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GLOBAL TRENDS FORCED DISPLACEMENT in 2020  Trends at a Glance 82.4 MILLION FORCIBLY DISPLACED WORLDWIDE 26

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GLOBAL TRENDS FORCED DISPLACEMENT in 2020  Trends at a Glance 82.4 MILLION FORCIBLY DISPLACED WORLDWIDE 26 GLOBAL TRENDS FORCED DISPLACEMENT IN 2020 Trends at a Glance 82.4 MILLION FORCIBLY DISPLACED WORLDWIDE 26 . 4 million refugees at the end of 2020 as a result of persecution, conflict, violence, human rights violations or events seriously million refugees 20.7 disturbing public order. under UNHCR’s mandate 90M million Palestine refugees 5.7 under UNRWA’s mandate 70M 1 50M 48 . 0 million internally displaced people 30M 4 . 1 million asylum-seekers million Venezuelans displaced abroad2 10M 3 . 9 - 1990 2000 2010 2020 86% 3.7 MILLION 1 IN 6 HOSTED IN REFUGEES HOSTED ARE DISPLACED DEVELOPING IN TURKEY COUNTRIES Relative to their national populations, the island of Aruba hosted the largest Turkey hosted nearly 3.7 million number of Venezuelans displaced refugees, the largest population Developing countries hosted 86 per abroad (1 in 6) while Lebanon hosted worldwide. Colombia was second cent of the world’s refugees and the largest number of refugees (1 in with more than 1.7 million, including Venezuelans displaced abroad. The 8)3, followed by Curaçao (1 in 10), Venezuelans displaced abroad. Least Developed Countries provided Jordan (1 in 15) and Turkey (1 in 23).4 asylum to 27 per cent of the total. Turkey Aruba 3.7 million 1 in 6 73% Colombia Lebanon HOSTED IN 1.7 million 1 in 8 NEIGHBOURING Pakistan Curaçao COUNTRIES 1.4 million 1 in 10 Uganda Jordan 1.4 million 1 in 15 73 per cent of refugees and Venezuelans displaced abroad lived Germany Turkey in countries neighbouring their 1.2 million 1 in 23 countries of origin. 1 Source: Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre 2 This number excludes Venezuelan asylum-seekers and refugees. 3 When the 480,000 Palestinian refugees registered with UNRWA living in Lebanon are included, this proportion increases to one in five. 4 In addition, Lebanon hosted 480,000 and Jordan 2.3 million Palestine refugees under UNRWA’s mandate. 2 UNHCR > GLOBAL TRENDS 2020 SOLUTIONS 68% 5.4 MILLION ORIGINATED FROM VENEZUELAN JUST FIVE COUNTRIES REFUGEES AND 3.4 MILLION MIGRANTS DISPLACED PEOPLE More than two thirds (68 per cent) RETURNED of all refugees and Venezuelans This figure includes Venezuelan displaced abroad came from just five refugees, migrants and asylum- countries: seekers reported through the 3.4 million displaced people Coordination Platform for Refugees returned to their areas or countries Syrian Arab Republic and Migrants from Venezuela.6 of origin in 2020, including 3.2 6.7 million million internally displaced people and 251,000 refugees. Venezuela5 4.0 million Afghanistan MILLION 2.6 million 1.1 34,400 NEW CLAIMS REFUGEES South Sudan 2.2 million RESETTLED Asylum-seekers submitted 1.1 million Myanmar new claims. The United States of 1.1 million America was the world’s largest 34,400 refugees were resettled in recipient of new individual 2020, one-third of the previous year applications (250,800), followed by (107,800), according to government Germany (102,600), Spain (88,800), statistics. UNHCR submitted 39,500 France (87,700) and Peru (52,600). refugees to States for resettlement. 1 MILLION CHILDREN WERE DEMOGRAPHICS OF PEOPLE WHO HAVE BEEN BORN AS REFUGEES FORCIBLY DISPLACED UNHCR estimates that between 2018 Children account for 30 per cent of the world’s population, but 42 per cent of and 2020, an average of between all forcibly displaced people.7 290,000 and 340,000 children were born into a refugee life per year. 60+ 3% 3% 18-59 25% 27% 12-17 6% 6% 5 This is the number of Venezuelan refugees and Venezuelans displaced abroad. 8% 9% 6 See the Coordination Platform for Refugees and 5-11 Migrants from Venezuela R4V. 7 Sources: Estimation of IDP demographics (IDMC); Palestine refugees under UNRWA’s mandate (UNRWA); Refugees, people in a refugee-like 0-4 6% 6% situation, asylum-seekers and Venezuelans Female Male displaced abroad are based on the available data (UNHCR) and World Population estimates (UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs). DISCLAIMER: figures do not add up to 100 per cent due to rounding UNHCR > GLOBAL TRENDS 2020 3 Statistics for forcibly displaced people and the population of concern to UNHCR The main focus of this report is the analysis of statistical are not covered by UNHCR’s mandate and excludes trends and changes in global forced displacement from other categories such as returnees and non-displaced January to December 2020 among populations for stateless people. whom UNHCR has been entrusted with a responsibility The total population of concern to UNHCR relates to by the international community.8 The data presented are the people UNHCR is mandated to protect and assist. based on information received as of 30 May 2021 unless It includes those who have been forcibly displaced; otherwise indicated. those who have returned home within the previous At the end of 2020, the total number of forcibly year; those who are stateless (most of whom are displaced people was 82.4 million, while the total not forcibly displaced); and other groups to whom population of concern to UNHCR stood at 91.9 million UNHCR has extended its protection or provided people. assistance on a humanitarian basis. The total number of forcibly displaced people These two categorizations are compared graphically encompasses refugees, asylum-seekers, internally below. A detailed breakdown of UNHCR’s population displaced people and Venezuelans displaced abroad. of concern by category and country is provided in It includes refugees and other displaced people who Annex Table 1. Forcibly displaced people Population of concern to UNHCR 82,381,000 91,923,000 Refugees under Includes both refugees and people in refugee-like UNHCR’s mandate 20.7M situations. Used consistently in both categorizations. Palestine refugees under 5.7M Not included in UNHCR’s population of concern. UNRWA’s mandate Asylum-seekers 4.1M Used consistently in both categorizations. Venezuelans 3.9M Used consistently in both categorizations. displaced abroad The biggest difference between the two categorizations is with people who have been internally displaced. When presenting these statistics, UNHCR applies two different sources: IDMC’s IDP statistics collate the total forcibly displaced while those IDPs protected/assisted by UNHCR are included in the Internally total population of concern to UNHCR. Displaced People 48.0M 48.6M The two sources of IDP data vary significantly in certain countries. Globally, (IDPs) for 2020, IDMC report 48.0 million IDPs while UNHCR reports 48.6 million conflict-affected IDPs. While in total UNHCR reports 4.2 million stateless people, 1.2 million are also forcibly displaced from Myanmar. These 1.2 million are only counted as forcibly Stateless people displaced when calculating the total population of concern to UNHCR to avoid 4.2M double counting. Refugee returns 0.25M Only included in UNHCR’s population of concern for a period of 12 months. IDP returns 3.2M Only included in UNHCR’s population of concern for a period of 12 months. Others of concern Only included in UNHCR’s population of concern. to UNHCR 8.3M The figures in this report are based on data reported Finder,9 figures contained in this report should be by governments, non-governmental organizations considered as provisional and subject to change. and UNHCR. Numbers are rounded to the closest Unless otherwise specified, the report does not refer hundred or thousand. As some adjustments may to events occurring after 31 December 2020. appear later in the year in UNHCR’s Refugee Data 8 See the Methodology page of UNHCR’s Refugee Data Finder for a definition of each population group. 9 https://www.unhcr.org/refugee-statistics 4 UNHCR > GLOBAL TRENDS 2020 CHAPTER 1 CHAPTER 1 Global Forced Displacement More than 82 million people worldwide are forcibly displaced While the 1951 Refugee Convention and the Global Compact on Refugees provide the legal framework and tools to respond to displacement, we need much greater political will to address conflicts and persecution that force people to flee in the first place. Filippo Grandi UN High Commissioner for Refugees The year 2020 will be remembered as a year like fewer people than would have been expected in no other. The COVID-19 pandemic has disrupted all non-COVID circumstances, and reflecting how many facets of life, causing millions of deaths around the of those seeking international protection in 2020 world and leading to human suffering, economic became stranded (see Figure 1 by region).10 Similarly, recession, restrictions on human mobility and severe the United Nations estimate that the pandemic may limitations on daily life. have reduced the number of international migrants by around two million globally during the first six months While the full impact of the COVID-19 pandemic of the year. This corresponds to a decrease of around on wider cross-border migration and displacement 27 per cent in the expected number of international globally is not yet clear, UNHCR data shows that migrants from July 2019 to June 2020.11 arrivals of new refugees and asylum-seekers were sharply down in most regions – about 1.5 million Figure 1 | Actual new arrivals of refugees and asylum-seekers versus forecast | 2020 Amer icas Asia and the Pacifi c East and Horn of Africa and Great Lakes Eur ope Middle East and North Afri ca Southern Africa West and Central Afr ica Gra nd Total -100% -80% -60% -40% -20% 0% 20% 40% A negative percentage in the chart means that there were fewer arrivals than forecast. 10 Based on displacement trends observed over the past 20 years, expected forced displacement in 2020 was estimated using a gravity model addressing explicitly the statistical problems of the non-random selection of destination countries by refugees from different countries of origin as well as controlling for the probability of the occurrence of trigger events such as conflict, based on the approaches documented in Echevarria & Gardeazabal, 2016 and Abel et al.
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