Jd to the Deputy President of The

[Handwritten] 220,699 Two hundred twenty thousand six hundred ninety-nine [initials] TO THE DEPUTY PRESIDENT OF THE PROVINCIAL COURT OF JUSTICE OF SUCUMBÍOS: I, Pablo Fajardo Mendoza, in my capacity as joint counsel for María Aguinda et. al., in connection with proceeding No. 002-2003 filed against Chevron Corporation (formerly Texaco) for environmental damage, respectfully appear before you in order to (1) ask the Court to order enforcement measures (attachment) on the defendant’s property located in Ecuador, and (2) ask the Court to order preventive measures on the defendant’s property located in Colombia and Argentina, in the terms stated below. I - INTRODUCTION AND PURPOSE OF THE REQUEST It should be recalled that Texaco agreed to SUBMIT to the jurisdiction of Ecuadorian courts and to SATISFY any judgment rendered against it. Recently, faced with Chevron’s attempt to back out of those obligations, the U.S. court had to “remind” it that Texaco’s promise to the court DID bind it1. The same conclusion had already been reached by the 1 In the decision rendered on March 17, 2011, the Court of Appeals for the Second District in New York stated that “Here, Texaco had been trying to convince the district court that Ecuador would serve as an adequate alternative forum for resolution of its dispute with Plaintiffs. As part of those efforts, Texaco assured the district court that it would recognize the binding nature of any judgment issued in Ecuador. Doing so displayed Texaco’s well-founded belief that such a promise would make the district court more likely to grant its motion to dismiss. Had Texaco taken a different approach and agreed to participate in the Ecuadorian litigation, [Circular stamp] PROVINCIAL COURT OF JUSTICE - SUCUMBÍOS [seal] OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT’S CLERK [initials] CERT. MERRILL VER: JD PLAINTIFF’S EXHIBIT 415 11 Civ. 0691 (LAK) Plaintiff's Exhibit 415 p. 1 of 123 [Handwritten] 220,700 Two hundred twenty thousand seven hundred [initials] 2 judge that previously presided over this proceeding and by the Sole Division of the Provincial Court of Justice of Sucumbíos when affirming the judgment against Chevron. Thus, Chevron’s failure to abide by the promises Texaco made (about ten years ago) requires the plaintiffs to file this request with the enforcement judge, a request that serves two purposes: OBTAIN THE ORDER FOR ENFORCEMENT MEASURES IN ECUADOR and the ORDER FOR PREVENTIVE MEASURES IN ARGENTINA AND COLOMBIA on the company’s assets. Being already in the judgment enforcement proceeding, we were forced to make this twofold request because, although the measures requested herein are very similar, a clear distinction must be made regarding their nature. First, having filed the enforcement proceeding for the Lago Agrio judgment, the plaintiffs are entitled to use attachments (as enforcement measures) for the purpose of enforcing the rights the judgment affords us. This is not a problem in the case of Ecuador because the law on this matter provides us with a very simple proceeding to attach and auction the judgment debtor’s assets. However, as we will see below, Chevron does not have nearly enough assets in Ecuador to cover its debt, so we are forced to turn to foreign countries— such as Argentina and but announced an intention to disregard any judgment the Ecuadorian courts might issue, dismissal would have been (to say the least) less likely. We therefore conclude that the district court adopted Texaco’s promise to satisfy any judgment issued by the Ecuadorian courts, subject to its rights under New York’s Recognition of Foreign Country Money Judgments Act, in awarding Texaco the relief it sought in its motion to dismiss. As a result, that promise, along with Texaco’s more general promises to submit to Ecuadorian jurisdiction, is enforceable against Chevron in this action and any future proceedings between the parties, including enforcement actions, [] proceedings, and attempts to confirm arbitration awards.” [Circular stamp] PROVINCIAL COURT OF JUSTICE - SUCUMBÍOS [seal] OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT’S CLERK [initials] CERT. MERRILL VER: JD Plaintiff's Exhibit 415 p. 2 of 123 [Handwritten] 220,701 Two hundred twenty thousand seven hundred one [initials] 3 Colombia—where Chevron’s operations are more extensive, in order to help meet its liability. Nevertheless, before being able to collect in those jurisdictions, we must get the Ecuadorian judgment recognized, a proceeding that requires valuable time that the defendant would foreseeably misuse since it has already announced its refusal to meet the obligations arising from the judgment. We need, then, to find a method that prevents the debtor from using this time to its advantage, allowing it to find new ways to oppose and deny plaintiffs’ rights while the recognition proceedings are underway. The institution of preventive measures exists precisely to avoid this kind of potential abuse, so this Court should use them as soon as possible. This request for preventive measures is even more reasonable if one considers that, almost parallel to Chevron’s breach of the promise made to U.S. judges, Chevron made a new promise: that it would never comply with the judgment rendered in this proceeding. It did so by resorting to tasteless hyperbole, such as the assertion that the Lago Agrio plaintiffs would have to litigate “until hell freezes over, and then skate it out on the ice.” It is important to highlight Chevron’s dilatory and obstructionist behavior throughout the proceeding. The trial court’s and court of appeals’ judgments themselves show, beyond doubt, that this has been the case. So the measures requested herein are justified because there is not only an enforceable judgment that is res judicata—which is reason enough to grant them—but there is also an [Circular stamp] PROVINCIAL COURT OF JUSTICE - SUCUMBÍOS [seal] OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT’S CLERK [initials] CERT. MERRILL VER: JD Plaintiff's Exhibit 415 p. 3 of 123 [Handwritten] 220,702 Two hundred twenty thousand seven hundred two [initials] 4 immediate need to order them because of the undeniable bad faith that has guided Chevron’s conduct throughout the proceeding. We cannot allow Chevron to do as it pleases while the recognition and enforcement proceedings are heard in these foreign countries because it will undoubtedly use that time to continue setting traps to prevent the collection of the legitimate award this Court ordered. It must be remembered, in this regard, that [the trial judge], Nicolás Zambrano, repeatedly reproached Chevron in the judgment because of its constant attempts to sabotage the course of the proceeding2, and the Sole Division of the Provincial Court of Justice of Sucumbíos did likewise [on appeal].3 2 Judge Zambrano mentioned—among many other things—the following factors that show this bad faith: “failing to appear for the ordered presentation of documents or present an excuse on the date indicated; trying to take advantage of the merger between Chevron Corp. and Texaco Inc. as a mechanism to evade responsibilities; abusing the rights granted by the procedural Law, such as the right to submit the appeals that the Law provides for, such as the vertical right of appeal, repeated motions on resolved issues, and incidental pleadings that by mandate of the Law there is no place for within summary verbal proceedings, and that have each warranted admonishments and fines against the professionals that have defended the defendant from the different Judges who have held the presidency of this Court; delays provoked through conduct legitimate in principle but whose use has unfair consequences for the proceedings themselves, such as refusing and blocking the payment of instated experts, thus preventing them from being able to commence their work, or drawing checks for the payment of experts in the name of the Court of Justice, or the well documented case of the videos that were illegally recorded by persons close to the defendant.” 3 “Persistently the defendant, Chevron Corporation, has been the instigator of incidents that have resulted in obstruction of the judicial process ...”; he also stated that the defendant’s submissions were “filed with clear abuse of process and clear intent to obstruct the administration of justice”; that Chevron used those improper submissions to “almost uselessly inflating” the case; even this Court did not hesitate to label Chevron’s submission on appeal as “insolent motions.” Then the Court said that “The record shows that Chevron has exercised a vigorous defense of its procedural interest; as stated above, it has been even overwhelming and offensive, filing, literally and markedly, thousands of motions with diverse petitions, some with a legal basis, but others, many times others, containing contradictory, repetitive, and even illegal petitions”; it immediately referred to “multiple attempts to abuse legal institutions for purposes unrelated to their fair exercise, such as appeals filed untimely in the middle of the first- instance trial in a summary verbal proceeding…or of petitions filed by the Defendant in order to open spaces and block them with challenges…or motions to revoke, and its persistence on them after they were denied, signed different professionals of the law for the obvious purpose of avoiding sanctions; or even the very fact of having sought recusals, literally of most of the judges conducting the proceedings.” This Court’s reference to the defendant’s conduct in the case is especially eloquent when it writes “...rarely seen in the annals of history of the administration of justice in Ecuador”; as well as the fact that this Court affirmed the punitive damages and the trial judge’s reason for awarding them, “showing what should not occur in a trial.” [Circular stamp] PROVINCIAL COURT OF JUSTICE - SUCUMBÍOS [seal] OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT’S CLERK [initials] CERT.

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