52 Experiments with Regulatory Review the Political and Economic Inputs Into State Rulemakings
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Joint Project on Term Limits 2004
Kansas: A Retro Approach to Lawmaking By Michael A. Smith, The University of Kansas Brenda Erickson, National Conference of State Legislatures Joint Project on Term Limits 2004 National Conference of State Legislatures Council of State Governments State Legislative Leaders’ Foundation 7700 East First Place Denver, CO 80230-7143 (303) 364-7700 • fax (303) 364-7800 444 North Capitol Street, N.W., Suite 515 Washington, D.C. 20001 (202) 624-5400 • fax (202) 737-1069 http://www.ncsl.org © 2005 by the National Conference of State Legislatures. All rights reserved. Introduction Among the fifty state legislatures, Kansas’s might be termed a retro approach to governing. The state lacks the petition initiative, and therefore it also lacks many of the complicating factors that have changed governance in many other U.S. states. Kansas has no citizen-initiated tax cap such as California’s Proposition 13, Colorado’s Taxpayer Bill of Rights, or Missouri’s Hancock Amendment. Furthermore, the state still maintains a citizen legislature with low pay, limited staff, and short sessions. And finally, Kansas does not have term limits on its legislators. The legislative process in Kansas has changed recently to accommodate a more-complex government, a changing political climate, and the advent of new information technology. But overall, Kansas’s Legislature has not changed radically in its functioning during the past ten years. Kansas is unlikely to have legislative term limits anytime in the foreseeable future. Because the Sunflower State lacks the petition initiative, the only way to pass such a policy in the state would be for the legislators themselves to send voters a constitutional amendment limiting their own terms—an unlikely prospect, especially given the near-universal disdain for term limits expressed by legislators during our interviews. -
Alabama Legislature Details
Alabama Legislature WHERE IS THE ALABAMA STATE HOUSE LOCATED? The Alabama State House is located at 11 South Union Street in Montgomery. The House of Representatives chamber is on the 5th floor and the public viewing gallery for the House is located on the 6th floor. The Alabama Senate chamber is on the 7th floor and the public viewing gallery for the Senate is located on the 8th floor. WHAT ABOUT LEGISLATIVE SESSIONS? The 2021 Regular Session of the Alabama Legislature will convene on February 2. The Legislature convenes in regular annual sessions on the first Tuesday in February, except (1) in the first year of the four-year term, when the session will begin on the first Tuesday in March, and (2) in the last year of a four-year term, when the session will begin on the second Tuesday in January. The length of the regular session is limited to 30 meeting days within a period of 105 calendar days. There are usually two meeting or “legislative” days per week, with other days devoted to committee meetings. Special sessions of the Legislature may be called by the Governor, with the Proclamation listing the subjects which the Governor wishes considered. These sessions are limited to 12 legislative days within a 30 calendar day span. In a regular session, bills may be enacted on any subject. In a special session, legislation must be enacted only on those subjects which the Governor announces in his proclamation or “call.” Anything not in the “call” requires a two-thirds vote of each house to be enacted Every four years (quadrennium), the members of the House and Senate must reorganize the Legislature, i.e. -
White House Review of Regulation: Myths and Realities
WHITE HOUSE REVIEW OF REGULATION: MYTHS AND REALITIES CASS R. SUNSTEIN 2013 REGULATION LECTURE AT THE UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW SCHOOL 1 WHITE HOUSE REVIEW OF REGULATION WHITE HOUSE REVIEW OF REGULATION: MYTHS AND REALITIES † CASS R. SUNSTEIN Many Americans have never heard of the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA), located within the White House. Yet OIRA is deeply involved in making federal regulations and has long been criticized by scholars, attorneys, and activists for overly politicizing rulemaking, allowing special interests to influence public policy, and impeding desirable governmental action. Cass Sunstein responded to these criticisms of OIRA as the honored speaker at the Penn Program on Regulation’s annual regulation lecture held earlier this year at the University of Pennsylvania Law School. The Regulatory Review and the Penn Program on Regulation are grateful of Professor Sunstein for taking the time to visit Penn Law, sharing his insights on one of the most important institutions in the federal regulatory process, and allowing us to reproduce this lightly edited transcript of his remarks. -Editor. THE BIG IDEAS BEHIND OIRA I’m going to tell you a bit about the real world of the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA). And I’m just going to tell you facts. But it occurred to me as I looked over the remarks I had prepared that they have no ideas in them, so here are some things that are, if not ideas, at least quasi-ideas. The first idea has to do with an oft-quoted statement by Felix Frankfurter about how the history of Anglo American liberty is in large part a history of procedural safeguards. -
In the United States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama Northern Division
Case 2:12-cv-00691-WKW-MHT-WHP Document 203 Filed 12/20/13 Page 1 of 173 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA NORTHERN DIVISION ALABAMA LEGISLATIVE ) BLACK CAUCUS, et al., ) ) Plaintiffs, ) ) CASE NO. 2:12-CV-691 v. ) (Three-Judge Court) ) THE STATE OF ALABAMA, et al., ) ) Defendants. ) __________________________________ ) ) ALABAMA DEMOCRATIC ) CONFERENCE, et al., ) ) Plaintiffs, ) ) CASE NO. 2:12-CV-1081 v. ) (Three-Judge Court) ) THE STATE OF ALABAMA, et al., ) ) Defendants. ) MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER Before PRYOR, Circuit Judge, WATKINS, Chief District Judge, and THOMPSON, District Judge. PRYOR, Circuit Judge: “There’s no perfect reapportionment plan. A reapportionment plan depends on what the drafter wants to get, and he can draw them many, many, many ways.” Dr. Joe Reed, Chairman, Alabama Democratic Conference. (Trial Tr. vol. 2, 155, Aug. 9, 2013). Case 2:12-cv-00691-WKW-MHT-WHP Document 203 Filed 12/20/13 Page 2 of 173 The Constitution of Alabama of 1901 requires the Alabama Legislature to redistrict itself following each decennial census of the United States, Ala. Const. Art. IX, §§ 199–200, but for a half century—from 1911 to 1961—the Legislature failed to fulfill that duty. Then the Supreme Court of the United States ruled that this abdication could be tolerated no longer, and it affirmed the judgment of this Court that the Alabama Legislature had to be apportioned after each census based on the principle of one person, one vote. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 568, 586, 84 S. Ct. 1362, 1385, 1394 (1964). -
10 the Honorable Blake Carpenter State Representative, 81St District
December 4, 2019 ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINION NO. 2019- 10 The Honorable Blake Carpenter State Representative, 81st District P.O. Box 350 Derby, KS 67037 Re: Constitution of the State of Kansas—Legislative—Majority for Passage of Bills; Votes to Ratify Federal Constitutional Amendments or Apply for Congress to Call a Federal Constitutional Convention Synopsis: The supermajority requirement of Article 2, § 13 of the Kansas Constitution is precatory language. The Kansas Legislature may by rule adopt a two- thirds vote requirement to ratify federal constitutional amendments or apply for Congress to call a federal constitutional convention. Cited herein: Kan. Const., Art. 2, § 13; U.S. Const., Art. V. * * * Dear Representative Carpenter: As State Representative for the 81st District, you request our opinion regarding the supermajority requirement in Article 2, § 13 of our state constitution. Specifically, you ask whether the Kansas Constitution may “provide for additional requirements” for ratification of a federal constitutional amendment beyond what is required by Article V of the United States Constitution. For the reasons discussed below, we believe the state constitution’s supermajority requirement cannot bind the Legislature when it is exercising the federally delegated power of ratifying an amendment to the federal constitution or applying for Congress to call a federal constitutional convention under Article V. Rather, the effect of the supermajority requirement is merely precatory, or in other words an expression by the people of Kansas of their desire that the Legislature muster a two-thirds vote in each house to ratify federal constitutional amendments or apply for Congress to call a convention for proposing federal constitutional amendments. -
Understanding the Alabama Legislature
A Primer on Alabama’s Legislative Process By: Lori Lein, General Counsel, Alabama League of Municipalities One of the prime functions of the Alabama League of Municipalities is to represent the interests of municipal government at the legislative level by informing members of legislation introduced that might affect municipal government and by presenting bills to the Legislature on behalf of Alabama’s municipalities. This article briefly explains the workings of the Alabama Legislature and how legislation is passed by that body. Constitutional Provisions Article IV of the Alabama Constitution of 1901 (Sections 44 through 111) establishes the legislative department of state government. Section 44 states that the legislative power of the state shall be vested in a legislature composed of a Senate and a House of Representatives. Section 44 has been construed by the Alabama Supreme Court to give plenary power to the state legislature. State v. Lane, 181 Ala. 646, 62 So. 31 (1913). According to the Court, the Alabama Legislature possesses all of the legislative power which resides in the state under the United States Constitution, except as that power is expressly or impliedly limited by the Alabama Constitution. This differs from the powers granted to the United States Congress in that Congress can exercise only those powers enumerated in the Constitution of the United States or implied therefrom. Article IV prescribes the manner of drafting bills, the organization and qualifications of members of both houses, authorizes each house to determine the rules of its proceedings and establishes procedures for the enactment of laws. Due to space limitations, only the provisions most applicable to the interests of municipalities will be discussed in this article. -
State and Local Political Party and Other Political Group Contributions
AT&T Corporate Political Contributions to State & Local Party Committees and Other Political Groups July–Dec. 2020 State & Local Party Committees and Other Political Groups Contributions Advancing Michigan Forward $1,000 Alex Padilla Ballot Measure Committee For Democracy and Justice (California) $25,000 Assembly Democratic Campaign Committee (Wisconsin) $3,750 Assembly Democratic Caucus (Nevada) $5,500 Assembly Republican Caucus (Nevada) $5,500 Associated Republicans of Texas $25,000 Building Bridges Fund (Michigan) $2,000 Bumstead Administrative Account (Michigan) $1,000 California Democratic Party $360,000 Civic Progress Action Committee (Missouri) $4,500 Committee to Elect a Republican Senate (Wisconsin) $8,750 Committee to Elect House Republicans New Hampshire $1,750 Commonwealth Victory Fund (Virginia) $3,500 Community Leaders of America $10,000 Concord Fund (Michigan) $1,000 Conservative Michigan $2,000 Democratic Assembly Campaign (New York) $51,000 Democratic Governors Association $100,000 Democratic Legislative Campaign Committee $50,000 Democratic Party of Arkansas $10,000 Democratic Party of Georgia $35,000 Democratic State Central Committee of Louisiana $10,000 Fairview Fund (Michigan) $2,000 Florida Democratic Legislative Campaign Committee $25,000 Florida Democratic Party $25,000 Florida House Republicans Campaign Committee $75,000 Florida Republican Senatorial Campaign Committee $75,000 Georgia Republican Party $15,000 Georgia Republican Senatorial Committee, Inc. $20,000 GoPAC, Inc. (Kentucky) $5,000 Great Lakes Justice -
Roster Executive Committee 2019-20
ROSTER EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE 2019-20 NCSL OFFICERS President Staff Chair Speaker Robin Vos Martha R. Wigton Assembly Speaker Director – House Budget & Research Wisconsin Legislature Office State Capitol, Room 217 West Georgia General Assembly PO Box 8953 412 Coverdell Legislative Office Building Madison, WI 53708-8953 18 Capitol Square (608) 266-9171 Atlanta, GA 30334 [email protected] (404) 656-5050 [email protected] President-Elect Staff Vice Chair Speaker Scott Saiki Joseph James “J.J.” Gentry, Esq. Speaker of the House Counsel, Ethics Committee – Senate Hawaii State Legislature South Carolina General Assembly State Capitol PO Box 142 415 South Beretania Street, Room 431 205 Gressette Building Honolulu, HI 96813 Columbia, SC 29202 (808) 586-6100 (803) 212-6306 [email protected] [email protected] Vice President Immediate Past Staff Chair Speaker Scott Bedke Jon Heining Speaker of the House General Counsel – Legislative Council Idaho Legislature Texas Legislature State Capitol Building PO Box 12128 PO Box 83720 Robert E. Johnson Building 700 West Jefferson Street 1501 North Congress Avenue Boise, ID 83720-0038 Austin, TX 78711-2128 (208) 332-1123 (512) 463-1151 [email protected] [email protected] Executive Committee Roster 2019-20 ROSTER EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE Immediate Past President Speaker Mitzi Johnson Speaker of the House Vermont General Assembly State House 115 State Street Montpelier, VT 05633-5501 (802) 828-2228 [email protected] AT LARGE MEMBERS Representative -
Second-Order Participation in Administrative Law Miriam Seifter
Second-Order Participation in Administrative Law EVIEW R Miriam Seifter ABSTRACT LA LAW LA LAW Public participation has long been a cornerstone of administrative law. Many UC administrative procedures require participation, and underlying normative theories embrace participation as a way to legitimate the administrative state. It is well recognized that interest groups dominate this participation. Yet the implications of interest-group dominance have been largely overlooked. Administrative law takes virtually no notice of how the dependence on interest groups affects the claimed value of participation. This Article argues that a close study of interest groups is essential to understanding, and ultimately reforming, administrative participation. It introduces the concept of second-order participation to describe the internal operation of interest groups. It then shows that second-order participation complicates every leading justification of administrative participation and the many practices built atop those justifications. These traditional conceptions of participation cohere only if groups actually speak for a membership, or at least provide information about how and for whom they work. Yet interest groups are seldom transparent, and, as this Article shows, they fall along a spectrum of internal governance with varying degrees of member involvement—with the most effective lobbyists tending to have less internal participation or no members at all. Attending to second-order participation thus provides a new framework for understanding -
GA-0063 Chair, House Committee on Redistricting Texas House of Representatives Re: Whether the Texas Legislature Is Required P-0
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TEXAS GREG ABBOTT April 23,2003 The Honorable Joe Crabb Opinion No. GA-0063 Chair, House Committee on Redistricting Texas House of Representatives Re: Whether the Texas Legislature is required P-0. Box 2910 to undertake congressional redistricting for the Austin, Texas 787682910 electoral period 2003-2010 (RQ-0017-GA) Dear Representative Crabb: You ask about the Texas Legislature’s legal rights and responsibilities in connection with congressional redistricting following the 2000 census.’ The Seventy-seventh Legislature failed to enact a redistricting plan for the United States House of Representatives, and a three-judge federal court therefore created a plan used for the 2002 general election. See Balderas v. Texas, No. 6:01-CV-158, slip op. (E.D. Tex. Nov. 14,2002) (per curiam), afyd mem., 122 S. Ct. 2583 (2002).* You first ask whether the map drawn by the three- judge panel was “a de novo map for the 2002 elections,“3 because the legislature had not acted. Request Letter, supra note 1. You also ask whether the Texas Legislature has a “mandated responsibility to enact a permanent map for the electoral period 2003 through 20 10.” Id. The United States Constitution provides that “Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each State,” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, 8 2, as determined by the decennial census, id. art. I, 8 2, cl. 3.4 The states have the primary duty and responsibility to redraw their congressional districts in ‘See Letter from Honorable Joe Crabb, Chair, House Committee on Redistricting, to Honorable Greg Abbott, Texas Attorney General (Feb. -
The Costs and Benefits of Cass Sunstein Obama’S Longtime Friend Is Poised to Oversee Federal Rulemaking, Leaving Many Liberals Concerned
I N FO C U S The Costs and Benefits Of Cass Sunstein Obama’s longtime friend is poised to oversee federal rulemaking, leaving many liberals concerned BY REBECCA ADAMS siderable clout to the OIRA post, and observ- Last week brought much cheer to liber- ers expect he will make his imprint quickly als who anticipate a more aggressive regula- felt. “My prediction is that Cass will be one of tory posture from the new administration the most powerful OIRA heads,” said Richard than its predecessor. L. Revesz, dean of the New York University President Obama signed an executive or- School of Law, who has urged regulators to der that revoked changes to the regulatory account for the ethical impact of failing to review process that President George W. Bush protect future generations and whether rules instituted two years ago. The Bush order re- are needed to protect certain groups, such as quired federal agencies to submit more types the disadvantaged, from risks. of regulatory policies for review by the White Regulatory activists are anxious about what House Office of Management and Budget Sunstein will do with his power because his before they could be published, and it granted office has the authority to kill rules or force OMB’s political appointees increased author- agencies to rewrite them. And he clearly parts ity to get proposed rules rewritten. In addition company with several prominent Obama ap- to suspending those changes, Obama asked pointees in the White House and in the agen- OMB to produce the basis for a new rule-mak- cies his office will oversee. -
Enhancing the Social Benefits of Regulatory Review
Enhancing the Social Benefits of Regulatory Review Rethinking OIRA for the Next Administration October 2020 Jason A. Schwartz NEW YORK UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW Copyright © 2020 by the Institute for Policy Integrity. All rights reserved. Institute for Policy Integrity New York University School of Law Wilf Hall, 139 MacDougal Street New York, New York 10012 Jason A. Schwartz is the Legal Director at the Institute for Policy Integrity at NYU School of Law. This report does not necessarily reflect the views of NYU School of Law, if any. Table of Contents Executive Summary i I. Refocus Regulatory Review on Maximizing Social Welfare 1 I.A. The Benefits of Regulatory Analysis and Centralized Review 2 Recommendation 1(A): Reaffirm the principles of rational decisionmaking from 5 President Clinton’s Executive Order 12,866 and President Obama’s Executive Order 13,563. I.B. Undoing Problematic Recent Distortions of the Regulatory Review Process 6 Recommendation 1(B): Repeal President Trump’s problematic Executive Orders 6 on the regulatory process—especially 13,771, 13,777, and 13,783—and any associated policies. Recommendation 1(C): Identify all problematic agency-level changes to cost-benefit 8 analysis and the regulatory process, especially at EPA and the Departments of Transportation and Energy II. Give Agencies Supplemental Guidance on How to Maximize Social Welfare 10 II.A. Make Distributional Analyses Meaningful and Consequential 11 Recommendation 2: Convene an Interagency Working Group on Distributional 11 Impacts to develop guidance on making distributional analysis more meaningful and consequential. II.B. Ensure That Important Unquantified Effects Do Not Count as Zero 13 Recommendation 3(A): Identify key unquantified effects and encourage research 13 to quantify them.