Fighting Iran with Trade Sanctions1
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FIGHTING IRAN WITH TRADE SANCTIONS1 Raj Bhala∗ TABLE OF CONTENTS I. FOUR ISSUES AND RESPONSES ........................................................................... 253 II. TRAGEDY ......................................................................................................... 256 III. METRICS ......................................................................................................... 259 IV. FIRST 3 OF 10 PHASES TO 1996 ....................................................................... 263 V. PHASE 4: 1996 ILSA EMPHASIS ON PETROLEUM ............................................. 265 A. ILSA, Subsequent Strengthening, and Five Practical Questions ............... 265 B. Crossing the Rubicon with ILSA (August 5, 1996 Through September 30, 2006) .......................................... 267 C. Two Sanctions for Petroleum Resource Development and Sensitive Weaponry Export Prohibitions .................................................................... 269 ∗ Associate Dean for International and Comparative Law, and Rice Distinguished Professor, The University of Kansas, School of Law, Green Hall, 1535 West 15th Street, Lawrence, KS 66045-7577, United States, www.law.ku.edu, http://en.wikipedia.org/ wiki/Raj_Bhala. Tel: 785-864-9224. Fax: 785-864-5054. Foreign Legal Consultant, Heenan Blaikie, L.L.P., Canada. J.D., Harvard (1989); M.Sc., Oxford (1986); M.Sc., London School of Economics (1985); A.B., Duke (1984). Marshall Scholar (1984-86). Member, Council on Foreign Relations, Royal Society for Asian Affairs, All India Law Teachers Congress, and Fellowship of Catholic Scholars. Author of the monograph TRADE, DEVELOPMENT, AND SOCIAL JUSTICE (2003), textbook INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY, NON-WESTERN TEXTBOOK (3d ed. 2008) (4th ed. forthcoming 2015) (two volumes), reference DICTIONARY OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW (3d ed. 2008), textbook UNDERSTANDING ISLAMIC LAW (SHARĪ‘A) (2011), and treatise MODERN GATT LAW (2d ed. 2013) (two volumes). 1 A version of this article was presented at the conference, Justice Beyond the State: Transnationalism and Law, at the University of Windsor, Ontario, Canada, on September 20-21, 2013, under the title “Great Satan” Squeezes “Evil Āyatollāhs” as the Centrifuges Keep Spinning: American Trade Sanctions Against Iran. The support of Professor Maureen Irish of Faculty of Law, University of Windsor, and the comments and suggestions from her and all participants at the Conference, are gratefully acknowledged, as is the help of Professor David Gantz of the University of Arizona, and the Editor-in-Chief, Eddie Walneck, Articles Editor, Maria Lomeli, and the Editors and Staff of the Arizona Journal of International and Comparative Law. All mistakes are those of the author, for which forgiveness is asked. The author rejects both extreme metaphors, “Great Satan” and “Evil Āyatollāhs,” but uses them only to reflect what some in each country think of the other. Accordingly, the metaphors are put in quotations throughout. 252 Arizona Journal of International & Comparative Law Vol. 31, No. 2 2014 VI. PHASES 5 AND 6: 2001 ILSA EXTENSION, 2006 IFSA, AND EXTRATERRITORIALITY ........................................................................................ 278 A. Phase 5: ILSA Extension (August 5, 2001 Through September 29, 2006) .......................................... 278 B. Phase 6: IFSA (September 29, 2006 Through July 1, 2010) ............................................... 280 VII. PHASE 7: 2010 CISADA EMPHASES ON TRADE EMBARGO, REFINED GASOLINE, ASSET FREEZES, AND HUMAN RIGHTS ................................................................. 285 A. Getting Tougher with Eight New Measures (July 1 Through December 31, 2016) ........................................................ 285 B. Measures 1 and 2: Import and Export Prohibitions .................................... 286 C. Measures 3, 4, and 5: Refined Gasoline Prohibitions ................................ 288 D. Measure 6: Asset Freeze Prohibition ......................................................... 292 E. Measure 7: Human Rights Prohibition ....................................................... 293 F. Measure 8: Expanded and Increased Sanctions .......................................... 294 VIII. PHASE 8: 2012 DEFENSE ACT TIGHTENING FINANCIAL SANCTIONS ............ 299 A. Targeting Iranian Financial Sector (January 1, 2012 Through December 31, 2016) ......................................... 299 B. Measure 1: Primary Money Laundering Concern Designation .................. 300 C. Measure 2: Iranian Bank Asset Freeze ....................................................... 300 D. Measure 3: Payments System Prohibition .................................................. 302 E. Payments System Prohibition Definitional Issues ...................................... 305 F. Third Country Central Bank Exception to Payments System Prohibition .................................................................................................. 306 G. Third Country Short Supply Exception to Payments System Prohibition .................................................................................................. 307 H. Sanctions Waiver Criteria Ambiguities ...................................................... 310 IX. PHASE 9: 2012 IRAN-SYRIA ACT’S NEW EXPANSIVE CONSTRICTIONS (AUGUST 10, 2012 THROUGH DECEMBER 31, 2016) ......................................... 311 A. Ten Further Measures (August 10, 2012 Through December 31, 2016) ........................................ 311 B. 1st: Expanded Prohibitions against Iranian Energy Sector ........................ 314 1. Prohibition Against Helping Iran Produce Refined Petroleum Products ................................................................................ 315 2. Prohibition Against Exportation of Refined Petroleum Products to Iran ...................................................................................... 315 3. Prohibition Against JVs for Iranian Petroleum Resource Development .......................................................................................... 316 4. Prohibition Against Buying Iranian Petrochemical Products ................. 317 5. Prohibition Against Transporting Crude Oil from Iran .......................... 317 6. Prohibition Against Concealing Iranian Origin of Crude Oil or Fighting Iran with Trade Sanctions 253 Refined Petroleum Products ................................................................... 319 C. 2nd: Barring Transshipment of Military Items ........................................... 321 D. 3rd: Government Procurement Certification Against Revolutionary Guards ................................................................................ 324 E. 4th: Diversion Prohibition .......................................................................... 325 F. 5th: Shipping and Insurance Prohibition ..................................................... 326 G. 6th: Sovereign Debt Prohibition ................................................................. 328 H. 7th: Affiliates Prohibition ........................................................................... 329 I. 8th: Tightening Human Rights and Censorship Prohibitions ...................... 332 J. 9th: Five of Twelve Sanctions ..................................................................... 334 K. 10th: Arguably Tougher Waiver Criteria ................................................... 338 X. PHASE 10: 2013 DEFENSE ACT TIGHTENING ENERGY, SHIPPING, AND FINANCIAL SANCTIONS, PLUS SHIPBUILDING, PORT, AND PRECIOUS METAL SANCTIONS ...... 339 A. Novel Link Between Iranian Human Rights Abuses and American National Security (January 2, 2013 Through December 31, 2016) .......................... 339 B. Energy, Shipping, Shipbuilding, and Port Prohibition ............................... 340 C. Precious Metals Prohibition ....................................................................... 342 D. Three Reinforcements of Existing Prohibitions ......................................... 343 XI. NECESSARY, BUT NOT SUFFICIENT? .............................................................. 345 I. FOUR ISSUES AND RESPONSES How do American trade sanctions against Iran work? Have they worked? Championed by six American Presidents and sixteen Sessions of Congress, these sanctions against Iran have spanned nearly forty years. In that time, the bilateral relationship between the United States and Iran has been dreadful, with each side fixated on monstrosities perpetrated by the other: the 1953 coup d’état of a democratically-elected Iranian leader orchestrated by the United States; the subsequent American support for human rights abuses by the Peacock Throne; and the November 1979 seizure of the American Embassy in Tehran by Iranian militants and subsequent state-sponsored terrorist atrocities. To Iran, America became the “Great Satan” to be confronted wherever and whenever possible. To the United States, Iran perpetrated “evil” and was to be targeted for sanctions. American trade sanctions against Iran thus became, and continue to be, an important part of international trade law. Around the globe, practice in this field is touched by the dysfunctional relationship between the “Great Satan” and “Evil” Āyatollāhs. The practical significance does not mean that the technical rules, or policy justifications for those rules, are easily or well understood. The rules have become more intricate as they have evolved over nearly forty years. The policies for them have been