The Environmental in Security

Securitization Theory and Russian Environmental Security Policy

Erdem Lamazhapov

Master Thesis Peace and Conflict Studies 45 credits

Department of Political Science Faculty of Social Sciences

UNIVERSITY OF OSLO

June 2020

Word Count: 34,939 The Environmental in Security: Securitization Theory and Russian Environmental Security Policy

2020

The Environmental in Security: Securitization Theory and Russian Environmental Security Policy

Erdem Lamazhapov http://www.duo.uio.no/

Trykk: Fridtjof Nansens Instituttet

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Abstract

Environmental security is one of the non-military aspects of security in international security studies, making it both misunderstood and mysterious in its ideational content. This thesis presents an application of the securitization theory in the context of securitization of the environment in Russia. Applying quantitative document stream and relative power methods and qualitative methods of discourse analysis, I draw upon a database of Russian legal and administrative documents from 1987 to 2019. Finding the core assumptions of the securitization theory correct, this thesis challenges it in regards to the possibility of distinction that security is an area beyond politics, whereas safety is a part of normal politics. Providing insight into the intentions and moves of key securitizing actors, as well as referent objects of security, this thesis concentrates on both international and domestic aspects of environmental securitization in Russia. Designed as an embedded mixed-methods case study, the thesis confirms its findings in subunit analysis of securitization of the environment by Russia during the NATO Operation Allied Force and in the Arctic. The thesis finds that it is difficult to characterize security as being beyond politics, as well as desecuritization in the Russian context is improbable. Concluding the discussion of securitization in the Russian context, the thesis reflects on the role of security and language in identity construction.

Acknowledgements

First and foremost, I am gratefully indebted to Research Professor Elana Wilson Rowe of the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs for her invaluable guidance and wisdom, as well as great patience as a mentor. Steering me in the creative process, she has always kept the metaphorical doors of her office open even in these troubled times.

I would also like to thank everyone at the Fridtjof Nansen Institute, especially my academic contact Research Director Pål Wilter Skedsmo and Research Professor Arild Moe, whose academic friendship was extremely valuable for this thesis.

Finally, I feel eternal gratitude to my family, both in health and in memory, without whose unconditional support this accomplishment would have been impossible.

List of Abbreviations

AMEC Arctic Military Environmental Cooperation CIS Commonwealth of Independent States CPSU Communist Party of the Soviet Union CSTO Collective Security Treaty Organization EAEC Eurasian Economic Commission EAEU Eurasian Economic Union ECHR European Court of Human Rights EMERCOM Ministry of the Russian Federation for Affairs for Civil Defense, Emergencies and Elimination of Consequences of Natural Disasters ENMOD Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques EurAsEC Eurasian Economic Community FRY Federal Republic of Yugoslavia GKChP State Committee on the State of Emergency Goskomprirody / State Committee of the Russian Federation for Environmental Goskomecology Protection Goskomsever State Committee of the Russian Federation for Northern Affairs GOST Inter-State Standard ICTY International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991 ISS International Security Studies MNR Ministry of Natural Resources NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization OAF Operation Allied Force OSCE Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe RSFSR Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic SCO Shanghai Cooperation Organization SCRF Security Council of Russian Federation SOZD Legislation Support System SSR Soviet Socialist Republic

UN United Nations U.N. GAOR United Nations General Assembly Official Records US United States of America USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics WTO Warsaw Treaty Organization

VII

Table of Contents

1 Introduction ...... 1 2 Securitization Theory and the Environment ...... 3 2.1 The Meaning of Environmental Security ...... 3 2.1.1 The Copenhagen School as a Theoretical Basis ...... 6 2.1.2 Philosophical Foundations of the Securitization Theory ...... 7 2.1.3 Modifications of the Classical Securitization Theory ...... 9 2.2 Towards Agent-relative Analysis of Security ...... 11 2.3 Summary ...... 17 3 Methodology/Methods ...... 18 3.1 Research Design ...... 18 3.1.1 Case Study as Research Design ...... 18 3.1.2 Embedded Case Study as Internal Architecture ...... 19 3.1.3 Data Collection ...... 21 3.2 Methods ...... 22 3.2.1 Quantitative Methods ...... 22 3.2.2 Qualitative Methods ...... 24 3.3 Summary ...... 26 4 Security in Russia ...... 27 4.1 The Rise of the Environmental Security in Russia ...... 29 4.1.1 The Securitizing Move ...... 33 4.1.2 Audience Acceptance ...... 36 4.2 Summary ...... 38 5 Environmental Security in Russian Foreign Policy ...... 40 5.1 Securitization of Environment: Systematic Picture ...... 40 5.1.1 Data ...... 41 5.1.2 Referent Object: What Kind of Security? ...... 43 5.1.3 Audiences: Who With? ...... 44 5.1.4 Analysis ...... 45 5.2 Russian Federation and Environmental Securitization ...... 47 5.2.1 Securitizing move ...... 48 5.3 Conclusion ...... 54

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6 Environmental Security Begins at Home ...... 56 6.1 Preliminary Large-N Analysis ...... 57 6.1.1 Burstiness Analysis ...... 59 6.1.2 Who is the Securitizing Actor? What is the Referent Object? ...... 60 6.1.3 Zoom in on the 1990s: The Formative Decade ...... 62 6.1.4 Audience Acceptance ...... 64 6.2 Part 2: Discourse Analysis ...... 65 6.2.1 Changing Tides: the Last of the USSR ...... 65 6.2.2 Securitization through the Legislative – the Creative Period ...... 66 6.2.3 Silent 2000: Desecuritization or Institutionalized Security? ...... 73 6.3 Summary ...... 76 7 Environmental Security Localized ...... 78 7.1 Yugoslavia ...... 79 7.2 The Arctic ...... 83 7.3 Summary ...... 92 8 Conclusion ...... 93 Bibliography ...... 97 Appendix I. Russian Environmental Services Structure (1988-2004) ...... 1

Table 1. Different Perspectives in International Security Studies ...... 5 Table 2. Bilingual Semantic Matrix for Safety and Security in Russian and English ...... 16 Figure 1. Embedded Case Study Design ...... 21 Figure 2. Environmental Security Mentions in Pravda Stories ...... 37 Figure 3. Documents by Macrocategory (Stacked) ...... 42 Figure 4. Types of Referent Objects (not including GOST, stacked) ...... 43 Figure 5. Russian International Treaties by Country Groups (stacked) ...... 44 Table 3. Burstiness Values for Environmental Security in International Treaties, 1990-2000 46 Figure 6. Relative Power of Environmental Security Relative to Selected Types of Security 47 Figure 7. Total Mentions of Environmental Security per Year ...... 58 Figure 8. Relative Power of Environmental Security as Percentage of Total Safety/Security Mentions ...... 59 Table 4. Burstiness Values for Environmental Security, 1989-2000 ...... 59 Figure 9. Mentions of Environmental Security by the President and the Legislative ...... 61 Figure 10. Mentions of Environmental Security in Acts of the Government and the Specialized Environmental Ministries (see Appendix I) ...... 61 Table 5. Classification of Documents by Referent Objects and Logic of Discourse ...... 62 Figure 11. Federal Acts by Referent Object ...... 64 Figure 12. Mentions of Environmental Security in Highest Courts ...... 65 Table 6. Yearly Budgets of the Federal Ecological Fund, 1995-2000 ...... 68 Table 7. Yearly Expenditures on the Federal Target Program "Environmental Security of Russia" ...... 70 Figure 13. Documents on Environmental Security in the Arctic, Cumulative, 1990-2019. .... 84

1 Introduction

Security is an overriding priority for all nations. It is also fundamental for both disarmament and development. Security consists of not only military, but also political, economic, social, humanitarian and human rights and ecological aspects.

— Report of the International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development, 1987 Russia’s former minister for environmental protection Viktor Danilov-Danilian compared human civilization to a venture enterprise, a high-risk, high-reward endeavor. Protected by the civilizational armor of technology, humans minimized the threats from natural disasters and pandemics. During the birth of the modern nation-state, political, economic, and social primary risks were primary for humans. As the modern concept of security developed, people were concerned with intentional threats, posed by other humans. In the XX century, however, humanity maxed out on the permissible disturbance of the ecosystem, which led to ever- increasing environmental risk, an insecurity, which became unfamiliar to humans. This served as the impetus for generating the concept of environmental security – an ideal state of affairs, in which environmental risks are minimized. Nevertheless, heuristically, security and threat construction rely upon intentionality of threats. Environmental security threats, on the other hand, do not have to be intentional – the worst kinds of environmental disasters were unintentional and, therefore, ensuring environmental security requires a different state response.

The Copenhagen School securitization theory is one of the most influential theories that expand security beyond the military sector in international security studies, allowing to conceptualize security in terms of a variety of referent objects: state, environment, humans. Based upon advancement in the philosophy of language, it provided a consistent theoretical framework for analyzing both military and non-military aspects of security, which is, to its theorists, a realm beyond the political process. Security in Copenhagen School is contradistinguished not only with threat or insecurity, but also with safety, which is a part of normal politics; a distinction rooted in English semantics.

With the goal to reveal the “environmental” component in security, this thesis shall critically assess the Copenhagen theory in its application to the environment, using the case of securitization of the environment in Russia. Towards this end, it is guided by the following interlinked research questions – one conceptual, the other empirical:

1. How does the distinction between security and safety affect the criteria for deciding whether an event is an instance of securitization, and the processes of threat construction, securitization, and desecuritization?

2. How did the environment become securitized in Russia, where did this securitization originate from, what kind of threats were used, and what role does the securitization play in the process of identity construction?

Answering the conceptual question requires resolving the analytical one, i.e. adjudicating whether Russian appellation to environmental security was a valid instance of securitization and scrutinizing its development.

This thesis is organized into eight chapters. Chapter 2 will consider the concept of environmental security, paying special attention to how it is presented in the Copenhagen School. Chapter 3 will describe the methods employed in this study: namely, quantitative methods employed in the first halves of Chapters 5 and 6, and discourse analysis employed in Chapters 4-7. Chapter 4 will examine the concept of security in Russia, as well as the first phase of development of environmental security. Chapter 5 revisits environmental security in the Russian foreign policy image, examining where it originated and how it spread internationally (from Russia, to Russia or both). Chapter 6 examines environmental security in the Russian domestic discourse in the process of domestic identity construction. Chapter 7 will summarize these findings, applying them to two concise cases: the securitization of the environment during the NATO bombings of Yugoslavia and in the securitization of the environment of the Russian Arctic. Finally, Chapter 8 will conclude this thesis, appraising the application of the securitization theory within the environmental sector to a non-Anglophone country with an independent security tradition. As the thesis shows, I find that Russian use of environmental security, while a case of securitization, is not an extraordinary tool beyond politics. These findings will be further discussed in the conclusion.

2 Securitization Theory and the Environment

Environmental security is one of those poisonous concepts, which cloud the mind.

— Wolfgang Sachs

2.1 The Meaning of Environmental Security

There is no single definition of environmental security, neither among security theorists nor among security practitioners. A lot of the criticism wielded against the study of environmental security focuses on the fact that there is little agreement on what the term actually means. In fact, it is often claimed that even the policy practitioners themselves do not completely understand the full implications of the term as well. Brinchuk (2003), for example, finds no difference between environmental protection and environmental security and bemoans application of such a vague term.

Thus, finding a definition of environmental security is an important task that needs to be accomplished in the course of this inquiry. It is interesting to note that the philosophical foundation of the Copenhagen theory, namely Austinian philosophy, finds it is pointless to analyze the meaning of any term in isolation from its contextuality. In an essay titled The Meaning of a Word, Austin (1979) argues against “the supposed ideal language” and argues that “actual language” has little respect for our semantical assumptions. The meaning is contained in a vague implicit semantic convention, rather than a rigid nuclear nominalist definition. My definition, therefore, will go beyond the textbook definitions, aspiring to be a living one, based upon theory and practice of environmental security lifted from the Russian empirical material.

Semantically, the term environmental security is a combination of two ontologically distinct terms, environment and security (Barnett, 2001, p. 1). Thus, the definition of environmental security needs to cover two distinct bases: in what way environmental security refers to the environment, and in what way it constitutes security. Grasping the nebulous relationship between these two is a task that rests on the shoulders of the security analyst. Generally speaking, the evolution of modern security studies has resulted in focusing on aspects of security, rather than on preoccupying with defining the term as a noumenon. These aspects

3 include: actor (who secures?), referent object (whose security?), functional scope (security where?), threats (security from what?), and strategy (security by what means?) (Buzan & Hansen, 2009, p. 9-10).

From the point of view of traditional security scholars, environmental security is somewhat of an oxymoron. “Traditional” security studies is an extremely broad term, as it includes schools that fall on different sides of both the rationalism/reflectivism debate and utilizes both positivist and post-positivist epistemologies. As such, the distinction between traditional and unconventional security studies is only useful in terms of the traditionalist- critical debate. Although heterogeneous in character, traditional security analysts generally place the emphasis on systemic issues and explain the behavior of collectivities as primary units of analysis. As such, security is concerned only with power politics, which is clearly differentiated from other state interest areas, including economics or the environment. Besides this shared limitation of the functional scope of security to the military and shared interest in the collectivities as a unit of analysis, “traditional” schools of security studies cannot be said to constitute a coherent group, spanning from realist and neorealist approaches to liberal and constructivist ones.

A second heterogeneous group that finds itself on the other side of the traditionalist- critical debate is critical security studies. Although there does not exist clear boundaries of the critical security studies, this group can be loosely characterized by its interest in the individual or the global community as the referent object of security, as well as the way security discourses play a role in social construction (Buzan & Hansen, 2009, pp. 35-37). From the epistemological perspective, this group is mostly post-positivist, thus Critical security approaches often add a normative dimension to security practices, speculating about how environmental security should be, rather than about how it is practiced (Floyd & Matthew, pp. 22).

Many of the research groups, however, fall into neither category. Such is, for example, the Copenhagen School, which posits itself “explicitly… as a middle position between traditionalist state-centrism on the one hand and equally traditional peace research’s and critical security studies’ calls for ‘individual’ or ‘global security’ on the other” (Buzan & Hansen, 2009, p. 213). Securitization theory builds upon John L. Austin’s and Searle’s philosophical contributions in the form of the speech act theory, applying it to international security studies. Security, in this sense, is understood as a performative utterance, a speech act that takes place under certain “felicity conditions” in a process called securitization. The Copenhagen School

hypothesizes that security is therefore an epipolitical phenomenon that transcends the rules of the political game and lifts political issues onto a qualitatively new level, outside the realm of normalcy. This type of move is otherwise known as a securitizing move, whereas the issue is presented as if it were beyond the rules of the political game by virtue of its importance. An issue being securitized, therefore, is positioned in terms of an existential threat that its disruption presents and the extraordinary measures that solving this existential threat calls for (Buzan et al., 1998).

Table 1. Different Perspectives in International Security Studies

Traditionalist Versatile Critical ISS perspectives (Neo)realism Copenhagen School Welsh School Strategic Studies Peace Research Feminist Liberalism Human Security Constructivism Referent object State or collectivities State, collectivities, Individual, globe society, the environment Sector Violent conflict Desecuritization Ecological security “Resource wars” Conflict resolution Power dynamics

Threats Primarily external External and internal External and internal

Approach Descriptive Descriptive Normative Normative Epistemology Primarily positivist Mixed Post-positivist Primarily rationalist Soft-positivist Reflectivist

Although the Copenhagen School is mostly informed by post-positivist epistemologies, since it necessitates a distinction between the security analyst and the securitizing actor, it is, strictly speaking, neither positivist, nor post-positivist, employing an epistemological approach, which Buzan and Hansen (2009) call speech act analysis. This approach is formed under the influence of the 20th-century philosophers of language, primarily Austin, Searle, Derrida, Schmitt, and others (Floyd, 2010, p. 9).

Similarly to the critical school, the securitization theory also incorporates a normative aspect: securitization is undesirable because it implies a certain political immediacy to the security issue, thus bringing it outside of the realm of normality. This is in a way, an admittance

that the normal political process has failed. Securitization, in this respect, is a political move that is always undesirable (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 29).

When it comes to environmental security, Buzan et al. (1998) recognize that the environmental security agenda is driven by a set of actors, which is quite different from the traditional security sectors. In particular, they underline the importance of the transnational scientific “epistemic communities” in shaping the agenda for environmental security. At the same time, state actors play a decisive role in politicization of the scientific events. Thus, the role of scientific actors in determining the ideational content of the environmental security agenda is stymied significantly by political institutions, which are guided more by short-term events and the “presumed urgency” of a particular issue. As such, securitizing moves do not always correspond to scientifically viable threats (e.g. the myth of overpopulation, see Hough, 2014, p. 45), and not all environmental threats make it to the security agenda (e.g. climate change).

Widening the field of security studies for the Copenhagen School does not come simply in the form of opening the discipline to new “sectors” of security. An important expansion to the previous theoretical framework was the inclusion of the multiple referent objects for securitization. Among others, the Copenhagen School allowed, inter alia, for the inclusion of social groups and stateless nations (societal security), the ecosystem at large, etc. as valid objects of securitization.

2.1.1 The Copenhagen School as a Theoretical Basis

What makes the Copenhagen School an interesting perspective for the analysis of environmental security is not the way that they approach the environment as a separate field of security studies. Rather, it is the securitization theory itself and the way that the Copenhagen School is able to approach security as “a self-referential practice”, thus employing the post- positivist methodology in the field of environmental security. Thus, an analyst can empty security of its meaning, focusing on the rheme (discourse/process) of security instead of its eidos (form). The phenomenon of security is thus analyzed not as how it is or what it is (eidos), but as a process or a discourse of its manifestation (rheme). As such, it makes it possible for the security analyst to take security in all of its forms, in the way it is conceived in the corridors of the securitizing actors. In the words of Buzan et al. (1998, p. 25), “the exact definition and

criteria of securitization is constituted by the intersubjective establishment of an existential threat with a saliency sufficient to have substantial political threats.”

Discourse, or process, is an important prerequisite for securitization in the classical securitization theory. Thus, securitization theory makes a distinction between a mere securitizing move, which is introducing something as a threat vis-à-vis the chose referent object, and securitization, which requires acceptance of such securitizing move by a target audience. This requirement for acceptance from the audience serves as a sieve that allows the analyst to differentiate between securitizing moves that are not accepted, and therefore do not constitute successful securitization, and legitimate cases of securitization.

At the same time, the demand for acceptance by the audiences is not the only significance filter that needs to be applied. Instances of securitization can also be discussed in terms of their scale as the gravity of threat or the importance of the referent object. As such, some threats, perceived as more urgent, will make a better case for securitization, which entails giving the issue the priority of a security issue and lifts it to the suprapolitical realm.

2.1.2 Philosophical Foundations of the Securitization Theory

Securitization theory is mainly based on the philosophical ideas of speech act theorists, especially Austin’s performative utterances. Performatives are such utterances that constitute an action by the means of speech, whereby an act is performed by pronouncing the words, where one can say that an actor “is doing something rather than merely saying something” (Austin, 1979, p. 235). Such performative utterances can be further classified into three groups: locutionary acts, illocutionary acts, and perlocutionary acts. A locutionary act is the most basic form of a speech act and constitutes a certain phatic act that connects and identifies the meaning of the words, as in the following locution: “He said to me ‘Shoot her!’ meaning by ‘shoot’ shoot and referring by ‘her’ to her” (Austin, 1967, p.101). The illocutionary act is the performative content of the locution, which in the previous example would constitute a request: “He urged me to shoot her” (Austin, 1967, p.101). Finally, since the actual intention behind the speech act is to produce a certain outcome, or a “consequential effect,” which might not match the content of either locution or illocution, Austin distinguishes additionally a perlocutionary act. Continuing this example, a perlocutionary act would be “He persuaded me to shoot her,” thus achieving the perlocutionary effect of persuading the listener (Austin, 1967, p.101).

Performative utterances, particularly illocutionary acts, form the backbone of securitization theory (Floyd, 2010, p. 12). Securitization in itself follows illocutionary logic: by performing a securitizing move, the securitizing actor is not merely seeking to establish the meaning and the logical relationship between the words, rather the speech act carries a certain illocutionary meaning, namely establishing a certain threat as a security issue and thus bringing it outside of the realm of normal politics. In this too, however, securitization must follow the logic outlined by Austin, since some securitizing moves will be successful and some not. Indeed, a performative utterance will only be meaningful under certain circumstances, as simply shouting “I will name this ship the Generalissimo Stalin” would not produce the appropriate effect if it were done by a “low type” not possessing the right to do so (Austin, 1979, pp. 239- 240). Austin christens these appropriate circumstances as felicity conditions, of which there are six: 1) that there is a conventional procedure, specifying “uttering of certain words by certain persons in certain circumstances;” 2) that the particular circumstances and the particular persons are appropriate for the particular procedure; 3) that the procedure is executed correctly and; 4) completely; 5) that the participants are sincere in performing the procedure and; 6) that the participants “must actually so conduct themselves subsequently” (Austin, 1967, pp. 14-15). If the felicity conditions were not satisfied, such act would be considered infelicitous. Moreover, if the conditions one to four are not satisfied, such act would be considered also void (Floyd, 2010, pp. 12-15) Hence, the performative utterance by our “low type” is a misinvocation, because he possesses no power of naming a ship, a misexecution if he were to break the conventional procedure, and an insincerity, if he referred to the ship as Queen Elizabeth regardless of the name previously given.

In securitization theory, these felicity conditions are simplified to three “facilitating conditions”: 1) The demand internal to the speech act of following the grammar of security, 2) the social conditions regarding the position of authority for the securitizing actor, - that is, the relationship between speaker and audience and thereby the likelihood of the audience accepting the claims made in a securitizing attempt, and 3) features of the alleged threats that either facilitate of impede securitization. (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 33)

Conditions one and two are clearly drawn from the first four felicity conditions, whereas condition three is a reformulation of the conditions five and six from the perspective of threat. Yet, these facilitating conditions are not a perfect reflection of Austin’s felicity conditions, since Austin’s first four felicity conditions do not make a mention of how the audience accepts the performative utterance.

2.1.3 Modifications of the Classical Securitization Theory

Ever since the securitization theory was developed by its authors, several important theoretical contributions proposed significant adjustments to some of its tenets, especially when these positions proved to be hard to operationalize. Balzacq (2019) structures this debate along three principal lines: whether securitization is performative (subjective) or audience-oriented (intersubjective), whether securitization takes the issue beyond the realm of normal politics, and whether securitization can be analyzed as a game of legitimacy.

The question of whether securitization theory should focus more on the subjective or inter-subjective view is entrenched in the facilitating conditions of securitization. On the one hand, the Copenhagen School postulates that no securitization is possible if a securitizing move is not accepted by the audience, which stems from the felicity conditions. On the other hand, the identity of the audience is not entirely clear; what and who constitutes a legitimate audience. Emphasis on the audience comes in the securitization theory as an important instrument of ascertaining whether securitization took place because it is inter-subjective, the analyst is able to differentiate between successful and unsuccessful cases of securitization. Such a prerequisite is a direct reformulation of Austin’s felicity conditions. At the same time, it serves a different purpose: when a security analyst writes or speaks security, she “executes a speech act, this speech act is successful if the problem raised becomes recognized as a security problem” (Floyd, 2010, p. 47). Thus, the demand for the recognition of a securitizing move by a certain audience makes it possible to differentiate between different actors and their agency to perform a securitizing move. Balzacq (2019) formulates it as a dichotomy between performativity and intersubjectivity: a speech act is a performative within itself and thus a self-referential instance of securitization, yet it is not given a title of security since that would assume that security is a speech act; a conclusion that would put the analyst in hot water from the standpoint of external validity. An uneasy balance between these two is found when the Copenhagen School makes a distinction between securitizing move and securitization, but it is also problematic, since it makes introduces tension within the theory, while audience acceptance is rarely demonstrated and is often assumed.

Furthermore, finding the audience proves to be problematic, since it is not entirely clear what this relevant audience is. Ironically, Buzan et al. (1998, p. 41) mention this important theoretical concept only in passing, defining it as “those the securitizing act attempts to convince to accept exceptional procedures because of the specific security nature of some

9 issue.” To a certain extent, this is deliberate, as specificity introduces excessive rigidity, which would not allow the theory to adapt to the specific political circumstances of a specific issue (Wæver, 1997, p.3). Balzacq (2019, p. 336) attributes this to the fact that security audiences are often invisible to public scrutiny, yet this lack of transparency does not justify denying the existence of such audiences. At the same time, Floyd (2010, pp. 50-52) chooses more simplistic definitions of an audience, equating it to the electorate.

Beyond the question of audience, the practice of acceptance of a securitizing move is also implicit, since the audiences rarely issue explicit notes of approval. These lines of communication are defined as discursive and intersubjective since they require audiential assent. Yet, since they are implicit, this is rather difficult to operationalize, which led some to omit this step altogether (Floyd, 2010; Sjöstedt, 2008; Eriksson, 2000). Moreover, these processes often take non-verbal forms, such as in the form of meaningful silence (Hansen, 2000). Some have sought to analyze this in terms of government practice (Hansen, 2013; Huysmans, 2006; Bigo, 2002). Since only a successful securitization would enter government practice, it can serve a useful proxy for audience acceptance. Building upon this, Balzacq (2019) proposes that instead, one should examine “regimes of practices” within the sociological mechanism of securitization, reconciling both verbal and non-verbal security practices. Analyzing this in terms of government practice, however, is problematic from a different standpoint: routines are hardly extraordinary measures.

Thus, a second issue is a question of whether securitization entails a break with the realm of normalcy in politics. Buzan et al. (1998, p. 23) emphasize that security “frames the issue either as a special kind of politics or as above politics,” which allows them to introduce a normative dimension to securitization. An issue travels the path from being “non-politicized” (outside public debate and government attention) to being “politicized” (as being recognized as a run-of-the-mill issue within normal political processes) to being “securitized” (at which stage it is so urgent it is dealt with by employing extraordinary means, which may violate rules of the regular political game) (Buzan & Hansen, 2009, p. 214). Bigo (2002) demonstrates that routine bureaucratic practices, rather than emergencies, form the backbone of the work for security professionals. This has lead Floyd to adopt a state-centric view that these routines are in themselves political in the sense of being conducted by the polity, yet they do not go beyond the normal politics (Floyd, 2010, pp. 57-58). Furthermore, since these security practices are still conducted by the state, the normative judgment of the “extraordinarity” of securitization is

thereby extended to these security practices. This, however, does not appear entirely convincing: not only does this approach remove the securitizing aspect of verbal utterances; it also gives the polity unilateral control over the securitization process, something that runs contrary to Austin’s theory and that the Copenhagen School carefully attempted to avoid. Rather, it is more useful to conceptualize securitization as a practice within the ordinary political process, but one that deals with extraordinary issues. Thus, as Balzacq (2019, p. 343) expresses it, “securitization’s outcomes are numerous, unpredictable, and non-linear.”

Indeed, Buzan et al. (1998, pp. 27-28) themselves argue that securitization can be “institutionalized.” This is a situation, where “states have long endured threats… and in response have built up standing bureaucracies, procedures, and military establishments to deal with those threats. Although such a procedure may seem to reduce security to a species of normal politics, it does not do so.”

2.2 Towards Agent-relative Analysis of Security

The first section roughly outlined the points of contention between the critical and traditionalist schools in security studies. Borrowing an example from Buzan and Hansen (2009, p. 44), traditional security scholars disagree that HIV/AIDS, while detrimental to human well-being, economy, and society, can be considered a threat to security in the same way that a military incursion would. However, it is not impossible to imagine a military conflict to have far lesser loss of life, economic and societal implications than pandemics or natural disasters. Indeed, Farber (2009, pp. 1075-1076) notes that Katrina and 9/11 are scalable in terms of magnitude, loss of life, and property damage, while the effects of climate change would be insurmountably greater.

In the English language, this contention is complicated by the fact that some things are considered security issues, while others are safety issues. The distinction between security and safety is summarized by Idsø and Jakobsen (2000, quoted in Albrechtsen, 2003) in the following manner: “Safety is protection against random incidents. Random incidents are unwanted incidents that happen because of one or more coincidences. Security is protection against intended incidents. Wanted incidents happen due to a result of deliberate and planned act.”1

1 Ironically, the French branch of the multinational Securitas security services company had to similarly defend the necessity of their services: “La sécurité désigne les moyens - humains, techniques et organisationnels - de 11

Yet, few languages actually make a distinction between security and safety (at least in the same way that English does), with a notable exception of East Asian languages (where 安全 safety and 安保 security). One is pressed to find European languages that do: it is contested whether French makes the same distinction 2 , while German Sicherheit, Italian sicurezza, Norwegian sikkerhet, Spanish seguridad omit the distinction altogether (Hamilton, 2016, p. 186). In fact, the legitimacy of this distinction even in English is contested, consider e.g. Hamilton (2016, p. 186), noting that “safety denotes the concrete fact of being removed from danger, whereas security merely denotes the presumption that one is safe, whether this be true or not.” Indeed, Albrechtesen (2003) concludes, “the differences between security and safety are not remarkable.” Additionally, one can think of scores of synonyms that convey similar meanings in any language, like English, Russian and Norwegian surety (уверенность, trygghet), readiness (готовность, beredskap) or protectedness (защищённость, beskyttethet).

In defining security as issues taken “out of the realm of normal politics,” the Copenhagen School attempts to salvage the security-safety debate. It is perhaps this bewilderment with the problem of translation that led Wæver to accept that security “has a specific meaning only within a specific social context” (Lipschutz, 2003, p. 10). The direction that the Copenhagen School takes on this matter is adding a certain degree of normativity to security. Considering environmental security, Buzan and Wæver (2003, pp. 64-65) argue that attaching the label of security tends to evoke “us vs. them” mentality and, due to its defensive logic, is perilous. Buzan (1992, p. 25) recommends substituting the security perspective for a more solution-driven “process-type” remedy. After all, environmental problems are rarely intentional, and Buzan and Wæver think it ought not to be a security issue (Floyd, 2010, p. 46). Yet, since environmental security as a concept exists in the world, they feel compelled to include it in their analysis.

To some readers, perhaps, this might justly appear to be counterintuitive. For example, if the reader is convinced that environmental problems are serious, deserve undivided government attention, and urgent action, calling for environmental security would be a reflection of the gravity and immediacy of the issue. Striving to tone down this normative

prévention et d’intervention contre les risques à caractère accidentel… La sûreté désigne l’ensemble des moyens dédiés à la prévention des actes de malveillance. Ces actes, par définition volontaires, ont pour finalité le profit et/ou l’intention de nuire.”

2 Some dictionaries define La Sécurité as safety and La Sûreté as protectedness. 12

reprehensibility of securitization, Floyd (2010) divides the outcomes of desecuritization into politicization (when the issue remains on the agenda) and depoliticization (when the issue disappears from the agenda too). Thus, treating the environment like any other political problem without attaching a security label is morally good, while striking it altogether is morally bad because it hinders solving the problem.

This, however, only takes the problem one level down, and is still inherently Anglo- centric, as it assumes that the political instrumentarium of any decision-maker includes the terms security and safety. Indeed, I believe that this does not hold true even to English-speakers, who are hardly in agreement on the definition of either term. Thus, a critique of securitization is at the same time a critique of “safeticization.” Why is securitization morally questionable, but analyzing the same issue under the lens of public safety is not?

I posit that this moral critique of securitization is misguided not because securitization is inherently morally good, but rather because it is mistargeted. Securitization can beget “us vs. them” mentality because modern humans (which, regrettably, encompass even security studies theorists) are heuristically conditioned to allocate blame. 3 The modern system of criminal justice, which presumes free will and heavily relies on the motive of an individual in determining appropriate punishment, draws extensively from Kant’s retributivist ethics of justice (Scheid, 1983; Murphy, 1987). As such, it assumes that it is always possible to assess the magnitude of a crime and to find a commensurate punishment, both deterrent and retributive at the same time (Scheid, 1983). The right to punish rests on the fact that a crime is an “intentional transgression,” and offenses of strict liability, which do not possess mens rea, are not subject to criminal liability. This is an example of the permeating influence of deontological ethics on the modus operandi of everyday life.

Deontological theories are normative theories, in which actions could be considered to be morally wrong, reprehensible, or permissible. Agent-centered deontological theories, in particular, emphasize the importance of intentionality in establishing human agency (Alexander & Moore, 2016). Hence, the obsession with the intentionality of threats unnecessarily complicates the distinction between safety and security (which I argue is inherently Anglophone), a distinction to which the Copenhagen School is also partial.

3 On self-serving bias and allocation of blame, read, for example, Sedikides et al. (1998) 13

The deontological spell can be remedied with a pinch of consequentialism: in analyzing threats, it is more useful to think about their magnitude, not the intention behind them. Consequentialism argues, “what is best or right is whatever makes the world best in the future,” i.e. its consequences (Sinnott-Armstrong, 2019). When thinking about what constitutes a security threat, therefore, a consequentialist security practitioner considers it against some arbitrary scale of danger: an issue is elevated to the rank of security issues when it is thought to be sufficiently threatening; the more immediate the danger, the greater it is securitized. This allows the analyst to keep a certain degree of normativity while avoiding descent into the blame- game of securitizing actors.

Floyd (2007) brilliantly attempted to stir the normative securitization in the direction of consequentialist analysis. Proposing positive and negative versions of securitization, she postulates that securitization can be considered positive then and only then when it maximizes genuine security. Floyd (2010) considers three criteria of the morality of securitization (just securitization): 1) objective existential threat; 2) legitimate referent object; 3) adequacy and appropriateness of a security response.

Although analytically captivating, this normative annex to the securitization theory suffers from the same flaw as its deontological counterpart: an attempt at objectivity. When considering objectiveness of a threat, legitimacy of a referent object, and adequacy of response the security analyst (or community) has to put herself into the shoes of a judge of moral character. This agent-neutral approach assumes that the security analyst can abstract to the observer’s perspective, but the Copenhagen School establishes that analysts, too, in “writing security” are “doing security.” Assuming that there is some genuine security that may be maximized, the security analyst would make herself vulnerable to the same criticism as utilitarianism.4

Thus, the version of consequentialism proposed here is agent-relative, i.e. in which observers must adopt a position of one of the actors or analyst’s own position (Sinnott- Armstrong, 2019). It is in this way more faithful to the original intersubjective nature of securitization proposed by the Copenhagen School. Since no security analyst can be credibly considered objective or free from biases, security threats and their securitization can be

4 Thus, in considering the magnitude, I by no means propose a utilitarian view on threats. Since threats are by nature subjective, in the infamous trolley problem the threat of being flattened by a trolley is equally dire for each of the workers, hence killing a single worker is no more permissible. 14

measured in accordance with the security analyst’s own perception of threat. Thus, an attempt of threat construction using the myth of overpopulation, while threatening to and securitized by a neo-Malthusian, can be dismissed by an informed social scientist. At the same time, she might be inclined to accept the devastating threat of climate change, being both personally threatened by its consequences and realizing the magnitude of devastation it is capable of causing, as well as go insofar as to bemoan the lack of securitization of the climate by powers that be.

This account of the process of threat construction differs from the Copenhagen School, which conceives securitization as an intersubjective process. Since threats are agent-relative, and thus subjective, they can be considered as neither objective nor intersubjective. If the security analyst thinks that a threat is objective, this means that either they put themselves in the position of the actor or they accept the threat as objective from their own perspective. Floyd (2010, p. 428) defines objective existential threats only as threats that endanger the actor’s existence. However, even such existential threats can hardly be considered objective or intersubjective. They are not objective, because there is no objective measurement of threat (as in original Copenhagen presentation), and not intersubjective, because there is no dialogue between the parties in the process of their construction.

Yet, there is more explanatory power that eludes agent-relative threat construction. It is the dialogue between securitization claims described by Buzan et al. (1998) when they say that intersubjectivity lies somewhere between the perceived oversecuritization and undersecuritization of certain threats. “The way the securitization processes of one actor fit with the perceptions of others about what constitutes a ‘real’ threat matters in shaping the interplay of securities within the international system” (Buzan et al., 1998, pp. 30-31). Although this is true, securitization and threat construction do not lie in this shared space between actors, on the contrary, they still lie with the securitizing actors. Although threats and securitizations are judged by other actors, the decision to securitize ultimately lies with the securitizing actors themselves.

It is freeing to the security analyst to delegate the responsibility to identify threats to the actors themselves. Rather than looking for objective threats, or intersubjective threats between multitudes of actors, the analyst can just observe the threats as they have been constructed. Arguably, this is how the Copenhagen School has been understood and applied in practice5.

5 See Wilkinson, 2007 15

Indeed, such a version of threat construction is much more useful for the Russian context. Not only does the Russian language employ the same word (безопасность) for both security and safety, but also it has a somewhat different threat construction/securitization culture, which I shall address in the next chapter.

The above ties in with the issue of “normalcy,” i.e. deciding what is “normal politics” is already a somewhat positivist concept. If, however, the same intersubjectivity is applied to the issue of normalcy, it becomes clear that most actors decide themselves what is normal politics in their polities. In most countries, the state of emergency would be most extraordinary. Yet, in Egypt, where the state of emergency has been in effect almost continuously since 1967, it is part of normal politics. Buzan et al. (1998, p. 28) indeed acknowledge that “in well- developed states, armed forces and intelligence services are carefully separated from normal political life, and their use is subject to elaborate procedures of authorization. Where such separation is not in places, as in many weak states (Nigeria under Abacha, the USSR under Stalin) or in states mobilized for total war, much of normal politics is pushed into the security realm.” The distinction between normal politics and the epipolitical can be summarized as a semantic matrix (Table 2).

Table 2. Bilingual Semantic Matrix for Safety and Security in Russian and English

English Russian Normal politics Safety Безопасность Beyond politics Security Безопасность

The implication of normalcy and securitization can be tied in the classic “chicken or the egg” causality dilemma. Social anthropological evidence suggests that security concerns lay at the origin of the state and normal politics, in other words, no politics would be possible without at least a rudimentary security establishment (Bates, 2009; Olson, 1993; Tilly, 1985). If security concerns always lie behind the creation of a state, the primacy of politics over security must be substantiated. Even abstracting to modern democracies, if threat construction is still part of normal politics, while security is not, the transition between normalcy and epipoliticalness has to be clearly substantiated (Bigo, 2002).

2.3 Summary

This chapter identified the principal directions in security studies, analyzing three heterogeneous currents in international security studies: traditional, critical, and versatile. This ad hoc classification of the international security studies is used to clarify the theoretical positioning of the Copenhagen School vis-à-vis other security theories and to justify the choice of securitization theory for the analysis of environmental securitization. Then, I briefly summarized the securitization theory and its principal tenets, focusing on theoretical strengths and important aspects that make it flexible and attractive for analysis of environmental security. This included the solid philosophical foundations of the securitization theory, particularly, Austin’s speech act theory. Finally, the chapter focused on some new developments and modifications of the securitization theory.

The second part of this chapter critically analyzed the original securitization theory, as well as some of the proposed modifications to it, and identified several issues, which will be addressed in the course of this thesis with its empirical focus on Russian environmental security. First, it is the issue of the term “security” and securitization outside of the Anglocentric context. Second, it is the intersubjective vs. subjective threat construction. Third, it is the assumption that securitization is not part of normal politics, which needs to be tested in socio-political contexts, where security considerations are more present in everyday life, i.e. the extent to which securitization can be considered an “epipolitical” (“suprapolitical”) phenomenon or merely the apotheosis of the political.

These theoretical issues predetermine the choice of methods, which shall be explored in detail in the next chapter.

3 Methodology/methods

Wir können kein Faktum an sich feststellen; vielleicht ist es ein Unsinn, so etwas zu wollen.

—Friedrich Nietzsche, Umwertung aller Werte, Band 1

3.1 Research Design

In the first part of this chapter, I explain what methods this study employs and how it methodologically and gnoseologically differs from mainstream studies on the environment on the one hand and from security studies research on the other. First, I describe the rationale behind choosing a case study approach, in particular, an embedded case study as a research design. Second, I explain how the data for this study was obtained and coded. Third, I describe the logical basis for choosing a mixed-methods design, as well as the concrete quantitative and qualitative techniques applied in this study. As this thesis employed a mixed-methods approach, some of the intricacies of how the methods are applied were most expediently addressed in context in later chapters, while this chapter aims to provide an overview of the methods employed on a more general level.

3.1.1 Case Study as Research Design

This research utilizes a mixed-method research design. In its overarching form, it is a case study. Since my goal here is to test and offer adjustments to the Copenhagen School theory of securitization, it is designed as a hypothesis-generating case study (Levy, 2008). Hypothesis- generating case studies are “useful in explaining cases that do not fit an existing theory” for the purpose of either refining existing theoretical propositions or generating a brand-new theoretical proposition (Levy, 2008). Rather than creating a new theory from scratch, this type of case studies more often concentrates on specifying causal mechanisms, especially when it comes to existing theoretical assumptions, uncovering endogeneity and multicollinearity issues. As such, it necessitates careful justification for uncovering particular causal relationships. Each case study thus presents a point used to alter theoretical assumptions, while the selection of a specific case is informed by theoretical necessities (Levy, 2008). The “hypothesis generation” component in hypothesis-generating case studies is therefore a consequence of constant feedback between theory and evidence.

This provides case studies great fora for identifying theoretical improvements. Indeed, rather than generalizing to the population of similar cases, Yin (2009) considers that case study findings, being subject to analytical generalization, need to be “generalized to theory.” In addition, Yin (2009, p. 48) posits single-case studies an appropriate research strategy, if the researcher’s objective is to describe the circumstances of the single case and to subsequently draw conclusions, shedding light on the larger classis of units of which the case is representative. Nevertheless, the question of external validity becomes an ontological problem, as a single case study leaves the researcher susceptible to criticism along the lines of selection bias, in which he falls in “the trap of trying to select a ‘representative’ case” (Yin, 2009, p. 37). In other words, no matter how representative a single or a set of cases might seem to the researcher, establishing external validity for Yin means that the case study findings need to be replicated in similar cases in order to be considered conclusively generalizable.

Indeed, vis-à-vis Copenhagen securitization theory, Russian securitization of the environment can be thought to be such a special case. First, from among the profile of countries, Russia posits a rare case of consistent environmental securitization, which, contrary to what theory mandates, is not followed by equally consistent extraordinary measures. Second, from among different types of securitization, environmental security is a special case of the non- military security aspect. Third, by providing theoretical adjustment to securitization analysis, it will allow satisfying the first part of Yin’s generalization requirement, while analyzing the cross-sectional data from within the case will help, at least partially, to satisfy the second requirement.

3.1.2 Embedded Case Study as Internal Architecture

Because securitization is a complex process, it can be considered a matryoshka doll, in which there are multiple internal case studies that are important for the overall argument. As such it lends itself to within-case analysis, which is an in-depth study of a case, allowing to “support, refute, or expand (a) a theory that the researcher has selected or (b) the propositions that the researcher has derived from a review of the literature and/or experience with the phenomenon under study” (Paterson, 2010). Although the case study of environmental securitization in Russia itself is a longitudinal case study, the richness of material and “internal tension” in its dimensionality allow for cross-sectional comparison, as defined by Aaltio & Heilmann (2010).

This lends the case study of securitization of the environment in Russia very well for an embedded case study analysis.

First defined by Yin (2009, p. 50), embedded case studies differ from holistic case studies in that they involve several units of analysis. Instead of concentrating on the cross- sectional data, these types of case studies focus on the variation identified within single cases. As such, embedded case studies lend themselves well to a type of mixed-methods research (Scholz & Tietje, 2002, pp. 331-332). An instance of this is a case study, where the main study relies on quantitative techniques while the subunit studies “investigate the conditions within one of the entities being surveyed” (Yin, 2009, p. 63). The embedded design adds “significant opportunities of extensive analysis, enhancing the insights into the single case” (Yin, 2009, pp. 52-53). At the same time, he warns against a potential pitfall of failing to return to the larger unit of analysis. The subunits selected in this work are not ideographic case studies; they serve the purpose of illustrating, supporting, and coordinating the overall argument.

In this way, a single case study with an embedded design can be thought of as a type of nested analysis. Nested analysis requires access to “a large N cross-case dataset” which allows “to construct a general model of the phenomenon that applies to the broader sample of cases” (Gerring, 2006, p. 198). In order to confirm this general panel study, several qualitatively distinct case studies are selected. In such a manner, the preliminary large cross-case panel study “provides information that should ultimately complement the findings” of the small-N case studies (Lieberman, 2005, p. 438). The advantage of using nested analysis is in triangulation: it emulates experimental research design in adding an additional dimension of variation. This acts as a control group of sorts, allowing the analyst to draw an inference to the causal question from independent sources, hopefully enhancing the persuasiveness of causal inference and consequently leading to stronger internal and external validity, even if case studies are always more successful in establishing internal validity than external validity (Gerring, 2006, p. 152).

In answering the research questions presented in the introduction, my analysis is therefore constructed as a single embedded case study of Russian environmental securitization of the environment with flexible nested research design (Figure 1): the securitization of the environment is analyzed as a longitudinal hypothesis-generating case study in two parts: focusing on international documents in Chapter 5 (to detect the securitizing actor(s) internationally) and domestic federal acts in Chapter 6 (to detect the securitizing actor(s) domestically). Each of those parts performs a preliminary large-N analysis, which serves as an

introduction for a qualitative study, which will give an answer to the research questions. Chapters 5 and 6 inform the analyst to select embedded subunits of analysis from its within- case cross-sectional variation, which will help to validate the conclusions in Chapter 7.

Figure 1. Embedded Case Study Design

Context: Securitization

Case: Securitization of Environment in Russia

International securitization of Domestic securitization of Environment Environment

Subunit: Arctic

Subunit: Yugoslavia

3.1.3 Data Collection

The story of securitization is primarily a story of performative speech acts. Speech acts can take different forms: official documents, statements, treaties, newspaper articles, speeches, etc. However, they can sometimes manifest as body language, or even as silence (Hansen, 2000). As this study is primarily interested in securitizing moves by the representatives of the “state,” the data for this study is acquired from official documents, speeches, and reports. There are several document sources.

First, the data from official Russian documents were collected using query results from a Russian legal database GARANT for the term “environmental security” (экологическая безопасность, безопасность окружающей среды) in various inflections. The GARANT database is a privately owned commercial compilation of most Russian legal documents with an in-built search engine. 6 Queries are divided into different categories: government acts

6 At the time of data collection, the author had access to the 04.05.20 edition of the “GARANT-Master aero” database. 21

(subdivided into federal acts, regional acts, as well as clarifications from the Ministry of Finance and the Federal Tax Service), legal commentary, judicial practice, draft legislation, international agreements, as well as applied information. The database is a nearly complete compilation of all publicly available official documents produced by all levels of the three branches of the Russian state, as well as includes documents from the Soviet era. To illustrate the extent to which environmental security is entrenched in the Russian legal vocabulary, a context-unspecific search within the database yielded hits in 197,695 separate documents.7

Second, the data from official newspapers and websites can be used to supplement this data from official documents when needed. From additional sources, only data from the Pravda newspaper was collected in its entirety. Until 1991, Pravda was the official organ of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, thus serving as a mouthpiece of the official party discourse (Murray, 1994, p. 46) and an indicator of securitization for the period until 1991. For the modern period, kremlin.ru, mnr.gov.ru, or Rossiiskaia Gazeta can be used to supplement the analysis, besides any other unstructured data.

3.2 Methods

The methodological design of this study is mixed-methods research. The mixed-method design allows analyzing the same environmental data parallelly from two complementary perspectives. According to Yin (2009, p. 63), this design “can permit investigators to address more complicated research questions and collect a richer and stronger array of evidence than can be accomplished by any single method alone.” Data collected in the course of this research lends itself well to both quantitative and qualitative methods. From the quantitative point of view, it can be considered a chronically ordered document stream; from the qualitative point of view, it can be considered a discourse. Below I shall explain in detail the methods utilized in this thesis.

3.2.1 Quantitative Methods

When analyzed quantitatively, it is useful to treat the documents collected in the previous steps as individual data points. Each document, mentioning environmental security, can be treated as a point in the analysis of environmental securitization. As such, this is a simplistic take on document analysis, as “mention” of a word here is binary and refers to a mention within the

7 Hits here are binary: the same document can contain multiple mentions of the term. 22

document, even if it is singular. Thus, a document is treated as having “mentioned” environmental security, without regard to whether the document uses the term several times or just once.

Russian federal documents and international treaties arrive over time, therefore I follow Kleinberg (2003) in analyzing them as “document streams,” in which not only the scale of the topic but also the time of arrival of documents can be meaningfully analyzed. Since documents appear probabilistically, Kleinberg (2003) poses that the wait time 푥 between messages 푖 and

−훼푖푥 푖 + 1 is distributed according to pdf 푓(푥) = 훼𝑖푒 , where 훼 > 0; the probability that the wait time between documents will exceed 푥 equals to 푒−훼푖푥 . The changes between these states (periods of high and low document emission) are thus a “hidden” Markov process, in which “bursts” are transitions between these states (Eggers and Spirling, 2016, p.9).

Although documents in environmental security data arrive continuously, their volume is too low to assess them on a day-to-day basis. Furthermore, treaties, federal laws, etc. are often signed on the same day, or, as Kleinberg (2003) designs a special finite-state model, where documents arrive in discrete “batches,” of which there is 푟푡 documents containing the relevant word 푤 (e.g. environmental security) out of the total of 푑푡 documents. If there is a total of 푛 푅 documents, the “base rate” of document arrival would be 푝 = , where 푅 = ∑푛 푟 and 퐷 = 0 퐷 푡=1 푡 푛 ∑푡=1 푑푡. Since there cannot be more relevant documents than total documents, 푝𝑖 never exceeds

1, and the state 푞𝑖 is only defined for 푖, where 푝𝑖 ≤ 1. Given a binomial distribution with 푡ℎ probability 푝𝑖, I can thus enumerate a cost of transitioning from the state 푞𝑖 for the 푡 batch as

푟 휎(푖, 푟 , 푑 ) = −ln [(푑푡) 푝 푡(1 − 푝 )푑푡−푟푡]. (1) 푡 푡 푟푡 𝑖 𝑖

Since the analysis here is only interested in bursts of positive intensity, it is possible to quantify this burst [푡1, 푡2] as the difference in cost by transitioning from the state 푞0 to 푞1

∑푡2 (휎(0, 푟 , 푑 ) − 휎(1, 푟 , 푑 )), (2) 푡=푡1 푡 푡 푡 푡

or the improvement in cost by using state 푞1 over 푞0, where the larger weight indicates periods of “elevated activity” (Kleinberg, 2003).

This method of identifying “bursty” periods in securitization opens the door to interesting possibilities. First, it is reasonable to assume that years, in which environmental security was a “bursty” term, would correspond to years of the securitizing moves or audience

acceptance. However, it is uncertain that this method will be able to identify all securitization periods correctly, for example, unsuccessful securitizing moves. Second, as Eggers and Spirling (2016, p. 10) note, the bursts of higher intensity in this model occur during periods of overall lower activity. Thirdly, this leads to the fact that it is only useful when the relative difference

between 푑푡 and 푟푡 is not too drastic.

In order to account for the aforementioned issues, it is possible to supplement this analysis with a measure of relative power, proposed by Ban et al. (2019), which measures the relative power of A vis-à-vis a number N of B, C, D… etc. as

푀푒푛푡𝑖표푛푠 푅푒푙푎푡푖푣푒 푃표푤푒푟 = 퐴 (3). 퐴 ∑푁 푀푒푛푡𝑖표푛푠 푖=퐴 푖

This measure of relative power allows us to determine the periods of securitization of lower intensity, which would fly under the radar of the “burstiness” measure.

Finally, the data can be analyzed using other methods. For example, in resolving the issue of residual indeterminacy (discrepancy between analysis and data), visual methods prove to be useful (Banks, 2001, p. 146), e.g. in Figure 6. Summing up, I employ quantitative methods as an exploratory tool in Sections 5.1 and 6.1 (where these methods are again explored in practical application), placing equal importance on qualitative methods to finalize the inference.

3.2.2 Qualitative Methods

An advantage of the quantitative approach is that it allows analyzing the holistic picture for the environmental securitization in Russia systematically. However, I am not able to establish valid, reliable inference solely based on the quantitative methods due to the nature of the data available and the limitations of the methods selected. Takamura et al. (2011) demonstrate that document streams exhibit contradictory characteristics: namely, it is not possible to determine whether two similar documents from the same stream are related if they are temporally distant; they could discuss the same topic or could be emitted with delay. Furthermore, it is implausible to apply qualitative methods to all documents in the stream: while I draw on a large array of sources, which span a variety of document types, attempting to subject all of them to qualitative analysis would result in what Dunn and Neumann call “data overload” (2016, pp. 100-101). I thus employ quantitative methods described above act as an inductive tool that informs the qualitative inference: it directs and focuses the attention of the qualitative methods.

“The way to study securitization is to study discourse and political constellations,” write Buzan et al. (1998, p. 25). Speech act analysis of the Copenhagen School is a discursive epistemology (Buzan & Hansen, 2009, p. 34). Dunn and Neumann (2016, p. 4) define discourse analysis as an analysis of the way meaning-production systems are generated, spread, and accepted, with a special emphasis on the interplay of different discourses. Securitization is a discourse: it is intersubjective, a process of constant feedback between the securitizing actor and the audiences (de Wilde, 2008). Although these discourses in principle do not have to be linguistic or textual, political collectives, which are the main emphasis in this study, primarily rely on formalized, structured, and jargonized verbal communication (Hansen, 2013, p. 21). Thus, discursive speech act analysis identifies securitization: since the reality of securitization is created in the discourse, this approach allows mapping and revealing the use of language, as well as the way that it transforms in the process.

To repeat, since the Copenhagen theory is methodologically inclined to follow speech act analysis, a type of discourse analysis, one of the principal concerns for this thesis is the selection and identification of discourse, and although this issue is already partly addressed by the preliminary quantitative work, the underlying epistemological problem remains. Therefore, several important rules for document selection should be followed in discovering the discourse from the stream of documents. Hansen (2013, p. 74) emphasizes that the documents selected for discourse analysis should be “frequently quoted and function as nodes within the intertextual web of debate.” The specific reason why the textual selection is an important issue is that, beyond its basic form, discourse analysis requires excavating discourses from the body of information.

Having identified relevant texts, I proceed to uncover the discourse in Sections 4.1, 5.2, and 6.2. The nature of the data allows using intertextual analysis, in which I identified meanings of separate documents by the implied connections with other texts, analyzing all “circulating discourses” and attempting to bridge the gap between quantitative content analysis and semiotic analysis, and also between analyses of different texts and their contexts into interwoven discourses (Ruiz Ruiz, 2009). Because the securitization is a process that can hardly be identified by one of its nodes (i.e. in a single document) and spans over multiple documents, while simultaneously experiencing periods of silence and rupture, this intertextual analysis requires to assume, inter alia, the genealogical approach to discourse analysis, which focuses

25 not only on the metamorphoses of a discourse over time, but also on breaks within this narrative (Dunn & Neumann, 2016, pp. 104-105).

Looking within the intertextual array of documents, I look for methodological clues, prerequisites that the speech act analysis identifies: the presence of the securitizing actor, existential threat construction, “rhetorical and semiotic structure” of the security argument, violation of political rules (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 25). Simultaneously, respecting the formal requirements of the securitization theory means that I am “preserving parsimony at the expense of explaining ‘more completely the outcome at hand’” (Balzacq et al., 2016, p. 519), which will allow me greater leeway in answering the first conceptual research question.

3.3 Summary

The study of environmental securitization in Russia, which follows in the next chapters of this thesis, is thus constructed on the methodological assumptions reviewed above and using the methods tools and data presented. As this chapter demonstrated, the underlying theoretical questions, outlined in Chapter 2 can be addressed well, when analyzing the case of Russian environmental securitization. In its practical execution, Chapter 4 will recap the origin of security in Russia, as well as apply the qualitative methods described in this chapter to analyze an important formative period in environmental securitization – the end of the Cold War. Utilizing data obtained from the selected legal database, described in section 3.1.3, Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 will apply the holistic, big-picture part of the embedded research design to international and domestic dimensions of securitization, respectively. Chapter 7 will implement the second part of the embedded research design, focusing on finding discourses within the subunits of analysis.

Having thus discussed the methodological basis of this thesis, I proceed to answer the questions, put forward in the introduction. To that end, I shall first the fundamental issue of security and its cultural relativity in the Russian context.

4 Security in Russia

Post-positivist theories in security studies suggest that what is understood under the concept of security highly depends on the positionality of the author vis-à-vis a certain cultural and political worldview. In that sense, an analysis of Russian security policy in the modern era is nay impossible without a rough understanding of what security matters imply in the Russian context. In the second chapter, I demonstrated that the Copenhagen School is ambiguous on the matter of threat construction and normalcy: a further inquiry into Russian securitization, therefore, necessitates a closer look at the lineage of security in Russia, the “normal” in Russian politics, and the earliest mentions of environmental security.

Although Russian security services trace their genealogy to Ivan the Terrible’s Sudebnik of 1550 and the first mentions of the raison d’état appeared already in Early Modern Russian documents, such as the Council Codex of 1649 (Beliaev & Beliaeva, 2017), it was not until 1934 that the term national security entered the modern legal and political landscape in Russia with the foundation of the Main Directorate for State Security within the People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs, which was ultimately responsible for political repression in the Soviet Union (Goes, 2017, pp. 4-5). The Soviet state employed many of the same repressive mechanisms as Imperial Russia, one of the principal important innovations, besides the sheer magnitude and brutality of the persecutions, was the ideological and the rhetorical packaging associated with it. The most common, everyday way that citizens stayed in contact with the term security was the Article 58 of the 1926 Penal Code of the RSFSR: “A counter- revolutionary action is any action aimed at overthrowing, undermining or weakening of the power of workers’ and peasants’ Soviets... and governments of the USSR and Soviet and autonomous republics, or at the undermining or weakening of the external security of the USSR and main economic, political and national achievements of the proletarian revolution” (Penal Code of the RSFSR, 1926). Essentially, state security in the early Soviet period became synonymous with the party’s line. In other words, “state security produces one basic product – arrests and convictions of state enemies” (Gregory, 2009, p. 82).

The resulting political culture of the Soviet Union was that by the end of the Cold War, the civil society had little oversight over the security policy and decision-making. As a result of the policy of glasnost, the shroud of secrecy became gradually lifted and the public received an avenue for expression.

National security was first officially defined only after the end of the Cold War, with the adoption of the law of the Russian Federation “On security,” which defined security as “the state of protectedness of vital interests of an individual, the society and the state from inside and outside threats” (Law of the Russian Federation on Security, 1992). The Federal Security Law of 1992 became the first Russian security legislation in the modern history of the country, and thus represented a symbolic shift towards an open society (Lomagin, 2007). Going further than that, it tried to break away from the stricter Soviet definition of security, where the ultimate referent object is the state, to a more flexible one, which incorporated other types of referent objects, beginning with human (Goes, 2017, pp. 5-8).

However, the Soviet specter continued haunting Russian security thinking. An illustrative example of this was the Pasko Japanese intelligence incident, in which Russian military journalist Grigorii Pasko was arrested in 1997 and indicted with high treason. Having been found guilty in 2001, he filed a complaint to the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation about the unconstitutionality of several subsections of Article 70 of the classified “Instructions for the Protection of State Secrets in the Armed Forces of the USSR,” which was instrumental for his prosecution. The Supreme Court found the clause that forbade individuals with security clearance to have contact with foreign citizens unconstitutional, which highlights the independence of the judiciary during the start of Putin’s presidency. Interestingly enough, when Pasko sued the Russian Federation at the European Court of Human Rights, claiming that his conviction was unlawful, the ECHR ruled 6:1 that there were no violations in his conviction “as a serving military officer… of treason through espionage for having collected and kept… information of a military nature that was classified as a State secret” (Pasko v. Russia, 2009)

Despite the introduction of the checks and balances system in the 1993 Constitution, the Russian security establishment largely follows the same structure, laid out in the Soviet Union. As such, the security establishment and formulation of the national security policy fall almost exclusively into the jurisdiction of the executive. The 1992 Security Law innovated the basic structure of the national security establishment, in particular, it established the Security Council of the Russian Federation (SCRF), which was confirmed in the Constitution.

4.1 The Rise of the Environmental Security in Russia

The rise of the environmental security is directly related to the Cold War. Indeed, Soviet Union started to securitize environment long before it became a mainstream issue in Western academic and security literature. It was largely the contribution of Soviet environmental scientists that brought the issues of environmental protection to the international stage in the first place. Using the example of Soviet soil science, Elie (2015) demonstrates, for example, that during the 1970s and 1980s the Soviet academia underwent the process of “silent ecologization.” This turn was caused by internal processes and by general internationalization of Soviet science, especially as Soviet scientists participated in international environmental developments in the newly decolonized countries. Beyond just being influenced by the ecological turn in the international scientific community, the contributions of Soviet scientists in many ways shaped this debate. Although Soviet scientists were not entirely free in their convictions, the Cold War rhetoric positioning of the Soviet Union as a champion against colonization and imperialism forced the hand of the Soviet leadership to bemoan the devastating effects of capitalism on the environment. The role of the USSR as a great power allowed Soviet scientists to assume influential positions in international environmental organizations. Scientists like Kovda, Gerasimov and Rozanov were influential in changing the view of the Soviet and the international scientific establishment (Elie, 2015).

While a green turn was taking place within the Soviet academia, the Soviet leadership also became influenced by the newly established environmental agenda. On the international stage, it was Sweden headed by Olof Palme that championed environmental protection, especially in the wake of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, held in Stockholm in 1972. Even though the 1972 Stockholm Conference did not securitize environment, it is universally considered as a watershed event in the global environmental politics as it raised the topic of environmental protection to the realm of “high politics” (Hough, 2014, p. 27). Accordingly, it had a significant impact on the Soviet environmental policy as well (Korppoo et al., 2015, p. 9). Immediately following the conference, a session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR established the protection of nature and the careful use of natural resources as one of the most important tasks of the state in September 1972. On December 29 of the same year, a joint resolution was adopted by the Central Committee of the CPSU and the

Council of Ministers “On Strengthening Environmental Protection and Improving the Use of Natural Resources.”

Occasionally, environmental opportunism allowed the Soviet leadership to use greening of international politics to their advantage. For example, “in the mid-1970s the Soviets were able to exploit the backlash against the US over Agent Orange and become the unlikely pioneer of international legislation proscribing deliberate environmental destruction in warfare” (Hough, 2014, p. 27).

It was therefore with this renewed understanding of the consequences of environmental warfare that the system of international peace and security (at least inasmuch the European theater is concerned) was built around the 1975 catalogue of principles outlined in the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe. The Helsinki Final Act established a universal East-West framework in terms of the understanding of security, development, and human rights. At the same time, it delineated those issues as internal affairs of sovereign states. What is characteristic of the Helsinki Final Act is the way it split the issues of peace and security into three general categories, or the so-called three “baskets,” which reflect the division of security issues.

The main feature of the East-West security dialogue was the question of what constituted run-of-the-mill transnational interactions, as opposed to intervention into the sovereign affairs of a different nation (Wæver, 1995, p. 60). Thus, the division of issues into the three baskets was significant in terms of delineating different aspects of security and to what extent the Eastern regimes could permit Western influence in those areas. The first basket included issues that are most conventionally understood as security issues, viz. military. The second basket included the second row of security issues, such as economic issues, which were crucial to both socialist and capitalist regimes, as they were ideologically related to the structure of the political and societal system. For example, statistics and data on the environment were always considered sensitive in the USSR and possessed strategic military significance, which was partly dictated by the fact that up to three-fourths of the Soviet economy one way or the other served the interests of the military-industrial complex (Pautova, 2018). Rather than securitizing the environment itself though, environmental data was seen as a security issue vis- à-vis military and regime security. As such, the content of the second basket was understood by socialist and capitalist nations alike in terms of regime security. It is unsurprising that the environment, accentuated in importance by the ecocidal consequences of the Second Indochina 30

War, entered the second basket. Finally, the content of the third basket was the furthest extent of “non-military aspects of security,” and concerned with issues of societal security.

The goal of the East-West security negotiations, at least as far as the Atlantic countries were concerned, was to desecuritize the contents of the third basket, and, if possible, the second basket. As Wæver (1995, pp. 56-61) notes, the traditional power system in Eastern Europe allowed power holders control over the speech acts, and, thereby control over what issues would be considered security issues. Indeed, loss of this power proved fatal to the stability of socialist regimes, and desecuritization, along with a more limited use of the security speech acts, served as a significant catalyst to the loss of the regime support and eventual revolutions of 1989.

The Helsinki Final Act is thus one of the first instances that the environment emerges as a security issue, yet, despite its military and economic consequences, it was not yet considered as its own type of security. Hence, the Helsinki Final Act presents as its referent objects “present and future generations,” as well as the “well-being of peoples and the economic development.” Yet, the scope is limited to a more conventional definition of environmental security: that each state pledges that “activities carried out on its territory do not cause degradation of the environment in another State or in areas lying beyond the limits of national jurisdiction” (Helsinki Final Act, 1975).

Conserving the momentum of the Helsinki Final Act and the esprit de détente, the USSR once again raised the question of the use of ecological warfare by the United States. The US Department of State previously argued in response to an inquiry by the General Assembly that the use of chemical herbicides had not been covered by the 1925 Geneva Protocol (Hough, 2014, p.62). Ample evidence points that potential anthropogenic manipulation of the environment underwent a rudimentary process of securitization in the Soviet military circles already in the 1970s. Based on documents like the Soviet Military Encyclopedia, Sokolov and Korenev (1999, p. 214) conclude that the Soviet security establishment seriously considered the threat of the United States conducting offensive operations that would target the Soviet environment in such ways that it would be rendered uninhabitable in a process of a “geo- physical” warfare. They point that this was a major paradigm shift in the USSR, which was traditionally welcoming of environmental manipulation for the goals of economic development. This is an indication that, contrary to the argument proposed by Hough (2014) that Soviet leadership merely used environmental issues as a bargaining chip in the international arena, environmental issues indeed were earnestly considered as part of the Soviet security regime. 31

As Sokolov and Korenev (1999, p. 214) state, the USSR, already significantly burdened economically by the arms race and lagging behind the US technologically, sought to ban environmental modification for military purposes. Following the US retreat from Vietnam, change of administration from Nixon to Ford, and signing of the Helsinki Final Act, the US did not feel the need to tolerate the reputational damage, acquiescing to Soviet demands. In 1974, the USSR submitted a proposal “on the prohibition of action to influence environment and climate for military and other purposes incompatible with the maintenance of international security, human well-being, and health,” which once again cast the environment and climate in light of security (General Assembly resolution 3264(XXIX), 1974). The United States, facing both domestic and international pressure, cooperated in creating the Resolution 31/72, which became adopted in 1976 as the Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques (ENMOD) (Crawford, 2019, p. 81).

It seems natural, in that sense, that the development of the notion of environmental security would coincide with the realization that the environment could be used offensively. Because the 1976 ENMOD convention with the definition of the ecocide enshrined in international law, both parties clearly saw that undermining the environmental security of the Cold War adversaries could become another offensive tactic in the East-West hostilities. On the contrary, the securitization of the environment did not have this impact. Indeed, as Brezhnev and his successors realized that transboundary environmental degradation could be utilized as another bargaining chip in their diplomatic strategy, the Soviet Union was exceptionally cooperative in terms of their environmental commitments. As such, “the USSR could project an image of cooperativeness by engaging in international environmental cooperation – a concession that posed a relatively small threat to the internal and external security of the Soviet state, yet one of considerable interest to the West” (Darst, 2001, p. 23).

A seminal event in Soviet environmental thinking was, without doubt, the Chernobyl nuclear disaster in 1986. It is truly impossible to underestimate the effect of the Chernobyl nuclear disaster on the Soviet leadership. Apart from the obvious devastating effect that it had on human security, environment, and the economy, the Chernobyl nuclear disaster propelled environmental issues, previously delegated to ceremonial ministries and party committees to the highest levels of decision-making. In terms of scientific input, it is important to underscore the work done by academician Valery Legasov, who directly investigated the causes of the Chernobyl disaster. Long before the Chernobyl disaster, Legasov was a pioneer in the field of

security and risk studies, being one of the first to introduce the term of “acceptable risk” as a response to the Three Mile Island accident, which was defined as “a risk indistinguishable by a person against the background of other risks to which he is exposed in normal conditions of life and work” (Legasov et al., 1984). Simultaneously, this was the introduction of security at the human security level. After the Chernobyl disaster, Legasov defined security on seven different levels: 1) security against military conflict; 2) human-environmental security; 3) economic security; 4) political security; 5) cultural security; 6) ethical security; 7) social security (quoted in Bykov, 2011, p. 82). In other words, Legasov placed environmental security, i.e. security to human habitat from technogenic threats, only second to the largest Cold War threat, i.e. security against military threats.

The 1980s ushered in a period, which was characterized by an integration of climate change and environmental concerns into the international security discourse, spearheaded by the Soviet Union and supported by its allies, including Czechoslovakia (Camprubí, 2016, pp. 234-235). This is caused by several factors. Domestically, the environmental movement in the Soviet Union picked up steam significantly due to the change of leadership and the start of the perestroika in 1985. Internationally, the move was dictated by the desire to reify international law and, like in the 1970s, in a general spirit of rapprochement with the US.

4.1.1 The Securitizing Move

This thinking reflected itself in the changing attitude of the Soviet leadership. The Soviet securitizing move should be understood in the context of the East-West dialogue on the meaning and scope of security, in which Soviet leadership sought to extend the definition of security, at least rhetorically, to include largely “non-military aspects” and to change the referent objects of security. This dialogue has been initiated during the 41st session of the General Assembly, with Soviet Union’s renewed interest to use the United Nations as a platform for resolving conflicts in the late 1980s (Alger et al., 1995, p. 450).

In order to analyze the securitizing move, I have scrutinized all mentions for “environmental security” (экологическая безопасность) in the Pravda newspaper, which until August 21, 1991, was the official newspaper of the Communist Party of the USSR and ergo the official channel for information distribution. As such, reporting in the Pravda newspaper, directed both at domestic and international audiences reflects the official position

33 of the Soviet state. By the means of content analysis, I examined mentions of environmental security in Pravda stories until August 1991, when it ceased to be an official newspaper. The analysis was carried out using the in-built search engine of the Pravda Digital Archive, searching for exact matches for the term “environmental security” (exact phrase экологическая безопасность in all possible declensions).

Overall, there are 75 relevant mentions of environmental security, 40 of which are in international context, 33 of which are in domestic context. The earliest mention of environmental security since 1912 is from 1984, but it is a standalone example in a rather typical story on industry. It is somewhat of a harbinger of the changing tides, since just three years later, environmental security appears in 1987 in an article “Economic efficiency and social justice,” which discusses environmental security as one of important considerations in terms of social justice and economic efficiency. The next mention is also in an opinion column on the reform of the nature management state agencies and on the priority that should be placed on environmental security. It is important to note that both articles were written by members of the academia, which, as previously seen, initiated the discussion on environmental security.

However, one should search for the securitizing move in the highest offices of the state. Indeed, it is the pen of Mikhail Gorbachev who popularized the term “international environmental security” in his article Reality and Guarantees of a Secure World, published in Pravda on September 17, 1987. The main point of the rather lengthy essay is to present the world the new Soviet ideas on how the system of international peace and security should look like. First, Gorbachev criticizes and dismisses the Cold War global security system and substantiates the need and the desire to change it, motivating it by nuclear disarmament and threats to global security. Environmental security is presented alongside economic security as a threat to global security:

Environmental security. In the most direct sense of this word, we are insecure, when poisons flow in rivers, as poisonous showers fall down from the skies, when cities and entire regions suffocate in an atmosphere saturated with industrial and transport wastes, when development of nuclear energy is accompanied by an unacceptable risk… The relationship between man and nature has become a threat. Environmental security concerns affect everyone, regardless wealth and poverty. A global environmental and resource management strategy is needed. And we propose to start also its development within the framework of a specialized UN program… To realize the need to open a common front for economic and environmental security and to start forming it means to defuse the time bomb, set in the bowels of universal human history by the people themselves. (Gorbachev, 1987)

It is evident from Gorbachev’s article that he envisioned environmental security, along with economic security (such as “security from starvation”), as a common threat to humanity, and as such, desired to supplant the term national security in order to create a new post-Cold War international security system. He relied on topics of past experience, where cooperation with the US had been productive and plausible (such as the ENMOD convention), in particular, environment and disarmament. Already during the Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development, which took place August 24 – September 11, 1987, the “non- military threats to security” were brought to the forefront of the discussion by socialist countries (United Nations Conference on Disarmament and Development, 1987). This foreshadowed the effort of the socialist nations to push through environmental security as a new common security issue and thus to restructure the “international system of peace and security.” Consequently, the USSR delegation raised the issue of “international economic security,” and the Czechoslovak delegation raised the issue of “establishing a world-wide system of ecological security,” which was tied to disarmament (U.N.GAOR, Oct. 8, 1987). Similarly, the 1987 Resolution Environmental Perspective to the Year 2000 and Beyond underscored the link between security and environment.

The main securitizing move followed immediately when Czechoslovakia and Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic submitted a draft resolution A/C.2/42/L.34 entitled International Ecological Security to the General Assembly on October 30, 1987. “The organizational guarantees of international ecological security could take the form of organically linked systems of national, regional, and collective ecological security. The functioning of each of those systems would ensure the observance of the principle of the inviolability” (U.N.GAOR, Nov. 4, 1987). Similarly, Shevardnadze repeated in his speech before the General Assembly in 1989: “Defining for itself the main principles of the concept of ecological security, the Soviet Union considers disarmament, the economy, and ecology as an integral whole.” (U.N.GAOR, Sept. 27, 1989)

Quantitative analysis of the mentions of environmental security after Gorbachev’s essay was published reveals the securitizing emphasis that was put by Soviet leadership on environmental security. Indeed, after this point, the term environmental security firmly entered

the vocabulary of Russian journalists, scientists, and legal scholars.8 Immediately after the publication of the article, it started figuring in important international articles, such as in an article on Finland from November 1987, on global nature protection in January 1988, on Canada in May 1988, etc. As the new term gained popularity, it was spread through the official channels and became a new rhetorical tool in Soviet diplomacy, being preached through the Warsaw Treaty Organization. In Pravda’s stories, environmental security was most often mentioned in relation to the Warsaw Treaty Organization (7 times).

That the concept of environmental security originated in the highest offices of the state is evident from the authorship of the Pravda stories. Four of the stories were authored by Gorbachev himself, two by foreign minister Shevardnadze, two by the premier Ryzhkov, three by the Supreme Council, one by vice foreign minister Petrovsky, one by the ministry of defense, two by the Congress of People’s Deputies. Although it was extremely difficult to be published in the Pravda to begin with (Murray, 1994, p. 46), the fact that the environmental security was in addition also presented as an idea of the party officials indicates their ownership over the concept.

As Broadus & Vartanov (1994, p. 8) mention, the Gorbachev team was eager to demonstrate the bona fide efforts on the part of the Soviet Union to the West and to establish Soviet leadership in this area. In this regard, it unsurprising that the Arctic issues were one of the first issues taken up by Gorbachev: in an October 1987 speech in Murmansk, he called for the creation of an “arctic zone of peace,” which would entail regional environmental cooperation. The Arctic remained an important area for Soviet environmental security, evidenced by the fact that a 1988 Pravda article considers it in the domestic context as well.

4.1.2 Audience Acceptance

An even more telling story is the way that the concept of environmental security was accepted both within the Soviet Union and by international audiences. After the publication of Gorbachev’s article, environmental security became more widely mentioned in Pravda’s stories. An interesting trend is that environmental security became mentioned in Pravda stories not only in reference to international and global environmental security but also increasingly in

8 A search in the National Corpus of Russian Language (Национальный корпус русского языка) has the oldest entry for environmental security in 1988. A similar search in Google Ngram Viewer shows that the term environmental security first briefly appeared in the 1930s, but only entered widespread use in the mid-1980s. 36

domestic contexts. This can be partly attributed to the fact that the 1986 Chernobyl disaster brought environmental issues to the forefront of Soviet domestic affairs (Broadus & Vartanov, 1994, p. 9). As such, the international dimension of environmental security peaked in 1989, which simultaneously is the period from which environmental security started being used in the domestic context. This undoubtedly is related to the fact that the international agenda lost its importance as the Soviet Union was undergoing the process of internal change.

10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0

International Domestic

Figure 2. Environmental Security Mentions in Pravda Stories

The call for international environmental security entailed creating a truly international ecological regime. Informational feedback is an important requirement in order to verify the observance of an international security regime (Timoshenko, 1992). In accordance with the policy of glasnost’, the Soviet leadership radically changed its position on environmental data. First, data on water and atmospheric pollution, which was previously considered sensitive and classified, was published in the 1987 statistical handbook (Pautova, 2018).

Internationally, the concept of environmental security did not initially make many strides due to opposition from the West. In fact, Gorbachev’s securitization move was received with fierce resistance in the West. Despite having a reputation for openness to take up non- military security issues, the US vigorously combatted Gorbachev’s initiative in international forums (Camprubí, 2016, p. 236). The 1988 U.S. Congress House Committee on Foreign Affairs reported:

The United States and other Western countries defanged and then eroded support for the major Soviet initiative on international security, a vaguely-worded but pernicious attempt to rewrite the U.N. Charter under the guise of a new “comprehensive system of international security.” (p. 7)

Nevertheless, on December 7, 1987, the UN General Assembly adopted Resolution 42/93 Comprehensive System of International Peace and Security, which “considers that interaction in the ecological sphere should become an integral part of comprehensive international security.” The resolution was adopted by 76 votes, which mostly included socialist countries, 12 votes against (among which France, UK, and USA) and 63 abstentions (U.N.GAOR, Dec. 10, 1987). Likewise, decision International Ecological Security was adopted by the General Assembly on December 10 (U.N.GAOR, Dec. 14, 1987).

4.2 Summary

This chapter demonstrated that Gorbachev’s new “comprehensive system of international peace and security” was designed to lead to disarmament and put an end to the Cold War rivalry with the United States by focusing on threats, shared commonly by the US, the USSR and by humanity at large. This narrative of a new concept of peace and security was peddled by the Soviet diplomats in the United Nations and through the Soviet integration channels, namely, the Warsaw Treaty Organization. Readily accepted by the governments of the Eastern European satellites, environmental security was met with suspicion in the West; not finding much support among Western international audiences.

Ultimately, it is only with the end of the Cold War and the demise of the Soviet Union that environmental security gained acceptance in the United States. It was only with the change from the George H. W. Bush to Bill Clinton administration that environmental security became securitized by the United States (Floyd, 2010, pp. 70-86). Ironically, American governmental agencies turned to environmental security only when they discovered the lack of an “enemy syndrome” and lasted until another military threat was successfully conjured (Camprubí, 2016, p. 236; Floyd, 2010, p. 70).

However, how environmental security became conceptualized in the United States differed fundamentally both conceptually and ideologically. Whereas the version of environmental security proposed by the USSR emphasized “at least implicitly that it is ecosystems and ecological processes that should be secured, the prima facie referent… [being] non-human,” the US internalization of the same concept was preoccupied with the relation between environment and military conflict (Barnett, 2001, pp. 108-109).

At the same time, Pravda stories demonstrated that environmental security found support among audiences it did not intend to target: the domestic audiences. Although environmental policy had always been important in the USSR, it was never a subject of public debate. The increased liberalization seems to have opened this curtain, and environmental security soon became a topic that could be deliberated by new political bodies, evidenced by the wide popularity that it gained in the Council of the People’s Deputies – a representative body, concerned mostly with the domestic policy. Environmental security thus became an important way of discussing the environment at home. It is thus important to consider the extent to which there existed a continuity between this Soviet securitizing move and the relatively later environmental securitization in Russia, to which I shall turn in the next chapter.

5 Environmental Security in Russian Foreign Policy

Having determined the initial, prelude securitization of the environment in the late Soviet period, this chapter will turn to the Russian Federation and the way it securitized the environment. Although the Soviet securitizing move and the Russian securitization of the environment are proximate in time, it is not clear whether they stem from the same process. Thus, it is important to find out whence the concept of environmental security originated and how it spread to Russia.

Floyd (2010) argued that the concept of environmental security originated in the United States. Following Sjöstedt (2008) logic of norm spreading, there are several possibilities as to the origin of environmental securitization:

1. The environment was securitized in Russia as an instrumental norm, which spread from outside (e.g. the United States);

2. The environment was securitized in Russia independently, thus, following the logic of a deepened identity.

I choose to analyze the securitization of the environment as an international norm based on international treaties involving the Russian Federation. International agreements are a source of law and an integral part of the Russian legal system (Kiseleva, 2017). According to Part 4 of Article 15 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation, which stipulates that “the commonly recognized principles and norms of the international law and the international treaties of the Russian Federation shall be a component part of its legal system. If an international treaty of the Russian Federation stipulates other rules than those stipulated by the law, the rules of the international treaty shall apply” (Constitution of the Russian Federation, 1993).

5.1 Securitization of Environment: Systematic Picture

Hence, in order to find the origin of the environmental security in the international context and to reconstruct this international discourse, I first quantitatively analyze texts from 1987 to 2019, compiled within the international treaties section of the GARANT legal system. As already

described in the methods chapter, this compilation includes all documents with binary hits for the term “environmental security” in various inflections. As a preliminary step for quantitative analysis, these hits were selected on the basis of context relevance (thus eliminating noise and false positives); with the results passing contextual tests being inductively coded into the database. Having subjected the resulting database to quantitative methods described in the methods section of this thesis, the resulting preliminary findings are then supplemented with discourse analysis to refine the argument and make the narrative ideographically clear. Due to the heterogeneous nature of the data collected in this section, it is reasonable to expect that the degree to which any particular document is relevant to environmental securitization varies. This dimension is not covered by quantitative methods; therefore, in order to narrow the scope of the research for this chapter, areas flagged for relevance to the securitization theory (i.e. ones where referent object is identifiable) were analyzed. These areas include international climate agreements, energy agreements, model legislation, etc.

5.1.1 Data

First, there were 1744 context-unspecific hits for “environmental security” within the international agreement section. The context-unspecific hits were then coded and sorted according to relevance, as many of the hits in this section did not have a mention of environmental security per se (rather security and environment as two separate concepts), or clearly constituted environmental safety documents (such as technical standards without referent objects) Thus, among these 1744 context-unspecific hits, only 389 hits passed the relevance test, covering the period from 1987 to the end of 2019. These hits were inductively coded according to issue areas: electrical power engineering, national security and geopolitics, hydrocarbon, ecology and human welfare, economics and trade, transboundary water, GOST, waste disposal, agriculture, space, and transport. These issue areas were then divided into three macro-categories: national security, human and ecosystem security, and economics and trade (see Figure 3).

In order of the magnitude of coverage, the first macro-category is national security and

geopolitics. Unsurprisingly, the earliest hit comes from this category, demonstrating the continuity between the Soviet securitizing moves, described in the previous chapter. The symbolic origin of environmental security in Russian legal practice is thus the aforementioned UN General Assembly Resolution 42/93, which names “ecological security” as an “integral

41 part of comprehensive international security.” Other documents in this category include agreements on military bases and troops in the former Soviet republics, general bilateral and multilateral security issues, etc. A separate subcategory of agreements includes agreements with Kazakhstan regarding the bilateral aerospace exploration and the use of Baikonur.

The second macro-category is ecology and human welfare is a category of diverse agreements, which primarily emphasize the importance of environmental protection as a general global security priority, including from the citizen and human security perspectives. Unsurprisingly, many of the documents from this category come from the early 1990s, when the term environmental security first started entering the legal jargon. The earliest document in this category is the Joint Soviet-Italian declaration from 1989, which called for immediate international cooperation on environmental issues. The explosion of documents in the early 1990s is attributed to generic bilateral agreements signed after the dissolution of the USSR, including ones with other newly independent former Soviet republics.

The third macro-category consists of economic and trade documents. Here, GOST is a category comprised of technical standards adopted within the structure of the Commonwealth of the Independent States. The temporal analysis demonstrates that this category of documents expanded significantly between 2012-2017, which can be attributed to increased Eurasian integration. Other documents include energy, economics, and trade, etc.

National security Human and ecosystem security Economic and trade

Figure 3. Documents by Macrocategory (Stacked)

National Territory Human Ecosphere

Figure 4. Types of Referent Objects (not including GOST, stacked)

5.1.2 Referent Object: What Kind of Security?

The macro-categories above demonstrate what the documents dealt with, but they do not reflect the referent object in these documents. Indeed, the issue area and the referent object might be different. For example, the Eurasian Commission decision on the single-window system is a document that deals with foreign trade, yet the referent object there is national environmental security, i.e. the state:

Reliable and timely information about goods, participating parties, payments and the integrity of logistics will ensure: a) national security, including in the economic, social and environmental spheres (Decision of the Eurasian Intergovernmental Council, 2019).

Not only is it not easy to adjudicate the referent object from the macro-category, sometimes it is not explicitly stated, or several referent objects are present (e.g., state and the people). In line with the Russian Law on Security and with von Lucke et al. (2014), the principal referent objects of environmental security are inferred: environmental security of the state (national environmental security), environmental security as territorial security, human security, and global security.

Figure 4 summarizes the documents by the referent object. Although documents here are coded into clean-cut categories, in practice, the same document usually has several referent objects. The referent object chosen here is the principal referent object, or whichever best passes the macro-category summarized above. For example, coding the 2012 Agreement on Russian- DPRK border, the principal referent object is territorial because the threat (risk) explicitly stated

is territorial. At the same time, the ecosystems are a second referent object, followed by human security concerns:

Industrial and agricultural work, forestry, mining and other economic activities carried out by business entities of the Russian Federation and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, including jointly in the border areas and in the waters of the Tumen River, should not harm the health of the border population, environmental and other security of the states of the Parties or contain a threat of causing such damage. (art. 12)

Summarizing the findings from Figure 3 and Figure 4, one can conclude that initially, agreements mentioning environmental security dealt mostly with human and ecosystem security. This is a legacy of the Soviet securitizing move discussed in the previous chapter – the one, in which the referent object was exclusively the ecosphere and the global environment. Then the military and geopolitics issues appeared. Finally, only much later did economics and trade became an issue area. The state has always been and consistently remained the principal referent object of security. Consider, for example, the agreement between governments of Russia and Kazakhstan on cooperation in the sphere of environmental protection (December 22, 2004), in which the ecosphere is important only insomuch it is of utility to the state:

Conscious of our responsibility to present and future generations for the prevention of environmental disasters, catastrophes and environmental degradation, as well as for ensuring environmental security in neighboring territories… (para. 4)

5.1.3 Audiences: Who With?

20 18 16 14 12 10 8 6 4 2 0

CIS EurAsEC+EAEU+CU CSTO SCO Union State Neighboring Countries

Figure 5. Russian International Treaties by Country Groups (stacked)

The next important question is whom those agreements are made with. Figure 5 demonstrates selected partners in the international agreements, showing that during the 1990s most of the agreements were made with neighboring countries. It seems that this first period of increased cooperation with neighboring countries on a bilateral basis lasted only until the early 2000s. Ever since the mid-1990s, the organizational factor had become important, and different regional organizations became the principal avenues of discussing environmental security issues.

5.1.4 Analysis

The data thus confirms the analysis from the previous chapter that demonstrated that the USSR/Russia started securitizing the environment in the early 1990s as a response to the end of the Cold War. To the first approximation, it would seem that the number of mentions of “environmental security” increased over time: whereas in the 1990s the number of international agreements containing the query fluctuated around ten, it peaked at 50 in 2016. However, this account does not take into consideration the total number of documents in the database9. Thus, considering the percentage of documents that mention “environmental security,” it becomes evident that the number of international agreements relative to the total number of documents remained relatively constant, averaging at 1.37%.

First, I apply the methodology explained in Kleinberg (2003) for analysis of document streams (see Chapter 3.1.4) in order to obtain the burstiness metric, which shows the degree to which a particular term was trendy. The burstiness metric takes into account the exponential growth and thus demonstrates when a particular new term was novel and its use spread rapidly. Since the burstiness metric used here is a two-state model, it is not so much the value of the burst that is significant, but whether it is greater than zero that demonstrates the “burstiness.” Because the metric demonstrates the difference in the cost of transition from one state of document emission to another, the positive value of the burstiness metric means that the use of the phrase grew exponentially from one state to the next (in this context, years).

Table 3 summarizes the findings of the analysis of the burstiness metric for the years 1990-2000. Although the analysis was done for the raw hits during the entire period from 1989

9 Since the total number of documents in the database is not publicly available, this is substituted by the number of documents containing the stop-word “и” (“and”) anywhere in the text. 45 to 2019, the phrase “environmental security” was bursty only in the 1990s. The data shows that there are two bursts for “environmental security”: 1990-1992 with a peak in 1991 and 1995- 1998 with a peak in 1996. The weight of these bursts and the “depth” of fall in 1993-1994 suggest that these two bursts should be treated as two separate events, rather than a continuation of a singular event. This does not suggest that the two bursts are not related; on the contrary, they are interrelated. At the same time, the duration and the weight of the second burst suggest that from the two securitization attempts the second one was more successful.

Table 3. Burstiness Values for Environmental Security in International Treaties, 1990-200010

Total documents (푑푡) Relevant documents (푟푡) Burst weight

휎(0, 푟푡, 푑푡) − 휎(1, 푟푡, 푑푡) 1990 163 4 0,8339 1991 128 5 1,966 1992 649 12 0,5509 1993 731 12 - 0,4488 1994 678 8 - 2,624 1995 652 14 1,9251 1996 622 14 2,2908 1997 704 15 1,9964 1998 539 11 1,1868 1999 524 8 -0,7463 2000 485 7 - 0,9761

Another way to quantify the power and the success of the term “environmental security” is to look at relative power, using methodology from Ban et al. (2019). As explained in Chapter 3, the relative measure is a method to determine the power of the term in relation to other(s). In order to find the results of the relative power metric, I perform queries for “national security” (национальная безопасность), “state security” (государственная безопасность), “military security” (военная безопасность), and just “safety/security” (безопасность). Unsurprisingly, the relative power metric supports the results of the burstiness metric. As Figure 6 illustrates, although the relative power of “environmental security” vis-à-vis military and state security showed several peaks, analysis of environmental security vis-à-vis national security

10 Although the metric was calculated for the entire period, only results to 2000 were given. Results for years 2001-2019 are negative and thus indicate no bursts. 46

shows that environmental security experienced its most significant peaks only in the 1990s. Similarly to the results obtained previously, the relative power of environmental security was highest in 1991 and in 1996-1998. During the 2000s/2010s, the relative power of environmental security was higher than state or military security, but it continued to decrease in relation to national security, which is also consistent with the lack of bursts during this period.

0,8

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1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 Military State Safety/ National National + MilSec StatSec SafSec NatSec2 MilNatStat Security Security Security Security Military Security

Figure 6. Relative Power of Environmental Security Relative to Selected Types of Security

5.2 Russian Federation and Environmental Securitization

The quantitative overview in the previous section showed several directions for discourse analysis: 1) environmental security was most active during the 1990s, though it never became entirely desecuritized; 2) the state was always the primary referent object of environmental security, even when the documents dealt with different topics; 3) it was mainly neighboring countries and former Soviet Union countries, with which agreements on environmental security were made.

The first quantitative glance also demonstrated that the concept of environmental security, despite its novelty, survived the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Not simply related to the Soviet securitization move, it remained an important part of international politics in Russia (Broadus & Vartanov, 1994, p. 9). As I have shown, the quantitative evidence from the previous 47

section shows that the research should focus on two peaks in environmental securitization: 1991 and the second half of the 1990s. The presence of two peaks could be explained that environmental security became ever more prominent in the Russian security debate at least in part for the same lack of an “enemy syndrome” as in the United States. Furthermore, environmental security issues were aggravated by the newly erected borders between former Soviet republics: many of the formerly purely domestic issues, including Chernobyl, transformed into transboundary issues. This section will analyze these securitizing moves and attempt to reconstruct this securitization discourse.

5.2.1 Securitizing move

Qualitative evidence collected from the documents in this database shows that environmental issues became immediately securitized on the territory of the former Soviet Union. Already possessing a developed bureaucracy (see Appendix I) and a rich experience in the field of environmental securitization, Russian Federation played a decisive role in the securitization of environmental issues both within and without the former territory of the USSR (Mukhutdinova, 2013, p. 382).

As mentioned already in Section 5.2.4, during the 1990s, most international agreements were made with the former Republics of the USSR and countries that share a border with the Russian Federation. It is interesting to note, that RSFSR started signing documents on environmental security already before the fall of the USSR, and such agreements were signed in chronological order with Ukrainian SSR, Kazakh SSR, Belorussian SSR, Estonia, Latvia, Kyrgyzstan, and Lithuania. All of these agreements included a similar calque: “cooperation in the field of environmental protection, including the prevention of transboundary pollution and participation in the creation of a comprehensive international system of environmental security” (emphasis mine). This formula transferred into the Agreement on the Establishment of the Commonwealth of Independent States, which was signed on December 8, 1991. The Commonwealth of Independent States will become an important forum for environmental securitization.

Given the systemic crisis in the post-Soviet space following the events of 1991, the legal status of the states inhabiting this region remained largely uncertain. 11 For this reason,

11 See, for example, Kipp (1992) 48

precedence was given to developing an institutional cooperation framework and solving pressing security issues at the executive level. As an attempt at solving the pressing issue of inter-republican cooperation in the absence of a central government, the Agreement on Cooperation in the Field of Ecology and Environmental Protection was signed in Moscow on February 8, 1992, which became one of the first agreements in the Commonwealth of Independent States. This agreement established the Interstate Environmental Council, which has as its goal among others coordination on environmental security issues. The Interstate Ecological Council and Interstate Ecological Fund were created in Minsk on July 10, 1992, as a branch of the executive council of the CIS meant for dealing with environmental issues across the newly erected borders. From 1992, the countries signed the Agreement on duties, rights and, responsibilities of the CIS member countries.

Environmental security was one of the first issues taken up at the legislative level as well. Immediately following the creation of the Inter-Parliamentary Assembly in March 1992, a Standing Committee on Environmental Issues was created. The first document adopted by the Inter-Parliamentary Assembly was the “Principal Directions of Harmonization of the National Legislations of the Member States of the Commonwealth of the Independent States,” which stipulated the goal of the Inter-Parliamentary Assembly as “all-round assistance in creating the most favorable and equal legal conditions for the development of entrepreneurship, economic activity and free trade throughout the Commonwealth, environmental security, as well as the creation of general guarantees of citizens’ rights,” as well as found it necessary to harmonize legislation on the subject of environmental security (Inter-Parliamentary Assembly, 1992, p. 37; emphasis mine). The first document that the Standing Committee on Environmental Issues initiated was the model law “On the Principles of Environmental Security in the States of the Commonwealth,” which was adopted on December 29, 1992. Parenthetically, the document referred to the CIS as “the State” (indicating the hypothetical preservation of the USSR in the capacity of the CIS), which reflects its unclear legal status. This was the first common law adopted after the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the only document on security adopted by the Inter-Parliamentary Assembly.12 Furthermore, in 1993, the Inter-Parliamentary Assembly began drafting a law On Compensation of Damages Caused by Violation of Environmental Security.

12 For more information on the impact of the CIS Interparliamentary Assembly see Petrova (2019), Murzakulova (2010) 49

Simultaneously, Russian Federation continued securitizing the environment on a bilateral basis and expanded cooperation to include neighboring countries, which were not part of the USSR: Finland, Poland, Sweden, Greece, Czechia, Denmark, Albania, etc. At the same time, new agreements were signed with former Soviet republics. Additionally, the scope of environmental security was widened to include two new crucial sectors: the military and nuclear energy. There are two reasons for this. First, this was an indication that environmental security became accepted in the military circles. Second, this comes because of the realization that the traditional security providers (i.e. the military) pose a risk to environmental security. Consequently, bilateral agreements on military cooperation also stipulated the importance of ensuring environmental security and often discussed the issue of compensation for potential damages, e.g. as in the Agreement between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Belarus on Strategic Forces Temporarily Deployed on the Territory of the Republic of Belarus: “Russian Federation is responsible for compliance of the strategic forces temporarily deployed on the territory of the Republic of Belarus to environmental security standards. In case of violation of these norms by them, the damage caused is subject to compensation in full by the Russian Federation. The amount of damage is determined jointly by the Russian Federation and the Republic of Belarus.”

Arctic Military-Environmental Cooperation (AMEC) stands alone as one of the principal international environmental initiatives of this period, not initiated by Russia. Floyd (2010, pp. 99-100) lists it as one of the most important moments in international environmental securitization by Clinton administration and as a critical moment in the turn towards environmental security. However, AMEC was decidedly not an initiative of the Clinton administration, nor was it even a US initiative. Rather, it was a Norwegian initiative. As Floyd (2010, p. 99) retells it, it was the Norwegian Defense Minister Jørgen Hårek Kosmo that approached his American colleague William Perry for assistance in persuading Russia in 1995. In 1996, Russia, Norway, and the United States signed the Declaration on Arctic Military- Environmental Cooperation (AMEC), which would ensure safe storage of nuclear waste, which included top-secret objects like nuclear submarines. AMEC opened an important chapter in environmental security cooperation because it represented a “military-to-military” interaction (Sokolov and Korenev, 1999).

The question is why Russia so readily agreed to participate in such an intrusive operation. The intuitive answer, at least to the Western reader of international relations, accustomed to the

othering of the Soviet Union and its successor, is that Russia, defeated in the Cold War, had no choice but to bandwagon on Western initiatives, while the West was concerned with the risks to their environmental security coming from Russia. Yet, this answer seems to be less than satisfactory. It is anecdotal to think that of all Arctic countries, both close and distant, Russia should be the only one not concerned by the environmental damage inflicted in its own territorial waters. As will be explored in detail in the next chapter, Russia had already securitized the environment by 1993. After all, the 1993 “Yablokov Commission Report” to the President was commissioned, made public, and disseminated by the Russian government (Yablokov, 2001). In 1996, Russia hosted the Moscow Nuclear Safety and Security Summit, which furthered environmental security vis-à-vis nuclear safety. Yeltsin agreed to host the summit already at the G7 plus Russia summit in autumn 1995 (Panova, 2007, p 108). Document analysis of radioactive and environmental security reveals that Russia had already begun the process of addressing these issues with its own limited capacities. Thus, when Norway and the US suggested AMEC to Russia in 1996, they were preaching to the choir, albeit a needy one. Russian participation in AMEC, largely as a beneficiary, is hardly surprising (even at a cost of potentially revealing military secrets), given that it was entirely in its national interest.

In 1994-1995, the Russian Federation began the process of overhauling environmental legislation, a process described in detail in the next chapter. Environmental security was included in the Law “On Subsoil Minerals.” The State Duma adopted Federal laws “On the Protection of the Population and Territories from Natural and Technogenic Emergencies,” “On Fire Safety,” “On Wildlife,” “On Special Protected Nature Territories,” “On Radiation Security of the Population,” “On Environmental Expertise.” Federal law “On Environmental Security” was drafted, but it was not given presidential assent, which I will discuss in detail in the next chapter. References to environmental security were made in other important security legislation, such as the Federal law “On Operational-Investigative Activity,” “On Federal Security Service,” “On the Continental Shelf of the Russian Federation.” The adoption of these legislative initiatives is significant because it demonstrates the scale of environmental legislative activity within Russia during this period.

In 1996, the Inter-Parliamentary Assembly adopted a series of environmental model legislation that was modeled on drafts of Russian laws in the process of adoption. Furthermore, both the Russian State Duma Committee on Ecology and the Inter-Parliamentary Assembly Commission on Environmental Issues were headed by the same person, Tamara Zlotnikova –

51 a State Duma member from Orenburg. The significance of the Federal Assembly in environmental securitization will be explored in detail in the following chapter. Thus, model laws “On Environmental Expertise” (February 17, 1996), “On Environmental Education of the Population” (February 17, 1996) “On Environmental Security” (November 2, 1996), “On Access to Environmental Information” (December 9, 1997), drafted by the IPA CIS Commission on Environmental Issues, which was renamed IPA CIS Commission of Ecology and Natural Resources in 1997, and eventually renamed to IPA CIS Commission on Agricultural Policy, Natural Resources, and Ecology, were largely modeled after bills being simultaneously proposed in Russia. In 2000, the CIS drafted but never moved past that point the Convention on Collective Environmental Security. Finally, on November 15, 2003, it drafted a new edition of the model law “On Environmental Security”. As Russia stopped working on environmental security legislation domestically, the need to push for the adoption of the same legislation in the CIS countries disappeared.

Both quantitatively and qualitatively, by the early 2000s active securitization of the environment by Russia on the international level decelerated. Both in the second edition of the Environmental Security Model Law and Environmental Insurance Model Law environmental security was discussed in a more matter of fact, technical manner. As the Convention on Collective Environmental Security states, the “efforts already undertaken at the national and international levels are aimed at creating a system of collective environmental security…. with the aim of developing integration processes and fixing the norms of international environmental law.” Thus, environmental security cooperation for Russia became one of the multiple avenues of deepened integration: although no further new securitizing moves were made it did become eventually institutionalized, as a steady document flow on environmental security kept being generated by the CIS (see Figure 5).

New securitizing initiatives came through the Union State of Russia and Belarus, which, starting from 1997 became one of the most important lines of integration. The Treaty on the Creation of a Union State of Russia and Belarus, which was meant as a federative document erecting a new supranational organization that would allow the two countries to tackle different issues jointly, including environmental security. In fact, environmental security is specifically mentioned several times within the text, and a common text for “Implementation of a joint policy in the field of environmental security, hydrometeorology, monitoring and environmental protection, prevention and elimination of the consequences of natural and man-made disasters,

including the consequences of the Chernobyl accident” was created. As a result, the Union State had become a new important line of securitization of the environment, where environmental security consistently remained on the agenda of the Union State, with regular reporting of the activities on the provision of environmental security in both states.

The Collective Security Treaty Organization and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization became additional avenues of environmental securitization. Since both alliances are explicit security organizations, environmental security is a natural field of interest for both. Although the CSTO is the older of the two, both qualitatively and quantitatively, there are rather few mentions of environmental security. In all cases, environmental security is mentioned in relation to movement or deployment of troops, namely, that the military should not create threats to environmental security. This is perhaps because members of CSTO already were members of CIS, so there was no reason for repeating the same securitization in a different forum.

The Shanghai Cooperation Organization, on the other hand, mentioned the environment as a sphere of cooperation between the parties already in the Declaration on the Creation of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Since then, several agreements on environmental security were created, such as the Agreement on Emergencies or the 2007 Bishkek Agreement on Friendship, which called for “cooperation in the field of environmental protection, ensuring environmental security, rational nature management.” The Bishkek Declaration of August 16, 2007, further stated that the SCO countries were also concerned with international security in non-military spheres, such as the environment:

Cooperation in countering new challenges and threats should be carried out sequentially, without applying double standards, through strict observance of international law. Such problems as ensuring the sustainability of the global economy, reducing poverty, leveling socio-economic development, ensuring economic, environmental, energy, information security, as well as protecting the population and territories of the member states of the Organization from natural and technogenic emergencies. (para. 4)

In addition, the Eurasian Economic Community, created in 2000, became another avenue of discussing environmental security. Because EurAsEC was primarily an economic community, the environmental agenda is natural and important for it. However, environmental security appeared first in the EurAsEC documents only in 2007, in the Concept for Unified Social Policy for the member states. Ever since, EurAsEC stayed instrumental for harmonizing environmental policy and regulations between member states, as well as providing funding for environmental think tanks and initiatives, such as the 2010 program for creation of unified

53 information systems. After the EurAsEC transformed into the Customs Union and the EAEC, cooperation on environmental security issues deepened and increased significantly in scope. During the fourteen-year-long existence of EurAsEC, only seven documents on environmental security were made, while the EAEC produced 22 documents just in five years of its existence. This can be attributed to a larger bureaucratic system within the EAEC and a deeper integration of the member states.

The integration of the environmental security agenda into Russian integration attempts is an important indicator of the depth and sincerity of cooperation. On the one hand, environmental security is not a pressing security concern, and therefore its discussion, even if it is purely declarative, requires a certain degree of depth in the integration process. An exception from this is the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, where environmental security was brought up very early. On the other hand, environmental security discussion underwent a transition from a more declarative tone towards more technical, implementation-oriented discussion. In the later CIS, EAEC and Customs Union documents, environmental security is discussed not as a theoretical concept, but in terms of its practical implementation. For example, a 2006 decision on the elimination of ionizing radiation sources from the Economic Council of the CIS, appeals to environmental security as an analytical system for administrative decision- making.

5.3 Conclusion

International agreements made with Russia demonstrate that the questions of environmental security of the country were taken up not due to international expectations, but due to the domestic identity construction. The data above indicated that the second wave of securitization in 1995-1996 came as a continuation of the first wave (directly related to the Soviet securitizing move explored in the previous chapter), which peaked in 1991. Moreover, Russia engaged in securitizing the environment internationally, which further indicates that environmental securitization followed the logic of a deepened internal identity construction, which I will explore in the next chapter.

Several Russian securitizing moves in regards to the environment on the international level can be distinguished. Although initially environmental security was mentioned simply as a part of the regulatory framework for environmental management with neighboring countries,

it soon acquired an important role in the integration processes. This suggests a link between environmental security and integration, akin to the one proposed by Dokken (1997). An international securitization move built upon the Soviet securitization move, discussed in the previous chapter, though drastically different in tone and character. The second securitization move had a renewed focus on the domestic aspects of environmental security. Unlike the former securitization attempt, environmental security this time did not focus on the state of global ecosystems. Rather, it gave priority to domestic issues and thus prioritized agreements with neighboring countries. The different profile of countries meant that it became a useful accessory to the integration processes in the post-Soviet space, and even as an avenue of cooperation with states outside it (e.g., China).

6 Environmental Security Begins at Home

Environmental security is the ability of the state to control, lower, and remove environmental insecurities of different scales, detected and evaluated using scientific methods, for ensuring the well-being of the society and human health, political, economic and social stability.

— Danilov-Danielian et al., 2007 The previous chapter established Russia as the securitizing actor in the international securitization of the environment, especially in the post-Soviet sphere. The assumption in the previous chapter was that, in the words of Buzan et al. (1998, p. 41), “the government is the state,” thus Russia is the Kremlin. Like the Kremlin is a fortress of twenty towers, the internal security hierarchy in a modern state is rarely homogenous. In popular Russian political jargon, the “Kremlin towers” refer to the system of inter-elite interactions with conflicted interests within Russia: ministries, departments, etc. This chapter’s objective is to reveal which of Russia’s various actors stand behind the securitization of the environment, in other words, are the securitizing actor(s).

The inductive, flexible design and the mixed-method logic of nested analysis require compiling several databases for environmental security literature. As a point of departure, analysis of non-specific, uncoded environmental security mentions from the federal acts section of the GARANT database from the 1990s to 2019 will help identify the principal securitization trends. However, determining securitizing actors requires analyzing and coding each document for relevance, actor, etc. Since the previous chapter showed that the most active period in international environmental securitization came during the 1990s, analyzing only that decade quantitatively will be a sufficient delimitation for determining the securitizing actor, even though qualitative discourse will focus on securitization moves through three decades beginning in the 1990s. Since audience acceptance makes or breaks any securitizing move, the encoding of the securitizing move in judicial practice (based on the highest courts) indicates the success of these securitizing moves. The second part of this chapter will complement the results of the first part of the chapter by identifying the most important documents from the quantitative part and then carrying out an in-depth discourse analysis. Finally, in order to ensure the robustness of these results, an “on-the-line” representative case study will test the model.

6.1 Preliminary Large-N Analysis

For examining environmental securitization within the country, I have analyzed and compiled databases for the three branches of the federal government – the executive, the legislature, and the judiciary. The executive branch is represented in this database as decrees, orders, and various documents produced by the President, the government, different ministries, departments, and federal agencies. The legislative branch is represented by laws, decrees, and other documents produced by the two chambers of the Federal Assembly, i.e. the State Duma and the Federation Council. Finally, the judiciary is represented by Russia’s two highest courts: the Supreme Court and the Constitutional Court.

First, I shall look at the unspecific data about the quantity of environmental security literature. A raw, unspecific analysis of the results for the query “environmental security” within the GARANT database yields 10,453 results between the years 1988 and 2019 in the federal acts section, which includes both executive and legislative acts. As an analytical delimitation, this section was only partially analyzed for relevance, so this number may be somewhat inflated (meaning some non-critical number of hits are possibly less relevant). However, the number is useful to demonstrate the scope of the environmental securitization and is useful in relative terms. The same query for high courts yields 697 results between 1994 and 2019. This number for the higher courts includes only relevant documents as all documents have been analyzed and, classified according to thematic categories. The reason why no data is available for the higher courts before 1994 is that these courts were established by the Constitution of 1993, which entered force on December 12 of the same year.

Figure 7 summarizes the trend for the number of environmental security mentions between 1988 and 2019 in absolute terms. As can be seen from the graph, the absolute number of mentions for environmental security kept steadily increasing until 2009, when it reached 782 mentions. Having fallen during the following years, it increased to 770 again in 2004 only to decrease again to 519 in 2019. Since the fluctuations in the absolute number of hits for environmental security could be a function of the overall flow of documents in the federal apparatus, it indicates certain attention to it within a broader period of several years.

For this analysis, I employ the relative measure of power, explained in Section 3.1.4. In order to obtain the necessary information, I have performed a simple query with the same query conditions for the following terms: security/safety (безопасность), state security

государственная безопасность), military security (военная безопасность), fire safety (пожарная безопасность). Because security is part of the syntax of the term environmental security, all the hits for these types of security are included in the results of the query for security/safety. Next, with the total mentions of security/safety in the denominator, the “relative power” (frequency) for each term was determined.

With these new results in mind, Figure 8 was constructed, which demonstrates the relative power of environmental security to all types of security. In terms of percentage, the environmental security kept steadily increasing throughout the 1990s, until it reached its peak of 17% of all security documents in 1995, after which it fluctuated around 14-15% until 2009, when it reached another peak of 17%, only to reduce significantly to less than 10% after 2015. Considering the above, it can be hypothesized that the primary period of environmental securitization came during the early 1990s, after which, having entered policy language, it remained securitized throughout the 2000s, with securitization entering institutionalized stage by that point.

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Figure 7. Total Mentions of Environmental Security per Year

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Figure 8. Relative Power of Environmental Security as Percentage of Total Safety/Security Mentions

6.1.1 Burstiness Analysis

The application of Kleinberg (2003) methodology for analysing document streams has been explained in Chapter 3.1.4. Table 4 summarizes the results of the computation for the burstiness metric for the years 1989-1990. As it can be seen from the Table 1, the weight value of “environmental security” burstiness was positive only in 1995, which means that that was the only year that “environmental security” was prevalent relative to other potential topics or “bursty” in the stream of federal documents. Since the burstiness weight penalizes transitions only upwards, the primary securitizing move took place either in 1995 or shortly before that, which corresponds well with the data described in the previous section. Thus, lack of burstiness is not the result of the lack of securitization; rather the presence of burstiness in 1995 indicates the success of the securitization move.

Table 4. Burstiness Values for Environmental Security, 1989-200013

Total documents (푑푡) Relevant documents (푟푡) Burst weight

휎(0, 푟푡, 푑푡) − 휎(1, 푟푡, 푑푡) 1989 110 2 -11,6149 1990 225 0 -27,0857 1991 453 13 -43,9567 1992 534 43 -29,3017 1993 766 72 -33,6378

13 Although the metric was calculated for the entire period, only results to 2000 were given. Results for years 2001-2019 are negative and thus indicate no bursts.

1994 666 90 -6,95619 1995 898 151 14,74064 1996 1339 139 -48,1097 1997 1419 188 -17,8773 1998 1538 219 -6,98326 1999 1661 235 -8,77367 2000 1769 183 -64,0783

6.1.2 Who is the Securitizing Actor? What is the Referent Object?

Determining the securitizing actor necessitates a more detailed analysis of this data. As such, the data needs to be classified according to the actor that produced the document – the specific agency, etc. Due to the complex nature of the Russian political architecture, even just at the federal level, there are scores of different ministries, services, agencies that participate in the national security dialogue and could act as a securitizing actor. The principal among them include the President, the Federal Assembly, the government, and the Ministry of Natural Resources (with its antecedents).

Figure 9 summarizes the number of documents mentioning environmental security by the President of Russia and the legislative (the Supreme Soviet until 1993, the State Duma and the Federation Council after). As seen from the previous chapter, although the concept of environmental security was introduced by Gorbachev, the President of the USSR, the Congress of People’s Deputies quickly accepted the concept of environmental security and changed the referent object from the global ecosystem to domestic ecosystems. It comes, therefore, as no surprise that the Supreme Soviet started environmental securitization already in 1990, and that Yeltsin followed suit. Likewise, after the events of 1993, the Federal Assembly entered a period of environmental securitization in 1994-1995 (which recalling the previous chapter was an important period of legislative activity), and this seems to be followed by the President.

Recalling the results of the previous subsection, I can divide the securitization moves into three decades: the 1990s, the 2000s, and the 2010s. Although it is possible to find different impetuses for securitization/desecuritization, such a division appears to be the simplest for several reasons. First, such division describes the data relatively well (see Figure 8 above): characterizing the 1990s as the active period, the 2000s as relative silence, and the 2010s as the revitalization period. Second, the data covers the period roughly from 1989 to 2019, exactly 30 years. Third, December of 1999 saw a seminal change in both the legislative and the executive,

the year 2000 becoming the first year of the third convocation of the State Duma and the first year of the first Putin administration. Based on the division above, I would expect important securitization events at the end of the 1990s and at the end of the 2000s.

Figure 10 summarizes the number of documents mentioning environmental security produced by the government and different environmental ministries (recall the genealogy of nature protection ministries from Chapter 3). Quite expectedly, the number of documents on environmental security from environmental protection ministries seems to follow the government documents. This reflects the hierarchical structure of the Russian executive and indicates that the environment and natural resource ministries most likely were not the securitizing actor. In fact, the legislative was the primary securitizing actor.

0 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025

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Figure 9. Mentions of Environmental Security by the President and the Legislative

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Figure 10. Mentions of Environmental Security in Acts of the Government and the Specialized Environmental Ministries (see Appendix I)

6.1.3 Zoom in on the 1990s: The Formative Decade

To better analyze the given data, I scrutinized the same data for federal acts for the period 1990- 2000 with a greater degree of precision. The previous chapter already identified the 1990s as the most critical period for securitization on the international stage, therefore, for the scope of this thesis, only the most relevant acts from that decade have been selected and coded using the following parameters: department, document type, referent object, and a larger topic (if applicable).

The main document types include executive order (указ), order (приказ), decree (постановление), directive (распоряжение), law (закон), etc. Executive orders (also called ukase) are decrees of highest legal power, which can only be issued by the President. As such, they usually deal with relatively pressing matters. In terms of importance, they often compete with laws. Other acts hardly compare in terms of importance, but decrees are regular documents for the government and the Federal Assembly; orders are the highest in power for ministries, departments, and agencies; and directives are usually given to deal with operational activities (Orlov, 1995).

Each entry was coded according to their referent object, i.e. that which is to be securitized/protected/lifted out of regular politics. There are four types of referent objects that can be identified in the data: state, territorial, human, and ecosphere. The types of referent objects and the logic of discourse also tallies loosely with von Lucke et al. (2014) and is summarized in Table 4. The state as a referent object applies to those documents, where the state or national dimension of security is primary. Such instances include both the hard security issues (such as military security), or more vague formulations of security.

Table 5. Classification of Documents by Referent Objects and Logic of Discourse

Logic of Discourse Security Risk to what Speech act example Level of Referent for whom Object

State State State as such Military counterintelligence Speech act security Environmental damage bodies are obliged to example reducing combat analyze information about capabilities of the armed probable threats to the forces which threatens security of the Armed state security Forces… that can lead to serious socio-political,

military, environmental consequences… (Executive Order on State Security Bodies in the Armed Forces) Territory Territorial Borders, land, subsoil Activities related to Speech act security Environmental damage crossing the State Border… example leading to change of river should not… harm… basin, leading to loss of environmental and other territorial integrity security of the Russian Federation, states adjacent to it and other foreign states… (Law on State Border of Russian Federation) Human Human Population In order to ensure the Speech act security Environmental damage legitimate rights and example posing serious risks to interests of the indigenous public health peoples of the North…. as well as to create additional mechanisms to ensure environmental security in the areas of industrial development of the North, I order… (Executive Order on the Indigenous Peoples of the North)

Ecosphere Ecosphere Ecosystems Ministry of Environmental Speech act security Environmental damage Protection and Natural example rendering large areas Resources of the Russian uninhabitable Federation is the federal executive authority that exercises state management and coordination of activities in the field of environmental protection, environmental management, environmental security, and… is responsible for improving the quality of the environment. (Decree on Ministry of Environmental Protection and Natural Resources of the Russian Federation)

Number Number of Hits 20

0 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 Years

Ecosphere Human State Territorial

Figure 11. Federal Acts by Referent Object

Figure 11 demonstrates the different types of referent objects that were used throughout the period. Although somewhat similar to the one from Figure 4, it differs in several important ways. It is interesting to note that the securitization of the ecosphere was steady and increasing throughout the period, while the securitization of the state was more uneven. This indicates that while they started out roughly at the same time, the state had more success being securitized at certain times, but was securitized much less during other periods. Human security, on the other hand, was always seen as the object of environmental security, and, as such, increased relatively evenly throughout the period. Similarly, securitization of the environment as the ecosphere stayed quite constant until 1998, when it experienced a rapid burst in mentions, which was exhausted by 1999.

6.1.4 Audience Acceptance

Figure 12 summarizes the number of environmental security mentions in Russia’s two highest courts: the Supreme and the Constitutional Courts. The data suggests that the first securitization move from the 1990s was not accepted by the domestic audiences. Although the number of environmental security mentions grew until the late 2000s, it remained relatively stable and low. The securitizing move, which must have happened in the 2010s, was more successful.

120

100

0 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025

Figure 12. Mentions of Environmental Security in Highest Courts

6.2 Part 2: Discourse Analysis

6.2.1 Changing Tides: the Last of the USSR

On October 24, 1990, the last nuclear test was conducted at the Novaya Zemlya polygon. Simultaneously, as this information became public, the Russian Supreme Soviet adopted a law on Chernobyl victims and the environmental damage, opening a new era in environmental securitization. Even the hardliners embraced environmental security, as it became one of the few types of security mentioned in relation to the GKChP documents. This was indeed a paradigm change: not only the military was no longer the sole provider of security; it was identified as a risk to environmental security in its own country. In the new post-Cold War security environment, the military aspects of security were becoming increasingly obsolete:

In the context of strengthening international security, strengthening mutual integration of the economies of developed countries, their saturation with environmentally hazardous industries, the level of immediate threat of unleashing world wars, local wars and large-scale military conflicts is significantly reduced. This can significantly reduce the armed forces and reduce military spending. (Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation, 1992a)

The main documents in relation to environmental security appeared after the GKChP August putsch, as Russia was becoming an independent entity and began developing its own bureaucracy. On September 4, 1991, the State Committee for Geology and Subsoil Development was established, tasked with overseeing the use of the subsoil. The Committee

was largely responsible for the environment as well, but environmental security has not yet become a salient issue for the government.

On September 5, 1991, the USSR State Defense Committee created the Declaration of Human Rights and Freedoms, which was adopted by the Congress of People’s Deputies and was supposed to become the guiding principles of the Soviet government, much akin to the U.S. Bill of Rights. This document does not yet mention environmental security as a part of the security of the state. Rather, it emphasizes the human and health aspects of the environment. Article 29 of the Declaration states that “the human has a right to a favorable environment, and a right to compensation for damage caused to his health or property by environmental violations.” This is a clear step towards understanding that the environment is a crucial part of human security. In contrast, the Declaration of Rights of Human and of the Citizen of Russia only mentions that the state “encourages activities that promote environmental well-being,” and does not make any mention to security. These alternative ways of framing and talking about issues similar to environmental security in a non-security language serve to underline that the securitizing move was by no means a foregone conclusion – it was a conscious choice.

As the Russian bureaucracy started to stiffen, more positions for environmental coordination were created. In January and February 1992, Yeltsin created the Coordinating Council for Environmental Policy under the President of the Russian Federation and the position of the Advisor for Ecology and Health. The descriptions of both of these organs included environmental security as a part of their responsibilities; the environmental securitization was underway.

6.2.2 Securitization through the Legislative – the Creative Period

Although the Russian legal system remained in full continuity with the Soviet legislation, the new era required the country to significantly reform its legal system. In practice, this meant creating a new layer of legislation, much of which was intended to reform the sociopolitical landscape of the country (Barsukova, 2016). In 1995-1999, 741 new bills were adopted by the parliament and signed into law by the President, in 1999-2003, this number stood at 772. Although the number of adopted laws kept increasing, the majority of these laws in the 2000s (about 70%) were amendments to previous legislation (Ovselian, 2016). In terms of environmental legislation, this means that although it in the total mass of legislation it

constituted only a modest part, it was nonetheless significant among the new legislative initiatives.

The legislative imitated securitization in December 1991, as the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR introduced the Federal Environmental Protection Law, which became the first Russian environmental legislation. Environmental security is mentioned within the legislation 18 times, setting “environmental law enforcement and ensuring environmental security” as its goal in the preamble. The principal two referent objects in the document are the state and the population. Environmental security of the population can be widely interpreted as the environmental security of the state or the society, or more narrowly as the environmental security of the individual. The ecosphere or the environment at large, as a thing in itself, is mentioned as a referent object only once: in connection to international environmental cooperation: “the Russian Federation motivates its policy in the field of environmental protection by the need to ensure universal environmental security.” This “universal environmental security” calls for better environmental conditions for all humans, mandates use of the environment for internal development, and calls for cooperation between states. Specifically, it states that “each state has the right to use the natural environment… for the purposes of development and meeting the needs of its citizens,” that “the ecological well-being of one state cannot be ensured at the expense of other states or without taking into account their interests,” and that “all disputes related to environmental problems should be resolved only by peaceful means” (art. 92). This signifies that while the Supreme Soviet considers the environment as a special and important sector of security, it explicitly proscribes military resolution of environmental disputes, anticipating the possibility of escalation of environmental conflict.

The full scope of reform comes forth in the intertextual space of the total mass of environmental legislation. The 1991 Environmental Protection Law created a system of environmental monitoring and environmental damage payments (Babina & Bobrov, 1999). It also prescribed establishing the Federal Ecological Fund, which was established in June 1992. The system included regional and federal funds, which drew fees for emissions and pollution, fines, etc.; the accumulated funds were used for local and regional nature protection activities, as well as to fund the work of the nature protection agencies (Ilicheva, 2007).

Table 6. Yearly Budgets of the Federal Ecological Fund, 1995-2000

Income, millions Expenditure, Income, USD14 Expenditure, millions USD 1995 43 500 31 159,2 9 375 000 6 715 345 1996 59 800 59 800 10 755 396 10 755 396 1997 65 500 65 500 10 989 933 10 989 933 1998 72,0 72,0 3 486 682 3 486 682 1999 161,4 161,4 5 977 778 5 977 778 2000 468,3 458,3 17 344 444 16 974 074 Source: Law on Federal Budget in 1995, Law on Federal Budget for 1996, Law on Federal Budget for 1997, Law on Federal Budget for 1998, Law on Federal Budget for 1999, Law on Federal Budget for 2000

The culmination of the securitizing move was mayhap the 1992 Federal Security Law. The law defined was extremely influential, as it established the main terminological framework for all subsequent security practice. First, it defined security as “the state of protectedness of the vital interests of individual, society and the state against inside and outside threats” (art. 1, para. 1). Second, it defined the possible referent objects of security as “the individual (and its rights and freedoms), the society (its material and spiritual values), and the state (its constitution, sovereignty, and territorial integrity)” (art. 1, para. 3). As such, the law mandated that the state must take action to protect the security of these three referent objects (human, society, and state) by identifying and addressing threats to security, both real and potential. These are remarkably similar to the von Lucke et al. (2014) topology, described previously. The document also identified the principal sectors of security: state, economic, societal, military, information, environmental security, although never addressed what these types of security entailed.

As this was the first security document in modern Russian history, it is significant that the environmental sector received the same coverage as issues like the military. This created the need to draft and pass laws clarifying these particular sectors of security, which urged the parliament to decree its committees “to draft laws on environmental security, on the state border of the Russian Federation, on social protection of military personnel, on defense, on public service, on the fight against corruption, on the fight against organized crime, on the foreign intelligence of the Russian Federation, on the continental shelf, on the marine economic zone of the Russian Federation” (Supreme Soviet of Russian Federation, 1992b). One can speculate

14 Budget in USD is calculated using the official exchange rate on Dec. 31 each year, obtained from the website for the Bank of Russia, can be found at http://www.cbr.ru. 68

that it was due to the lack of understanding of the content of the environmental security that elevated the environment to the highest position. With the help of security rhetoric, the environment acceded precedence over other issues.

In any event, the Supreme Soviet was determined to make the environmental sector part of the security agenda. The 1992 Law on Foreign Intelligence identified the following spheres as the competency of the Foreign Intelligence Service: “political, economic, scientific and technological, environmental” spheres. Information in these spheres was considered important for decision-making and realizing the security policy. This is striking, as the Foreign Intelligence Service was created on the basis of the KGB First Chief Directorate. One can read the reason for such change of profile in the Supreme Soviet Decree on the Military Policy of Russia, the Supreme Soviet declared that the “direct threat of the outbreak of world wars, local wars, and large-scale military conflicts is significantly reduced,” while the “environmental insecurity” is mounting.

This move to categorize environmental security issues within the competencies of the former conventional security providers found resonance in the executive. President’s Executive Order from February 1993 established state security counterintelligence organs within the Armed Forces, which, understandably, was tasked with gathering information on the potential threats to the security of Armed Forces, particularly, threats with “socio-political, military, and environmental consequences.”

The most telling story for the purposes of securitization is budget. Securitization may be primarily done with speech acts, yet funding demonstrates that this process was backed by other measures and accepted by core audiences as a relevant security concern. In 1992, the government developed and rolled out a program called Ecology of Russia. The 1993 budget introduced the federal target program Environmental Security of Russia, for which 396 billion rubles were allocated, which corresponds to a little more than 2% more than the total yearly budget. In 1995, the federal program for environmental security received considerable funding. However, due to consistent budget deficits, the environmental program funding was patchy: due to economic crisis and inflation, the program’s total funding was half the target (Danilov- Danilian, 2007, p. 64). Speaking of program’s targets, most of the projects funded addressed problems of local environmental insecurity, some addressed legal documents that apply to the entire country, and a negligible part of the program addressed transboundary environmental

69 insecurity; global environmental insecurities, to the woe of Russian environmental scientists, were not addressed at all (Danilov-Danilian, 2007, p. 65).

Table 7. Yearly Expenditures on the Federal Target Program "Environmental Security of Russia"

Capital Current expenses Total funding, Total funding, investment R&D Other milion RUB USD 1993 N/A N/A N/A 396 317 562 1994 N/A N/A N/A N/A 1995 7.6 21.14 67.3 96.04 27 053 1996 N/A N/A N/A N/A 1997 472.95 193.80 916.8 1583.55 265 696 1998 192.1 82.57 679.2 953.87 160 045 1999 N/A N/A N/A 104 200,00 Source: Law on Republic Budget in 1993, Law on Federal Budget for 1994, Law on Federal Budget for 1995, Law on Federal Budget for 1996, Law on Federal Budget for 1997, Law on Federal Budget for 1998, Law on Federal Budget for 1999

In the period leading to the burst peak of 1995, it was the legislative that remained at the spearhead of the securitization, as documents of 1993-1995 show the increased legislative activity. For example, the legislative plan for 1995 included adopting the law on environmental security. The committees of the State Duma, including the State Duma Committee for Ecology, started drafting multiple legislations. Environmental security was successfully passed and defined in legislative initiatives: the 1994 Law on Protection of the Population and Territories from Natural and Technogenic Emergencies mandated making public the information on environmental security. In the spirit of the previous decade, it appealed to glasnost’ (transparency), as well as the population and territorial security. Similarly, the 1994 Law on Fire Safety mandated the information on fires to be consolidated with other statistical information for the purposes of environmental security. The 1995 Law on Wildlife mandated considering environmental security when handling wildlife objects.

Temporally, this spike in legislative activity coincides with the drafting of model legislation in the Inter-Parliamentary Assembly, described in the previous chapter. Law on Environmental Security was drafted by the State Duma Committee for Ecology, which was at the time headed by Tamara Zlotnikova, a Yabloko member. She simultaneously headed the CIS Committee on the Environment, which drafted the Environmental Security Model Law, which was mentioned in the previous chapter. This commission also included Grigorii Galazii, a

biologist and a full member (academician) of the Russian Academy of Sciences, who, among other things, was already known worldwide for his efforts to preserve Lake Baikal15.

However, the bill was vetoed by the President of the Russian Federation. The reason given by the President was due to the fact that the document allegedly conflicted with the Constitution of the Russian Federation (Ustiantseva, 2011). In defining the concept of environmental security as part of the security of the “individual, society and the state” from inside and outside threats, the bill did not take into account that the “defense and security” (Article 71) is part of the exclusive responsibility of the Russian Federation, while “environmental protection” is a part of the joint responsibility of the federal government and subjects of the Federation (Article 72). Thus, Boris Yeltsin argued that environmental security could not be considered an integral part of national security.

The reason given for rejecting this bill is a rhetorical tool, rather than a genuine argument. The 1997 Federal Constitutional Law on the Government of the Russian Federation, for example, states that the federal government “ensures the implementation of unified state policy in the field of environmental protection and environmental security.” Theoretically, the same logic should have applied to it, as the Article 72 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation already attributed environmental security to the sphere of joint responsibility of the Federation and the subjects of the Federation. Furthermore, Article 13 of the 1992 Federal Law on Security listed different types of security, among others, environmental security. Likewise, the 2010 Federal Law on Security, which came to replace it, listed environmental security already in Article 1, coming after state security and societal security. Thus, this sentiment is inconsistent with both the preceding and subsequent legal practice, and in any case, did not come to last.

After the law on environmental security was vetoed by the President, the State Duma changed the composition of the drafting committee. However, the question of redrafting the bill was left untouched until 2000, when it was picked up by the third State Duma. Notably, neither Zolotnikova nor Galazii were elected. The ecology committee was headed by a chemist and corresponding member of the RAS Vladimir Grachev. The newly created ecology committee

15 See, for example, Brown, Kate P. (2018) Saving the Sacred Sea: The Power of Civil Society in an Age of Authoritarianism and Globalization. Oxford University Press and Lowenhardt, John (1981) Decision Making in Soviet Politics. Palgrave, p. 73 71 attempted to salvage the bill, but having met little cooperation from the government and the presidential executive office, the orphaned bill was abandoned.

Some of the legislation is much more expected, such as the 1995 Environmental Expertise Law or the 1995 Law on the Continental Shelf of the Russian Federation. Others are less so; perhaps one of the more unexpected, and definitely more long-lasting mentions of environmental security, is the 1995 Law on Operational-Investigative Activity. The law defined “obtaining information about events or actions (inactions) that pose a threat to the state, military, economic, informational or environmental security of the Russian Federation” as one of the objectives of the criminal investigative activity. Thus, threats to environmental security became ground for conducting operational investigative measures. 16 Furthermore, as environmental security, along with other types of security, was now a hard security issue, Article 8 of the same law allowed activities that “restrict the constitutional rights of a person and citizen to the privacy of correspondence… and inviolability of the home” with a court warrant. In urgent cases, which pose a threat to among others environmental security, such suspension of constitutional rights was made possible by simply notifying the court within 24 hours, and with a court warrant within 48 hours. Because the Law on Operational-Investigative Activity is one of the most widely used, these formulations ensured that environmental security be forever enshrined into Russian legal vocabulary.

While the previously mentioned Law on Operational-Investigative Activity clearly uses the state as the referent object of security, other referent objects also were salient. The 1996 Law on Radiation Safety regards environmental security/safety as part of hygienic norms in terms of public health, i.e. human security. The 1996 Law on Foreign Intelligence and the 1997 Law on Chemical Weapons Destruction as military security, the 1996 Law on Professional Unions as human security, the 1996 Law on Coal, the 1996 Law on Gene Modification, the 1997 Air Code, the 1997 Law on Industrial Safety in terms of the environmental security of the ecosphere. Thus, environmental security was mentioned in six laws in 1996, four laws in 1997, in four laws in 1998, and in five laws in 1999, indicating the sheer commitment of the legislative to the environmental security.

16 The Article 6 lists the following measures: surveying; inquiries; sample collection for comparative research; test purchase; object and document analysis; observation; personal identification; inspection of premises, buildings, structures, terrain and vehicles; control of mail, telegraph and other messages; telephone tapping; information readout from technical communication channels; operative infiltration; controlled delivery; operational experiment; obtaining computer information. 72

6.2.3 Silent 2000: Desecuritization or Institutionalized Security?

With the start of the new millennium, a new administration came into power. One of the first things done by the Putin administration was to reform the structure of federal ministries and federal agencies. This paradigm change is seen in a peer-reviewed article, written by then Minister for Emergency Situations (EMERCOM) Sergei Shoigu, who later went on to become the Minister of Defense. In his article titled “From Absolute Security towards Acceptable Risk,” Shoigu (2000) calls to find a balance between risk and security:

The transition of Russia in its security policy to a policy of “acceptable” risk requires a fundamental change in the entire executive and legislative system of security management: “react and correct” should be replaced by “anticipate and warn.” The transition in the security policy from the principal of “absolute” security or “zero” risk to the principal of “acceptable” risk is a qualitatively new step not only in this area. It determines the direction of further development of the entire socio-economic system of our country. Today, security indicators such as public health and environmental quality are given the role of an “indicator” of the country’s sustainable development, and the role of the management mechanism is the security process. That is how the problem of Russia's transition to sustainable development is considered in the most important state document: The Concept of the Russian Federation’s Transition to Sustainable Development. (Shoigu, 2000)

Already in 1998, the Yeltsin administration abolished several federal agencies, including, e.g. the Federal Service for Hydrometeorology and Environmental Monitoring of Russia. In a letter to the President, the Federation Council protested, arguing that “abolition of federal executive bodies implementing state economic and environmental policies in these areas, or the lowering of the status of these bodies will negatively affect the national security of the Russian Federation, the rights and freedoms of man and citizen” (Federation Council, 1998).

It is unsurprising that when the State Committee for Environmental Protection was abolished in May 2000 and merged with the Ministry of Natural Resources, the Federation Council (2000a) protested:

The legislation of the Russian Federation proclaims environmental security as one of the significant components of the national security of the Russian Federation. In addition, Russia has undertaken international obligations related to the implementation of environmentally oriented policies. The abundance of environmental problems in Russia urgently requires an independent federal executive body in the field of environmental protection.

In all developed countries of the world, there are independent bodies of state power both in the field of natural resources management and in the field of environmental protection. In the structure of executive bodies of the constituent entities of the Russian Federation, special executive bodies have been

created and are functioning that exercise authority in the field of environmental protection, which require coordination of their activities, as well as appropriate methodological, personnel and organizational support from the federal center.

Based on the long-term interests of Russia and the importance of ensuring the country’s environmental security, the Council of the Federation of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation urges you to restore the independence of the environmental agency - the State Committee of the Russian Federation for Environmental Protection.

The Goskomprirody was not the only agency under abolition; the same fate befell the State Committee on Land Policy and the Federal Forestry Service. These too were protested by the Federation Council (2000b) in two separate letters, both of which appealed to environmental security. The one on the Forestry Service stated:

Russia is a world forest power. Its forests, which make up more than a quarter of the forest cover of the Earth and 69 percent of the country’s territory, play a crucial role in ensuring the environmental security of the entire planet.

Did this desecuritizing trend mean the end of environmental security? It appears that this is not the case. Practically, institutionalization and bureaucratization make desecuritization impossible. Audience acceptance in Russia means that an issue, once taken up as a security issue, in practice continues to be securitized. Once securitized, an issue needs to be removed from legal practice and vocabulary in order to disappear from the security landscape and thus become truly desecuritized. Otherwise, it is inevitable that it will stay securitized and will re- enter active use at some point.

The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation from the same year placed environmental security among the main tasks of the Armed Forces, under the section of military security. Moreover, the Federal Law on Environmental Protection, adopted in January 2002, became the first clear piece of legislation on environmental security. Aiming to “strengthen the rule of law in the field of environmental protection and ensuring environmental security,” the law gave a definition to environmental risk and environmental security. Unlike the Law on Environmental Protection of 1991, it defined environmental security solely in terms of the natural environment and human as the referent object:

Environmental security is the state of protection of the natural environment and vital human interests from the possible negative impact of economic and other activities, natural and man-made emergencies, and their consequences (art. 1, para. 39).

Besides the Constitution of Russia itself, perhaps, the most vivid example of such securitization in regards to environmental security is the aforementioned Law on Operational- Investigative Activity. Adopted in 1995, it remains in use even when the environmental is 74

seemingly not actively securitized. Analyzing the data from the highest courts (Figure 12) the spike in higher court mentions is primarily accounted for two categories: “operational- investigative activity” and “criminal offense.” In 2013, this is because the Law on Operation- Investigative Activity was quoted in the texts of Supreme Court judgments on criminal offenses, such as drug possession and trafficking. Far from desecuritization, environmental security had become a part of the legal jargon.

Thus, although the environmental security was on the downward trend during the period of early 2000s, it has never been properly desecuritized, even by the president, who started optimization of the state bureaucracy. This was merely a change in security provider; rather than being entrusted to specialized agencies, environmental security has defaulted to traditional security providers. In a 2006 interview, Putin stated:

Of course, we will use the capabilities of the Navy to solve environmental and economic, technical problems… No one has such means of monitoring and inspecting the seabed, no one can better solve the problem of ensuring environmental security. All these tasks are somewhat new, but absolutely necessary for the Navy, in this case, of course, in the Baltic. (Kremlin, 2006)

Thus, as soon as a salient threat to environmental security became apparent on the horizon, it was re-introduced into the political vocabulary. Consider that in the same interview, Putin framed the nuclear tests by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea as a potential threat to Russian environmental security.

In practice, environmental security never really became desecuritized. Creating security concepts as a response to security challenges could be considered a pastime of the Russian security establishment. In 1997 and 2000, the National Security Concepts were written ad hoc as a reaction to NATO enlargement and intervention in Yugoslavia (Godzimirski, 2000). Because environmental security had become securitized both the 2009 National Security Strategy, which came after the conflict with Georgia, and the 2015 National Security Strategy, which came after the conflict with Ukraine listed environmental security as a type of national security, defining a myriad of endemic issues as threats to environmental security. This is due to the fact that Russian security strategies, exhibiting features of being written by committees (Giles, 2009), simultaneously cover all securitized sectors when they are written ad hoc like in 2009 and 2015. This includes the institutionalized environmental sector.

The 2015 environmental security concept was elaborated in 2017 when an entire Environmental Security Strategy was written as a document of “strategic planning in the field

75 of ensuring national security of the Russian Federation, which defines the main challenges and threats to environmental security, goals, objectives, and mechanisms for implementing state policy in the field of environmental security.” This strategy copied the structure of the 1995 Concept of Environmental Security, developed by the Ministry for Environmental Protection and Natural Resources (rendered in Danilov-Danilian et al., 2007, p.59). As a document of security planning, it identifies the types of threats to Russia’s environmental security, dividing them into three groups: global, internal, and external threats. Although primary importance is given to internal threats, narrative precedence is awarded to the global environmental security challenges.

These strategies do not bring much novelty to the table: many of the motives that appear there have already made their entrance earlier. In terms of referent objects, state security is obviously of primary interest. Human and ecosphere security are also present, but references to those are made only insofar they are useful to state security, such as in the following passage: “an increase in the consumption of natural resources and their depletion… have a negative impact on the state of national security of the Russian Federation.” What is interesting about these documents is their timing. Both come after the 2014 Ukrainian conflict and thus come as a reaction towards a national security crisis in a securitized field. The environment is hardly the principal concern of the conflict with the West, yet, because the environment remained institutionally securitized, a frustrated security establishment reacted across all securitized sectors, including the environment, to which the 2017 strategy makes an explicit (and rather spiteful) reference in the threats section:

In the context of the containment policy towards the Russian Federation, a threat of restricted access to foreign environmentally friendly innovative technologies, materials and equipment is being created. (para. 23)

6.3 Summary

The evidence shows that the concept of environmental security in Russia is longstanding. Environmental security in Russia became securitized in the 1990s, and this was the period with the most noticeable securitization dynamics in the field of environment (and, based on the evidence from queries for other terms, perhaps even more broadly). The main securitizing actor during this period was the legislature. Although during the 2000s environmental security was not very prominent, it had already become institutionalized and remained securitized, which

ensured that when the conditions became right in 2010s it once again emerged to the forefront, though it never became “bursty” again. From the point of view of identity construction and norm proliferation, this meant that environmental security has become a deepened internalized norm: it was definitely not instrumentally activated to pursue other ends. If securitization thus takes part in intensified or novel identity construction, desecuritization would require a reconstruction of identity (the self) in the absence of the securitized phenomenon. Moreover, the chapter shows that security is the highest political language in Russia. As such, it is difficult to desecuritize a securitized issue: doing so would remove a pillar in a constructed identity.

Perhaps the reason why a national security issue can never truly be desecuritized in the Russian context is three-fold. First, this has to do with the nature of the Russian legal system. If an issue is a security issue, it is included in the Constitution, which ensures it almost a “holy cow” status, rendering desecuritization impossible. Second, on a related note, securitization could be considered a type of “tradition” in an organized institutional activity. In this way, securitization is an “institutionalized organizational behavior” and is, therefore, “stable, repetitive and enduring” (Oliver, 1992), resistant to transformation and resilient to desecuritization. Third, securitization could be considered a political tool, rather than an epipolitical phenomenon. It is, as Bigo (2002, p. 65) puts it, “a mode of governmentality by diverse institutions to play with the unease… as to affirm their role as providers of protection and security and to mask their failures.” Whether used ad hoc, or for the purposes of identity construction, security language in the Russian context is the highest way to speak about an issue. Acknowledging something as a security issue, therefore, means to acknowledge its importance and lift its priority in the hierarchy of issues. As such, it stays as an important tool, which is used when the situation allows it or when it is important to underscore the urgency of a particular issue.

7 Environmental Security Localized

The methodological logic of inquiry, outlined in chapter 3 of this thesis, suggests supplementing the analysis, carried out in the previous two chapters with case studies as a form of an internal validity check. So far, this thesis has only focused on the larger unit of analysis. Now, as an attempt at triangulation, it is important to examine some of the subunits ideographically and to demonstrate how they relate to the conclusions drawn from the overall analysis. This kind of within-case analysis in case study research is an important step, as it allows to compare “how the patterns evident in case data fit with those predicted in theory, the literature, or researchers’ experience,” as well as to “elucidate causal or interactive linkages within the phenomenon under study” (Paterson, 2010).

The choice of the case study is always an important analytical decision. Since this chapter is dedicated to embedded units of analysis, case selection also needs to be justified. From among multiple identifiable subunits of analysis, this chapter will focus on two: both of which involve simultaneously international and domestic dimensions and are therefore significant and applicable for both previous chapters. The selection of the cases follows the logic of the crucial case studies, which takes important cases, from which it is possible to test the conclusions of the previous chapters, namely that a securitized sector, even if not currently discussed and active, will stay dormant within the institutional toolbox until the right occasion. These embedded subunits will test the conclusions of the previous chapters and demonstrate that the language of security is the highest language of importance in Russian political vocabulary (hence, addressing a referent object in the language of security intensifies its urgency) and that securitization of the environment, once institutionalized, is nay impossible to desecuritize. Additionally, these subunits zoom-in on the particular securitization stories, acting as ideographical illustrations of environmental securitization.

This chapter will analyze two different crucial subunit discourses in environmental securitization, identified during the process of coding the databases for the previous two chapters. The first case is the appellation to environmental security during the NATO bombings of Serbia. Rather than a case of a full securitization, it is more of an addendum on how a country with a securitized environment reacts in a conflict situation. This case is interesting because it followed threat construction outside Russia. As such, it is especially useful for testing the conclusions of the second part of the previous chapter, namely, that once securitization is

institutionalized, a reaction will follow all possible routes of securitization. The second case is the case of environmental securitization of the Arctic, which tests the conclusions of the previous two chapters holistically: unlike the previous one that just focuses on an event isolated in time, it will test the entire span of three decades in a geographically defined environment.

7.1 Yugoslavia

The first subunit, which I turn to, is the securitization of the environment by Russian Federal Assembly during the NATO intervention in the Serbian civil war in 1999. This event occured during the height of Russian securitization of the environment. Therefore, it presents a most likely case. NATO military intervention in the Serbian civil war in 1999 had a profound effect on Russian security thinking, becoming the last brick in disillusionment in the idea of a “common European home” (Averre, 2009). In terms of Russian foreign policy, the NATO bombings of Yugoslavia represent an end of an era of an inconsistent and accommodating foreign policy of the ending Yeltsin administration, an event that would harbinger the more assertive Putin foreign and domestic policy. Fearing a similar punitive campaign against Russia, which was still in the process of resolving Chechen insurgency, it highlighted the need to resolve its domestic issues and thus paved the road to the Second Chechen War. Observing securitization of the environment in this case of highest geopolitical importance for Russia would indicate that environmental security was internalized constituting a part of deepened identity construction.

Russian Federal Assembly played an active role in monitoring situation in Yugoslavia. Already on February 3, 1999, forecasting the failure of Rambouillet and fearing use of military force on FRY territory, the State Duma appealed to Yeltsin to unilaterally cancel sanctions against Yugoslavia. On February 17, 1999, the State Duma again issued a Declaration that underlined the unacceptability of military intervention against FRY. After the Operation Allied Force (OAF) began on March 24, both houses of the Federal Assembly issued Declarations that painted the situation as a threat to both human security and national security of Russian Federation. The first address from the Federation Council to the U.S. Senate was an attempt to constitutionally end the U.S. involvement in FRY. The Federation Council also issued a Declaration that urged to “rethink principal tenets of the national security concept of the Russian Federation and to increase the defense capacities of the country.”

However, the first address from the State Duma to the parliaments of European states was cast in a completely different light. On April 16, 1999, the State Duma issued the “Address to the Parliaments of European States Regarding the Threat of a Common European Environmental Catastrophe.” Rather than casting it from the standpoint of conventional or military security, the State Duma highlighted the OAF as an incursion on the environmental security of Europe.

“The ongoing NATO bombing raids on Yugoslav territory take the lives of civilians, bring grief to every family, and present a real threat of environmental disaster in Europe, which could lead to a global environmental crisis.

The powerful fires that arose as a result of rocket-bombing strikes at the oil refining, chemical and pharmaceutical enterprises of Yugoslavia created the danger of chemical pollution, including dioxin pollution.

Water of the Danube, one of the largest rivers in Europe, suffered significant oil pollution, and a real threat to the environmental safety of the population living on its banks has already arisen. This situation is doubly dangerous because of the approach of an oil spill with a length of about 15 kilometers to a nuclear power plant in Bulgaria, which threatens radiation pollution not only in Bulgaria, Russia, Ukraine, Moldova, Romania, Macedonia, Greece, Hungary, Austria, but also in other countries.

Europe is on the verge of a real environmental disaster, which could lead to tragic consequences for the environment, health and life of millions of people.

The State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation calls on the parliaments of European states in the interests of ensuring environmental security and preserving the life of the peoples of Europe to take urgent measures of political influence on NATO with a view to speeding up the cessation of missile and bomb attacks on the territory of Yugoslavia.”

This framing of the NATO bombings of Yugoslavia as a threat to environmental security continued in later Declarations as well. In the “Address of the State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation to the President of the United States of America and the members of Congress of the United States of America, to the Governments and Parliaments of Europe Regarding the Situation on the Balkans,” the State Duma framed the Balkan crisis as a threat in terms of four security dimensions: 1) ethnic cleansings and terrorism; 2) global and regional security; 3) humanitarian and environmental disaster; 4) military security.

Again, on November 30, 1999, the State Duma issued a Declaration after the OSCE Summit in Istanbul, re-emphasized the need for “an integrated approach to the security problem, which encompasses the military-political, economic and environmental components, the human dimension, the fight against crime, terrorism, and corruption.”

In early 2001, it transpired that depleted uranium ammunition was widely used in the 1999 NATO intervention, which immediately raised international concern for the potential 80

radiation effects. Although subsequent inquires disputed the carcinogenic and environmental effects of depleted uranium17, the widespread concern over the so-called “Balkan syndrome” allowed the Russian State Duma to once again frame the 1999 NATO attacks in terms of environmental security. On January 18, 2001, the State Duma issued a Declaration “On environmental consequences of NATO actions in the territory of the former Yugoslavia”

In 1999, during the aggression of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, depleted uranium ammunition was actively used as part of the so-called humanitarian action. At the same time, industrial facilities of increased environmental danger were bombed, in particular, in the city of Pancevo, chemical enterprises and an oil refinery were completely destroyed, which led to the infection of the area with ammonia and the formation of toxic clouds.

The State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation has repeatedly expressed its strong protest in connection with the indicated actions of NATO, fraught with environmental disaster in the center of Europe and, in essence, a violation of international law and a crime against humanity.

At present, as is known, there is information about repeated cases of leukemia among the military personnel who were part of the international forces in the Balkans. This confirms the warnings of the State Duma about the dangerous consequences of the use of depleted uranium ammunition in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 1999 and in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1995.

The leadership and the public of a number of NATO member states, concerned about the health status of their military personnel, unfortunately, are silent about the consequences of the use of depleted uranium ammunition for millions of people of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia who have been victims of NATO aggression, as well as residents of neighboring states, primarily Albania and Macedonia.

The State Duma calls on the President of the Russian Federation to initiate the creation, under the auspices of the United Nations and with the participation of the International Atomic Energy Agency, of an independent expert commission to study and assess the environmental consequences of NATO aggression against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The State Duma calls on the parliaments of the member states of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe to come up with a joint initiative to urgently conduct a similar international parliamentary investigation.

The State Duma calls on the President of the Russian Federation and the Government of the Russian Federation to provide regular medical examinations of the Russian contingent and environmental monitoring of their locations in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Kosovo), as well as in Bosnia and Herzegovina and to inform the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation about the results of the survey.

On January 25, the State Duma sent the report made by a newly created State Duma commission for the study and compilation of information on crimes committed during the aggression of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). In the appeal to ICTY, the State Duma requested immediate prosecution of the people responsible for the use of depleted uranium munition in 1999 and in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1995. This was

17 See, for example, The Royal Society Working Group on the Health Hazards of Depleted Uranium Munitions (2002) 81 considered by the ICTY prosecutor, but neither the prosecutor nor the subsequently established Review Committee found elements of offense in the actions of NATO (Colangelo, 2002).

The Russian narrative about the illegality of NATO actions in terms of international law found audiences both at home and abroad. On September 7, 1999, the Russian State Construction Committee (Gosstroi) was tasked with assisting with reconstructing the Yugoslavian economy, among other things, it was tasked with “ensuring Russian participation… in assessing the material and environmental damage caused to Yugoslavia by NATO aggression.” Internationally, the Government of Cuba (1999) issued a declaration on June 1, in which they condemned “killing thousands of civilians, destroying a country’s economic and social means of subsistence and polluting the environment” and repeated the State Duma statement regarding the threat to environmental security that the NATO attacks created: “the destruction of oil refineries and chemical plants as well as the non-enriched uranium contained in many of the missiles used by the attackers have already caused ecological damage of incalculable proportions. The air in the Balkans is poisoned with sulfur dioxide and ammonia. The soil is saturated with the progressive death of animals, plants and human beings. The Danube, other rivers and the sea are full of toxic products.” In this declaration, the Government of Cuba attempted to reconstruct the events of the NATO operation, including a day-by-day list of alleged crimes committed by NATO. The allegations laid out by Cuba included, among others, contaminating the waters of the Danube, “acid rains,” and radioactive fallout.

Generally, however, the international community remained unimpressed by this move. China, for example, only issued a declaration regarding the attack on the Chinese embassy in Yugoslavia, but in calling for the stop of military operations, remained vague on the alleged crimes that NATO committed, apart from the Chinese embassy incident. In an official note to the US, foreign minister Tang Jiaxuan only parenthetically mentioned that the attacks “caused a serious disaster to the people of the region” (Tang, 1999)

Again, in the statement of the State Duma on the third anniversary of the NATO bombings in 2002, the State Duma underlined that “Yugoslavia and the Balkans as a whole suffered enormous environmental damage, the consequences of which will continue to affect for many decades to come.”

Subsequently, the environmental security concerns disappeared from the discourse on OAF, but the NATO bombings left a lasting impression on the Russian foreign policy. For example, NATO bombings were mentioned in a Declaration of the State Duma in response to the European Parliament Resolution on Chechnya – a clear suggestion of the parallels that the Russian political elite drew between the Kosovo War and the Second Chechen War. Similarly, the 2009 Declaration on the ten-year anniversary of the bombings does not mention the environmental impact of the bombings, focusing instead on human security and economic consequences of the OAF, and the general impact on the “security, peace and stability in Europe.”

7.2 The Arctic

From among different regional cases of environmental securitization (the Far North and the Arctic, Lake Baikal, the Black Sea, the Caspian Sea, the Urals, the Volga), the Arctic appears to be the most representative, lending itself very well to the most-likely case design. First, it has the greatest number of documents, which indicates its overall presence in environmental security policy. Second, it involves an international, transboundary dimension: the Arctic is an area with long-established hierarchy, known rules of the game, and intertwined state and private interests (Wilson Rowe, 2018, p. 125). Third, as an area of increased territorial and state security concerns, the Arctic is an important region for Russia’s economy and identity (Hønneland, 2016, p. 19).

The analysis of the securitization of the environment in the Arctic uses documents from the same database as in the previous chapter, which in the process of coding have been flagged as pertaining to the Arctic. Overall, it shows that there are two important periods, or two important securitization moves, in regards to the Arctic. Figure 13 demonstrates the cumulative number of the most important and most relevant mentions of environmental security in combination with either of the two traditional Russian terms for the Arctic: the Far North (Крайний Север), which also includes areas with harsh climatic conditions, and the Arctic (Арктика). The first one lasted from 1991 to 2001, while the second one began in 2007 and continues to this day. It is interesting to note that the term “the Arctic” becomes more popular only during the second securitization period, while during the first period “the Far North” is used preferentially. It is thus important to find out what caused this absence of Arctic

83 environmental securitization between 2002 and 2005, as well as the impetus behind the second wave of securitization.

Figure 13. Documents on Environmental Security in the Arctic, Cumulative, 1990-2019.

The Arctic has become securitized in terms of environmental security very early on: perhaps as early as the famous 1987 Gorbachev’s Murmansk speech. The first document that mentions the Arctic is the presidential executive order of April 22, 1992 “On urgent measures to protect the places of residence and economic activity of the indigenous peoples of the North,” which called for “protection of environmental security in the industrial development areas of the North.” Although this document deals with the rights of the indigenous peoples of the Russian North, rather than dealing with environment or environmental security per se, it indicates an important turn towards its securitization.

The next document is the regulation on the procedure for licensing of the subsoil natural resources, issued on July 15, 1992, by the Supreme Soviet. In this case, environmental security is mentioned in relation to the continental shelf of the Russian Federation, the exclusive economic zone, and the protection of the state border. First, this demonstrates that environmental security was early on understood in terms of territorial security, explicitly linked with it. Second, this connection between environmental security, Russian economic activity in the North, and the Russian strategic state interest will become a lasting leitmotif in the environmental security literature. Such a link between territorial security and environmental security is very natural in the Russian North. As Broadus and Vartanov (1994, p. 187) note, the loss of more than half of Russia’s ports to other former republics of the USSR meant the

increased territorial significance of Russia’s Arctic ports and the exclusive economic zone associated with it.

On December 25, 1992, the Russian government established the State Committee for Social and Economic Development of the North (Goskomsever), which was, among others, was tasked with ensuring environmental security in the North.

The securitization move in the Arctic coincided with other, pan-Arctic initiatives for cooperation in the area. In 1991, there was a conference in Rovaniemi, also called the “Finnish initiative” and in 1993, there was a conference in Nuuk. Accordingly, on July 22, 1994, the Minprirody created the Interdepartmental Council for ensuring the effective implementation of Russia’s national obligations arising from the decisions of the Rovaniemi (1991) and Nuuk (1993) conferences. This committee was tasked with creating a federal-regional program for ensuring environmentally secure development of the Arctic and Russian North in 1996-2000.

That the policy of the Russian government in the Arctic was largely guided by the results of these international initiatives can be illustrated by the governmental program for reforming and developing the economy in 1995-1997, adopted in April 1995:

In this regard, measures will be taken to maintain an acceptable level of environmental security and the scope of direct environmental protection activities, as well as compensatory measures to preserve and maintain the natural resource potential. The urgency of implementing these measures is defined as the need to fulfill the obligations arising from international treaties and conventions on the conservation of biological diversity, the prevention of global climate change, the preservation of the ozone layer of the Earth, the protection of unique natural zones, including the Arctic, the reduction of transboundary air pollution, the protection of the seas from pollution and other agreements and the severity of the environmental situation in many regions of the country. (sec. 7.9, para. 11)

The main securitizing actor is the Federal Assembly. 1995 was an important year in terms of legislation, and this applies to the Arctic. In June 1995, the State Duma and the Federation Council adopted the Law on Principals of State Regulation of the Social and Economic Development of the North of the Russian Federation. This law was drafted by the State Duma Committee for the Problems of the North and Far East and was the first legislation that governed the Russian Arctic. In terms of its content, the law was doctrinal, rather than normative in character and was primarily significant as it identified the overall policy for the development of Russian North, and thus mirrored the desire to create a protectionist regime in the Russian Arctic. In practice, this entailed creating a preferential development regime for the region’s industry and import substitution. In terms of the Arctic environmental security, it used the ecosphere in the Arctic as the referent object, stating:

State regulation in the field of environmental protection and nature management in the North is aimed at meeting the needs of the population in natural resources, maintaining a stable state and integrity of ecological systems, ensuring environmental security based on the special vulnerability and poor restoration of the nature of the North. (art. 1, para. 1)

The law was vetoed by the President and was only signed into law after a revision in 1996 (SOZD, 2020b), thus sharing the fate of the Law on Environmental Security, which was described in Chapter 6. As such, this is already a second instance of the President being skeptical towards the securitizing moves from the parliament; at least insofar they employed the ecosphere as the referent object.

At the same time, the government developed the Federal target program the World Ocean, which was set into force on August 10, 1998. The program was created by the Ministry of Economy, and among other departments, the Ministries of Natural Resources, Defense, and the Goskomsever were assigned with carrying out this program. Notably, the Goskomecology was not included among the program’s administrants. Rather than focusing on environmental protection, this program’s explicit goal was to study and use the “resources of the World Ocean for the purposes of economic development, ensuring security of the country and her sea borders.” Therefore, when it comes to environmental security in this program, the emphasis was heavily shifted toward the security dimension of its implementation, and the state, rather than the ecosphere was the referent object. For example, it mentions that the goal of “determination of the fundamentals of environmental security” is to “preserve the biological resources of the seas of the Russian Federation,” and not the marine ecosystems in themselves. Notably, the program included a subprogram titled Environmental security in the Arctic, which was aimed at restoring the environment of the Russian Arctic. Speaking of the importance of environmental security the program noted that

The problems of environmental security of the Arctic attract the attention of both the Arctic states and states outside the Arctic. In the conditions of the extremely vulnerable environment of the Arctic (violation of its state is almost irreversible), the increasing anthropogenic load, accumulation of waste, the entry of pollutants as a result of transboundary transport, and the threat of oil, chemical and radioactive pollution are of particular concern. (pt. 1, para. 22)

This securitizing push of the late 1990s, which used the state as the referent object and emphasized its economic dimension continued momentum in the early 2000s as well, but the “environmental” in the environmental security was downplayed in favor of the state security concerns. While the government did not come with any concrete environmental plans during this period, the environmental security for some time continued to be present in the strategies for the development of the Arctic, all of which have been in development for quite some time. 86

The Concept of State Support for the Economic and Social Development of the North (2000) thus solemnly declared that “the northern territories play a key role in the national economy, in ensuring the security and geopolitical interests of Russia.” Indeed, the environmental security of the Arctic is seen through the lens of its economic and geopolitical importance. In declaring ensuring environmental security “the main objective of state environmental policy in the North,” it called for “active state regulation of environmental management and the promotion of environmental protection.”

An important event, shaping the Russian Arctic environmental and security policy was undoubtedly the K-141 Kursk nuclear submarine disaster that happened on August 12, 2000. Though a similar accident occurred in 1989, this was the first disaster of its kind in modern Russian history, leaving a profound impact on the public psyche. This is reflected by the fact that the 2001 Program of Socio-Economic Development of the Russian Federation for the Medium Term (2002-2004), the country’s first comprehensive Arctic policy document, published on July 10, 2001, mentioned the environmental security of the Arctic with a vague suggestion of the catastrophe.

Particular attention will be paid to ensuring environmental security in the Arctic, especially during the operation, conservation and disposal of ships with nuclear power plants, as well as solving the problem of radioactive waste management resulting from the activities of nuclear icebreakers, submarines and power plants. It is necessary to establish a special nature management regime that guarantees the conservation of the Arctic territories as a global environmental resource (pt. 4.4.3, para. 14).

The directive from the Ministry of Natural Resources on ensuring radiation and environmental safety in the territory of the Murmansk Region from February 7, 2002, is among the last environmental security documents from this period. After this, environmental security largely disappeared from the Arctic documents, which is consistent with the traditional secrecy surrounding the sensitive environmental security data in the area,18 on the one hand, and with the trend of desecuritization of environment, on the other. Finally, in 2005 even the Federal Law on Principals of State Regulation of the Social and Economic Development of the North of the Russian Federation was scrapped.

The following period is a period of several years of silence about the environmental security of the Arctic: an unusual silence, considering that between 2003-2005 Russia assumed chairmanship of the Arctic Council. Wilson Rowe (2018, pp. 89-94) characterizes the period

18 Take, for example, the Aleksandr Nikitin case from the Northern Fleet or a similar Pasko case from the Pacific Fleet. See ZumBrunnen and Trumbull (2016, p. 269) 87

1997-2007 as a decade when Russia was a “large state” with a “quiet voice in Arctic politics”: seeking to prioritize sustainable development of its urban areas over environmental initiatives. Evidently, after the nuclear security issues had been addressed, the environmental security angle became irrelevant for a time being. For six years, there are virtually no documents on the environmental security of the Arctic.

A certain change started brewing in 2007-2008. In 2007, an expedition of Russian scientists collecting data for Russian continental shelf claim planted a Russian flag at the seabed of the North Pole (Hønneland, 2016, p. 15), which is often cited as a start of a new chapter in Russian Arctic policy (Hart et al., 2012, Hønneland, 2016). However, the story is much more complicated: the research was carried out using Swedish funds, and the flag planting in itself was neither a competition nor a political statement (Aarskog, 2016). From then on, Russia attempted to assume a leadership role in the Arctic Council negotiations and adopted a more active stance in the region, while at the same time underscoring the continuing peaceful nature of the region (Wilson Rowe, 2018, pp. 95-97). Unsurprisingly, the Russian first global Arctic strategy document, the 2008 Fundamentals of State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Arctic for the Period until 2020 and Beyond, was the first document to mention the issues of the Arctic concerning the global ecosphere. The strategy placed environmental security as the third in the list of goals of the state policy of Russia, coming only after social/economic development and military security, and defined it “in the field of environmental security as the preservation and protection of the natural environment of the Arctic, the elimination of the environmental consequences of economic activity in the face of increasing economic activity and global climate change” (art. 6, pt. c).

This is an indication that environmental security, having survived in Russian policy documents, transformed in focus from the state towards the ecosystemic, global dimension. Whereas in the previous securitization period Russia was concerned with its territories of the “Far North,” this period is signified by an interest in the global “Arctic.” As such, Russia can no longer be content with ensuring environmental security of only its Arctic territories. Indeed, the 2010 Polar Bear Conservation Strategy in the Russian Federation admitted, “Further development of economic activity in the Arctic region of Russia… will positively affect the socio-economic development of the northern regions… At the same time, the expansion of industrial activity aggravates environmental security problems and poses a threat to the

inhabitants of marine and coastal areas, including the polar bear” (MNR, 2010, pt. 6.2.1.1, para. 3).

At the same time, human security and public health perspective remained an important facet of environmental security. The Strategy for Socio-Economic Development of the North- West Federal District for the Period until 2020 (18.11.2011), for example, declared that “strategic goals in the field of environmental protection are to ensure an environmentally secure and comfortable environment,” while “human health and the environment are one of the key indicators of sustainable development.” Unlike a more ecosphere conscious approach, this represents that environmental security was most important in its relations to “ecological conditions of human life, the formation of ecologically safe and comfortable places of work and leisure, other social activity, the living environment of the population in cities, improving health and increasing the life expectancy of people.”

This new wave of environmental securitization did not just have a declarative character. While increasing investment into the region, environmental security is always taken into account, as in the planning of the comprehensive investment plan “Energy of the Arctic,” which entered development by the Ministry of Finance in 2012. The Federation Council Committee on Federative Structure and Northern Affairs, which is responsible for environmental security, held a conference on the Problems of Environmental Protection and Environmental Security in the Far North and Equivalent Locations. The conference was organized as a bottom-up initiative, which invited submissions from regional and local governments, scientists, and civil society organizations. As a result, the senators received information on the threats to environmental security of the Arctic and important aspects of nature management and nature protection from the regions.

The international dimension of the Arctic policy was the principal driver of environmental securitization. The Arctic (along with Lake Baikal) is one of the few regions specifically addressed in the 2012 State Policy in the field of Environmental Development of Russia until 2030. Furthermore, the Arctic is mentioned specifically in the context of international projects and information exchange for the purposes of ensuring environmental security.

Similarly, the 2013 strategy document, unlike the 2008 Arctic policy document, while rhetorically setting the same priorities, adopted overall a more technical tone (Hønneland, 2016,

89 p.157). As far as environmental security is concerned, this strategy developed concrete, tangible provisions “to protect the environment and ensure environmental security in the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation.” This plan included six points: biodiversity, conservation, alleviation of environmental damage, minimization of environmental impact, environmental monitoring and observation, and sustainable development mechanisms. Rhetorically, this also helped advance Russian claims to the continental shelf, as it was included in the scope of the strategy.

Thus, the biggest rhetorical change was that the country started positioning itself as a householder, who cleans up his own backyard, instead of leaving the task to his neighbors. The 2017 Federation Council report on socio-economic development of the Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrug thus characterized Russian efforts:

For the Yamal-Nenets Autonomous Okrug, environmental security and the preservation of fragile Arctic nature are important priorities. Over the past five years, the Bely Island has been completely cleared of debris. Similar work is underway on the island of Vilkitskii. The experience of scientists working in the Autonomous Okrug on the scientific support of all vital processes in the Arctic based on the principal of rational environmental management is in demand by Russian and foreign colleagues. (para. 12)

This effort, however, was not limited to Russia’s private backyard. In September 2014, the government issued the Concept for the Creation and Development of the Russian Scientific Center on the Spitsbergen Archipelago, a scientific station in Svalbard which was meant to enhance “the environmental security of marine activities in the Arctic, including hydro- meteorological support for the activities of the Navy of the Russian Federation, marine transport operations, and the development and conservation of biological and mineral resources of the Arctic.” The Expert Council of the Federation Council was also not just limited to the Arctic, but also included the Antarctic, and was meant to advise the Federation Council on “the issues of… state policy and ensuring the national interests in… military security, protection of the state border of the Russian Federation, environmental security.”

These changes were to stay, as more intellectual and human resources were focused on the Arctic and its environmental security. The Northeastern Federal University opened study programs, aimed at “development of innovative technologies for the efficient reproduction of the mineral resource base and rational nature management in the North-East of Russia and in the Arctic, taking into account modern standards for ensuring environmental security.” The State Duma Committee on Ecology and Environmental Protection from 2016 incorporated environmental security in the Arctic and Antarctic into its official agenda, enshrined in its bylaws. In 2015, the government created a new department, the State Commission for the

Development of the Arctic. Its goals included, “ensuring environmental security in the implementation of economic and other activities in the Arctic,” a goal which was subordinate only to economic policy, transport, the continental shelf development, and border delineation. This indicated continued interest to pursue Russian interests in the Arctic, while at the same time again demonstrated the ideological precedence of economic development to environmental security. However, as previously, environmental security is a continued presence even in purely economic documents, such as the state program for the development of shipbuilding for 2013 – 2030 or the state program for the socio-economic development of the Arctic zone. Ensuring environmental security is thus seen as a natural part of the economic development doctrine. Just like Lenin called for electrification of the whole country in 1920, the Arctic documents called for “fiber-optic and satellite communication and monitoring systems, … wireless access to the Internet, and … environmental security facilities.”

The 2014 events in Ukraine and Crimea affected Russian foreign policy and undoubtedly reflected on the Arctic. As such, foreign policy documents of the recent years carry a more stern, assertive tone, all the while underlining Arctic as a zone of peace, in which environmental security aspects remain an important security dimension. The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation, adopted in 2016, discussing Russia’s position in Northern Europe, calls for “the principal of equal and indivisible security,” which entails “practical cooperation with the states of Northern Europe, including the implementation of joint projects within the framework of multilateral structures, taking into account the environmental aspects and interests of indigenous peoples.” Even the most recent reformulation of Russian Arctic policy, the Fundamentals of State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Arctic for the period until 2035 from March 5, 2020, which more or less reiterates its previous formulation is more assertive in terms of environmental security, having expanded the list of environmental security objectives to include the following:

implementation of a set of measures to prevent the entry of toxic substances, pathogens of infectious diseases and radioactive substances into the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation (art. 15, pt. h).

Thus, the Russian stance on environmental security in the Arctic has come full circle. Discontent with the reproaches in the role of the principal polluter, Russia is now considering the threat of transboundary transfer of pollutants into its zone from without its borders.

This newfound voice in Russian discourse on environmental security indicates an essential change. If 1997-2007 Arctic stance was silent, and the 2007-2017 period could be

91 described as “high negotiator still receiving ‘aid’” (Wilson Rowe, 2018, p. 95), this new period could perchance be characterized by the “get-off-my-lawn” mentality: delineate its borders, clean it up, and guard against trespassing.

7.3 Summary

This chapter was designed to test the validity of the quantitative and qualitative inferences of the previous two chapters. The first part of this chapter analyzed how Russia reacted to a conflict situation at the height of its environmental securitization and demonstrated that when a country reacts to a threat arising from a conflict situation, the reaction will follow across all securitized sectors. This mirrors the conclusion from Chapter 6 when Russia responded to conflicts in Georgia and Ukraine by designing environmental security strategies.

The second subunit analysis looked at the securitization of the environment in the Arctic. It demonstrated that securitization leads to eventual institutionalization, and entering bureaucratic practice. As a result, the periods of silence do not indicate desecuritization; when external conditions change, the same securitized discourse re-emerges. Most importantly, environmental securitization in the Arctic shows that security discourse follows the same rules of normal politics in Russia: bureaucratic conventions and institutional practices.

8 Conclusion

»Alle streben doch nach dem Gesetz«, sagt der Mann, »wieso kommt es, daß in den vielen Jahren niemand außer mir Einlaß verlangt hat? « Der Türhüter erkennt, daß der Mann schon an seinem Ende ist, und, um sein vergehendes Gehör noch zu erreichen, brüllt er ihn an: »Hier konnte niemand sonst Einlaß erhalten, denn dieser Eingang war nur für dich bestimmt. Ich gehe jetzt und schließe ihn. «

—Franz Kafka, Der Prozeß This thesis was conceived as a test of the Copenhagen theory on securitization. Securitization is a useful and intellectually engrossing theory, which demonstrates where the concept of security originates and how it influences policy: from its birth as a speech act to its implementation as policy. At the same time, the story of securitization is pretty much a story about words, which in themselves are actions. This made it especially important to test how the linguistic landscape affects the practical understanding of security.

As I have shown in Chapter 4, Soviet Union was one of the first countries in the world to securitize the environment, when it became a political decision in an attempt to find a universal security value as an attempt to end the Cold War. This securitization attempt was not accepted in the West but found resonance at home. Domestic audiences obtained in environmental security a useful tool to express their discontent with the conditions of the environment, using the language of the highest weight in Russian political arsenal, the national security language.

Chapter 5 demonstrated that it was not foreign securitizing moves that became the trigger for securitization in Russia. Rather, Russia played the role of a securitizing actor internationally, employing the logic of environmentalism as one of the pillars in its international identity construction and its integration initiatives. Environmental security was thus not a mere instrumental norm, but part of a deep identity. The process of this identity construction was explored in Chapter 6, which demonstrated that once securitization was deepened, internalized, and institutionalized, desecuritization had become nay impossible. This had both endemic and general causes. Generally, this finding is consistent with the Copenhagen School’s appraisal that persistent threats lower in urgency, become institutionalized, and trivialized. Yet, “behind the first layers of ordinary bureaucratic arguments, one will ultimately find a – probably irritated – repetition of a security argument so well established that it is taken for granted” (Buzan et al., 1999, p. 28). Endemically, the Russian political environment, where security rhetoric is the epitome of the political language, requires security language to be employed in order to validate

93 the importance of an issue. In Russia, a political issue that cannot be discussed in terms of security is not significant.

This conclusion incites the desire to modify the central tenet of the Copenhagen theory that securitization is beyond the realm of politics. Perhaps securitized issues are not always open to public deliberation, nevertheless, they follow the same rules of the political game. This was once again demonstrated in Chapter 7 when securitization is used as an ad hoc political tool in the case of Yugoslavia. The case of Arctic environmental securitization underscored that it is more useful to think of securitization as a security ritual, in which the language of securitization becomes a part of the bureaucratic practice, exhibiting the traits of institutionalized organizational behavior. The epipolitical nature of securitization could be simply a phenomenon, unique to the Anglophone linguistic framework, though other research challenged its application there as well.

One of the goals of this inquiry was to apply it in the non-Western context and to isolate the Anglo-centricity in its formulation. Much of the normative critique directed towards national security, proposed even by the Copenhagen School itself, has emphasized that securitization is undesirable because it is rooted in the parochial interests of the nation-state. At the same time, “safeticizaiton” does not carry similar negative connotations. It appears that I have succeeded to demonstrate that it is difficult to separate security and safety as distinct terms when the meanings of the two are deeply interwoven. It would seem to the speakers of English that safety and security are insular terms, yet to a Russian, they are part of the same spectrum. This is perhaps desirable in an idealistic sense, as no security of the state without the safety of its society can exist: be it safety from environmental disasters brought upon by the state itself or safety of the Leviathan political system.

Despite some of these suggestions of how securitization theory could be nuanced, I believe that inquiry into the Russian context helped to undo Russia as a civilizational other to Western society. As such, this thesis shows that the underlying “security narrative” in Russia is not that much different from the one in the West. Environmental securitization in Russia is not opportunistic, because it is often idealistic and non-pragmatic, and it is not a spiritual ideal, because it deals with measures. In the underlying form, Russia is just another bureaucracy, plagued by many of the same problems as bureaucracies of the West, even if to a higher degree.

This thesis was designed as an embedded mixed-methods case study. The embedded case study design most often resembles a matryoshka doll, even if sometimes it may turn out to be a Kinder-egg: the subunits of the study may repeat the patterns of the holistic study, or they may complement them in an unexpected manner. The former is theoretically more desirable, as it demonstrates little unexplained variation within the case. The latter is more common and challenging, and therefore more exciting. The ultimate form that a case study takes between these two is not always determined by the epistemological status of the study, but rather by the various facets of the subunits under study. In the case of environmental securitization in Russia, it appears to be the former: the subunits under study fit well with the conclusions of the case inquiry. Both cases of Yugoslavia and the Arctic demonstrate that a securitized field does not need to produce a continuous flow of documents; it is only with the change in circumstances that this happens. Yet, they demonstrate uniqueness: there remains some “unexplained variance,” which suggests that each of the “dolls” have their own unique designs.

The ultimate goal of this case study was to shed light on the larger classis of phenomena that share similar traits: it appears that there are several interesting avenues for generalization. First, in a narrow sense, the findings of this thesis would likely hold true for other sectors securitized in the Russian context, from societal security to language security. This is also true for countries that share the same profile as Russia, from post-Soviet countries to countries with transition economies. In a broader sense, I believe that the case of Russia is to a certain extent generalizable to all nation-states. The lessons about the institutionalization of security institutions, defaulting to the traditional security providers, and the difficulty of desecuritization are applicable also to other nation-states.

Perhaps the greatest theoretical contribution of this thesis is that it might be useful not to make a distinction between the political and the securitized in the way that the Copenhagen School predicts. The language of security is a language of politics, and, depending on the political culture of a particular society, it might become the highest language of politics, like in Russia. The language of security is applied not because it is intended to stop political deliberation, as the Copenhagen School predicts, but rather in order to underscore the importance assigned to the issue under consideration. In a country, where security is the first priority, securitizing a sector is an expression of concern, value, and appreciation.

Russia has a particularly complicated relationship with nature and the environment, and it can be said that it is an important facet in the construction of Russian identity. At the same 95 time, this relationship is perhaps not clearly understood in the Western academic literature – it was the purpose of this study to attempt to peek behind that doorway. It was simultaneously intentional and intuitive that the entrance that I have chosen here were primarily legal documents. Because this thesis dealt with performative statements and identity construction, relying on legal documents appears to be ever more relevant, as the Law unto the state is both a statement of intent and a resolution to action.

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Appendix I. Russian Environmental Services Structure (1988-2004)

-198819 1988-1990 1990 1991 1991 1991 1992-2000 1996-2000 2004 Ministry of USSR State USSR State Ministry for USSR Inter- Ministry on Ministry on Russian Federal Federal Service for Geology of Committee on Committee on Nature republican Ecology and Ecology and Federation State Service for Supervision in the USSR Environmental Environmental Management Committee on Nature Natural Resources Committee on Supervision Field of Nature Protection Protection and Environmental Management of RSFSR (Russian Environmental in the Field Management Environmental Security of RSFSR Federation) Protection of Ecology Protection of and Nature USSR Management Ministry of RSFSR State RSFSR State Committee on Ecology and Nature Ministry of Ministry of Ministry of Natural Geology of Committee on Management Natural Natural Resources and RSFSR Environmental Resources of the Resources of Ecology of the Protection Russian the Russian Russian Federation Committee on Water Management under the Council of Ministers of the RSFSR Committee of Federation Federation Federal Agency for Russian Federation Water Resources on Water Management RSFSR State Committee on Geology and Subsoil Use Committee of Federal Agency for Russian Federation Subsoil Use on Geology and Subsoil Use

RSFSR Minestry for Forest Management Federal Agency for Forestries USSR Ministry for Energy and Electrification RSFSR Ministry for Fuel and Energy Ministry for Fuel Ministry for Ministry for Ministry for Energy and Energy of the Energy of the Industry and of Russian Russian Federation Russian Energy of Federation USSR USSR Ministry for Nuclear Energy and Industry Ministry for Federation Russian Federal Ministry for Nuclear Energy of Federation Agency Nuclear the Russian for Energy / Federation Nuclear Ministry for Energy Middle (Rosatom) Engineering

19 Dates are approximate. Grey color of the cell indicates that the organization is an independent ministry, brown that it is subordinate to an executive organ, and red that it is an agency. 1