Is the Concept of Non-Partisan Voters Relevant to the Post-Democratized Southeast Asian Elections? 77

Is the concept of non-partisan voters relevant to the post-democratized Southeast Asian elections? 77

〈特集政治意識の諸相〉

Is the concept of non-partisan voters relevant to the post-democratized Southeast Asian elections?: The cases of the Philippines, Thailand and Indonesia.

Yoko Yoshikawa

summary: The rise of nonpartisan voters in the past decades are reported in the various studies on voting behavior in the developed democratic countries such as the US and Japan. Against this backdrop, it is the prime concern of this paper to make inquiries that whether or not the parallel partisans/nonpartisans, particularly the rise of nonpartisans, is discernable in the recently democratized (or democracy restored) Southeast Asian countries: the Philippines, Thailand and Indonesia. If it appears so, how it is explained and what the voting determinants are. Prior to proceeding to voting behaviors, the paper takes up the issues of democratic transition, the broader inclusive concept of the nonpartisans, the political and electoral institutional reforms, the behavior of political parties and party systems conducted in the three respective countries. The problems encountered are that, first, whether or not the concept of partisans vs. nonpartisan derived from the experiences in the developed countries can be adequately applied to the electorates whose political regime environment, the behaviors of political party and candidates, and electoral governance are different, and those who are basically identified with candidates or party leaders in the fluid multiparty system. Secondly the lack of solid and clear-cut evidence obtained from the outcome of surveys asking the electorates of the specific party identification or non-identification compelled to rely on the various different literatures and the election outcome. The conclusion remains to be the preliminary stage and it is desired that the studies on the candidate and party behavior along with the voting behavior in the post-democratized countries are extensively conducted.

and to the realignment of political parties in the Introduction post-Cold War era in the shorter term. Studies on voting behavior increasingly reveal The problem that the practitioners and political that voting behavior of nonpartisan rather than analysts are concerned with is that such a large partisans has transformed into a politically signifi- share of nonpartisan voters make the voting and cant factor, as the share of the nonpartisan voters electoral outcome unpredictable (Kobayashi rise in the elections in the developed countries 2000:71) and corresponding decrease in the num- such as Japan and the US. Substantial part of bers of partisans and regular membership sup- these nonpartisan voters have been previously porting of the political parties. identified with or supported specific parties in The paper seeks to make inquiries into the vot- the mid-1960's or 1970's while some are younger ing behavior in electoral politics in relations to generation. The studies invariably trace the roots partisan/nonpartisan in the three post-democra- of this ongoing change to the transition relevant tized (including restored) developing countries of to the post industrial society in the longer term, Southeast Asia; the Philippines, Thailand and In-

選挙研究21号2006年 78

donesia with a comparative perspectives. Particu- gemonic party under an illiberal electoral system. lar interest rests in empirical analysis of kind of The persistent preference by the electorates for "nonpartisan" in relations to political parties , who the hegemonic party during authoritarian re-

were supposed to be previously "partisans" in gimes can not be conceived as the "partisan" be- the days of illiberal democracy. After an introduc- havior in the same sense of those partisans in a

tory summary of points, the constitutional and liberal democratic election. The former "parti-

electoral system, the characteristics of political sans" are largely the product of the ruling regime

party and party system, and finally the voting be- where the government intervention and manipu- haviors are discussed by country. It is in the hope lation under illiberal or illegal structure. It is de-

that the more inclusive notion of the nonparti- ceptive to say that the political vector in the post-

sans to be reconstructed as the basic voting be- democratized countries is moving from the for-

havior by infusing the outcome from the cases of merly "partisans" to more of nonpartisans in the

developing countries in Southeast Asia. same sense as we witness such shift in long es-

Many existing studies of nonpartisans present tablished liberal democracy even if it appears so. the various notions of who are to be defined as Secondly, the paper is limited to the prelimi- the nonpartisan electorates by presenting elabo- nary analysis as no solid sample poll surveys are rate categorizations and typologies based on the readily available inquiring into the issues of outcome of intensive poll surveys: e. g. passive or partisan/nonpartisans in the three countries positive, politically concerned or apolitical etc. (though some available in Indonesia), which allow (Araki, 2001 and 2004; Ida, 2003; Ide, 2000 and us a clear cut conclusion. What are available are 2002; Kabashima and Ishio Miyake,1999; Tanaka the abundant pre-and post-electoral surveys on 1999 and 2004). Moreover the different models the specific election results. Many of these are and hypothesis on voting behaviors which are the analysis of voting behavior using socio,

drawn from individual survey suffer from the diffi- economic, and cultural variables and almost none culties of generalization (Kobayashi, Chapter 11 ask whether or not the respondents are support- pp. 163-171). Yet many of them are exclusively de- ing on a daily basis or consistently voted for spe- rived from the cases of party preferences in the cific parties in the consecutive elections. Thus I long established democracy, which may or may am compelled to rely on available descriptive lit- not accord to the post-democratized cases. eratures on political parties and statistical reports Admittedly there are limits in applying to the on electoral results from which related to the con- post-democratized countries the notions of cept of nonpartisans of the three countries. The partisan/nonpartisan which was learned from the conclusion is tentative and much have to be done long experienced democratic countries. First, it is before reaching a strong conclusion. not only the post cold war factor but other factor The third and the fundamental question is like different political vector and milieu that the whether the notion of nonpartisans can meaning- given political structures should be taken into fully explain the voting behavior against the no- consideration. In full or semi-authoritarian re- tion of partisans in the country where the gimes, the electorates were either compelled, or political party system itself is mostly character- forced, or mobilized as well as willing to continue ized by identical, less ideological and weak to support the ruling government party or the he- platform-based party but predominantly Is the concept of non-partisan voters relevant to the post-democratized Southeast Asian elections? 79 candidate-centered party like the cases of the I am excluding a sort of core groups from the

Philippines and Thailand. The party reorganiza- discussion, which are constituted of the immedi- tions rooted from various actors such as the prac- ate and extended families, kinship network, close tice of frequent party switching by the aides, friends, proteges and clients in the clien- candidates, the entries of new parties by new can- telism whose absolute loyalty to the specific candidates, the mergers and the coalitions making didate are embedded in the social networks. among the parties, and quick rise and fall of par- They mobilized vote-getting networks for a spe- ties at almost every election, make the party sys- cific candidate, not for political party as tem exceedingly fluid. The common responses of organization. The family members are often the the electorates to this party fluidity are to go for biggest contributors of political funds. the split ticket voting in the same or consecutive I Transitions toward democratic and so- elections. Another factor is that in the transi- cial changes: political party as tional countries where the voting structure com- prerequisite for democratic consolidation manded by local patrons and their intermediate The Philippines, Thailand, and Indonesia are in leaders, by means of local clientelism, money poli- the process of long term transitions in two tics, vote buying, bribery of the electoral officials, arenas: political and social, having emerged from frauds and riggings, intimidation, threat (death) an prolonged authoritarian regime and illiberal and election violence remain an integral part of democracy. The Philippines restored democratic election, if not the majority, it is difficult to apply regime after thirteen years under the Marcos meaningfully the conceptual tools of partisans Martial law regime (1971-1986). Indonesia was and nonpartisan to explain the voting behavior of democratized after thirty three years of the Su- the post-democratized countries. harto military authoritarian regime (1965-1998)

Finally for the purpose of discussion in this pa- and Thailand after a periodic cycle of military re- per, let me take the liberty to define the term gime and civilian government until early 90's. "nonpartisans" as inclusive as possible . The term The utmost political concern of the three at includes those electorates who have no specific present, therefore, is how to consolidate democ- party to support regularly or daily base; those racy through strengthening various democratic in- who actually did not consistently cast their votes stitutions, governance and performance for a specific party over the past several consecu- capability. For this purpose, the fundamental re- tive elections; those who prefer the candidates or forms were undertaken through constitutional party leaders based on personality, the attributes, and institutional reforms in which electoral re- the benefits and gains delivered by, regardless of forms and reforms of political party system be- the candidate's party affiliation including "party- came central. The underlined assumption here is hopping" candidates, rather than prefer political that emergence of strong political party system party as organization. Lastly, the term extends to and partisan voting behavior modeling after the the mixed and split tickets voters in the same or developed countries are most desired as a prereq- consecutive elections The above defined nonpar- uisite for democratic consolidation, and that the tisans may be politically aware or apolitical, the moderate multiparty system is more democratic positive or passive in going out for voting at the and inclusive than the hegemonic or one domi- polling place. nant party system. 80

establishing political party systems and that a po-

1 Framing democratic Constitutions and litical party is defined as the ideal organizational institutional reforms model functioning as "an aggregation of organ-

The Philippines restored democracy in 1986 ized groups who share a common belief and are and framed the most democratic 1987 Constitu- committed to the pursuit of political power tion among the three constitutions in the post-in- through the elections to seek specific goals and dependence period. For its part, Thailand framed platforms." the 1999 Constitution and the Political Party Law A theory of democratic consolidation also pre- of 1998, so far the most democratic by Thai stan- scribes three significant arenas of political dards compared with its past 15 constitutions.(1) institutionalizations: first, state administrative ap-

Indonesia revised the Constitution in 2002 along paratus; secondly, democratic representation and with three political laws: the Legislature Compo- governance; and thirdly, structure which ensures sition Law, the Electoral Law, and the Political accountability, constitutionalism and rule of law,

Party Law. All of three countries, particularly In- all of which are vital components of governance donesia and Thailand adopted new political insti- capability. Accordingly, the political party system tutional reforms, covering electoral, legislative and political party in theory are considered as one and executive branches. Table 1 provides the po- of major components of the democratic represen- litical and electoral systems of the three coun- tation in the electoral system and the legislature. tries as of 2005 (Table 1). It is argued that the new or troubled democracies

The Weberian argument presumes that demo- are invariably weak in at least one of these three cratic consolidation can not be evolved without arenas. (Diamond, p.93), and that a weak political

Table 1 political system, political party system in the Philippines, Thailand and Indonesia

by Yoko Yoshikawa, 2005 Is the concept of non-partisan voters relevant to the post-democratized Southeast Asian elections? 81 party system with the nonpartisan electorates public goods and services. Given this transitional would lead to political instability and divisive con- phase which is burdened with the hybrid and in- fusion exhibiting fragility of the no party state. formal actors such as ethnic groups, the extended

The fact is that many of "political parties" in families, clans and factions play the major roles in the Philippines, Thailand and to some extent in the formal democratic institutions. Such informal Indonesia are factions and groups of candidates clannish networks persist in making ideal and ef- and party leaders, which by theory are blamed for fective democratization considerably difficult (Col- weak, unreal, defective and immature democracy. lins pp. 235-243). To cope with these defects, new constitutional framings and various political laws in the three 2 Inverted relationship of democracy with countries are more or less invariably designed to the establishment of political party foster a sound and strong political party system Yet a glance at the relationships between the and to give a semblance of voting behavior of pre- degree of democracy and the strength of the po- ferring political parties as means of democratic litical party system in the three countries pro- consolidation. vides a picture of the inverted relations: The The political reforms are also designed to Philippines is considered as a nation of relatively make some political institutions nonpartisanship. lengthy democratic experiences including pre-

The directed vector of the reforms here is two- authoritarian period and of advanced participatory fold; to transform "nonpartisan" or "false and political institutions developed from the belief in volatile partisanship" to ideal,"real" partisanship the inclusive representation. This is the counter- toward the development of strong political party effect of the historical electoral democracy of the on one hand, and to install nonpartisan institu- Philippines that economic and political oligarchy tions (above the political parties competition) to could legitimately dominate and exert political counter-balance the possible exceeding politiciza- power through electoral system. Historical trajec- tion of the electoral politics on the other hand.(2) tories of the absence of kingship and absolute

The second transition that the post-democra- monarchy and the US colonial legacy contributed tized countries are undergoing is social change to the perceived power structure that the wealth which necessarily affects the voting behavior of went along with political power. Despite 100 people at large. A theory of social contract argues years of the direct elections of national and local that the developing countries are in the process leaders, the Philippines has not developed an ef- of social transition with different phases. The fective and meaningfully differentiated political first phase is a transition from a traditional patron- party system until today.(3) clientelistic and paternalistic society in which pa- Thailand, emerged out of coup' ridden political tronages for individual needs and local benefits instabilities, appears to have fairly viable multiple through informal contract are the effective me- political party system since the 90's, largely ow- dium of exchange for the votes between the ing to its parliamentary system and electoral re- socio-political leaders and the peoples, to the forms designed by the framers of 1997 modern state in which civic-minded people pro- Constitution. No independent candidates and no vide resources to and vest powers in their gov- party switching are allowed by law any longer but ernment in return for accountability in delivering politically and technically prevailed. An empirical 82

scrutiny, however, reveals that Thai voting behav- the purpose of mobilization for wining election,

ior is not as quite simple as projected by the insti- the regular activities on daily base of political par-

tutional change. ties down to the local grass root members are

Indonesia appear to have developed fairly well absent. This happens despite the requirement by

institutionalized political party system, as the con- political party law that the enlisted membership sequence of the long, oppressive rein of a he- and local branches of the political parties be ac- gemonic government party of which victory was credited for electoral participation. Furthermore, absolutely assured by its electoral system and except perhaps for Indonesia, party discipline and

Proportional Representation. Furthermore Indo- loyalty cannot be guaranteed to secure vote deliv- nesian political parties are roughly identifiable ery from grassroots' supporters nor from the can- with ideological orientations, ranging from the dilates themselves. clearly Islamist to secular nationalism. Yet Indo- The democratized countries in theory now en- nesia today is characterized by a relatively weak joy the benefits of political liberalism with differ- democracy as indicated by the average freedom ent degree. At the same time they remain score evaluated by the Freedom House (Dia- embedded in strong social ties and networks, par- mond, p. 30).(4) ticularly the vote rich rural mass who may sup- A scrutiny of Indonesian voting behavior, how- port the candidates who deliver the benefits and ever, provides a more complicated picture of vot- rewards in needs, or identify with their social af- ing determinants than a simple loyalty to political finity and familiarity. The tradition of intervention party. The electorates has been under the influ- by the liders in the Philippines or electoral con- ence of clientelistic networks organized into po- tractors in Thailand and the local machine net- litical machines by the command of the local works in Indonesia remain. Yet it does not mean government employees and politicians of ex-mili- that the rural voters are automatic and persistent tary officers and religious leaders. In the post de- partisan voters. Both the incumbents and chal- mocratized election, small new spin-off parties lengers, regardless of their party affiliations, have emerged. The PR system was changed to must compete to woo them by offering or promis- the open list system from the closed list system ing delivery of patronages in exchange for their in response to the clamor from candidates and po- votes. The powerless rural masses in the Philip- litical parties. The direct election of the pair of pines distrust the traditional politicians while President and Vice President by popular vote in- Thai rural mass express appreciation for them troduced for the first time in Indonesia in 2004 (Tamada p.73). Yet both will go out to vote in ex- certainly affected Indonesian voting behavior. It change for the benefits they expect. Election is worked to encourage the voting on preferring the only time when they can gain material bene- popular and capable candidate for top leaders fits from the candidates. rather than voting on the base of political parties It is interesting to know an argument that they support. American electorates who once identified with a

The internal structures of pre-existing political specific party in the past, voted merely out of the parties in the three countries has been dominated force of habit and familiarities without any per- by the elites, the cadres, the party leaders, and in- sonal commitments to the party platforms. Today cumbent members of the legislature. Except for they are increasingly turning out to be nonparti- Is the concept of non-partisan voters relevant to the post-democratized Southeast Asian elections? 83 sans who simply prefer the best national leaders, (maximum 12 year).(6) Most re-electionist Senato- regardless of party affiliations (Lindblom and rial candidates with or without his own party are Woodhouse pp. 61-66). Furthermore, it is argued allied with the incumbent administration or the that widespread 'Presidentialization' or candidate- opposition coalitions in the Presidential or mid- centeredness in election campaigns across the term election, with one of presidential world's democratic regimes, is the actual practice candidates. However, such inclusion as ally in the even without parliamentarism. The concept of official party slate never guarantees individual presidentialization involves the leadership of per- candidate's winning, as the electorates vote for sonalization of the leadership-centered electoral preferred individual candidates with split voting. process (Poguntke and Webb). If this argument The possibility of senatorial winning depends on on presidentialization implies less party-centered the number of effective presidential candidates electoral process, nonpartisans will increase and much more on the popularity of each individ- across the world. ual candidate along with capability, personality

and regional identity. II The electoralsystem and institutions The House of Representatives (maximum of in the Philippines,Thailand and Indonesia 250 seats) is elected from a single-member dis- 1 The Philippines: Inclusive democratic trict (225 seats in 2004 ) with a three-term limit system under 1987 Constitution but low (maximum 9 years). It also has those elected by credibility in governance the Party List system (section 5, Article VI and

All political executive chiefs and legislative rep- 1995 Party List Act). The Party List system of resentatives from the national posts down to the Proportional Representatives is a historic and local posts (including more than 42,000 Barangay unique political reform. It was introduced and de- officers and youth representatives at the lowest signed to develop political parties representing administrative unit) are elected by popular vote. the marginalized and unrepresented multi-sec-

The presidential and the mid term elections of tors by opening up 20% of the total seats of the national and local elections except for the Baran- House (e. g. 54 seats allocated in 2004). The com- gay and Youth representatives, are conducted missioners of the 1986 Constitutional Commis- every three years in May, in one day on one ballot sion earnestly translated the idealism of People sheet. The President and Vice President are Power democracy into a political institution. The elected by simple plurality. Though they run as a electorates have two votes for the House seats pairs the voters can separately vote for each. The (Republic of the Philippines Journal of Constitu- presidential candidates are required to bring up a tional Commission of 1986, June 4 to July 25). Un- slate of 12 senatorial candidates under his/her re- like Thailand and Indonesia, the uniqueness of spective party or coalition if the party or coalition the Philippine Party List system rests on the prin- to qualify as a major party to be granted the de- ciple that only marginalized and unrepresented sired privileges.(5) groups, organizations and small political parties The Senate is comprised of 24 Senators of categorized as peasants, fisher folk, laborers, OF- which half of members (12) are re-elected by sim- Ws, urban poor, handicapped, indigenous cultural ple plurality nationwide every three years at communities, women, youth and professionals, every national election with a two-term limit etc. (except for the religious sector) can 84 participate. It is a kind of functionalism by elec- the results and the rigging the vote counts oper- tion designed to encourage the entry of nonparti- ated by the wealthy and powerful candidates are san, grass root organizations previously excluded prevailed (Tangcangco)(7). The most recent exam- from the legislature (Casiple p. 6). However, the ple is the victory of President Arroyo in 2004 law mandates that two percent of the total votes presidential election. A serious investigation cast for a party list group as the minimum thresh- need for her well organized "special operation old to get one seat in Congress. It also limits the campaign" of vote-padding but the Congress maximum number to three seats per one group. failed to do so due to the politically strong ruling

All of which designed to restrict the maximum pro-administration coalitions. numbers of PL representative in Congress. In the PL elections since 1998, disputes arose over the 2 Thai electoral system: so far the most issue of which groups were qualified participants. democratic under 1997 Constitution The Overseas Absentee voting system was an- The 1997 Constitution was historic as it was in- other example of a democratic electoral reform. troduced through, by Thai standards, an unprece- The system was introduced in the hope that a dented democratic procedure It installed various substantial part of eight million Filipino Overseas new constitutional institutions and bodies for hu- Workers (OFWs) would be granted the right to man rights, civil liberties, and good governance. vote. After all, they annually remit to the country These measures aimed to curtail the past abuses the totalamount of more than $10 billion.The of power of elected and government officials.(8) outcome however was somewhat disappointing One of the major objectives of framing the despite the high cost and publicity. Only 270,000 1997 Constitution was to strengthen the political out of 360,000 registered OFWs in 64 countries party. Its goal was to transform it from the politi- actually voted. cal parties dominated by bureaucrat-military elite

The obsolete voting system together with the or wealthy local businessmen, to a mass party, outdated electoral administrative procedure, how- based more on party management and party disci- ever, impede the electoral credibility regarding pline (Tamada, p. 101). On the other hand, the PR the results. Being originally derived from the US party list scheme is intended to promote a fairer colonial period, the voting system requires the allocation of seats by deterring those House voters writing in many names (the maximum of members of parliament (MPs) from rural constitu- more or less 30) from the top national candidates encies who were elected by vote buying. The sys- down to local councilors at one time in one plural tem is supposed to strengthen the political party ballot system. Likewise, their system of verbal system and encourage knowledgeable and well and manual counting remains unreformed. The educated but hesitant candidates to run (Crois- manual ballots counting and canvassing take long, sant et al., p. 13). The impact on the competitive all of which cause cheatings, frauds and flaws rule in the multiparty system was enormous, but such as vote padding and reduction (dagdag-ba- it did not mean that these aims of electoral re- was), switching the ballots and rewriting of Elec- form were perfectly achieved. tion Returns at the multiple levels. The loss of Some other reforms introduced remain elitist. credibility of the Election Commissioners due to Voting was made compulsory. If one fails to vote,

bribery of some election officers and tampering of he or she loses some political rights. An ap- Is the concept of non-partisan voters relevant to the post-democratized Southeast Asian elections? 85 pointed Senate was replaced for the first time by them resign from their MP posts in the latter pe- an elected set of nonpartisan Senators based on riod of 2004 prior to the 2005 general elections the respective Provinces. The qualified Senators (Tamada June 26, 2005 p. 20). must be professionals such as bureaucrats, schol- ars, military officers etc. remained elitist, exclud- 3 Indonesian electoral system: democratic ing mere politicians. The House was changed reform under the 2002 Constitution and from a multimember constituency to the first- direct presidential election past-the post single member constituency (400 Under the Suharto New Order, a president seats) parallel with a proportional representation paired with a vice-president was elected by the elected nationwide (100 seats). members of a super parliament, the Peoples Con-

The PR is the largest remainder formula that sultative Assembly (1000), the majority of which allows each party to prepare a maximum of 100 were appointees. Under the 2002 Constitution, it open lists of candidates. Those parties that ob- was reformed so that the pair would be directly tained less than 5% of total PR votes were not elected by popular vote since 2004. qualified for any seats. The Constitution intro- The general elections are to be held every five duced the separation of powers between the years. The prime function of the election in the party list MP and the constituency MP. While the New Order was to provide legitimization of the former is eligible to assume a cabinet ministerial regime stability and of its illiberal democracy. post, the latter is not. If the latter is appointed to The parliament had to approve all proposed bills. a ministerial post, he/she would have to resign Under the 2002 Constitution The semi-bicam- from the MP. As it is incredible, the Thai party eral Legislature is composed of the parliament list candidates are to be drafted from knowledge- (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat, Peoples' Representa- able, well educated elites of high esteem. The far tive Council) of proportional representatives more incredible qualification is that the candi- (PR), and the Regional Representative Council dates for MP post are required, at minimum, to (DPRD), also PR. The authority of the latter is have a bachelor's degree (college graduate) confined to acting solely on regional agenda and which excludes 95% of the total population from related laws, and the candidates and the elected running as MP candidates. It practically excludes members of the DPRD must be nonpartisans. the entire rural population that makes up 70% of A political party is to submit a nonbinding open the total. party-list. No independent candidate and party The Constitution also provides that the candi- switching of an incumbent member of parliament dates must affiliate with one party at least for 90 are allowed. The electorates may vote for a candi- days preceding the election to prevent incumbent date but always together with his affiliated party. MP's from defecting. It allows the merger of and The reform was introduced in response to accusa- organization of new parties. Yet party switching tions that one candidate was being preferred over continued to prevail in the 2001 election (Siripan another. The law also urged the inclusion in the p. 21-22; McCargo 2002 p. 9-11). What was amaz- list of a minimum of 30% of female candidates in ing is that the incumbent Prime Minister Thaksin the party list, but it is nonbinding. overrode this constitutional ban and managed to The National Assembly (DPR) has a total of draft nearly 30MPs from other parties by letting 550 seats and the members are elected from the 86 middle-sized constituencies of 69, where 3 to 12 argument is acceptable in general, MacIntyre mis- seats are allocated each on a provincial basis. The conceives the numbers of veto players in the Phil- province of Java is inhabited by 60% of the total ippine government as only three-the executive, population but is allocated only 55% (303) of the the House and the Senate. Given insignificant total seats, while the outer islands, far less popu- role of political parties in Philippine governance lated are favorably allocated. The DPRD has a to- and in the decision-making process, he overesti- tal of 132 seats composed of four seats each from mated the crisis-solving capability of the Philip- 33 provinces; they are elected by single non- pines as considerably high. The truth is that transferable vote system. The two post-Suharto given the weak political party system, the liberal, general elections were held in 1999 and 2004. democratic policy making process in the Philip-

Direct elections for a president paired with pines encounters formidable, unpredictable num- vice-president was introduced in 2004 for the bers of veto players in the power constellations. first time in Indonesian political history. Though Many of the 24 Senators could turn out to be po- their affiliated parties may differ, no independent tentially veto players; the independent Supreme candidate is permitted to run. The first voting for Court frequently vetoes laws and a wide scope of a presidential candidate requires a majority vote policies. Social and economic institutions such as (51%) won by plurality nationwide, as well as the Church, business organizations, mass media, more than 20% of the total votes from more than and academic groups could actually play the role half of 33 provinces. The run-off election is to be of the public veto power. contested by the top two ranking pairs by simple What is absent here is the political party by plurality. Eligibility for running in the presidential definition. The Election Code of the Philippines elections requires that the parties should have defines a political party as "a group of persons won the minimum threshold of 3% of the total pursuing the same ideology, political ideas or plat- seats, or 5% of the total votes in the previous forms of government" (Section 60: political party general election. Thereafter, a minimum thresh- in the Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines). old of 15% and 20% are to be imposed on to re- The mainstream parties of the Philippines are not strict the numbers of political parties. ideologically polarized as most of the major parties such as Lakas-CMD, LDP, PDP-Laban, Lib- IIIPolitical Party in the Philippines, eral Party etc. espouse the center of the middle Thailand, and Indonesia of liberal democracy and represent moderate ideo- 1 Philippines: the least regulated and logical inclination advocating identical, neutral, inclusive multiparty system and distributive policies (Table 2 as of 1992).

(1) Absence of political party as the unit of deci- Yet there are minor ideological parties and sion making groups, ranging from the radicalist Communist The institutional school argues that the case Party (CPP), the militant leftists like PnB, and study of the Asian financial crisis proves that in- the progressives, many of which are the Party stitutional reforms designed to reduce the num- List parties and are not in the mainstream; to the bers of veto players will ensure quick and rightists including military rebel groups, the mod- effective policy-making and good governance in a erate right-inclined parties like the waning Mar- crisis (MacIntyre Chapter 3 and 4). Though the cos clan's KBL, the Laurel clans' Nacionalista, Is the concept of non-partisan voters relevant to the post-democratized Southeast Asian elections? 87

Table 2 summary of the position/policies of selected political parties flair and money" of the on a number of critical issues, 1992 candidates. 80% of Filipino voters consider the political ads very helpful in making de- cisions, liberating the voters from clientelistic command votes (Gloria et al. pp. 65-92). Secondly, the identical platforms and policy positions and programs could be hard to differentiate. Third, the con- stant and rampant turncoatism (opportunistic party switching) at pre-and post- election time, suggest lack of party control and organizational party loyalty. Finally the 1987 constitutional mandate provided the least restrictive multiparty system (Carlos pp. 211-212). The Philippines has the tradition of "partyless democracy". The party discipline takes a back seat in legislative ac- tions and democratic decision- making. The strict separation

Source:PCIJ and Ateneo, p. 142. of power of the presidential system allows individual mem-

Santiago's Peoples Reform Party and Lacson's bers of the legislature to vote independently, to faction. However, an individual candidate who de- submit their individual bills representing the con- cide to run from the moderately ideological party stituencies and policy positions, and to work for is not necessarily ideologically identified with the consensus building among the interested col- party. leagues on issue-base. The nonbinding rule along

The Philippine political party is characterized, partisan line voting requires less cohesion within the first, as the leader-and candidate-centered the political party and the coalitions. The party with highly personalized party. Such personifica- leaders cannot take for granted that the members tion of the party are further reinforced by the will act collectively. There is a more functional di- electoral campaign strategies of building image of vision between the administration (ruling) coali- individual candidates and leaders using political tion and the opposition. It contributes to a ads on TV. "The voters…give primacy to looks, weakening party system letting it remain an inef- 88

fective means and ultimately irrelevant in voting, party coalition.(9) unless the president, the legislative, and floor The Regional Party system was introduced for

leaders work hard to whip them up or offer pork the Batasan election during the Martial Law pe-

barrels. riod when the candidates competed in the region- based constituency (as of 2005, 17 administrative (2) The least regulated multiparty system regions and 79 provinces). The provincial-based The 1987 Constitution and the revised political party is organized for a governorship and a local

party law encouraged a multiparty system, allow- party for congressmen on the bases of a specific ing registration under multi-layers: national, coali- city and the single member district constituency.

tion, regional, provincial, and local parties These local and minor parties simply ally with

without the accompanying fundamental electoral one of the major national party and coalition. The

reform. Consequently, the Philippine multiparty Philippine parties hardly merge as Thai parties

system appears anomic and atomic. As of 2001, do but retain the party names and followers and

there were 82 parties registered, out of which 29 simply make temporary coalitions at the election. are national, 11 regional, 27 provincial, and 15 are The increased number of political parties, the

local political parties. It reflects the reality that ramified and multiplying minor parties at every

most of the local parties are organized on the ba- election indicate their ephemeral, volatile, and at-

sis of the geographically defined constituency omized nature. where those candidates run in the election. Thus, they retain their identity with their original local (3) Ramified parties and the majority and mi-

party even when they run from one of coalition nority bloc in the House and the Senate parties (to be discussed in (3)) There are many major and minor parties and When a new face runs for any national post, coalitions formed at every election. It is impossi- particularly the president, VP, or sometimes, ble for the electorates to differentiate among Senator, he/she sets up his own new party sup- many new and old parties, much less to remem- ported by a grassroots organization (a kind of ber which party a specific representative or candi- Japanese Koenkai) as the vehicles. Table 3 shows date is currently affiliated with, or which party he that the numbers of the presidential candidates in- has switched to. What matters most for the vot-

creased the numbers of parties from 1986 to ers and politicians is not which political party but 2004. In 1986, two candidates with their respec- which side of power, in power or outside of pow-

tive VP candidates contested under three politi- er, would-be-pro administration or would-be-

cal parties. In 1992, seven presidential candidates opposition.

with their respective VP contested under nine The candidates and elected officials (politi-

parties, out of which three were new. In 1998, 10 cians) are circumscribed to identify with three pairs of candidates ran, including one independ- levels of affiliations One is of course the loosely ent and two nuisance candidates under 9 different affiliated political party. Another is the majority or

parties, 4 of whom were new. In 2004, five presi- minority bloc to be recomposed within the Con- dential candidates with four VP candidates congress, and the third is anti- or pro-administration

tested including the incumbent President; three position. They need not always remain absolutely were new faces. Two out of three ran from a new consistent at all three levels to the last from the Is the concept of non-partisan voters relevant to the post-democratized Southeast Asian elections? 89

Table 3 Presidential and Vice Presidential candidates, 1986, 1992, 1998, 2004

Source: Kawanaka, p. 38 and by Yoko Yoshikawa. 90

Table 4 Number of Candidates (House Of Representatives), 2004

Table 5a Party Affiliation in the 12th and 13th Congress(the House) position of early time. For example in the 12th Congress (2001- 2004), the 226 House representatives were affiliated with four major parties and coalitions (pro-administration Lakas, LP; oppositions NPC and LDP), 19 minor parties, 10 independents, and 20 party list representatives from 16 groups and parties. In the Senate, 24 Senators were affiliated with seven parties. For the 13th Congress (2004-2007), the total of 655 candidates ran. 169 (26%) affiliated with the ruling administration coalition (K4 by Lakas-CMD, LP 70% of NPC and other minority parties). 135 candidates (21%) joined the opposition coalition (KNP by LDP and 30% of NPC etc.) There were still 124 (19%) independent candidates ran. The Philippine electoral law allows independent candidates unlike Thailand and Indonesia (Table 4).

Frequent party switches change the numbers of seats by party line. As of May 26, 2004 immediately after the election, just before the 13th Congress was com- menced, the pro- administration major parties and coalitions (Lakas, NPC (70% of), LP KAMPI) and other minor parties con- Is the concept of non-partisan voters relevant to the post-democratized Southeast Asian elections? 91

Table 5b Overlapping Affiliations of Party coalition Self-claimed by the House Representatives (the 13th Congress as of May 2005)

Source: Congressional Profile, www.congress.gov.phi. Recomposed by Yoko Yoshikawa. stituted the majority bloc within the House while Table 7 shows that the twelve Senators who oppositions coalitions (LDP 30% of NPC and won to the 13th Congress in 2004 out of 48 candi- some minor parties) constituted the minority dates who ran from 9 parties, two coalitions and bloc. Table 5a shows the seats won by political one independent: Seven belong to the pro-ad- party in the 12th and 13th House. Table 5b shows ministration coalition (K4 of President Arroyo) the subcategories of these parties identified by and five belong to the opposition coalition (KNP the elected representatives as of 2005. Notewor- of late Fernando Poe, Jr.) but in fact they belong thy is that many identify themselves with the to more than five different political parties. overlapped parties they ever affiliated or allied One might be puzzled that, having experienced with. Their claim to be the members of ruling or every kind of political party system, ranging from opposition coalitions looks more stable but never the pre-war time one party system, the post war "two party system" (actually one party tw assured. In the 2004 party list election, the total o fac- of 66 Party List parties and groups are accredited tions), the hegemonic dominant party system dur- by the Commission on Elections. Out of them, 24 ing the Martial Law regime, to the present representatives were elected from 16 parties and extreme multiparty system, why does the Philip- groups (Table 6) which is to be explored in (6) pine political party system remain weak ? 92

Table 6 Outcome of the 2004 Party-List Elections (Partial) One reason is that the politicians themselves conveniently

prefer the flexibility in party affiliation, defection and legislative voting under Presidentiali- sm. It is highly risky to fix the membership in the disciplined political

party when you are not certain who and from what party will win (except for midterm election) as the next president. It is common practice that the distribution of party constellations in the Congress immediately after the election will be subject to change as both the elected Presi- dent and some legisla- tors move to seek the possible party switch for majority making.

Yet the members, regardless of the majority or minority bloc, claim to Table 7 Electoral Results(the Senate) 2004 retain the potential right of voting at their discre- tion in legislative action, and ultimately right of

changing party. For example, on August 31, 2005, Senator An- gara, president of the opposition party (LDP) is- sued a statement to join the Senate majority bloc while remaining in opposition to the Malacanang: "I will remain the opposition . I will remain an independent opposition. Formally, I belong to the minority bloc but I am not bound by the positions Source: Arugay et al. p. 19. to be adopted by the minority.", meaning that he Is the concept of non-partisan voters relevant to the post-democratized Southeast Asian elections? 93

would join pro-administration legislative meas- the intermediate leaders(liders) campaign for ures of majority bloc. Speculation is rife of his vote delivery to the family candidate extracting eventual defection to the pro-administration rul- votes from the mass electorates. Then the politi-

ing coalition. cal family aligns with one of higher national and

Secondly, the election system is anchored on local politicians attaching their networks to an ap- electing individuals in the first past-the-post con- propriate major political party of their choice. Ulti- test in a single member constituency in the mately, it is not matter of which party the

House. This significantly motivates candidates to candidates affiliate with though the ruling party is

organize an individual political party based on per- more advantageous with obvious reason. What

sonal networks linked by social ties and power of matters is the winning possibility. Party switch-

patronages. ing known as turncoatism in the Philippines (Ta- Another constraint comes from the voting ble 8) will be explored in section (5).

system. The 1951 law (RA 599) eliminated bloc Once the members of the political family oc- and party-voting and instead introduced the write- in ballot system. The voters Table 8 List of Representatives Who Switched Parties for 2004 election write the names of individ-

ual candidates from top national posts down to the

local municipal councilors in

one plural ballot. Only for

the PL representative, the voters are required to write

in a name of marginalized political party or sector group, which further contributes to extremely ramified political party system.

(4) Family clan as political player The local political family clans persist in rural Prov- inces, if not dominant as before, as their party affiliation changes. The local political family clans built their own political networks at the grassroots through clientelism in small constituencies. The core groups and Source: Arugay et al. p. 16. 94 cupy multiple national and local elective posts in clients. The utility of the party affiliation rests one or two Provinces, these political assets are to first in the use of political machines and political be maintained by all means. It is achieved by al- fund provided by top leaders and the Senators. ternating among the various members of family Secondly, identifying with the actual and imag- and kin of elective posts to overcome the consti- ined political links with higher national patrons, tutional restrictions of term limits. Table 9 shows preferably up to President, will make the elector- some of political dynasties in Province. ates believe that his victory would deliver future

While once the family clan fall out of power, the benefits. Thirdly, once elected, the winner appre- political power and the supporters wane but the ciates the utility of party coalition in the legisla- old party of the influential families remains tive business in and out of the floor in the two though it become smaller, weaker and unstable Chambers. The legislative rules require the ma- until a renewed opportunities provide the chance jority and minority differentiation in the allocation to revive the family's political fortunes.(10) The of the committee chairmanship or memberships,

Philippine parties wane smaller but rarely merge the legislative budget and other expenses, sched- with other parties. uling sponsored bills and so on. Each member is Why then does the family need soft affiliations allowed to act independently in the law-making with a political party? The answer is twofold. It is process unless strong pressure and the whip are instrumental for the family clan to access power exerted by the President and other floor leaders by contesting the electoral posts in the election. using sticks of pork barrel identification (Priority The so called instrumental theory (Ide p. 7) can Development Assistance Fund), and patronages explain the wealthy class as well in seeking like budget allocations, money grants, public power to protect their vested interest, wealth and works projects or government jobs.(11)

Table 9 List of Representatives Replaced by Their Relatives for 2004 Election (5) Turncoatism: Party switching in the presidential system The Omnibus Elec- tion Code allows an elective official to change his/her political party affiliation for the purpose of the next election, following his change of party within one year prior to such election (Sec- tion 71). The election is conducted every three years with a dif-

Source: Arugey et al. p. 14. ferent ruling President Is the concept of non-partisan voters relevant to the post-democratized Southeast Asian elections? 95 at every six years, contributing to produce party lition badly needs a popular figure, a process switchers. called the horse trade. A long prevailing practice of political turncoa- The case of the Dy clan in Table 8 is illus- tism is evident in the fact that three Philippine trative. A rent-seeker in logging concessionaries presidents switched parties prior to their in Isabela Province has long dominated every na- election. It shed light on the character of Philip- tional and local posts in Isabela Province from the pine political parties as hierarchies of individual 1960s until 2004. The political survival of the Dy patron client networks. Table 8 lists the 32 family was achieved as they switched through House of Representatives who switched parties five parties in order to maintain themselves al- for the 2004 election. Switching maximizes per- ways "in" power (Coronel pp. 63, 66)(12). sonal links with the national patron up to the winnable presidential candidate and the ruling (6) Low Performance of Party-list coalition. The basic pattern is from the opposition The party list (PL) system is also encouraging to the ruling party, as they need the pork barrel the atomization of multiparty system in repre- to keep local supporters satisfied and to compen- senting practically any minor sector. Table 10 sate for the election expense, but there are also shows that the Comelec accredited 123 party list some cases switching from the ruling party to the groups in 1998. They increased to 163 parties oppositions. Local officials switch because the pa- and organization in 2001 which were categorized trons in the Congress switched with his as 78 sectoral organizations, 26 political parties, supporters. It is indeed very hard to keep track of professionals, 46 marginalized and unrepresented which political party a political family or politician sectors. Then a Supreme Court ruling disquali- belongs to after several elections (Coronel 2004 fied 120 groups, which eventually reduced to 44 p.63). The Anti- turncoatism Senate bill was parties and organization (Casiple p. 11). The ac- once filed in the 8th Congress but failed to pass. credited party list groups in 2004 election are 66.

The similar bill is filed now in the 13th, Congress Table 10 shows that the vote turnout for PL is in 2005 but finds no way to go. declining from 33.5% of total votes in 1998, up to If material benefits and rewards are so impor- 52% in 2001, and down to 29% in 2004. The tant, one is inclined to ask why so few switch. lower turnout made only 13 organizations and

The answer rests in the absolute limit on Presi- one political party actually managed to reach the dential resources: the principle of "the minimum 2 percent threshold, resulting in 14 seats won by winning coalition." (Wurfel p.96). 13 groups and parties for 50 seats allocated in '98 The ordinary voters are more concerned with . Furthermore, in 2001, a Supreme Court rul- whether or not the specific candidate is affiliated ing reduced the number of seats to only seven with "in", the ruling coalition, or "out", the oppo- won by five parties as the consequence of confu- sition coalition this time. When the candidates sion and misinterpretation by the Comelec of the who find themselves on the wrong side at a cer- Party list law. In 2004, 24 seats won by 16 parties tain phase of the election go out to negotiate with for the 54-seat allocation. All of seats won are the other side. The popular hero or a big vote-get- less than one half of seats allocated for PR ter with abundant funds is often welcome to be representatives. The low vote turnout, compared accommodated when the ruling or opposition coa- to the 80% turnout of the national election is 96

Table 10 Party List Performance, 1998, 2001, 2004 Table 11 Thai Election results,1986-96

by Yoko Yoshikawa largely due to the ignorance and unfamiliarity of the voters to vote for Party list. The gradual increase in the PR seats won are largely attributed Source: Pasuk and Baker, Table 6.1, p. 139. to strategically well organized militant leftists(13). which exhibit "the unusual ability of militant so- fect, the parties burgeoned (Siripan p. 6-7). In due cial movement through the elected party list sys- course, the numbers of effective parties in- tem" (Rivera p. 466) The PL system is now creased from four (the rest are 109 parties) in accepted as a part of legislative reforms yet 1986, to seven (the rest are 15 parties) in 1996, needs further reforms. but declined to nine in 2001 and four in 2005 (Ta- Yet there is virtually no viable party system ble 11). The top three Parties, Democrat, Thai and political party developed in the mainstream Nation (Chat Thai), Social Action, remained the Philippine politics except for a very few (Liberal same with shifting ranks between 1975 and 1988, party) after two decades of democratization since but in the 1990's the situation changed. More the 1986 crises (interview of Casiple and Igaya). new parties (New Aspiration, Chart Pattana, Thai A critic says that even the party list seats are Rak Thai) emerged as the top ranking parties (Ta- dominated by political elites and that most of the ble 12) aside from Democrat and Thai Nation. leading PL parties heavily rely on the popularity These burgeoning parties, as the Commission of the individual leadership without building a for Developing Democracy criticized them, were constituency based on the membership to pro- far from mass parties. The minimum numbers of vide the solid support to the party (Rodriguez party membership listed in the official document p. 145). of the parties as required by law should be 5000 encompassing four regions, but it does not corre-

2 Thai political parties under 1998 political spond with the numbers of votes actually gar- party law nered by PR in most of the parties (Table 13). The local units, the membership and its record of (1) The venue for provincial family clan and the political parties rarely exist. In the 2001 elec- businessmen tion, the alleged membership was not translated

The emergence of the Thai political party has into votes. For example, Thai Nation and New As- been always the product of the law and the piration, both long established parties got fewer constitution. In the 72 years between 1932 and votes in the PL than their alleged membership 2004 after the collapse of absolute monarchy, ap- (Siripan p. 24). proximately 220 political parties emerged under The party is controlled by a few big providers seven Political Party Acts. Particularly, after the of political money because of the tremendous

Political Party Act of 1981 and 1998 came into ef- amount of money needed to install more candi- Is the concept of non-partisan voters relevant to the post-democratized Southeast Asian elections? 97

Table 12 Three Political Parties that won the largest seat in each however, argues that the func- general election from 1975-2000 tion of party ideology is to maintain the identity of the organization in formality in the eyes of supporters, which may involve considerable dissimu- lations. In addition, he believes that no matter how implausible (even meaningless) the official goals of individual Thai parties remain, they successfully function as organizations. He further appreciates that at least one

good party has emerged in each election, to which the electorates are quick to cheer new chal- lengers (MacCargo 1997 p.115- 120). If the Thai electorates' quick

response to a new challenger is Source: Author's calculation on data from the Secretariat of the National. Assembly; and the Election Commission of Thailand. Siripan Table 5, p. 1. appreciated on the basis of the

party's organizational identity in dates as required by law (Tamada p. 97). By the formality, one should understand the big swing to late 80's and 90's, all the major parties including the Thai Rak Thai (TRT, Thais love Thai) in 2001 the oldest Democrat party which was tradition- and 2005. It meant that the Thai electorates legiti- ally favored by Bangkok urban intellectuals, were mately supported the party's organizational iden- dominated by the coalitions of provincial business- tity of TRT rather than Thaksin's personal men and politicians. A provincial boss of dubious leadership and tactic, tremendous money, and personality, Chao Poh (Godfather, criminals, various populist patronages. smugglers and gamblers, etc) and the wealthy family clans whose members ran for the MP (2) Party switching by log rolling under the Par- seats or worked to deliver the local votes, collabo- liamentary system: From multiparty system to a rated to secure access to economic and political dominant party system power. Thai multipolitical party system under the par- The Thai political party, therefore, has been liamentary system is compelled to forge a coali- criticized as "not real" with a checklist of multi- tion government. Thais have suffered from the ple shortcomings, instead of being an "authentic long fractured multiparty system with intra-fac- Thai party" is presented.(14) Most Thai political re- tional power struggles. MPs frequently defect

searchers may agree with these two notions: "not from one party to another to play the power game

real" and "the authentic" Thai parties. MacCargo, of log rolling, expecting ministerial posts or any 98

Table 13 Parties' memberships, number of candidates competed in single-member constituency & party-list system, number of elected MPs, Party list votes: 2001 Elections .

Source: Electiom Commission of Thailand cited in Siripan pp. 12-13. Is the concept of non-partisan voters relevant to the post-democratized Southeast Asian elections? 99

other reward when the de- Figure 1 The 1996 election log-roll fected party won the election. For instance, Ban- hamn in 1995 finally se- cured his electoral victory as the top party by playing log rolling game. All the major provincial barons and their followers were recruited into his Chat Thai (Thai Nation) (see Figure 1. The 1996 log- roll). Yet a few years later, his Chat Thai was torn apart as many MPs defected to Chavalits' new "New Aspiration" party , which was unhinged by the Chavalit's fall in 1997. makes well-funded political parties go head-hunt- It led to the subsequent disintegration of New As- ing and buyouts of incumbent MPs and small po-

piration Party. Another example is the Social Ac- litical parties to merge with (Siripan p. 8). tion party, one of the top parties in the 70's and The institutional reforms of introducing RP na-

80's, which also disintegrated in the 90's as one tionwide was designed to prevent rampant vote- transferred faction within the Social Action re- buying and party switching, and to execute more volted against and behaved independently from control of party leaders over the party candidates the party leaders (Tamada p. 109). in selecting the candidates by quality and compe-

In the log rolling game, the power of money, tency rather than mere "electability" (Siripan not party ideology or identification, lead to party p. 8). The expectation was that all of the electoral victory in ruling coalition. Party leaders offer reforms would reduce the massive abuse of cash to attract "electable" Table 14 Changing Party Affiiations, Before 2001 General Elections (winnable) candidates (incumbent MP). At the same time they offer cash to retain their own party's affiliated MPs in order to keep them from rolling away.(15) The incumbent MPs, as elsewhere, have the advantage of the brand name, the name known to the electorate through patronages and Source: Author's computation on data from Election Commission Thailand and various sources by Siripan pork barrel politics. This Table 6, p. 22. 100

Table 15a Number of Seats and Percentage of Voters, 2001 Elections (200+48PR) out of a total of 500 in 2001 election (Ta- ble 15a, 15b) which was an unprecedented big share in the parliament. Furthermore, he absorb- ed three minor parties in 2004 (Seritham, New Aspi- ration, and Chart Pattana) along with two large fac- Source: Author's chalculation on data from Election Commission of Thailand by Siripan, Table 1, p. 10.

Tabele 15b Party List Votes and Percentage of Votes, Table 16 The seats won by party in Thai 2001 Elections general election in 2005

tions within the Chart Thai and even a De- mocrat, which increased the number of MPs of Source: Author's calaculation on data from Election Commission of Thailand by the TRT to 319 (63.4%). It secued the majority Siripan p. 10. of the House. The Democrats could attract money politics. The death of Chatichai on May only three ex-MP switchers from other parties 1998, who rose to the first premiership as the (Tamada p. 112; Siripan p. 22). Thaksin as Prime consequence of log rolling of provincial barons in minister provided popular patronage government 1988 seems to symbolize the end of the era of the projects such as huge village funds, inexpensive provincial barons (Pasuk and Baker pp. 134-137). medical care, strict drug control etc., all of which Instead, more party switchers continued to were targeted the vote-rich rural sector. emerge in 2001 for a total of 167 (Table 14). The Four years later, the majority of Thai elector- national and the Bangkok-based wealthiest IT ates were so enchanted by him that they surpris- businessman Thaksin Shinawatra organized the ingly handed the TRT an overwhelming victory. Thai Rak Thai in 1998, in the pursuit of his future The satisfactory rating of Thaksin's projects rose prime ministership and long reign. He first at- up to 85% by average (Tamada 2005-b, p. 16). As tracted 117 (116 according to Tamada) ex-and in- Table 16 shows that the TRT emerged as the cumbent MP switchers from other parties using dominant party as it garnered 60.66% of the total his enormous resources. Its sheer magnitude sur- votes with 377 seats out of 500, followed by only prised many. The TRT ultimately got 248 seats four smaller effective parties: Democrat (18.34%, Is the concept of non-partisan voters relevant to the post-democratized Southeast Asian elections? 101

96 seats), Chat Thai (39%, 25 seats), and Ma- post-Suharto period witnessed the emergence of hachon Party (8.28%, 2 seats). For the first time a relatively liberal multiparty system with a in Thailand, one single party won the absolute greater fragmentation of political parties. The sys- majority in the House. Thaksin personally com- tem is characterized by the co-existence of the mands a complete free hand over his party and old and new parties, in contrast with the one he- the government with his CEO-style leadership. gemonic party system during the Suharto Pasuk critically argues that Thaksin envisioned regime: Golkar (Golongan Karya party), the gov- the vehicles for the oligopolies to pursue a com- ernment party. The two oppositions, PPP (Devel- petitive high proportion of rent seeking by opment and Unity party) and PDI-P (Indonesian investment. He then reproduced this competition Democratic Party for Struggle), were strictly in- at the political level, where it was called "nicely" tervened by the government agencies and de- competitive clientelism" (Pasuk p. 10). He favora- prived of genuine political freedom.(16) bly cultivated the effect of electoral reform of a In the 1999 general election, more than 140 po- single member district along with the PR system litical parties were registered for contesting 458 to control the stable government which he ruled seats but only 48 parties were accredited to par- with his strong personal leadership in the domi- ticipate in election. Out of 48, 20 parties restored nant party and with the "new money politics". the Islamic ideology as their party platform. This reflects the past practice where all Indonesian or-

3 Indonesian political parties under the ganizations including political parties were forced 1990 and 2002 Constitution by the government to adhere to only Pancha Sila,

(1) The regulated multiparty system the state principle, as their organizational ideol- Being provided with institutional democracy, ogy by the 1985 law. basic political freedom, and democratic space, the Out of 48 parties, only eight parties (three are two general elections of 1999 and 2004 in the Islamic parties) won more than 1% of the total

Table 17 Seven Major Political Parties in Comparative Perspective, Indonesia Source: Anies R. B. p. 685 102

votes, and out of which only six cleared the position Law (No. 22, 2003), and the Presidential threshold of 2% of seats, which qualify them as Electoral Law (Act no. 23, 2003). All these politi- eligible to participate in the 2004 election. cal reforms corresponded to the four Constitu- A comparative description of seven major par- tional amendments of 2002 (for details, see ties is provided in Table 17. The top four and the Kawamura pp. 33-36). The electoral system of sixth parties were long established during the Proportional Representatives elected from the authoritarian period, particularly the Golker, ex- Province-based middle sized constituency were hegemon and the PDI-P opposition remaining un- retained with the number of seats increased to

changed as the two top ranking parties. Only two 550. new parties, PAM (National Awaking party) and In the April 2004 general election, 7,776 candi- PKS (formerly PK in 1999, Justice and welfare dates from 24 accredited political parties ran for party) emerged as effective parties. 550 seats. Out of 24 parties, 17 parties won the Prior to the 2004 election between 2002 and seats but only seven parties passed the revised 2004, the Indonesian legislature enacted four po- threshold of 3% popular votes, or of 5% seats to litical reform laws: Political Party Law (Act no. be eligible to participate in the 2009 general elec- 31, 2002): General Election Law (Act no. 12, tions (Table 18). Five out of seven eligible parties 2003) which was to install the independent Com- were established parties. The remaining two par- mission of Election, the National Assembly Com- ties, Partai Demokrat, the newest organized for

Table 18 The 2004 Legislative Election Results, Indonesia

Source: Election result as announced by KPU 5 May 2004. Cited by Staff, CSIS p. 126. Is the concept of non-partisan voters relevant to the post-democratized Southeast Asian elections? 103

Table 19 Parties' Power Configuration, 1999&2004, Indonesia Yudhoyono in 2001 and

another new party PKS which was ranked

at the bottom in the

1999 election, finished 5th and the 6th respe-

ctively. PKS adhere to

cultural Islamization of Islam society which Source: Staff, CSIS p. 127. Vote threshold: 2% in 1999, 3% in 2004. was initiated by the

Muslim students mis-

Table 20 Comparison of KPU official DPR election result data, May sionary movement Dakwah Kam- 2004 and that in 1999 pus in 1998 (Miichi 2004, p. 111). These two parties forged a coalition toward the presidential election to be held in July, four months after the National As- sembly election of 2004. The vote configuration of the effective and all the parties in 1999 and 2004 are compared by the votes and the seats won in Table 19 and Table 20. The ranking order by the share of votes and that of seats slightly differ as the seats are allocated in favor of the outer islands constituencies in Indonesia. The total share of votes of the two top parties, the Golkar and PDI-P declined from

about 56% in 1999 to 40% in 2004, yet it is noteworthy that

the government party Golkar

maintains the top ranking even in the second national election in

the post-Suharto era. However,

it is premature to say that Indo-

nesian electorates are conserva-

tive and consistently loyal to the

same political party. 104

effective ideology. The Presidential direct elec- (2) Nationalistic-Islamic ideology as party prin- tion conducted for the first time in 2004 under ciple the majority-plurality rule dictated that all of the Indonesian political parties are moderately five pairs of candidates adopt the election strat- ranged along an ideological continuum from the egy of pairing candidates recruited from national- secular-nationalist (Pancasila) on one end, fol- ist and religious sectors. The goal was to broadly lowed by Islam-friendly parties to the Islamists at encompass many different ethnic groups in order other end. The division, however, is not to catch all voters (Table 21), to be explored in III categorical. The major seven or eight parties rep- section (5). resent a continuum from the secular-nationalist to the Islamist ideology. Among the eight, only Table 21 Presidential Candidates and Ideological Constellation, Indonesia PDI-P adheres to a secularist, nationalist ideology, while the rest are Islam-friendly with the col- orful spectrum of the political Islam including the

Golkar party, and the secular inclusive, predominantly Santori led group that also accepts Muslim political aspirations. The PKB and PAN derive their support largely from the members of Islam social organizations; Source: Staff, Dept of political & social change, CSIS, Indonesia (32-2) 2004, PKB from the traditional Nahdatul Ulama (NU) Table 6, p. 133. and PAN from the modern Muhammadiyah. Yet both promote pluralism as Islamic inclusive parti- IV Voting behavior of the Filipino,Thai, es, not exclusively Islam. The PKB is the party and Indonesian officially approved by the NU leaders led by Wa- hid (ex-President) but it formally espouses the 1 Three types: The solid and committed

Pancasila ideology. The PAN, led by Amien Raise, partisan, the nonpartisan and the mixed a ex-student activist accommodates non-Muslim Voting behaviors in Southeast Asian countries and non-Muhammadiya members. are categorized into three types. First, the pre-

Only PBB, PPP and PKS clearly adhere to Is- dominantly fixed and solid supporters of a spe- lam and are categorized as Islamist parties. The cific political party in semi-democratic political

PBB and PPP but not PKS, are for adopting systems (Singapore and Malaysia). Second, pre-

Syariah. It is noteworthy, however, to find the to- dominantly nonpartisan voters (the Philippines tal votes garnered by PBB and PPP is about and Thailand). Third, a combination of the two

12.5% indicating that many Muslim voters do not types coexisting side by side (Indonesia) (Iwasaki prefer the adoption of Syariah. They believe that 2004). it will harm non-Muslim populations and the plu- I consider these three typologies appropriate in ralism of Indonesia society, risking the political the light of the voting behavior of the three coun- tradition of "unity in the diversity" (Anies pp. tries as of 2004, but with certain reservations re-

669-690). garding the explanatory variables of rural-urban Yet two ideological orientations are maximizing dichotomy for generating these different types of Is the concept of non-partisan voters relevant to the post-democratized Southeast Asian elections? 105 behavior: The more rural (conservative) a coun- tem provides the appearance of the electorates try is, the more committed in and solid for a spe- strongly preferring political party. In reality, it cific political party are the voters; the more conceals the voting behavior in support of the urbanized a country is the more nonpartisans are leaders and switched candidates, or supporting in- the voters. The former may correspond to the termediating agencies like the liders (Philippi- command vote, and the latter may correspond to nes), contractors (Thailand), and local political the market vote; that the urban areas are charac- elites (Indonesia). The analysis of the candidate terized more by the market vote in contrast to behavior in relation with party affiliation also the more command vote in the rural areas (Cari- need to be scrutinized in order to articulate more zo, pp.4-5). It is undeniable that The urban-rural precisely the nonpartisan voters. variable is one of useful variables to analyze Vot- ing behavior. 2 Preferring the candidate and party leader

However, the urbanized-rural variable alone as or the party as institution an intermediate variable cannot adequately ex- A survey of Japanese voting behavior suggests plain the three different types of voting behavior three voting determinants: candidate apprecia- in the Southeast Asian countries when one sim- tion, political party that the electorates identify ply looks into the corresponding urbanization with, and the affinity with the policy advocated by rate in comparison with voting behavior in the re- the candidates. It is reported that the Japanese spective countries. Highly urbanized Singapore is voting behavior relatively shifted their weight categorized as predominantly fixed and solid parti- from the candidate appreciation to political party- san voters. While the urbanized rate of the Philip- centered at around 1970. Yet it is interesting to pines, Thailand, and Indonesia are 50%, 31% and know that the ratio of loyalty to the political party 43% respectively in 2004 (World Population Data and to the candidate remained 5 to 4, which re- Sheet of 2004), it is hard to explain why the two mained unchanged for the next three decades. It highest and the lowest urbanized countries further retained a 50-50 balance even after the among the three are categorized into the same single member district system replaced the mid- predominantly nonpartisan types of voters. The dle size constituency in 1996 (Miyake 1999, pp.7- Indonesian urbanized rate falls in-between those 31). This implies that the pattern of voting deter- of Thailand and the Philippines, yet it is classified minants built in the past persists for considerable as the mixed type of voting behavior. This is years even after institutional electoral reform. probably because the country emerged out of the Such reform do not effect drastic shift in the rela- long authoritarian control over the partisans and tive preference for candidates or for party leaders is still at the early stage of a liberal democratic to political party despite of steady decline in the voting system. The voting behavior in 2004 Indo- volumes of organized votes like labor unions. nesian elections revealed a relative shift toward more nonpartisan voters than before. 3 Philippine "nonpartisan": Preferring the

Other socio-economic cultural variables as well candidates as the path of political institution affecting the vot- (1) Perception of election: Choosing the good ing behavior are important and need to be leaders explained. The electoral system of the PR sys- Given the fact that the concept of the nonparti- 106 san was derived from a premise that it is a assistance. counter concept of the partisan voters, it might However, among the rural poor specially, side be misleading to categorize the Filipino mass by side with the strong negative perception per- electorates as nonpartisan voters when the parti- sists the idea that the election is a competition san voters as a basic concept is not meaningfully among the politically competent and powerful established. On the contrary, in the Philippine whose interest representation is not that of the electoral setting, it is more adequate to argue represented but that of the representative. Some that the basic concept of the Filipino voting be- traditional politicians (trapo) of the family clan havior is the nonpartisan, choosing the preferred continue to use the well known three Gs: Goons, candidates and leaders rather than the political Guns and Gold for controlling the voters. Yet party in election. those with the negative perception do not opt to It does not mean the Filipino electorates are abstain from participating in the election. Instead apathetically nonpartisan. The class voting analy- they work with the system by selling their votes sis reports that the middle and lower and the bot- (Alejo and et al. p.67). tom, so called DE income strata constitutes 60 to 75% of voting populations. The voting turnout (2) Poll surveys asking the preferred (out of the registered voters) in the national elec- candidates: tion is by average as high as 70% to 85% depend- Every Philippine poll survey asks the same ing on the elective posts, locality and the region. question "Whom he/she prefers" out of all na- Various voter- education and guidance are pro- tional candidates listed. It never asks which politi- vided by the church related civil society and for- cal party he/she prefers or identifies with except eign organization networks. for the PL parties and groups. The election statis-

The perception of the Filipino electorates of tical data of the Commission on Elections of the election is the opportunity to prefer the national Philippines and the researches conducted by ma- and local leaders regardless of party affiliation. jor poll survey companies (the Social Weather The ideal leaders are perceived to be those Forecast Station and the Pulse Asia) mostly list whose personalities are helpful, and have Lakas up the names of candidates only except for the (power, resources and competency) in solving PR system. News reports regarding elected offi- many problems, such as providing jobs and hous- cials rarely identify their affiliated parties but al- ing, health and food as well as economic ways identification with their constituencies. development. They acknowledge the political ac- Assuming a voter who is determined to sup- cess that enable them to personally approach the port one of the party list parties, it is practically individual elected officials to ask for patronage and logically impossible for him to claim to be a and favors for the community or families as peti- partisan voter because he is compelled to vote in tioners or lobbyists. The interests or policies rep- one ballot by the mixed ticket for the rest of the resentation are assumed to be performed by the other candidates, both national and local posts, of individual elected or appointed government offi- the different parties from the party list parties. At cials in power, not by the political party as maximum, he votes for all national posts candi- institution. The political party is least perceived dates from the same parties only if he believes in as the core entity from which to seek necessary the election as preferring political party. Is the concept of non-partisan voters relevant to the post-democratized Southeast Asian elections? 107

Table 22 Determinants of voters comparison of 1995 and 2003, Philippines

Source: IPER p. 30.

st, the benefits; the second, the political machi-

(3) Voting determinants nes; the third, popularity; and the fourth, the One psychological study on the voting behavior endorsement of the traditional network and or- of the Filipino electorates examined the priorities ganization (Table 22). that would determine how the voters choose The respondents in the 2003 election re- candidates. The respondents (1003) were pro- sponded that the first was the benefits factor, the vided with a set of 18 items for three questions: delivery capability of the candidates, meaning (1).what characteristics do you look for in a politi- that candidates who could deliver more benefits cian? (2).What influences your votes? (3).What to the voters were preferred. A typical benefit is other factors do you consider when you vote? money accepted for vote-selling. The voters The results of the two midterm elections of 1995 think that it is only during the election time that and 2003 were compared. they can directly benefit from the candidates. The The 1995 survey found that the first determi- voters have a limited appreciation of party pro- nant was popularity, the second, the endorsement grams and policies that affect them. The party is of traditional networks and organization (family not a major factor to decide the preference of can- or relative, church, organization, barangay lead- dilates (IPER pp. 27-33). ers), third, the characteristics that can benefit the According to a political researcher, psychologi- voters (closeness, integrity), and the fourth was cal affinity through any possible relationship such party program. The 2003 survey findings are: Fir- as ka-provincia, ka-classe, pro-poor image, famil- 108 jar movies star, TV or radio programs could be the preferred parties and vote by split ticket. the first determinant. Secondly, voters prefer a An study of voting determinants conducted by candidate whose characteristics of popularity, per- the Election Commission of Thailand (ETC) in 12 sonality, and leadership enable them to deliver ac- constituencies, asked "What influenced your deci- tual benefits and resources to them (What can sion in casting your vote?" It found that when a

(did) you deliver to me?). Only the upper middle party won a seat in a single member constituen- and upper class may consider good leadership for cy, the share of party list votes for this same much desired reforms and policy changes in their party in the same constituency is higher than the decision (Interview of Mr. Igaya). The Filipino share of the votes that the same party received middle class voters comprise at least 50% of the nationwide. Table 23 summarized two factors: the total voting populations (IPER p. 21). political party and the candidate. In constituency,- The foregoing leads to a hypothesis that the based voting, the preference ratio of a party to a Filipino electorate as well as the candidates are candidate is nearly 4 to 5 while in the party list hard to be categorized as "the nonpartisans" de- based, the ratio is nearly 6 to 2. It seems to indi- fined as a universal concept when the concept of cate, according to the ECT, that when a voter pre- partisan politics exists in a vacuum. fers a candidate in single member constituencies, he/she has the tendency to vote for the party that

4 Thai voting behavior his/her candidate affiliated as well for PR. This (1) Shift from preferring the candidates to po- variable in the voting behavior is the candidate, litical party? dictating the political party, not vice versa.

The 2001 general election was the first na- Yet the ECT observes that it is normal that the tional election held under the 1997 Constitution party factor has a strong influence in the party and the 1998 political party law, followed by the list election, and that it had almost equal influ- 2005 election. The overall vote turnout in 2001 ence over the voters in single member and in 2005 was 70% and 80% respectively, de- constituency. ECT adds that if this result is to be spite constitutional compulsory voting. believed, it represents a clear departure from the

As already explained, Thai voters are consid- past voting behaviors. In the past, the voters ered as largely nonpartisan as the voting behavior seemed to base their choice on more tangible is predominantly centered on candidates or party qualities of the candidates rather than on abstract leaders who frequently switch or merge parties. and often non-consequential platforms. It may

This behavior tends to generate the harsh fac- say that the voting determinants has shifted from tional fighting within a transferred or merged the candidate to the political party and its party. Thai voters in general frequently change platform. However, this conclusion

Table 23 ECT survey on voting determinants in 2001, Thailand needs to be subject to careful scrutiny. The above ECT question defined the political party identified not only with its policies but also with its leader. The

Source: the Commission of Election of the Thailand www.ect.go.th/menuparticipation electorates would have chosen Is the concept of non-partisan voters relevant to the post-democratized Southeast Asian elections? 109 the political party more because of its party This is essentially the same tactics used by the leader's attraction as proved by the TRT, or more New Aspiration Party in '90, Samakitam in '91, precisely because of the effect of the party leader, and Chat Pattana (National Development Party) as in the 2001 and 2005 elections. in '92 but only in a much larger scale.

Tamada argues that, based on his comparative (2) Sweeping the majority votes by one party analysis of the share of votes garnered in the sin- yet unchanged gle member constituencies and the share of votes In 2001 the Thai electorates gave a remarkable won in the PR in the same constituencies by the land-slide victory to Thai Rak Thai, close to the major parties, the inverted constituencies majority of the total seats (49.60%) and the votes reached nearly one half of 76 provinces: The (40.6%). share of the votes won by a elected MP in single Thaksin's pledges of populist distribution poli- member constituency is larger than those of his cies, which was unknown in the past Thai elec- affiliated party in the PR in the same constitutions, promised to provide medical treatment for ency (Tamada pp.115-117; MacCargo 2002 Chap- a token 30 baht fee and 1 million baht develop- ter 15). The foregoing confirmed the belief that ment fund in every village, apparently targeting the Thai electorates in general remain nonparti- the vote-rich rural sector. The special region in san despite the constitutional institution of voting his mind was the Northern Thai where he came for political party. from, and where he employed more than ever mo- In the 2005 election, the Thai electorate twice bilized and well-funded political machines, ram- gave a sweeping victory to the already dominant pant vote-buying, and electoral manipulation. TRT party. With that departure from nonpartisan- Tamada, however, argues that the behavior pat- ship, the majority of the Thai electorate appeared tern of the political party, the candidates, and the to prefer partisan voting. The most conventional voters in the 2001 election have not essentially explanation was that the Thai voters preferred a changed from the past: The same influential pro- government controlled by one dominant party, vincial family clans act as the core unit of the po- the first experience in the history of Thai govern- litical party with party switching and big money ment, to a traditional unstable coalition govern- politics. The voters predominantly preferred the ment, which was doomed to be ridden by intra- candidates than the political party as an factional fighting (Pasuk and Baker pp.137-138, institution. This is because the candidates still 151-153). cultivate their personal supporters with their Such swing votes, however, would not have own expenses to secure the votes by hiring the been possible without Thaksin's powerful and dy- electoral contractors of vote getting in their namic personal leadership, the effect of being the constituencies. Then the political party as an in- party owner and leader. Being equipped with the stitutional vehicle merely goes out to hunt winna- continued strong influence of money and the ble incumbents and ex-MPs who will run as their popular patronages on a national scale, particu- candidates. larly in the rural areas, he easily prevailed.

As already mentioned, the tactics of Thaksin Bangkok electorates are well known swinging proved successful as he could hunt as many as voters casting their votes by split tickets as ex- 117 ex-MPs who defected from other parties emplified by the rise and fall of the fascinating 110 monk-soldier Chamlong's Palan Tham Party in ministration party, the PDI-P (by votes 18.53%, 1992 in which Thaksin once joined.(17) Bangkok by seats from 151 to 109). The PKB and PPP re- electorates in 2005 made a sweeping shift to the tained the 3rd (10.57%) and the 4th (8.15%) re- TRT by providing overwhelming victory in Bang- spectively but declined in their share of votes. kok (32 out of 37seats) leaving only four seats to Most of the other Islamic parties PBB as well re- Democrat Party (DP) favored by the Bangkok in- duced their share of votes in 2004 (Table 19) tellectuals, only a half year after they elected though the PAN'S share of seats increased from Bangkok Mayor of the DP(18)The Thai voters con- 7.42% (34) to 9.45% (52). tinue to provide the majority votes to one specific The part of the lost votes shifted to the Partai party as long as the party delivers. In this case Demokrat, a new secular party founded for and they are transformed into partisans. The same by Yudhoyono for his presidential candidacy. It old strategies remain major weapons to woo the surprisingly won 57 seats (10.36% of the total voters to become strong partisans. seats), and came 5th rank. The PKS (successor to PK), a Islamic party also increased its share of

5 Indonesian voting behavior the seats from 1.53% to 8.18%. It is assumed that

(1) Stay with the established parties but move the urbanized and highly educated voters in 2004 for the oppositions cast the votes for the new parties like PD and

In the first post-democratized election of 1999, PKS. The two rising stars allied with the coali-

Indonesian electorates played safe. They voted tion in the presidential election conducted three heavily for the familiar and long established parti- months after. The new parties significantly in- es, but among them, moved away from the Gol- creased the share of the votes, reaching nearly kar in favor of the oppositions: PDI-P (33.76%) one fourth of the total votes cast. and PPP (10.72%). The Golkar, once an eternal Among the major seven or eight effective par- ruling party, lost to the PDI-P and drastically re- ties in 1999 and 2004, the top four seem to ap- duced its share to 22.46%. By contrast, the newly pear to have a substantial share of the partisan organized parties (PKB 12.62%, PAN 7.12%, PK votes, particularly the Golkar from the outer is- 1.36%, PBB 1.94%, PKP 1.01%, PSI 2.9%) won lands and the relatively poor provinces. It main- around 27 % in total. (see Table 19). tained the share and number of seats 118 The first and the third parties, the PDI-P and (25.76%) in 1999 and 128 (23.27%) in 2004, ow- PKB formed the coalition government of Presi- ing to its long established party machines and net- dent Wahid of PKB and Vice-president Megawati works, and helped by the collapse of PDI-P in of PDI-P). They remained a tandem until Wahid's 2004. A scrutiny of voting behavior by micro resignation in mid 2001 when Megawati replaced analysis will provide a different interpretation. him upon assuming the Presidency.

Five years later, in the 2004 general election (2) Indonesian partisans: swinging party loyalty held during the Mega administration, Indonesians How consistent is the party loyalty of the Gol- preferred for the Golkar than the ruling party. It kar supporters ? returned as the first winning party though less in For example, Sulawesi Provinces, where the share (21.58%) with more number of seats, masses are poor and controlled by the noble clas- largely thanks to the heavy loss by the ruling ad- ses, were predominantly for the Golkar in the Is the concept of non-partisan voters relevant to the post-democratized Southeast Asian elections? 111

80's and 90's. In the 1999 general election, the ing and turncoatism to winnable parties among Golkar acquired the highest percentage of votes the ex-Golkar members are rampant (Okamoto in every five provinces of Sulawesi Island (by av- 2005-(b) pp. 63, 70-72) erage 61.72%), prominently high in South Sulaw- The highest share of votes in one province for esi (66.67%) and Southeast Sulawesi (63.07%). the PDI-P in 1999 came from the province of Bali Except for Makasar, the urbanization rate of the (77.8%) and Central Java (42%). A large part of four Sulawesi provinces is low (20-30%) (Ananta the swing votes cast for PDI-P came out of affin- et al. p. 277). ity and identity with Megawati, president of PDI- In the 2004 general election, however, the Gol- P. She is popular in Bali and Central Java as she is kar lost by a wide margin (22%) in most of the Su- ethically mixed blood of both. Her mother is Bali- lawesi provinces. Its share declined to 44.66% on nese and her Javanese father was President Su- average especially in South Sulawesi 41.67%. karno, the founding father of Independent Gorontalo though a newly separated province got Indonesia. The PDI-P support drew heavily from 66.67%. At maximum, less than one half of the the low income rural class in Java, the unsatisfied Sulawesi voters seem consistently identified with social and economic class. the Golkar. Furthermore, in the Presidential elec- The PDI-P in 2004 lost by a wide margin in tion of July 2004, South Sulawesi votes cast for every province previously won, particularly in the Golkar tandem was nearly the lowest (15.2%) the urbanized cities and provinces. It drastically among all the Indonesian provinces. This big dis- reduced the share of total votes to 19.8% and the crepancy in the share of votes for the Golkar in number of seats in National Assembly, yet the South Sulawesi between 1999 and 2004 can be at- party managed to rank second. In Bali it lost the tributed to the factor that the leaders and candi- share of seats as well from 77.8% to 55.6%, (7 to

dates were out of power. 5 seats) but remained the top ranking party. The In 1999, then incumbent President Habibi of PDI-P comfortably enjoyed her popular opposi- the Golkar came from South Sulawesi. In July tion leadership in 1999 but her incumbency as 2004, Jusuf Kalla, high ranking officer of the Gol- President severely suffered from her leadership kar a and a wealthy businessman came also from problem (KPU official DPR election result, data Sulawesi. However, he conveniently switched to announced on May 2004 and Matusi September become Vice Presidential candidate of Yudhovono 2004). Party loyalty to PDI-P looks quite limited.

of PD, for whom many Sulawesi

Golkar supporters voted. The Table 24 Party preferred in 1999 and that 2004 surveyed by Yudhoyono-Kalla tandem won LP3ES, Indonesia (%)

64.2%, the highest percentage

among all provinces, despite the fact that PD got only 3% votes in

South Sulawesi province in the April general election. The same is true in local politics where the mo- nopoly of power machine by the

Golkar has collapsed. Party switch- 112

party hereafter. (3) Party loyalty less than one half by average The second highest in commanding party loy- How consistent are the Indonesian partisans alty was the PKB, 54% because of the influence in relation to party loyalty? The voting behavior of religious leaders and organizations, but the in the four elections of 1999, the April 2004 legis- PKB votes are far from being a block votes. lative election, and the July and September 2004 While the above two parties exhibit the highest Presidential elections conducted in five years sug- party loyalty, such loyalty ratio remains a little gest approximately about 50% voters voted for more than one half of voters. Furthermore the different parties. Table 24 shows the share of vot- PKS and PKB command only a limited share of ers who voted for the various party in two con- votes in the National Assembly election (14% in

secutive legislative elections which are con- 1999 and 18% in 2004). sidered to indicate the share of voters with party The Golkar has been always perceived to have loyalty. A survey asked a question: Which parties the most established party machine in East

the voters voted for in 1999 and 2004. The voters Indonesia. Its share of votes in the 2004 National

who voted for the same party twice are consid- Assembly election is the biggest among all the ered as partisans. parties (21.58%). But its party loyalty is 46%, The party loyalty of the voters ranges from the less than one half (Table 24). If the party loyalty highest 56%, to the lowest 34%, depending on among the Golkar members such as military offi- the political parties. The simple average of loy- cers, bureaucrats and financers are genuinely alty rate among the seven major parties is 45%. maintained, and if one believes in effective con- The Partai Demokrat (PD) is not yet included trol of a big share of the loyalist and the machi- among them as it was not yet set up in 1999. nes, the victory of Wiranto-Wahid Tandem in the Among seven, the PKS (prosperous justice par- presidential election in July 2004 could have been ty, former PK) exhibits the highest party loyalty materialized. The house, however, was divided in

rate of 56%, but its share of seats in the National 2004. Assembly of 2004 is limited (7.34%) though it in- The share of those who voted for PAN twice is creased the seats from seven in 1999 to 45 in 44%. The substantial part of the voters of PAM

2004. As already explained, the PKS is advocat- (16%) voted for PKS in 2004 as the PKS came ing Islam-style social and cultural reforms, and is from a part of PAN. The PBB, the Islamist party a promising, platform-oriented party supported in 1999 dispersed their votes as PBB was not eli- by the educated members (Ananta et al. p. 399). gible to participate in the 2004 election. The PBB The PKS derives strong party loyalty from regu- votes in 1999 were diversified to PKS (22%) and lar party activities to build up membership in the Demokrat (12%). Forty-two percent of PBB sup-

urban localities, which is uncommon in other porters split their votes into various small parties. parties. It does not rely on regionalism, charis- The lowest party loyalty was exhibited by PDI- matic leader, nor traditional patronages and ma- P. Only 36% of PDI-P voters in 1999 was loyal to chines politics (Interview with Kawamura and PDI-P in 2004 despite the fact that the incumbent

Matusi, IDE). It remains to be seen if more Indo- President Megawati was Party president. The

nesian electorates, particularly non-intellectuals swing voters left the PDI-P and turned to the Gol- would identify with the PKS type of political kar, PKS and PD. Is the concept of non-partisan voters relevant to the post-democratized Southeast Asian elections? 113

A survey conducted by the Asian Foundation 2004 election were useful in representing the in- prior to the legislative election in April 2004 terests of the people. Only 16% responded that found that more than half of Indonesian elector- they believed so. The higher the education, the ates were nonpartisans. Approximately two more suspicious they were of the role of the po- thirds of the respondents responded that they did litical party as an institution representing the not normally support any political party. Being people's interests. asked whom they would vote for if the DPR elec- Another survey conducted in 2002 by the Cen- tion were held today, almost 58 percent respon- ter for the Study of Islam and Society reported dents did not know. These 58% respondents that 81% of the voters cast their votes because of claimed no party identification (Internet Website their familiarity with a party. Of these 81%, 47% of the Asian Foundation, Indonesia 2004). voted based on party recognition, 17% voted for From the foregoing analysis, it can be tenta- because of the party leader, and 17% voted based tively argued that approximately one half of Indo- on religious affiliation. Only 11% cast their votes nesian voters in practice appear to be based on the party's platform and agenda (Anies nonpartisans. Those voters who identify with spe- p. 682). cific political parties are in the process of dynamic The familiarity factor as a habit of the past may change in two directions: Newly organized par- have contributed generating partisanship. Such fa- ties exemplified by the PKS and PD are increas- miliarity, if it is based on party machines and con- ing in the numbers of the committed partisans trol of local leaders, will change voters into while old parties such as the Golkar and PDI-P nonpartisans in a democratic transitional period are decreasing the numbers of their committed when the new power constellation tends to mobi- supporters. However it is premature to make a fi- lize the more mass in every election. nal judgment as the cases of general elections Regression analysis of effective parties using and the presidential election are too limited. Yet the variables of religion (Muslim/non-Muslim) it is highly probable that Presidential direct elec- and of ethnicity (Javanese/non-Javanese) recog- tion provides an unknown effect of the chemistry nizes that religious and ethnic factors moderately of the catalysis. This reaction would encourage affect the party preference. Although the two fac- more formerly bound electorates to turn nonparti- tors provide positive relations with partisanship, sans as political power competition among the it has a limited degree of consistency, given a power seekers using both illiberal and liberal range of multiple choices within the frame work strategies become so formidable. of religious and ethnic parties (Ananta, et al. Chapter 2). (4) Political attitude and vote determinants: fa- Nearly 89% of the total population, Muslims miliarity, recognition, regional affinity are too big to provide a solid Muslim bloc to spe- A survey of the political concerns of the Indo- cific parties as religious voters. In the 1999 elec- nesian electorate conducted by LP3ES in 2004 re- tion, the total votes garnered by all the Islam- ported that only a little over the majority (54%) friendly parties constituted a little more than one was interested in general election while 27% half (56%). Even the votes for the Islamist par- were not. The majority (64%) do not believe that ties such as PBB, PPP PKS, constituted only nearly 200 political parties registered for the 14% in total. The LP3ES survey of non- Muslim 114 reveals that the Islamist parties were practically and Vice president) among competing pairs. The never chosen by the non-Muslims (2-4%). This is electorate is compelled to go for split voting be- because the Islamist parties are clearly for the cause the electoral system requires the first Muslims while the Muslims can vote for either Is- round (in case of failure in winning majority) and lam or Pancasila ideology. a run off election, and of the strategies of forging The negative co-efficiency with religion was party coalitions employed by the political parties. only seen for PDI-P for which non-Muslims The strategies of paring of two candidates from voted more than the Muslim (22%, the highest different parties and professional groups are among seven parties). The positive co-efficiency shown in Table 21 which pushed the voters to was seen with the most of the parties: PPP fol- support a split ticket. lowed by the Golkar, PAN, PKB, PBB, and PK The poll survey conducted by the International (PKS in 2004). PKB is supposed to be secular but Foundation for Electoral system asked Indone- the perception of PKB as the political arms of NU sian electorates what was the most important de- whose stronghold is in Java explains why the Java- terminant in choosing a President: 42% nese Muslim are likely to vote for PKB. It is hard responded leadership, 19% integrity and justice, to reject the hypothesis of the existence of the re- 11% personality, 10% economic policy, 4% relig- ligious vote in Indonesia, although it has only a ion and 1% pairing (6% others, 7% no response). moderate influence. The preferred profession was first, military offi- The regional affinity with the candidates is cer, followed by scholar, religious leader, and fairly well recognized in the 1999 election as a businessman. (Asahi Shimbun, June 18 2004). voting determinant. Given this affinity factor, the The first three voting determinants in preferring strategy of the parties was to assign the candi- a president and vice president are related to can- dates to their home province of origin (Morishita didate appreciation. It is evident that the Indone- pp.361-368). The Indonesian PR system is based sian electorates perceive the presidential election on provincial, not nationwide constituency. as an opportunity to directly choose top leaders

Positive co-efficiency with the Javanese vari- with a problem solving type of leadership. able are seen with PDI-P and PKB while negative The voting turnout was considerably high for with the Golkar, PPP PBB and PK (PKS), imply- both: The first round was 78% and the run off ing their strongholds are in the outer islands or was 81% out of 150 million registered electo- even distribution. It is said that ethnicity needs to rates. The first round was contested among the be cooped by all parties except for PAN which ca- five pairs of candidates, all of them representing ters to both Javanese and non-Javanese (Ananta two major constellations of the nationalist (mili- et al. pp. 367-373). tary) and Islamic factors. The result was a big surprise. The SBY-JK (5) The first Presidential direct election: push- (PD) tandem won 33.6% votes, followed by Mega- ing further to be nonpartisans Hasyim tandem (PDI-P) 26.6%, Wiranto-Wahid

The first Presidential direct election logically tandem (Golkar) 22.2%, Amien-Siswono tandem worked to encourage increasing numbers of non- (PAN) 14.7% Hamzah-Agum (PPP) tandem 3.0%. partisans in Indonesia as it is essentially a prefer- SBY got a fairly even share of the votes in almost ence of a set of candidates (a pair of President every Province except for three Sulawesi prov- Is the concept of non-partisan voters relevant to the post-democratized Southeast Asian elections? 115

Figure 2 the Coalitions forged by Political Parties at Runoff Presidential Election, 2004

Table 25 Seat Composition of House of Representative (DPR) before Runoff Presidential Election The Mega-Hasyim tandem formed the Na- tional Union as inclusively as possible (Fig- ure 2; Table 25, Matsui pp. 3-5). The assumption was that the total votes cast for the seven parties in the National As- sembly election (total 323 seats), would

Source: Formulated by Matsui, Sept. 2004. comfortably secure Mega's victory if the machines established by the local leaders

inces, which gave an average 50%.(19) of the respective coalition party effectively con-

After the first round election, the top two tan- trolled the loyalty of the voters.

dem formed party coalitions to win in the run off. On the other hand the SBY-JK tandem, formed

Table 26 Pilihan Presiden 2004: Berdasarkan Pilihan Partai politik Pemilu 2004 (preference of President by political Party, 2004) 116

Table 27 Preference of political party in April Table 28 Pilihan Masyarakat dalam Pemilu 2004 Legislative Election and September Presiden putaran I terhadap Pilihan Presidential Election Masyarakat dalam Pemilu Presiden putaran II (Shift of preference in Presidential Pairs, the 1st and 2nd round, 2004)

Source: LP3ES Composed by Yoko Yoshikawa. Table 29 Shift of choice to presidential the People's Union limiting the coalition parties candidates (adjusted) to only PD, PBB, PKS and PKPI (total 113 seats). The PAN and PKB declared later to support PD. The SBY-JK, lacking party machines, adopted the campaign strategies to reach the people directly using mass media like TV. In the runoff held in September, the SBY-JK fairly loyal. The most interesting is that the large tandem won by a surprisingly wide margin of majority of the Golkar (70% or 76%) and of the 62.4% over the Mega-Hasyim tandem (37.6%). It PPP (53.8% or 76%), coalition parties of the Na- means that almost 80% of the 35 million voters tional Union for Mega voted for SBY, probably be- changed their support to the SBY-JK ticket. Table cause of Kalla, high ranking officials of the Golkar 26 (unadjusted) and Table 27 (adjusted to 100%) and the Islam factor. show the voting behavior between preferred Table 28 (unadjusted) and Table 29 (adjusted to party in the 2004 legislative election and the pre- 100%) show the shift of choice from five pairs of ferred Presidential candidates. The percentage the first round voting to two pairs in the run off. identifies the share of voters who voted for a spe- The SBY tandem got sweeping support from the cific political party in April 2004 and presidential voters for four pairs of the first round: 71% of pre- candidates in the run off election. viously voted for Wiranto-Wahid (Golkar)), 79% Partai Demokrat voters exhibited close to per- of Amien- Siswono (PAM) and 65% of Hamzah- fect loyalty to SBY (93.3% or 95%). The voters of Agum (PPP). Understandably the only voters two Islam coalition parties, PKS and PBB were who gave few votes (12% or 14%) to SBY was also loyal to the SBY tandem (67% or 86% and the Mega supporters who remained strongly 66.7% or 87% respectively). PAM (70.2% or loyal to Mega in the run off(78.9% or 88%). 77%) and PKB (70.7% or 66%) which declared It is highly dubious whether the preferrence in later their support for the SBY tandem were presidential election can be effectively deter- Is the concept of non-partisan voters relevant to the post-democratized Southeast Asian elections? 117

Table 30 Pilihan Presiden 2004: Berdasarkan Afiliasi Organisasi Keagamaan (Islam) (Preferred President by the affiliation with Islam organization)

mined on the basis of the political party. Though poll survey conducted before the 2004 presiden- the two core parties of the National Union, PDI-P tial election asked a question in assessing the loy- (88%) and PDS (63%) remained loyal to the alty of the electorates to party leader: "At present Mega tandem, the rest of the National Union par- some of party leaders declared supporting some ties failed in vote delivery. The Golkar, PPP and Presidentiables pairs. Do you think that those PBR entered the coalition with the PDI-P agree- electorates who voted for this particular party in ing among the party leaders only after the first the legislative election in April will vote following round election did not properly deliver the votes. the leaders voting behavior?" Nearly half (48.4%) The Golkar suffered from lack of party discipline of respondents said No. Only a little more than not only because of the split leadership between one fourth (27.8%) responded Yes. The rest, 23.7 party president Tanjun Akbar and Wiranto (Mat- % were no response (Grafik 10 Loyalitas Simpati- sui pp. 3-5) but also because of the image of an san Partai Politik, LP3ES). It is evident that in old face with old regime. the presidential election by popular vote, nearly Table 30 and Table 31 show that two religious half of the Indonesian electorates are not bound organizations, the Nahdatul Ulama and the Mu- by the party disciplines or policy of party leaders

hammadiyah did not deliver the majority votes to even if he or she voted for that specific party in a

Hasyim Muzadi (40%), who is a NU leader,. In- previously election. This confirms that at least stead, more votes were delivered to the SBYJK nearly one half the Indonesian electorates are (58% or 60%). The majority of the Muhammadi- nonpartisans, of which trend will be further rein- yah also voted for the SBY-JK (68% or 60.9%). Al- forced by experiencing more direct elections. though JK is known as a dedicated Muslim, it is misleading to overestimate the religious variable (6) Illiberal democracy and lack of voter educa- in delivering the votes. There was no regional and ethnic votes for the victory of the SBY tan- Table 31 Affiliation to Islamic organization in dem as they got an even share from both Java preferring Presidential Candidates (adjusted) (61%) and the outer islands (64%) (Table 32). The assumption that the larger the share of seats of political parties exercising control in the national legislature, the larger votes be mobilized to be delivered through the party machines Table 32 Java vs Outer-Java in preferring proved to be ineffective in the presidential Presidential Candidates (%) election. It implies that the party machines cannot control the electorates in the presidential election where candidate appreciation matters. A 118 tion and instead presented celebrities or symbolic

The Mega tandem was perceived as represent- marginalized peoples from bajai drivers to ing the status quo while the SBY tandem was per- vendors. The campaigns were reduced to sing- ceived as representing democratic reform, In and-dance performances (Staff, CSIS, pp. 123- practice electoral campaigns of both regimes 138), similar to the election campaigns in the were managed by well experienced ex-military Philippines. politicians, who exerted military-like top down It is too premature to judge that the half of the command in the campaign organizations. It needs Indonesian electorates voted for the 2nd post Su- to be aware that the partisans in Indonesia means harto liberal election as a genuine partisan voters not necessarily democratic development, but the enjoying flawless democracy. They are twofold: remnants of the old practice controlling the ordi- the legacy of past party system persistently af- nary electorates by the political, military and so- fords to make use of old human social networks; cial power. The reality is that the dubious figures and a new party designed to organize the civic (using threats and violence) were involved to mo- minded people at large to gain their support bilize the voters to support even for the SBY-JK based on platforms and policy with moderate tandem. The vote determinants in rural Indone- ideology. It seems to stand at a juncture of re- sian local election remain illiberal, where the maining at 50-50 ratio, between partisan and non- promises of patronages in patron-clients rela- partisan, or to increasingly shift toward non- tions, control of machines and networks, money partisan voters in 2009 election. politics and vote- buying, intimidation and vio- Concluding remark lence are rampant (Honna and Okamoto, June

2005). The foregoing observations of electoral sys-

Another problem is that a tremendous gap ex- tem, political party, and voting behavior in the its between the well educated, Civic-minded and three post-democratized Philippines, Thailand the lowly educated. The former may support spe- and Indonesia lead to the tentative conclusion cific political parties on their own rights. The lack that the effectiveness of nonpartisans as the con- of party differentiation, information and voter edu- ceptual tool in analyzing voting behaviors are var- cation remain problematic. A survey conducted ied among them. The hypothesis on basic voting from June to August 2003 found that more than behavior, however in general is "nonpartisan" in 90% do not know when the elections will take a broad sense with multiparty system in dynamic place, and more than two thirds have not heard process of democratic transition. anything about the Council of Regional For the Philippine multiparty system under

Representatives. Two thirds of the electorates do presidential system, the concept of "nonpartisan" not know what differences exit among the differ- is unviable and ineffective in analyzing voting be- ent parties and their current representatives in havior of the Filipino as it is basically "nonparti- the National Assembly (Meisburger and Charny). san" in the absence of the counter concept of

The political parties neither offered clear and real- partisans who are committed to continue to iden- istic manifested platforms and priority issues in tify with specific parties as organizations except their campaign. The party campaign in Indonesia for some party list parties. The Philippine case offered very little substance in voter education, represents the predominantly candidate centered Is the concept of non-partisan voters relevant to the post-democratized Southeast Asian elections? 119 preference to party preference. The election is Thai candidates used to build up their vote get- conceived as the opportunity for the people to ting constituencies in Province by their own execute the constitutional right to choose na- money and efforts. The incumbent members of tional and local leaders beneficial to them. No parliament often switch parties in exchange for Philippine electoral and political survey bother to the ministerial posts offered by the prime ask the respondents which political party they minister's party in the coalition government as prefer but always whom they prefer. The voting Thai voting behavior votes basically for candi- system of write- in names out of multi candidates dates anyway. but for the Party List parties in one plural ballot A new Constitution of 1997 introduced drastic encourage split voting as common practice of the electoral reforms: single member constituency electorates. and PR system and compulsory voting. Conse-

Secondly, the various functions of political quently between 2001 and 2005 Thai shifted from party such organized channel opinion representa- the multiparty coalition government to a single tion and decision-making agencies are very weak dominant party system due to a rapid rise of a The fragmented and less restrictive multiparty new single party, Thai Rak Thai. The substantial system, non-restricted frequent party switching part of the Thai electorates appear to have trans- by the sizable candidates and the incumbents formed themselves to partisans by continuing to make party discipline and identification ex- vote for the TRT, in order to solve the problems tremely blur. This encourage further personifica- of unstable coalition governing in the past caused tion of party identified with the top leaders or the by the conflicts between the multiparty system founder. The political party are hardly used as with nonpartisans, and parliamentary institutional identification of the elected officials, at maximum, constraint. pro-administration or opposition coalition. The TRT as an unprecedented dominant party Yet party affiliation is necessary working basic in Thai political history, however, was achieved unit for the candidates and the incumbents to ex- by old and new strategies. The old are the money tract various benefits in the legislative system. politics, bandwagon effect of the massive switch- Party affiliation is reformulated into the division ing of the incumbents, and the merger of small of majority- minority bloc and pro- administration parties to his would- be ruling party, for all of and oppositions coalitions. It is, however, an ac- which the enormous funds was provided by the cepted rule that individual members ultimately party president, a wealthy businessman. New may vote as nonpartisan in legislative action. The strategies are such as Party president's CEO call for a constitutional change from presidential style of strong leadership, economic policy more system to parliamentary system advocate that suitable for the globalization, and generous pa- more effective and swift decision-making would tronage policies reaching out down to the rural be made as political party system is disciplined mass constituencies. Majority of Thai electorates under parliamentary system. The argument is ex- swiftly moved leaning toward the TRT in two tremely dubious. elections. Whether or not the Thai voted for it

The Thai voting behavior under the multiparty based on the effect of the personal leadership of system has been predominantly candidate-cen- party president, or based on the effect of the plat- tered and therefore largely nonpartisans. The forms and policies needs to be clarified. It re- 120 mains to be seen, therefore, whether or not erated the climate of urgency for reform to- majority of Thai electorates became full-fledged ward more democratic institutions and effective governance. partisans who identified with and continue to (2) Varieties of nonpartisan election are intro- vote for the TRT as organization. duced to Barangay election in the Philippines; Indonesian voting behavior in three elections the Thai Senate; and the Regional Develop- since 1999 appears the mixed type of partisans ment Council of Indonesia and nonpartisans either on platform base or party (3) National and local election began since 1907. In the post independent period in 1946, leader base. More or less one half of Indonesian 14 elections between 1946-1971, elections of electorates may be estimated as partisan voters, parliamentary National Assembly under the thanks to the long tradition of PR system, the fac- martial law period between 1978-1986, and 11 tor of religion (Islam/secular nationalism), the le- elections were held between 1987 and 2004. (4) Average Over all Freedom Scores and aver- gal ban of party switching by the incumbents, and age rating in Global Survey of 2005 (P:2.5, above all, familiarity with the past voting. They, T:2.5, I:3.5 and freedom of press of 2004 rank- however, appear to be in the trend of shifting ing Philippines: 75th, Thailand: 88th, Indone- their support toward new or other parties as the sia 117th, from Web site of Freedom House. (5) Five major laws pertinent to the election effect of severe democratic competition and expe- and political party in the Philippines are: 1 The riences of direct presidential elections, which per- Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines of mit the change of support of the parties on the 1985 (Batas Pambangsa Blg. 881 as amended bases of candidate appreciation. Accordingly in by the Electoral Reform Law of 1987 (R. A. 6646) 2 The Local Government Code of 1991 the next five years between 2004 and 2009, more (R. A. 7160): 3 The Party List System Act of Indonesian electorates most probably transform 1995 (R. A. 7941): 4 The Fair Election Practice themselves into nonpartisans despite of re- Act of 2001 (R. A. 9006): 5 The Political Party stricted numbers of and behavior of political Act of 2002) The pending is Political Party law to provide public money for political party. parties. (6) Constitution set the one term, six years The limit of this paper rests in the analysis limit for President, and two terms 12 years largely relied on various different quality of re- limit for Vice President, two terms 12 years searches and loose literatures on election and po- limit for Senator and three term limits of 9 litical party of the respective countries. The years for Congressman. conclusion drawn in this paper is preliminary and (7) The Philippine electoral system and electoral administrative procedure largely rooted in needs to be subject to reexamine by the consis- the early 20 century US system except for tently formulated poll surveys to be conducted federalism. The first local election and the na- targeting two dimensions of electoral behavior: tional election by restrictive voters were held in 1902 and 1907 respectively. There held a lo- voting behavior of the partisan/nonpartisan of the cal election in 1893 during the Spanish period electorates, and behavior of choice of party affilia- as well as during the Aguinaldo government in tion and party switching of the candidates and in- Luzon and a few of Visaya Provinces in 1889. cumbents in the three countries. (8) The Independent Election Commission of Thailand, National Counter Corruption Com- mission, Constitutional Court, three Ombuds- End notes men Administrative Courts National human (1) The 1992 bloody incident following after the 1991 coup and the Financial Crisis in 1997 gen- Rights Commission, State Audit Commission. (9) In 2004 presidential election, Macapagal-Ar- Is the concept of non-partisan voters relevant to the post-democratized Southeast Asian elections? 121

royo ran from Lakas-CMD but her own party is (12) Beginning with the Liberal Party of the Kampi. Roco ran from his own party Action De- President Roxas in post independence period, mokratiko and formed the coalition of Alyansa the Dy family switched the allegiance to ng Pagasa. Action movie star Poe,Jr.( FPJ) was President Marcos during Martial Law period completely new being persuaded by Angara, (KBL), then left KBL to join the LDP of Pep- party president of LDP-Angara faction. They ing Cojuangco, brother of President Aquino formed coalition of KNP. Lacson ran from the during the Aquino Administration and further LDP-Agapito Aquino faction, secretary general switched to the NPC of E. Cojuangco, then to of LDP. E.Villanueva from Bagon Pilipinas who NPC- Lakas Coalition in 2004 of President is Brother Eddie, Evangelical religious Arroyo. preacher. The four parties allied with the (rul- (13) Bayan Muna, Gabriela, Anakpawis, Anak ing) coalitions(K4). 8 parties allied with the op- ng Bayan, Migrante, Suara Bangsamoro ac- position coalition(KNP) including two parties counts for 21% the biggest militant leftist of the arrested ex-President Estrada. The Na- group. They strategically ramified into 5 parti- tional Peoples Coalition was split to two groups es, considering 2% threshold. Other left which joined ruling and opposition coalitions. groups are Akbayan!, PM, San Lakas, ABA- The third coalition Alyansa ng PagAsa was AKO, Coop-NATCCO, account for 11%. The reformed by three individual parties of the past ligious sector backed like Buhay Alagad and CI- presidential candidates; Aksyon Demokratiko BAC account for 12.12% garnerd from the of Rocco, Promdi of Lito Osmena, Reporma of urban educated and the labor union. Others are Renato de Villa. The fourth coalition allied with farmer, war veteran, indigenous, teacher and three parties, two of which are split factions. regional parties. Once Estrada was ousted from presidency, (14) A lack of principle, identical platforms, pre- most of oppositions affiliated with the coalition dominance of personality, indiscipline, disunity of ex-president (Lammp) switched to the rul- and internal conflict, lack of stable support ing administration coalitions of incumbent from the public, most of which are parallel to President Arroyo. the Philippines political parties. The authentic (10) Political parties of the major presidential school argues that Thai political party are char- candidates: The Laurel's Nacionalista, The acterized by dominance of personalities and re- Marcos' Kilusang Bagong Lipunan(KBL'78), source and money politics, the role of factions, Aquino and Peping Cojuangco's Laban ng De- regional groupings and close links between mokratikong Pilipinas (Laban '78, LDP '86), Ra- politicians and provincial Chao Pho. That The mos' Lakas-Tao, now Lakas-CMD (Lakas '92), function of political party is a mechanism for re- Estrada's Partido ng Masang Pilipino (PMP sponding and adjusting a multitude of demands '98) and Puwersa ng Masa. Arroyo's Kabalikat from the various stakeholders by reconciling ng Malayang Pilipino (Kampi '92), Eduardo these demands. Cojuangco's National Peoples Coalition(NPC (15) So-called "fertilizer formulas" like 5-10-10- '92) , Pimentel's Philippine Democratic Party 20, which indicates the sums in millions of baht (PDP-Laban '82) Osmena's Promdi, Roco's a candidate will receive when he expresses in- Aksyon Demokratiko ('97), Santiago's Reform terests (5million): when he sighed up to join Party of the Philippines (RPP '92), de Villa's the party (10 million); when he successfully Reporma ('98) elected (10 million) for which huge amount of (11) Priority Development Assistance fund money earned completely outside of the politi- (PDAF), formerly Countrywide Development cal system (Pasuk 2003, p.7) Fund(CDF). The fund allocation is P200million (16) The political parties during Suharto regime per Senator and P65 million per Congressman were regulated to only three by the govern- in 2004 who identify the wide range of projects ment coercion: Golkar (Golongan Karya party) listed up by the executive departments for his of which members are all kinds of government own district). employees and bureaucrats organized into 122

party machines down to the outer islands. PPP(Development and Unity party) the alga- Bibiliograpy mated opposition consisted of different Islamic Alejo, Myrna J. and Maria Elena P. Rivera, and parties and social organizations. PDI, (now Noel Inocencio P. Valencia. (1996) [De]scribing PDI-P, Indonesian Democratic Party for Strug- Election: a Study of Elections in the life world of gle) was an integrated party of all secular and San Isidro. Quezon City: IPD. non-Islamic parties. The independent was not Ananta, Aris Evi Nurvidyaya Arifin and Leo allowed and any party activities in the rural Suryadinata. (2004) Indonesian Electoral area by the opposition was not allowed. Behavior: A Statistical Perspective. Singapore: (17) Palantham Party of Chamlong which won Institute of Southeast. 32 out of Bangkok 35 seats in March 1992 de- Anies Rasyid Baswedan (2004) "Political Islam in clined to 23 seats in September 1992, to 1 Indonesia: Present and Future Trajectory." seats in 1996 and 0 in 2001. The oldest and Asian Survey (XLIV,no. 5 September/October). long standing Democrat Party regained in Araki, Yoshinobu.荒木義修(2001)「政界再編成 Bangkok after 1992 by the image of economic 期における無党派層の変質について」『選挙』 technocrats but its character has totally 54巻9号 changed from party supported by urban intel- Araki, Yoshinobu.荒木義修(2004)「有権者はな lectuals to Provincial businessmen dominated. ぜ投票にでかけるのか」三重県選挙管理委員 (18) Exit poll found that Bangkok Democrat 会・松阪大学地域社会研究所 supporters voted for party candidates in single Arugay, Aries, Gladstone Cuarteros and Aya member constituency but voted for TRT in Fabros. (2004) "The 13th Congress: Old faces , Party List ballot. By contrast the most of the New Dynamics." Political Brief. (2nd Q. V.12, TRT supporters are younger generation who No. 2) voted for it in both ballots. A half year earlier Bansuelo, Fernando.U., Jr. (1991) Election Cam- in August 2004, the Bangkok voters elected paign Plan. Metro-Manila: Informerchant Democrat Governor. Enterprises. (19) The first, Yudhoyono (SBY-JK) (Partai De- Carlos, Clarita. (1996) Political Parties in the mokrat) is retired general , cabinet minister of Philippines: From 1900 to the Present. Makati: Wahid and Megawati Administrations and Jusuf Konrad Adenauer Foundation. Kalla is wealthy businessman, former Golkar. Casiple, Ramon C. (2003) "The Party-list Path to The second, Mega-Hasym ticket (PDI-P) is the a Broadened Philippine Democracy" Public Pol- incumbent President Megawati and Hasyim, icy V.VII No. 1 Jan -June. NU leader. Neither ticket could win the Carizo, Jay A. (2004) "Presidential Elections: Be- majority. The third, Wiranto-Wahid ticket yond the Vote Arithmetic." Political Brief. 2nd (Golkar). Wiranto is a retired general ex-Chief quarter V.12. No.2. Commander of Armed Force and Salahuddin Collins, Kathlean. (2004) "The Logic of Clan Wahid, NU leader and brother of ex President Politics: Evidence from the Central Asian Wahid. The Fourth, Amien-Yudohusodo Trajectories." World Politics. V.56, no. 2 January. (PAN). Amien Rais was student activist. The Coronel, Sheila S. (2004) "Born to Rule" in The fifth, Vice President Hamzah (PPP) and Agum, Rulemakers: how the wealthy and well -born a retired general. dominate the Congress. Quezon City: The Phil- ippine Center for Investigative Journalism. Croissant, Aurel and Jordn Dosch (2001) "Old * This is a revised paper originally submitted to Wine in New Bottlenecks?: Election in Thai- the National Meeting of Electoral Studies held land under the 1997 Constitutions." Leeds in May 15, 2005. East Papers no. 63. University of Leeds. * I acknowledge the assistance provided by the Diamond, Larry (1999) Developing Democracy: To- Nanzan University Pache Research Subsidy 1- ward Consolidation. Baltimore: the Johns Hop- A-2, 2001 for this paper. kins University Press. Is the concept of non-partisan voters relevant to the post-democratized Southeast Asian elections? 123

Gloria, Glenda, M. Ana Maria L. Tabunda and Car- Making Process. Prentice Hall. Inc. 1993) men Fonfuena. (2004) Spin and Sell: How po- Leduc, Lawrence, Richard G. Niemi and Rippa litical Ads shaped the 2004 Elections. Makati: Norris edited. (1996) Comparing Democracies: The Foundation of Communicative Initiatives. Elections and Voting in Global Perspective. Sage Honna Jun.本名純(2005)「ポスト・スハルト Publications Inc. 時代におけるジャワ3州の地方政治-民主化 MaCintyer Andew. (2003) The Power of Institu- ・支配エリート・2004年選挙」(2003)『アジ tions: Political Architecture and Governance. ア研究』第51巻第2号 Ithaca: Cornel University Press. Ida Masamichi井田正道(2003)「政治的態度」 MacCargo, Duncan edited. (2002) Reforming Thai 河田潤一・荒木義修編『政治心理学』第2章 Politics. Nordic Institute of Asian Studies. 北樹出版 MacCargo, Duncan. (1997) "Thailand Political Ide Tbmoyuki井出知之(2000)「『支持政党なし』 Parties: Real, authentic and actual," in Political 層の分類とその政治的影響」『社会学年報』 Change in Thailand: Democracy and participa- 第29号 tion edited by Kevin Hewison. London and Ide Tbmoyuki井出知之(2002)「社会構造と支 New York: Routledge. 持号政党なし層の多様性」『社会学研究』第72 Matsui, Kazuhisa. (2004) "The 2004 Indonesian General Election and the New Government." IPER. (2004) The voter's Choice: Myself, Quezon The 2nd short report, IDE, JETRO September. City: Institute of Political and Electoral Reform Meisburger, Tim and Craig Charney (2004) "A (IPER) and UNDE Survey of the Indonesian Electorate in 2003" Iwasaki Ikuo.岩崎育夫(2004)「東南アジアの選 (Regional Advisor on Democratization and

挙と政治変動」A paper presented in Sympo- Elections of The Asia Foundation, Jakarta and sium on Asian election, held by Asian Research Craig Charney, President of Charney Research, Center at Nanzan University (20 Nov.) (January 9, Washington DC) Kabashima Ikuo and Ishio Yoshito.蒲島郁夫・石 Miichi, Ken.見市建(2004)「民主化期におけ生義人(1998)「政党支持の安定性」『レヴァるイスラム主義の台頭-インドネシアのダーイアサン』第22号春ワキャンパスと正義党」『現代の宗教と政党 Kawamura Koichi.川村晃一(2004)「民主化2 :比較の中のイスラーム』日本比較政治学会度目の選挙を迎えるインドネシア」『ワールド編,早稲田大学出版部トレンド』 No.103 Miyake, Ichiro.三宅一郎(1999)「政党投票と候 Kawanaka, Tsuyoshi.川中豪(2004)『民主化後補者個人投票のバランス-小選挙区制移行のフィリピン政治経済資料集』アジア経済研期の投票決定『レヴァイアサン』第25号秋究所 Morishita Akiko.森下明子(2003)「スハルト体 Kobayashi, Yoshiaki.小林良彰(2000)『選挙・投制崩壊後のインドネシア政治エリート-1999 票行動』東京大学出版会年総選挙による国会議員とはどのような人た Kipp. Rita Smith. (2004) Indonesia in 2003: Ter- ちか」『東南アジア研究』41巻3号 rors' Aftermath. Asian Survey V.XLIV No. 1 Okamoto, Masaaki.岡本正明(2005)「インドネ (Jan/Feb). シアにおける地方政治の活性化と州『総督の Kusuma, Rizal(2002)「ポストスハルト期の政党誕生』ーバンテン地方の政治:1998-2003」政治」『民主化時代のインドネシア』佐藤百『東南アジア研究』43巻1号合編アジア経済研究所 Okamoto, Masaaki.岡本正明(2005)「5年おく Linantud,John L. (2005)"The 2004 Philippine れの『改革』-2004年インドネシア-南スラ Elections:Political Change in an Illiberal ウェシ州におけるゴルカル党の凋落」『アジア Democracy." ContemporarySoutheast Asia: V. 研究』第51巻第2号 27-No. 1, April. Pasuk, Phongpaichit. (2003) "Governance: Cor- Lindblom, Charles and Edward J. Woodhouse.チ ruption and Honest Mistakes in Thailand after

ャールス・Eリンドブルム・エドワード・J Enron." A paper read at the Center for South- ・ウッドハウス(2004)「政策形成の過程:民 east Asian Studies, Kyoto University, March.

主主義と公共性』東京大学出版会(The Policy Pasuk Phongpaichit and Chris Baker. (2000) 124

Thailand's Crisis. Singapore: Institute of South- Wurful, David. (1998) Filipino Politics. Quezon eas Asian Studies. City: Ateneo de Manila University Press. Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism Yamamoto, Nobuto.山本信人(2005)「中スラウ and Ateneo Center for Social Policy and Public ェシ州ポソ県政治の構造的特性「宗教」暴動、 Affairs edited. (1992) 1992 & Beyond. 造られた制度・2004年県議会選挙『アジア研 Poguntke, Thomas and Paul Webb ed. (2005) The 究』第51巻第2号 Presidentialization of Politics in Democratic Societies: a Framework for Analysis. Oxford Uni- News paper article, poll survey, Internet website versity Press. Asahi Shimbun, June 18, 2004. Rivera, Temario C. (2002) "Transition: Pathways The Commission of Election of the Thailand, and Democratic Consolidation in Post-Marcos www.ect.go.th Philippines." Contemporary Southeast Asia V The Commission of Election of the Philippines, 24, No. 3 December www.comelec.gov.ph Rodriguez, Augustin Martin G. (2002) "The Rein- Indonesia: A Report on Public Opinion and the vention of Civil Society Organizations as Party - 2004 Elections Quarterly Research Survey List Representatives," Loyola School of Review Feb. 2003 conducted by AC Nielsen for the (Social Sciences )V.II. Asian Foundation. Siripan Nogsuan. (2004) "Political Parties in the KPU, Comparison of KPU official DPR election Wake of Electoral Reforms in Thailand." (A Pa- result data announced 5 May 2004. per presented at the Asian Election Confer- LP3ES, election data and press release of 21 Sep- ence, Manila, October) tember 2004, www.lp3es.or.id www.jurdil.org Singh, Bilveer (2003) "The 2004 Presidential Philippine Daily Inquirer, www.ing7.net Elections in Indonesia: Much Ado about Noth- The Pulse Asia, www.pulseasia.newsmaker.ph ing?" Contemporary Southeast Asia. 25-3. Republic of the Philippine Congress. Staff, Department of political and social change, www.congress.gov.ph CSIS. (2004) "Some Lessons of the Democrati- The Social Weather Station. www.sws.org.ph zation Process: Post-Legislative and Pre-Presi- dential Elections." The Indonesian Quarterly, V. 32, No. 2. Tamada, Yoshihumi.2001玉田芳史『民主化の虚像と実像-1990年代タイ政治』(平成11年～12 年度科学研究費補助金研究成果報告書) Tamada, Yoshihumi. March 2005(a).玉田芳史「タイ政治の安定:2005年2月総選挙を手がかりとして」『東・東南アジア諸国における政治の民主化と安定』(科研費研究成果報告書) Tamada, Yoshihumi. June 2005(b).玉田芳史「タイの政党政治-民主化との関連で」日本比較政治学会報告 Tanaka Aiji.田中愛治(1997)「「政党支持なし」層の意識構造:政党支持概念の再検討の試論」『レヴァイアサン』第20号春 Tanaka Aiji田中愛治(2004)「日本の政党システムの変容-1980-90年代の変化と無党派層の増大」『変動期の日韓政治比較』曽根泰教・崔章集編慶応義塾大学出版会 Tangchangco, Luzviminda. G. (1992) The Anatomy of Electoral Frauds: Concrete Basis for Electoral Reform. Manila: Matrix. 215

The conclusion remains to be the preliminary stage and it is desired that the studies on the candidate and

party behavior along with the voting behavior in the post democratized countries are extensively conducted.

Is the concept of non-partisan voters relevant to the post-democratized South- east Asian elections?: The cases of the Philippines, Thailand and Indonesia

Yoko YOSHIKAWA

The rise of nonpartisan voters in the past decades are reported in the various studies on voting behavior in the developed democratic countries such as the US and Japan. Against this back drop, it is the prime concern of this paper to make inquiries that whether or not the parallel partisans/nonpartisans, particularly the rise of nonpartisans, is discernable in the recently democratized (or democracy restored) Southeast Asian countries: the Philippines, Thailand and Indonesia. If it appears so, how it is explained and what the voting determinants are. Prior to proceeding to voting behaviors, the paper takes up the issues of democratic transition, the broader inclusive concept of the nonpartisans, the political and electoral institutional reforms, the behavior of political parties and party systems conducted in the three respective countries. The problems encountered are that, first, whether or not the concept of partisans vs. nonpartisan derived from the experiences in the developed countries can be adequately applied to the electorates whose political regime environment, the behaviors of political party and candidates, and electoral governance are different, and those who are basically identified with candidates or party leaders in the fluid multiparty system. Secondly the lack of solid and clear-cut evidence obtained from the outcome of surveys asking the electorates of the specific party identification or non-identification compelled to rely on the various different literatures and the election outcome.