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Unep's Compliance Assistance Programme UNITED NATIONS EP Distr. United Nations GENERAL Environment Programme UNEP/OzL.Pro/ExCom/73/30 13 October 2014 ORIGINAL: ENGLISH EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE MULTILATERAL FUND FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE MONTREAL PROTOCOL Seventy-third Meeting Paris, 9-13 November 2014 UNEP’S COMPLIANCE ASSISTANCE PROGRAMME (CAP) BUDGET FOR 2015 Pre-session documents of the Executive Committee of the Multilateral Fund for the Implementation of the Montreal Protocol are without prejudice to any decision that the Executive Committee might take following issuance of the document. UNEP/OzL.Pro/ExCom/73/30 PROJECT DESCRIPTION 1. UNEP has submitted for consideration at the 73rd meeting, in the context of its work programme, the proposed budget for its Compliance Assistance Programme (CAP) for 2015. The submission is valued at US $9,459,000, plus agency support costs of 8 per cent amounting to US $756,720. Progress report of CAP 2014 2. UNEP continued assisting Article 5 countries with activities to support their compliance, summarized as follows: (a) Supporting HCFC phase-out management plans (HPMPs) as the lead implementing agency in 71 countries and cooperating agency in 28 countries; (b) Assisting 103 Article 5 countries, where UNEP is responsible for the institutional strengthening projects, through policy advice, capacity development and finalization of their licensing and quota systems; (c) Project implementation through the organization of 21 network meetings and thematic workshops between October 2013 and August 2014 on priority issues related to HCFC phase-out; (d) Monitoring the ratification of outstanding amendments to the Montreal Protocol; and (e) Raising awareness through publications and videos on HCFC phase-out focusing particularly on the air-conditioning and refrigeration servicing sector; and electronic knowledge management (i.e., materials: Informal Prior Informed Consent (iPIC)-online; TradeNames database; OzonAction’s websites and social media platforms; webinar series on various topics related to ozone protection and ODS management). 3. UNEP also continued to support the timely reporting of both ODS consumption and production data under Article 7 of the Montreal Protocol, reporting progress on the implementation of the country programme (CP), and the timely development as well as the implementation of action plans to assist Article 5 countries in potential non-compliance to return to compliance. Budget utilization in 2013 4. Of the US $9,158,000 plus support costs of US $732,640 approved for CAP budget for 2013, UNEP returned US $915,833 plus support costs of US $73,267 to the 72nd meeting as balance, in line with decision 35/36(d). Summary of CAP proposal for 2015 5. UNEP continued to implement a three-track approach to define its services for the coming year. In 2015, these tracks will continue from where they were left off last year, and will focus on providing support to Article 5 countries to ensure compliance with the 2015 and 2020 HCFC control measures; fostering partnerships to sustain compliance of phase-out already met (i.e. CFCs and other ODS); and implementing awareness raising and capacity building services that promote substitutes and alternatives to ODS to minimize the impact on the environment. 6. UNEP will continue to provide country-specific special compliance services, support the regional networks of Ozone Officers, facilitate and encourage South-South cooperation, provide capacity building assistance on technology awareness and operate a global information clearinghouse to offer the National Ozone Units (NOUs) with relevant information. UNEP will continue to implement other projects 2 UNEP/OzL.Pro/ExCom/73/30 approved by the Executive Committee from its business plan and on behalf of bilateral partners, as well as project development, reporting and monitoring functions associated with its role as implementing agency. 7. As UNEP implements its mandate to provide compliance assistance to Article 5 countries its main challenge is to ensure that any support given to these countries will take into account the specific needs of the broad spectrum of client countries which vary in geographical size, population and consumption of ODS. In its consultations with countries through network meetings, UNEP will face the following specific challenges in 2015: (a) Ensuring the remaining ratifications of the Montreal and Beijing amendments to the Montreal Protocol; (b) Maintaining political attention on the Montreal Protocol requiring continued strengthening of national institutions to comply with the Montreal Protocol objectives; (c) Political instability/conflicts in some countries/regions which affect programme delivery and potential non-compliance with the Protocol’s control measures; (d) Regular turnover of NOUs requiring continuous capacity building; (e) Completion of HPMPs and initiating work on stage II of the HPMPs for eligible countries, ensuring that compliance for 2015 and 2020 targets are met; (f) Identifying barriers to consideration of long term low-global-warming potential alternatives to HCFCs particularly in the air-conditioning and refrigeration servicing sector, and finding solutions applicable to Article 5 countries; (g) Challenges in the refrigeration servicing sector (e.g., lack of standards for the use of flammable refrigerants) especially for low-volume consuming (LVC) countries and the informal sector; and (h) Potential issues related to illegal ODS trade for substances that have already been phased out. Changes in the CAP 2015 budget 8. The proposed CAP budget for 2015 of US $10,215,720 (including the 8 per cent agency support costs) shows a 1.3 per cent increase over the total budget approved in 2014, and is within the provisions of decision 47/24. These changes are summarized as follows, and are presented in Annex 1E(bis) of the submission. Staff costs 9. Changes in the staff costs were made to accommodate staffing needs of the regions. These are: (a) BL 1101, (Head of Branch for the Paris OzonAction programme) was increased from US $217,000 to US $250,000 to account for a full year’s cost, as it was previously budgeted for only 10 months. The difference was made up through reprioritization of other budget lines as explained below; (b) BL 1106 (Programme Officer, Policy and Technical Support) was increased from US $190,000 to US $214,000 to adjust costs to reflect the level of the post; 3 UNEP/OzL.Pro/ExCom/73/30 (c) BL 1141 (Regional Network Coordinator for Africa, P5), US $220,000 was cancelled, and funds were reallocated to create two new Programme Officer posts at P-2 levels, and a Programme Assistant (G6 level) post to support the regional CAP team in Africa (BLs 1146, 1147 and 1344 for a total cost of US $232,000); (d) BL 1317 (temporary assistance associated with the Paris office) was reduced by US $12,000 (from US $75,000 to US $63,000) and fund balances were moved to cover the additional costs needed for BL 1101 as mentioned in sub-paragraph (a); and (e) BL 1333 (Regional Outreach Assistant for ROWA), was increased from US $29,000 to US $60,000 to make this a full time post, with US $30,000 coming from a reduced BL 2130 (ROWA sub-contracts), as indicated in paragraph 10(b) below. Operational and programmatic costs 10. The main changes made due to regionalization and reprioritization of CAP funds are summarized below: (a) BL 2110 (ECA sub-contracts) was reduced by US $10,000 (US $35,000 to US $25,000); (b) BL 2130 (ROWA sub-contracts) was reduced by US $30,000 (US $50,000 to US $20,000) to cover the costs for BL 1333, as indicated in paragraph 9(e) above; (c) BL 2140 (ROA sub-contracts) was reduced by US $15,000 (US $28,000 to US $13,000); (d) BL 2220 (ROAP regional awareness) was reduced by US $5,000 (US $54,000 to US $49,000); (e) BL 2230 – (ROWA Regional awareness) was reduced by US $ 10,000 (US $20,000 to US $10,000); (f) BL 2250 (ROLAC regional awareness) was reduced by US $10,000 (US $40,000 to US $30,000); (g) BL 3220 (ROAP south-south cooperation) was decreased by US $5,000 (US $48,000 to US $43,000); (h) BL 3250 (ROLAC south-south cooperation) was decreased by US $5,000 (US $45,000 to US $40,000); (i) BL 4301 – (Office rental Paris and ECA network) was decreased by US $20,000 (US $360,000 to US $340,000); (j) BL 4310 – (Office rental regions) was increased by US $28,000 (US $151,000 to US $179,000); (k) BL 5301 – (Communication and dissemination for Paris and ECA) was decreased by US $55,000 (US $123,000 to US $68,000); and (l) BL 1650 (ROLAC staff travel) was reduced by US $20,000 (US $90,000 to US $70,000) and funds were reallocated to BL 3350 (ROLAC network meeting) which was increased from US $204,000 to US $224,000. 4 UNEP/OzL.Pro/ExCom/73/30 SECRETARIAT’S COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATION COMMENTS Overall 2015 CAP submission 11. UNEP’s 2015 CAP programme is consistent with the mandate given in decision 35/36 which first established the CAP. While it continued to focus on three tracks as it had done so in the past year (i.e., 2014 CAP) these tracks were updated to reflect the changing priorities that the programme faced, based on its experience working with Article 5 countries. UNEP explained that the revised format for the 2015 work programme provides an overview of all global CAP services and reflects on specific issues that need to be addressed either globally, regionally or nationally through each of its delivery mechanisms. It further explained that the new presentation is made to avoid duplication of information in the document. One example would be activities in the refrigeration servicing sector where UNEP’s current focus would be standards and safety, issues that when resolved would promote the use of flammable alternatives especially for LVC countries.
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