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Mitigating Mistrust? Participation and Expertise in Hydraulic Fracturing Governance

Kate J. Neville and Erika Weinthal

Version Post-print/accepted manuscript

Citation Neville, K. J., & Weinthal, E. (2016). Mitigating mistrust? Participation (published version) and expertise in hydraulic fracturing governance. Review of Policy Research, 33(6), 578-602.

Publisher’s Statement This is the peer reviewed version of the following article: Neville, K. J., & Weinthal, E. (2016). Mitigating mistrust? Participation and expertise in hydraulic fracturing governance. Review of Policy Research, 33(6), 578-602, which has been published in final form at https://doi.org/10.1111/ropr.12201. This article may be used for non- commercial purposes in accordance with Wiley Terms and Conditions for Use of Self-Archived Versions.

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Title: Mitigating mistrust? Participation and expertise in hydraulic fracturing governance Authors: Kate J Neville1 and Erika Weinthal2

Acknowledgements: This work was supported by funding from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (SSHRC). The authors thank Don Roberts and members of Yukoners Concerned, as well as Lois Moorcroft, Jim Tredger, Sandy Silver, Darius Elias, Currie Dixon, and Patti McLeod. Earlier versions of this paper were presented in 2014 at the University of British Columbia Liu Institute, in 2015 at the International Studies Association in New Orleans and the Duke University Environmental Institutions Seminar series, and in 2016 at the Hybrid Organizations working group at Duke University and the Northern Planning Conference in Whitehorse. We thank participants of these sessions, including Michael Urban and Sara Elder, for their helpful comments. The authors are also indebted to Alayne Potter for research assistance, and to Shana Starobin, Kimberly Marion Suiseeya, Christopher Paul, McKenzie Johnson Durnez, Lukas Neville, and two anonymous reviewers for generative and generous comments on the manuscript.

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1 Department of Political Science and School of the Environment, University of Toronto, 100 St. George St, Toronto, Ontario, Canada, M5S 3G3, email: [email protected] 2 Nicholas School of the Environment, Duke University, 9 Circuit Drive, Durham, NC, USA, 27708, email: [email protected]

Mitigating mistrust? 1

Mitigating mistrust? Participation and expertise in hydraulic fracturing governance

Abstract: In Canada’s Yukon Territory, a legislative committee was tasked with assessing the risks and benefits of hydraulic fracturing. The committee designed an extensive participatory process involving citizens and experts; however, instead of information access and public hearings fostering an open dialogue and trust, these two channels failed to de-polarize debates over hydraulic fracturing. We argue that mistrust was reinforced because (1) weak participatory processes undermined the goals of public involvement, (2) scientific evidence and scientists themselves were not accepted as neutral or apolitical, and (3) strategic fostering of mistrust by actors on both sides of a polarized issue intensified existing doubt about the integrity and credibility of the process. The implications of a failure to restore trust in government are significant, not only for the issue of hydraulic fracturing, but for governance more broadly, as mistrust has spillover effects for subsequent public negotiations. keywords: participation, expertise, hydraulic fracturing, governance, mistrust, trust

Mitigating mistrust? 2

Mitigating mistrust? Participation and expertise in hydraulic fracturing governance

Introduction

In May 2013, responding to citizen concerns about new oil and gas claims, at the instigation of the government of Canada’s northwestern territory, the Yukon, the Legislative Assembly created a “Select Committee” to evaluate the risks and benefits of hydraulic fracturing (HF: at times referred to as “fracking”)i (YLA, 2013a). Around the world, HF—a process for extracting unconventional oil and gas resources involving the high-pressure injection of water, sand, and chemicals into tight rock formations—has been controversial owing to its potential environmental, health, and social impacts (Vengosh et al., 2014). The six-person Select Committee—comprised of politicians from all three of the territory’s political parties, with an equal number of members of government and opposition parties—held a series of public hearings in 2014 to solicit citizen views on HF. They travelled to 12 communities across the territory and listened to statements from nearly 250 individuals. The Committee also held two separate two-day expert proceedings, bringing in speakers from industry, government, non- governmental organizations (NGOs), and academia to testify on HF. In these hearings, Select Committee members and the watching public listened to presentations on the potential impacts of allowing HF in the Yukon (SC-HF, 2014a). The government’s stated aim was to develop public policy on this emerging technology and process based on scientific data, informed opinion, and public participation. However, over the course of the Committee’s work, from its initiation in 2013 to its report submission in 2015, these approaches failed to foster open dialogue, information access, or the perception of transparency. Through public meetings, written submissions, and on the sidelines of official processes, many citizens expressed strong doubt about government sincerity, the validity of scientific evidence, and the qualifications of the invited experts. Trust, understood as a relational, conditional, action-inducing judgment necessary for accepting perceived vulnerability (Levi and Stoker, 2000), was notably lacking in these debates. When mistrust exists at the outset, new negotiations over contested projects are difficult to conduct—once lost, trust is exceedingly difficult to restore (Lount et al., 2008). Governments and industry are increasingly searching for ways to repair relationships and overcome public skepticism. However, in the Yukon, such strategies have been unsuccessful. Why have these efforts to develop participatory processes and engage with evidence-based policy-making failed to assuage citizen mistrust of decision-makers? We argue that, together, the lack of confidence in the integrity of consultative and participatory processes and the disagreements about facts and expertise reinforce existing mistrust of government. This occurs in two ways, one unintended and the other deliberate. First, weak participatory processes undermine the goals of such approaches, leading to unintended outcomes—these leave citizens feeling unheard, and thus lacking confidence in the decisions of government. Second, the strategic fostering of mistrust by actors on both sides of a polarized issue intensifies existing doubt—these are intentional processes that create uncertainty and skepticism. We suggest, these create a barrier to meaningful agreement on the issue of HF, with outcomes that benefit no one: social tensions heighten between those supporting and those opposing these developments; many citizens perceive themselves to be ignored by their governments, leading them to turn to protests and lawsuits; and corporations end up with official Mitigating mistrust? 3 permits but lack the security of a social license to operate. The absence of meaningful public dialogue and involvement, and a shared foundation for debate, has implications for understanding the dynamics of governance processes over contested energy and development projects. Participation and science-based decision-making are widely lauded in the policy field as tools for fostering open dialogue and gaining social license for development projects. However, our work traces the processes through which public participation and scientific expertise fail to build trust. To make the argument about why expertise and participatory processes often fail to overcome lost trust, we proceed in five parts. First, we situate our argument in the literature on trust, participation, and science policy. In section two, we describe our investigation of HF debates in the Yukon. We detail our methods, including fieldwork in the Yukon, use of documents on the public record, and analysis of public hearings. Next, we look at the goals and challenges of participatory processes (section three), and at the contested role of expertise in policy development (section four). In both, we consider evidence from the Yukon case study. Finally, we assess the linkages between expertise and consultative processes, and the implications of multiplying mistrust for resource development decisions in the Yukon and for governance more broadly.

I. Trust, participation, and science policy

Trends in mistrust – and why mistrust matters

Survey data in Canada indicates that governments and industry seem not to inspire high levels of public trust. For instance, the World Values Survey recorded a drop in Canadians’ confidence in parliament (Conference Board of Canada, 2013), the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) reported a drop in trust in government following the financial crisis (CBC, 2013), and the Edelman Trust Barometer (2014), indicated that government remained the least trusted institution for the third consecutive year. Trust in CEOs, reported by the Edelman Trust Barometer (2014), was also low. Polling of trust at the subnational level suggests similar results, with the highest levels of trust accorded to NGOs (Goar, 2013) and academics (Turcotte et al., 2012). In public statements in the Yukon, the BC Oil and Gas Commission echoed this finding on higher levels of trust in academics, noting survey results in BC revealed, “the top trustworthiness group is a university. So you see the bottom end there, you see politicians and government officials and where people are actually trusting as well: experts, ENGOs, Internet and their friends and then all the way down.”ii Low levels of trust in industry—and the governments tasked with regulating these developments—have substantial implications. Some evidence suggests that a lack of public trust in operations and governments heightens the felt impacts of industrial activity. The former dean of Pitt Public Health, Bernard Goldstein—a co- author of a study on the health impacts of shale development in Pennsylvania—was quoted in Science Daily (2013): “Scientific literature shows that if people do not trust companies doing work in their communities, or believe that the government is misleading them, there is a heightened perception of risk.” Further, the Canada West Foundation (2011, p.11) bluntly states: “Trust is the grease that keeps the machinery of democracy from jamming…. If the level of trust falls too low, voter support and community cooperation will fall too low as well and the system will breakdown.” Mitigating mistrust? 4

In the context of HF, governments increasingly recognize the relevance of trust. In 2012, the Canadian Environment Minister tasked the Council of Canadian Academies, an independent, not-for-profit organization that undertakes research to inform public policy, to evaluate the state of knowledge on the environmental impacts of shale gas extraction. Among the Council’s five guiding considerations for the assessment was the relevance of public trust to the development of the shale gas sector (CCA, 2014, p. 7-8). Other HF assessment bodies came to similar conclusions, including an independent panel led by Cape Breton University in Nova Scotia, whose 2014 Wheeler Report found “[t]he question of hydraulic fracturing as a mechanism to develop unconventional gas and oil resources is dominated by mistrust and conflicting information” (Wheeler et al., 2014, p. 4). Citizen engagement and the accessibility of science have been highlighted as strategies by which policy-makers could develop an effective risk management framework and gain public trust. In its report, the Council of Canadian Academies claimed, “Public engagement is necessary not only to inform local residents of development, but to receive their input on what values need to be protected, to reflect their concerns, and to earn their trust. Environmental data should be transparent and available to all stakeholders” (CCA, 2014, p. xix). These reflections link trust with the assessment of information and expertise (and experts themselves) and participatory processes. To further explore these linkages, we turn to political science, environmental politics, science and technology studies, and organizational behavior and management. Together, these fields provide us with insight into the role of participatory processes and scientific evidence in public policy debates, and the impact that knowledge controversies and consultative processes have on trust and governance relationships.

Trust: a multi-scale concept

Much scholarly effort has been devoted to understanding trust, and it is understood and operationalized differently across contexts. Trust is “multiplex” and dynamic, according to Rousseau et al. (1998), and the literature on trust is wide-ranging, from studies of risk to institutions to inequality (Bohnet and Zeckhauser, 2004; Edlund and Lindh, 2013; Fairbrother and Martin, 2013). Within environmental policy, trust has been examined to understand the working relationships between federal and state officials in the implementation of environmental programs (Scheberle, 2004). Trust can involve many different actors and institutional or interpersonal relationships across many scales; these include institutions, such as governments, universities, or other authority categories; relationships, involving identity attachments and group belonging; or incentives, with a calculus of potential gains or losses. Trust can also be generalized or specific. In spite of variations in the focus and findings of trust studies, Rousseau et al. (1998, p. 402) argue that there is strong “overlap and synthesis” among definitions and across disciplines about the core components of trust. One general definition, as per Rousseau et al. (1998, p. 395), is “a psychological state comprising the intention to accept vulnerability based on the positive expectations of the intentions or behavior of another.” As Bohnet and Zeckhauser (2004, p. 467- 468) further recall, “…one price of engaging in consequential relationships at a distance is that one must choose to trust strangers.” Here, we might see trust as deeply linked with risk and threat: a calculated gamble that the potential profits are worth the risk, and that the person or company being trusted is capable of fulfilling the planned actions. Mitigating mistrust? 5

These views correspond with Levi and Stoker’s (2000) understanding of trust as relational, conditional, action-inspiring, and based on judgment. Further, the notion of trust—a state or action—is intertwined with the idea of trustworthiness—a conferred judgment. Trustworthiness is also a relational condition, based on perceived benevolence (the trustee is seen to have the interests of the truster at heart) and competence (the trustee is understood to have the capacity to act in ways that uphold the trust) (Levi and Stoker, 2000).

Trust and mistrust

Trust should be considered in light of not only its presence and development, but also its absence and dismantling. The creation and destruction of trust are not parallel: Levi (1998, p. 81), for instance, quoting Dasgupta (1988, p. 50), writes that “…trust, at least interpersonal trust, may be “a fragile commodity” … hard to construct and easy to destroy.” This continues to be a contested claim: recent work by Greenberg et al. (2014) finds a rebound in public trust in the US Department of Energy only two years after it experienced a decline in trust following the Fukushima events in Japan (although Greenberg, 2014, p. 153 also states that “once lost[,] trust is hard to regain”). The fragility of trust appears to depend on the type of trust in question: Uslaner (2008, p. 290-291), for instance, claims that while “experience-based trust” (how you respond to others based on your interactions) is easily shifted, “moralistic trust” (reflecting values learned early in life) is quite stable. Trust relations also seem to depend on the issue at hand. Work on emerging technologies reveals a link between trust, mistrust, and uncertainty or complexity. Sylvester et al. (2009) review the research on decision-making, noting that people generally use heuristics and rely on instinct, intuition, and emotion—they turn to trusted authorities to glean their views, and then adopt those positions as their own, and they judge information based on the identity of the messenger. When governments deliver information on complex technologies, such as nanotechnology, audiences assess the claims based on whether they trust the government (Sylvester et al., 2009). Here, we note that concepts of betrayal, deception, and loss of confidence are central to questions of trust. In the context of policy-making and governance processes, the mechanisms by which trust is acquired or lost are significant, as they point to the need for different kinds of institutional solutions. For instance, the collapse in communication between citizens and public institutions can result in a breakdown in trust of government on science issues (and accompanying policy decisions), with the public looking elsewhere for information; this was illustrated by the case of bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE, or “mad cow disease”) in the United Kingdom in 1996 (Jasanoff 1997). Alternately, how scientific advisors conceptualize their role in the policy- making process can also affect citizens’ trust in scientific committees and public institutions (Douglas 2009; Hilgartner 2000). In this paper, we investigate strategies designed to foster—and to repair—trust. We argue that two of these strategies—participation and evidence-based decision- making—can, in some cases, undermine the goals of policy-makers by intensifying existing mistrust. This work fills a gap in the literature on policy development for HF. While scholars are extensively exploring public perceptions of HF (Davis and Fisk, 2014), policy specificity and variation across regions and districts (Fisk, 2013; Rabe and Borick, 2013; Rinfret et al., 2014), coalitions involved in the promotion of and opposition to these developments (Heikkila et al., 2014), and financial arrangements related to HF revenues (Rabe and Hampton 2015), less Mitigating mistrust? 6 attention has been paid to the dynamics of processes that are designed to overcome the polarization observed in these debates (although see Weible et al., 2016). Rinfret et al. (2014, p. 100) find that stakeholder participation that occurs “early and often” appears to have an influence on regulatory outcomes; recognizing the importance of participation, we see an increased need to consider the implications of participation on citizen relationships with governing authorities. Further, work on advocacy coalitions suggests the importance of stakeholder beliefs and interest group framing strategies on policy change (Boudet, 2011; Heikkila et al., 2014); we extend this discussion to consider the implications of strategic framing and scientific controversies on governance relationships.

Challenging engagement: Participatory processes

Citizen engagement and participatory processes are often employed for addressing complex environmental problems, with the aim of making decisions more democratic, effective, and fair (see, e.g., Kasymova and Schachter, 2014; Renn, 2006). Multiple mechanisms of public participation have been proposed to improve the perceived legitimacy of decisions, from information provision to direct citizen engagement through consensus conferences to co- governance and shared decision-making (Bixler et al., 2015; Einsiedel et al., 2001), particularly since public support for development plans does not depend on distributional outcomes alone. There is a strong link between procedural justice, citizen engagement, and perceptions of legitimacy (Doberstein and Millar, 2014; Schlosberg and Carruthers, 2010). This is reaffirmed in the literature on environmental management; Maguire and Lind (2003, p. 134) state: “Without [citizen and stakeholder support], limited capabilities for enforcing compliance from unwilling citizens and legislative action to overturn unpopular regulations would doom attempts to regulate.” While Glicken highlights the potential value of public participation in environmental planning, she identifies several major design challenges, cautioning, “many participatory processes fail because stakeholders believe that risk managers have made decisions prior to a solicitation for input, and so are really looking only for validation of predetermined decisions” (2000, p. 309). While such validation might have value, Glicken (2000) observes it is problematic if stakeholders are unaware of the intent. One of the challenges in participatory processes is that decision-makers are faced with questions of the content of deliberations—what technical information is under consideration in assessing governance options for contested developments. In the context of industrial developments and HF, the Council of Canadian Academies (2014, p. 208) affirms the connection between decision-making processes and public support, noting: “From a proponent’s perspective, a goal of public engagement is to gain local support for and acceptance of a project.” Acceptance often depends on whether those affected by a project perceive the decision-making process to be legitimate.

Scientific controversies: evidence and experts

Decision-makers are often exhorted to develop “evidence-based” policy, relying on scientific data to inform their choices. However, the literature on science and technology studies and the sociology of science offers a cautionary approach to understanding the role of science and scientists in informing the policy process, questioning the possibility of neutral arbitration of political decisions (Douglas, 2009; Hilgartner, 2000). Carolan (2008) claims that science is itself Mitigating mistrust? 7 inextricably embedded in social systems. Cordner (2015, 915-916) describes the ways in which stakeholders frame and communicate scientific information on contested issues to “bolster their arguments, strengthen their authority, and inspire change regarding a policy-relevant issue,” terming these discursive and interpretive efforts as “strategic science translation.” She finds that actors holding opposing positions all refer to scientific findings to support their claims, and that their choice of resources, presentation of information, and explanations of uncertainty are involved in these strategic efforts; ultimately, outcomes are the product of power relations, rather than agreement on science (Cordner, 2015). These power dynamics are complex, according to Elgin and Weible (2013), who observe a combination of individual policy actor, coalition networks, and policy subsystem dynamics at play in determining the outcomes of state-level climate and energy policy. Along with the inherent nature of science itself, its presentation—that is, its framing— influences the position of science and scientists in policy-making processes. Efforts to control problem definitions, and to suppress or undermine the authority and credibility of scientists, are well-explored in the literature (McCright and Dunlap, 2010). Further, Lachapelle et al. (2014) find that the framing of risk influences individuals’ assessments of the credibility of experts.

Trust, participation, and experts

In the context of energy debates, we understand trust judgments to be necessary where an individual or group cannot undertake monitoring, verification, or enforcement on their own (and so must rely on regulatory oversight by governments and other agencies), and where data may be difficult for the general public to access and evaluate (and so must then determine which sources of information provide credible assessments). This is the case with large scale or widely dispersed developments, and with new and emerging technologies—both of which describe HF processes. This poses a challenge for governance, then, when processes that are lauded as trust- building fail to overcome mistrust. Using the case study of HF debates in the Yukon, we assess the relationship of individuals (citizens) with institutions (government-led public participation processes) and information (science and experts). Here, we explicate how the repeated loss of trust in both participatory processes and evidence further erodes the possibility that government decisions will be seen as transparent and accountable, and leads to contested outcomes that benefit neither industry nor the public.

II. Hydraulic fracturing debates in the Yukon

Methods

We investigate participation and expertise through an in-depth case study of debates over HF in the Yukon, Canada. Given our interest in the dynamics of negotiations, we turn to process tracing and discourse analysis to examine citizen engagement with government through the Select Committee. To identify public perceptions, government positions, and expert identities and knowledge, we use qualitative methodology involving direct observation and document analysis. Our work is based on in-depth field observations (with one author living close to Whitehorse, the capital of the Yukon, from 2013-2015) and analysis of public hearing transcripts and official documents, with triangulation of these data based on general trust surveys, media analysis, NGO reports, and reviews of the academic literature. We use transcripts from 2014 Mitigating mistrust? 8 from four days of expert hearings in Whitehorse (involving presentations by 15 invited individuals or organizations from industry, academia, First Nations government, federal and provincial regulatory bodies, independent consulting firms, and NGOs) and 13 public hearings held in 12 communities across the Yukon (247 individuals made oral statements to the Select Committee), and written comments submitted online to the Select Committee from September 2013-September 2014 (432 submissions were made from 375 individuals, organizations, and First Nations governments and agencies) (SC-HF, 2014b). One author attended 12 of the 13 public hearings in Yukon communities. We read the Select Committee transcripts for public and expert hearings (verbatim transcripts made publicly available by the Legislative Assembly) and searched for statements that included the terms, and variations thereof: “trust” (trustworthy, trustworthiness, mistrust), “truth” (truthful, lie), and “transparency” (transparent). We also highlighted statements that referred to (dis)honesty, (in)sincerity, and openness (or being closed). These terms were chosen by beginning from the literature on trust, considering a range of synonyms and antonyms, and removing associated terms that were generally used in a different context (e.g., “believe,” predominantly used to signify the view of the speaker, rather than as a judgment of trustworthiness of a person or institution). Along with these official events and submissions, one author attended: two sessions of the Legislative Assembly where HF was debated; four community-led rallies and protests on HF and liquefied natural gas (LNG) in the Yukon (November 2013, July 2014, September 2014, May 2015); numerous environmental events where anti-fracking signs and sentiments were expressed (including rallies about land use planning for the Yukon’s Peel Watershed); two public lectures on HF (January 2014 and February 2015); and meetings of the community group Yukoners Concerned.iii We also read Yukoners Concerned meeting minutes (the group sends out regular email messages, often weekly or more frequently, circulated on an email listserv with approximately 500 subscribers as of April 2015iv), other public announcements and comments from local community groups and NGOs (Yukoners Concerned, Frack-Free Yukon, the Yukon Conservation Society (YCS), and the Yukon chapter of the Canadian Parks and Wilderness Society (CPAWS-Yukon)), and local, national, and international media articles and opinion pieces on HF (including from the Yukon News and Whitehorse Daily Star,v the CBC,vi and the Guardianvii). In addition, we considered publicly available materials from other HF assessment processes and reports, including, the 2014 federal Council of Canadian Academies report (CCA, 2014), Nova Scotia’s 2014 Wheeler Report (Wheeler et al., 2014), Quebec’s 2014 review by its advisory office of environmental hearings (BAPE, 2014), and the draft 2015 report from the ongoing US Environmental Protection Agency study on water contamination and HF (EPA, 2015). As our study is based primarily on publicly available data, it does not reflect the political dynamics occurring through back channels and other venues. However, this record offers a powerful picture of the relationship between the public and the government—the central focus of this study. Further, we were able to assess industry perspectives as these were articulated in the expert hearings, and are also widely available in the media and through sources such as the Yukon Chamber of Commerce and the Canadian Association of Petroleum Producers. Thus, through the analysis of context and claims, and triangulation with multiple sources and with the literature, we are confident that our assessment reveals valuable insights about the role of citizen trust in science and experts, as well as provides insights about the legitimacy and credibility that uphold governance authority. Mitigating mistrust? 9

The Yukon political context in brief: governance arrangements

The Yukon territory is in northwest Canada, bordered by Alaska to the west, the Northwest Territories to the east, and British Columbia and Alberta to the south. With a population of just over 37,000 in 2014 (YTG, 2015), the territory has 14 official communities, of which only one— the capital, Whitehorse (population 29,000 as of 2015; YTG, 2016)—is incorporated as a city.vi ii The territory has had a multi-party political system since the late 1970s (see Sabin, 2014 for an account of changing political institutions in the 1960s and 1970s), and now has three major parties: the Yukon Party (formerly Yukon Territorial Progressive Conservative Party), the Yukon Liberal Party, and the Yukon New Democratic Party (NDP). As documented and elaborated by Slowey (2015, especially p. 369-371), party politics in the territory mirror federal Canadian politics, with deep ideological divides across party lines: the Yukon Party positions itself as a pro-development party, concentrating on extractive industries and resource-based economic growth; the NDP focuses on an agenda of social justice, public services, environmental protection, and indigenous rights; and the Liberal Party takes the middle ground between the two. There are currently 19 Members of the Legislative Assembly (MLAs; the number of seats increased following electoral redistribution for the 2011 election), and the Yukon Party has formed government since 2002. Indigenous people comprise 23% of the territory’s population (as of 2012; Statistics Canada, 2016), and constitute the majority of the population in seven of the Yukon’s communities (Coates and Graham, 2015, p. 80). Treaty negotiations between government and First Nations in the Yukon began in the 1970s—initially involving the federal Department of Indian Affairs and Council for Yukon Indians, and later the territorial government (CYFN, 2016). Negotiations took place in several stages, culminating in the Umbrella Final Agreement (UFA) signed in the 1990s. The UFA provides the framework agreement for individual First Nations to negotiate their own Final Agreements, which are self-government agreements— formalizing separate authority structures from the federal and territorial governments.ix Among other things (from economic development to health and social services), the UFA established that just under 9% of the Yukon’s territory would be demarcated as Settlement land (under various categories—see UFA, 1993, section 5.4.0), and set out the allocation of this land to each First Nation (UFA, 1993, Schedule A, p. 85). The land settlements transfer varying levels of administrative responsibility—in the case of Settlement A lands, complete authority—to First Nations. Of the 14 Yukon First Nations, 11 have settled these treaties.

The Select Committee

The Yukon has a limited history of oil and gas development; prior to 2012, the only active oil and gas extraction was from three conventional gas wells in the Kotaneelee field, in southeastern Yukon. Advances in the 2000s in HF technologies, which allow the extraction of oil and gas from shale and other tight rock formations, created the potential for rapid change in the territory. In early 2012, the government held a regular biannual ‘Request for Proposal’ (RfP) opportunity for companies to submit proposals for oil and gas exploration; companies identified twelve areas in the Whitehorse Trough, a geological formation that includes the capital city.x As the government conducted hearings in communities in the Whitehorse Trough about the RfP, as mandated by law, citizens in the Yukon mobilized rapidly around the issue of HF (YLA, 2015, p. Mitigating mistrust? 10

5888-5889). Existing NGOs such as YCS and CPAWS-Yukon spoke out on the issue, and community members created local organizations such as Yukoners Concernedxi and Frack-Free Yukon. These groups organized information sessions, public meetings, demonstrations, petitions, and rallies to raise awareness and attention about HF, and about oil and gas development more broadly. Responding to this public concern, the government placed a moratorium on oil and gas development in the Whitehorse Trough, and, in May 2013, the Legislative Assembly established the Select Committee Regarding the Risks and Benefits of Hydraulic Fracturing (YLA, 2013a). Since 2007, Select Committees, which involve small groups of MLAs (partisan, elected politicians), have been used to address issues of controversial public policy. Established by motions of the Legislative Assembly, these committees may have representation from multiple parties.xii There were six Select Committees established during the 2006-2011 Legislative Assembly, and two during the 2011-2016 Assembly.xiii Of these, none were comprised of only government MLAs; four—including the Select Committee on HF—had equal representation from government and non-government MLAs, and another two had equal representation from all three parties and required that any decisions made by the Committee had unanimous agreement by all members. With strong divides in the ideological commitments across the parties, multi- party representation on these committees provides a strong signal of the role of the committees in soliciting and representing diverse views. When one of the non-government MLAs on the Select Committee on HF crossed the floor to join the Yukon Party, the committee membership was amended to re-balance the party representation (YLA, 2013b). The Select Committee on HF did not require consensus for its final decisions, but rather operated by majority vote, with the Chair holding the same right to vote as other members (YLA, 2013a). In the Legislative Assembly, the NDP proposed the Committee operate through consensus decision-making; the government opposed this proposal, countering that this would equate to veto power for each Committee member (YLA, 2013c, p. 2762-2763). The Yukon Party and NDP provided conflicting accounts of the “usual” composition and decision-making procedures of select committees (as noted above, the membership and rules of procedure for committees had varied in the past); a news report following the debate highlighted that even when structured for majority voting, past committees were run by “de facto consensus,” with committees excluding recommendations on which agreement could not be reached (Ronson, 2013). Although the proposal for consensus was not adopted, the Select Committee was created with equal government/non-government representation, with the government underscoring this represented “an equal and balanced committee” (YLA, 2013c, p. 2763). The Select Committee was not assembled as an expert advisory board, as had been established at the federal level through the Council of Canadian Academies or in some other provinces, such as Nova Scotia’s Independent Panel on HF. Instead, the Committee involved elected politicians tasked with establishing the facts, promoting public dialogue, and soliciting citizen views. As the Chair of the Committee clarified in a public meeting: “I can tell you that the Committee is not made up of experts. Just like everybody else, we are just folks.”xiv While not given explicit guidance on how to balance different types of input, the Committee’s mandate included provisions to: “gain a science-based understanding of the technical, environmental, economic, and regulatory aspects of hydraulic fracturing” and “facilitate an informed public dialogue for the purpose of sharing information on the potential risks and benefits of hydraulic fracturing.” The latter required “input from the Yukon public, First Nations, stakeholders, and stakeholder groups including non-governmental organizations,” including through public Mitigating mistrust? 11 hearings (YLA, 2013a). Ultimately, the Committee had to advise the government whether allowing HF would be “in the public interest,” and recommend steps to responsibly regulate HF, if it were allowed. The Committee remained vague when responding to community members’ questions about its deliberation process; when asked during a community hearing “how will you prepare your report and deliver your recommendation to the government,” the Committee Chair replied “I can certainly tell you that it will involve a lot of discussion….I can’t really tell you how that process is going to work out, but I can tell you that the Committee has learned an awful lot and we have heard an awful lot on this topic, and we will give all information its due consideration.”xv Final decision-making was not delegated to the Committee, and so community input was not part of a co-produced outcome, but rather information input to a broader assessment process. The Committee’s final report reiterated its key tasks, with sections on gaining a “science- based understanding” of hydraulic fracturing, “facilitating an informed public dialogue”, and “public hearings” and “input from First Nations” (SC-HF, 2015). The report documented the work of the Committee—along with the community visits (around the territory, where views from Yukoners were solicited) and expert hearings (in Whitehorse, where invited experts gave presentations and answered Committee and public questions), Select Committee members also requested information from each of the territory’s 14 First Nations, along with the Council of Yukon First Nations and the Gwich’in Tribal Council,xvi and visited Alberta (a province with active hydraulic fracturing activity) on a “fact-finding mission” (SC-HF, 2015). The public responded loudly to requests from the government for input; over two hundred people spoke at the oral hearings (SC-HF, 2014b), and hundreds more attended the meetings (personal observation)—a high turnout, recalling the Yukon’s small population.xvii In these meetings, the validity of the participatory process itself was questioned, and deep divides emerged about the terms of the debate. These two areas of controversy—participation and science—served to reinforce broader mistrust of the government, as will be demonstrated in the next two sections.

III. Consultative processes: meaningful voice?

Iterative processes: a starting point of mistrust

The debates over HF took place in the context of a number of land use and energy plans in the territory. In particular, a contested process for the territory’s Peel River Watershed in the northeast Yukon was well underway by the time HF arrived on the public agenda. The divisive land use plan landed the government in court (Kawaja and Windeyer, 2015): although the details are still under consideration by the courts, the Yukon Supreme Court in 2014 and Yukon Court of Appeal in 2015 ruled that the government had failed to honour its treaty responsibilities and must return to consultations.xviii In early 2014, the former Chair of the Peel Planning Commissionxix wrote a letter to the editor of the Yukon News, a widely circulated newspaper in the territory, calling the government’s plan for the Peel watershed “divisive, dishonest, and likely illegal” (Loeks, 2014). Public comments around the planning process and court case suggest that the government’s perceived disregard for public views and participation would have repercussions beyond the Peel. For instance, one submission to the Yukon Government, reported in its compilation of comments on the Peel Watershed Regional Land Use Plan multistakeholder planning process, indicated that there would be consequences for future consultative work: Mitigating mistrust? 12

“It is no wonder that the public has lost faith in the public consultation process now. This is so detrimental to all future public consultations, and it has resulted in greater distrust and disdain for government – regardless of one’s vision for the Peel Watershed. Democracy goes beyond the ballot box; the public needs to know that, when government asks their opinion, they truly want to know the opinion and will seriously consider it. YTG has done a remarkable job of undermining that public trust. […]” (YTG, 2013, p. 21)

Similarly, in a 2014 letter to editor in the Yukon News, the territorial newspaper, one citizen drew the connection between the Peel and HF, writing:

“But it seems the Yukon government thinks that their obligation to consult means to only provide a possibility for Yukoners to voice their opinion but to ignore them anyway. …What kind of consultation is that? It is meaningless. A similar scenario seems to shape up regarding fracking in the Yukon” (Obermueller, 2014).

These comments were substantiated in the HF hearings, with a number of statements in public sessions referring to the Peel. Comments revealed a sense of fatigue—“We just went through this public consultation regarding the Peel”; of disbelief that the democratic process was being respected—“during one of the last big public consultation in the Yukon for the Peel watershed plan, the Yukon government stated quite clearly that numbers don't matter”; of a repeated disregard for the public—with the HF hearings likened to the Peel planning process, where “the Committee has not taken [into account] the considerations of Yukoners”; and of mistrust of the government acting in good faith—“The government, as of now, I have no trust in, because when you guys went around to all the meetings, we were here fighting for the Peel River watershed.”xx As seen here, participatory processes are iterative and interactive, especially in places with small communities and long public memories. Prior processes can initiate a breakdown in government trust, especially if the public felt misled previously (also see Jasanoff 1997). The cost of a poorly-received public process may not only be the rejection of a particular development plan, but increased resistance to future projects and proposals, and a broader loss of confidence in institutions of government and industry. As Levi (1998, p. 86) notes, “[p]olitical entrepreneurs can affect the capacity of a group to trust government. Reminding citizens of past broken promises by government, oppositional leaders can feed distrust.” The public outreach efforts on HF were initiated with a skeptical public, and many expressed doubt about the integrity and credibility of the process.

Efforts to build trust: participation

The Select Committee initially planned public hearings in only a few communities; according to its mandate, the Committee was to hold hearings in Watson Lake and Old Crow, the two communities closest to the shale basins most likely to be explored, and thus “most likely to be affected by oil and gas development” (YLA, 2013a). The mandate was open-ended, though, and allowed the committee to convene hearings in “other Yukon communities as deemed appropriate by the Committee” (YLA, 2013a). Citizens requested additional community visits, and the government responded to these requests, expanding the public hearing agenda. By the end of the Mitigating mistrust? 13 process, the Committee had visited 12 communities—representing nearly all the communities in the territory.xxi In the Yukon, given the distances between communities, this involved 14 meetings (two were held in Whitehorse), over 13 days in June, July, and September 2014. Expanding participation was one mechanism that the Select Committee had at its disposal for building trust and confidence in the consultative process, as broader access to meetings and opportunities for participation can help to assuage citizen concerns that a decision-making process is simply top-down (Hisschemöller, 2005). Yet, in spite of the expansion of community visits, which should have fostered wider discussion, skepticism about the hearings was widespread from the outset. Many felt the process was merely for show. As one speaker declared, “In my view, when the Yukon Party government does not like public opinions, they throw these things into committees for committees to deal with. You’ll find these committees going into the communities to hear the people out but I don’t think that, you know, really in the end, the Yukon government decision would even follow the Committee’s rules.”xxii Notably, at these meetings, the Select Committee provided a brief introduction of their mandate and the six members, but otherwise did not provide information or engage in dialogue. As stated by Committee Chair Patty McLeod at each hearing, “The Committee will not be presenting information on the risks and benefits of hydraulic fracturing at this hearing. This time is allotted to hear from Yukoners.”xxiii Although the expression of citizen voice is relevant—rather than a government only providing information to the public—such an approach is still one-way communication, rather than a two-way dialogue, and is far from consensus-based or collaborative decision-making.

Rapid development, uncertain risks, and slow participatory processes

Meaningful public engagement requires developing relationships, gaining credibility, and fostering dialogue where outcomes are not predetermined. In these processes, interactions are iterative, trust-building is slow, and—for new technologies—concerns are often unknown and emerging. HF and horizontal drilling run into the problems identified by Falkner and Jaspers (2012) for emerging technologies, where they involve not only risks, but uncertain risks. Risk assessment and management are difficult when the form and extent of risks are unknown, which shifts decision-making from a regulatory into a political arena (Falkner and Jaspers, 2012). The politicization of the emerging science adds to the challenge of building trust across actors and groups in the debates over HF. Conventional (onshore) oil and gas developments in North America carry risks—oil spills, pipeline breaches; water contamination; air pollution, and more. What differentiates shale oil and gas from these existing, known risks is, in part, the novel nature of the technology: evidence is only now being gathered to determine whether these approaches and their impacts are substantively different from conventional drilling (e.g., Vengosh et al., 2014). Further—and as is the case in the Yukon—shale developments have been introduced to regions without little or no history of oil and gas developments. Building trust in government through public participation is difficult where the facts are absent or contested (as will be discussed further in the next section). Although some research suggests that trust is particularly important in cases of uncertainty (Bijlsma-Frankema and Woolthuis, 2005), this seems to apply more in the context of contractual negotiations—creating agreements in the face of incomplete information requires trust. This is a tricky situation: when moving forward on irreversible development plans, trust seems not to be a substitute for Mitigating mistrust? 14 information; rather, inadequate information appears to exacerbate mistrust. In the Yukon, public statements referred to the mismatch between information access and rapid development plans, underscoring the challenges of remaining informed. For instance, one speaker noted, “Our collective knowledge is advancing so fast that governments all over the world are scrambling to try to keep up with the technology boom. The same goes more so even for First Nation governments. It’s creating an information gap.”xxiv Another commented, “For me, this fracking thing, I don’t think it’s proven. Maybe we’re going a little too fast.”xxv Speakers in at least six other communities (of the total 12) commented in the public hearings on uncertainty and lack of information, highlighting the challenges this poses either to citizens asked to provide input or to decision-makers charged with regulating development.xxvi HF and horizontal drilling technologies came with a host of unknown impacts on water resources contamination, emissions to the atmosphere, and seismic activity. Battling estimates of life-cycle impacts and fugitive emissions from leaky wells only intensify scrutiny and concern (Parry, 2013). Reports of HF-caused earthquakes remain under investigation (USGS, 2015). The implementation of industrial projects has, in many cases, outpaced the development of regulations and monitoring, and moved more quickly than research and data requirements have become available. As stated by the CCA (2014, p. xii), “the rapid expansion of shale gas development in Canada over the past decade has occurred without a corresponding investment in monitoring and research addressing the impacts on the environment, public health, and communities.” Thus, for HF, it seems not to be a matter of reconciling different views when weighing known risks, but rather of making decisions in the face of great uncertainty. As one speaker commented in a public hearing, “There is nobody on this planet who can guarantee that there will be no ramifications in the long term. If anybody says that, they’re a fool. They are not being honest. It is a dangerous experiment.”xxvii Building trust in conditions of uncertainty and perceived risk is exceptionally difficult, particularly when repeated interactions leave citizens wary of decision-makers’ sincerity and benevolence. With the rapid pace of development and lagging data on its effects, participatory processes—even when attempted—are difficult to conduct in a way that achieves their stated goals. As the comments demonstrate, the public did not feel informed and engaged, nor did participants perceive that sufficient time was given to consider evidence. Combined as we suggest, weak participatory processes undermined the goals of such engagement—that is, the approach failed to build trust in either decision-makers or decision-making processes.

IV. Experts and evidence: the contested nature of facts

In the public hearings, experts, community members, and Select Committee members frequently made references to scientific studies and findings, suggesting that reliance on science is a critical component of these debates. Science was central to the mandate of the Committee—as stated at the outset of each public hearing: “Firstly, the Committee endeavored to gain a science-based understanding of the technical, environmental, economic and regulatory aspects of hydraulic fracturing, as well as Yukon’s current legislation and regulations relevant to the oil and gas industry.” Reference to scientific studies and research outcomes featured in several written and oral public comments, with at least 15 of the roughly 250 statements from community members directly raising the topic. Many speakers called for the use of science to justify decisions, suggesting that the public would like evidence-based decision-making to take place. As one Mitigating mistrust? 15

noted, “[Y]ou have to have the science before you can even design effective regulations.”xxviii Yet, agreement on which scientific studies, academic institutions, and journals are considered credible remains elusive. The divides over the trustworthiness of various experts appear to be deepening. In the Yukon, with direct reference to trust and related concepts—transparency, honesty, and truth (and their antonyms)—many community and expert interveners expressed skepticism about the quality of knowledge and the benevolence of both proponents and opponents of HF. Those speaking and writing letters on the issue communicated their doubt about the trustworthiness across sectors, with citizens varyingly questioning the integrity and reliability of governments, scientists, industry, NGOs, and each other. As one community member expressed in a hearing in June 2014, “Right now, all I hear is—I hate to use this word—but hysterical propaganda, anti-fracking. None of it is really proven 100 percent. I really would like to hear the good parts about fracking as well as the bad things about fracking. I don’t want to be swayed by propaganda; I want to be swayed by honest truth and studies.”xxix Another, in a July public meeting, lamented, “How can we get the facts? If we get it from the corporation, it’s propaganda 100 percent — outright lies most of the time. I don’t trust those guys at all. So we have to educate ourselves, and when it comes down to it we have to make a decision.”xxx Summarizing the link between interests and expertise, one speaker cautioned: “I would remind you to consider whose experts you are consulting.”xxxi

HF debates: the state of the science?

In the expert hearings (held in Whitehorse in January/February and May, 2014), the Select Committee appeared to genuinely be engaged in understanding the science involved in HF, and in listening to a range of speakers. Invited experts gave presentations followed by question-and- answer sessions, in which Committee members and the public were invited to submit questions. Across political parties, the Committee’s questions tended to be technical, focused on gathering information, rather than partisan and leading. Further, the Committee read out questions from the public, without commentary or screening (other than to avoid duplication of questions). However, in spite of the apparent sincere interest in establishing a scientific understanding of HF, such an approach assumed that a neutral basis for discussion could be uncovered and that clear facts could be determined. As was revealed in the expert presentations and subsequent Committee work, scientific understandings of HF are contested. Over the past decade, industry has made rapid advances in drilling technologies, with US companies at the forefront of HF and shale resource extraction, and, too, with US citizens at the front lines of opposition to these activities. As Canada follows the US lead, on both increased drilling and countering campaigns, questions continue to arise about the socio-economic and environmental impacts of HF. Industry assures the public that they have longstanding experience with HF, and the technology is safe: as Canadian Association of Petroleum Producers vice-president of policy and environment Alex Ferguson writes in a public letter in 2014, “Hydraulic fracturing, a process used to tap into deep natural gas and oil reservoirs, is a common industry practice that has been used safely in Canada for many decades” (Ferguson, 2014). Environmental NGOs, think tanks, and activist groups, in contrast, contest the practice is harmful and dangerous: in one of many examples, a study by the Oil and Gas Accountability Project finds “hydraulic fracturing fluids contain toxic chemicals; …chemicals are injected directly into drinking water aquifers; …citizens from across the country have been affected by Mitigating mistrust? 16 hydraulic fracturing” (Sumi, 2005, p. vii-viii). Organized resistance has been prevalent in North America across scales, from the Americans Against Fracking coalition to the Whitehorse-based Yukoners Concerned About Oil and Gas Development. Efforts to resolve these conflicting debates through scientific study have led to many peer-reviewed papers and institutional reports. All these efforts have not, however, resulted in general agreement on the dangers—or safety—of HF. Academic studies increasingly identify the specific risks involved in the sector, with emerging work that quantifies, among other things, water use, specific contaminants and their downstream effects, and methane leakages (see, e.g., Parker et al., 2014; Vengosh et al., 2014). The US EPA has also attempted, over a five-year period, to assess the risks to water quality from HF, with its draft report released in June 2015 (EPA, 2015). These studies reveal ongoing gaps in knowledge: for instance, Souther et al. (2014) state “Although shale drilling operations for oil and natural gas have increased greatly in the past decade, few studies directly quantify the impacts of shale development on plants and wildlife.” Participants in the Yukon public hearings underscored such uncertainty in the science. According to one speaker, “I think what we have to do is establish proper criteria for whatever. I don’t know where that’s going to come from, because I don’t think anyone has come up with the science at the moment to say, “Well, okay this way of fracking is the way it should be done in this particular type of rock. If you got this type of rock it is at this depth, if it’s that, it’s something else.” I don’t think that has been done.” Further, the results from scientific studies are understood and interpreted differently by readers; in the case of the 2015 EPA draft report, headlines announced “EPA finds no widespread drinking water pollution from fracking” (Brady, 2015) and, simultaneously, “Fracking poses potential risks to some drinking water supplies, study finds” (Guardian, 2015). These divergent announcements highlight the ways in which the same information can be represented to public audiences. For the general public, who might not be versed in the technical language and details of these studies, assessing the credibility of these claims is difficult without using the decision- making heuristics described earlier—short-cuts involving, for instance, turning to trusted institutions of authority to translate and interpret the findings. Yet, as shown in the survey data earlier, evidence suggests there are few sources seen to be credible authorities by all stakeholders. Trust in the scientific evidence was a central theme in debates over HF, and this was often raised in reference to the identity of the actors involved in providing information and making decisions. In the Select Committee public hearings, of the 247 speakers who made statements in 12 communities, 28 comments (in 9 different communities) involved trust and trust-related terms. Over half of these cases were in reference to trust—and mostly mistrust—in government and industry. The lack of public trust in corporations indicated by the survey numbers, particularly for extractive industries, corresponded with observations in the Yukon during the public hearings on HF. Several comments on the public record reiterate skepticism about corporate honesty in admitting and communicating risks. Commenting on an oil and gas company’s exploratory work in the Eagle Plains region, one speaker said: “even though Northern Cross [the oil and gas company] says it’s not on their shopping list, they don’t intend to frack — but they are doing horizontal drilling to protect the environment…. Anyway, they said they’re not going to frack, but I don’t know if I trust them,” and another bluntly stated “I don’t trust the oil companies.”xxxii Financial motivations were pointed to as the driving force for companies, as “impossibly huge shape-shifting immortals…[that] exist only to grow, to increase the bottom line,”xxxiii rather than the public good. Mitigating mistrust? 17

Expert credibility and the fostering of mistrust

While science and scientists are generally more trusted than politicians and corporate officials according to survey data, and while actors across sectors call for science as the basis for making development decisions, the position of science as a provider of unbiased facts is not without challenge. Scholars broadly point out that science is not a “value-neutral terrain” (Douglas 2009, x) and scientists should be explicit about why they make the judgments that they do, taking into account the social and ethical consequences of their judgments (p. 133). Within the context of the Yukon, one commenter stated this clearly, underscoring the role of science in the debates: “I want to talk a bit about the science aspect here. … science and technology are only tools and nothing more. So are legislation and regulations. These things don’t make the decisions or come up with recommendations. It’s the people who make decisions and recommendations on how to use those tools.”xxxiv Moreover, as we found in the Yukon HF debates, the intersection of experts and knowledge deemed to be untrustworthy with engagement processes seen to be deceitful does not only fail to instill, but further undermines, trust. Thus, beyond the nature of science itself, suspicions of funding from industry or the affiliation of scientists with NGOs undermines confidence in the research community, and stands in the way of agreement on the science in these controversies. As one citizen commented during the hearing process, “I grew up when the tobacco industry was telling people that smoking was good for you and then denied for years and years that it caused cancer. So I am well aware of what science that is bought out by industry can do.”xxxv Questioning the validity of information being given to the public, another stated, “As I say, what bugs me the most is people being told what’s what and there’s no proof that that is what it is or what is happening. It’s a scare tactic that — I just don’t like that. I don’t like it from the government. I don’t like it now from the NGOs. It’s a bad thing.”xxxvi These questions and doubts reveal intensifying debates over the validity of the scientific research itself and who counts as a reliable researcher. With these conflicting claims, across institutions of authority and power, citizens are left with the task of assessing the reliability, veracity, and relevance of claims made about these technologies—and with the responsibility to decide how to respond. As stated by Starobin and Weinthal (2010) in the context of assessing the credibility of certification labels, there are limits to the capability of “atomized individuals” to evaluate competing information. Lack of access to research findings—or understanding of the analyses—creates a barrier to the use of science in these debates. Several interested and concerned citizens commented during the hearing process that they felt under-informed, with statements such as: “I don’t have a detailed scientific knowledge of fracking. I have been reading extensively on the Internet about that”; “I have to admit, I don’t have a lot of information about fracking, what is involved in the process”; and “With fracking, I think for the most part what you are hearing is from people who don’t know what they’re talking about, and that includes me, because most of us haven’t got a clue about fracking.”xxxvii With the perception that credible science and trustworthy information is lacking, it seems particularly difficult for the public to make assessments of complex technical and environmental processes. This polarizes the issue and fosters mistrust.

V. Implications: antagonistic governance and deepening divides Mitigating mistrust? 18

For oil and gas producers, ongoing opposition to development impedes access to land, permits for operations, infrastructure for transporting products, and, ultimately, their participation in the energy commodity chain. Uncertainty at the extraction and operations level, owing to unclear or changing regulations, the potential for disruption, and possibility of legal battles, affects production and trade in these commodities. This creates increased volatility in global markets. Trust—or, perhaps more accurately, mistrust—ripples through the commodity chain. In the Yukon, HF has not yet begun (although the government announced that it will consider applications for HF in the southeast Yukon).xxxviii However, in other extractive sectors, the effects of mistrust on finance and investment are already being observed. In the Fraser Institute’s annual ranking of worldwide mining jurisdictions, the Yukon dropped from 8th to 19th place (Winter, 2014). One observer suggests that uncertainty caused by lawsuits against the government over land rights and participation “is scaring away investment” (this was Samson Hartland, the executive director of the Yukon Chamber of Mines, quoted by Winter, 2014). With his statement, Hartland links questions of risk, trust, and uncertainty to financial outcomes for the entire territory. While the Yukon has not yet had lawsuits over HF, legal action over land rights and industrial permits for other projects have added instability to the investment environment, indicating the outcomes of a breakdown in trust and negotiations. We anticipate that similar uncertainty will persist for HF, as affected communities have threatened legal action, protests, and other resistance if the government grants permits. These findings reveal the urgency of increasing the transparency and independence of scientific research, and of developing new forms of public engagement and participatory planning. The existing mechanisms for information access, risk evaluation, and public engagement, we find, have not provided a common basis for negotiation and compromise, nor have they established respected channels of communication and exchange. Instead, we observe the failure to restore trust and ongoing skepticism about the intentions of governments and corporations alike. A lack of trust in the sources of expertise about energy developments creates a barrier to meaningful dialogue about the risks and impacts of these projects—it contributes to the polarization of positions on both sides and reduces the potential for reaching settled agreements. Further, the deliberate undermining of opponents’ credibility eradicates any basis for meaningful conversation on these issues, deepening the divides between advocates and challengers of projects. Such active efforts to undermine trust and foster doubt are antithetical to building open negotiations among parties with differing views and values. Public engagement efforts fail to rebuild trust between citizens and government, especially when agreement is lacking on the facts upon which negotiations are based. Mistrust across sectors creates uncertainty in the eventual regulatory outcomes, making the shale industry particularly unpredictable and volatile; these results further entrench divisions between and across the public and private sector. It may simply be that trust is difficult to repair, once eroded. Or it might be that the form of trust-building has been flawed—that there may be other modes of participation and consultation that could be useful. Some scholars have suggested moving away from traditional public involvement efforts to other participatory models, such as joint fact-finding to co-produce science (Karl et al., 2007). These questions merit further investigation, particularly as the scale of public opposition to HF moves from local to global levels. As global coalitions and transnational advocacy networks mobilize to support efforts across countries, the impacts of development and political contestation shift from local places to a wider landscape. These are urgent matters: we find that without public trust either in the Mitigating mistrust? 19 sources of information about the social and technical aspects of HF or in the participation and assessment processes for development, decisions made about these projects are further deepening antagonism and increasing contestation between and across communities, corporations, and governments—a situation from which no one benefits.

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i Technically, hydraulic fracturing is a step in the process of some unconventional oil and gas production, involving high-pressure fluid injection into wells to create underground fractures in shale and other tight rock formations. However, public—and sometimes policy—discourse uses the term to indicate the full cycle extraction, ranging from horizontal drilling to wastewater disposal. Further, the short-form “fracking” (adapted from the industry short-form “fraccing”) has become associated with critical perspectives on the industry. In our paper, we generally use hydraulic fracturing (or HF), but at times use “anti-fracking” to refer to critical campaigns. ii BC Oil and Gas Commission Commissioner, Expert hearing held by the Select Committee Regarding the Risks and Benefits of Hydraulic Fracturing, January 31, 2014, Whitehorse. iii Originally ‘Yukoners Concerned About Oil and Gas Development/Exploration.’ iv Yukoners Concerned email, April 28, 2015 v Yukon territorial newspapers vi The national Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, a radio and television public news service with an online news component vii A UK daily national newspaper viii The Government of Yukon lists 14 communities in its official register (http://www.gov.yk.ca/aboutyukon/communities.html), while Coates and Graham (2015) list 17; in either case, only two communities—Whitehorse and Dawson City—have more than 1500 residents. ix First Nations governments are distinct and autonomous governments from either federal or territorial authorities; these are not subsidiary (unlike municipal governments). See, e.g., Dacks (2004) on the integration of traditional governance practices in the self-governance arrangements. x Note that the Canadian federal government transferred control of the Yukon’s lands and resources to the territory through a devolution process that went into effect in 2003—for more on this, especially on the connection between First Nations land rights and devolution, see, e.g., Natcher and Davis (2007), Alcantara et al. (2012). xi The group created its Facebook page in February 2012. The group’s initial webpage, launched in 2013, is still available at http://yukonersconcernedaboutoilandgas.blogspot.ca/; the revised website, started in 2015, is available at http://www.yukonersconcerned.com/ xiiDetails on Select Committee memberships and mandates available via http://www.legassembly.gov.yk.ca/committees.html and http://www.legassembly.gov.yk.ca/32_leg.html xiii Prior to the establishment in 2007 of the Select Committee on Anti-Smoking Legislation, such committees had not been used since 1992-1993, when one had addressed indigenous peoples’ land claims and self-government (SC-ASL, 2007). xiv Committee Chair, July 7, 2014, Faro. xv Exchange between community member and Select Committee Chair, June 26, 2014, Dawson City. xvi The Gwich’in Tribal Council (GTC; http://www.gwichin.nt.ca/) represents the Indigneous Gwich’in peoples, most of whom are in the Mackenzie River delta region. In terms of political Mitigating mistrust? 27

jurisdictions, the GTC is based in the Northwest Territories, and the Council has a transboundary agreement with the Yukon. xvii In several communities, speakers also noted that participation in the hearings would have been higher if circumstances permitted, pointing to the convening of public meetings during regular work hours and to conflicting events for communities. For instance, one speaker in Mayo (July 9, 2014), noted: “I’d also like to go on record that this hearing in Mayo may seem quiet and not well-attended, but by no means does this signal compliance with any hydraulic fracturing process. The date and time slot conflict greatly with the Peel court case and the average workers of the day.” xviii For details on the case, see CPAWS-Yukon and the Protect the Peel campaign coverage and links at http://cpawsyukon.org/campaigns/peel-watershed and http://www.protectpeel.ca/ xix In the Yukon, under the Umbrella Final Agreement, land use planning follows a prescriptive process: for a region under consideration, such as the Peel, the territorial Minister of Energy, Mines and Resources appoints a Regional Land Use Planning Commission; members of the Commission are nominated by the Yukon Government and Yukon First Nations whose traditional territories are in the planning region; the planning process begins, involving various stages establishing terms of reference, gathering information and involving various stakeholders, providing scenarios, submission to the government and the First Nations involved in the region for comment, revisions, and review, and finally approval, modification, or rejection (YLUPC, 2015). xx Community members, June 26, 2014, Dawson City, September 25, 2014, Whitehorse. xxi The Select Committee visited 12 of the 14 official Yukon communities, only excluding Burwash Landing (population 90) and Beaver Creek (population 100) from their circuit; the closest Select Committee hearing for these communities would have been Haines Junction—the former is about an hour drive, and the latter 3.5 hours. xxii Community member, July 8, 2014, Carmacks. xxiii As stated by the Committee Chair at each meeting – see, e.g., July 8, 2014, Carmacks, p. 11-1 of hearing transcript: http://www.legassembly.gov.yk.ca/pdf/rbhf_july8_2014_carmacks.pdf. xxiv Community member, June 25, 2014, Old Crow. xxv Community member, July 8, 2014, Pelly Crossing. xxvi Community members, June 26, 2014, Dawson City, July 8, 2014, Carmacks, July 9, 2014, Mayo, September 23, Haines Junction, September 24, 2014, Carcross-Tagish, September 27, 2014, Whitehorse. xxvii Community member, September 24, 2014, Carcross. xxviii Community member, September 25, 2014, Whitehorse. xxix Community member, June 23, 2014, Watson Lake. xxx Community member, July 7, 2014, Faro. xxxi Community member, September 25, 2014, Whitehorse. xxxii Community members, June 26, 2014, Dawson City. xxxiii Community member, September 24, 2014, Carcross. xxxiv Community member, September 24, 2014, Carcross. xxxv Community member, September 27, 2014, Whitehorse. xxxvi Community member, July 7, 2014, Faro. xxxvii Community members, June 26, 2014, Dawson City, July 7, 2014, Faro. xxxviii At the time of latest revisions to this work, the future of HF in the territory remains uncertain for a number of reasons, including a lack of clarity about First Nations consent in the Liard Basin Mitigating mistrust? 28

and an election planned for 2016. Interest from the government in oil and gas development appears to remain high: in March 2016, a news release was posted on the Government of Yukon website with the title “Liard Basin one of the largest shale gas resources in the world, new assessment shows” (http://www.gov.yk.ca/news/16-084.html#.V0eOsJMrKuU) and in April 2016, the government posted a request for proposals for technical and communication support to the Ministry of Energy, Mines and Resources for their planned engagement strategy on how to responsibly develop oil and gas resources in Yukon (https://tenders.rfpalertservices.com/en/2016-4/27/rfp-tender/project-support-for-engagement- strategy-on-responsible-oil-and-gas-development-4002375)