Venezuelan Migrants and Refugees in Latin America and the Caribbean Venezuelan Migrants and Refugees in Latin America and the Caribbean

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Venezuelan Migrants and Refugees in Latin America and the Caribbean Venezuelan Migrants and Refugees in Latin America and the Caribbean Venezuelan Migrants and Refugees in SHEET FACT Latin America and the Caribbean A Regional Profile AUGUST 2020 BY DIEGO CHAVES-GONZÁLEZ AND CARLOS ECHEVERRÍA-ESTRADA BOX 1 Executive Summary What Is the Displacement Tracking Matrix? According to the Regional Coordination Platform for The Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) is a system the Response for Venezuelans (R4V), co-led by the for tracking and monitoring displacement and pop- ulation mobility. Through the DTM, the International International Organization for Migration (IOM) and Organization for Migration (IOM) collect data on UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and migrants’ demographics, economic activities, health composed of more than 150 organizations, as of conditions, access to health services, trip details, and challenges encountered while travelling. June 2020, more than 5 million refugees and mi- grants from the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela While the DTM monitors displacement in many had left their country due to the ongoing political world regions, the data presented in this fact sheet and economic crises there, with more than 4 million were collected by IOM to inform United Nations agencies, governments in the region, and nongov- of them migrating to other Latin American and Ca- ernmental actors about this population. ribbean countries. Until 2015, the region had largely been characterized by high levels of emigration, and More information about the DTM instrument and neighboring countries had never experienced mi- the data used in this fact sheet can be found on the DTM website (https://dtm.iom.int) and in the Ap- grant inflows at this scale.1 Since then, receiving pendix. countries have largely maintained an “open-door” approach toward Venezuelans, with significant poli- Given these trends, there is a pressing need for time- cy innovations allowing many to enter, remain on an ly and accurate data on this population’s characteris- interim basis, and receive legal status via existing tics and vulnerabilities. IOM is working to fill this gap visa categories and special regularization programs, by using its Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) to as well as the reception of requests for asylum. How- collect cross-sectoral data via detailed assessments ever, the COVID-19 pandemic that hit the region in across countries in Latin America and the Caribbean. early 2020 has added a new layer of complexity. Re- The DTM collects data that have become a first-hand ceiving countries now face the challenge of manag- source of information and a tool for policy design ing a public-health crisis while also addressing the for host and transit countries to manage Venezuelan needs of displaced Venezuelans and the communi- migrant and refugee flows. During times of COVID, ties in which they live. the DTM will continue informing governments, UN VENEZUELAN MIGRANTS AND REFUGEES IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN VENEZUELAN MIGRANTS AND REFUGEES IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN agencies, and relevant stakeholders by providing what broader than in the first group of countries, data to inform evidence-based decision making. with many stating that they were married or had a partner, or were divorced or separated. In Ecuador, This fact sheet presents a regional profile of Venezu- 74 percent of respondents declared that they were elan migrants and refugees traveling across 11 Latin working, most of them independently and mostly in American and Caribbean countries during 2019 (see the informal economy. Most respondents in Ecuador the Appendix for details). In doing so, this fact sheet reported very limited health insurance coverage sheds light on country-to-country variations in the and an unwillingness to seek assistance to deal with characteristics of these migrants and refugees and stress; they did, however, note that sanitary condi- their experiences as they travel and set up a new life tions in their new country were better than they had in another country. been in Venezuela. This analysis identifies three groups of countries that attract different migrant profiles and in which refu- This analysis identifies three groups gees and migrants describe different living condi- tions and future intentions to travel. The first group of countries that attract different includes Venezuela’s immediate neighbors—Brazil, migrant profiles and in which refugees Colombia, Guyana, and Trinidad and Tobago—where and migrants describe different living respondents tended to report having low education- conditions. al attainment, most having completed only second- ary school. They also tended to be young and single, The final group of destinations are further away in to report more restricted access to health services the Southern Cone—Argentina, Chile, Paraguay, and and mental-health supports, and to express less will- Uruguay—and Costa Rica, where more than 90 per- ingness to ask for assistance with a health problem. cent of respondents expressed their willingness to In Colombia and Trinidad and Tobago, a somewhat stay long term. In Argentina, Paraguay, and Uruguay, larger share of respondents expressed their inten- the proportion of respondents who were age 36 tion to eventually return to Venezuela (17 percent or over was slightly higher (more than 40 percent). and 5 percent, respectively), a pattern that could Across all five countries, respondents reported high suggest pendular migration. Others said they would levels of educational attainment, with approximately move to another destination, frequently mentioning half or more having completed a college or graduate Peru, Ecuador, Argentina, and Chile. However, the degree. The proportion of respondents who said majority in all four countries (and more than 95 per- they were economically active was larger in Argenti- cent of those in Brazil and Guyana) expressed their na and Costa Rica, but more limited in Paraguay and intention to stay in those countries. Uruguay. Whereas in Argentina and Costa Rica, less than one-quarter of respondents described sending The second group of receiving countries—Ecuador resources back to Venezuela, between one-third and and Peru—are nearby but do not immediately bor- roughly half of those in Chile, Paraguay, Uruguay der Venezuela. Respondents in these countries also said they did so; among those who did, most sent tended to be young, but a notable proportion re- cash remittances. ported holding a technical degree or higher (41 per- cent in Ecuador and 35 percent in Peru). Although Across all of the countries in this analysis, respon- more than half of respondents were single, the dents reported holding a variety of migration status- spectrum of relationships they described was some- es, reflecting differences in the profile of migrants MIGRATION POLICY INSTITUTE | 2 MIGRATION POLICY INSTITUTE | 3 VENEZUELAN MIGRANTS AND REFUGEES IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN VENEZUELAN MIGRANTS AND REFUGEES IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN each country attracts as well as the diverse policy ious conditions during their journeys. The COVID-19 instruments countries have designed to manage mi- pandemic that swept into the region in early 2020 gration from Venezuela. Whereas Brazil, Costa Rica, has added to the risks, with potentially fatal conse- Peru, and Trinidad and Tobago had granted a con- quences for refugees and migrants, especially those siderable proportion of respondents humanitarian who are elderly or have chronic health conditions. visas or recognized them as refugees (depending on As of June 2020, the Regional Coordination Platform the country), most respondents in Argentina, Chile, for the Response for Venezuelans (R4V) estimated Guyana, Paraguay, and Uruguay declared that they that 5.1 million Venezuelans were living abroad, 4.3 had entered the country regularly using a tourist million of whom were in other Latin American and visa or were in the process of regularizing their sta- Caribbean countries.2 tus. Ecuador seems to have the largest proportion of irregular migrants of the sampled countries, and Co- Since 2017, the International Organization for Migra- lombia constitutes an outlier with a large share of re- tion (IOM) has recorded both significant increases spondents declaring no particular status. In contrast, in migration from Venezuela to other countries in notable shares of respondents in Argentina, Brazil, the region—particular to Brazil, Ecuador, and Peru Paraguay, and Uruguay described having attained through border crossings along the Andean Re- 3 residency. gion —and shifts in the patterns of movement. Ef- fective policy planning and implementation require These findings have important policy implications governments in the region to continuously monitor for countries across the region, particularly in the these rapidly evolving trends and the characteristics context of the challenges the COVID-19 pandemic of refugees and migrants arriving at their borders. has imposed on Venezuelan migrants, receiving communities, and governments. They suggest, among other things, the regional advantages of con- Effective policy planning and tinuous efforts to regularize refugees and migrants implementation require governments from Venezuela and the need to balance national security considerations with flexibility when design- in the region to continuously monitor ing policies to slow the spread of the virus while these rapidly evolving trends. protecting vulnerable migrants at entry points. For instance, countries may find it beneficial to couple Rich and trustworthy information about the demo- strict
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