2011_CIC_3.qxd:Peacekeeping_FM_qxd.qxd 1/16/12 1:45 PM Page 109 3.7 Somalia Somalia underwent enormous political and security change in 2011. Al-Shabaab’s Background August announcement that it would retreat Somalia, the prototypical “failed state” and from Mogadishu brought hope that conditions one of the most dangerous countries in the in the capital city would improve. While se- world, has struggled with political instability curity gains have been made, Al-Shabaab has and insecurity for over two decades. In 1991, scaled up asymmetric attacks in the city since Somalia was confronted with clan-based vio- ceding control. The militia has also threat- lence after the collapse of Siad Barre’s regime. ened reprisal against Kenya, after that coun- A year later, drought in the region sparked a try’s military entered Somalia in October to famine in Somalia that resulted in the death drive Al-Shabaab from its northern border. of over 300,000 people and the displacement The efforts against Al-Shabaab were also bol- of thousands more. stered by the November announcement that In 1992 the UN imposed an arms em- Ethiopia would send troops to Somalia for a bargo, followed by the establishment of the short deployment. first UN Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM I) A massive drought and poor harvests in 2011 resulted in a declaration of famine in June, and this acute humanitarian situation has expanded to cover nearly all of south- central Somalia. While a rapid increase in hu- manitarian assistance has improved condi- tions, progress remains fragile and the crisis has resulted in the displacement of hundreds of thousands of Somalis, both inside the country and into refugee camps in Kenya and Ethiopia. At the same time, Somalia underwent im- portant political developments. Somali polit- ical stakeholders agreed to extend the transi- tional period, which was set to end in 2011, until August 2012. While the timeline to complete the transitional period is ambitious, the agreement may be an important milestone for developing the critical long-term political structures needed in Somalia. However, the political and security gains of 2011 remain fragile. The humanitarian crisis and the con- tinued threat from Al-Shabaab could reverse the year’s progress. 109 2011_CIC_3.qxd:Peacekeeping_FM_qxd.qxd 1/16/12 1:45 PM Page 110 110 • MISSION NOTES Political Context AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) After approximately a dozen peacemaking at- tempts in Somalia, discussions led by the •Authorization Date 21 February 2007 (UNSC Res. 1744) Inter-Governmental Authority on Develop- • Start Date March 2007 ment (IGAD) in 2004 resulted in the estab- • Force Commander Major-General Fred Mugisha lishment of the Transitional Federal Charter (Uganda) and the Transitional Federal Government • Budget $152 million (TFG). Many Somalis viewed the TFG as a (1 October 2010–30 September 2011) puppet of Ethiopia, and its legitimacy contin- •Strengthasof Troops:9,754 30 September 2011 Police: 50 ues to be deeply challenged both inside So- Civilian Staff: 13 malia and abroad. After the establishment of the TFG, the president quickly requested the support of a peacekeeping mission, but the planned AU- to monitor a cease-fire in the Somali capital sponsored IGAD mission was never deployed of Mogadishu and provide military support to and the TFG—unable to control the capital the UN humanitarian relief operation. How- on its own—was forced to meet in exile. ever, attacks on aid convoys and humanitarian In 2006 the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), staff continued, and aid efforts were slowed a coalition of moderate and extreme Islamist dramatically as 1.5 million people were de- groups and exiled Somali parliamentarians, clared to be at risk of starvation. came to power in Mogadishu, initiating the It was these circumstances that prompted first period of relative stability and security US president George H. W. Bush to deploy in over fifteen years. In December 2006 the the UN-authorized and US-led Unified Task- Ethiopian military, concerned about the emer- force (UNITAF). The mission, deployed under gence of an Islamist state on its border, inter- Chapter VII of the UN Charter, comprised vened with tacit support from the United 37,000 soldiers authorized to use “all neces- States, ousting the ICU and reinstalling the sary means” to open up space for the delivery TFG in the capital. In response, Al-Shabaab, of humanitarian aid. a hard-line faction of the ICU, launched an In 1993 the UN assumed control of the insurgency. Large-scale fighting in 2007 and operation, under the new name UNOSOM II, 2008 displaced over 1 million Somalis. with a wider statebuilding mandate. In Octo- In 2007 the UN Security Council author- ber of that year an attempt by US forces to ized the deployment of the AU Mission in capture warlord Mohamed Farrah Aidid re- Somalia (AMISOM). The mission was man- sulted in the infamous “Blackhawk down” in- dated to support the TFG, provide assistance cident and the death of eighteen US soldiers. to ongoing political dialogue, create secure In the aftermath, US and other Western mili- space for the delivery of humanitarian assis- tary forces withdrew from Somalia; the effect tance, and support the reform and reestablish- of this incident on popular perceptions of ment of a professional Somali security sector. peacekeeping, and of Somalia, continues to Initial discussions cast AMISOM as a “bridg- impact Western policymaking in the region. ing” mission, intended to pave the way for a The UN operation struggled following UN deployment. Following serious disagree- the withdrawal of Western forces and assets, ments at senior levels of the UN and among and in 1995 the mission withdrew from the Security Council member states, it was de- country and established the UN Political Office termined that conditions on the ground were in Somalia (UNPOS) in Nairobi, to continue not appropriate for the deployment of blue its monitoring and negotiation efforts. helmets. 2011_CIC_3.qxd:Peacekeeping_FM_qxd.qxd 1/16/12 1:45 PM Page 111 SOMALIA • 111 In the context of continued fighting in 2007, ICU members, diaspora leaders, and ex- iled Somalis joined together to form the Al- liance for the Reliberation of Somalia (ARS). This group also included Al-Shabaab and other hard-line militant groups. Under what came to be known as the Djibouti process, ARS leaders and the TFG met in Djibouti in 2008 to hammer out an agreement that would precipitate the withdrawal of Ethiopian forces, the incorporation of ARS elements into the TFG, and the creation of an “international se- curity presence.” The hard-line members of the ARS, in- cluding Al-Shabaab, rejected the agreement and intensified their efforts to oust the TFG and AMISOM forces, while the Djibouti pro- UN Photo/Stuart Price cess moved forward without them. In early A Ugandan soldier serving with the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) 2009, after the withdrawal of Ethiopian stands guard in a doorway inside Mogadishu Stadium, north of the forces and the selection of Sharif Sheikh Somali capital, on 7 August 2011, two days after the insurgent group Al-Shabaab withdrew the majority of its forces overnight. Ahmed, the former head of the ICU, as pres- Transitional Federal Government (TFG) forces, backed by AMISOM troops, ident, there was a lull in the violence and fought sporadic gun battles in the area as pockets of resistance some businesspeople began to return to Mo- erupted and “mopping-up operations” took place, according to an AMISOM commander on the ground. gadishu to reclaim property and resume their affairs. However, Al-Shabaab resumed its in- surgency with renewed vigor, and by June Al-Shabaab has also returned to a more 2009 the TFG had declared a state of emer- asymmetric style of attacks, however. A num- gency. The militant group continues to con- ber of suicide bombings in the capital in Oc- trol large swathes of south-central Somalia tober 2011 have resulted in many civilian today. deaths, including a truck bomb that killed more than 100 people. On 17 October, the government of Kenya Key Developments launched military operations aimed at creat- ing a large buffer area inside Somalia, be- Security Developments tween Al-Shabaab and the Kenyan border In 2010 and 2011, AMISOM took a more for- area. The Kenyan government initially stated ward-leaning approach, mounting offensive that the operations were in response to a operations against Al-Shabaab throughout number of high-profile kidnappings, despite Mogadishu, an effort that was bolstered by Al-Shabaab’s denial of involvement in the the December 2010 UN Security Council au- abductions. However, the Kenyan government thorization to increase troop levels. In August subsequently acknowledged that the opera- 2011, weary of continuing direct confronta- tions had been planned further in advance and tions with the growing AMISOM force, Al- were in reaction to long-term security threats.1 Shabaab declared that it was withdrawing from The incursion is likely to draw Al- the capital to regroup. Since Al-Shabaab’s Shabaab forces into combat in the southwest withdrawal, the TFG and AU peacekeepers of the country. Militants have also promised to now control all of Mogadishu. mount attacks inside Kenya, adding a new—and 2011_CIC_3.qxd:Peacekeeping_FM_qxd.qxd 1/16/12 1:45 PM Page 112 112 • MISSION NOTES wider—dimension to the Al-Shabaab threat. Political Developments To date, the majority of violence has taken Continued infighting between President Sharif place in Somalia, with the notable exception Sheikh Ahmed and the Transitional Federal of the 2010 suicide bombing in Uganda, the Parliament, particularly the speaker of the par- first bombing outside the country for which liament as well as a series of prime ministers, Al-Shabaab claimed responsibility.