Where Was the Government? in Inquiry Into the Events of September 11, 2001

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Where Was the Government? in Inquiry Into the Events of September 11, 2001 Western Michigan University ScholarWorks at WMU Master's Theses Graduate College 8-2008 Where Was the Government? In Inquiry into the Events of September 11, 2001 Elizabeth A. Bradshaw Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.wmich.edu/masters_theses Part of the Politics and Social Change Commons Recommended Citation Bradshaw, Elizabeth A., "Where Was the Government? In Inquiry into the Events of September 11, 2001" (2008). Master's Theses. 4146. https://scholarworks.wmich.edu/masters_theses/4146 This Masters Thesis-Open Access is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate College at ScholarWorks at WMU. It has been accepted for inclusion in Master's Theses by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks at WMU. For more information, please contact [email protected]. WHERE WAS THE GOVERNMENT? AN INQUIRY INTO THE EVENTS OF SEPTEMBER 11, 2001 by Elizabeth A. Bradshaw A Thesis Submitted to the Faculty of The Graduate College .. in partial fulfillmentof the requirements forthe Degreeof Master of Arts Department of Sociology WesternMichigan University Kalamazoo, Michigan August 2008 Copyright by Elizabeth A. 'Bradshaw 2008 "All truth passes throughthree stages. First, it is ridiculed. Second, it is violently opposed. Third, it is accepted as being self-evident" - Arthur Schopenhauer ACKNOWLEDGMENTS Thanks to the support, guidance and criticisms "ofmy chairperson Dr. G�egory Howard and committee members Dr. Ronald Kramer and -Dr. Barry Goetz, this project has been a surprisingly educational and· enjoyable research experience. Without the time, effort and most importantly encouragement so generously lent by my colleagues, friends and family I would have never seen this behemoth of a thesis through to its completion. Deserving of a very special acknowledgement is Mark Ferguson for all of his suggestions, thoughts and feedback throughout this entire escapade. To the diverse group of concerned citizens, academics and victims' families who dare to question the actions of the United States government in the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, your efforts exemplify patriotism. Ask questions, demand answers. Elizabeth A. Bradshaw 11 ' . WHERE WAS THE GOVERNMENT? AN INQUIRY INTO THE EVENTS OF SEPTEMBER 11, 2001 Elizabeth A. Bradshaw, M.A. WesternMichigan University, 2008 The terrorist attacks of �eptember 11, 2001 have forever changed the geopolitical landscape. Yet despite the significance of such an event, those working in the field of state crime have been reluctant to investigate the role of the United States government in failing to prevent the attacks. Utilizing the fivecriteria of state crime put forth by Kauzlarich, Mullins and Matthews (2003), the ._actions and inactions of the National Security Council, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the North American Aerospace Defense Command and the Federal Aviation Administration are examined. Drawing on the testimonies of government officials from each of the five agencies to the 9/11 Commission, evidence suggests that key officials failed to act on available information to prevent the attacks therefore constituting an explicit crime of omission. Most significantly, the National Security Council composed of top Bush administration officials, who were charged with the task of coordinating a response to such a threat, neglected to take crucial actions which may have prevented the attacks. TABLE OF CONTENTS ACKNOWLEDGMENTS............................................ : .................................... : .... 11 CHAPTER · I. INTRODUCTION........................................................................................ 1 II. LITERATURE REVIEW.............................................................................. _ 3 Legalistic and Expanded Legalistic..................................................... 5 Human RightsDefinitions ...... i.......................................................... :. 9 InternationalLaw ................................ ;................................................ 11 State Crime and September 11, 2001 .................................................. 14 Crimes of Omission............................................................................. 16 III. DATA ANDMETHODS... ........................................................................... 21 Data ...................................................... ; ............................................-. 21 The National Commission on TerroristAttacks Upon the United States ................................................................................................... 23 Methods............................................................................................... 29 Analytic Strategy .................................................... :;:;;........................ 31 IV. NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL............................................................ 35 Testimony of Condoleezza Rice.......................................................... 35 Assignedor Implied Trust or Duty...................................................... 35 Action or Inaction on Behalf of State or State Agencies..................... 37 Summary.............................................................................................. 42 iii Table of Contents-continued Testimony of Richard Clarke .............................................................. 43 Assignedor Implied Trust or Duty...................................................... 43 Action or Inaction on Behalf of State or State Agencies..................... 44 Summary..................................................... :........................................ 49 National Security Council Summary................................................... 50 CSG Reporting to Deputies Committee.............................................. 51 V. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY...................................................... 54 Testimonies of George Tenet and John McLaughlin .......................... 55 Assignedor Implied Trust or Duty...................................................... 55 Action or Inaction on Behalf of State or State Agencies..................... 56 Summary.............................................................................................. 62 Testimony of Cofer Black................................................................... 63 Assignedor Implied Trust or Duty...................................................... 63 Action or Inaction on Behalf of State or State Agencies..................... 65 Summary........................................................................ ;............... :..... 69 Central Intelligence Agency Summary................................................ 70 "VI. FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION.............................................. 74 Testimony of Louis J. Freeh................................................................ 75 Assignedor Implied Trust or Duty...................................................... 75 Action or Inaction on Behalf of State or State Agencies..................... · 75 Summary.............................................................................................. 80 Testimony of Thomas J. Pickard......................................................... 81 iv Table of Contents-continued Assignedor Implied Trust or Duty................................. ;.................... 81 Action or Inaction on Behalf of State or State Agencies..................... 82 Summary.......................................................................................... .-... _ 87 Federal Bureau of Investigation Summary:......................................... 88 VII. NORTH AMERICAN AEROSPACE DEFENSE COMMAND.................. 94 Testimonies of Craig McKinley, Larry Arnold and AlanScott .......... 96 Assignedor Implied Trust or Duty...................................................... 96 Action or Inaction on Behalf of State or State Agencies..................... 97 Summary.............................................................................................. 107 Testimonies of Richard/Myers, Charles Joseph Leidig, Ralph Eberhart and Larry.Arnold................................................................... 109 Assignedor Implied Trust or Duty...................................................... 109 Action or Inaction on Behalf of State or State Agencies..................... 110 Summary.............................................................................................. 120 North American Aerospace DefenseCommand Summary................. 124 VIII. FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION.............................................. 133 Testimonies of Jane Garvey and Kenneth Mead................................. 134 Assignedor Implied Trust or Duty ..........................�;........................ 134 Action or Inaction on Behalf of State or State Agencies..................... 135 Summary.............................................................................................. 142 Testimony of Bogdan Dzakovic.......................................................... 145 Assignedor Implied Trust or Duty...................................................... 145 Action or Inaction on Behalf of State or State Agencies..................... 146 V Table of Contents-continued Summary.............................................................................................. 150 Testimonies of Monte Belger, JeffGriffith, John White and Benedict Sliney...................................................................................
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