Russian Analytical Digest No. 5

No. 5 29 August 2006 rrussianussian aanalyticalnalytical ddigestigest www.res.ethz.ch www.russlandanalysen.de BESLAN – TWO YEARS AFTER ■ ANALYSIS Looking Back at Beslan. Alexander Cherkasov, Moscow 2 ■ ANALYSIS Th e North Caucasus: Taking stock two years after Beslan. Jeronim Perovic, Zurich 4 ■ TABLES AND DIAGRAMS Th e North Caucasus and the Southern Federal District: Statistics and Facts 9 ■ OPINION SURVEY Th e North Caucasus in Russian Eyes 13 ■ CHRONOLOGY Terror-related incidents in the North Caucasus September 2004 – August 2006 14 Research Centre for East CSS Center for Security Otto Wolff -Stiftung DGO European Studies, Bremen An ETH Center Studies, ETH Zurich rrussianussian aanalyticalnalytical russian analytical digest 05/06 ddigestigest Analysis Looking Back at Beslan Alexander Cherkasov, Moscow Summary Two years after the Beslan tragedy, the authorities have yet to publish a fi nal report on what took place there. Most importantly, they have refused to examine the terrorist attack within the larger context of the Chechen war. Th ey have also blamed all the deaths on the terrorists, preventing a thorough investigation examining the role of the Russian security forces and the responsibilities of the authorities. Such a study would make possible a more nuanced understanding of what happened at Beslan. Hostage-taking tragedies: Moscow’s terrorists prepare and carry out their plans? Which questionable approach administrative and law enforcement offi cials were uring the course of the Chechen wars over the responsible for this?” Th ose questions are suitable for Dlast 12 years, Beslan was the fourth large-scale prosecutors. In the wider sense, we need to address terrorist act with the taking of hostages in Russia. It the questions: “What were the pre-conditions and followed Shamil Basayev’s June 1995 capture of more context for the terrorist act? How was it possible to than 1,500 people in the hospital in Budennovsk form the units of fi ghters and terrorist networks?” In (Stavropol Krai), the Salman Raduyev-led attack in other words, “Why did the Chechen war, at fi rst de- January 1996 on the hospital in Kizlyar (Dagestan), scribed as an eff ort to ‘disarm illegal groups’ and then and the October 2002 siege and hostage-taking of a ‘counter-terrorist operation’ lead to the opposite re- more than 1,000 people in Moscow’s Dubrovka the- sult - to the establishment of powerful illegal armed ater. Nevertheless, Beslan was exceptional. Never be- formations and a terrorist underground?” Th is topic fore had there been so many deaths (according to the is suitable for a parliamentary investigation and wide preliminary Duma report, 331 hostages were killed), social discussion. and, above all, the loss of so many children’s lives (offi cially, 186 children were killed). Never before did the Need to investigate the authorities as well public pay so much attention to the investigation of a he conditions surrounding the terrorist act itself, terrorist act. Tits course and outcome, are also a subject for the Th e investigation of the 1995 assault in Budennovsk work of the investigative organs. As experience shows, was stopped more than once. Only after many years the innocent people held hostage died not only at the did the authorities bring the terrorists to court, either hands of the terrorists, but during the “counter-terror- individually or in small groups. Salman Raduev, the ist operations.” Such was the case in all terrorist acts, leader of the terrorist act in Kizlyar, was only brought including Budennovsk and especially Dubrovka. Th e to justice much later, sentenced to life in prison in investigation should have determined how each hos- December 2001. During the government’s storm on tage died, examining the actions not only of the ter- the theater in Moscow, all the terrorists were killed rorists, but also the special services, military, and the and there simply was no trial. In the case of Beslan, law enforcement agencies, if not to punish the guilty, the former hostages organized a public campaign to then to extract lessons from these experiences. demand an investigation, but only in North Ossetia Today, the “siloviki” have pre-approved carte- did these demands and protests become widespread. blanche for any action and any “losses.” Existing legis- Furthermore, one terrorist, Nurpashi Kulayev, lation allows them, in the course of “counter-terrorist from Beslan was captured alive and tried in court. operations,” to infl ict any damage, not only to prop- Th erefore it was possible to seek more information erty, but also to the health and life of citizens, and not in a court of law going far beyond the criminal case bear any responsibility for doing so. against this one individual. In fact, such investigations should have been Th e Chechen war causes terrorism possible in all of the terrorist acts listed here. Most he Russian mass media today is not prevented importantly, it is necessary to investigate the condi- Tfrom discussing the topic of terrorism. Usually, tions leading to the tragedy. In a narrow sense, the public discussion focuses on questions such as: “How questions probing such conditions were “How did the did this happen? Who allowed it? Could it have been 2 rrussianussian aanalyticalnalytical russian analytical digest 05/06 ddigestigest prevented?...” Th e question “Who concretely is re- tor tried to maintain the remnants of trust in the law sponsible for the death of a specifi c person?” is usually enforcement agencies. But one can interpret “trust” in answered thus “Wait, the investigation is still taking a variety of ways. One can be guided by the rules that its course. In the meantime, we are talking about...” “we want to establish the truth, we will check all facts, and the discussion returns to the general questions. we will operate with maximal openness so that no- Th e answers of the investigation are well known: body will doubt our lack of bias” or one can support a “the terrorists alone are responsible for the deaths of “general line,” denouncing all other possibilities. the hostages.” One can research the documents and Th is predetermination was laid in the fi rst minutes fi nd there such senseless and general formulations as: of the armed outcome of Beslan. Already then it was “Kulayev, working as part of a criminal group, mur- necessary to immediately divide the investigation into dered two or more individuals” instead of specifi c evi- two parts. Th e fi rst, focusing on the actions of the ter- dence describing the concrete crimes of each fi ghter. rorists, such as how they prepared and conducted the Th ere are other factual absurdities presented to society attack on the school, undoubtedly should have been for the purpose of burying clear and seemingly obvi- carried out by the Federal Security Service (FSB). But ous things. the FSB should have played absolutely no role in the Undoubtedly, it is important to answer such ques- second investigation, focusing on the storm of the tions as “How did the terrorists make their way to school in which people died. While the FSB claimed Beslan? How many were involved? Were arms hidden that it wanted “to counter the possibility of falsifi ca- in the school before the attack? Was it possible to ne- tion of material evidence in the case,” in fact the in- gotiate with them correctly? Why did the fi rst explo- terests of the agency in painting the best picture of its sion happen?” among others. Of course, it is necessary own actions was too obvious. to seek answers, but as a result, by forgetting about But the investigation was not divided into two the previous terrorist act, society deals only with the parts. In a situation of a clear “confl ict of interests,” next one, ignoring a basic and obvious truth: before all facts and circumstances that did not agree with the the Chechen war there were no conversations about general line could be excluded from examination, re- such terrorism at all. In fact, the Chechen war itself placed with skillfully formed and “correct” questions caused this terrorism. Now, given the existence of to the witnesses and experts, if not directly falsifi ed terrorism, does the state have the ability to react ad- testimony. Every obstacle on the road favoring the equately, not just dealing with each individual terror- general line was pushed aside and destroyed. How ist act, but countering the deeper causes of terrorism? else can one explain the discovery at the dump of a And, moreover, in dealing with specifi c terrorist acts, large quantity of the personal eff ects and clothes of can the state act while taking into account the larger the dead hostages, which should have been evidence context and deeper reasons for the attack? in the case? After the investigators confi rmed the “general Th e authorities’ general line: Th e terrorists line” in regard to the terrorists and the victims that alone are responsible “Basayev was responsible for everything,” there was no here is another, no less important fl aw limiting the need to conduct further investigations, determine the Tinvestigations, parliamentary examinations, and conditions making the attack possible, or reconstruct social discussions about Beslan. Th e questions are fo- events. Th us, they could write in the investigatory cused on the one offi cial version of events. Even if you documents that the weapons and instructions were re- do not agree with it and seek to dispute it, the pres- ceived “from unknown people at an unknown time in ence of the one offi cial version limits discussion. an unknown place,” that everything took place under It is not simply that the investigation should have the leadership of Basayev, who personally gave the ter- examined not only “the one true version,” but all pos- rorists almost every automatic weapon and bullet.

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