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3.7

Somalia

Somalia underwent enormous political and security change in 2011. Al-Shabaab’s Background August announcement that it would retreat Somalia, the prototypical “failed state” and from brought hope that conditions one of the most dangerous countries in the in the capital city would improve. While se- world, has struggled with political instability curity gains have been made, Al-Shabaab has and insecurity for over two decades. In 1991, scaled up asymmetric attacks in the city since Somalia was confronted with clan-based vio- ceding control. The militia has also threat- lence after the collapse of ’s regime. ened reprisal against Kenya, after that coun- A year later, drought in the region sparked a try’s military entered Somalia in October to famine in Somalia that resulted in the death drive Al-Shabaab from its northern border. of over 300,000 people and the displacement The efforts against Al-Shabaab were also bol- of thousands more. stered by the November announcement that In 1992 the UN imposed an arms em- Ethiopia would send troops to Somalia for a bargo, followed by the establishment of the short deployment. first UN Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM I) A massive drought and poor harvests in 2011 resulted in a declaration of famine in June, and this acute humanitarian situation has expanded to cover nearly all of south- central Somalia. While a rapid increase in hu- manitarian assistance has improved condi- tions, progress remains fragile and the crisis has resulted in the displacement of hundreds of thousands of Somalis, both inside the country and into refugee camps in Kenya and Ethiopia. At the same time, Somalia underwent im- portant political developments. Somali polit- ical stakeholders agreed to extend the transi- tional period, which was set to end in 2011, until August 2012. While the timeline to complete the transitional period is ambitious, the agreement may be an important milestone for developing the critical long-term political structures needed in Somalia. However, the political and security gains of 2011 remain fragile. The humanitarian crisis and the con- tinued threat from Al-Shabaab could reverse the year’s progress.

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Political Context AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) After approximately a dozen peacemaking at- tempts in Somalia, discussions led by the •Authorization Date 21 February 2007 (UNSC Res. 1744) Inter-Governmental Authority on Develop- • Start Date March 2007 ment (IGAD) in 2004 resulted in the estab- • Force Commander Major-General Fred Mugisha lishment of the Transitional Federal Charter (Uganda) and the Transitional Federal Government • Budget $152 million (TFG). Many Somalis viewed the TFG as a (1 October 2010–30 September 2011) puppet of Ethiopia, and its legitimacy contin- •Strengthasof Troops:9,754 30 September 2011 Police: 50 ues to be deeply challenged both inside So- Civilian Staff: 13 malia and abroad. After the establishment of the TFG, the president quickly requested the support of a peacekeeping mission, but the planned AU- to monitor a cease-fire in the Somali capital sponsored IGAD mission was never deployed of Mogadishu and provide military support to and the TFG—unable to control the capital the UN humanitarian relief operation. How- on its own—was forced to meet in exile. ever, attacks on aid convoys and humanitarian In 2006 the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), staff continued, and aid efforts were slowed a coalition of moderate and extreme Islamist dramatically as 1.5 million people were de- groups and exiled Somali parliamentarians, clared to be at risk of starvation. came to power in Mogadishu, initiating the It was these circumstances that prompted first period of relative stability and security US president George H. W. Bush to deploy in over fifteen years. In December 2006 the the UN-authorized and US-led Unified Task- Ethiopian military, concerned about the emer- force (UNITAF). The mission, deployed under gence of an Islamist state on its border, inter- Chapter VII of the UN Charter, comprised vened with tacit support from the United 37,000 soldiers authorized to use “all neces- States, ousting the ICU and reinstalling the sary means” to open up space for the delivery TFG in the capital. In response, Al-Shabaab, of humanitarian aid. a hard-line faction of the ICU, launched an In 1993 the UN assumed control of the insurgency. Large-scale fighting in 2007 and operation, under the new name UNOSOM II, 2008 displaced over 1 million Somalis. with a wider statebuilding mandate. In Octo- In 2007 the UN Security Council author- ber of that year an attempt by US forces to ized the deployment of the AU Mission in capture warlord Mohamed Farrah Aidid re- Somalia (AMISOM). The mission was man- sulted in the infamous “Blackhawk down” in- dated to support the TFG, provide assistance cident and the death of eighteen US soldiers. to ongoing political dialogue, create secure In the aftermath, US and other Western mili- space for the delivery of humanitarian assis- tary forces withdrew from Somalia; the effect tance, and support the reform and reestablish- of this incident on popular perceptions of ment of a professional Somali security sector. peacekeeping, and of Somalia, continues to Initial discussions cast AMISOM as a “bridg- impact Western policymaking in the region. ing” mission, intended to pave the way for a The UN operation struggled following UN deployment. Following serious disagree- the withdrawal of Western forces and assets, ments at senior levels of the UN and among and in 1995 the mission withdrew from the Security Council member states, it was de- country and established the UN Political Office termined that conditions on the ground were in Somalia (UNPOS) in Nairobi, to continue not appropriate for the deployment of blue its monitoring and negotiation efforts. helmets. 2011_CIC_3.qxd:Peacekeeping_FM_qxd.qxd 1/16/12 1:45 PM Page 111

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In the context of continued fighting in 2007, ICU members, diaspora leaders, and ex- iled Somalis joined together to form the Al- liance for the Reliberation of Somalia (ARS). This group also included Al-Shabaab and other hard-line militant groups. Under what came to be known as the Djibouti process, ARS leaders and the TFG met in Djibouti in 2008 to hammer out an agreement that would precipitate the withdrawal of Ethiopian forces, the incorporation of ARS elements into the TFG, and the creation of an “international se- curity presence.” The hard-line members of the ARS, in- cluding Al-Shabaab, rejected the agreement and intensified their efforts to oust the TFG and AMISOM forces, while the Djibouti pro- UN Photo/Stuart Price cess moved forward without them. In early A Ugandan soldier serving with the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) 2009, after the withdrawal of Ethiopian stands guard in a doorway inside Mogadishu Stadium, north of the forces and the selection of Sharif Sheikh Somali capital, on 7 August 2011, two days after the insurgent group Al-Shabaab withdrew the majority of its forces overnight. Ahmed, the former head of the ICU, as pres- Transitional Federal Government (TFG) forces, backed by AMISOM troops, ident, there was a lull in the violence and fought sporadic gun battles in the area as pockets of resistance some businesspeople began to return to Mo- erupted and “mopping-up operations” took place, according to an AMISOM commander on the ground. gadishu to reclaim property and resume their affairs. However, Al-Shabaab resumed its in- surgency with renewed vigor, and by June Al-Shabaab has also returned to a more 2009 the TFG had declared a state of emer- asymmetric style of attacks, however. A num- gency. The militant group continues to con- ber of suicide bombings in the capital in Oc- trol large swathes of south-central Somalia tober 2011 have resulted in many civilian today. deaths, including a truck bomb that killed more than 100 people. On 17 October, the government of Kenya Key Developments launched military operations aimed at creat- ing a large buffer area inside Somalia, be- Security Developments tween Al-Shabaab and the Kenyan border In 2010 and 2011, AMISOM took a more for- area. The Kenyan government initially stated ward-leaning approach, mounting offensive that the operations were in response to a operations against Al-Shabaab throughout number of high-profile kidnappings, despite Mogadishu, an effort that was bolstered by Al-Shabaab’s denial of involvement in the the December 2010 UN Security Council au- abductions. However, the Kenyan government thorization to increase troop levels. In August subsequently acknowledged that the opera- 2011, weary of continuing direct confronta- tions had been planned further in advance and tions with the growing AMISOM force, Al- were in reaction to long-term security threats.1 Shabaab declared that it was withdrawing from The incursion is likely to draw Al- the capital to regroup. Since Al-Shabaab’s Shabaab forces into combat in the southwest withdrawal, the TFG and AU peacekeepers of the country. Militants have also promised to now control all of Mogadishu. mount attacks inside Kenya, adding a new—and 2011_CIC_3.qxd:Peacekeeping_FM_qxd.qxd 1/16/12 1:45 PM Page 112

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wider—dimension to the Al-Shabaab threat. Political Developments To date, the majority of violence has taken Continued infighting between President Sharif place in Somalia, with the notable exception Sheikh Ahmed and the Transitional Federal of the 2010 suicide bombing in Uganda, the Parliament, particularly the speaker of the par- first bombing outside the country for which liament as well as a series of prime ministers, Al-Shabaab claimed responsibility. However, has stymied achievement of key transitional shortly after the Kenyan government launched benchmarks, including the establishment of a the operation, Nairobi suffered several grenade Somali constitution and preparation for elec- attacks, carried out by a Kenyan member of tions. The transitional process was slated to Al-Shabaab.2 end in August 2011, but on 9 June the presi- In addition, in late 2011 Ethiopia, re- dent and the speaker of the parliament, with sponding to an IGAD request for support, the support of IGAD, agreed to extend the agreed to provide assistance to the efforts of transitional period to August 2012 under the Kenya and the AU to oust Al-Shabaab. The Kampala Accords. form and scale of this support is yet to be The accords commit the TFG to a new determined, but it is expected that the deploy- “roadmap” for stabilization and development. ment will be brief and that Ethiopian troops In conjunction with UNPOS, the TFG has will remain outside AMISOM command. The agreed to a set of priority benchmarks that must decision followed media reports that Ethiopian be met in the lead-up to an election in August troops entered Somalia in late November. 2012. This timeline is ambitious, especially be- Separate from these operations, US offi- cause the benchmarks include activities that cials confirmed in October that the US military went unrealized during the first three years of is flying unarmed surveillance drones from a the transitional period, and also because donor base in Ethiopia to monitor Al-Shabaab’s activ- support for the effort has been tied to results ities in Somalia. The drones are part of a broader that the TFG may struggle to achieve. Nonethe- counterterrorism effort in the region aimed at less, the first major milestone—the drafting of militant groups with links to Al-Qaida. a new national security and stabilization plan— Meanwhile, as the acute humanitarian sit- was completed in October and has been viewed uation continues, Al-Shabaab has hindered as a successful, Somali-owned process with a international efforts to provide aid to famine- greater chance of long-term success than its affected people in two ways. First, severe donor-driven predecessors. insecurity throughout most of the famine- The Kampala Accords also included a affected area, as well as an Al-Shabaab– provision requiring the resignation of Prime declared ban on the World Food Programme Minister Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed, who and other aid organizations, has meant that was widely respected as a reformer who humanitarians must negotiate access day by could rise above the clan divisions that often day, village by village, in order to operate. In dictate Somali politics. While his resignation November, Al-Shabaab looted the offices of a was based on an agreement between the pres- number of aid agencies and announced a ban ident and the speaker of the parliament to on more humanitarian organizations in areas strengthen parliament’s support for the ac- under its control, striking a further blow at re- cords and unify the TFG, it prompted large- lief efforts. Second, Al-Shabaab is considered scale protests in Somalia and throughout a terrorist organization by the United States, the diaspora community. There is hope, how- which restricts the delivery of assistance funded ever, that the new prime minister, Abdiweli by the US government or by any donors based Mohamed Ali, a US-trained economist, will in the United States that operate in areas con- strengthen international support and confi- trolled by the militants. dence in the Somali political process. 2011_CIC_3.qxd:Peacekeeping_FM_qxd.qxd 1/16/12 1:45 PM Page 113

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Peace Operations AMISOM has struggled to find balance Since its deployment in 2007, AMISOM has between difficult counterinsurgency in densely pursued a three-phase approach to stabilizing populated Mogadishu and the need to minimize south-central Somalia. The first phase in- civilian casualties. The more aggressive pos- volves stabilizing and establishing control ture of the mission has come with increased over Mogadishu; while the force established accusations of indiscriminate killing of civil- control over the city in 2011, the recent trend ians. In 2011, with the assistance of the non- of suicide attacks by Al-Shabaab suggests profit organization Campaign for Innocent further challenges. In the second phase, the Victims in Conflict, AMISOM instituted a new force is to expand southwest, toward Kismayo indirect fire policy in an effort to reduce the and Baidoa, though mission leadership has likelihood of civilian casualties. The mission emphasized that AMISOM will need signifi- also instituted a policy of making “amends” cant air and sea assets—including attack and with families and communities when its ac- utility helicopters—as well as strengthened tions result in harm to people or property. logistical and engineering capacity in order to AMISOM itself has been the target of se- progress past the first phase. The third phase rious attacks, including an October attack on would entail consolidation and the full imple- an AU military base that resulted in an undis- mentation of AMISOM’s mandate. closed number of AMISOM troop fatalities.3 In order for AMISOM forces to move out Though the mission has sustained heavy ca- of Mogadishu, TFG security forces, including sualties, troop-contributing countries—Uganda police and military, must be able to hold and and Burundi—regard the operation and the maintain order in the capital. AMISOM, with containment of the threat posed by Al- European Union support, completed the train- Shabaab to be national priorities, and have ing of 1,000 soldiers in January 2011, and a sustained support in spite of the human and second cohort of 998 troops completed train- economic costs of continued involvement. ing at the end of October. The TFG and AMI- The UN Security Council first authorized SOM are also currently seeking strong lead- the expansion of AMISOM troop levels— ers from within the ranks of the newly trained from 8,000 to 12,000 (still 8,000 fewer than troops, as well as from the TFG-allied militia the requested ceiling of 20,000)—in Decem- groups operating inside Mogadishu, who can ber 2010. But in October 2011 there were still be trained as midlevel officers. Somali soldiers just 9,700 troops deployed, though additional are now being registered in a biometric data- deployments, including from Djibouti and base in an effort to minimize corruption and Sierra Leone,4 are expected to bring the troop help ensure that troops receive their salary. levels to 12,000 by early 2012.5 The Somali Somali police have also made strides to- prime minister has stated that these troops are ward becoming a more professional force. urgently needed to support the extension of AMISOM police provide operational training the state’s presence to those areas vacated by and capacity building for the Somali police Al-Shabaab. force, roughly 500 of whom were trained in Further, in December the Kenyan parlia- 2011. Still, there is a tremendous need for ment approved a request from the AU to rehat continued donor support to enhance individ- Kenyan troops under AMISOM, contingent ual troop and officer capacity, and to better on approvel from the UN Security Council to equip the police for the difficult task of main- increase the mission’s troop ceiling. The AU’s taining law and order in Mogadishu. The TFG Peace and Security Commissioner noted that also requires support to develop institutional including Kenya’s forces in AMISOM would processes and controls to manage its new se- provide the mission with critical force enablers curity institutions. including helicopters and war ships,6 which 2011_CIC_3.qxd:Peacekeeping_FM_qxd.qxd 1/16/12 1:45 PM Page 114

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may provide the necessary support for the mis- deterring and preventing acts of piracy and sion to move to its second phase. armed robbery off the coast of Somalia, in- The UN Support Office for AMISOM cluding protecting transports by the World (UNSOA) is mandated to provide support and Food Programme, AMISOM, and other vul- supplies to the overstretched mission, includ- nerable vessels. In 2010, EU NAVFOR’s man- ing logistical, engineering, medical, and trans- date was extended two years, until December port support. UNPOS is also working to build 2012. In June 2011, Operation Atalanta es- AMISOM capacity through training in com- corted its 100th AMISOM vessel, ensuring the munications and public information. This sup- secure delivery of important humanitarian port has allowed for significant improvements and security supplies. to AMISOM’s capabilities in recent years, but the mission remains extremely under- resourced for the complex tasks it is mandated Conclusion to perform. Gaps in information-gathering and In December 2011, Ban Ki-moon visited Moga- analytical capacity still hamper the mission’s dishu, the first trip by a UN Secretary-General ability to operate in this highly fluid and inse- to Somalia in nearly two decades, underscoring cure environment. the tremendous change that took place in the The EU Training Mission in Somalia was country this year. The ambitious agenda set out established to provide assistance to the Somali in the roadmap for stabilization and develop- security sector. Deployed in 2010, the mis- ment will require renewed efforts by Somali sion’s original twelve-month mandate was political stakeholders and international partners extended for an additional year in July 2011 if the transitional period is to be brought to an to support the training of 2,000 Somali sol- end in 2012. Significant challenges remain: the diers. The training takes place in Uganda and TFG’s legitimacy is still contested, and both the focuses on strengthening the TFG security famine and the continued threat from Al- forces. In addition to military assistance, the Shabaab could further destabilize the already mission provides training on human rights, tenuous security environment. international humanitarian law, and protection AMISOM’s ability to support the TFG of civilians. and stabilize Somalia will depend critically Piracy continues to present a major threat upon the availability of troop reinforcements off the Somali coast, and incidents continue to and military assets. Without these resources, occur in spite of the international naval pres- while it may be able to hold its positions in ence in the Gulf of Aden (see Box 3.7.1). The Mogadishu, AMISOM will likely face signif- EU Naval Force (EU NAVFOR), also known icant challenges in extending its presence be- as Operation Atalanta, is tasked primarily with yond the capital.

Notes 1. Jeffrey Gettleman, “Kenyan Motives in Somalia Predate Recent Abductions,” New York Times, 26 October 2011. 2. “Kenyans in First Al-Shabab Battle in Somalia,” BBC News, 28 October 2011. 3. Josh Kron, “Militants Strike at Troops at Base in Somali Capital,” New York Times, 29 October 1. 4. Josh Kron, “Somalia: Sierra Leone to Send Troops,” New York Times, 3 November 2011. South Sudan has also offered to send troops. 5. Mohamed Ahmed and Richard Lough, “Suicide Bomber Hits Somali Capital, Dozens Killed in South,” Reuters, 6 December 2011. 6. Peter Heinlein, “Regional Summit Urges Ethiopia to Send Troops to Somalia,” Voice of America, 28 November 2011. 2011_CIC_3.qxd:Peacekeeping_FM_qxd.qxd 1/16/12 1:45 PM Page 115

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Box 3.7.1 Piracy off the Coast of Somalia

Piracy off the Somali coast continues to voluntary international military group, of a Somali legal framework for prose- present a significant challenge to inter- continued facilitating coordination be- cution. UN Security Council Resolutions national security, prompting concerted tween independently deployed navies in 2015 (2011) and 1976 (2011) call for effort from a diverse group of actors to the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean. In Somalia to strengthen its governance counter the threat. Since 2008, over May, members agreed to further bolster and rule of law structures to play a more 1,900 individuals have been kidnapped communication mechanisms, strengthen substantial role in combating piracy. In from Somali coastal waters1 and hun- operational cooperation, and enact re- the resolutions, the Council further reit- dreds of millions of dollars have been gional capacity-building measures to in- erated its call for the adoption of a com- paid in ransom, disrupting one of the crease the organization’s efficacy. prehensive set of counter-piracy laws world’s key shipping routes. In 2011 NATO’s Operation Ocean Shield and the construction of correctional fa- alone there were twenty-six successful and the EU’s Operation Atalanta also cilities for convicted pirates. In addition, ship hijackings in Somalia, representing maintained critical assistance and protec- the Council also noted the need for spe- nearly 70 percent of the global total.2 tion through their presence in the water- cialized anti-piracy courts in Somalia While the success rate of attacks off the ways. Operation Ocean Shield engaged and other states in the region. As a first Somali coast has decreased over the past in a number of counter-piracy operations, step, Resolution 2015 requests the UN several years, mainly due to the presence successfully freeing pirate-held ships and Secretary-General to provide further in- of naval vessels, the level of violence, dismantling mother ships. The NATO op- formation on the technical and financial sophistication, and frequency of attacks eration also liaises with regional states, requirements needed to implement these hit a record high in 2011. including Djibouti and Somalia, to pro- courts. International collaborative efforts mote anti-piracy efforts. Additionally, Piracy in the Gulf of Aden and the through the Contact Group on Piracy off Operation Atalanta continued to provide Indian Ocean is inextricably linked to the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS) and the assistance to the anti-piracy efforts of the crisis in Somalia, and many of the group Shared Awareness and Deconflic- Somalia’s Transitional Federal Govern- root causes, including political instabil- tion (SHADE) to counter piracy con- ment and the African Union’s peacekeep- ity and poverty, persist. However, the tinue. As a voluntary international forum, ing mission in Somalia through 2011. challenge is not isolated to Somalia, and the CGPCS coordinates the responses of During the course of the year, inter- the threat of piracy in the Gulf of Guinea over seventy member states and several national attention also turned to bolster- is an increasingly pressing international major international organizations, includ- ing onshore anti-piracy mechanisms, concern. Concerted international support ing on operational matters, legal issues, particularly in the judicial and security and a multipronged approach that targets shipping self-awareness, and public infor- sectors. Although 1,046 individuals are piracy offshore, supports the develop- mation. In 2011 the CGPCS created a currently being prosecuted or have faced ment of institutions and capacity on- group to strengthen international efforts prosecution for piracy in twenty coun- shore, and addresses root causes such as aimed at dismantling complex pirate tries,3 more than 90 percent of captured widespread poverty and high unemploy- financial networks—an area of increas- pirates are immediately released due to ment, will be critical for responding to ing international attention. SHADE, a judicial obstacles, including the absence international maritime piracy.

Notes: 1. United Nations, Report of the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on Legal Issues Related to Piracy off the Coast of Somalia, S/2011/30, 25 January 2011. 2. International Maritime Bureau, Piracy Reporting Center, “Piracy News & Figures,” http://www.icc-ccs.org/piracy-reporting-centre/piracy newsafigures. 3. Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia, “WG2: Chairman’s Conclusions from the 9th Meeting,” fact sheet, 11–12 October 2011, http://www.thecgpcs.org/doc.do?action=doc. 2011_CIC_3.qxd:Peacekeeping_FM_qxd.qxd 1/16/12 1:45 PM Page 116

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Box 3.7.2 From Host Nation to Troop Contributor

As United Nations peacekeeping struggles AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), and Meanwhile, some countries have al- with debates on troop reimbursement and has deployed five battalions to the mis- ready begun participating in global oper- divides between troop contributors and fi- sion since 2007. Sierra Leone, previously ations even as missions continue within nancial contributors, a growing number of host to a six-year UN peace operation, their national borders. The Democratic troops and police are deploying from famil- responded to the AU’s September 2011 Republic of Congo (DRC), current host iar places: countries that have previously call for more AMISOM troops by signal- to the UN Organization Stabilization hosted or currently host peace operations. ing its intention to send a troop battalion Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO), has a Former hosts to peacekeeping mis- to join Sierra Leonean police officers al- small number of police deployed to the sions including Bosnia and Herzegovina, ready serving with the mission. UN Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI), Cambodia, and El Salvador now provide Countries with current peacekeep- while Côte d’Ivoire has contributed over troops and police to multilateral peace ing missions are also readying them- a hundred police to MONUSCO and UN operations. Rwanda, former host to the selves for future contributions through missions in Haiti and Darfur. UN Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UN- training and capacity building exercises. Through proactive training, countries AMIR), is currently ranked among the top The UN Integrated Mission in Timor- are increasingly emerging from robust ten UN military contributors globally, Leste (UNMIT) has trained the national peacekeeping missions with the ability with Rwandan troops and police sta- army for potential deployment as mili- and desire to contribute to global multilat- tioned in UN missions in Haiti, Liberia, tary observers in peacekeeping opera- eral operations. Their own recent experi- Sudan, and South Sudan. With the sup- tions. In July 2011, Timor-Leste Defense ences of transition may also provide valu- port of the UN Development Programme Force engineers also began training able lessons for peace operations and (UNDP), Rwanda also runs one of the ahead of their integration with a Portu- peace consolidation. Supporting these new main peacekeeping training centers in guese contingent serving the UN Interim and emerging troop and police contri- Africa, helping to prepare current and Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), which will butors is especially important as many future troop-contributing countries using mark the first international military con- peace operations, including AMISOM, lessons learned from both the UN and its tribution by Timor-Leste. In Liberia, secu- face chronic troop and police shortages. own experiences. rity forces received training for potential Further diversifying the group of con- Burundi also plays a critical role in peacekeeping duties in 2011 from both tributing countries in peacekeeping mis- peacekeeping in Africa. A former host to the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) and sions also helps bolster the flexibility of African Union and United Nations peace- the US African Command (AFRICOM), these operations and strengthen their abil- keeping missions, Burundi is now one of which assisted in a regional communica- ity to deploy to crises around the world. the two main troop contributors to the tions exercise.