Mutual Equities and Enduring Relationships

Stability and Prosperity in the Region: Mutual Equities and Enduring Relationships

October 17-18, 2011 Doha, Q atar

A S aban Center a t Br ookings-United St ates Central Command Conference The Brookings Institution is a private non-profit organization. Its mission is to conduct high-quality, independent research and, based on that research, to provide innovative, practical recommendations for policymakers and the public. The conclusions and recommendations of any Brookings publication are solely those of its author(s), and do not reflect the views of the Institution, its management, or its other scholars.

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A Letter from Kenneth M. Pollack ...... 1

Conference Agenda ...... 2

“The Arab Awakening from the Outside In” By Kenneth M. Pollack ...... 3

Summaries of Conference Discussions Prepared by Irena L. Sargsyan and Mehrun Etebari ...... 6

“Rewriting the Social Contract in the Wake of the Arab Spring” By Salman Shaikh ...... 18 A LETTER FROM KENNETH M. POLLACK

On October 17–18, 2011, the Saban Center at Brookings and United States Central Command partnered to bring together nearly one hundred experts and policymakers from the United States and the Middle East to discuss the implications of the Arab Spring. The conference, Stability and Prosperity in the Region: Mutual Equities and Enduring Relationships, examined the political, economic, and security challenges that have developed in countries undergoing change, and the way in which these challenges will affect the region as a whole. We were honored to have the U.S. Ambassador to Qatar, Susan Ziadeh, and Qatar’s Assistant Foreign Minister for Follow Up Affairs, H.E. Mohammed Bin Abdullah Bin Mutib Al Rumaihi, each deliver keynote remarks. CENTCOM Deputy Commander Vice Admiral Robert S. Harward participated in the conference and delivered opening remarks. The Middle East has become a vibrant hotbed of political activity, so it is fitting that we held our Saban Center-CENTCOM conference in the region for the first time. Dozens of scholars, policymakers, members of the military, and activists who witnessed—and, in some cases, participated in—the transformations in their home countries were able to join us and provide unique insights. Our discussions looked at the formation of new governments in Egypt, Tunisia, and Libya, ongoing unrest in Yemen and Syria, and the U.S. departure from Iraq, and asked what the ramifications of these would be for U.S. interests in the region. While we examined events in each country experiencing change, much of our discussion focused on the big picture, analyzing the shifts in the regional balance of power. One speaker noted that Turkey, which abandoned its support of the Asad regime in Syria, endorsed the NATO-led campaign in Libya, and has championed the Palestinian cause, has been the biggest “winner,” strengthening its regional position. Similarly, Qatar—by housing Al Jazeera, a key influencer during the Arab Spring, and by acting as a pragmatic mediator of regional conflicts—has emerged as an important player. Several par- ticipants argued that Iran has emerged weaker from this year’s events—not only is its ally, the Asad regime, on the ropes, its narrative of violent, religious-based revolution has fallen on deaf ears. Others felt that Iran had benefitted from the Arab Spring and the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq, at least in the short term, but potentially over the longer term as well, given the un- predictability of the political changes sweeping the region. In examining these issues, we sought to offer insight into how the United States can best safeguard its own long-term interests, while playing a constructive role in advancing the political freedoms of people in the Middle East. What follows are the Proceedings of the conference, including summaries of the sessions and a pair of analysis pieces based on the discussions that took place. Please note that the conference was held under the Chatham House Rule, meaning that the content of the dialogue can be made public but not attributed to any person. The keynote addresses were delivered off the record. I would like to express my sincerest thanks to the staff of the Saban Center, in particular members of the Brookings Doha Center, as well as our partners at CENTCOM for putting together the conference and the Proceedings. Among our many invaluable partners at CENTCOM, Colonel Michael Greer and Lieutenant Colonel Robert Earl worked tirelessly to make this conference a reality. Special thanks are due to Vice Admiral Harward for his insights and contributions throughout the conference.

Kenneth M. Pollack Director, Saban Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings

STABILITY AND PROSPERITY IN THE REGION: Mutual Equities and Enduring Relationships | 1 CONFERENCE AGENDA

Day One: October 17, 2011

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Opening Dinner Remarks Susan Ziadeh, United States Ambassador to Qatar

Day Two: October 18, 2011

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Opening Remarks and Introduction Vice Admiral Robert Harward, Deputy Commander, U.S. Central Command

Keynote Address H.E. Mohammed Bin Abdullah Bin Mutib Al Rumaihi, Assistant Foreign Minister for Fol- low Up Affairs, State of Qatar

Panel One: The Arab Spring: Impacts on Civil-Military Relations in the Levant and GCC Moderator: Kenneth Pollack, Director, Saban Center at Brookings

Panel Two: Dealing with Terrorism in the Region: Al-Qa’ida and Hizballah Moderator: Salman Shaikh, Director, Brookings Doha Center

Panel Three: Regional Actors and Gulf Security: Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Iran Moderator: Suzanne Maloney, Senior Fellow, Saban Center at Brookings

Closing Remarks and Conference Wrap-Up Kenneth Pollack, Director, Saban Center at Brookings

STABILITY AND PROSPERITY IN THE REGION: Mutual Equities and Enduring Relationships | 2 THE ARAB AWAKENING FROM THE OUTSIDE IN

KENNETH M. POLLACK

hen the revolutions in Tunisia than the sum of its parts, redefining the bal- and Egypt first shook the politi- ance of power across the Middle East. W cal foundations of the Middle East, they set off a cascade of dominoes It was this set of issues that the third annual across the region that has not stopped fall- Brookings Institution-U.S. Central Com- ing yet. Ben Ali is gone. Mubarak is gone. mand conference attempted to address. At Qadhafi is gone. Saleh and Asad are teeter- this point in time, so close to the initial ing on the brink. Who knows who else may events, and with some of them still unfold- follow. ing, we were only able to begin exploring this topic, but it was a very constructive and Although inspired by the wave that has rewarding set of first steps, one that made swept across the region, the Arab Awaken- clear how important it will be for the United ing has been characterized by revolutions States and its allies to continue to pay atten- from within. In every case, the winds blow- tion to how the internal changes in the Arab ing from without served as nothing more world are reshaping its external relations as than the catalyst—the spark, the start, the well. drop of Ice-9 that began the chain reaction. But the upheavals themselves were wholly Reflecting on the many views presented at homegrown. the conference, at least four broad trends seemed to present themselves as worth con- Given how internal political developments sidering. have transformed the face of the Middle East, it is both understandable and entirely First, the alliances and coalitions—both appropriate that the entire world has been formal and informal—that once defined the fixated on the internal politics of every region may well be resorted partially or en- country in the region. Indeed, such a focus tirely. In the past, the region was dominated was long overdue in a part of the world by a status quo alliance of the United States, where internal politics (and economics and Egypt, the GCC, Jordan, Morocco, Turkey, social development) were routinely ignored and Israel (tacitly), with support from Eu- by their own elites and by everyone else in rope and America’s East Asian allies. This the world. alliance was opposed by a small but trouble- some coalition of rejectionist states/groups Nevertheless, it is important to recognize led by Iran and including Syria, Libya before that the internal changes transforming the 2004, Hizballah, Hamas, and other terrorist face of the region will inevitably transform groups. In the future, the dividing line may its geopolitics as well. As new political and change and we could instead see democratic economic systems emerge in these coun- states opposing more traditional autocracies, tries, they will seek new destinations, find haves demanding more assistance from new friends, set new goals, and define new have-nots, Islamist-dominated states against codes of conduct. They may also enjoy new more secular countries, or some other, cur- strengths and suffer from new liabilities rently unimaginable, alignment. The very compared to the governments they sup- different kinds of governments currently planted. The whole will inevitably be greater taking power will undoubtedly embrace very different goals and foreign policies than

STABILITY AND PROSPERITY IN THE REGION: Mutual Equities and Enduring Relationships | 3 their predecessors and that could result in range of considerations. For a very long very different regional divisions than what time, the rest of the world has been content we have seen in the past. to allow the United States to be the dominant power in the Middle East, allowing Second, the militaries of the Arab world are Washington to order the region as it saw fit sailing into uncharted waters. Their roles are largely because it was American power that changing fundamentally, and generally in guaranteed the free flow of Middle Eastern ways they did not expect or desire. The re- oil. For its part, the United States believed gional militaries never sought to play the (wrongly and disastrously) that the best way role of custodians of political change and to ensure the latter requirement was to do they do not really know how to do it, but as little on the first matter as possible: leave neither do they relish cracking down on the region, and particularly, the region’s popular dissent, especially since most rec- governments, alone and they will keep the ognize the validity of the peoples’ griev- oil flowing. That was never a smart long- ances. Thus, those forced to play this role term strategy, and the Arab Awakening (if find themselves in a very not the Iranian Revolution and uncomfortable position, one 9/11 before it) has revealed they would like to escape as The regional militaries the flaw in that thinking. To quickly as possible. Howev- never sought to play the its credit, the Obama adminis- er, the history of these kinds role of custodians of po- tration recognized (albeit bela- of political transitions is that litical change and they do tedly) that change was coming they take decades, if not to the region whether the generations, so the need for not really know how to United States or the regional a guiding hand will remain. do it, but neither do they governments wanted it or not, The inexperience of the mi- relish cracking down on and has taken up the cause of litaries being forced into this popular dissent. change, at least rhetorically, role is also showing, with and in the critical cases of tremendous friction devel- Egypt and Libya in deed as oping in Egypt and Libya, and splits within well. This has, for the first time, put Ameri- the military itself in Yemen and Syria. ca’s Middle East policy squarely at odds Moreover, while the U.S.-Egyptian military- with that of China, Russia, India, Brazil, and to-military relationship played an important other developing states all of whom are now positive role during the revolution, some- trying to check American power and actions thing that should make Americans eager to in the Middle East in ways they never have deepen ties with other regional militaries, it before. The more these other nations dem- is not clear that we will be able to do so. onstrate a willingness to act on Middle Not only are the administration and Con- Eastern issues, the more that Middle East- gress increasingly turning inward in ways ern states may look to them for assistance that will make military aid harder to come when the United States can’t or won’t pro- by, the existing monarchies and autocracies vide it—something that will greatly compli- are well aware of the role the American mili- cate the future Middle Eastern chess board. tary played, and may in the future seek to quarantine their militaries from too much Fourth, in the short term, there are oppor- exposure to Americans, lest they experience tunities for all manner of mischief-makers the same surprise as Hosni Mubarak did on to cause great havoc. But over the longer the morning of February 11, 2011. term, constructive change across the region would likely be the most effective method Third, outside powers are taking a greater of obliterating the plague of violent extrem- interest in the region than before, and that ists that has torn the region for too long. could be positive or negative based on a There is always opportunity in chaos, and

STABILITY AND PROSPERITY IN THE REGION: Mutual Equities and Enduring Relationships | 4 that is especially true for Iran, al-Qa’ida, and pact on the underlying grievances of the other regional troublemakers. The region Arab people that have been the underlying has been thrown into an uproar. Civil war malady afflicting the Middle East for the has swamped Libya and Yemen, and is past forty years. Such changes will take dec- threatening Syria and perhaps Bahrain. ades, but if they are the ultimate legacy of There has been significant unrest in Moroc- the Arab Awakening, nothing could be co, Oman, Jordan, and elsewhere. Even more powerful in eliminating the anger and Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Algeria have seen frustration that drive Arabs to violence, and new protests. Any popular unrest, any in- on which Tehran and the terrorists have ternal conflict, creates opportunity for Iran, preyed. al-Qa’ida, and other groups to stoke popular passions and incite violence—which they Thus, as always with epochal events like the see as advancing their interests regardless of Arab Awakening, the changes will be pro- the ostensible aims of those doing the profound, but whether they will be hopeful or testing. These actors see opportunities to hurtful, positive or negative, constructive or bring their own allies to power, and to wea- destructive, still remains to be seen. Indeed, ken and distract those countries or groups we may not see them at all. But if our child- allied with their enemies (including the ren and grandchildren are to live in a better United States). Thus, the region may get world than the one we have nurtured for worse before it gets better. But over the the past fifty years, coping with the tre- long term, if the Arab Awakening produces mendous geopolitical changes of the Arab governments and economies that are both Awakening, guiding them toward sure stable and better able to provide their channels and helping them around danger- people with the freedoms, dignity, oppor- ous routes will be one of the most impor- tunities, and control over their own lives tant tasks of the twenty-first century. that they seek, it will have a profound im-

STABILITY AND PROSPERITY IN THE REGION: Mutual Equities and Enduring Relationships | 5 SUMMARIES OF CONFERENCE DISCUSSIONS

PANEL ONE: take root, but the issue of legitimacy re- THE ARAB SPRING: IMPACTS ON mains: Where does the legitimacy that soli- CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN THE difies democracy flow from? Who is the LEVANT AND GCC source of legitimacy in the Arab world: a monarch, the military, a coup d’état, a presi- Prepared by Irena L. Sargsyan dent for life, or the people? In answering this, the speaker said that the Arab people, n the opening session of the Saban representing different countries, united to Center at Brookings-U.S. Central pursue a common goal: to take ownership I0 Command conference, the panelists of their states. Arab people have shown that discussed the impact of the Arab Spring on they want their governments to represent civil-military relations in the Gulf Coopera- them. People, therefore, are the new source tion Council (GCC) and the broader Middle of legitimacy in the Arab world. East. The moderator began by saying that the events of the Arab Spring not only Still, institutions matter. In Egypt, the army shook the political, military, and social has been a powerful institution that has his- foundations of separate countries, they torically been politicized. The military can, transformed the region as a whole. A new therefore, effect political change as well as Middle East is emerging. New balances of prevent change from occurring. The speaker power are being shaped. And these new said that in the wake of the Arab Spring, the realities require novel ways of ordering and military continues to play a role in Egyptian maintaining regional security. society by overseeing the political competi- tion. In particular, it has prevented a single The moderator stressed that indigenous mi- group from taking over the political process. litaries played a critical role in the Arab As a result, no particular group or ideology Spring: while the Tunisian and Egyptian dominates post-revolution Egypt, and the armies facilitated the transformation of their political space remains wide open. At the respective states, the Syrian and Libyan mili- same time, the speaker argued that the Arab taries resisted any political change triggered Spring has set in motion the Egyptian ar- by the popular uprisings. my’s retreat from political life. Although that process will take time—especially be- The first panelist argued that the Arab cause the military is committed to safe- world has experienced a paradigmatic and guarding its interests—eventually the Egyp- generational shift—the implications of tian military will focus on security-related which cannot be measured within a year or matters. How that transition occurs will two. The panelist said that at least a decade largely depend on who assumes the presi- will need to pass before the ramifications of dency in Egypt and how the parliament ap- all the ups and downs, advances and re- proaches the issue of civil-military relations. treats, and triumphs and frustrations of the Arab Spring will be revealed. In analyzing the role of the Syrian military, the speaker said that the Syrian army has According to the speaker, one of the most wielded less power than the Egyptian mili- important lessons of the Arab Spring is that tary, and its legitimacy is questionable. The it was a mistake to believe that the Arab speaker argued that because the Syrian army world was immune to democratization. is weak, and because Syrian soldiers have Arab states have proven that democracy can opened fire on demonstrators (unlike their

STABILITY AND PROSPERITY IN THE REGION: Mutual Equities and Enduring Relationships | 6 Egyptian counterparts), the army will likely In the speaker’s view, Egypt has become a be purged and replaced should the protests “laboratory” for civil-military relations. So succeed. Stressing the issue of sectarianism, far, the Egyptian experience has produced the speaker said that many Sunni soldiers mixed results, with both tragic outcomes have left the army, despite threats that they and high hopes. The speaker said that the will be punished for desertion. October 2011 killing of unarmed Coptic Christian protesters by the Egyptian security The Syrian government has relied on the forces tarnished the army’s reputation and state’s extensive security apparatus—a com- legitimacy. Conversely, the appearance of plex body that has multiple forces, a myriad Field Marshal Mohamed Hussein Tantawi, of intelligence services, and several chains Egypt’s minister of defense and chairman of of command—to neutralize opponents of the SCAF, in a civilian suit in Tahrir Square the regime and defend the ruling elite was a sign of hope. against potential threats emanating from within the The speaker said that histori- army. The speaker said that cally the Egyptian military has because members of the Egypt has become a “la- played a significant role in Alawite sect (to which the boratory” for civil- both regional affairs and do- ruling Asad dynasty belongs) military relations. So far, mestic matters. For instance, it dominate the state’s security the Egyptian experience participated in security cam- apparatus, security forces are has produced mixed re- paigns in Yemen, Sudan, Bos- highly sectarian. The plura- sults, with both tragic nia, and Somalia. More recent- listic composition of the Sy- ly, it took part in brokering a rian opposition is a sign of outcomes and high hopes. deal that facilitated the ex- hope, though, and if a vigor- change of Palestinian prison- ous civil society and genuine ers for an Israeli soldier held civilian government take hold, the country captive in Gaza. The military is concerned may be able to move past this division. not only about its future role in Egypt, but also about its status in the region. In order The second panelist focused on Egypt’s to maintain the respect of the international Supreme Council of the Armed Forces community, it has made clear that it will (SCAF). The speaker said that the Egyptian abide by all international laws and treaties. military played a pivotal role during the uprisings that ousted President Mubarak On the domestic front, the Egyptian army when it refused to fire on the peaceful intends to meet people’s expectations by protesters. As an interim ruling government, facilitating the country’s peaceful transition the army has become involved in daily poli- to democracy; enabling free and fair parlia- tics and has overseen the country’s transi- mentary elections (to be held in November tion to democracy. As a result, many Wes- 2011) and presidential elections (to be held terners and Egyptians perceive the Supreme in the spring of 2012); continuing to pro- Council as the leading actor in Egypt. How- vide internal security and defending the ever, the speaker disagreed with this con- country against external enemies; and help- ventional wisdom, arguing that the military ing to strengthen Egypt’s paralyzed econo- is the second most important player. In- my. stead, it is the people, who continue to influence the course of events in post- The third panelist presented a statistical risk revolutionary Egypt, who are the most in- analysis of the countries of the Middle East fluential actors. and North Africa (MENA). The speaker analyzed issues that influence the political and economic risk of the given countries, as

STABILITY AND PROSPERITY IN THE REGION: Mutual Equities and Enduring Relationships | 7 a result of these issues favorable or unfa- The speaker said that a combination of fac- vorable effects on financial investment, tors affects a country’s risk levels. For ex- business environment, credit, exchange ample, terrorist attacks and the pursuit of rates, and macroeconomic stability. The the weapons of mass destruction, as well as speaker also discussed governance risk, prices of oil, energy, and food can interact which takes into account regime stability, to have a negative effect on a country’s risk corruption, and the effectiveness of the se- score. The speaker concluded by saying curity forces and judicial system. there is a positive trend in the region—in the past five years, violence has plummeted Based on a comparative statistical analysis, (most of that violence occurred in and the speaker evaluated Qatar and the United spilled over from Iraq). The speaker inter- Arab Emirates as low-risk states, but preted the trend as an indication that more pointed to Iran, Yemen, and Syria as high- countries in the region favor peaceful risk. The speaker noted that a country may change to violent conflict. have low political and economic risks but a high go- The moderator asked the vernance risk, or vice versa. speakers if cooperation be- For example, Jordan’s politi- Even if the events in tween the U.S. military and cal and economic risks are Tunisia had not oc- the Egyptian army was neces- higher than its governance curred, change would sary to ensure a peaceful tran- risk. The speaker explained sition to democracy in Egypt, that while terrorist attacks on have happened in Egypt and how the concept of po- Jordanian soil have negative- someday because a revo- tential cooperation between ly affected the country’s po- lution had been brewing the American and GCC mili- litical and economic risk in- for several years. taries was perceived in the dicators, the speaker felt that Middle East. One panelist Jordanians have not chal- said that in Egypt, the military lenged the legitimacy of the took the right step in helping Hashemite monarchy, despite the existence oust President Mubarak. In a different sce- of governance problems. The reason for nario—for example, if the military did not this is because the speaker believed that side with the people—the armed forces King Abdullah II has been responsive to his could have fragmented. The fact that Egypt people’s grievances. According to the is a relatively unified, less tribal, and more speaker, the king has supported political and institutionalized state has facilitated the economic reforms and anticorruption transition. The speaker added that even if measures, and to that end dismissed his the events in Tunisia had not occurred, government twice in 2011. change would have happened in Egypt someday because a revolution had been Within the risk assessment framework, the brewing for several years. The pressure was speaker discussed a few other countries. building from the bottom, from youth and The speaker said that compared to GCC other grassroots levels. People’s discontent states, Iran is a high-risk country. By con- with the political repression and socioeco- trast, countries like Sweden, Singapore, New nomic conditions was simmering, and as a Zealand, and Switzerland are low-risk coun- result, Egypt was ripe for revolution. tries. But compared to the latter group of countries, GCC states have higher levels of With regard to cooperation between the political, economic, and governance risks. U.S. and GCC militaries, the speaker said Therefore, members of the GCC should that it was unclear how such cooperation strive to reach the risk levels of Switzerland was perceived in the region, particularly be- or Singapore. cause many viewed relationships between

STABILITY AND PROSPERITY IN THE REGION: Mutual Equities and Enduring Relationships | 8 the American and GCC militaries through military played a positive role during the the prism of Iraq and Afghanistan (both revolution and that it is now facilitating a campaigns are generally seen as unsuccess- peaceful transition to democracy. Com- ful). More broadly, security ties with the menting on the same issue, another speaker United States are not part of the debates said that a Western model of civil-military about the Arab Spring. Rather, political, relations has been alien in the Middle East. economic, and social reforms are the center of attention in the region. Regarding their Another participant outlined two issues that militaries, people want their armies to serve he thought were peculiar to the Arab them rather than dominate them. Spring. He pointed out the lack of consensus among the military on any social con- The moderator posed another question to tract or program. Similarly, he noted the the panelists, asking if it was possible for the uncomfortable silence on the issue of the emerging schisms between the Egyptian separation of religion and politics: no mos- military and the general population to dee- que, sheikh, or marja (a senior cleric who is a pen, with the military choosing one political source of emulation) has emerged to confer direction and the people choosing another. legitimacy on democracy. One of the speak- One of the speakers said that such a devel- ers said that the Arab Spring revolutions opment was not inconceivable; the Egyptian have not been Islamist revolutions. Rather, military’s use of force in response to the they have been civilian, social revolutions in Coptic protest showed how relations be- which Islamists have played some role but tween the military and the population could by no means a central role. Therefore, it deteriorate. In addition, the speaker said should not be surprising that in the current that even though senior Egyptian officers context, the separation of religion and poli- have made reassurances that they will not tics has not been a dominant issue. The nominate a presidential candidate from their speaker said that the issue will arise at some own ranks, the context in which the army point and it will be critical to find a prag- presently operates is entirely new. There matic balance between religion and politics have not been precedents, therefore, it is and between respect for Islam and respect difficult to predict how the military will be- for the principles of democracy, liberty, and have. human rights.

One participant asked the panelists if, in the PANEL TWO: context of civil-military relations, it made a DEALING WITH TERRORISM IN THE difference whether an Arab army was influ- REGION: AL-QA’IDA AND enced by Western or Eastern military doc- HIZBALLAH trines. The participant noted that while many Tunisian and Egyptian officers were Prepared by Irena L. Sargsyan educated in the United States and were thus exposed to U.S. military training and proce- he second panel of the conference dures, the Syrian and Libyan militaries examined terrorism as a persistent lacked similar experience. Consequently, T0 feature of Middle Eastern politics within the Syrian and Libyan militaries the and discussed strategies for countering that rules of engagement are not clearly defined deadly phenomenon. In particular, this pan- and it is easy for Syrian and Libyan officers el addressed the economic, political, and to open fire on civilians. One of the speak- social grievances that lie at the root of both ers responded that in practice the exposure terrorism and the upheavals of the Arab to Western military doctrine did not make a Spring to ascertain whether this wave of difference. The speaker disagreed with the unrest will be a catalyst for or a suppressant other panelists’ arguments that the Egyptian of further terrorism.

STABILITY AND PROSPERITY IN THE REGION: Mutual Equities and Enduring Relationships | 9 The first panelist focused on Iraq, saying such a development could prove risky and that in the context of the Arab Spring, the could reignite violence across the country, country differs in many ways from its particularly because the Samarra mosque, a neighboring states. On the positive side, major Shi’i shrine, is located in the province there is a political process in post-Saddam of Salahaddin, which is populated predomi- Iraq. The development of participatory de- nantly by Sunni Arabs. mocracy has given people hope that they can enact change through the ballot box. The speaker said that the fact that many Therefore, Iraq has largely remained im- Shi’i political parties maintain armed militias mune to the upheavals that swept through adds to sectarian and ethnic tensions. Mak- the Middle East, despite the localized pro- ing matters worse, the current Shi’i- tests that erupted in some Iraqi provinces in dominated government allows these militias 2010. On the negative side, identity politics to act with impunity. This threatens the dominates the country. The speaker said Sunni community which, in turn, maintains that Iraq’s current political system— ties to some Sunni armed groups. In the together with struggles for context of insecurity and lin-

power and resources by var- gering fears, the mobilization ious factions and elites— Iraqi people have legiti- of one group will necessarily encourages polarization provoke a counter- along sectarian and ethnic mate social and economic mobilization by the other. The fault lines. As a result, Iraq grievances. But the secta- speaker said that a conflict remains a divided nation. rian and ethnic divisions between Sunni and Shi’i Arabs preclude Iraqi citizens or Arabs and Kurds will give The speaker said that the from uniting and pur- al-Qa’ida in Iraq (AQI) opera- Iraqi people have legitimate suing a common objec- tional freedom to conduct social and economic griev- large-scale terrorist attacks. Of ances. But the sectarian and tive. greater consequence, a re- ethnic divisions—which newed ethnic or sectarian vi- deepened in the aftermath of the violent olence will erode the legitimacy of the in- civil conflict that broke out in February cumbent government. 2006—preclude Iraqi citizens from uniting and pursuing a common objective. In that Based on Iraq’s experience with democrati- sense, Iraq’s internal dynamics generally zation, the speaker analyzed a few possible resemble Lebanon’s social and political outcomes for the countries experiencing structure rather than Tunisia’s. transition as a result of the Arab Spring. It is plausible that, like Iraq, these countries will The speaker argued that the United States’ attain a limited degree of pluralism and de- continuous involvement in Iraq was critical mocracy but will remain socially conserva- to facilitating a meaningful compromise tive, with restricted women’s rights, human among the various ethnic and sectarian rights, and minority freedoms. The speaker communities and political factions. But, Iraq said that a potential Islamist awakening has not yet achieved a sustainable social could gain ground at the expense of natio- contract, nor has the Iraqi government put nalist movements. forth a pragmatic solution to the issue of Iraqi refugees and internally displaced per- In Iraq, the sense of nationalism has proven sons (IDPs). At the same time, the griev- weaker than originally thought. This pattern ances of the Sunni minority continue to may repeat in other states, with ethnic and build. In light of this, the Sunni community sectarian cleavages, as well as tribal loyalties, is contemplating the creation of a separate affecting political developments in Libya, Sunni region. The speaker cautioned that Yemen, and Syria. The speaker closed by

STABILITY AND PROSPERITY IN THE REGION: Mutual Equities and Enduring Relationships | 10 identifying potential “winners” and “losers” majority opposes the ruling Alawite sect. as a result of the Arab Spring: Turkey has Other sectarian and ethnic groups (Chris- been on the winning side, whereas Israel tians, Druze, and Kurds) remain thus far on and Iran have been on the losing side. the sidelines. Global al-Qa’ida may gain some operational advantage in the short run, but it will lose if The speaker said that revolutions in Tunisia democratization takes root in the region. and Egypt emboldened ordinary Syrians, and the persistent protest spreading across The second panelist discussed Hizballah in Syria is a testament to this. The confronta- the context of a changing Middle East. The tion in Syria has been mutating into an speaker said that Arab pro-democracy upris- armed insurgency, as the opposition ac- ings provided a new model of revolution, quires weapons to fight the regime; pros- one that runs counter to Hizballah’s mes- pects for a negotiated outcome are rapidly sage. This model espouses democracy not diminishing, as the intelligence-party- religion, supports moderate business complex ferociously as opposed to radical voices, resists change. Although some focuses on internal reform within the Syrian regime are instead of an external agen- concerned that in the case of da, and favors peaceful Revolutions in Tunisia a full-blown civil war the change over violent upheav- and Egypt emboldened Alawite minority is likely to al. Most important, indigen- ordinary Syrians, and lose, the speaker said that it ous movements caused these the persistent protest was unlikely that the regime revolutions, not foreign in- spreading across Syria is would reverse the course it tervention. The speaker said a testament to this. had chosen and allow for a that collectively these factors peaceful transition to occur. have weakened Iran in the sense that Iran has lost its The speaker put forth four ideological appeal and soft scenarios for Syria: the regime power. While Hizballah lost some of its re- survives and remains in control, it strikes a levance and popularity, on balance, the Arab deal with the opposition, it collapses and Spring has not produced any major impact becomes a failed state, it is replaced by a on that organization. But any dramatic Sunni government. The speaker discussed change in Syria could potentially break Hiz- the implications of each scenario for Hiz- ballah’s strategic backbone. ballah.

In discussing Syria, the speaker said that if  If the regime succeeds in suppress- popular uprisings in the country persist, ing the uprising, the incumbent change in Syria is more likely to follow government would stabilize and the Libya’s pattern than Tunisia’s or Egypt’s, status quo would solidify. Under because Bashar al-Asad’s excessive use of this scenario, Hizballah would re- force against the population resembles gain its confidence and continue to Muammar Qadhafi’s reaction to the unrest receive support from the govern- in Libya. Like in Libya, the Syrian regime’s ment, as well as from Iran. brutal onslaught has caused larger crowds to pour into the streets. The speaker noted  If the regime negotiates a deal with that in Syria, the epicenter of popular upris- the opposition, then it would most ings has not been in big cities like Damascus likely be replaced by a national unity or Aleppo, but rather in small towns and government. In this context, the rural areas. The confrontation has increa- new government may ask Hizballah singly become sectarian in nature: the Sunni

STABILITY AND PROSPERITY IN THE REGION: Mutual Equities and Enduring Relationships | 11 to keep a low profile in Lebanon, spread popular support among domestic but this would not entail any major constituencies not only because of their ef- strategic changes on the part of fectiveness in conducting terrorist opera- Hizballah. tions and deploying coordinated violence, but also because of their ability to provide  If the incumbent regime collapses social services and financial aid to Lebanese, and Syria becomes a failed state di- Palestinians, and Afghans when the respec- vided along the Alawite, Kurdish, tive governments failed to do so. By con- and Sunni fault lines, then Hizballah trast, al-Qa’ida in Iraq, which used excessive and Iran may try to build “regions violence and brutal tactics against the indi- of influence” in the country. At the genous population and neglected to attend same time, Hizballah may have to to its supporters’ socio-economic griev- consider strengthening its political ances, quickly lost the support of Iraq’s standing in Lebanon. Sunni population.

 Finally, if a Sunni- The speaker argued that the

dominated govern- ability to control defection is ment replaces the The current conflict in what differentiates effective violent organizations from current regime, Hiz- Syria is the largest stra- ballah may find itself ineffective ones. Historically, in a deep distress, be- tegic threat to Hizballah resilient terrorist organiza- cause the new regime since the 2006 Israel- tions have developed me- would likely under- Hizballah war. chanisms to cultivate loyalty take action against of their operatives. The pro- the group and expel it vision of social services, mu- from the country. tual assistance, and charitable activities that benefit opera- The speaker concluded by stating that the tives and their families have proven to be current conflict in Syria is the largest stra- the most effectual mechanisms for con- tegic threat to Hizballah since the 2006 straining defection. The speaker contended Israel-Hizballah war. The collapse of the that it is significantly more difficult for an Asad regime—something that is highly like- individual to defect from a group if that in- ly—would be a major blow to Hizballah, by dividual and his or her family receive weakening the organization. A weak Hizbal- healthcare and financial aid in return for lah would create either the conditions for loyal service. From a counterterrorism or another Israeli war against the group or an counterinsurgency point of view, it is more opening for reviving Israel-Syria peace talks. difficult to co-opt operatives who receive social and economic assistance from the The third panelist analyzed violent extremist organization with which they are affiliated. organizations from both political and military perspectives. The speaker challenged The speaker said that the narrative and spirit the view that terrorist groups and violent of the Arab Spring were different from the movements are purely military organiza- narrative and motivation of violent extrem- tions, arguing that that these organizations ist organizations. The uprisings in Tahrir possess in their arsenal not only coercive Square made no mention of Osama bin La- tools, but also persuasive ones. For exam- den. Yet, if the Arab Spring produces failed ple, Hizballah, Hamas, and the Taliban have states instead of prosperous democracies, it all built and maintained military, political, is plausible that violent extremist organiza- and social wings. These groups gained wide- tions will capitalize on the failure and rapid-

STABILITY AND PROSPERITY IN THE REGION: Mutual Equities and Enduring Relationships | 12 ly fill the void created by unsuccessful tran- war that could lead to a failed state. The sitions. danger in Egypt is the return of dictator- ship. Therefore, in formulating recommen- The moderator asked the panelists to dis- dations, it is important to understand and cuss Hizballah’s attitude toward the Arab account for the specific needs of each coun- Spring and analyze the psychological impact try. on Hizballah if the Asad regime collapses. One speaker said that it was difficult to PANEL THREE: guess Hizballah’s innermost thoughts about REGIONAL ACTORS AND GULF the Arab Spring, but by extrapolating from SECURITY: SAUDI ARABIA, IRAQ, Hizballah leaders’ public statements, it be- IRAN comes clear that the organization believes that the crisis in Syria has reached a plateau Prepared by Mehrun Etebari and the uprisings will gradually taper off. In addition, Hizballah has tried to hedge its he third panel of the conference bets by stating that while it supports the addressed the role of three coun- incumbent Syrian government and con- T0 tries which, while they have not demns the foreign machinations that caused experienced the most intense elements of the uprisings, it also sympathizes with some the Arab Spring firsthand, are deeply af- of the popular grievances and demands for fected by the regional upheaval and poised reform. The speaker said that at the same to play important roles in the futures of the time that Hizballah has tried to maintain countries undergoing change. The speakers good relationship with the Asad regime, it discussed Iran, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia, each has also made attempts to gain the opposi- of which has held an important place in the tion’s goodwill. strategic thinking of the United States, and each of which will be crucial to the security One participant asked the panelists under of the region. what conditions Hizballah would continue to thrive. One of the speakers said that One speaker began by giving an overview of Hizballah will continue to be an influential Iran’s historical influence on political political party in Lebanon because the pecu- movements throughout the Middle East. liar causes it pursues still resonate with the Iran’s Islamic Revolution of 1979 intro- Lebanese public: the organization’s anti- duced political Islam to the region, and be- Israel posture and its commitment to pro- gan a tumultuous period that included the tecting the interests and welfare of Leba- siege in Mecca and the assassination of An- non’s Shi’i population. Another participant war Sadat. This era, the speaker argued, was commented on the issue saying that Hizbal- brought to an end by the events of the Arab lah is a resilient and flexible organization Spring, which have shown a decline in the that has a tested ability to overcome set- appeal of traditional political Islam as a re- backs. gional force. Another speaker said that the initial appeal of the Iranian model of Islamic A participant asked what would happen if resistance to perceived Western domination the Arab Spring failed and people’s expecta- slowly waned in the region following the tions in Egypt, Tunisia, and elsewhere were Iran-Iraq War of 1980–88 because Iran unmet. One speaker said that success and came to be seen as an authoritarian state failure are context-specific concepts. In Tu- cloaked in religious rhetoric. The Arab nisia, for example, the expectation is to cul- Spring further harmed Iran’s standing; de- tivate an accountable and responsive gov- spite the fact that Tehran has tried to frame ernment. In Libya, the objective is state- the events of the Arab Spring as an out- building and avoidance of a full-fledged civil pouring of Islamist expression inspired by

STABILITY AND PROSPERITY IN THE REGION: Mutual Equities and Enduring Relationships | 13 the Iranian Revolution, it has been unable though, its influence may come to depend to capitalize on the revolutions. on whether the promises of the Arab Spring are fulfilled in the countries experiencing One panelist argued that decisions taken by change. Tehran in the late 1970s and early 1980s have left it wallowing in an economic and One speaker described the international political quagmire. While many developing sanctions regime against Tehran as largely powers like China, India, and Turkey were ineffective against the Iranian political elite. beginning to foster their rise by opening up The primary effect of the sanctions has to the world during this period, the revolu- been inflation, which has harmed the mid- tionaries in Iran turned inward, committed dle and lower-middle classes. In addition, to the idea that indigenization on all levels while targeted financial measures have made was critical to national security. Aided by international trade far more costly for establishment interpretations Iran—an estimated $15 to of political Islam, this $18 billion in commissions process has been remarkably and bribes are being paid an- continuous over the history nually to secure imports, of the Islamic Republic, and Decisions taken by Te- more than triple the annual has spurred the entrench- hran in the late 1970s total prior to 2005—these ment of a military-industrial and early 1980s have costs have been manageable, complex that controls the left it wallowing in an thanks to Iran’s hydrocarbon financial and industrial bases economic and political income. Thus, many of the of the economy, the intelli- quagmire. speakers dismissed the like- gence services, and, increa- lihood that sanctions would singly, the domestic political significantly alter Tehran’s establishment. With the rise foreign policy posture. of this centralized power structure, there has been a dampening effect One speaker argued that the majority of on the political debates that marked the era Iran’s economic woes are due to govern- of former president Mohammad Khatami. ment mismanagement, rather than interna- The speaker asserted that this has reached tional isolation. Iran has fallen behind its the level of a near eradication of collective neighbors, such as Turkey and Saudi Arabia, civil society, particularly after the protests of due to declines in the quality of education, June 2009. Fearing punishment for dissent environmental indicators, and measures of in an inward-looking nation, many Iranians economic welfare. This is particularly noti- have turned inward themselves, resulting in ceable in the oil industry, where the speaker what the speaker characterized as an ato- said Iran’s exports are currently declining by mized society. 3 percent annually, due to a lack of investment—a trend that could see Baghdad ec- Still, Iran remains an ideological power, and lipse Tehran in OPEC’s power within a because of this, it will be a central concern decade. The poor state of Iran’s oil infra- to the United States as it decides how to structure has partly been caused by the way address the future of its military presence in in which the country squandered profit it Iraq and the region as a whole. Another made during the recent oil boom. Sixty-two speaker added that while Iran could become percent of Iran’s total historical oil in- less relevant as a regional actor should the come—dating back to 1908—has come Asad regime fall in Damascus, its geograph- during Ahmadinejad’s tenure. The speaker ical and political ties in Iraq and Afghanistan argued that money has been used primarily will give Tehran a platform to influence the to “buy” political loyalty via handouts to the region for many years to come. Ultimately, regime’s political base and families of the

STABILITY AND PROSPERITY IN THE REGION: Mutual Equities and Enduring Relationships | 14 security apparatus rather than to build infra- ing that regardless of Iran’s true intentions structure, or even improve education. with regards to its nuclear program, other nations’ perceptions matter greatly: an Israe- Overall, the speaker argued, this strategy of li perception that Iranian nuclear develop- rewarding loyalists and building a security ment needs to be stopped by force could apparatus has had countervailing effects. On lead to military action and a regional confla- the one hand, dissent has been effectively gration. quashed by the expansive network of pro- regime agents, with reformists and the On Saudi Arabia—the nation seen as Iran’s Green Movement being described by one ideological and strategic rival in the chang- speaker as in disarray. On the other hand, ing political landscape of the Middle East— the speaker said, the growing economic and several speakers concurred that regional political frustration felt by the majority of events have benefited the conservative ele- Iranians—largely the result of the diversion ments of the kingdom’s power structure. As of the nation’s oil windfall Riyadh opposed many of the to pro-regime elements and uprisings in the region, the the military—means that the regime’s right wing used the right circumstances could The growing economic chaos to argue that outside unleash political change, and political frustration sectarian threats necessitated a particularly in the event that felt by the majority of strong response, including a Supreme Leader Ali Kha- Iranians means that the clampdown on political and menei dies or otherwise social liberalization. In addi- leaves the political scene. right circumstances could tion to the uprising in Bahrain, Another speaker agreed, unleash political change. which Riyadh claimed was noting that the Arab Spring inspired by Iran, Saudi con- had shown that people have servatives have pointed to the the need for economic well- alleged Iranian plot to assassi- being and dignity, and when they are left nate the Saudi ambassador to the United wanting, the population itself is the greatest States as evidence that Riyadh faces a nefa- threat to a nation’s stability. rious threat from Tehran. As one speaker said, the latter case has provided a great tool A speaker argued that the West’s standoff for the House of Saud to deflect national with Iran over the latter’s nuclear program attention away from the domestic political was a bargaining chip for Tehran, particular- struggles that have been rising in impor- ly in the view of the clerical establishment. tance. In addition, when the nuclear issue leads to debate with Washington, it allows the politi- However, while portraying an aura of stabil- cal elite to emphasize the urgency of its ity, the Saudi regime has not been immune commitment to national security, which it to domestic dissent. Although smaller in can use to bolster the regime’s legitimacy. number than those that occurred in other Another speaker added that Iran does not countries, the protests that have occurred in pose a major military threat to the United Saudi Arabia have been notable. The pro- States, and surmised that the national secu- tests have ranged from expressions of anger rity elite in Tehran has no plans to go over the response to floods in Jeddah, to beyond a threshold nuclear capability. Ra- demonstrations by the Shi’ah of the Eastern ther, the speaker argued that Iran would use Province, and to feminist and labor pro- a nuclear weapons capacity as a “diplomatic tests. Some demonstrations have targeted force multiplier” in an attempt to have oth- the security establishment of the state, as er countries recognize its interests. Another was the case when protestors amassed out- speaker responded to this comment by not- side the Interior Ministry in anger at the

STABILITY AND PROSPERITY IN THE REGION: Mutual Equities and Enduring Relationships | 15 arrests of their family members. Still, like in This speaker said that many in the Gulf and other countries, economic challenges may the West have been frustrated by the lack of prove to be the most potent fuel for protest. a constructive relationship between Iraq and As the number of college graduates rises in its Arab neighbors to the south, particularly the kingdom—one speaker noted estimates Saudi Arabia. Like many of the political of 250,000 Saudis earning their diploma problems facing the Baghdad government, each year—a lack of job prospects has this one has its roots in personal relation- prompted some popular discontent over ships and rivalries—the speaker argued that unemployment. With increasing economic King Abdullah does not like or trust Prime challenges, more than one speaker sug- Minister Nouri al-Maliki. This antipathy is gested that the social contract that has ex- only exacerbated by the fact that rival Iraqi isted in the kingdom through disbursement politicians have travelled to Riyadh to tell of oil revenue would need serious repair in the king that Maliki is a sectarian, an Islam- the near future. ist, an Iranian puppet, and a man with dictatorial designs.

Another speaker addressed Occupied by fear over the the domestic situation in Iran has largely failed to treatment of his Sunni coreli- Iraq and its implications for gionists in Iraq, the king is like- the country’s foreign policy. take economic advantage ly to continue to withhold true The speaker described the of its influence, as Tur- support for the government of political climate in Baghdad kish companies have his northern neighbor as long as dysfunctional, and said been far more active in as the bitter power struggle the main political actors are Iraq. exists there. more concerned with their internal power struggles The role that Iran continues to than with developing a plan play in the Iraqi political dy- for the future of the state. namic remains a source of fru- The speaker said that there is persistent dis- stration for the West. One speaker, though, content among Iraqis with their standard of asserted that Iran is not widely popular in living. Because the average Iraqi still only Iraq, and the memories of the eight-year has access to electricity for five hours per war the two nations fought in the 1980s day, and less than 3 percent of the popula- remain fresh in the minds of the Arab tion has access to the Internet, Iraqis see population. Still, many of Iraq’s political themselves as worse off than those in elites have close ties to their Iranian coun- neighboring countries. The economic and terparts, and many of their political parties development problems in Iraq, coupled were set up with the active support of Te- with a divisive sectarian situation in the re- hran or currently receive Iranian funding. gion, such as the crackdown on Bahraini Iran, seeking to maximize its benefit from Shi’ah, have spurred a political standoff be- the removal of its archenemy, Saddam Hus- tween the various factions in the Iraqi par- sein, was described as conspiring to keep liament with little prospect for resolution in Iraq weak to prevent it from becoming a sight. While this implies that Iraq—once threat again. This, the speaker argued, is thought of by Washington as a potential what lies behind Iranian efforts to maintain beacon of democracy in the Middle East— a sectarian divide in Iraq, efforts that in- has become a prism for the sectarian divide clude pushing to get the Sadrist faction to in the region, the speaker emphasized that join Maliki’s coalition. However, the speaker Iraq contains the oil and gas resources to noted that Iran has largely failed to take become a major power if it “gets its own economic advantage of its influence, as house in order.” Turkish companies have been far more active in Iraq. That said, the speaker noted

STABILITY AND PROSPERITY IN THE REGION: Mutual Equities and Enduring Relationships | 16 that one of America’s failures in non- governments, and the rivalry between the military relationship-building with Iraq is in two over Iraq. Yet, the speaker noted, the the economic sphere. The relatively sparse upheaval of the Arab Spring has left Saudi presence of American companies in Iraq Arabia scrambling to maintain its control at deprives Washington of a soft-power lever home and the protests in Syria (and the en- with which it could take advantage of Iran’s suing Turkish condemnation of Bashar al- lack of trade prowess. Asad) have torn apart the burgeoning alliance between Tehran, Ankara, and Da- The session concluded with one speaker mascus that had buoyed Iran as a regional saying that thanks to the Arab Spring, the actor in recent years. While each nation con- three countries discussed in the panel inte- tinues to be central to American strategy in ract with one another in a manner deeply the region, the consensus was that Washing- different than before. In the past, a discus- ton must adapt quickly to the rapidly chang- sion of the three countries would likely have ing faces of Baghdad, Riyadh, and Tehran in focused entirely on Iran’s role as the leader the aftermath of the Arab Spring. of the so-called resistance axis, Saudi Arabia as the leader of the pro-American Arab

STABILITY AND PROSPERITY IN THE REGION: Mutual Equities and Enduring Relationships | 17 REWRITING THE SOCIAL CONTRACT IN THE WAKE OF THE ARAB AWAKENING

SALMAN SHAIKH

hroughout the Brookings- While a variety of institutions and services CENTCOM conference, one will need to be built, strengthened, or relied T question was consistently asked: upon in states transitioning to democracy Given the extraordinary change that has (Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia), the military in occurred in the region, do constituencies in particular will be an important player in the the Middle East still agree with their current realignment of the social contract. Indeed, social contracts? This theme of rewriting the in its most basic form, the social contract social contract, or the agreement between involves only a promise of mutual defense; the ruler and the ruled, was raised in the citizens pledge their loyalty to the state in three panel discussions. Certainly, the exchange for military protection. In the question of what services, privileges, and past, Arab militaries played the role of a rights should be delivered to populations by praetorian guard of the deep state, but in those that govern them is one that the post-Mubarak Egypt, that role has altered to drivers of change in the region have both one of being an alleged guarantor of posed, and hope to answer. Indeed, the democratic change. In the wake of the Arab response to this question will shape the Spring, many people’s expectations have nature of political systems in the region for been raised with regard to the once-feared coming generations. It is in the immediate military. Beyond having the traditional role and long-term interests of the United States of protecting the country from external to follow closely these domestic military threats, in some instances, armies developments, given both its declared are being pressed to redefine their intentions to help foster transitions to more relationship with the people and the state. responsive and accountable governments, and given the important implications of Even in nations not facing transitions, the these internal struggles for broader regional need for a redrawn social contract is security. becoming clearer. Popular unrest in the Gulf states in particular has demonstrated At a time when popular protests of various that these prosperous and seemingly placid sizes and intensity are sweeping the region, countries are not immune to challenges. the debate about what rights and services Protests have been seen as a persistent rulers owe their citizens is more relevant existential threat for monarchies that have than ever before. The Arab Awakening— long ruled from the top down, and what one panelist dubbed a “second therefore Gulf leaders have attempted to independence for Arab nations, from keep the Arab Awakening at arm’s length. regimes rather than colonizers”—has been The age-old rentier system of monarchs marked by popular demands for more sharing economic gains with their citizenry representative and accountable in exchange for loyalty and political inaction governments, as well as calls to improve the may have to be recast, or at least economic plight of thousands suffering modernized. For now, Gulf states have from joblessness, corruption, and inequality. largely reacted to the rise of popular unrest In essence, the Middle East is facing a with the time-tried tactic of securing movement to fundamentally realign how acquiescence, if not support, through rulers interact with their citizens. financial handouts. The unsustainability of

STABILITY AND PROSPERITY IN THE REGION: Mutual Equities and Enduring Relationships | 18 such measures—which depend not only on environment in which recent changes are the continued existence of oil but on its taking place. In particular, the fact that we constantly fluctuating price—is clear. It are seeing Egypt join Turkey and Qatar as remains to be seen, however, what the one of a set of assertive regional foreign agreed-upon responsibilities of the state will policymakers suggests that as countries be as the political systems of the region democratize—or at least become more evolve in the aftermath of the Arab Spring. responsive to their publics—we will see a For example, in Kuwait, protesters have strand of more assertive nationalism, or demanded accountability for government even populism emerge. spending and increased transparency to stamp out corruption. In Qatar, the emir In addition, though Iran continues to pose a recently announced that parliamentary threat to regional stability, both internal elections will take place in the second half pressure and external developments (which of 2013, ten years after the constitution was have weakened the Syrian-led “resistance amended with a provision for bloc” to which Iran is allied), such elections. suggest that it may be in It remains to be seen decline. Indeed, the Arab As the citizen-state what the agreed-upon Spring presented a different relationship is being narrative to the one Iran has redefined, the region is likely responsibilities of the long championed. As popular to experience a great deal state will be as the politi- protests continue, we are more instability that will cal systems of the region reminded of Iran’s own enable both sub-state and evolve in the aftermath of equivalent to the Arab Spring external actors to thrive. In the Arab Spring. in 2009, and of the contested places like Lebanon and nature of its own social Yemen, where violence contract—which many see as threatens the very fabric of politically and economically the nation, governments face the difficult corrupt. An atmosphere of domestic decision of how to respond to non-state pressure has been mounting recently, with groups that provide many of the goods and major opposition figures under continued services traditionally associated with house arrest, and ministers coming under national governance. One panel discussion renewed scrutiny for corruption. While Iran touched on this difficulty, stressing that is sometimes perceived as the biggest extremist organizations in failed or failing “winner” in Iraq, internal struggles in the states like Yemen have the option of using Islamic Republic suggest that it will be both coercive and persuasive means to unable to formulate a coherent foreign garner support, as they can carry out policy. In the season of the Arab services that governments are failing to Awakening, there will likely be increasing grant. In the long run, then, it will be the pressures to respond to popular demands in ability of the government to genuinely foreign policy as well as in domestic politics. respond to its citizens’ economic and As such, Iran will likely play a losing hand. political demands that will determine its On the global level, although Iran is a fate. threat, the fixation on the Islamic Republic aids counterrevolutionaries when the focus Significant changes are also taking place in should truly be on creating a new social the larger strategic geopolitical framework contract—for both Iran, and its Arab of the Middle East, as a result of domestic neighbors. demands for more responsible, responsive governance. Indeed, the final panel of the The Brookings-CENTCOM Conference conference addressed the geostrategic threw into sharp relief the fundamental

STABILITY AND PROSPERITY IN THE REGION: Mutual Equities and Enduring Relationships | 19 need for substantial changes to the will be better equipped to aid both states in agreement between rulers and their citizenry transition and those facing pressure to to guarantee both domestic and regional reform. security in the Middle East. By understanding this fact, the United States

STABILITY AND PROSPERITY IN THE REGION: Mutual Equities and Enduring Relationships | 20 The Saban Center for Middle East Policy

he Saban Center for Middle East Policy to promote a better understanding of the policy was established on May 13, 2002 with an choices facing American decision makers. They in- inaugural address by His Majesty King clude Bruce Riedel, a specialist on counterterrorism, TAbdullah II of Jordan. The creation of the Saban who served as a senior advisor to four presidents on Center reflects the Brookings Institution’s com- the Middle East and South Asia at the National Se- mitment to expand dramatically its research and curity Council and during a twenty-nine year career analysis of Middle East policy issues at a time when in the CIA; Suzanne Maloney, a former senior State the region has come to dominate the U.S. foreign Department official who focuses on Iran and eco- policy agenda. nomic development; Stephen R. Grand, Fellow and Director of the Project on U.S. Relations with the The Saban Center provides Washington policymak- Islamic World; Salman Shaikh, Fellow and Director ers with balanced, objective, in-depth and timely of the Brookings Doha Center; Ibrahim Sharqieh, research and policy analysis from experienced and Fellow and Deputy Director of the Brookings Doha knowledgeable scholars who can bring fresh per- Center; Shadi Hamid, Fellow and Director of Re- spectives to bear on the critical problems of the search of the Brookings Doha Center; and Shibley Middle East. The center upholds the Brookings Telhami, who holds the Sadat Chair at the Universi- tradition of being open to a broad range of views. ty of Maryland. The center is located in the Foreign The Saban Center’s central objective is to advance Policy Studies Program at Brookings. understanding of developments in the Middle East through policy-relevant scholarship and debate. The Saban Center is undertaking path breaking research in five areas: the implications of regime The center’s foundation was made possible by a gen- change in Iraq, including post-war nation-building erous grant from Haim and Cheryl Saban of Los An- and Gulf security; the dynamics of Iranian domes- geles. Ambassador Martin S. Indyk, Vice President tic politics and the threat of nuclear proliferation; of Foreign Policy at Brookings, was the founding mechanisms and requirements for a two-state so- Director of the Saban Center. Kenneth M. Pollack lution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict; policy for is the center’s Director. Daniel Byman is the center’s the war against terrorism, including the continuing Director of Research. Within the Saban Center is challenge of state sponsorship of terrorism; and po- a core group of Middle East experts who conduct litical and economic change in the Arab world, and original research and develop innovative programs the methods required to promote democratization.

62 UNFINISHED BUSINESS: An American Strategy for Iraq Moving Forward BROOKINGS 1775 Massachusetts Ave., NW Washington, D.C. 20036-2103 www.brookings.edu