Cyber Security Cooperation a Universal Internet in a Bordered
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
Load more
Recommended publications
-
Doing Business in Canada 2019
Doing Business in Canada A disciplined, team-driven approach focused squarely on the success of your business. Lawyers in offices across Canada, the United States, Europe and China — Toronto, Calgary, Vancouver, Montréal, Ottawa, New York, London and Beijing. Among the world’s most respected corporate law firms, with expertise in virtually every area of business law. When it comes to dealmaking, Blakes Means Business. Blakes Guide to Doing Business in Canada Doing Business in Canada is intended as an introductory summary. Specific advice should be sought in connection with particular transactions. If you have any questions with respect to Doing Business in Canada, please contact our Firm Chair, Brock Gibson by email at [email protected]. Blake, Cassels & Graydon LLP produces regular reports and special publications on Canadian legal developments. For further information about these reports and publications, please contact the Blakes Client Relations & Marketing Department at [email protected]. Contents I. Introduction ............................................................................................................... 1 II. Government and Legal System ............................................................................... 2 1. Brief Canadian History ............................................................................................. 2 2. Federal Government ................................................................................................. 3 3. Provincial and Territorial Governments -
The Internet Beyond Borderless Versus Balkanized
POROUS TERRITORIES: THE INTERNET BEYOND BORDERLESS VERSUS BALKANIZED LUKE MUNN Western Sydney University (Australia) [email protected] Abstract: If the internet was once viewed as a borderless realm, critics now warn it is in danger of being “balkanized”, splintering into nationalized fragments. Certainly nation-states increasingly see the Internet as “their” internet, a national space to be regulated and actively shaped. The first half of this article charts the technologies that appear to place this vision within reach: data localization, internet shutdowns, and internet filtering. These moves promise to exert sovereign control, to make the inter- net an extension of national territory. Yet by drawing on two recent events in China, this article argues that these territories are messy and their borders are permeable. Pro-government activists jump across the firewall in order to attack individuals and organizations who threaten the stability and security of their motherland. Simultane- ously, individuals scale the firewall in order to question the party line and express solidarity with democratic movements, undermining the political and technical boundaries established by their nation. Internet architectures create a condition where territorialization is constantly being both amplified and undermined by “extra- territorial” activities. These practices demonstrate the everyday porosity of internet territories, providing a messier portrait that goes beyond the dichotomy of borderless vs balkanized. Keywords: territory, fragmentation, balkanization, internet, China. When nations speak of the internet today, they no longer use the language of the virtual, but of soil. At the dawn of the internet, cyberspace was framed as a new realm decoupled from the state. This digital sphere stretched across the globe, making it essentially ungovernable. -
Threat Modeling and Circumvention of Internet Censorship by David Fifield
Threat modeling and circumvention of Internet censorship By David Fifield A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Computer Science in the Graduate Division of the University of California, Berkeley Committee in charge: Professor J.D. Tygar, Chair Professor Deirdre Mulligan Professor Vern Paxson Fall 2017 1 Abstract Threat modeling and circumvention of Internet censorship by David Fifield Doctor of Philosophy in Computer Science University of California, Berkeley Professor J.D. Tygar, Chair Research on Internet censorship is hampered by poor models of censor behavior. Censor models guide the development of circumvention systems, so it is important to get them right. A censor model should be understood not just as a set of capabilities|such as the ability to monitor network traffic—but as a set of priorities constrained by resource limitations. My research addresses the twin themes of modeling and circumvention. With a grounding in empirical research, I build up an abstract model of the circumvention problem and examine how to adapt it to concrete censorship challenges. I describe the results of experiments on censors that probe their strengths and weaknesses; specifically, on the subject of active probing to discover proxy servers, and on delays in their reaction to changes in circumvention. I present two circumvention designs: domain fronting, which derives its resistance to blocking from the censor's reluctance to block other useful services; and Snowflake, based on quickly changing peer-to-peer proxy servers. I hope to change the perception that the circumvention problem is a cat-and-mouse game that affords only incremental and temporary advancements. -
The World Internet Project International Report 6Th Edition
The World Internet Project International Report 6th Edition THE WORLD INTERNET PROJECT International Report ̶ Sixth Edition Jeffrey I. Cole, Ph.D. Director, USC Annenberg School Center for the Digital Future Founder and Organizer, World Internet Project Michael Suman, Ph.D., Research Director Phoebe Schramm, Associate Director Liuning Zhou, Ph.D., Research Associate Interns: Negin Aminian, Hany Chang, Zoe Covello, Ryan Eason, Grace Marie Laffoon‐Alejanre, Eunice Lee, Zejun Li, Cheechee Lin, Guadalupe Madrigal, Mariam Manukyan, Lauren Uba, Tingxue Yu Written by Monica Dunahee and Harlan Lebo World Internet Project International Report ̶ Sixth Edition | i WORLD INTERNET PROJECT – International Report Sixth Edition Copyright © 2016 University of Southern California COPIES You are welcome to download additional copies of The World Internet Project International Report for research or individual use. However, this report is protected by copyright and intellectual property laws, and cannot be distributed in any way. By acquiring this publication you agree to the following terms: this copy of the sixth edition of the World Internet Project International Report is for your exclusive use. Any abuse of this agreement or any distribution will result in liability for its illegal use. To download the full text and graphs in this report, go to www.digitalcenter.org. ATTRIBUTION Excerpted material from this report can be cited in media coverage and institutional publications. Text excerpts should be attributed to The World Internet Project. Graphs should be attributed in a source line to: The World Internet Project International Report (sixth edition) USC Annenberg School Center for the Digital Future REPRINTING Reprinting this report in any form other than brief excerpts requires permission from the USC Annenberg School Center for the Digital Future at the address below. -
Data Localization Requirements Across Different Jurisdictions 70
The Localisation Gambit Unpacking Policy Measures for Sovereign Control of Data in India 19th March, 2019 By Arindrajit Basu, Elonnai Hickok, and Aditya Singh Chawla Edited by Pranav M Bidare, Vipul Kharbanda, and Amber Sinha Research Assistance Anjanaa Aravindan The Centre for Internet and Society, India Acknowledgements 2 Executive Summary 3 Introduction 9 Methodology 10 Defining and Conceptualizing Sovereign Control of Data 11 Mapping of Current Policy Measures for Localization of Data in India 13 The Draft Personal Data Protection Bill, 2018 13 Draft E-commerce Policy (s) 17 RBI Notification on ‘Storage of Payment System Data’ 19 Draft E-Pharmacy Regulations 20 FDI Policy 2017 20 National Telecom M2M Roadmap 21 Unified Access License for Telecom 21 Companies Act, 2013 and Rules 21 The IRDAI (Outsourcing of Activities by Indian Insurers) Regulations, 2017 22 Guidelines on Contractual Terms Related to Cloud Services 22 Reflecting on Objectives, Challenges and Implications of National Control of Data 24 Enabling Innovation and Economic Growth 24 Enhancing National Security and Law Enforcement Access 34 Law Enforcement Access 34 Protecting Against Foreign Surveillance 36 Threat to fibre-optic cables 37 Widening Tax Base 40 Data Sovereignty and India’s Trade Commitments 41 A Survey of Stakeholder Responses 48 Data Localisation Around the World 49 Conclusions and Recommended Approaches 61 Annexure I 70 Mapping Data Localization Requirements Across Different Jurisdictions 70 Annexure 2 75 A survey of stakeholder responses 75 1 Acknowledgements The authors would like to thank Pranav MB, Vipul Kharbanda, Amber Sinha, and Saumyaa Naidu for their invaluable edits and comments on the draft. -
Regulation of the Internet a Technological Perspective
Regulation of the Internet A Technological Perspective "As we surge toward a new millennium, the Internet has become more than the overwhelming reality of the technology industry's current existence. It is the foundation for the Information Age, the environment in which we will all be living before long."1 Gerry Miller Gerri Sinclair David Sutherland Julie Zilber March, 1999 1 Dan Gillmor, San Jose Mercury News, December 19,1998, http://www7.mercurycenter.com/business/top/069597.htm Table of Contents PREFACE ...................................................................................................... IV INTRODUCTION............................................................................................. 1 SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS .................................................................... 3 PART 1 SETTING THE CONTEXT................................................................. 7 1. An Internet Primer.......................................................................................................................7 1.1 What is it?...............................................................................................................................7 1.2 Who owns it?...........................................................................................................................7 1.3 How does it work? ..................................................................................................................7 1.4 Who governs the Internet? .....................................................................................................8 -
The Role of Civil Society Organizations in the Net Neutrality Debate in Canada and the United States
THE ROLE OF CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANIZATIONS IN THE NET NEUTRALITY DEBATE IN CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES By Bruce Thomas Harpham A thesis submitted in conformity with the requirements for the degree of Master of Information Studies Graduate Department of the Faculty of Information University of Toronto © Copyright by Bruce Thomas Harpham (2009) Thesis title: The role of civil society organizations in the net neutrality debate in Canada and the United States Degree: Master of Information Studies (2009) Author: Bruce Thomas Harpham Graduate Department: Faculty of Information Institution: University of Toronto Abstract: This thesis investigates the policy frames employed by civil society organizations (CSOs) in the network neutrality debate in Canada and the United States. Network neutrality is defined as restrictions on Internet Service Providers (ISPs) to respect freedom of expression on the Internet and not seek to prevent innovative competition nor control the services or content available to users. The primary question under investigation is the policy frames of CSOs in the debate. The second question is whether CSOs have influenced policy outcomes in either legislation or regulation. The focus of the analysis is on regulatory agencies (CRTC and FCC); proposed legislation in Parliament and Congress is also analyzed as well. By examining the arguments advanced by various policy participants (government, ISPs, and CSOs), common points can be identified that may help the participants come to agreement. ii Acknowledgements Over the months of research and writing the thesis, I have greatly benefited from the comments and suggestions from my supervisors, Professors Andrew Clement and Nadia Caidi. Their contributions have allowed me to develop my argument in greater detail and have pointed out errors and other problems. -
"Splinternet" – Danger for Our Citizens, Businesses and Society?
"Splinternet" – Danger for our citizens, businesses and society? Once upon a time, there was the World Wide Web (www). Just as it was invented by Sir Tim Berners-Lee. John Perry Barlow wrote the "Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace" in 1996. The Internet was a great promise of freedom. It worked like a continuation of the Gutenberg invention, the printing press: the Internet gave a voice to all citizens whose views and attitudes were suppressed by the media and elites. This had and has great political consequences. 30 years later the opinion about the internet changed: It was thought that monopoly companies like Google, Facebook, etc. control Big Data and Artificial Intelligence, and therefore control us. However, politics followed suit and began to regulate. The concern now is that the state will disenfranchise citizens and restrict companies. There is a fear of new totalitarian regimes. And in this situation, the Internet ("splinternet") is increasingly fragmented. National "Internet" networks are emerging. States treat the Internet as an extension of their national territory. The most recent example is Russia, where Kremlin laws ensure that national Internet traffic goes through state nodes and the state has the right to shut down the global Internet: a sort of digital Iron Curtain. The champion of the national Internet is China. The state monitors and controls Internet content, blocks foreign services and companies (like Facebook) and replaces them with national services and companies that are in line with the Communist Party. The "Great Firewall" is successful. The number of states imitating China's Internet policy is growing: Iran, North Korea, Cuba, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, but also Thailand and Vietnam etc. -
Internet Drift: How the Internet Is Likely to Splinter and Fracture
Steve Song Internet Drift: How the Internet is Likely to Splinter and Fracture Future-Proofing Digital our Digital Rights Freedom Fund Future-Proofing our Digital Rights Steve Song Internet Drift: How the Internet is Likely to Splinter and Fracture The idea of a “splinternet” or “Balkanization” of the internet is not new, although the exact manner by which this is becoming a reality is evolving. Early discussions on the topic focused around cultural or policy differences and extraterritoriality that could result in a fractioned internet. For example, China’s Great Firewall is implementation of a national policy which creates an “intranet” connected to the greater Internet. However, there is another shift in internet infrastructure that is less talked of and even more fundamental to its functioning – the physical backbone of fi- bre optic cables crossing oceans and international borders that enables the relatively seamless experience of the Internet regardless of location. Increas- ingly investment and ultimately ownership and control of the cables used to transport information across the world is moving away from telecommunica- tions operators. One example is the increased investment in and ownership of trans-oceanic cables by application and service providers, or platforms, such as Google, Facebook, and Microsoft. Another is the strategic investment in undersea cables by nation states as part of a geo-political cyber strategy. 2 Internet Drift: How the Internet is Likely to Splinter and Fracture Internet Giants and Undersea Cables Historically, undersea cables were either publicly owned or owned and oper- ated by telecommunications network operators (telcos) which had little to do with content or application delivery, unlike digital platforms like Google, Face- book and others that are now beginning to expand their private networks. -
E Wilberforce Society Cambridge, UK 1 Www
e Wilberforce Society www.thewilberforcesociety.co.uk 1 Cambridge, UK September 2012 Proposed Constitutional Framework for the Republic of Tunisia The Wilberforce T W S TWS Society About this report Chief Drasperson: Dr. Riddhi Dasgupta Chairman: Mr. George Bangham Senior Editors: Mr. Niolas Crawford Mr. Millad Matin Editors I Ms. Wen-Zhen Low I Mr. Samuel Goodman I Mr. Maximilian Bulinski I Ms. Eliane Bejjani I Mr. Justin Kempley I Mr. Joseph Sanderson I Mr. Pragesh Sivaguru I Ms. Anisha Polson I Mr. P.J. Welsh I Mr. Luke Woodward I Ms. M.D.C. Fernandez-Fernandez I Ms. J. Youngs I Mr. Jake Richards I Mr. Alastair Wooder I Mr. C.T. Kwan I Ms. Laura Edwards I Ms. Aya Majzoub I Mr. H.J. Dadswell I Mr. Juan Zober de Francisco Rasheed I Mr. Adam Shutie I Mr. Vincent Scully I Mr. Kwan Ping Kan I Ms. Vanessa evathasan With Special anks to: Prof. George Joffé, Prof. Laurence Tribe, Lord Wilson of Dinton GCB, Mr. Raza Habib, Prof. Kevin Bampton, Mr. Alexander McLean, Ms. Anna Triponel Mr. David Baynard. © Dr. Riddhi Dasgupta and Mr. George Bangham copyright 2012. You may re-use the text of this report free of charge in any format or medium. Any enquiries regarding this publication should be sent to us at: [email protected] and [email protected] is publication is available for download at: http://www.thewilberforcesociety.co.uk/policy_paper/proposed- constitutional-framework-for-the-republic-of-tunisia About The Wilberforce Society e Wilberforce Society was founded in 2009 by students at the University of Cambridge. -
The International Politics of Authoritarian Internet Control in Iran
International Journal of Communication 12(2018), 3856–3876 1932–8036/20180005 Transforming Threats to Power: The International Politics of Authoritarian Internet Control in Iran MARCUS MICHAELSEN1 University of Amsterdam, The Netherlands Authoritarian Internet control is generally explained by domestic power preservation: to curtail dissent within their borders, authoritarian regimes censor, monitor, and shape online communications. Yet this focus neglects important external factors. As a global communication technology, the Internet carries strategic and normative interests of competing international actors. This article investigates the influence of international politics on practices of Internet surveillance and censorship. Using the case of Iran, I analyze how opposition to the West, and particularly to the United States, led the Iranian state to perceive the Internet as a strategic battleground for regime stability. I argue that external threats in the form of democracy promotion, cyberattacks, and sanctions have created conditions enabling the Iranian state to advance and justify capabilities for censorship and surveillance. They have also pushed the regime to build a “national Internet” that is more resistant to outside influence and open to state control. Authoritarian practices are thus produced in international struggles over the use, content, and infrastructure of digital technologies. Keywords: information and communication technologies, censorship, surveillance, authoritarianism, international relations, Iran The fundamental aim of authoritarian rulers is to maintain and expand political power. In the field of Internet politics, authoritarian power holders have pursued this aim by establishing sophisticated systems of Internet control to curb alternative information and dissent perceived as challenge to their rule. They have also come to benefit from digital communication technologies for information manipulation, monitoring, and surveillance. -
Regulatory Framework for an Open Internet: the Canadian Approach – the Right Way Forward?
Regulatory Framework for an Open Internet: The Canadian Approach – the Right Way Forward? George N. Addy [email protected] Elisa K. Kearney [email protected] icarus – Fall 2010 Regulatory Framework for an Open Internet: The Canadian Approach – the Right Way Forward? George N. Addy [email protected] Elisa K. Kearney [email protected] Davies Ward Phillips & Vineberg LLP1 Access to the Internet depends on the physical infrastructure over which it operates. Although increasingly becoming a competitive market with the introduction of wireless and satellite technologies for broadband Internet access, in many countries or geographic areas the options available for Internet access may be limited to one or two facilities based carriers and a number of resellers of telecommunications services. For example, in Canada, as in the United States, the “residential broadband market has largely settled into regionalized competition between the incumbent telephone company and local cable provider.”2 The concept of net neutrality embodies the principle that access to the Internet be provided in a neutral manner in that Internet service providers (“ISPs”) do not block, speed up or slow down particular applications or content, and that ISPs do not use infrastructure ownership to favour affiliate offerings, content or applications. Calls for net neutrality regulation are premised on the fear that market competition is insufficient to discipline the 1 George N. Addy is the senior partner leading the Competition and Foreign Investment Review group of Davies Ward Phillips & Vineberg LLP in Toronto, Canada and is also part of the Technology group. Mr. Addy was head of the Canadian Competition Bureau (1993- 1996) and its merger review branch (1989-1993).