00-056 The Efficiency of Equity- Linked Compensation: Understanding the Full Cost of Awarding Executive Stock Options Lisa K. Meulbroek Harvard Business School Soldiers Field Rd Boston, MA 02163 The author thanks Brian Hall, Josh Lerner, Mark Mitchell, André Perold, and Peter Tufano, as well as seminar participants the Harvard Business School, University of Wisconsin, Georgetown Law School’s Conference on Highly-Paid Employees, and Tel Aviv University’s Accounting and Finance Conference, Lemma Senbet and Alex Triantis (the editors), as well as an anonymous referee for helpful comments. Andrew Kim provided excellent research assistance, and Harvard Business School’s Division of Research provided financial support for this project. E-mail:
[email protected]. Copyright © 2000 Lisa K. Meulbroek Working papers are in draft form. This working paper is distributed for purposes of comment and discussion only. It may not be reproduced without permission of the copyright holder. Copies of working papers are available from the author. Abstract The incentive-alignment benefits of equity-lined compensation are well-known, but relatively little attention has been devoted to identifying and measuring certain deadweight costs that inevitably accompany such programs. To properly align incentives, the firm’s managers must be exposed to firm-specific risks, but this forced concentrated exposure prevents the manager from optimal portfolio diversification. Because undiversified managers are exposed to the firm’s total risk, but rewarded (through expected