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Making a Difference with Aviation Foreign Internal Defense

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Making a Difference with Aviation Foreign Internal Defense View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by Calhoun, Institutional Archive of the Naval Postgraduate School Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection 2012-12 Making a difference with Aviation Foreign Internal Defense Carrano, Eric M. Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School http://hdl.handle.net/10945/27804 NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA THESIS MAKING A DIFFERENCE WITH AVIATION FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE by Eric M. Carrano December 2012 Thesis Advisor: Anna Simons Second Reader: Brian Greenshields Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No. 0704–0188 Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202–4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704–0188) Washington, DC 20503. 1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 2. REPORT DATE 3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED December 2012 Master’s Thesis 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 5. FUNDING NUMBERS MAKING A DIFFERENCE WITH AVIATION FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE 6. AUTHOR(S) Eric M. Carrano 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION Naval Postgraduate School REPORT NUMBER Monterey, CA 93943–5000 9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSORING/MONITORING N/A AGENCY REPORT NUMBER 11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. IRB Protocol number ____N/A____. 12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT 12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words) This thesis analyzes how U.S. Aviation Foreign Internal Defense (AvFID) proved itself to be a critical component in the successful campaign against the Hukbalahap (i.e., Huks) in the Philippines and the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) in El Salvador. In addition, this thesis explores how AvFID was employed in Vietnam and why AvFID was not successful there. The overall argument is that airpower was not a decisive factor in the two successful counterinsurgency campaigns examined. However, airpower certainly played a critical role in quelling both insurgencies and without U.S. AvFID the air forces in the Philippines and El Salvador would not have been able to employ airpower as effectively as they did. In contrast, Vietnam offers a case study where AvFID failed; this thesis explores why. Ultimately, the reader should walk away with ideas about how to implement AvFID more effectively, and that if done right, can help ensure that AvFID can make a significant difference in a counterinsurgency campaign. 14. SUBJECT TERMS Aviation Foreign Internal Defense (AvFID); El Salvador; Philippines; 15. NUMBER OF Hukbalahap Rebellion; Vietnam; Edward Lansdale; Ramon Magsaysay; Ngo Dinh Diem; PAGES counterinsurgency (COIN); airpower in irregular warfare; aviation advisors 75 16. PRICE CODE 17. SECURITY 18. SECURITY 19. SECURITY 20. LIMITATION OF CLASSIFICATION OF CLASSIFICATION OF THIS CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT REPORT PAGE ABSTRACT Unclassified Unclassified Unclassified UU NSN 7540–01–280–5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2–89) Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239–18 i THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK ii Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited MAKING A DIFFERENCE WITH AVIATION FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE Eric M. Carrano Major, United States Air Force B.S., United States Air Force Academy, 2000 M.S., South Dakota School of Mines and Technology, 2008 Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of MASTER OF SCIENCE IN DEFENSE ANALYSIS from the NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL December 2012 Author: Eric M. Carrano Approved by: Anna Simons Thesis Advisor Brian H. Greenshields Second Reader John Arquilla Chair, Department of Defense Analysis iii THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK iv ABSTRACT This thesis analyzes how U.S. Aviation Foreign Internal Defense (AvFID) proved itself to be a critical component in the successful campaign against the Hukbalahap (i.e., Huks) in the Philippines and the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) in El Salvador. In addition, this thesis explores how AvFID was employed in Vietnam and why AvFID was not successful there. The overall argument is that airpower was not a decisive factor in the two successful counterinsurgency campaigns examined. However, airpower certainly played a critical role in quelling both insurgencies and without U.S. AvFID the air forces in the Philippines and El Salvador would not have been able to employ airpower as effectively as they did. In contrast, Vietnam offers a case study where AvFID failed; this thesis explores why. Ultimately, the reader should walk away with ideas about how to implement AvFID more effectively, and that if done right, can help ensure that AvFID can make a significant difference in a counterinsurgency campaign. v THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK vi TABLE OF CONTENTS I. INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................1 II. THE PHILIPPINES.....................................................................................................7 III. VIETNAM ..................................................................................................................19 IV. EL SALVADOR .........................................................................................................33 V. CONCLUSION ..........................................................................................................47 LIST OF REFERENCES ......................................................................................................55 INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST .........................................................................................59 vii THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK viii LIST OF FIGURES Figure 1. OSS Deer Team members with Minh and Giap ..............................................22 ix THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK x LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS AFDD – Air Force Doctrine Document AFSOC – Air Force Special Operations Command AvFID – Aviation Foreign Internal Defense CAS – Close Air Support CCTS – Combat Crew Training Squadron CIA – Central Intelligence Agency COIN – Counterinsurgency DoD – Department of Defense ESAF – El Salvadoran Armed Forces FAS – Fuerza Aerea Salvadorena FID – Foreign Internal Defense FMLN – Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front Huk – Hukbalahap IDAD – Internal Defense and Development ISR – Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance JUSMAG – Joint United States Military Advisory Group NSC – National Security Council OSS – Office of Strategic Services PAAC – Philippine Army Air Corps PC – Philippine Constabulary PAF – Philippine Air Force xi PKP – Partido Komunista ng Pilapinas SMM – Saigon Military Mission SOF – Special Operations Forces ST – Special Tactics U.S. – United States USAF – United States Air Force USAFFE – United States Armed Forces Far East U.S. MAAG – United States Military Assistance and Advisory Group U.S. MilGroup – United States Military Group USSOCOM – United States Special Operations Command WWII – World War II xii ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I would like to thank the staff and all professors of the Defense Analysis Department at the Naval Postgraduate School for their outstanding dedication and expertise in helping the U.S. and partner-nation armed forces understand the complex set of issues that we face as military professionals. In terms of quality and applicability, this has been the best academic experience that I have ever received. I would especially like to thank Dr. Anna Simons and Professor Brian Greenshields for their instrumental advice and assistance throughout this project. Without their help, this thesis would not have been possible. I would also like to thank Dr. Kalev Sepp for his invaluable help and input on the Philippines chapter. In addition, I would like to thank Dr. Marcos Berger for his expertise and assistance in developing the El Salvador chapter. Finally, I would like to thank my wife, Harmony, and our daughter, Ella, for their unrelenting love and devotion as I spent countless hours away from them working on this project. I could not have done this without their help, understanding, and encouragement. xiii THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK xiv I. INTRODUCTION In January 2012, President Barack Obama and Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta released the United States’ (U.S.) new defense priorities for the 21st century. A key principle of the new strategy document is that “U.S. forces will no longer be sized to conduct large-scale, prolonged stability operations.”1 It also states that, “Whenever possible, we will develop innovative, low-cost, and small-footprint approaches to achieve our security objectives, relying on exercises, rotational presence, and advisory capabilities.”2 It is clear
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