Cap and Dividend: Cap and of American Families of American Families

Total Page:16

File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb

Cap and Dividend: Cap and of American Families of American Families RESEARCH INSTITUTE POLITICAL ECONOMY Cap and Dividend: How to Curb Global Warming While Protecting the Incomes Of American Families James K. Boyce & Matthew Riddle November 2007 Gordon Hall 418 North Pleasant Street Amherst, MA 01002 Phone: 413.545.6355 Fax: 413.577.0261 [email protected] www.peri.umass.edu WORKINGPAPER SERIES Number 150 CAP AND DIVIDEND: HOW TO CURB GLOBAL WARMING WHILE PROTECTING THE INCOMES OF AMERICAN FAMILIES James K. Boyce & Matthew Riddle Political Economy Research Institute University of Massachusetts, Amherst November 2007 ABSTRACT This essay examines the distributional effects of and have a regressive impact on income distri- a “cap-and-dividend” policy for reducing carbon bution, since fuel expenditures represent a lar- emission in the United States: a policy that auc- ger fraction of income for lower-income tions carbon permits and rebates the revenue households than for upper-income households. to the public on an equal per capita basis. The The net effect of carbon emission-reduction aim of the policy is to reduce U.S. emissions of policies depends on who gets the money that carbon dioxide, the main pollutant causing households pay in higher prices. We find that a global warming, while at the same time protect- cap-and-dividend policy would have a strongly ing the real incomes of middle-income and progressive net effect. Moreover, the majority of lower-income American families. The number of U.S. households would be net winners in purely permits is set by a statutory cap on carbon monetary terms: that is, their real incomes, af- emissions that gradually diminishes over time. ter paying higher fuel prices and receiving their The sale of carbon permits will generate very dividends, would rise. From the standpoints of large revenues, posing the critical question of both distributional equity and political feasibil- who will get the money. The introduction of car- ity, a cap-and-dividend policy is therefore an bon permits – or, for that matter, any policy to attractive way to curb carbon emissions. s curb emissions – will raise prices of fossil fuels, s Key words: Global warming; fossil fuels; climate JEL codes: H22, H23, Q48, Q52, Q54, Q58 change; carbon permits; cap-and-dividend; cap-and-auction; cap-and-trade. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY FIGURE A: IMPACT ON FAMILY INCOMES OF A $200/TON CARBON CHARGE Policies to curb emissions of carbon dioxide – 0.0% the main cause of global warming – will inevita- bly raise the prices of fossil fuels: coal, oil, and -2.0% natural gas. The resulting price increases will reduce the real incomes of American families, -4.0% striking hardest at those who can afford it least: lower-income households for whom fuel costs -6.0% -5.3% represent a higher fraction of their expenditures. -6.6% Lowest Quntile The political feasibility of U.S. efforts to curb car- -8.0% -7.6% bon emissions may hinge on whether policies Second Quintile -8.8% Third Quintile are designed to protect middle-class and poor -10.0% Fourth Quintile families from these adverse income effects. -10.2% Highest Quintile -12.0% A “cap-and-dividend” policy offers a simple and Source: Calculated from Table 7. practical way to do this. The policy would auction carbon permits – rather than giving them free-of- charge to historic polluters – and then return all This paper calculates the net effects of a cap- or most of the revenue to American families on and-dividend policy on income distribution in the an equal per person basis. Families who con- United States. We estimate that a permit price of sume lower-than-average amounts of fossil fuels $200 per ton of carbon would reduce U.S. emis- come out ahead, receiving more in dividends sions by approximately seven percent. The re- than they pay in higher prices. Those who con- sulting increases in the prices of fossil fuels, and sume more-than-average amounts pay more. in the prices of goods and services produced with them, would raise the cost of living of the The policy has three basic steps: median American family by $1,570 per year. The • First, U.S. carbon emissions are capped at a price increases would represent a larger per- level that gradually declines over time. One centage of family income in poor households widely discussed target is to reduce emis- than in more affluent households (see Figure A). sions 80% below their current level by the FIGURE B: NET IMPACT ON FAMILY year 2050. INCOMES OF A CAP-AND-DIVIDEND POLICY • Second, based on the cap in a given year, 16.0% permits are auctioned to firms that bring 14.0% 14.8% Lowest Quintile fossil carbon into the economy (whether Second Quintile 12.0% through domestic extraction or imports). The Third Quintile 10.0% supply of permits in a given year is fixed by Fourth Quintile 8.0% the cap; their price depends on the demand Highest Qunitile for them. 6.0% 3.9% • Third, revenue from the sale of permits is 4.0% deposited into a trust fund and paid out 2.0% 0.8% equally to every woman, man, and child in 0.0% the country. In addition, some fraction of -2.0% -0.9% -2.4% the revenue initially may be earmarked for -4.0% other uses, such as transitional adjustment Source: Calculated from Table 9. assistance. CAP & DIVIDEND / EXECUTIVE SUMMARY / PAGE II The revenue from the sale of carbon permits Withholding carbon revenues beyond this would amount to roughly $200 billion per year. threshold would push the net beneficiary share If this revenue is recycled to the public equally, of the population below half. the majority of households receive more in divi- A cap-and-dividend policy will assert the princi- dends than they pay as a result of higher fossil ple of common ownership of nature’s wealth: fuel prices. The net impact ranges from a 14.8% the right to benefit from our share of the Earth’s income gain for the poorest 20% of families capacity to absorb carbon emissions is allo- (and a 24% gain for the poorest 10%) to a 2.4% cated equally to all Americans. It will protect the loss for richest 20% (see Figure B). real incomes of the majority of Americans while Initially earmarking a modest fraction of the curbing global warming and hastening the U.S. carbon revenues for other uses, such as transi- economy’s transition towards the energy tional adjustment assistance, could further en- sources of the future. From the standpoints of hance the appeal of the cap-and-dividend policy. both distributional equity and political feasibility, Up to 10% of the carbon revenues can be dedi- a cap-and-dividend policy is therefore an attrac- cated to other uses while maintaining positive tive way to curb carbon emissions. s net benefits for roughly 50% of households. I. INTRODUCTION FIGURE 1A: CARBON EMISSIONS OF THE U.S, CHINA, AND EU-15, 1987-20051 The time is coming when the United States ( MILLION METRIC TONS) government will enact policies to curb emissions 1800 of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases, 1600 joining the efforts of other nations to confront the 1400 historic challenge of global warming. When this happens, a key question – from the standpoints 1200 of both fairness and political feasibility – will be 1000 how to protect the incomes of American families. 800 600 The Clinton administration signed the 1997 400 EU Kyoto Protocol, which envisioned a 7% cut in China 200 U.S. carbon emissions from their 1990 level by US the year 2012. But the Senate refused to ratify 0 7 3 98 989 991 99 995 997 001 003 005 the agreement, and when the government of 1 1 1 1 1 1 1999 2 2 2 George W. Bush came to power it announced it Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration (2007, Table H.1). had “no interest” in the accord. Political winds in the country are now shifting. At FIGURE 1B: CARBON EMISSIONS PER CAPITA OF THE U.S, CHINA, AND EU-15, 1987-2005 the Group of Eight summit meeting in Germany ( MILLION METRIC TONS) in June 2007, the Bush administration agreed to 6.0 re-enter international climate negotiations and to “seriously consider” a European plan to cut 5.0 greenhouse gas emissions in half by 2050. A US legislative proposal unveiled in August 2007 by 4.0 China U.S. Senators Joseph Lieberman and John War- EU 3.0 ner goes further, calling for a 70% reduction by 2050. It now seems possible, even likely, that 2.0 the U.S. will adopt a serious emissions-reduction policy early in the post-Bush administration. 1.0 Any policy to curb carbon emissions will raise 0.0 8 0 2 4 prices of fossil fuels – coal, oil, and natural gas – 99 00 00 00 1997 1 1999 2 2001 2 2003 2 2005 and the prices of other goods and services in Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration (2007, Table H.1). proportion to the use of fossil fuels in supplying them. These price increases will reduce the real incomes of Americans in general, and low-income II. THE CARBON ECONOMY and middle-class American households in par- ticular. But for every dollar paid by consumers in The United States is the world’s top emitter higher prices, someone else receives a dollar in of carbon dioxide (CO2), the most important additional income. Recycling this money to the greenhouse gas. The burning of fossil fuels in public would protect real incomes of the majority the U.S.
Recommended publications
  • The Too Polite Revolution
    THE TOO POLITE REVOLUTION Why the Recent Campaign to Pass Comprehensive Climate Legislation in the United States Failed Petra Bartosiewicz & Marissa Miley January 2013 Prepared for the Symposium on THE POLITICS OF AMERICA’S FIGHT AGAINST GLOBAL WARMING Co-sponsored by the Columbia School of Journalism and the Scholars Strategy Network February 14, 2013 4-6 pm Tsai Auditorium, Harvard University CONTENTS Introduction..............................................................................................3 Opportunity of a Generation, or Was It?.................................................10 USCAP – The Ultimate Compromise.....................................................19 From Earth Day to Inside the Beltway....................................................28 Taking the House.....................................................................................38 Struggle in the Senate..............................................................................52 Grassroots vs. Big Green.........................................................................71 Conclusion...............................................................................................78 2 INTRODUCTION Passage of an economy-wide cap on greenhouse gas emissions has been one of the great, unrealized ambitions of the environmental movement of this generation. With the effects of global warming already in our midst, and environmental catastrophe very much a threat in this century, curbing man-made emissions of carbon dioxide, the gas that most significantly
    [Show full text]
  • The Compendium
    The Compendium The Global Economy | Environment, Development and Globalisation CEMUS Education/Uppsala Centre for Sustainable Development • Fall Semester 2012 Documentary Online Video & lecture Podcast WikiArticle Article Book ★ Alternative/Heterodox Economics http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Heterodox_economics Buddhist Economics: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Buddhist_economics Evolutionary Economics: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Evolutionary_economics Thermoeconomics: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bioeconomics_(biophysical) Econophysics: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Econophysics Institutional Economics: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Institutional_economics Progressive Utilization Theory: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Progressive_utilization_theory ★ E.F. Schumacher (1973). Small is Beautiful [Available at UU] ★ Steve Keen (2004). Debunking Economics – The Naked Emperor of the Social Sciences [Interview 2011, 24min at: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7F2FKxxN_IE&feature=plcp] [Available at CEMUS] Behavioral Economics http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Behavioral_economics Andrew Oswald LSE: Herd behaviour and keeping up with the joneses (2011, 75min) http://www2.lse.ac.uk/newsAndMedia/videoAndAudio/channels/publicLecturesAndEvents/player.aspx?id=1270 Paul Dolan LSE: behavioural economics and human happiness (2011, 71min) http://www2.lse.ac.uk/newsAndMedia/videoAndAudio/channels/publicLecturesAndEvents/player.aspx?id=878 Freakonomics (Docu 2010, 90min) Full movie at: http://www.movie2k.to/Freakonomics-watch-movie-399638.html Steven Levitt:
    [Show full text]
  • Media Update Fall 2015
    MEDIA UPDATE FALL 2015 An overview of media generated by CCL Volunteers July 1 -October 29, 2015 Every day, Citizens’ Climate Lobby volunteers generate media in newspapers and online publications throughout the United States. How much media? Quite a lot. Since our last update in June, CCL volunteers have published 928 letters to the editor, 136 op-eds and generated 19 editorials. The charts below illustrate the growth in media our volunteers are generating. 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 YTD 380 2,343 2,338 311 251 1267 537 87 39 131 Letters to the Editor Op-eds 50 46 41 228 121 181 22 58 12 Editorials Articles Online This report highlights three of our media campaigns over the last 4 months: 1. Media generated on the climate change resolution introduced by Rep. Chris Gibson and 10 other Republicans on Sept. 17. 2. Publication of op-ed from CCL Executive Director Mark Reynolds, Everything you think you know about Republicans and climate change is wrong. 3. Publication of op-ed co-authored by Mark Reynolds and former Congressman Bob Inglis (R-SC), There’s a better response to EPA climate rules besides ‘Just say no.’ EDITORIAL ENDORSEMENT Many of our 305 CCL chapters have met with the editorial boards of their local newspapers to seek endorsements for our Carbon Fee and Dividend proposal. They develop a relationship with a member of the editorial board and from time to time pitch our media packets whenever climate change is in the news. When the Gibson resolution was introduced in the House, we prepared a media packet that our volunteers pitched to local newspapers.
    [Show full text]
  • Public Comments
    Cost and Benefit Analysis of Policies to Reduce Greenhouse Gas Emissions in Vermont Comments to RFF Contents Allen, Ted ...................................................................................................................................................... 5 Montpelier ................................................................................................................................................ 5 Anderson, Leslie ............................................................................................................................................ 5 Propane Gas Association of New England ................................................................................................ 5 Barlow, Daniel ............................................................................................................................................... 7 Vermont Business for Social Responsibility [Public Policy Manager] ....................................................... 7 Barstow, Rick ................................................................................................................................................. 8 Beck, Scott ..................................................................................................................................................... 8 Representative, Caledonia – 3 .................................................................................................................. 8 Burde, James ................................................................................................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • American Enterprise Institute to Tax Or Not to Tax: Senators Sheldon Whitehouse and Brian Schatz Present Their American Opportun
    AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE TO TAX OR NOT TO TAX: SENATORS SHELDON WHITEHOUSE AND BRIAN SCHATZ PRESENT THEIR AMERICAN OPPORTUNITY CARBON FEE ACT INTRODUCTION: ARTHUR C. BROOKS, AEI PRESENTATION: PROPOSAL FOR A NEW CARBON TAX SHELDON WHITEHOUSE, US SENATE (D-RI) BRIAN SCHATZ, US SENATE (D-HI) CONVERSATION: TO TAX OR NOT TO TAX? JERRY TAYLOR, NISKANEN CENTER BENJAMIN ZYCHER, AEI MODERATOR: KEVIN HASSETT, AEI 2:30 PM – 4:00 PM WEDNESDAY, JUNE 10, 2015 EVENT PAGE: http://www.aei.org/events/to-tax-or-not-to-tax-sen-sheldon- whitehouse-presents-his-american-opportunity-carbon-fee-act/ TRANSCRIPT PROVIDED BY DC TRANSCRIPTION – WWW.DCTMR.COM ARTHUR BROOKS: Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. Please take your seats. Good afternoon. Please take your seats. Please have a seat in the back, if you can find a seat. Good afternoon. I’m Arthur Brooks, president of the American Enterprise Institute, and I’m delighted to welcome all of you to this event today entitled “To Tax or Not to Tax.” This is the think-tank version of Shakespeare, clearly, and it features our two keynote speakers, Senators Whitehouse from Rhode Island and Schatz from Hawaii, which we’re very much looking forward to. These men are no strangers to most of you, but I’ll give you a little bit of their background nonetheless. Senator Sheldon Whitehouse was first elected in 2007 and currently serves as the ranking member of the Judiciary Subcommittee on Crime and Terrorism, and Environment and Public Work Subcommittee on Fisheries, Water, and Wildlife. Before his election to the Senate, Senator Whitehouse was the attorney general of Rhode Island, the U.S.
    [Show full text]
  • Carbon Capping: a Citizen's Guide
    CARBON CAPPING CARBON CAPPING A Citizen’s Guide By Peter Barnes Foreword by Bill McKibben T o m a l e sA B Citizenay Ins’sti tGuideute • 2 0 0 7 1 CARBON CAPPING Foreword | Bill McKibben Solving the climate crisis is up to us If you’re reading this guide, you don’t need to be told we face a planetary crisis. You’ve heard the warnings. You know there’s no time to lose. You also know that, while a single citizen can’t stop global warming, an army of citizens can. Acting together, we can make our government respond with solutions that are commensurate with the crisis. Fortunately, millions of Americans are now demanding that all levels of government — local, state and federal — take immediate and effective action to cut greenhouse gas emissions. What’s more, many thousands are participating in discussions about specific ways to get the job done. They’re exploring climate policy options and pushing politicians to act. This ground- swell has made it a near-certainty that the next President and Congress — the ones who take office in 2009 — will finally address the climate crisis at the national level. If bad climate But there’s a big problem. Despite countless conferences and think policies are tank reports, there’s no broad consensus on what policies will actually adopted, years work. Hundreds of proposals are floating about, and many of them aren’t could be lost good or sufficient. It’s quite possible that bad climate policies will be adopted, and that more years will then be lost before real emission before emission reductions occur.
    [Show full text]
  • Carbon Pricing 101
    Carbon Pricing 101 Strategies to put a price on global warming pollution Carbon Pricing 101 Strategies to put a price on global warming pollution Written by J. David Lippeatt, Frontier Group Andrea McGimsey, Environment America Policy and Research Center Matt Casale, U.S. PIRG Education Fund April 2021 Acknowledgments The authors wish to thank Susan Rakov, Tony Dutzik, James Horrox and Adrian Pforzheimer of Frontier Group for editorial support and Linus Lu, formerly of Frontier Group, for his contributions to this project. The authors also thank Professor Henry D. Jacoby, Co-Director of the MIT Joint Program on the Science and Policy of Global Change and Professor Emeritus at the Sloan School of Management at MIT, as well as Peter Vail Marsters, researcher and carbon tax expert at the Columbia University SIPA Center on Global Energy Policy, for their careful review of and improvements to the paper. The authors bear responsibility for any factual errors. Policy recommendations are those of Environment America Research & Policy Center and U.S. PIRG Education Fund. The views expressed in this report are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of our funders or those who provided review. 2021 Environment America Research & Policy Center and U.S. PIRG Education Fund. Some Rights Reserved. This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution Non-Commercial No Derivatives 3.0 Unported License. To view the terms of this license, visit creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0. Environment America Research & Policy Center is a 501(c)(3) organization. We are dedicated to protecting our air, water and open spaces.
    [Show full text]
  • Who Bears the Brunt? Distributional Effects of Climate Change Mitigation Policies
    View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by Institutional Repository of the Freie Universität Berlin MILENA B ÜCHS University of Southampton N I C H O L A S B ARDSLEY University of Reading SEBASTIAN D UWE Free University Berlin Who bears the brunt? Distributional effects of climate change mitigation policies Abstract Climate change scholars generally urge that CO2 emissions need to be cut rapidly if we are to avoid dangerous risks of climate change. However, climate change mitigation policies are widely perceived to have regres- sive effects – that is, putting a higher financial burden as a proportion of household income on poor than on rich households. This is one of several major barriers to the adoption of effective mitigation policies. They would also have considerable social justice implications requiring significant welfare state responses. We assess the claim that climate change policies have regressive effects by comparing different types of mitigation poli- cies. We will argue that many of these are indeed likely to have regressive distributional implications but that there are several policy options to counteract regressive effects. Key words: emissions, environment, fairness, inequality, taxation Introduction There is long-standing interest in the distributional effects of climate change mitigation policies in the literatures on climate and energy policy, and economics. Hitherto, though, this debate has not impacted much on mainstream social policy debates (however, see Gough et al., 2008). This needs to change because climate policy will have an imme- diate impact on social policy through various channels, in particular © The Author(s), 2011.
    [Show full text]
  • Distributional Effects of Climate Change Mitigation Policies
    MILENA B ÜCHS University of Southampton N I C H O L A S B ARDSLEY University of Reading SEBASTIAN D UWE Free University Berlin Who bears the brunt? Distributional effects of climate change mitigation policies Abstract Climate change scholars generally urge that CO2 emissions need to be cut rapidly if we are to avoid dangerous risks of climate change. However, climate change mitigation policies are widely perceived to have regres- sive effects – that is, putting a higher financial burden as a proportion of household income on poor than on rich households. This is one of several major barriers to the adoption of effective mitigation policies. They would also have considerable social justice implications requiring significant welfare state responses. We assess the claim that climate change policies have regressive effects by comparing different types of mitigation poli- cies. We will argue that many of these are indeed likely to have regressive distributional implications but that there are several policy options to counteract regressive effects. Key words: emissions, environment, fairness, inequality, taxation Introduction There is long-standing interest in the distributional effects of climate change mitigation policies in the literatures on climate and energy policy, and economics. Hitherto, though, this debate has not impacted much on mainstream social policy debates (however, see Gough et al., 2008). This needs to change because climate policy will have an imme- diate impact on social policy through various channels, in particular © The Author(s), 2011. Reprints and permissions: http://www.sagepub.co.uk/journalsPermissions.nav Critical Social Policy, 0261-0183 101; Vol. 31(2): 285–307; 396036 10.1177/0261018310396036 http://csp.sagepub.com 285 Downloaded from csp.sagepub.com at Freie Universitaet Berlin on April 24, 2015 286 CRITICAL SOCIAL POLICY 31(2) redistribution effects.
    [Show full text]
  • HOW to DESIGN CARBON DIVIDENDS Donald Marron and Elaine Maag December 12, 2018 ABSTRACT
    HOW TO DESIGN CARBON DIVIDENDS Donald Marron and Elaine Maag December 12, 2018 ABSTRACT A robust carbon tax would generate considerable revenue. Some carbon tax advocates have suggested returning those revenues to Americans through direct payments, often called carbon dividends. We examine how to design these dividends considering two, sometimes conflicting, principles. Carbon dividends can be viewed as shared income from a communal property right, much as Alaskans share in income from the state’s oil resources. Dividends can also be viewed as rebating the carbon tax back to consumers. These views often have different implications for designing carbon dividends. Political and practical considerations are also important. With that in mind, we propose a carbon dividend design that combines beneficial features from both the communal property and tax rebate views. ABOUT THE TAX POLICY CENTER The Urban-Brookings Tax Policy Center aims to provide independent analyses of current and longer-term tax issues and to communicate its analyses to the public and to policymakers in a timely and accessible manner. The Center combines top national experts in tax, expenditure, budget policy, and microsimulation modeling to concentrate on four overarching areas of tax policy that are critical to future debate. Copyright © 2018. Tax Policy Center. Permission is granted for reproduction of this file, with attribution to the Urban- Brookings Tax Policy Center. TAX POLICY CENTER | URBAN INSTITUTE & BROOKINGS INSTITUTION II CONTENTS ABSTRACT II CONTENTS III ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
    [Show full text]
  • Cap and Trade 101 a Climate Policy Primer
    September 2008 edition Cap and Trade 101 A Climate Policy Primer By Alan Durning with Anna Fahey, Eric de Place, and Clark Williams-Derry Sightline Report s Cap and Trade 101 s September 2008 edition 2 SIGHTLINE INSTITUTE is a not-for-profit research and communication center—a think tank—based in Seattle. Founded in 1993 by Alan Durning, Sightline’s mission is to bring about sustainability, a healthy, lasting prosperity grounded in place. Our focus is Cascadia, or the Pacific Northwest. Alan Durning is executive director; Anna Fahey is communications strategist; Eric de Place is senior researcher; and Clark Williams-Derry is research director. You can learn more about Sightline at www.sightline.org and at Sightline’s blog, daily.sightline.org/daily_score. Sightline Institute 1402 Third Avenue, Suite 500 Seattle, Washington 98101 Sightline Report s Cap and Trade 101 s September 2008 edition 3 Contents SUMMARY . 4 INTRODUCTION . 6 Why do we need cap and trade? . 6 What does “cap and trade” mean? . 6 How does cap and trade work? . 7 In brief: Why cap and trade?. 8 What’s the status of cap and trade elsewhere? . 8 What are the main design variables in a cap-and-trade program? . 10 How to tell whether a cap-and-trade program is well designed . 10 What do we mean by “fairness”? . 11 What cap-and-trade design works best? . 11 SCOPE: COMPREHENSIVE . 12 POINT OF REGULATION: UPSTREAM . 12 What about offsets? . 13 ALLOCATION: AUCTION . 14 Special cases? Electric utilities, exporters, transition. 16 How to auction . 17 REVENUE: BUILT-IN PROTECTIONS FOR WORKING FAMILIES .
    [Show full text]
  • A Distributional Analysis of a Carbon Tax and Dividend in the United States
    A Distributional Analysis of a Carbon Tax and Dividend in the United States April 2017 Anders Fremstad1 and Mark Paul2 Abstract Although the vast majority of economists view a carbon tax as an efficient mechanism to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, the policy does not enjoy widespread public support. One reason for this is that economists have failed to adequately address the policy’s effect on household budgets. This paper models the distributional impacts of placing a $49 tax per ton on carbon in the United States. We combine carbon emissions data from the Energy Information Agency with the Input-Output tables from the Bureau of Economic Analysis to calculate the carbon intensity of each industry and commodity. We then analyze data from the Consumer Expenditure Survey to estimate how households would be affected by placing a price on carbon. A carbon tax would disproportionately burden low-income households, and using the carbon tax revenue to reduce taxes on labor leaves 59 percent of people worse off, including 75 percent of those in the bottom half of the income distribution. On the other hand, equal per capita dividends protect the purchasing power of 61 percent of all individuals, including 89 percent of those in the bottom half of the distribution. Many economists have dismissed a tax-and-dividend scheme on efficiency grounds, but we show that potential macroeconomic effects of tax cuts do little to protect the purchasing power of the poor. In an age of increasing inequality, we argue that providing all Americans with equal rebates is the most fair and politically-feasible policy.
    [Show full text]