretariats is worrisome. Respondents in Riohacha, Bogotá, and Maicao felt most that their buildings were not safe; respondents in Soledad indicated that their buildings were safe compared to other secretariats.
TABLE 50. SCHOOL BUILDING SAFETY, BY SECRETARIAT
SCHOOL SAFETY
DON’T KNOW/ NO SECRETARIAT VERY SOMEWHAT NOT SAFE RESPONSE
Barranquilla 46% 24% 29% 1%
Bello 59% 11% 30% 0%
Bogotá 32% 16% 52% 0%
Cali 37% 44% 19% 0%
Cartagena 48% 27% 25% 0%
Maicao 31% 31% 37% 0%
Palmira 65% 33% 2% 0%
Riohacha 7% 47% 47% 0%
Soacha 27% 50% 23% 0%
USAID.GOV COLOMBIA RAPID EDUCATION AND RISK ANALYSIS | 80 SCHOOL SAFETY
DON’T KNOW/ NO SECRETARIAT VERY SOMEWHAT NOT SAFE RESPONSE
Soledad 66% 19% 15% 0%
Total 47% 29% 25% 0%
Most schools in the sample report having preparedness plans, but simulations and evacuation drills appear to be implemented infrequently and inconsistently. All schools should have a preparedness or risk management plan, according to Ministry of Education policies and directives. In the survey, 61 percent of respondents reported that a school preparedness or risk management plan was in place. Respondents in Palmira, Bello, and Bogotá cite the presence of plans most frequently (Table 51). However, a sizeable minority (30 percent) reported no plan. Respondents in Riohacha cited an absence of a plan the most. It must be noted that with the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic and the uncertainty surrounding how long it will remain, the existing preparedness plans of the schools are now outdated.
TABLE 51. SCHOOL PREPAREDNESS PLAN, BY SECRETARIAT
EXISTENCE OF SCHOOL PREPAREDNESS PLAN
DON’T KNOW/ SECRETARIAT YES NO NO RESPONSE
Barranquilla 60% 32% 8%
Bello 75% 15% 10%
Bogotá 75% 25% 0%
Cali 64% 27% 9%
Cartagena 47% 38% 15%
Maicao 46% 54% 0%
Palmira 86% 7% 7%
Riohacha 23% 54% 23%
Soacha 74% 21% 6%
Soledad 63% 29% 9%
Total 61% 30% 9%
In general, only 23 percent of survey respondents reported that emergency drills were carried out “frequently,” and 48 percent indicated that drills were implemented “sometimes.” A sizeable group (25 percent) claimed that no drills were done. Respondents in Bogotá, Soacha, and Cali mentioned simulations
81 | COLOMBIA RAPID EDUCATION AND RISK ANALYSIS USAID.GOV conducted the most, while Riohacha, Cartagena, and Bello reported the lowest frequencies (Table 52). In a significant number of cases, participants reported that the simulations are not conducted at all.
TABLE 52. FREQUENCY OF SCHOOL DISASTER DRILLS, BY SECRETARIAT
SCHOOL DISASTER DRILL FREQUENCY
DON’T KNOW/ SECRETARIAT FREQUENTLY SOMETIMES NOT AT ALL NO RESPONSE
Barranquilla 24% 41% 25% 10%
Bello 7% 56% 26% 11%
Bogotá 44% 52% 4% 0%
Cali 48% 44% 7% 0%
Cartagena 11% 48% 39% 2%
Maicao 14% 49% 37% 0%
Palmira 39% 43% 17% 0%
Riohacha 0% 33% 60% 7%
Soacha 38% 56% 4% 2%
Soledad 16% 54% 27% 3%
Total 23% 48% 25% 4%
In interviews, respondents elaborated on the approach of their schools to disaster drills. In some, Community Action Boards are involved in the drills and provide training to parents and teachers. In other schools, communities participate in a limited fashion by staying outside the school but observing the exercise. A few respondents explained how the presence of gangs prevented the school from completing their evacuation drills, as the students could not leave the school. In one school, brigades are used:
We have a risk plan. Drills are set up. There are groups of students and prevention activities that take place throughout the year. Brigades are organized within the students: there are security brigades, for example, where if there is a complex situation, an earthquake or something, this brigade counts the students, checking that they are all there. There is another first aid brigade, who are given basic first aid training. There is another evacuation brigade, assuming that they are alone they organize their classmates to evacuate. A fire brigade, an environmental one. At the beginning of the year they are organized, during the year there are trainings and drills. When we do the drills, there is a park next to the school, we have a map of how to evacuate depending on the location, and at the park we organize ourselves.
However, respondents mentioned that their community participated in the drills or in emergency planning only rarely, with 5 mentions. In these cases, the Community Action Board and Directive Council appeared to be important actors facilitating the collaboration.
USAID.GOV COLOMBIA RAPID EDUCATION AND RISK ANALYSIS | 82 MEDELLÍN CASE STUDY The following limited findings draw from interviews with a principal, teacher, parent, and student from a school in Medellín, as well as three interviews with experts working at the city level, including the education secretariat. All respondents were Colombian.
KEY RISKS Illegal groups impose invisible borders that students must cross to access school, putting them at risk of crime, violence, and forced recruitment. In the poorer areas of the city, illegal groups seek to control territory, people, and markets, delineate invisible borders, and compete with other illegal groups for control. Some of these borders correspond to drug sale markets, and there are pressures from illegal groups to link the population inside those limits, as consumers and sellers, including children. Armed confrontations occur when the invisible borders are crossed.
People must move, go to work, and go to school by crossing these borders. By moving between territories, they expose themselves to crime, mistreatment, or physical violence. The illegal groups seek to connect children and adolescents to their networks, making them drug users and exposing them to other criminal activities: prostitution, arms trafficking, forced recruitment, slavery, and other forms of violence and exploitation. Respondents explained that drug use is widespread in the city, but vendors continually compete for new customers and position themselves outside schools to identify opportunities to access children. Young Venezuelan women are particularly vulnerable.
EDUCATION ADAPTATION The school has flexibly adapted to accommodate Venezuelan migrant students. The city had classroom spaces to offer Venezuelan migrants due to demographic changes in the population. Some of the homes were far from school, so the city offered options for subsidized school transportation. Given the older ages of the Venezuelan students in the school, the city made accelerated learning options available as soon as grade 1 primary school. Venezuelan children also required enrollment at all times of the school year cycle, which the city has accommodated. The school helps them obtain study certificates if they do not have them or cannot acquire them, and while this happens, they immediately can begin studying. Tests are made so that they are in the grade that most corresponds to their situation. The school had to change its previous focus and open academic degrees for grades 10 and 11 in response to the Venezuelan migrants.
The interface between the education sector and other sectors can require adjustment to handle the unique situation of Venezuelan migrant documentation. An unsolved problem is the access of Venezuelan migrant students to upper secondary school that can give them better opportunities for work after finishing their studies. They cannot register for upper secondary if they do not have Colombian citizenship documents or Colombian ID as foreign nationals, and the vast majority are in the country only with transitory permits. This document does not allow them to receive the benefit of education with SENA (National Apprenticeship Service). This situation is yet to be solved, because the Ministry of Labor regulates SENA, not the Ministry of Education. As expressed by a female migrant student:
Upon arrival, I had problems because they put me in the 10th grade, and I had to be in 9th. When I arrived, there were many things that I had not seen. And I was completely lost, as “this is not my
83 | COLOMBIA RAPID EDUCATION AND RISK ANALYSIS USAID.GOV world.” It is all very confusing. I also had to validate 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th, and 9th grades, because I had no apostilled [officially sealed/signed] papers. All at once. I had to study double, and I did not understand anything about anything. In Venezuela, they teach differently. I decided to focus on the validation. I lost 10th grade, and I did 10th again the next year. Now I am in the 11th. And I am now in academic baccalaureate. I was in a technical baccalaureate when I did 10th grade because my stepfather is Colombian, and I’ll have nationality soon. When I lost it, I had to repeat it and stay in academics; if you repeat, you cannot go on with the technical baccalaureate. I was in architectural drawing. The SENA asks for a foreigner’s or nationality card. Venezuelans find it difficult to enter the technical baccalaureate of the school. SENA gives it. In environment, drawing, and construction. Those who make technical baccalaureate can leave school and follow the full track at SENA or go out and work.
Efforts to be inclusive for Venezuelan students, specifically, have helped the school be inclusive generally. The inclusion model for Venezuelans has reinforced the inclusion capacities that the school and the city have been developing. The school has LGBTI students, blind students, students with cerebral palsy who require ever-present support, and students from all socioeconomic backgrounds. It also has inclusive education programs from the grade 1 of primary school. The teacher said, “We have blind students, students with cerebral palsy. We already have a graduate who is with us since late primary school. Another student in a wheelchair, with the caretaker at his side always, always helps. He has a great ability in mathematics. When he graduated, another one could enter the 6th grade. This diversity gave us a hard time at first, due to the curricular adaptations that had to be made. Now these adjustments generate affection among everyone.”
The city’s resilience orientation appears to help identify partnership opportunities to innovate on risk reduction and education innovation. Medellín has a resilience strategy that focuses on equity, disaster risk management, data and information, and violence prevention. While the strategy has limited attention to education, the city has made efforts to apply resilience thinking to education and young people. The city learned about urban resilience and education innovation from US cities, such as Chicago and New Orleans, and the resilience strategy supported the Colombian peace process.
The city invested in harnessing resilience concepts to create a public program on the memory of conflict. For example, the Museo Casa de la Memoria de Medellín (https://www.museocasadelamemoria.gov.co/) organized an exhibition on reckoning violence and armed conflict, identifying their causes, and cataloguing the public response from a resilience approach. There are now similar memory processes being undertaken in other Medellín schools, emphasizing resilience, capacity development to manage risks, reconciliation, and integration, and strategies to guarantee non-repetition.
The city offers teacher training platforms that allow them to experiment and develop new forms of teaching and learning. At Mova (https://medellin.edu.co/mova), teachers can access courses, research, and exchange experiences with universities. The Explora Park museum (https://www.parqueexplora.org/educaci-n-explora) works with the education secretariat on STEM subjects for students, using a resilience approach. The city sees flexible and attractive educational models as vital for students to want to be in school and build life projects.
USAID.GOV COLOMBIA RAPID EDUCATION AND RISK ANALYSIS | 84 CONCLUSIONS
CONTEXTUAL RISK All school communities in the sample are multi-hazard realities, beset by the recent shock of a major pandemic.
• Quarantined due to COVID-19, respondents unsurprisingly cited epidemics as the priority disaster risk, with 31 percent of respondents across all locations indicating epidemics as the main risk. • The other most cited disaster risks across secretariats were flooding (21 percent) and earthquakes (20 percent). Respondents in several secretariats described how their schools flood or how flooding prevents access to school. Gales were the priority risk in communities along the Caribbean coast. • A majority of respondents identified drugs, gangs, and violence as the principal threats in their communities. • Respondents indicated that the most common forms of violence in the sample are fighting, domestic violence, and violence against Venezuelans. • It is important to note that each school community cited multiple risk categories, including disaster risks and human threats, underscoring the importance of supporting resilience against these risks.
The sale of drugs constitutes the most critical social risk faced by school communities and signals wider organized criminal activity.
• The consumption and sale of drugs in school communities is generalized and normalized, and schools are adopting a range of measures to prevent students from using drugs and being recruited. • Except for Riohacha, respondents in all secretariats identified groups with different levels of organization that can be considered forms of gangs. Moreover, these groups are consistently reported as being involved in micro-trafficking drugs. Respondents further consider these groups responsible for other security and social problems. • Teachers (50 percent) and students (24 percent) mentioned gangs the most among all respondent categories. They elaborated on how gangs produce community insecurity in myriad manifestations— general insecurity from their presence and agency, inter-gang confrontations and fighting, and threats to and intimidation of non-gang members.
EDUCATION Schools are positively valued by a majority of respondents across the sample, and teachers are particularly esteemed.
• In all secretariats, at least 65 percent of survey participants have a very good perception of their schools, with 74 percent of all respondents valuing their school “a lot.” • In interviews, respondents described schools as the most local extension of the state, the one location in the community where different people and groups could come together peacefully. • The majority (66 percent) of respondents surveyed liked their teachers “a lot,” and nearly the full remainder liked their teachers “somewhat.” In most of the participants’ categories, teachers were mostly valued (“a lot”). • Students are generally interested in school—with Venezuelan students showing slightly more interest than their Colombian peers.
85 | COLOMBIA RAPID EDUCATION AND RISK ANALYSIS USAID.GOV Schools are seen as relative islands of safety amidst insecure surroundings.
• In the survey, 45 percent of students reported feeling “very” safe inside school and 45 percent reported feeling “somewhat” safe in school. Male students felt slightly safer than female students. • Teachers feel less safe than students, with only 29 percent feeling “very” safe in school. • In contrast, a mere 16 percent of respondents felt “very” safe outside their school, and 50 percent of respondents felt “somewhat” safe. When these response options are combined, 66 percent of respondents felt generally safe outside school, compared to 91 percent inside school. • Teachers (6 percent), principals (11 percent), and female students (11 percent) felt the least safe among all respondents. • Respondents explained how schools often have no walls, fences, or any type of physical boundary from the surrounding neighborhood, and respondents regularly recalled their fear about having to enter or, worse, leave school and enter the surrounding area where they would find gang members, drug traffickers, thieves, or confrontations between gangs.
Schools are seen as fair environments—but bullying and discrimination persist.
• In the survey, 73 percent of respondents reported good integration between Colombian and Venezuelan students. • Respondents pointed to equal treatment as an important asset of the school environment and specifically mentioned the importance of empathy. • In 202 interviews, 217 responses mentioned equal treatment for students at school and in all secretariats. • However, bullying among students was reported in 23 percent of interview responses, and bullying or discrimination specifically toward Venezuelan students was mentioned in 25 percent of responses. One quarter of survey responses indicated that violence that occurred in schools was bullying, and 11 percent noted violence against Venezuelans.
Respondents pointed to several deficiencies in materials, with schools on the Caribbean coast faring the worst.
• Educational materials, chairs, labs, computers, internet connectivity, classrooms, bathrooms, books, and other materials were reported as lacking in interviews and survey responses. The respondents from Riohacha, Cartagena, Maicao, and Barranquilla reported fewer school materials than the ones toward the center of the country (Bogotá, Cali, Bello, and Palmira). • In the survey, 53 percent of the respondents reported a “little” amount of materials, compared to 41 percent who reported “a lot.” • Respondents in all schools—particularly in Riohacha, Bogotá and Maicao—called into question the safety of their school buildings, a worrying insight given the high disaster risk of many schools. • 25 percent of the responses in the interview reported lack of teacher training resources, particularly for remote learning.
USAID.GOV COLOMBIA RAPID EDUCATION AND RISK ANALYSIS | 86 Costs, insecurity, and drugs are cited as the main reasons why children and adolescents in the sample are out of school.
• School communities included in the sample belong mainly to the first and second socioeconomic strata, which indicate high levels of poverty. Respondents interviewed conveyed a situation of unemployment and lack of access to services, resources, and even food. • Costs (25 percent) was unsurprisingly the most cited reason for being out of school, followed by insecurity (18 percent) and drugs (18 percent). • It deserves mention that since 2011, public schools are free of student fees, which means that “costs” can be related to school materials, supplies, uniforms, or even transportation to and from school. • Participants reported that some parents might be avoiding sending their children to school because of the insecurity of their neighborhoods or the area around school. • Interviews further revealed that uninterested parents, limited household income, and student employment influenced dropout. Some respondents (12 percent) described how students had jobs to help their families financially, while others were concerned about parents who took their children to the streets to ask for money.
Respondents pointed to documentation problems as the main reason why Venezuelan children and adolescents were out of school.
• Interviews revealed that discrimination and quotas (13 percent), delays in parental job attainment (19 percent), and documentation (40 percent) were the most common barriers Venezuelan students faced when trying to enter the Colombian education system. • Respondents described 27 cases in which Venezuelans were denied spaces in school based upon their nationality. • It also emerged that secretariats may need to better understand the normative frameworks behind documentary requirements in order to appropriately adjudicate quotas or spaces for Venezuelan migrants.
Venezuelan migrant students face a variety of challenges to integrate into the Colombian education system, but many also appear to thrive.
• Respondents interviewed offered mixed reports about the situation of Venezuelan students in their schools. On the one hand, they spoke about how Venezuelan students have problems integrating into the Colombian education system due in part to a lack of documentation (education certificates and civil registration), the different academic content and calendars, differing pedagogical approaches, school quota availability, and different forms of spoken Spanish. • On the other hand, respondents also described how Venezuelan students are very good in school, thriving academically, and faring well with their Colombian peers. Respondents describe them as interested, disciplined, and respectful students, but they come from a different system with a distinct educational language and culture. • In interviews, respondents described the challenges that Venezuelan students have to face to be enrolled in schools, mostly related to barriers to access in the education system, such as legal documents, lack of pedagogic resources, and learning gaps. • Respondents also cited difficulties Venezuelan families confronted in terms of paying for school supplies and clothing for their children to attend school.
87 | COLOMBIA RAPID EDUCATION AND RISK ANALYSIS USAID.GOV • In interviews, many respondents reported knowing Venezuelan students who are out of school mainly due to economic hardship that leads them to work instead of study.
Across all sites in the sample, the majority of respondents cited positive relations between Venezuelan migrants and Colombians, but a significant minority reported tension and violence as well.
• In interviews, the majority of responses generally described how Venezuelan migrants and Colombian communities coexisted peacefully and even pointed to a sense of solidarity. • However, and in line with survey findings, roughly 25 percent of all mentions of relations between Colombians and Venezuelans refer to some form of violence against Venezuelans. This included bullying, discrimination, physical fights, and other forms of abuse, such as the exclusion of opportunities (leases, quotas in programs) and social distancing, where respondents explained they preferred not to speak to Venezuelans. • The behaviors by Colombians were attributed to a variety of factors: racism, competition for employment, false attributions of criminality, xenophobia, their lack of resources, their ghettoized living conditions, and grievance over the perception that Venezuelans receive more aid than Colombians.
Teachers have played a central role in making remote learning viable, but they need support.
• Remote learning has turned teachers into heroes, as described by some respondents, as they designed whole new teaching methodologies and delivery systems to keep children engaged and up to date in their school duties. These diverse strategies were mentioned in 85 percent of interview responses. • In many instances, teachers were left to their own devices, with some training themselves on technologies and remote learning. • Respondents explained how teachers would go beyond the call and make additional efforts to reach students, walk to their homes (but stay outside) if they did not have connectivity, use local stores to print copies of study guides and leave them for students, and cover the costs of cell phone data usage. • One quarter of interview responses reported lack of teacher training, while 18 percent reported recent or current training efforts.
Remote learning has led to increased involvement of many families in education, but it is also accentuating inequalities in education access.
• The extraordinary transformation from in-person schooling to at-home remote learning has compelled families to change how they support their children’s education. • Interviews revealed that families had been involved in their children’s education before COVID-19, but there were 41 mentions in interviews (20 percent) of parents not being interested in participating or even enrolling children in schools. • Respondents described how parents have become more involved in helping their children with remote learning, supporting assignments, helping with technologies, and interacting with their teachers. • However, 29 percent of interview responses related to the reality that many families lacked the computers, smartphones, internet access, and other resources to enable their children to learn remotely. This lack of resources negatively affects access and learning outcomes in a normal situation, but it is magnified in the present reality.
USAID.GOV COLOMBIA RAPID EDUCATION AND RISK ANALYSIS | 88 School quality and access are negatively affected by disaster risks and insecurity in the surrounding school environment.
• Community insecurity—violent neighborhoods, drug micro-trafficking and recruitment, alcohol consumption, and gang confrontations, to name a few risks—were described in 10 percent of the responses as situations that can make students think that going to school is not worth the risk. • Insecurity was further cited by respondents in 20 percent of interview responses as factors influencing dropout, absenteeism, and student and teacher social-emotional well-being. For instance, 18 percent of those responses mentioned situations in which parents or students threatened teachers because of a grade or comment, or students or teachers were robbed inside schools. • Natural hazard impacts, such as floods, landslides, gales, and earthquakes, appeared in 21 percent of interviews as a threat to education quality, as they often interrupt education (and also introduce other risks).
Student social-emotional well-being and academic achievement are affected by a variety of household factors.
• Limited family financial capacity was reported by parents, students, community members, teachers, and school principals as having a negative impact on students’ academic performance, school assistance, and homework. • A lack of food provided at home and even hunger were mentioned often by respondents: they described some students who arrived at school hungry from not having had breakfast or even dinner the night before, and the only meals they received were the school’s own meal plan (PAE), potentially affecting their ability be attentive and interested in classes or influencing a decision to drop out and work. • Many interview responses (20 percent) described situations like neglect, sexual abuse, and domestic violence. • Survey respondents identified several types of domestic violence that took place in their communities: insults and humiliation, physical punishment, and abandonment were the most often cited, and most of these were reported by female respondents. • Around 10 percent of the interview responses spoke of how children and adolescents emulate and imitate the negative behaviors and values at home and in their neighborhoods.
SCHOOL COMMUNITY RESILIENCE School community resilience to the COVID-19 crisis critically needs government action.
• School communities have done admirable work finding local solutions to absorb and adapt to the COVID-19 crisis. Secretariats and the Ministry of Education have provided important guidance and resources. However, the crisis puts into stark relief the need for regional and national governments to address underlying vulnerabilities that hamper the resilience of school communities. Action at these higher levels constitutes transformative capacity,182 which is essential for resilience.
182 School community resilience requires three resilience capacities: absorptive, adaptive, and transformative. Absorptive and adaptive capacities rely on internal and external assets, networks, skills, and relationships—such as psychosocial (i.e., dispositions and attitudes including hope, perseverance, confidence, and motivation),
89 | COLOMBIA RAPID EDUCATION AND RISK ANALYSIS USAID.GOV • Respondents and secondary sources point to how remote learning exposes vulnerabilities and can exacerbate inequity, as poorer families lack the resources to obtain the necessary technological devices. • Findings reveal that the two poorest and most marginalized towns in the sample—Riohacha and Maicao—report higher levels of risk and vulnerability, as well as ower education quality. • Several schools reported they lacked running water and sanitation, which are critical to any school reopening scenario. • Many teachers and principals regularly mentioned how they felt they had to adapt and manage on their own with limited support from their secretariats or the Ministry of Education. They asked for more resources, support, and training to be effective in this extraordinary situation. • Lastly, ungoverned areas have played a central role in the growth of drugs, gangs, organized crime, and armed groups.
All schools in the sample have made impressive efforts to adapt to remote learning, and teachers have played a central role.
• Valued for their dedication before COVID-19, teachers are making notable adaptations to implement remote learning during the crisis, but they need support. Respondents described various ways teachers are patient, take time to help students, explain topics clearly, answer questions, and in general make students feel comfortable. • Many teachers have adapted to the unprecedented remote learning requirements caused by COVID- 19, often by their own devices, and have asked for more support. • While most of the adaptations have relied upon technology, efforts to reach the poorer students without technology necessitated adaptability using traditional materials.
Overall, the COVID-19 crisis has enhanced community cohesion and collaboration, but the risk of tension is real.
• Participants in the survey reported that during COVID-19, the community united “a lot” (56 percent), followed by “a little” with 35 percent. The lowest report of cohesion came from respondents in Soacha, who noted “a lot” only 29 percent and “not at all” 10 percent. • Interviews with respondents surfaced insights into how humanitarian solidarity helped unite communities, including Colombians and Venezuelans, describing a range of ways neighbors are helping each other manage the difficult situation, such as providing food, helping with safety and hygiene, shopping, and helping with school.
knowledge, and financial and social capital—which are typically deployed at the individual, household, and community levels. Transformative capacities, however, require more collective efforts from the community level upward. On a spectrum, absorptive capacities are deployed to address the consequences of shocks and stressors; adaptive capacities are used to reconfigure and reorganize systems, and in anticipation of future shocks; and transformative capacities are developed to address underlying vulnerabilities to these shocks and stressors. Transformative capacities are the ability of communities and institutions to establish an enabling environment for systemic change through their governance mechanisms. See White Paper: Transforming Systems in Times of Adversity: Education and Resilience, USAID Office of Education, October 2019, https://www.eccnetwork.net/resources/transforming-systems-times-adversity-education-and-resilience-white- paper.
USAID.GOV COLOMBIA RAPID EDUCATION AND RISK ANALYSIS | 90 • Members of the school community work together in a range of ways to manage the crisis, including providing food, holding community feeding days, restricting movement, helping neighbors wash the fronts of their homes, and using the action board to address community needs. • However, the pandemic and the mobility restrictions have dealt a blow to already struggling household livelihoods, exacerbating inequalities and magnifying deprivation. Moreover, Colombia and Venezuela have locked down borders. These all can lead to the potential for increased grievance and tension.
The collaboration between schools and their communities has also been strengthened by the COVID-19 crisis.
• In the survey, 23 percent of respondents indicated that their schools and communities collaborated “a lot,” while 54 percent claimed “somewhat,” and 20 percent thought “a little.” • School and community collaboration was mentioned in 72 percent of interview responses and included joint issue campaigns on respect and tolerance, joint talks with local churches, Red Brigade and Red Cross support on disaster preparedness, and community forums to reduce violence and drug use. • Schools partner with a diversity of partners, from police and churches, to local authorities, NGOs, and Community Action Boards.
Schools in the sample are not sufficiently prepared for a new emergency—particularly one occurring during the COVID-19 crisis.
• Respondents in all schools called into question the safety of their school buildings. Respondent perceptions of the safety of their school buildings showed significant variance across sample sites, posing questions about the resilience of these structures to natural hazard impacts. Less than half of respondents (47 percent) felt very safe in their buildings; 29 percent felt somewhat safe, and 25 percent felt unsafe. • Most schools in the sample report having preparedness or risk management plans, but due to COVID- 19, these plans will be outdated. • Simulations and evacuation drills appear to be implemented infrequently and inconsistently. The level of community participation in preparedness planning was reported to be low. All schools should have a preparedness or risk management plan, according to Ministry of Education policies and directives.
RECOMMENDATIONS
The following recommendations are offered for the consideration of USAID/Colombia, the Ministry of Education, and international and national development and humanitarian partners.
EDUCATION
ACCESS • Ministry of Education. Explore transitional adaptations of existing documentary requirements and tracking systems to allow flexibility for Venezuelan students to enter and move within the Colombian educational system.
91 | COLOMBIA RAPID EDUCATION AND RISK ANALYSIS USAID.GOV • USAID/OFDA, WFP, NRC and others. Explore or expand programs that support Venezuelan migrant family livelihoods, food insecurity, and resilience, in an effort to ensure enrollment and permanence of their children in schools.
• USAID, Ministry of Education, secretariats, and private sector partners. Learn from ongoing efforts, such as in Bogotá, to work with the private sector, service providers, and donors to facilitate low-cost or no-cost access to the internet and cellular service for student families in the poorest and most remote areas, where technology access gaps are most pronounced.
• Ministry of Education. Subsidize all costs related to public schools (such as materials, supplies, uniforms, and transportation).
• Ministry of Education and secretariats. Ensure easy and secure accessibility to schools (transportation) in order to avoid dropouts due to long distances, insecurity, or lack of an adult to accompany students to school.
• Ministry of Education and secretariats. Organize an information system in which projections can be made regarding the influx of Venezuelan students into the education system in Colombia. This can support more effective education programming projections and school quotas, reducing the risk of discrimination.
• Ministry of Education and secretariats. Based on the lack of information regarding the Venezuelan students enrolled in the Colombian education system, implement institutional strategies to obtain and manage more accurate data of Venezuelan students enrolled in official schools before, during, and after the COVID-19 emergency.
QUALITY • Ministry of Education and secretariats. Capitalize on the increased family involvement in education by strengthening parenting programs, including domestic violence prevention programs, and explore ways to sustain support to family participation during and after COVID-19.
• Ministry of Education, secretariats, USAID, and partners. Explore opportunities for flexibility in pedagogical models and teacher training to accommodate the needs of Venezuelan migrant students, including language barriers, pedagogic approaches, social-emotional well-being, and over-age students. Explore lessons learned from schools with success in flexible approaches and create peer learning mechanisms to equip teachers in all recipient communities.
• Ministry of Education and secretariats. Assign and train psychological counsellors to all schools to handle the expected rise in social-emotional issues due to the COVID-19 contingency, as well as drug use prevention and teenage pregnancy, and to offset the burden being placed on teachers. If more counsellors cannot be recruited, consider training teachers, teaching assistants, or volunteers, as appropriate.
• USAID, Ministry of Education, secretariats, and local governments. Ensure that all students have nutritious and complete meals (at least three times per day); consider this through an initial COVID-19 emergency program. Build on existing programs like the PAE.
USAID.GOV COLOMBIA RAPID EDUCATION AND RISK ANALYSIS | 92 • Ministry of Education, secretariats, and USAID. Address shortages in quality and quantity of educational materials (including computers and internet access) and physical infrastructural requirements in the poorest, rural schools, especially those with accessibility difficulties, to increase equitable access.
• Ministry of Education, secretariats, and USAID. Retool in-service teacher training program to include modules adapted to distance learning, emergencies, conflict resolution, and social-emotional well-being requirements associated with COVID-19 social restrictions.
• Ministry of Education and secretariats. Develop and/or scale up preventive school and community programs to address bullying and discrimination and promote student resilience and norms of masculinity. These activities can be designed and planned under a resilience framework.
• Ministry of Education, secretariats, and USAID. Document teacher good practices regarding COVID-19 remote learning strategies and special follow-up methods for Venezuelan students. Connect teachers around the country regarding their experience and practices, and strengthen teacher peer learning networks. Create other social and educational strategies to support Venezuelan students through academic resources, pedagogic accompaniment, and social care, considering the specific characteristics of the community context.
SAFETY • USAID and Ministry of Education. Design and implement student leadership programs (including Venezuelan students) to preventively address drug use, violence (including violence against girls), and xenophobia and build individual resilience. Student leadership programs can include components on team building, leadership skills, anti-bullying, violence prevention, conflict resolution and peer mediation, crime and drug use prevention, multiculturalism, global/community perspectives, interpersonal communication, working in groups, personal empowerment, leading younger peers, risk reduction and preparedness, entrepreneurialism, community participation and voluntarism. Short- term implementation may use virtual learning modules using teacher-led group work; longer-term implementation will be school- and community-based, involving practicums, group work and volunteer networks, and feedback mechanisms to build the next class of leaders in schools.
• Ministry of Education, secretariats, USAID, and World Bank. Inventory school building infrastructure to identify and prioritize physical plant improvements to improve the overall learning environment.
• Ministry of Education, secretariats, USAID, National Police, and drug/crime prevention authorities. Develop a baseline, map community engagement and support opportunities, and explore place-based strategies to reduce bullying, gender-based violence, crime and micro-trafficking in school environments. Establish schools and a surrounding perimeter as safe, drug free zones. Facilitate joint action between schools and the police, the Instituto Colombiano de Bienestar Familiar (ICBF), NGOs, and other organizations that support safe learning and prevent drop-out. Draw on lessons from community-based policing to improve safety of areas surrounding schools.
93 | COLOMBIA RAPID EDUCATION AND RISK ANALYSIS USAID.GOV SCHOOL COMMUNITY RESILIENCE • USAID, Ministry of Education, and secretariats. Learn from the implementation of resilience strategies in Cali to explore contextualization and application of education-focused approaches in other secretariats in the sample. Consider strategies that prioritize mobilizing partner and community support to schools to implement existing planning commitments, school resilience plans jointly developed with communities, joint planning for community strategies for expected reopening scenarios, participatory disaster preparedness activities, and risk reduction and violence prevention efforts in line with existing normative frameworks. Explore financing incentives.
• Ministry of Education, secretariats, USAID, World Bank, and partners. Develop a school resilience diagnostic tool focusing key indicators on the status of infrastructure and materials, as well as social systems, management, participation, and community risks, that can be implemented easily by school and community partners and monitored by secretariats and the Ministry. Learn from World Bank experience in infrastructural diagnostic tools in the region, such as in the Dominican Republic (ISCERD tool).
• Ministry of Education, secretariats, and USAID. Strengthen monitoring and support to schools on developing and updating risk and preparedness plans in light of COVID-19 and assist school- community mobilization to implement related preparedness and risk reduction activities.
• USAID, Ministry of Education, local authorities, and partners. Support the development of youth centers and networks (virtual and physical) that serve not only as safe, neutral spaces but hubs for relevant and quality non-formal education and programming: youth leadership, project management, risk reduction, sports and culture, social cohesion/conflict resolution, drug prevention, and community voluntarism.
USAID.GOV COLOMBIA RAPID EDUCATION AND RISK ANALYSIS | 94 ANNEX I: QUANTITATIVE SURVEY RESULTS
May 12–19, 2020
SURVEY RESPONSE DEMOGRAPHICS
A.1. WHAT IS YOUR GENDER?
TOTAL NUMBER OF RESPONDENTS AND GENDER, BY SECRETARIAT
GENDER
SECRETARIAT Female Male TOTAL
Barranquilla 43 25 68
Bello 19 8 27
Bogotá 13 12 25
Cali 20 7 27
Cartagena 55 37 92
Maicao 19 16 35
Palmira 27 19 46
Riohacha 11 4 15
Soacha 31 17 48
Soledad 41 33 74
Total 279 178 457
B.1. WHAT IS YOUR AGE?
AVERAGE AGE OF RESPONDENTS, BY RESPONDENT TYPE
AGE
RESPONDENT TYPE Female Male Total Avg. Age
Community Member 39 37 38
Parent/Caregiver 35 37 36
Student 12 13 13
Teacher 40 44 41
School Principal 49 57 55
Total Avg. Age 33 31 32
95 | COLOMBIA RAPID EDUCATION AND RISK ANALYSIS USAID.GOV C.1. WHAT IS YOUR NATIONALITY?
RESPONDENT NATIONALITY, BY SECRETARIAT
NATIONALITY
DON’T KNOW/ COLOMBIAN- NO SECRETARIAT COLOMBIAN VENEZUELAN VENEZUELAN OTHER RESPONSE TOTAL
Barranquilla 87% 6% 7% 0% 0% 100%
Bello 67% 33% 0% 0% 0% 100%
Bogotá 76% 24% 0% 0% 0% 100%
Cali 67% 19% 11% 4% 0% 100%
Cartagena 53% 39% 8% 0% 0% 100%
Maicao 94% 6% 0% 0% 0% 100%
Palmira 63% 26% 11% 0% 0% 100%
Riohacha 73% 20% 7% 0% 0% 100%
Soacha 100% 0% 0% 0% 0% 100%
Soledad 91% 8% 1% 0% 0% 100%
Total 77% 18% 5% 0% 0% 100%
RESPONDENT NATIONALITY, BY RESPONDENT TYPE
NATIONALITY
DON’T KNOW/ COLOMBIAN- NO RESPONDENT TYPE COLOMBIAN VENEZUELAN VENEZUELAN OTHER RESPONSE TOTAL
Community Member 90% 8% 3% 0% 0% 100%
Parent/Caregiver 63% 30% 7% 0% 0% 100%
School Principal 100% 0% 0% 0% 0% 100%
Student 60% 31% 9% 0% 0% 100%
Teacher 99% 1% 0% 1% 0% 100%
Total 77% 18% 5% 0% 0% 100%
USAID.GOV COLOMBIA RAPID EDUCATION AND RISK ANALYSIS | 96 D.1. DO YOU IDENTIFY WITH ANY ETHNIC GROUP?
ETHNIC IDENTITY, BY SECRETARIAT
ETHNIC IDENTITY
NONE DON’T BLACK/AFRO- OF KNOW/ COLOMBIAN/ THE NO SECRETARIAT INDIGENOUS RAIZAL/PALENQUERO RROM ABOVE RESPONSE TOTAL
Barranquilla 1% 9% 0% 66% 24% 100%
Bello 0% 4% 0% 89% 7% 100%
Bogotá 0% 0% 0% 52% 48% 100%
Cali 0% 0% 0% 70% 30% 100%
Cartagena 5% 47% 0% 43% 4% 100%
Maicao 23% 23% 0% 49% 6% 100%
Palmira 0% 20% 0% 65% 15% 100%
Riohacha 40% 20% 0% 27% 13% 100%
Soacha 2% 2% 0% 81% 15% 100%
Soledad 0% 7% 0% 82% 11% 100%
Total 5% 17% 0% 64% 15% 100%
ETHNIC IDENTITY, BY RESPONDENT TYPE
ETHNIC IDENTITY
NONE DON’T BLACK/AFRO- OF KNOW/ RESPONDENT COLOMBIAN/ THE NO TYPE INDIGENOUS RAIZAL/PALENQUERO RROM ABOVE RESPONSE TOTAL
Community Member 5% 40% 0% 45% 10% 100%
Parent/Caregiver 5% 11% 0% 62% 22% 100%
School Principal 10% 20% 0% 60% 10% 100%
Student 3% 11% 0% 83% 3% 100%
Teacher 5% 20% 0% 56% 20% 100%
Total 5% 17% 0% 64% 15% 100%
97 | COLOMBIA RAPID EDUCATION AND RISK ANALYSIS USAID.GOV E.1. WHAT IS YOUR CURRENT SITUATION?
RESPONDENT SITUATION/STATUS
SITUATION/STATUS TOTAL
Internally Displaced Colombian 3%
Venezuelan Migrant 18%
Colombian/Colombian Parents 73%
Colombian/Venezuelan Parents 1%
Other 4%
Don’t Know/No Response 0%
Total 100%
RESPONDENT SITUATION/STATUS, BY SECRETARIAT
SECRETARIAT
SITUATION/STATUS BARRANQUIL LA BELLO BOGOTÁ CALI CARTAGENA MAICAO PALMIRA RIOHACHA SOACHA SOLEDAD Internally Displaced Colombian 13% 13% 7% 7% 13% 20% 0% 0% 0% 27%
Venezuelan Migrant 7% 11% 7% 5% 43% 1% 15% 5% 0% 6%
Colombian/Colombian Parents 17% 5% 5% 5% 15% 9% 7% 3% 14% 19%
Colombian/Venezuelan Parents 0% 0% 0% 25% 50% 0% 25% 0% 0% 0%
Other 10% 0% 0% 15% 15% 10% 35% 0% 5% 10%
Don’t Know/No Response 0% 0% 50% 0% 0% 0% 50% 0% 0% 0%
Total 15% 6% 5% 6% 20% 8% 10% 3% 11% 16%
F.1. WHAT IS YOUR SOCIOECONOMIC STRATUM?
RESPONDENT SOCIOECONOMIC STRATUM BY SECRETARIAT
SOCIOECONOMIC STRATUM
DON’T KNOW/ SECRETARIAT 1 2 3 4 5 6 NO RESPONSE TOTAL
Barranquilla 47% 28% 24% 1% 0% 0% 0% 100%
Bello 41% 19% 33% 0% 4% 0% 4% 100%
USAID.GOV COLOMBIA RAPID EDUCATION AND RISK ANALYSIS | 98 SOCIOECONOMIC STRATUM
DON’T KNOW/ SECRETARIAT 1 2 3 4 5 6 NO RESPONSE TOTAL
Bogotá 0% 60% 40% 0% 0% 0% 0% 100%
Cali 4% 70% 22% 4% 0% 0% 0% 100%
Cartagena 51% 33% 8% 1% 1% 1% 5% 100%
Maicao 31% 60% 0% 0% 0% 0% 9% 100%
Palmira 11% 54% 33% 2% 0% 0% 0% 100%
Riohacha 93% 7% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 100%
Soacha 33% 42% 25% 0% 0% 0% 0% 100%
Soledad 65% 24% 5% 0% 1% 0% 4% 100%
Total 40% 38% 17% 1% 1% 0% 3% 100%
RESPONDENT SOCIOECONOMIC STRATUM BY NATIONALITY
NATIONALITY
COLOMBIAN- STRATUM COLOMBIAN VENEZUELAN VENEZUELAN OTHER TOTAL
1 75% 4% 0% 21% 100%
2 76% 5% 0% 19% 100%
3 87% 4% 1% 8% 100%
4 100% 0% 0% 0% 100%
5 33% 0% 0% 67% 100%
6 100% 0% 0% 0% 100%
Don’t Know/ No Response 58% 17% 0% 25% 100%
Total 77% 5% 0% 18% 100%
99 | COLOMBIA RAPID EDUCATION AND RISK ANALYSIS USAID.GOV G.1. HOW LONG HAVE YOU LIVED IN THE COMMUNITY?
TIME IN COMMUNITY, BY SECRETARIAT
TIME IN COMMUNITY
DON’T KNOW/ SECRETARIAT <1 YEAR 1-3 YEARS 3-5 YEARS 5+ YEARS NO RESPONSE TOTAL
Barranquilla 15% 25% 4% 56% 0% 100%
Bello 22% 26% 15% 37% 0% 100%
Bogotá 0% 24% 16% 60% 0% 100%
Cali 19% 30% 7% 44% 0% 100%
Cartagena 13% 41% 13% 33% 0% 100%
Maicao 3% 9% 20% 69% 0% 100%
Palmira 22% 37% 11% 30% 0% 100%
Riohacha 13% 7% 27% 53% 0% 100%
Soacha 2% 10% 10% 77% 0% 100%
Soledad 12% 24% 8% 55% 0% 100%
Total 12% 26% 11% 50% 0% 100%
TIME IN COMMUNITY, BY NATIONALITY
TIME IN COMMUNITY
DON’T KNOW/ NATIONALITY <1 YEAR 1-3 YEARS 3-5 YEARS 5+ YEARS NO RESPONSE TOTAL
Colombian 8% 17% 11% 65% 0% 100%
Colombian-Venezuelan 23% 50% 23% 5% 0% 100%
Venezuelan 28% 60% 12% 0% 0% 100%
Other 0% 0% 0% 100% 0% 100%
Total 12% 26% 11% 50% 0% 100%
USAID.GOV COLOMBIA RAPID EDUCATION AND RISK ANALYSIS | 100 H.1. WHAT IS THE HIGHEST LEVEL OF YOUR EDUCATION ATTAINMENT?
EDUCATION LEVEL, BY RESPONDENT AGE GROUP
AGE GROUP
EDUCATION LEVEL ADULT STUDENT TOTAL
1 0% 1% 0%
2 0% 1% 0%
3 0% 15% 4%
4 0% 5% 1%
5 0% 18% 5%
6 0% 8% 2%
7 0% 13% 4%
8 0% 7% 2%
9 0% 13% 4%
10 0% 16% 4%
11 0% 1% 0%
None 0% 0% 0%
Postgraduate 22% 0% 17%
Primary 7% 3% 6%
Secondary 25% 0% 18%
Tertiary 14% 0% 10%
University 31% 0% 23%
None 0% 0% 0%
Don’t Know/No Response 0% 0% 0%
Total 100% 100% 100%
101 | COLOMBIA RAPID EDUCATION AND RISK ANALYSIS USAID.GOV I.1. HOW LONG HAVE YOU KNOWN YOUR SCHOOL?
TIME KNOWN SCHOOL, BY SECRETARIAT
TIME
DON’T KNOW/ SECRETARIAT <1 YEAR 1-3 YEARS 3-5 YEARS 5+ YEARS NO RESPONSE TOTAL
Barranquilla 12% 31% 10% 47% 0% 100%
Bello 37% 30% 15% 15% 4% 100%
Bogotá 0% 28% 8% 64% 0% 100%
Cali 22% 26% 11% 41% 0% 100%
Cartagena 13% 40% 14% 33% 0% 100%
Maicao 0% 11% 17% 71% 0% 100%
Palmira 20% 35% 15% 30% 0% 100%
Riohacha 27% 7% 0% 67% 0% 100%
Soacha 8% 8% 19% 65% 0% 100%
Soledad 15% 34% 14% 38% 0% 100%
Total 14% 28% 13% 44% 0% 100%
J.1. HOW DO CHILDREN AND ADOLESCENTS IN YOUR AREA SPEND THEIR DAY?
LAST WEEK’S ACTIVITIES OF CHILDREN AND ADOLESCENTS, BY AGE GROUP
ACTIVITIES ADULT STUDENT TOTAL
Studying and Housework 36% 42% 37%
Work, Study, Housework 20% 8% 17%
Study Only 35% 42% 37%
Work and Study 8% 7% 8%
Work Only 1% 0% 1%
Don’t Know/No Response 1% 1% 1%
Total 100% 100% 100%
USAID.GOV COLOMBIA RAPID EDUCATION AND RISK ANALYSIS | 102 K.1. DO CHILDREN AND ADOLESCENTS IN YOUR AREA CONTRIBUTE FINANCIAL SUPPORT TO THEIR HOUSEHOLDS?
STUDENT FINANCIAL CONTRIBUTIONS TO HOUSEHOLD, BY RESPONDENT AGE GROUP
RESPONSE ADULT STUDENT TOTAL
No 88% 84% 86%
Yes 10% 14% 12%
Don’t Know/No Response 2% 2% 2%
Total 100% 100% 100%
SURVEY QUESTIONS
1. HOW MUCH DO YOU LIKE YOUR SCHOOL?
LIKE SCHOOL BY SECRETARIAT
LIKE SCHOOL
DON’T KNOW/ SECRETARIAT A LOT SOMEWHAT A LITTLE NOT AT ALL NO RESPONSE TOTAL
Barranquilla 68% 31% 1% 0% 0% 100%
Bello 74% 26% 0% 0% 0% 100%
Bogotá 80% 20% 0% 0% 0% 100%
Cali 89% 11% 0% 0% 0% 100%
Cartagena 65% 30% 3% 0% 1% 100%
Maicao 77% 23% 0% 0% 0% 100%
Palmira 78% 20% 2% 0% 0% 100%
Riohacha 67% 33% 0% 0% 0% 100%
Soacha 81% 19% 0% 0% 0% 100%
Soledad 76% 24% 0% 0% 0% 100%
Total 74% 25% 1% 0% 0% 100%
103 | COLOMBIA RAPID EDUCATION AND RISK ANALYSIS USAID.GOV LIKE SCHOOL BY RESPONDENT TYPE
LIKE SCHOOL
DON’T KNOW/ RESPONDENT TYPE A LOT SOMEWHAT A LITTLE NOT AT ALL NO RESPONSE TOTAL
Community Member 55% 40% 3% 0% 3% 100%
Parent/Caregiver 66% 34% 0% 0% 0% 100%
School Principal 80% 10% 10% 0% 0% 100%
Student 68% 29% 3% 0% 0% 100%
Teacher 91% 9% 0% 0% 0% 100%
Total 74% 25% 1% 0% 0% 100%
LIKE SCHOOL BY NATIONALITY
LIKE SCHOOL
DON’T KNOW/ NATIONALITY A LOT SOMEWHAT A LITTLE NOT AT ALL NO RESPONSE TOTAL
Colombian 75% 23% 1% 0% 0% 100%
Colombian-Venezuelan 59% 41% 0% 0% 0% 100%
Venezuelan 72% 27% 1% 0% 0% 100%
Other 100% 0% 0% 0% 0% 100%
Total 74% 25% 1% 0% 0% 100%
2. IN YOUR COMMUNITY, WHAT IS THE MAIN REASON WHY CHILDREN AND ADOLESCENTS ARE OUT OF SCHOOL?
REASONS OUT OF SCHOOL, BY GENDER
GENDER
REASONS OUT OF SCHOOL FEMALE MALE TOTAL
Cost 23% 28% 25%
Insecurity 18% 19% 18%
Drugs 19% 16% 18%
Must Work 14% 10% 12%
Pregnancy 6% 8% 7%
USAID.GOV COLOMBIA RAPID EDUCATION AND RISK ANALYSIS | 104 GENDER
REASONS OUT OF SCHOOL FEMALE MALE TOTAL
Join Illegal Armed Groups 3% 2% 3%
Identity 1% 2% 2%
Don’t Know/No Response 15% 15% 15%
Total 100% 100% 100%
REASONS OUT OF SCHOOL, BY SECRETARIAT
SECRETARIAT
REASONS WHY OUT TOTA
OF SCHOOL L BARRANQUILL A BELLO BOGOTÁ CALI CARTAGENA MAICAO PALMIRA RIOHACHA SOACHA SOLEDAD Cost 28% 26% 16% 11% 13% 40% 37% 27% 21% 32% 25%
Insecurity 16% 22% 32% 22% 16% 17% 13% 7% 19% 22% 18%
Drugs 24% 22% 16% 19% 17% 3% 13% 7% 29% 18% 18%
Must Work 9% 15% 20% 15% 11% 23% 13% 7% 6% 14% 12%
Pregnancy 6% 0% 0% 4% 15% 11% 2% 33% 4% 1% 7%
Join Illegal Armed Groups 3% 7% 0% 4% 4% 0% 2% 0% 4% 1% 3%
Identity 1% 0% 0% 0% 3% 0% 0% 0% 0% 4% 2%
Don’t Know/No Response 13% 7% 16% 26% 20% 6% 20% 20% 17% 8% 15%
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 Total % % % % % % % % % % 100%
REASONS OUT OF SCHOOL, BY NATIONALITY
NATIONALITY
COLOMBIAN- REASONS WHY OUT OF SCHOOL COLOMBIAN VENEZUELAN VENEZUELAN OTHER TOTAL
Cost 22% 50% 30% 100% 25%
Insecurity 21% 9% 12% 0% 18%
Drugs 18% 18% 18% 0% 18%
Must Work 12% 9% 16% 0% 12%
Pregnancy 8% 5% 2% 0% 7%
105 | COLOMBIA RAPID EDUCATION AND RISK ANALYSIS USAID.GOV NATIONALITY
COLOMBIAN- REASONS WHY OUT OF SCHOOL COLOMBIAN VENEZUELAN VENEZUELAN OTHER TOTAL
Join Illegal Armed Groups 3% 0% 2% 0% 3%
Identity 2% 0% 1% 0% 2%
Don’t Know/No Response 15% 9% 18% 0% 15%
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
3.A. HOW MUCH DO YOU LIKE YOUR TEACHERS?
HOW MUCH LIKE TEACHERS, ALL RESPONDENTS
HOW MUCH LIKE TEACHERS RESPONSE (ALL)
A Lot 66%
Somewhat 33%
A Little 1%
Not at All 0%
Don’t Know/No Response 0%
Total 100%
HOW MUCH LIKE TEACHERS, BY SECRETARIAT
HOW MUCH LIKE TEACHERS
SECRETARIAT A LOT SOMEWHAT A LITTLE NOT AT ALL TOTAL
Barranquilla 63% 35% 1% 0% 100%
Bello 56% 44% 0% 0% 100%
Bogotá 76% 24% 0% 0% 100%
Cali 81% 19% 0% 0% 100%
Cartagena 59% 39% 2% 0% 100%
Maicao 66% 34% 0% 0% 100%
Palmira 76% 24% 0% 0% 100%
Riohacha 33% 60% 0% 7% 100%
Soacha 65% 33% 2% 0% 100%
Soledad 73% 27% 0% 0% 100%
USAID.GOV COLOMBIA RAPID EDUCATION AND RISK ANALYSIS | 106 HOW MUCH LIKE TEACHERS
SECRETARIAT A LOT SOMEWHAT A LITTLE NOT AT ALL TOTAL
Total 66% 33% 1% 0% 100%
4.A. DOES YOUR SCHOOL HAVE SUFFICIENT MATERIALS?
SCHOOL MATERIALS SUFFICIENCY, BY SECRETARIAT
SUFFICIENT SCHOOL MATERIALS
DON’T KNOW/ SECRETARIAT A LOT A LITTLE NOT AT ALL NO RESPONSE TOTAL
Barranquilla 34% 66% 0% 0% 100%
Bello 74% 19% 4% 4% 100%
Bogotá 68% 32% 0% 0% 100%
Cali 52% 41% 7% 0% 100%
Cartagena 21% 70% 8% 2% 100%
Maicao 31% 63% 6% 0% 100%
Palmira 59% 39% 0% 2% 100%
Riohacha 13% 80% 7% 0% 100%
Soacha 35% 56% 8% 0% 100%
Soledad 51% 43% 5% 0% 100%
Total 41% 53% 5% 1% 100%
SCHOOL MATERIALS SUFFICIENCY, BY RESPONDENT TYPE
SUFFICIENT SCHOOL MATERIALS
DON’T KNOW/ RESPONDENT TYPE A LOT A LITTLE NOT AT ALL NO RESPONSE TOTAL
Community Member 28% 55% 13% 5% 100%
Parent/Caregiver 43% 54% 2% 1% 100%
School Principal 40% 60% 0% 0% 100%
Student 51% 45% 3% 0% 100%
Teacher 35% 59% 6% 0% 100%
Total 41% 53% 5% 1% 100%
107 | COLOMBIA RAPID EDUCATION AND RISK ANALYSIS USAID.GOV 5.A. HOW DIFFICULT IS THE WAY TO AND FROM SCHOOL?
ROUTE TO SCHOOL DIFFICULTY, BY SECRETARIAT
ROUTE TO SCHOOL
DON’T KNOW/ SECRETARIAT HARD MODERATE EASY NO RESPONSE TOTAL
Barranquilla 9% 19% 72% 0% 100%
Bello 15% 11% 74% 0% 100%
Bogotá 8% 24% 68% 0% 100%
Cali 0% 11% 89% 0% 100%
Cartagena 17% 20% 63% 0% 100%
Maicao 31% 37% 31% 0% 100%
Palmira 9% 22% 70% 0% 100%
Riohacha 60% 20% 20% 0% 100%
Soacha 17% 29% 54% 0% 100%
Soledad 15% 30% 55% 0% 100%
Total 16% 23% 61% 0% 100%
ROUTE TO SCHOOL DIFFICULTY BY GENDER
ROUTE TO SCHOOL
DON’T KNOW/ GENDER HARD MODERATE EASY NO RESPONSE TOTAL
Female 15% 24% 61% 0% 100%
Male 16% 22% 62% 0% 100%
Total 16% 23% 61% 0% 100%
USAID.GOV COLOMBIA RAPID EDUCATION AND RISK ANALYSIS | 108 6.A. HOW SAFE IS YOUR SCHOOL BUILDING?
SCHOOL BUILDING SAFETY, BY SECRETARIAT
SCHOOL SAFETY
DON’T KNOW/ SECRETARIAT VERY SOMEWHAT NOT SAFE NO RESPONSE TOTAL
Barranquilla 46% 24% 29% 1% 100%
Bello 59% 11% 30% 0% 100%
Bogotá 32% 16% 52% 0% 100%
Cali 37% 44% 19% 0% 100%
Cartagena 48% 27% 25% 0% 100%
Maicao 31% 31% 37% 0% 100%
Palmira 65% 33% 2% 0% 100%
Riohacha 7% 47% 47% 0% 100%
Soacha 27% 50% 23% 0% 100%
Soledad 66% 19% 15% 0% 100%
Total 47% 29% 25% 0% 100%
SCHOOL BUILDING SAFETY, BY RESPONDENT TYPE
SCHOOL SAFETY
DON’T KNOW/ RESPONDENT TYPE VERY SOMEWHAT NOT SAFE NO RESPONSE TOTAL
Community Member 53% 25% 0% 100%
Parent/Caregiver 54% 21% 25% 1% 100%
School Principal 30% 40% 30% 0% 100%
Student 54% 34% 13% 0% 100%
Teacher 33% 33% 34% 0% 100%
Total 47% 29% 25% 0% 100%
109 | COLOMBIA RAPID EDUCATION AND RISK ANALYSIS USAID.GOV SCHOOL BUILDING SAFETY, BY NATIONALITY
SCHOOL SAFETY
RESPONDENT DON’T KNOW/ NATIONALITY VERY SOMEWHAT NOT SAFE NO RESPONSE TOTAL
Colombian 43% 29% 27% 0% 100%
Colombian-Venezuelan 41% 41% 18% 0% 100%
Other 0% 100% 0% 0% 100%
Venezuelan 64% 22% 14% 0% 100%
Total 47% 29% 25% 0% 100%
7.A. HOW INTERESTED ARE YOU/STUDENTS IN WHAT IS BEING TAUGHT AT SCHOOL?
STUDENT INTEREST IN SCHOOL BY SECRETARIAT
STUDENT INTEREST IN SCHOOL
DON’T KNOW/ SECRETARIAT A LOT SOMEWHAT A LITTLE NOT AT ALL NO RESPONSE TOTAL
Barranquilla 31% 57% 12% 0% 0% 100%
Bello 52% 48% 0% 0% 0% 100%
Bogotá 32% 60% 8% 0% 0% 100%
Cali 56% 37% 7% 0% 0% 100%
Cartagena 42% 50% 8% 0% 0% 100%
Maicao 51% 43% 6% 0% 0% 100%
Palmira 67% 30% 2% 0% 0% 100%
Riohacha 20% 80% 0% 0% 0% 100%
Soacha 44% 50% 6% 0% 0% 100%
Soledad 64% 35% 1% 0% 0% 100%
Total 47% 47% 6% 0% 0% 100%
USAID.GOV COLOMBIA RAPID EDUCATION AND RISK ANALYSIS | 110 STUDENT INTEREST IN SCHOOL BY RESPONDENT AGE
STUDENT INTEREST IN SCHOOL
DON’T KNOW/ SECRETARIAT A LOT SOMEWHAT A LITTLE NOT AT ALL NO RESPONSE TOTAL
Adult 40% 53% 7% 0% 0% 100%
Student 70% 29% 2% 0% 0% 100%
Total 47% 47% 6% 0% 0% 100%
STUDENT INTEREST IN SCHOOL BY NATIONALITY
STUDENT INTEREST IN SCHOOL
DON’T KNOW/ NATIONALITY A LOT SOMEWHAT A LITTLE NOT AT ALL NO RESPONSE TOTAL
Colombian 43% 50% 7% 0% 0% 100%
Colombian-Venezuelan 45% 55% 0% 0% 0% 100%
Venezuelan 69% 29% 2% 0% 0% 100%
Other 0% 100% 0% 0% 0% 100%
Total 47% 47% 6% 0% 0% 100%
8.A. HOW FREQUENTLY DO STUDENTS RECEIVE SCHOOL MEALS?
SCHOOL MEAL FREQUENCY, ALL RESPONDENTS
SCHOOL MEAL FREQUENCY ALL RESPONDENTS
Always 42%
Sometimes 28%
Never 26%
Don’t Know/No Response 4%
Total 100%
111 | COLOMBIA RAPID EDUCATION AND RISK ANALYSIS USAID.GOV SCHOOL MEAL FREQUENCY BY SECRETARIAT
SCHOOL MEAL FREQUENCY
DON’T KNOW/ ROW LABELS ALWAYS SOMETIMES NEVER NO RESPONSE TOTAL
Barranquilla 13% 24% 59% 4% 100%
Bello 33% 15% 44% 7% 100%
Bogotá 76% 16% 0% 8% 100%
Cali 78% 19% 0% 4% 100%
Cartagena 16% 48% 33% 3% 100%
Maicao 37% 43% 17% 3% 100%
Palmira 89% 9% 0% 2% 100%
Riohacha 87% 13% 0% 0% 100%
Soacha 44% 40% 13% 4% 100%
Soledad 45% 22% 32% 1% 100%
Total 42% 28% 26% 4% 100%
9.A. WHAT UNITES THE SCHOOL COMMUNITY?
WHAT UNITES SCHOOL COMMUNITY BY SECRETARIAT
SECRETARIAT
* *
WHAT UNITES
COMMUNITY BARRANQUILLA BELLO BOGOTÁ CALI CARTAGENA MAICAO PALMIRA RIOHACHA SOACHA SOLEDAD TOTAL
Sports 36% 22% 27% 32% 32% 25% 30% 27% 39% 43% 32%
Local Identity 27% 12% 23% 16% 22% 22% 18% 24% 20% 16% 21%
Education 19% 20% 20% 24% 17% 19% 20% 16% 29% 24% 20%
Religion 12% 22% 12% 15% 13% 15% 15% 12% 6% 10% 13%
Plazas 4% 12% 12% 9% 9% 10% 10% 10% 4% 4% 8%
Don’t Know/No Response 4% 12% 5% 4% 7% 9% 6% 10% 2% 3% 6%
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% * Respondents could select more than one response
USAID.GOV COLOMBIA RAPID EDUCATION AND RISK ANALYSIS | 112 WHAT UNITES SCHOOL COMMUNITY BY RESPONDENT TYPE
RESPONDENT TYPE
COMMUNITY PARENT/ ACTIVITY/ISSUE MEMBER CAREGIVER PRINCIPAL STUDENT TEACHER TOTAL*
Sports 38% 33% 23% 37% 28% 32%
Local Identity 87% 17% 19% 15% 26% 21%
Education 210% 19% 23% 19% 23% 20%
Religion 204% 17% 15% 13% 9% 13%
Plazas 105% 9% 12% 8% 8% 8%
Don’t Know/No Response 105% 6% 8% 7% 5% 6%
Total 750% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% * Respondents could select more than one response
10.A. WHAT TYPES OF THREATS EXIST IN THE COMMUNITY?
TYPES OF THREATS IN COMMUNITY, BY SECRETARIAT
SECRETARIAT
* *
VIOLENCE
TYPE BARRANQUILLA BELLO BOGOTÁ CALI CARTAGENA MAICAO PALMIRA RIOHACHA SOACHA SOLEDAD TOTAL
Drugs 26% 20% 21% 29% 25% 16% 36% 15% 30% 28% 25%
Gangs 28% 13% 22% 25% 22% 13% 17% 11% 24% 23% 21%
Violence 17% 14% 16% 18% 16% 14% 17% 15% 22% 19% 17%
Don’t Know 10% 9% 9% 4% 9% 14% 14% 20% 2% 7% 9%
Armed Groups 4% 11% 9% 6% 7% 12% 5% 9% 9% 7% 8%
Extortion 6% 14% 7% 6% 7% 11% 2% 9% 6% 7% 8%
Prostitution 6% 11% 9% 8% 9% 10% 6% 11% 3% 4% 7%
Recruitment 2% 8% 5% 5% 5% 10% 2% 9% 4% 5% 5%
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% * Respondents could select more than one response
113 | COLOMBIA RAPID EDUCATION AND RISK ANALYSIS USAID.GOV TYPES OF THREATS BY RESPONDENT TYPE
RESPONDENT TYPE
THREATS IN COMMUNITY COMMUNITY MEMBER PARENT PRINCIPAL STUDENT TEACHER TOTAL
Drugs 27% 28% 25% 25% 23% 25%
Gangs 22% 20% 13% 22% 21% 21%
Violence 14% 16% 18% 15% 20% 17%
Don’t Know 10% 9% 5% 15% 6% 9%
Armed Groups 7% 7% 15% 6% 8% 8%
Extortion 8% 8% 8% 6% 8% 8%
Prostitution 7% 7% 10% 5% 8% 7%
Recruitment 5% 5% 8% 5% 5% 5%
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% * Respondents could select more than one response
TYPES OF THREATS BY RESPONDENT GENDER
GENDER
THREATS IN COMMUNITY FEMALE MALE TOTAL
Drugs 26% 24% 25%
Gangs 20% 22% 21%
Violence 17% 17% 17%
Don’t Know 10% 9% 9%
Armed Groups 8% 7% 8%
Extortion 7% 8% 8%
Prostitution 7% 8% 7%
Recruitment 5% 5% 5%
Total 100% 100% 100%
USAID.GOV COLOMBIA RAPID EDUCATION AND RISK ANALYSIS | 114 11.A. TO WHOM DO YOU LOOK WHEN YOU ARE AFRAID?
WHOM STUDENTS TURN TO, BY GENDER
STUDENT
WHOM TO TURN FEMALE MALE
Father 4% 17%
Friend 2% 3%
Mother 85% 65%
Police 2% 0%
Relative 4% 9%
Teacher 4% 2%
Neighbor 0% 0%
Don’t Know/No Response 0% 5%
Total 100% 100%
WHOM ADULTS TURN TO, BY GENDER
ADULTS
WHOM TO TURN FEMALE MALE
Friend 1% 2%
Police 38% 35%
Relative 13% 14%
Teacher 4% 7%
Spouse 19% 26%
Mother and Father 19% 15%
Don’t Know/No Response 3% 0%
Neighbor 2% 2%
Total 100% 100%
115 | COLOMBIA RAPID EDUCATION AND RISK ANALYSIS USAID.GOV 12.A. TO WHAT KINDS OF DISASTERS IS THE SCHOOL VULNERABLE?
DISASTER RISK BY SECRETARIAT
NATURAL HAZARD RISK
DON’T KNOW/ SECRETARIAT EPIDEMIC FLOODING EARTHQUAKE STORMS LANDSLIDES NO RESPONSE TOTAL
Barranquilla 40% 16% 11% 23% 10% 0% 100%
Bello 32% 13% 18% 18% 20% 0% 100%
Bogotá 36% 16% 29% 13% 7% 0% 100%
Cali 26% 34% 28% 9% 3% 0% 100%
Cartagena 29% 28% 17% 16% 11% 0% 100%
Maicao 27% 20% 21% 16% 15% 0% 100%
Palmira 39% 13% 29% 14% 5% 0% 100%
Riohacha 27% 24% 14% 22% 14% 0% 100%
Soacha 29% 18% 32% 7% 14% 0% 100%
Soledad 27% 27% 11% 30% 5% 0% 100%
Total* 31% 21% 20% 17% 10% 0% 100% * Respondents could select more than one type
13.A. WHAT KIND OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE OCCURS IN THE SCHOOL COMMUNITY?
TYPES OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE BY SECRETARIAT
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE TYPE
/ /
TY
SECRETARIAT INSULTS/ HUMILIATION PUNISHMENT PHYSICAL ABANDONMENT MONEY, OF SUPPRESSION FOOD DESTRUCTION OF PROPER DON’ KNOW T NO RESPONSE TOTAL
Barranquilla 29% 19% 19% 18% 14% 0% 100%
Bello 18% 20% 23% 23% 15% 0% 100%
Bogotá 26% 23% 20% 18% 12% 0% 100%
Cali 33% 28% 15% 15% 9% 0% 100%
USAID.GOV COLOMBIA RAPID EDUCATION AND RISK ANALYSIS | 116 DOMESTIC VIOLENCE TYPE
/ /
TY
SECRETARIAT INSULTS/ HUMILIATION PUNISHMENT PHYSICAL ABANDONMENT MONEY, OF SUPPRESSION FOOD DESTRUCTION OF PROPER DON’ KNOW T NO RESPONSE TOTAL
Cartagena 22% 23% 21% 19% 15% 0% 100%
Maicao 30% 18% 18% 18% 15% 0% 100%
Palmira 26% 28% 28% 10% 9% 0% 100%
Riohacha 25% 20% 23% 18% 15% 0% 100%
Soacha 25% 28% 22% 14% 11% 0% 100%
Soledad 27% 18% 23% 18% 14% 0% 100%
Total* 26% 22% 21% 17% 13% 0% 100%
TYPES OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE BY RESPONDENT GENDER
RESPONDENT GENDER
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE TYPE FEMALE MALE TOTAL
Insults/Humiliation 26% 27% 26%
Physical Punishment 23% 21% 22%
Abandonment 20% 22% 21%
Suppression of Money, Food 18% 16% 17%
Destruction of Property 13% 13% 13%
Don’t Know/No Response 0% 0% 0%
Total 100% 100% 100% * Respondents could select more than one response
117 | COLOMBIA RAPID EDUCATION AND RISK ANALYSIS USAID.GOV 14.A. HOW SAFE DO YOU FEEL INSIDE YOUR SCHOOL?
SAFETY INSIDE SCHOOL BY SECRETARIAT
HOW SAFE ARE YOU INSIDE SCHOOL
DON’T KNOW/ SECRETARIAT VERY SOMEWHAT A LITTLE NOT AT ALL NO RESPONSE TOTAL
Barranquilla 31% 62% 7% 0% 0% 100%
Bello 41% 56% 4% 0% 0% 100%
Bogotá 16% 68% 12% 4% 0% 100%
Cali 30% 63% 7% 0% 0% 100%
Cartagena 35% 48% 14% 3% 0% 100%
Maicao 34% 57% 6% 3% 0% 100%
Palmira 61% 35% 2% 2% 0% 100%
Riohacha 20% 80% 0% 0% 0% 100%
Soacha 25% 63% 13% 0% 0% 100%
Soledad 43% 50% 7% 0% 0% 100%
Total 36% 55% 8% 1% 0% 100%
SAFETY INSIDE SCHOOL BY RESPONDENT GENDER
HOW SAFE INSIDE SCHOOL
DON’T KNOW/ VERY SOMEWHAT A LITTLE NOT AT ALL NO RESPONSE TOTAL
Female 33% 57% 9% 1% 0% 100%
Male 39% 51% 7% 2% 0% 100%
Total 36% 55% 8% 1% 0% 100%
SAFETY INSIDE SCHOOL BY RESPONDENT TYPE
HOW SAFE ARE YOU INSIDE SCHOOL
DON’T KNOW/ RESPONDENT TYPE VERY SOMEWHAT A LITTLE NOT AT ALL NO RESPONSE TOTAL
Community Member 38% 53% 10% 0% 0% 100%
Parent/Caregiver 35% 57% 6% 1% 0% 100%
School Principal 30% 50% 0% 20% 0% 100%
USAID.GOV COLOMBIA RAPID EDUCATION AND RISK ANALYSIS | 118 HOW SAFE ARE YOU INSIDE SCHOOL
DON’T KNOW/ RESPONDENT TYPE VERY SOMEWHAT A LITTLE NOT AT ALL NO RESPONSE TOTAL
Student 45% 45% 10% 0% 0% 100%
Teacher 29% 61% 9% 1% 0% 100%
Total 36% 55% 8% 1% 0% 100%
SAFETY INSIDE SCHOOL BY STUDENT GENDER
HOW SAFE INSIDE SCHOOL
DON’T KNOW/ STUDENT GENDER VERY SOMEWHAT A LITTLE NOT AT ALL NO RESPONSE TOTAL
Female 40% 49% 11% 0% 0% 100%
Male 50% 41% 9% 0% 0% 100%
Total 45% 45% 10% 0% 0% 100%
SAFETY INSIDE SCHOOL BY STUDENT NATIONALITY
HOW SAFE ARE YOU INSIDE SCHOOL
DON’T KNOW/ STUDENT NATIONALITY VERY SOMEWHAT A LITTLE NOT AT ALL NO RESPONSE TOTAL
Colombian-Venezuelan 55% 45% 0% 0% 0% 100%
Venezuelan 46% 41% 14% 0% 0% 100%
Colombian 44% 46% 10% 0% 0% 100%
Other 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Total 45% 45% 10% 0% 0% 100%
15.A. HOW SAFE DO YOU FEEL IN THE SCHOOL’S SURROUNDING AREA?
SAFETY OUTSIDE SCHOOL BY SECRETARIAT
HOW SAFE ARE YOU OUTSIDE SCHOOL
DON’T KNOW/ SECRETARIAT VERY SOMEWHAT A LITTLE NOT AT ALL NO RESPONSE TOTAL
Barranquilla 15% 51% 28% 6% 0% 100%
Bello 26% 63% 7% 4% 0% 100%
119 | COLOMBIA RAPID EDUCATION AND RISK ANALYSIS USAID.GOV HOW SAFE ARE YOU OUTSIDE SCHOOL
DON’T KNOW/ SECRETARIAT VERY SOMEWHAT A LITTLE NOT AT ALL NO RESPONSE TOTAL
Bogotá 8% 40% 48% 4% 0% 100%
Cali 7% 56% 30% 7% 0% 100%
Cartagena 19% 47% 26% 8% 0% 100%
Maicao 14% 49% 37% 0% 0% 100%
Palmira 24% 63% 13% 0% 0% 100%
Riohacha 13% 67% 20% 0% 0% 100%
Soacha 4% 31% 52% 13% 0% 100%
Soledad 22% 50% 23% 5% 0% 100%
Total 16% 50% 28% 5% 0% 100%
SAFETY OUTSIDE SCHOOL BY RESPONDENT TYPE
HOW SAFE ARE YOU OUTSIDE SCHOOL
DON’T KNOW/ RESPONDENT TYPE VERY SOMEWHAT A LITTLE NOT AT ALL NO RESPONSE TOTAL
Community Member 21% 56% 21% 3% 0% 100%
Parent/Caregiver 23% 52% 20% 5% 0% 100%
School Principal 10% 50% 40% 0% 0% 100%
Student 20% 48% 28% 4% 0% 100%
Teacher 6% 48% 38% 8% 0% 100%
Total 16% 50% 28% 5% 0% 100%
SAFETY OUTSIDE SCHOOL BY RESPONDENT GENDER
HOW SAFE ARE YOU OUTSIDE SCHOOL
DON’T KNOW/ RESPONDENT GENDER VERY SOMEWHAT A LITTLE NOT AT ALL NO RESPONSE TOTAL
Female 15% 52% 27% 6% 0% 100%
Male 17% 47% 30% 5% 0% 100%
Total 16% 50% 28% 5% 0% 100%
USAID.GOV COLOMBIA RAPID EDUCATION AND RISK ANALYSIS | 120 SAFETY OUTSIDE SCHOOL BY STUDENT GENDER
HOW SAFE ARE YOU OUTSIDE SCHOOL
DON’T KNOW/ STUDENT GENDER VERY SOMEWHAT A LITTLE NOT AT ALL NO RESPONSE TOTAL
Female 11% 51% 32% 6% 0% 100%
Male 27% 45% 24% 3% 0% 100%
Total 20% 48% 28% 4% 0% 100%
SAFETY OUTSIDE SCHOOL BY STUDENT NATIONALITY
HOW SAFE ARE YOU OUTSIDE SCHOOL
DON’T KNOW/ STUDENT NATIONALITY VERY SOMEWHAT A LITTLE NOT AT ALL NO RESPONSE TOTAL
Colombian 17% 52% 25% 6% 0% 100%
Colombian-Venezuelan 9% 64% 27% 0% 0% 100%
Venezuelan 30% 35% 32% 3% 0% 100%
Total 20% 48% 28% 4% 0% 100%
16.A. HOW MUCH DO YOUR SCHOOL AND COMMUNITY COLLABORATE AND COOPERATE?
SCHOOL COMMUNITY COLLABORATION BY SECRETARIAT
SCHOOL COMMUNITY COLLABORATION
DON’T KNOW/ SECRETARIAT A LOT SOMEWHAT A LITTLE NOT AT ALL NO RESPONSE TOTAL
Barranquilla 21% 55% 21% 3% 0% 100%
Bello 30% 48% 11% 11% 0% 100%
Bogotá 13% 54% 29% 4% 0% 100%
Cali 19% 63% 19% 0% 0% 100%
Cartagena 26% 51% 19% 4% 0% 100%
Maicao 11% 60% 29% 0% 0% 100%
Palmira 26% 60% 12% 2% 0% 100%
Riohacha 13% 67% 20% 0% 0% 100%
Soacha 10% 52% 31% 6% 0% 100%
121 | COLOMBIA RAPID EDUCATION AND RISK ANALYSIS USAID.GOV SCHOOL COMMUNITY COLLABORATION
DON’T KNOW/ SECRETARIAT A LOT SOMEWHAT A LITTLE NOT AT ALL NO RESPONSE TOTAL
Soledad 36% 47% 12% 4% 0% 100%
Total 23% 54% 20% 4% 0% 100%
SCHOOL COMMUNITY COLLABORATION BY RESPONDENT TYPE
SCHOOL COMMUNITY COLLABORATION
DON’T KNOW/ RESPONDENT TYPE A LOT SOMEWHAT A LITTLE NOT AT ALL NO RESPONSE TOTAL
Community Member 38% 48% 13% 3% 0% 100%
Parent/Caregiver 17% 58% 17% 8% 0% 100%
School Principal 20% 60% 20% 0% 0% 100%
Student 27% 47% 23% 3% 0% 100%
Teacher 20% 57% 21% 1% 0% 100%
Total 23% 54% 20% 4% 0% 100%
17.A. IN THE PAST, HOW MUCH HAVE YOUR SCHOOL AND THE COMMUNITY JOINTLY WORKED TO REDUCE VIOLENCE?
PAST SCHOOL-COMMUNITY VIOLENCE PREVENTION, ALL RESPONDENTS
PAST SCHOOL-COMMUNITY VIOLENCE PREVENTION ALL RESPONDENTS
A Lot 20%
Somewhat 43%
A Little 30%
Not at All 7%
Total 100%
PAST SCHOOL-COMMUNITY VIOLENCE PREVENTION BY SECRETARIAT
PAST SCHOOL-COMMUNITY VIOLENCE PREVENTION
DON’T KNOW/ SECRETARIAT A LOT SOMEWHAT A LITTLE NOT AT ALL NO RESPONSE TOTAL
Barranquilla 18% 39% 36% 7% 0% 100%
USAID.GOV COLOMBIA RAPID EDUCATION AND RISK ANALYSIS | 122 PAST SCHOOL-COMMUNITY VIOLENCE PREVENTION
DON’T KNOW/ SECRETARIAT A LOT SOMEWHAT A LITTLE NOT AT ALL NO RESPONSE TOTAL
Bello 23% 54% 23% 0% 0% 100%
Bogotá 9% 35% 39% 17% 0% 100%
Cali 15% 41% 37% 7% 0% 100%
Cartagena 17% 51% 24% 9% 0% 100%
Maicao 26% 51% 23% 0% 0% 100%
Palmira 29% 33% 31% 7% 0% 100%
Riohacha 13% 53% 33% 0% 0% 100%
Soacha 11% 36% 40% 13% 0% 100%
Soledad 28% 39% 27% 5% 0% 100%
Total 20% 43% 30% 7% 0% 100%
18.A. HOW MANY VENEZUELAN MIGRANTS ARE IN YOUR COMMUNITY?
PERCEIVED NUMBER OF VENEZUELAN MIGRANTS IN THE COMMUNITY, BY SECRETARIAT
NUMBER OF VENEZUELAN MIGRANTS IN COMMUNITY
DON’T KNOW/ SECRETARIAT A LOT SOME NONE NO RESPONSE TOTAL
Barranquilla 72% 24% 4% 0% 100%
Bello 67% 33% 0% 0% 100%
Bogotá 92% 8% 0% 0% 100%
Cali 70% 30% 0% 0% 100%
Cartagena 88% 10% 1% 1% 100%
Maicao 89% 11% 0% 0% 100%
Palmira 80% 20% 0% 0% 100%
Riohacha 67% 20% 13% 0% 100%
Soacha 90% 10% 0% 0% 100%
Soledad 78% 20% 1% 0% 100%
Total 81% 18% 2% 0% 100%
123 | COLOMBIA RAPID EDUCATION AND RISK ANALYSIS USAID.GOV 19.A. WHAT TYPES OF VIOLENCE OCCUR IN YOUR SCHOOL?
TYPES OF SCHOOL VIOLENCE, ALL RESPONDENTS
TYPES OF SCHOOL VIOLENCE TOTAL*
Bullying 25%
None 16%
Violence against Students 11%
Violence against Venezuelans 11%
Violence against Teachers 10%
Violence against Girls 8%
Violence against Afro-Colombians 7%
Violence against Indigenous 6%
Don’t Know/No Response 5%
Total* 100% * Respondents could select more than one response
TYPES OF SCHOOL VIOLENCE BY SECRETARIAT
SECRETARIAT
* *
TYPES OF SCHOOL VIOLENCE BARRANQUILLA BELLO BOGOTÁ CALI CARTAGENA MAICAO PALMIRA RIOHACHA SOACHA SOLEDAD TOTAL Bullying 24% 19% 27% 36% 20% 21% 37% 14% 32% 35% 25%
None 17% 18% 9% 8% 15% 14% 16% 16% 12% 34% 16%
Violence against Students 14% 12% 15% 8% 11% 9% 11% 11% 16% 6% 11%
Violence against Venezuelans 11% 9% 15% 12% 16% 10% 9% 11% 9% 5% 11%
Violence against Teachers 12% 9% 7% 12% 11% 9% 6% 9% 13% 5% 10%
Violence against Girls 9% 9% 11% 8% 9% 9% 5% 11% 8% 5% 8%
Violence against Afro- Colombians 6% 8% 5% 7% 8% 9% 7% 9% 4% 3% 7%
Violence against Indigenous 5% 8% 5% 5% 5% 9% 5% 11% 4% 4% 6%
None 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
USAID.GOV COLOMBIA RAPID EDUCATION AND RISK ANALYSIS | 124 SECRETARIAT
* *
TYPES OF SCHOOL VIOLENCE BARRANQUILLA BELLO BOGOTÁ CALI CARTAGENA MAICAO PALMIRA RIOHACHA SOACHA SOLEDAD TOTAL Don’t Know/No Response 3% 8% 5% 3% 6% 9% 4% 8% 1% 4% 5%
Total* 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% * Respondents could select more than one response
TYPES OF SCHOOL VIOLENCE, BY STUDENT NATIONALITY
STUDENT NATIONALITY
COLOMBIAN- COLOMBIAN VENEZUELAN VENEZUELAN TYPE OF SCHOOL VIOLENCE STUDENTS STUDENTS STUDENTS TOTAL*
Bullying 29% 57% 16% 25%
None 19% 14% 16% 17%
Violence against Students 11% 7% 11% 11%
Violence against Venezuelans 9% 14% 15% 12%
Violence against Teachers 9% 0% 11% 9%
Violence against Girls 8% 7% 9% 8%
Violence against Afro-Colombians 6% 0% 8% 7%
Violence against Indigenous 6% 0% 7% 6%
Don’t Know/No Response 4% 0% 6% 5%
Totals 100% 100% 100% 100% * Respondents could select more than one response
20.A. WHAT TYPES OF VIOLENCE OCCUR IN YOUR COMMUNITY?
TYPES OF COMMUNITY VIOLENCE, ALL RESPONSES
TYPES OF COMMUNITY VIOLENCE TOTAL RESPONSES*
Fighting 26%
Domestic Violence 20%
Violence against Venezuelans 16%
Discrimination 12%
125 | COLOMBIA RAPID EDUCATION AND RISK ANALYSIS USAID.GOV TYPES OF COMMUNITY VIOLENCE TOTAL RESPONSES*
Gender-Based Violence 11%
Violence against Afro-Colombians 8%
Violence against Indigenous 7%
None 0%
Don’t Know/No Response 0%
Total* 100% * Respondents could select more than one response
TYPES OF COMMUNITY VIOLENCE BY RESPONDENT GENDER
RESPONDENT GENDER
TYPE OF COMMUNITY VIOLENCE FEMALE MALE TOTAL*
Fighting 25% 27% 26%
Domestic Violence 20% 19% 20%
Violence against Venezuelans 15% 17% 16%
Discrimination 13% 11% 12%
Gender-Based Violence 11% 12% 11%
Violence against Afro-Colombians 8% 8% 8%
Violence against Indigenous 7% 6% 7%
None 0% 0% 0%
Don’t Know/No Response 0% 0% 0%
Total* 100% 100% 100% * Respondents could select more than one response
USAID.GOV COLOMBIA RAPID EDUCATION AND RISK ANALYSIS | 126 TYPES OF COMMUNITY VIOLENCE BY SECRETARIAT
SECRETARIAT
TYPE OF COMMUNITY VIOLENCE BARRANQUILLA BELLO BOGOTÁ CALI CARTAGENA MAICAO PALMIRA RIOHACHA SOACHA SOLEDAD TOTAL Fighting 30% 21% 22% 18% 27% 16% 21% 15% 31% 39% 26%
Domestic Violence 19% 18% 22% 23% 17% 18% 21% 17% 21% 24% 20%
Violence against Venezuelans 16% 16% 14% 15% 17% 14% 26% 15% 15% 13% 16%
Discrimination 13% 12% 14% 17% 11% 15% 14% 15% 11% 8% 12%
Gender-Based Violence 11% 13% 14% 10% 12% 13% 9% 11% 11% 9% 11%
Violence against Afro- Colombians 7% 10% 9% 8% 10% 10% 4% 11% 7% 3% 8%
Violence against Indigenous 4% 10% 6% 8% 6% 12% 4% 17% 4% 3% 7%
None 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Don’t Know/No Response 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 Total % % % % % % % % % % % * Respondents could select more than one response
127 | COLOMBIA RAPID EDUCATION AND RISK ANALYSIS USAID.GOV TYPES OF COMMUNITY VIOLENCE, BY RESPONDENT NATIONALITY
RESPONDENT NATIONALITY
TYPE OF COMMUNITY COLOMBIAN- VIOLENCE COLOMBIAN VENEZUELAN OTHER VENEZUELAN TOTAL
Fighting 28% 35% 25% 17% 26%
Domestic Violence 21% 15% 25% 17% 20%
Violence against Venezuelans 14% 35% 25% 24% 16%
Discrimination 12% 8% 25% 13% 12%
Gender-Based Violence 12% 4% 0% 10% 11%
Violence against Afro-Colombians 8% 4% 0% 9% 8%
Violence against Indigenous 6% 0% 0% 9% 7%
None 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Don’t Know/No Response 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% * Respondents could select more than one response
21.A. DOES YOUR SCHOOL HAVE A PREPAREDNESS PLAN?
SCHOOL PREPAREDNESS PLAN, ALL RESPONDENTS
EXISTENCE OF SCHOOL PREPAREDNESS PLAN ALL RESPONSES
Yes 61%
No 30%
Don’t Know/No Response 9%
Total 100%
SCHOOL PREPAREDNESS PLAN BY SECRETARIAT
EXISTENCE OF SCHOOL PREPAREDNESS PLAN
DON’T KNOW/ SECRETARIAT YES NO NO RESPONSE TOTAL
Barranquilla 60% 32% 8% 100%
Bello 75% 15% 10% 100%
Bogotá 75% 25% 0% 100%
Cali 64% 27% 9% 100%
USAID.GOV COLOMBIA RAPID EDUCATION AND RISK ANALYSIS | 128 EXISTENCE OF SCHOOL PREPAREDNESS PLAN
DON’T KNOW/ SECRETARIAT YES NO NO RESPONSE TOTAL
Cartagena 47% 38% 15% 100%
Maicao 46% 54% 0% 100%
Palmira 86% 7% 7% 100%
Riohacha 23% 54% 23% 100%
Soacha 74% 21% 6% 100%
Soledad 63% 29% 9% 100%
Total 61% 30% 9% 100%
22.A. HOW FREQUENTLY DOES YOUR SCHOOL CONDUCT EMERGENCY SIMULATIONS OR EVACUATIONS?
FREQUENCY OF SCHOOL DISASTER DRILLS AND SIMULATIONS ALL RESPONDENTS
SCHOOL DISASTER DRILL FREQUENCY ALL RESPONSES
Frequently 23%
Sometimes 48%
Not at all 25%
Don’t Know/No Response 4%
Total 100%
FREQUENCY OF SCHOOL DISASTER DRILLS AND SIMULATIONS BY SECRETARIAT
SCHOOL DISASTER DRILL FREQUENCY
DON’T KNOW/ SECRETARIAT FREQUENTLY SOMETIMES NOT AT ALL NO RESPONSE TOTAL
Barranquilla 24% 41% 25% 10% 100%
Bello 7% 56% 26% 11% 100%
Bogotá 44% 52% 4% 0% 100%
Cali 48% 44% 7% 0% 100%
Cartagena 11% 48% 39% 2% 100%
Maicao 14% 49% 37% 0% 100%
Palmira 39% 43% 17% 0% 100%
129 | COLOMBIA RAPID EDUCATION AND RISK ANALYSIS USAID.GOV SCHOOL DISASTER DRILL FREQUENCY
DON’T KNOW/ SECRETARIAT FREQUENTLY SOMETIMES NOT AT ALL NO RESPONSE TOTAL
Riohacha 0% 33% 60% 7% 100%
Soacha 38% 56% 4% 2% 100%
Soledad 16% 54% 27% 3% 100%
Total 23% 48% 25% 4% 100%
23.A. HOW MUCH AS LEARNING CONTINUED WHILE THE SCHOOL HAS BEEN CLOSED?
EXTENT OF REMOTE LEARNING CONTINUITY, ALL RESPONDENTS
EXTENT OF REMOTE LEARNING ALL RESPONDENTS
Always 60%
Sometimes 27%
Not at All 12%
Don’t Know/No Response 1%
Total 100%
EXTENT OF REMOTE LEARNING CONTINUITY BY SECRETARIAT
EXTENT OF REMOTE LEARNING
DON’T KNOW/ SECRETARIAT ALWAYS SOMETIMES NOT AT ALL NO RESPONSE TOTAL
Barranquilla 65% 21% 12% 3% 100%
Bello 78% 11% 11% 0% 100%
Bogotá 56% 36% 8% 0% 100%
Cali 70% 19% 11% 0% 100%
Cartagena 59% 29% 12% 0% 100%
Maicao 46% 29% 26% 0% 100%
Palmira 59% 28% 11% 2% 100%
Riohacha 40% 40% 13% 7% 100%
Soacha 52% 33% 13% 2% 100%
Soledad 65% 26% 9% 0% 100%
USAID.GOV COLOMBIA RAPID EDUCATION AND RISK ANALYSIS | 130 EXTENT OF REMOTE LEARNING
DON’T KNOW/ SECRETARIAT ALWAYS SOMETIMES NOT AT ALL NO RESPONSE TOTAL
Total 60% 27% 12% 1% 100%
EXTENT OF REMOTE LEARNING CONTINUITY BY RESPONDENT TYPE
EXTENT OF REMOTE LEARNING
DON’T KNOW/ RESPONDENT TYPE ALWAYS SOMETIMES NOT AT ALL NO RESPONSE TOTAL
Parent/Caregiver 60% 22% 17% 1% 100%
School Principal 70% 30% 0% 0% 100%
Student 61% 22% 16% 2% 100%
Teacher 61% 36% 3% 1% 100%
Total 60% 27% 12% 1% 100%
EXTENT OF REMOTE LEARNING CONTINUITY, BY RESPONDENT NATIONALITY
EXTENT OF REMOTE LEARNING
DON’T KNOW/ RESPONDENT NATIONALITY ALWAYS SOMETIMES NOT AT ALL NO RESPONSE TOTAL
Venezuelan 65% 19% 16% 0% 100%
Colombian 59% 29% 11% 1% 100%
Colombian-Venezuelan 59% 18% 18% 5% 100%
Other 100% 0% 0% 0% 100%
Total 60% 27% 12% 1% 100%
24.A. HOW MUCH AS THE COMMUNITY COME TOGETHER TO HANDLE THE COVID- 19/CORONAVIRUS CRISIS?
EXTENT COMMUNITY JOINED TOGETHER DURING COVID-19 BY SECRETARIAT
EXTENT COMMUNITY UNITED DURING COVID-19
DON’T KNOW/ SECRETARIAT A LOT A LITTLE NOT AT ALL NO RESPONSE TOTAL
Barranquilla 57% 38% 3% 1% 100%
Bello 63% 30% 4% 4% 100%
131 | COLOMBIA RAPID EDUCATION AND RISK ANALYSIS USAID.GOV EXTENT COMMUNITY UNITED DURING COVID-19
DON’T KNOW/ SECRETARIAT A LOT A LITTLE NOT AT ALL NO RESPONSE TOTAL
Bogotá 60% 24% 16% 0% 100%
Cali 63% 22% 15% 0% 100%
Cartagena 55% 36% 7% 2% 100%
Maicao 57% 37% 6% 0% 100%
Palmira 63% 26% 11% 0% 100%
Riohacha 53% 47% 0% 0% 100%
Soacha 29% 58% 10% 2% 100%
Soledad 62% 30% 7% 1% 100%
Total 56% 35% 7% 1% 100%
EXTENT COMMUNITY JOINED TOGETHER DURING COVID-19 ALL RESPONDENTS
EXTENT COMMUNITY UNITED DURING COVID-19 ALL RESPONDENTS
A Lot 56%
A Little 35%
Not at All 7%
Don’t Know/No Response 1%
Total 100%
EXTENT COMMUNITY JOINED TOGETHER DURING COVID-19 BY RESPONDENT TYPE
EXTENT COMMUNITY UNITED DURING COVID-19
DON’T KNOW/ RESPONDENT TYPE A LOT A LITTLE NOT AT ALL NO RESPONSE TOTAL
Community Member 63% 33% 5% 0% 100%
Parent/Caregiver 50% 36% 13% 1% 100%
School Principal 50% 40% 0% 10% 100%
Student 50% 39% 10% 0% 100%
Teacher 65% 31% 1% 3% 100%
Total 56% 35% 7% 1% 100%
USAID.GOV COLOMBIA RAPID EDUCATION AND RISK ANALYSIS | 132 ANNEX II: RERA SAMPLE SECRETARIAT PROFILES
Sources: INFORM Subnational Country Profile, Ministry of Education. 1 = low risk, 10 = high risk
OVERALL CONTEXTUAL RISK, VULNERABILITY AND EDUCATION INDICATORS, BY SECRETARIAT
CITY/ MUNICIPALITY URBAN OR RURAL ENROLLMENT TOTAL OF % STUDENTS VENEZUELAN TOTAL VULNERABLE GROUPS VULNERABILITY HAZARDS NATURAL HUMAN THREATS THREATS RESPONSE OF LACK CAPACITY TOTAL INFORM RANK Maicao Rural 50,569 10% 6.94 7.3 4.6 5.4 6.3 1.6 6.4
Riohacha Rural 59,496 8% 5.63 5.7 5.5 4.9 6.5 1.3 5.2
Soacha Rural 127,226 3% 2.87 2.2 7.5 2.4 6.3 0.6 2.3
Medellín Urban 425,015 5% 2.70 2.0 7.0 3.8 6.8 0.0 2.2
Cartagena Urban 216,683 6% 2.38 1.5 7.7 2.9 6.7 0.4 1.9
Soledad Rural 112,954 6% 1.84 2.0 6.7 1.6 5.3 0.5 1.8
Cali Urban 358,253 4% 1.74 1.5 7.0 3.5 6.6 0.2 1.8
Barranquilla Urban 259,452 5% 1.61 1.4 7.2 2.8 6.3 0.6 1.7
Bello Rural 82,448 4% 2.33 1.6 6.5 1.6 5.1 0.3 1.4
Palmira Rural 58,384 3% 1.58 0.8 7.1 2.8 6.2 0.3 1.2
Bogotá, D.C. Urban 1,267,263 4% 0.23 0.5 6.9 1.8 5.5 0.0 0.7
KEY SOCIAL RISK/HUMAN THREAT INDICATORS, BY SECRETARIAT
-
CITY/ MUNICIPALITY HOMICIDES MASSACRES KIDNAPPINGS ARMED COMBAT THREATS ARMED ACTION SEXUAL CRIMES INFRASTRUC TURE ATTACKS PROTECTED PERSONS HOMICIDE HUMAN THREATS GENERAL THREATS Palmira 6.7 2.8 4.2 3.6 4.1 3.4 4.6 0.5 0.0 3.8 6.8
Cali 6.2 0.0 0.0 2.6 4.3 3.7 2.3 0.1 1.1 2.9 6.7
Bogotá 8.1 2.6 4.9 3.2 2.9 2.5 2.9 1.0 0.0 3.5 6.6
Soacha 6.0 3.8 6.2 4.0 5.2 2.7 4.2 3.6 5.3 4.9 6.5
Barranquilla 6.9 0.0 3.4 3.3 3.7 0.1 0.9 0.1 0.0 2.4 6.3
133 | COLOMBIA RAPID EDUCATION AND RISK ANALYSIS USAID.GOV
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CITY/ MUNICIPALITY HOMICIDES MASSACRES KIDNAPPINGS ARMED COMBAT THREATS ARMED ACTION SEXUAL CRIMES INFRASTRUC TURE ATTACKS PROTECTED PERSONS HOMICIDE HUMAN THREATS GENERAL THREATS Soledad 6.2 0.0 2.9 2.6 4.7 2.9 0.0 1.4 0.0 2.8 6.3
Cartagena 7.0 0.0 6.5 5.8 3.3 5.2 4.6 4.8 4.0 5.4 6.3
Riohacha 7.7 0.0 4.9 0.0 2.1 2.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.8 6.2
Maicao 5.3 0.0 4.8 0.0 3.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.0 1.8 5.5
Medellín 5.5 0.0 0.7 0.0 0.9 1.0 0.0 0.0 3.9 1.6 5.3
Bello 5.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.3 1.4 2.0 0.3 0.0 1.6 5.1
KEY DISASTER RISKS, BY SECRETARIAT
CITY/ MUNICIPALITY VOLCANO DROUGHT EARTHQUAKE LANDSLIDE FLOOD NATURAL HAZARD
Cartagena 0.0 0.0 8.0 6.9 7.8 7.7
Soacha 0.0 0.0 8.0 7.1 7.2 7.5
Barranquilla 0.0 0.0 8.0 5.3 7.9 7.2
Palmira 0.0 0.0 8.0 5.7 7.1 7.1
Cali 0.0 0.0 8.0 5.4 7.3 7.0
Medellín 0.0 0.0 8.0 7.3 5.1 7.0
Bogotá, D.C. 0.0 0.0 8.0 6.0 6.3 6.9
Soledad 0.0 0.0 8.0 5.3 6.6 6.7
Bello 0.0 0.0 8.0 5.9 5.2 6.5
Riohacha 0.0 0.0 8.0 1.4 6.7 5.5
Maicao 0.0 0.0 8.0 0.4 5.1 4.6
USAID.GOV COLOMBIA RAPID EDUCATION AND RISK ANALYSIS | 134 KEY VULNERABILITY INDICATORS, BY SECRETARIAT
-
BILITY MENT - -
ECONOMIC DENCY DIMENSIONAL DIMENSIONAL - -
- CITY/
MUNICIPALITY COEFFICIENT GINI MULTI POVERTY DEVELOP HUMAN MENT NEEDS BASIC UNMET SOCIO VULNERABILITY INFANT MORTALITY ADOLESCENT PREGNANCY DEPEN INDIGENOUS DISPLACE VULNERABLE GROUPS VULNERA TOTAL INFORM RANK
Maicao 3.9 7.6 6.3 6.7 6.6 6.8 4.1 9.3 9.2 5.6 6.9 7.3 6.4
Riohacha 3.5 5.3 5.0 4.6 5.0 4.3 3.9 5.1 8.9 4.8 5.6 5.7 5.2
Soacha 6.5 0.9 3.1 1.1 1.6 1.7 4.4 2.4 0.0 3.6 2.9 2.2 2.3
Medellín 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.7 1.4 1.9 3.4 0.8 0.0 5.7 2.7 2.0 2.2
Cartagena 9.3 1.9 0.0 2.2 0.9 2.8 3.3 1.9 0.0 3.0 2.4 1.5 1.9
Soledad 6.5 2.1 3.1 2.0 2.2 2.7 3.3 2.4 0.0 2.5 1.8 2.0 1.8
Cali 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.6 1.4 0.6 2.6 1.5 0.0 3.4 1.7 1.5 1.8
Barranquilla 2.4 1.0 0.0 1.3 1.4 2.2 2.9 1.7 0.0 2.6 1.6 1.4 1.7
Bello 7.0 0.1 2.5 0.5 1.0 0.5 3.6 1.2 0.0 4.3 2.3 1.6 1.4
Palmira 8.5 0.0 1.3 0.8 0.4 1.2 3.3 1.6 0.0 3.9 1.6 0.8 1.2
Bogotá, D.C. 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 1.2 1.7 2.2 0.8 0.0 1.6 0.2 0.5 0.7
KEY RESPONSE CAPACITY INDICATORS, BY SECRETARIAT
CITY/
MUNICIPALITY RECEIVING SUBSIDY REGIME WATER ACCESS ACCESS TO GARBAGE COLLECTION ACCESS TO SEWAGE SERVICE UARIV CAPACITY INDEX ROAD DEFICIENCY MUNICIPAL MANAGEMENT INDEX OF LACK RESPONSE CAPACITY INFORM TOTAL RANK
Maicao 6.7 3.8 2.2 6.7 2.6 3.0 6.0 1.6 6.4
Riohacha 4.0 1.7 3.1 5.9 2.7 3.5 4.7 1.3 5.2
Soacha 1.1 0.9 0.1 1.2 6.1 4.8 2.9 0.6 2.3
Medellín 1.8 0.2 0.0 0.6 1.4 0.0 0.5 0.0 2.2
Cartagena 3.1 0.9 0.5 3.1 1.2 3.1 0.5 0.4 1.9
Soledad 2.0 0.4 2.0 1.9 3.1 0.0 2.0 0.5 1.8
Cali 1.6 0.2 0.2 0.5 1.9 3.1 2.0 0.2 1.8
Barranquilla 3.0 0.1 0.1 0.5 2.8 3.0 7.8 0.6 1.7
135 | COLOMBIA RAPID EDUCATION AND RISK ANALYSIS USAID.GOV
CITY/
MUNICIPALITY RECEIVING SUBSIDY REGIME WATER ACCESS ACCESS TO GARBAGE COLLECTION ACCESS TO SEWAGE SERVICE UARIV CAPACITY INDEX ROAD DEFICIENCY MUNICIPAL MANAGEMENT INDEX OF LACK RESPONSE CAPACITY INFORM TOTAL RANK
Bello 0.9 0.8 0.1 1.3 2.6 0.0 3.1 0.3 1.4
Palmira 1.9 1.4 0.4 1.3 1.6 4.3 1.1 0.3 1.2
Bogotá, D.C. 0.8 0.0 0.0 0.1 2.4 4.8 0.4 0.0 0.7
USAID.GOV COLOMBIA RAPID EDUCATION AND RISK ANALYSIS | 136