An Intense Debate During the Italian Civil War

Punishing the Fascists: An Intense Debate 249

Chapter 11 Punishing the Fascists: An Intense Debate During the Italian Civil War

Andrea Martini*

Introduction

On 25 April 1945, in the midst of the insurrection, the Committee of National Liberation for Northern Italy (CLNAI) passed Decree no. 148 in which it took it upon itself to “punish fascist crimes […] in its quality as delegate of the Italian government in the liberation struggle.”1 More precisely, the CLNAI set up People’s Courts of Assizes in order to judge those who had collaborated with the German occupiers up to that moment. Defendants would be assessed on the basis of rules in force on the eve of 8 September 1943. Decree no. 148 fol- lowed by a few days the proclamation Arrendersi o perire! (“Surrender or die!”) which pre-announced a death penalty “for officers, NCOs, and soldiers of the Fascist armed forces, state civil servants and employees of state-controlled bodies of the so-called Fascist Republican government,” as well as for Nazi soldiers who might continue to fight against the partisans.2 The “Surrender or die” proclamation, dated 19 April 1945, together with Decree no. 148 represented the last attempts by the CLNAI to regulate the purging process which was about to begin in the north of the peninsula. The Kingdom of the South, however, had no intention to delegate this delicate question to CLNAI. Since February 1945, the government, under pres- sure from the Allies and a sizable part of public opinion, had started work on new legislative measures designed to ensure the quick and effective punish- ment of collaborationists active in the provinces of Northern Italy.3 Thus, on

* I would like to thank Giulia Albanese and Santo Peli who have read my essay, giving me pre- cious advice. 1 The Decree n. 148 is taken from Gaetano Grassi (ed.), Verso il governo del popolo. Atti e docu- menti del Clnai 1943/1946 (Milano: Feltrinelli, 1977), pp. 324–25. 2 The manifesto Arrendersi o perire! is taken from Grassi (ed.), Verso il governo del popolo, pp. 309–10. 3 The Allies proposed and convinced Bonomi’s government to take the French system of épura- tion as a model. See Hans Woller, I conti con il fascismo. L’epurazione in Italia 1943–1948 (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1997), pp. 306–307 and Valeria Galimi, “Circulation of Models of Épuration After

© Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2018 | doi 10.1163/9789004363762_013 250 Martini the eve of the final insurrection, the Council of Ministers passed the Decreto Legge Luogotenenziale (DLL) no. 142 setting up Extraordinary Courts of Assizes, special judiciary bodies exclusively designed to sanction presumed collabo rationists. DLL no. 142 was published in the extraordinary edition of April 24 of the Official Journal, five days after the “Surrender or die” proclamation and one day before decree no. 148 of the CLNAI.4 Evidently the two institutions—the government and the CLNAI—were vying for the monopoly of justice: neither the Bonomi government, nor the Allies, would allow the CLNAI to manage criminal sanctions against collaborationists but the CLNAI, thanks to its prestige and its representation of different political forces, was still the expression of the Resistance world. From the viewpoint of the government in Rome, the question had already been solved by the agreements signed in December 1944, by which the CLNAI had been officially recognised as representing the Italian State in the north of the peninsula, while undertaking on its part to abide by the political and legislative directives of the central government.5 Nevertheless, the CLNAI continued to regard itself as the only actor on the scene which was able to square accounts with the remnants of Fascism effectively, ensuring a “balance between law and public conscience”—in other words, punishing the culprits while reducing the rate of violence to a minimum in the insurrection phase.6 On the other hand, according to the Resistance world, the Italian State did not possess the necessary legitimacy to take upon the task of applying penal sanctions to colla

the Second World War: From France to Italy” in Dealing with Wars and Dictatorships: Legal Concepts and Categories in Action, eds. Liora Israël and Guillaume Mouralis (The Hague, 2014), pp. 197–208. See also STATE CENTRAL ARCHIVES, Presidency of the Council of Ministers, Alto commissariato per le sanzioni contro il fascismo, title I/10, b. 12. The Italian government was, definitively, persuaded to project a new law concerning the purge after a riot exploded in March 1945 as a consequence of Mario Roatta’s escape from a military hospital in Rome. The former commander of the II Italian Army in Yugoslavia and also former head of military secret service during Fascism, Roatta was being charged by the High Court of Justice with collabo- rationism with the enemy when he escaped during the night of 4 March 1945. As a consequence, on 6 March there was a significant demonstration in Rome, and a demonstrator died during the clash with the police. Prime Minister Ivanoe Bonomi promised a new and quick law concerning the purge to reassure public opinion as well as the Allies. See Roy Palmer Domenico, Processo ai fascisti (Milano: Rizzoli, 1991, repr. 1996), pp. 161–62. 4 See DLL n. 142 of 22nd April 1945 in Edizione straordinaria della Gazzetta ufficiale del Regno d’Italia published on 24th April 1945. 5 See Gian Enrico Rusconi, Resistenza e postfascismo (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1995) and Santo Peli, La Resistenza in Italia. Storia e critica (Torino: Einaudi, 2004). 6 Franco Catalano, Storia del Comitato di liberazione nazionale alta Italia (Milano: Bompiani, 1956, repr. 1975), p. 404.