Issue No. 1306 16 March 2018 // USAFCUWS Outreach Journal Issue 1306 //

Feature Report

“U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces: Background, Developments, and Issues”. Written by Amy F. Woolf. Published by the Congressional Research Service; March 6, 2018 https://fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL33640.pdf This report reviews the ongoing programs that will affect the expected size and shape of the U.S. strategic nuclear force structure. It begins with an overview of this force structure during the Cold War, and summarizes the reductions and changes that have occurred since 1991. It then offers details about each category of delivery vehicle—land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and heavy bombers—focusing on their current deployments and ongoing and planned modernization programs. The report concludes with a discussion of issues related to decisions about the future size and shape of the U.S. strategic nuclear force.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS US NUCLEAR WEAPONS  National Nuclear Security Administration Chief Tours Savannah River Site on Friday  Cost of New Nuclear Subs is 'Eye Watering,' Navy Secretary Says  Nuclear Weapons Program Bogged Down by Distrust between Energy Department and Pentagon, Report Says US COUNTER-WMD  Missile Defense Agency Awards Lockheed Martin Contract to Build Missile Defense Targets  Space-Based Sensors Needed For Missile Defense Vs. Hypersonics: MDA  Common Bricks May Record Evidence of Nuclear Weapons US ARMS CONTROL  Middle East Media Reacts: Gulf Arabs Praise Tillerson Firing While Iran Weighs Nuclear Deal  Pentagon Head Warns Syrian Forces on Use of Chemical Weapons  North Korea Nuclear Deal Would Require Major US Concession Too ASIA/PACIFIC  Moon on a Mission: South Korea's New Approach to the North  North Korea to Seek Peace Treaty with US at Trump Meeting: Report  Reactivation of Plutonium Plant Brings Kim’s Overture into Question  Japan Sees No Impact from Tillerson Exit on North Korea Policy EUROPE/RUSSIA  EU Admits to ‘Secret’ Talks with North Korea for Last Three Years to End Nuclear Programme  UK Envoy Says Russia Failed to Fully Declare Nerve Agent Stocks  Russia Releases Footage of New 'Kinzhal' Nuclear-Capable Air-Launched Missile  Lockheed Martin Syracuse Will Add Jobs after Landing German Missile Defense Deal MIDDLE EAST  Elections Take Back Seat to Nuclearized Middle East at Cabinet Meeting COMMENTARY  Who Killed the Dugway Sheep? Why It Matters Fifty Years Later  What Does Trump Mean When Alluding to a North Korean 'Missile Test' Freeze?  How Trump’s Disdain for the Iran Deal Makes a North Korea Pact Even Harder  Mikhail Gorbachev: The U.S. and Russia Must Stop the Race to Nuclear War

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US NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Aiken Standard (Aiken, S.C.) National Nuclear Security Administration Chief Tours Savannah River Site on Friday By Colin Demarest March 9, 2018 The woman heading up the upkeep, security and advancement of the nation's nuclear weapons complex toured the Savannah River Site on Friday. Lisa Gordon-Hagerty – who was sworn in Feb. 22 as the U.S. Department of Energy's under secretary for nuclear security and the administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration – visited several SRS facilities and introduced herself to employees and local officials. "I promised Sen. Lindsey Graham during my confirmation hearing that I would visit the Savannah River Site to become fully acquainted with this community," she said in a prepared statement, "and I'm happy to be here today to fulfill that promise." Gordon-Hagerty was accompanied by U.S. Rep. Rick Allen, R-Ga. The NNSA administrator said SRS's workforce is "world-class." Gordon-Hagerty specifically toured the Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility – the currently 70- percent complete, billions-over-budget plutonium processing plant – and K-Area, an interim plutonium storage complex. K-Area is the target of a potential $60 million injection related to plutonium disposition, according to DOE fiscal year 2019 budget request documents. The money, if appropriated, would fund the pursuit of downblending, a MOX alternative that involves mixing plutonium with inert material and burying it elsewhere. The DOE fiscal year 2019 budget request moves to terminate MOX. Gordon-Hagerty has said she is a supporter of downblending – also known as dilute-and-dispose. In February, during a U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee hearing, Gordon-Hagerty said she is anti- MOX. This became a major point of contention. A visit-related press release states Gordon-Hagerty was involved in a "discussion on the dilute and dispose option" on Friday. Gordon-Hagerty is one of three high-profile SRS visitors in the past two months: U.S. Secretary of Energy Rick Perry spent two days at SRS at the beginning of February, and DOE Under Secretary for Science Paul Dabbar toured last week. Gordon-Hagerty's visit on Friday comes at an opportune time. The NNSA is currently debating where to conduct its industrial-scale plutonium pit production mission: Los Alamos National Laboratory, where it's been for some time; or SRS, where it could repurpose the MOX building or require a new structure, according to the NNSA. Pits are grapefruit-sized nuclear weapon triggers. During her confirmation hearings, Gordon-Hagerty said jolting pit production back to life – no weapons-usable pits have been produced since 2011 – is her "No. 1 priority."

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"We do need to have a robust program to ensure that we can make pits, more reserve pits," Gordon- Hagerty said. https://www.aikenstandard.com/news/national-nuclear-security-administration-chief-tours- savannah-river-site-on/article_2a8ea16e-23e3-11e8-b168-27ea7c46afd9.html Return to top

Washington Examiner (Washington, D.C.) Cost of New Nuclear Subs is 'Eye Watering,' Navy Secretary Says By Travis J. Tritten March 12, 2018 A new Columbia-class nuclear submarine currently under development will likely end up costing taxpayers an “eye-watering” $100 billion over the program’s lifetime, Navy Secretary Richard V. Spencer said on Monday. Spencer and the secretaries of the Air Force and Army discussed the challenge and high costs of modernizing the U.S. nuclear triad during a rare public gathering together at the Center for Strategic and International Studies think tank. The Trump administration has recently completed a review of its nuclear forces and the Congressional Budget Office found last year that it will cost $1.2 trillion over 30 years to modernize the Cold War-era triad. “All of sudden you’re talking about the submarines and there is a number that will make your eyes water. Columbia will be a $100 billion program for its lifetime. We have to do it. I think we have to have big discussions about it.” The triad is made up of a Navy submarine fleet, ground-based intercontinental ballistic missiles and nuclear bombers and is designed to deter a strike from other nuclear powers, particularly Russia. Last week, Gen. John Hyten, the head of U.S. Strategic Command, touted the power of the U.S. submarines, saying Russia and China “do not know where they are and they have the ability to decimate their country if we go down that path.” Even with a coming budget hike, the Navy is still looking for a viable plan and the funding to increase its fleet to 355 ships. It has already made advanced plans to buy the Columbia-class ballistic missile subs to replace the Ohio-class that now form that leg of the triad. “The underwater aspect to date does seem to be the most elusive [to adversaries] but it comes with a price,” Spencer said. Air Force Secretary Heather Wilson said she “faces the same challenge” with her service, which manages the U.S. ground-based nuclear missiles and bomber fleet. “We are modernizing all three legs of the triad and the nuclear command-and-control at the same time in both the Navy and the Air Force. It’s a challenge,” Wilson said. The Air Force will be doing modernization and engineering work over the next five years to update its legs of the triad but over the next decade big investments will be needed, she said. “The nation is going to have to make the decision on the actual purchase of these systems within this 10-year window,” Wilson said.

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As the country weighs the costs, it should also consider investing in other ways to head off a nuclear conflict, Army Secretary Mark Esper said. “Many of us grew up with the triad as part of the Cold War but we have a new capability these days that provides the president more options and creates its own deterrence and that is missile defense,” he said. Congress approved over $4 billion in supplemental missile defense spending at the end of last year and that area of defense seems in line for more increases in the upcoming Pentagon budget. Former Virginia Sen. John Warner, who also served as Navy secretary, attended the CSIS event and warned that the U.S. nuclear deterrent has a growing strategic problem. He said the Trump administration secretaries should consider greater emphasis on the submarine component, which has the highest invulnerability. “It is in stone that we have it and we shall always have it. We’ve got to begin to make tough decisions on the various allocations between air-sea, sub-sea and land,” Warner said. https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/policy/defense-national-security/cost-of-new-nuclear- subs-is-eye-watering-navy-secretary-says Return to top

Washington Examiner (Washington, D.C.) Nuclear Weapons Program Bogged Down by Distrust between Energy Department and Pentagon, Report Says By John Siciliano March 13, 2018 President Trump faces a nuclear weapons program rife with distrust between the Energy Department and Pentagon as he pushes for a new and improved nuclear weapons arsenal, according to a study by the National Academies of Sciences issued Tuesday. The new report funded by the Energy Department says one of the biggest problems stems from “misunderstanding, distrust and frustration” between the Energy Department and the Pentagon. The report looks to address the trust issue as one of “five serious concerns” across the U.S. nuclear weapons program, which is housed within the Energy Department at the National Nuclear Security Administration. The Defense Department is the Department of Energy's customer for nuclear weapons. Energy Secretary Rick Perry oversees the large fleet of national labs in charge of research and development for nuclear weapons and power plants. But it's a long way from perfect, as the report shows. “Insufficient collaboration between DOE/NNSA and Department of Defense weapons customers, resulting in misunderstanding, distrust, and frustration,” is number five on the study's list of top concerns. The top concern is the total "lack of sustained national leadership focus and priority," according to the report. The remainder include the "blurred accountability" between the Department of Energy and NNSA over the nuclear program's mission, the "lack of proven management practices, including a

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// USAFCUWS Outreach Journal Issue 1306 // dysfunctional relationship between line managers and mission-support staffs," and even more "dysfunctional relationships" between the government and its management and site operators. Perry is set to testify Wednesday before the House Appropriations Committee on his department's fiscal 2019 budget, where he is bound to face stiff questions over the state of the nuclear arsenal and the extent to which he is aware of the problems in the report. The nuclear weapons component takes up nearly half of the Energy Department's budget in the fiscal 2019 request. The report is the second in a series of studies developed over the last four years to propose fixes to a broken and dysfunctional nuclear weapons enterprise. The five concerns were first published when the National Academies began its initial review in 2014. Now the Academies are aimed at fixing them. Tuesday's study comes just weeks after the Nuclear Posture Review was issued by the White House, outlining its policy for nuclear weapons development. Since many of the problems stem from a lack of strategic thought, the administration is now in the right frame of mind to address the problems in the report, the study said. “With the release of the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review and the appointment of a new NNSA administrator, NNSA is faced with an excellent opportunity — and challenge — to move from a tactical to a strategic approach for executing the critical mission of the enterprise,” the study reads. The report calls on the NNSA to “expeditiously” create two plans, one a strategic plan for the entire nuclear security program. The second would be to “guide the ongoing program of governance and management reform,” the report said. “The emphasis in both cases must be on creating a strategic vision that is clearly connected to mission,” it said. “This is not a call to develop new processes and reports per se, which should follow only once clear and well-rationalized direction has been set.” https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/policy/energy/nuclear-weapons-program-bogged-down- by-distrust-between-energy-department-and-pentagon-report-says Return to top

US COUNTER-WMD

Homeland Preparedness News (Washington, D.C.) Missile Defense Agency Awards Lockheed Martin Contract to Build Missile Defense Targets By Kevin Randolph March 12, 2018 The Missile Defense Agency recently awarded Lockheed Martin an $80.6 million fixed-price contract for modified ballistic re-entry vehicles and separation modules for missile defense tests. Lockheed Martin will develop and produce unarmed re-entry vehicles for integration into target missiles through 2022. The contract also includes options for additional modified re-entry vehicles and mission support. “The re-entry vehicle is essentially the bullseye for an interceptor missile, and it is also one of the most complex parts of the target,” Sarah Reeves, vice president of Missile Defense Programs at Lockheed Martin Space, said. “In today’s environment, it’s incredibly important to test against

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// USAFCUWS Outreach Journal Issue 1306 // threat-representative targets that look like enemy missiles, and we are proud to continue to provide that capability to the Missile Defense Agency.” Lockheed Martin will design and produce the vehicles in Huntsville, Alabama. Subcontractors include Huntsville companies Dynetics, Inc., which will provide aeroshell structures, and Battelle, which will provide the hit detection system. Rather than carry warheads, modified ballistic re-entry vehicles carry sensors to measure the accuracy and effectiveness of the target, interceptor, and missile defense system. Lockheed Martin has delivered more than 50 threat-representative missile targets and 36 modified ballistic re-entry vehicles to the Missile Defense Agency since 1996. https://homelandprepnews.com/stories/27241-missile-defense-agency-awards-lockheed-martin- contract-build-missile-defense-targets/ Return to top

Breaking Defense (Washington, D.C.) Space-Based Sensors Needed For Missile Defense Vs. Hypersonics: MDA By Sydney J. Freedberg Jr. March 9, 2018 WASHINGTON: The Missile Defense Agency needs sensors in orbit to track hypersonic threats, the MDA director said this week. Such satellites would use mature technology and could perform other surveillance missions to help justify their cost, Lt. Gen. Samuel Greaves told the McAleese/Credit Suisse conference Tuesday. Last week, as we reported, the chief of Strategic Command, Gen. John Hyten, came out in favor of space-based sensors; Greaves provided some details. “A ballistic missile is pretty well behaved,” Greaves said, but hypersonics are unpredictable, so you have to keep a closer eye on them. IBCMs and other ballistic missiles follow a smooth ballistic path trajectory once launched — hence the name — Russia, China, and the US itself are now developing Mach 5-plus hypersonic weapons that can maneuver. (Hypersonics are actually slower than ballistic missiles but much faster than traditional cruise missiles). Since hypersonics can change course at any point, missile defenders need to keep track of them continuously from the time they’re launched. But that’s something the current ground– and sea-based sensors cannot do, because the curve of the earth blocks their line of sight. Worse, while a ground sensor can see high-altitude targets like ballistic missiles a long way away, hypersonics can stay low and stay undetected until they’re much closer. “If you can’t see it, you can’t shoot it,” Greaves said. “We have globally deployed sensors today, but — just look at the globe — there are gaps. What we are looking towards is to move the sensor architecture to space and use that advantage of space, in coordination with our ground assets, to remove the gaps.” “And why is that important?” he said. “The hypersonic threat.” It’s not only hypersonics, Greaves continued. Increasing use of countermeasures on conventional ballistic missiles — decoys or less brightly-burning propellants — also calls for continuous

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// USAFCUWS Outreach Journal Issue 1306 // monitoring so you don’t lose track of the real warhead. “As the countermeasures become more complex that the enemy’s using, you have to see what they’re doing earlier in flight,” he said. It’s the emergence of these new threats that requires a new response, Greaves said: “What’s changed? The threat has voted.” Will It Work This Time? The thing is, space-based sensors for missile defense are not a new idea. They were part of Reagan’s original Star Wars vision in the 1980s and Hyten worked on them as a young officer. So, I asked Greaves at the conference, how do you counter all the skeptics who say we’ve never gotten this to work before? “We didn’t start thinking about this yesterday,” Greaves replied. “We’re not starting from scratch. We’re starting from capability that’s either existing or has developed to a point where there’s high confidence….It’s based on a design that’s absolutely achievable, Technology Readiness Level Six.” A TRL 6 rating is reserved for technology that has “system/subsystem model or prototype demonstration in a relevant environment (ground or space). It’s well short of something fully flight- tested, but it’s far beyond components in the lab. “This is entirely doable. This is not unobtanium,” Greaves said. “We can work with the United States Air Force, the funding provider…. It is not a very challenging thing to do.” Challenging or not, a new space-based sensor system won’t fit in MDA’s current budget, which is why Greaves is talking about Air Force funding. It’ll be a lot easier to get that funding if Greaves can convince other parts of the military that they can make use of the sensors too. When the satellites aren’t tracking incoming missiles — which, short of an apocalyptic war, is most of the time — they can conduct surveillance of other targets. “There’s very little capability that we have (MDA) that does not support other missions,” Greaves said. The Cobra Dane radar, for example, spends most of its time tracking satellites, not missiles. The new space-based sensors would similarly perform other missions than missile defense much of the time, he said. What those missions would be, or how the sensors would work, he didn’t detail. https://breakingdefense.com/2018/03/space-based-sensors-needed-for-missile-defense-vs- hypersonics-mda/ Return to top

Gizmodo (New York, N.Y.) Common Bricks May Record Evidence of Nuclear Weapons By Ryan F. Mandelbaum March 9, 2018 I hope you aren’t making nuclear weapons in your garage. If you are, your bricks know what you’re doing. Researchers have long studied retrospective dosimetry—looking at what kind of radiation was present in a room based on the signature left over in the environment. Frequently, this requires lots of treatment and work. One team of researchers at North Carolina State University thinks they have a simple way to detect the leftover radiation simply by taking a core of material out of a brick. Something like this could be important for things like nuclear weapons inspections.

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“The potential is there for it to be something really important for the nonproliferation regime,” graduate student Ryan O’Mara told Gizmodo. The system uses methods already used by archaeologists to date their finds, said O’Mara. Essentially, radiation such as gamma rays or x-rays can excite electrons in quartz crystals. The electrons get trapped in parts of the crystal’s structures and stay there for a while. Counting the electrons by exciting them out of the trap allows the researchers to see how much radiation there was in the room and where it came from. Previous studies have treated the bricks first, but O’Mara and his advisor wondered if they’d be able to read the radiation without isolating the quartz grains. After testing some bricks with a radiation source, drilling a core into the brick, and reading what came out, they found that they could pretty faithfully reconstruct whatever was going on in the room. They published their paper in the most recent issue of Health Physics. This is a difficult problem to solve. There are potential calibration issues, since building materials are all different, pointed out Stephanie Keehan, nuclear physics lecturer at RMIT University in Australia. She wasn’t sure that the method without treating the bricks first was valid and would like to see the experiment repeated. Melissa Spencer, health physicist at Penn State University, told Gizmodo in an email that she agreed in the calibration issues. Spencer thought the technique could be important. “What is so interesting about this technique is not only that it could significantly reduce processing time and equipment needed (which is invaluable in an accident scenario), but also that it has the potential to identify what specific kind of radiation caused the dose, which helps to answer the question, ‘What happened here?’” There’s plenty more work to be done, of course, and other ways to passively detect radiation, including “neutron activation analysis,” pointed out Keehan. In that analysis, elements in a material are identified by bombarding them with neutrons. But she noted that while not being so revolutionary, the method could make it easier to determe what kind of radiation the brick saw. That’s end goal here, after all, said O’Mara: To make it more difficult for people to build nuclear weapons without getting caught. “If this method is deployed in the field, there’s always a detector watching.” https://gizmodo.com/common-bricks-may-record-evidence-of-nuclear-weapons-1823627225 Return to top

US ARMS CONTROL

Haaretz (Tel Aviv, Israel) Middle East Media Reacts: Gulf Arabs Praise Tillerson Firing While Iran Weighs Nuclear Deal By The Associated Press March 14, 2018 There was no immediate response from officials in the region, but the newspapers had a field day Reactions in the Middle East on Wednesday to the firing of U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson reflect the volatile divide between Iran, where many fear his departure heralds the demise of the 2015 nuclear deal, and Gulf Arab nations hoping for a more hawkish U.S. stance toward Tehran and Qatar.

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There was no immediate response from officials in the region. But Iran’s daily Javad newspaper, believed to be close to the hard-line Revolutionary Guard, said that replacing Tillerson with CIA director Mike Pompeo signaled the end of the nuclear deal. President Donald Trump’s appointment of Pompeo places an ardent foe of the deal in charge of U.S. diplomacy as the administration debates whether to withdraw from the agreement. Tillerson had pushed Trump to remain, and had been pursuing a delicate strategy with European allies and others to try to improve or augment the Obama-era deal. “For quitting the deal his dumping was necessary,” Javad said. That would be welcome news for Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, which view Iran as a regional menace. They have also pushed Washington to take a harder line on Qatar, which they and other Arab nations have boycotted since last year, accusing it of supporting extremist groups and cozying up to Iran. Tillerson had sought to mediate the crisis among the U.S. allies. In the UAE on Wednesday, the English-language Khaleej Times borrowed from the U.S. president’s show-biz days for its headline: “YOU’RE FIRED!” Saudi Arabia’s English-language Arab News had the same headline. Another English-language newspaper, the state-aligned The National newspaper of Abu Dhabi, offered an editorial saying Tillerson’s firing would “surprise few,” pointing to his disagreement with Trump over Qatar. The UAE, along with Bahrain, Egypt and Saudi Arabia, cut off land, sea and air routes to Qatar in June 2017. Qatar, which has backed Islamist opposition groups like the Muslim Brotherhood, has denied supporting extremists. It shares a massive offshore natural gas field with Tehran. Trump has at times appeared to side with Qatar’s rivals in the dispute, while Tillerson had projected a more neutral stance. “While Mr. Tillerson shortsightedly urged Saudi Arabia and allies in the quartet to end their boycott of Qatar, Mr. Trump named Doha ’a funder of terrorism at a very high level,’” The National’s editorial page said. Faisal J. Abbas, the editor-in-chief of the Arab News, similarly said Tillerson’s mishandling of the Middle East “turned the region into his political graveyard.” Abbas wrote that Tillerson’s handling of the Qatar dispute proved the former ExxonMobil CEO was “‘full of gas’ more than anything else.” “Is there reason to believe Doha had influence over Tillerson? Was he really biased toward Qatar?” Abbas wrote in a front-page editorial. “Or was he surrounded by so many State Department officials still stuck in the Obama era that they undermined his ability to act? None of this matters now.” Abdulkhaleq Abdulla, a prominent Emirati professor of political science, called Tillerson “the worst foreign minister in the history of America” on Twitter. He also implied Gulf Arab unhappiness with Tillerson led to his ouster. “History will remember that a Gulf state had a role in expelling the foreign minister of a superpower and that’s just the tip of the iceberg,” he wrote. Kuwait, which has sought to broker an end to the Qatar crisis, offered no immediate comment, though a local newspaper described Tillerson’s departure as striking “like an earthquake” in a headline. https://www.haaretz.com/middle-east-news/gulf-arabs-praise-tillerson-firing-while-iran-weighs- nuclear-deal-1.5907454 Return to top

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Military.com (San Francisco, Calif.) Pentagon Head Warns Syrian Forces on Use of Chemical Weapons By Robert Burns, Associated Press March 12, 2018 MUSCAT, Oman — U.S. Defense Secretary Jim Mattis on Sunday warned the Syrian government not to use chemical weapons in its civil war and said the Trump administration has made it clear that it would be "very unwise" to use gas in attacks. Mattis told reporters traveling with him to the Mideast that he was disturbed by reports of civilian casualties from bombings by Syrian President Bashar Assad's forces. "Right now we're getting reports — I don't have evidence that I can show you — but I'm aware of the reports of chlorine gas use," he said before arriving Sunday in Oman. The U.S. responded militarily last year to reported Syrian government use of sarin gas, and Mattis was asked whether the administration is now considering retaliating for chlorine gas use. "I'm not going to strictly define it. We have made it very clear that it would be very unwise to use gas" as a weapon, Mattis said. He said the latest reports of Syrian government forces killing civilians in eastern Ghouta show that troops are "at best indiscriminately" attacking and "at worst targeting hospitals. I don't know which it is, whether they're incompetent or whether they're committing illegal acts or both." In Washington, CIA director Mike Pompeo noted that President Donald Trump has said he will not tolerate chemical weapons attacks, but has not yet made a decision about the latest reports. "In this case, the intelligence community is working diligently to verify what happened there," Pompeo said in an interview on CBS' "Face the Nation." "I've seen the pictures. You've seen the pictures as well. We have a higher standard to make sure we understand precisely what took place, precisely who did it so that our response can meet the threat." Mattis said Russia, which intervened militarily in Syria to support the Assad government, could be complicit in the civilian casualties. "Either Russia is incompetent or in cahoots with Assad," Mattis said. "There's an awful lot of reports about chlorine gas use or about symptoms that could be resulting from chlorine gas." Added Pompeo: "The president asks me nearly every day what it is the intelligence community knows about the Syrian regime's use of chemical weapons and who else — the Russians or the Iranians — who might be responsible for them." On Sunday, the Russian military said 52 civilians have evacuated from besieged eastern Ghouta suburbs of Syria's capital, Damascus. Russia and the Syrian government have accused rebels of blocking civilians from fleeing the violence. The Britain-based Syrian Observatory for Human Rights monitoring group says an indiscriminate campaign of government and Russian air strikes and shelling has killed some 1,100 civilians in rebel-held eastern Ghouta over the past three weeks. The U.N. estimates 400,000 civilians are trapped in the siege. Syria's deputy foreign minister Faisal Mekdad denied opposition charges that government forces used poisonous gas in their attacks on some suburbs of Damascus.

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Mekdad said at a news conference Saturday that insurgents groups in eastern Ghouta are preparing "to fabricate" more such attacks to blame the Syrian army. While in Oman, Mattis planned to meet with the country's supreme ruler, Sultan Qaboos bin Said, on Monday. Oman is a longtime security partner of the U.S., though some question whether it is facilitating, or turning a blind eye to, the movement of Iranian weapons to Yemen to aid Houthi rebels. Asked whether Oman is assisting Iran in this respect, Mattis said, "I'm not willing to say that." He said he expects to discuss Yemen with Qaboos. Oman has long-standing commercial and political ties to Iran, an Omani neighbor and U.S. nemesis. Oman, which borders Yemen on the eastern edge of the Arabian Peninsula, has been ruled by the 77-year-old Qaboos since he took power from his father in a bloodless palace coup in 1970. After the 2011 Arab Spring, Qaboos is now the longest-serving Arab leader in the Middle East. While ostensibly a member of the Saudi-dominated Gulf Cooperation Council, Oman has struck out on its own diplomatic path in the region. Oman was the site of secret talks between Iran and the U.S. that birthed Tehran's 2015 nuclear deal with world powers. Oman also has negotiated to help release Western detainees in Iran, as well as Yemen, in recent years. Anthony Cordesman, a Middle East expert at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, said Saturday that Oman's role in the Persian Gulf is important to the U.S. at a time of sharp divisions among the Gulf Arab states, civil wars in Yemen and Syria, and growing Iranian influence in Iraq. "The pattern in the Gulf is one of deep concern for the U.S.," Cordesman said. Mattis said he also will visit Bahrain this week. It is home to the U.S. Navy's 5th Fleet. https://www.military.com/daily-news/2018/03/12/pentagon-head-warns-syrian-forces-use- chemical-weapons.html Return to top

Voice of America (Washington, D.C.) North Korea Nuclear Deal Would Require Major US Concession Too By Brian Padden March 12, 2018 SEOUL — The yet to be confirmed summit between U.S. President Donald Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un has raised expectations that a major breakthrough in resolving the nuclear crisis on the Korean Peninsula is within reach. “It is expected that there will be more rapid progress regarding the freezing and dismantling of the North Korean nuclear programs than in the past, as the leaders of the U.S. and North Korea will meet directly this time,” said Cheong Seong-chang, a North Korea analyst at the Sejong Institute in South Korea. However the process to achieve the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula is complex and will require significant concessions from all involved. Deal or no deal On Saturday, Trump said his meeting could fizzle without an agreement or it could result in "the greatest deal for the world" with the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula.

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In the short term, Kim could make a seemingly dramatic offer to stop developing its intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) capability that directly threatens the U.S., to extend its unilateral freeze on missile and nuclear tests, and even to reduce over time its stockpile of nuclear material. It is unclear what concessions the U.S. might offer in return. The Trump administration is wary of providing relief and assistance in exchange for promises, given Pyongyang’s record of reneging on past agreements. Washington would likely demand that international inspectors be given access to verify the freeze and dismantling process, before agreeing to reduce economic sanctions. But to get a significant deal Trump must offer something significant in return. “In order to make this whole process successful, for which Donald Trump will be responsible, he would have to provide economic concessions,” said Go Myong-Hyun, a North Korea analyst with the Asan Institute for Policy Studies in Seoul. No preconditions Both Pyongyang and Washington have already made significant concessions in moderating their conditions for dialogue. The Kim government has agreed to suspend all missile and nuclear tests during negotiations and discuss the possibility of giving up its nuclear deterrence if their security concerns are assured. Since November of 2017 North Korea has refrained from provocative actions after a two-year period in which it conducted two nuclear tests and accelerated efforts to develop a nuclear-armed ICBM that can target the U.S. mainland. For his part, Trump has dropped the longstanding U.S. condition that Pyongyang first take concrete measures to end its nuclear program before there can be talks. The Trump administration insists, however, that its “maximum pressure” campaign will remain in place until a deal is reached. U.S. led efforts at the United Nations produced tough sanctions, banning billions of dollars of North Korean exports. The Trump administration also emphasized the threat of U.S. military action, if sanctions were to fail, to increase pressure on Kim to eliminate the nuclear threat. Delay tactics North Korea is estimated to have between 13-30 nuclear weapons, hundreds of medium and long- range missiles, and is continuing to produce enough fissile material for two to three nuclear bombs a year. In addition to its nuclear reactor in Yongbyong, which produces plutonium, North Korea reportedly has hidden uranium enrichment facilities, as well, to produce nuclear fuel. Even if inspectors were allowed in, it would take possibly years to properly inspect and dismantle the North’s nuclear program. The Kim government strategy may be cooperate enough to reduce sanctions, but to delay and obstruct the denuclearization process for years on end. “If North Korea can have nuclear weapons for the next 20 years in the process of nuclear disarmament, then North Korea becomes a de facto nuclear state,” said Go with the Asan Institute. Inter-Korean summit South Korean President Moon Jae-in, who has worked to facilitate talks between Pyongyang and Washington, will hold a leaders summit with Kim in April, prior to the U.S.-North Korea summit. The inter-Korean summit is expected to deal with restarting military to military communications, organizing reunions for families separated since the Korean War divided the country, and resuming humanitarian aid.

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The Moon administration may also offer Kim economic incentives contingent on denuclearization progress, such as reopening the jointly run Kaesong complex of South Korean manufacturers that employed over 5,000 North Koreans before it was shut down after a 2016 nuclear test. The Unification Ministry in Seoul said on Monday it would only consider restoring these economic ties once denuclearization progress is made. “The issue of reopening the Kaesong Industrial Complex can be discussed in a process where the inter-Korean relations and North Korea’s nuclear issue are in progress as a mutually virtuous cycle,” said Baik Tae-hyun, the spokesman for the Ministry of Unification. Peace treaty Clarifying North Korea’s stance on denuclearization would be a key long-term goal in the upcoming summit between Trump and Kim. The North Korean leader reportedly said his country would have no reason to retain nuclear weapons if the military threat from the U.S. and its allies is resolved. But in the past, Pyongyang has called for a permanent peace treaty to the replace the armistice ending the Korean War, which has been used to justify the continued presence of 28,000 American military forces in South Korea. “When North Korea says it will give up its nuclear weapons and missiles, it is expected that the United States will have to cease all joint South Korea-U.S. military exercises, completely eliminate the international community’s sanctions on North Korea, and to accept establishing diplomatic ties between the U.S. and North Korea,” said Cheong with the Sejong Institute. Washington and Seoul oppose ending their longstanding military alliance that is defensive in nature in exchange for the North’s denuclearization. North Korea has still not officially commented on the upcoming summits or responded to recent inquiries from the South Korean government. "I feel they're approaching this matter with caution and they need time to organize their stance," said the Unification Ministry spokesman. https://www.voanews.com/a/north-korea-deal-would-require-major-us- concession/4294652.html Return to top

ASIA/PACIFIC

The Diplomat (Washington, D.C.) Moon on a Mission: South Korea's New Approach to the North By Ramon Pacheco Pardo March 14, 2018 Moon Jae-in is learning from his liberal predecessors, while being careful to avoid their mistakes. Events over the past few days have confirmed a dramatic shift in how South Korea, the United States, and the international community at large are dealing with North Korea. Maximum pressure defined relations with Pyongyang during 2017, most notably through the escalation of sanctions and open discussion about a possible “bloody nose” strike. Engagement is poised to define relations with the Kim Jong-un regime in 2018, with the first inter-Korean summit in over a decade and,

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// USAFCUWS Outreach Journal Issue 1306 // potentially, the first-ever meeting between a sitting U.S. president and the leader of North Korea taking place in the coming months. Among the many factors explaining this shift, one stands out: South Korean President Moon Jae-in’s laser-like focus in putting engagement and cooperation at the center of relations with Pyongyang. After a decade of conservative rule in South Korea, Moon is taking a page from his liberal predecessors who also favored engagement. Former presidents Kim Dae-jung (in office 1998 to 2003) and Roh Moo-hyun (2003-2008) followed a “Sunshine Policy” focused on economic, cultural, and people-to-people exchanges as a means to induce reform and opening up in North Korea. However, Moon is aware of the criticisms that Korean conservatives – and many liberals – have laid on this policy over the years, and is determined to avoid them. Thus, Seoul has refrained from offering Pyongyang any concessions prior to the upcoming inter-Korean summit. Economic aid has been kept to a minimum, even though Moon ran on a platform calling for its resumption. The Sunshine Policy suffered a backlash when it was discovered that the Kim Jong-il government had received $500 million just prior to the summit with then-President Kim Dae-jung, which calls for caution in providing aid to North Korea. Also, the summit next month will be held in Panmunjom, a neutral venue. Moon does not want a picture of him going to Pyongyang at this stage, which could be portrayed as South Korea bowing to its northern neighbor and its nuclear program. Furthermore, the Moon government is working to make sure that engagement has international and domestic support. At the international level, Moon and other government officials have gone out of their way to court U.S. President Donald Trump and praise his maximum pressure policy as key to North Korea’s call for summits with the United States and South Korea. Indeed, Seoul has repeatedly stated that sanctions remain part of its toolkit to deal with Pyongyang – providing explicit support to Washington’s approach. Roh Moo-hyun’s government suffered from poor relations with the George W. Bush administration. This stifled continuation of the Sunshine Policy during his presidency. Moon wants to avoid this mistake. Seoul probably did not expect Trump to agree to a summit with Kim Jong-un so quickly, but it is clear that the Moon government was working toward setting up the conditions to make this happen in consultation with U.S. officials. At the domestic level, engagement has broad support after two conservative presidencies, which dismantled inter-Korean engagement without preventing North Korean provocations or its acquisition of nuclear weapons. Moon has even received a boost in public opinion polls in recent days, to a large extent thanks to the widespread perception that his overture to Pyongyang has already calmed down tensions in the Korean Peninsula. But the Korean government is working on having as many conservatives as possible on board by insisting that engagement is ultimately contingent on Pyongyang’s good behavior. In fact, Moon and his special envoys to Pyongyang – national security adviser Chung Eui-yong and intelligence chief Suh Hoon – can be considered relatively conservative in terms of their approach to South Korean security. They probably sincerely believe that engagement is one of the many options to deal with Kim Jong-un, but not the only one. The caution with which the Moon government is approaching engagement, however, should not distract from the fact that the president wants to create a new framework for inter-Korean relations based on engagement and, crucially, that will outlast his presidency. The president is on a mission to reshape the strategic calculus in the Korean Peninsula. This explains why he has sought a summit with the Kim regime early in his five-year term in office. His government will have four years to implement any agreement reached during the April inter-Korean summit, meaning that the next South Korean president will not find it easy to renege on it. In contrast, the agreement between Roh Moo-hyun and Kim Jong-il following their June 2007 summit was dead in the water as soon as Lee Myung-bak won a decisive victory in the election held only six months later. By the time the next president is elected, four years of cooperation under Moon will be difficult to reverse.

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Furthermore, Moon seems bent on creating a legacy that puts South Korea firmly in the driving seat of Korean Peninsula affairs. Conservatives in the country sometimes seem to be more interested in managing the alliance with the United States at the expense of improving inter-Korean relations. This can lead to a degree of bypassing of South Korea in the latter. By holding the summit in Panmunjom, Moon is opening the door to more regular summits in a neutral venue. By establishing the first-ever direct communication line between the leaders of the two Koreas, his government is opening a hitherto nonexistent channel to quickly diffuse tensions. And by very possibly restarting economic engagement, Seoul is testing how sincere Kim Jong-un is in his economic reform push – and the extent to which South Korea can support it and benefit from it. In other words, Moon is developing a quasi-permanent framework for use by future presidents. This could be the most important part of his legacy. https://thediplomat.com/2018/03/moon-on-a-mission-south-koreas-new-approach-to-the-north/ Return to top

FOX News (New York, N.Y.) North Korea to Seek Peace Treaty with US at Trump Meeting: Report By Lucas Mikelionis March 12, 2018 Kim Jong Un, the bellicose North Korean leader, hopes to sign a peace deal after the upcoming meeting with President Donald Trump, which is tentatively set for May, Bloomberg reported, citing a South Korea report. Dong-A Ilbo, South Korea's national newspaper, spoke to an unidentified senior official from President Moon Jae-in's office, who said Kim will likely raise the possibility of the peace treaty. The report said Kim is also likely to voice his desire to establish diplomatic relations with the U.S. and consider nuclear disarmament, the report said. The regime wants a peace treaty to end the more than 60-year-old ceasefire between the two sides and to safeguard its sovereignty, Koh Yu-hwan, who teaches North Korean studies at Dongguk University in Seoul, told the outlet. “There were agreements between the U.S. and North Korea to open up discussion on a peace treaty, but they never materialized,” Koh said. “The U.S. wants a peace treaty at the end of the denuclearization process, while for the North, it’s the precondition for its denuclearization.” The peace treaty would need to address issues such as the U.S. military’s presence in South Korea and the continued military drills aimed at countering the North’s threat in the region. Trump last week accepted a meeting with Kim – expected sometime in May – but the key details of the meeting are yet to be decided. The deal with North Korea is very much in the making and will be, if completed, a very good one for the World. Time and place to be determined. Despite speculation of possible denuclearization, it is still widely believed that Kim will insist on keeping some nuclear weapons as a deterrent – a proposal that might be too hard to swallow for the Trump administration that came out against nuclear North Korea in any shape or form.

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Kim might also propose giving a full report on the North’s current nuclear weapons arsenal and allowing international verification once the denuclearization process takes hold, said Choi Kang, vice president of Seoul’s Asan Institute for Policy Studies. In addition, North Korea could offer Trump to release several American citizens currently being imprisoned in the country. http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2018/03/12/north-korea-to-seek-peace-treaty-with-us-at- trump-meeting-report.html Return to top

The Seattle Times (Seattle, Wash.) Reactivation of Plutonium Plant Brings Kim’s Overture into Question By William J. Broad March 9, 2018 Two separate teams of U.S. analysts examining satellite images have concluded North Korea’s Yongbyon reactor, which had appeared to be dormant, is making plutonium — a principal fuel of nuclear weapons. North Korea appears to be making new nuclear-bomb fuel, satellite imagery shows, even as its leader, Kim Jong Un, has expressed willingness to negotiate atomic disarmament with President Donald Trump. Two separate teams of U.S. analysts examining satellite images from January and February have concluded the North’s Yongbyon reactor, which had appeared to be dormant, is making plutonium — a principal fuel of nuclear weapons. In a report this week, one of the teams, at 38 North, a research institute at the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, said rising plumes of steam from the reactor complex, and melted river ice nearby, suggested, “The reactor is operating again” to make plutonium for the North’s nuclear-weapons program. The 38 North analyst team includes Frank Pabian, formerly a satellite-image analyst at the Los Alamos National Laboratory in New Mexico, birthplace of the bomb. The signs of nuclear activity coincided with the North’s string of diplomatic overtures to South Korea and the United States. The overtures began with Kim’s conciliatory message toward the South in his New Year’s Day address and intensified last month during the Olympic Games in Pyeongchang, South Korea. The North’s diplomacy accelerated this week, punctuated by Kim’s meetings with South Korean envoys and South Korea’s announcement that he and Trump — leaders known for their bombastic threats — would meet by May to discuss denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula. Nuclear experts say a core of irradiated fuel from the Yongbyon reactor can be processed to make between two and three nuclear weapons. The North began its nuclear program with plutonium and later expanded into uranium. Conservative estimates made in the past year or so put the North’s overall atomic-fuel production as sufficient to make between 20 and 25 weapons. The 38 North team identified plumes of steam rising from the reactor in satellite images obtained Feb. 17 and Feb. 25, the day the Olympics closing ceremony was held.

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The other team, at the Institute for Science and International Security, a private group in Washington, C.D., that tracks nuclear weapons, came to similar conclusions about the North’s nuclear activity. Three analysts studied satellite images taken Jan. 17 and Jan. 30 and discussed them in two reports, the first Feb. 2 and the second Feb. 13, as the Olympic Games were in full swing. North Korea, the second analyst team said, “may be on the verge of expanding its stock of plutonium for nuclear weapons.” The North has fired no missiles this year, compared with 20 known launchings last year. The North’s most recent firing was more than three months ago. On Nov. 29, it conducted a third test of an intercontinental ballistic missile, demonstrating a range that in theory could reach anywhere in North America. https://www.seattletimes.com/nation-world/reactivation-of-plutonium-plant-brings-kims- overture-into-question/ Return to top

Kyodo News (Tokyo, Japan) Japan Sees No Impact from Tillerson Exit on North Korea Policy By Brian Padden March 13, 2018 The Japanese government on Wednesday ruled out any negative impact from the dismissal of U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson on its cooperation with Washington in dealing with North Korea. "The Japanese and the U.S. governments have closely communicated with each other through various channels, including between Prime Minister (Shinzo) Abe and President (Donald) Trump. In that sense, we do not anticipate any negative impact," Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshihide Suga said in a press conference. The top government spokesman also underlined that Tokyo, Washington and Seoul will maintain their policy to keep putting "maximum pressure" on Pyongyang to prod it to give up its nuclear and missile programs as well as resolve the issue of the North's past abduction of Japanese nationals. Trump dismissed Tillerson on Tuesday amid rifts over such issues as the Iran nuclear accord and the approach toward North Korea, and appointed Central Intelligence Agency chief Mike Pompeo as his successor. Foreign Minister Taro Kono also said he does not think the U.S. chief diplomat's exit will have an impact in the run-up to the envisioned U.S.-North Korea summit by May. "I've heard that President Trump led the decision (to hold the talks). So I believe the mainstream (policy) will be unaffected," Kono told reporters at his ministry. Last week, Trump accepted North Korean leader Kim Jong Un's proposal to hold a first-ever meeting between incumbent leaders of the two countries in the coming months. But the Japanese foreign minister said Tillerson's departure was "really regrettable, personally" as the two trusted each other and were able to talk in a candid manner.

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Kono, meanwhile, expressed readiness to work with Pompeo, saying, "The United States holds the key to the North Korean crisis. I would like to meet the incoming secretary of state as soon as possible and start exchanging views over the North and other issues." He had planned to visit Washington later this week to hold talks with Tillerson over the latest developments concerning the North. A source close to him said the minister instructed staff to keep to the schedule and arrange talks with senior U.S. officials. https://english.kyodonews.net/news/2018/03/cf3cef1abc70-japan-sees-no-impact-from- tillerson-exit-on-n-korea-policy.html Return to top

EUROPE/RUSSIA

South China Morning Post (Hong Kong) EU Admits to ‘Secret’ Talks with North Korea for Last Three Years to End Nuclear Programme By Agency France-Presse March 15, 2018 A European Parliament delegation said on Wednesday it has been conducting secret talks with North Korea over the last three years to try to persuade Pyongyang to negotiate an end to its nuclear programme. The group led by British MEP Nirj Deva has met senior North Korean officials, including ministers, 14 times and plans another meeting in Brussels in the near future. News of the below-the-radar diplomacy effort comes after the surprise announcement that US President Donald Trump plans a summit with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, part of fast-paced developments following an Olympic detente. Deva said he and his colleagues on the European Parliament Delegation for Relations with the Korean Peninsula had been “relentlessly advocating the case for dialogue without preconditions” to end the increasingly tense nuclear stand-off with the North. “I did much of the advocacy in secrecy with my colleagues. It is only now that I am revealing our efforts to a wider audience in the light of the proposed talks,” Deva said. The group also met senior officials in the US, China, Japan and South Korea, Deva said, for dialogue aimed at achieving a “verifiable denuclearised Korean peninsula”. Members of the European Parliament take part in a voting session at the European Parliament on March 14, 2018 in Strasbourg, France. Photo: AFP “We met in secret with senior North Koreans on 14 occasions. We understood their concerns and they understand ours,” he told a press conference at the European Parliament in Strasbourg. The MEPs held regular clandestine meetings with the North Koreans in Brussels, Deva said, listening to their concerns and trying to convince them of the risks of nuclear war. “We told them in no uncertain terms that if they carry on with the missile programme and the nuclear bomb programme they will only lead to an inevitable conclusion which is unthinkable,” Deva said.

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EU diplomacy is normally carried out by the bloc’s dedicated foreign affairs department, which has diplomatic missions all around the world. North Korean nuclear crisis at a crossroads: Xi Jinping urges Kim and Trump to fast track talks Deva said his delegation had a role to play in developing “confidence building measures” to support the planned US-North Korea dialogue. And Deva said that from his meetings he believed the tough sanctions the EU has in place against North Korea had been an important factor in driving Pyongyang to agree to talks. “Part of the reason that this happened was the sanctions started to bite poor people – not the elite,” he said. Donald Trump hopes for ‘greatest deal’ with North Korea’s Kim Jong-un as he praises helpful China The sudden announcement of the summit between Kim and Trump and Pyongyang’s reported willingness to discuss ending its nuclear programme have raised hopes of detente after months of tension. As well as the Kim-Trump meeting, North and South Korea are also planning a summit next month. Paul Ruebig, an Austrian MEP who is deputy chair of the committee and took part in the secret meetings, called for the UN to take part in the summits to give them a global scope. http://www.scmp.com/news/world/europe/article/2137243/european-parliament-secret-talks- north-korea Return to top

U.S. News and World Report (Washington, D.C.) UK Envoy Says Russia Failed to Fully Declare Nerve Agent Stocks By Reuters March 13, 2018 THE HAGUE (REUTERS) - Britain's ambassador to the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons said on Tuesday Russia had failed to declare its full stockpile of nerve agents to the international body. Peter Wilson told reporters that Russia, which says it destroyed all its chemical weapons under OPCW supervision last year, has in fact "failed for many years" to fully disclose its chemical weapons program. Wilson repeated assertions by the British government that Russia was "implicated" in the attack last week on a former spy in Britain, and demanded that Moscow now declare its undisclosed program. The British government says the former spy and his daughter were attacked in Salisbury with Novichok, a nerve agent first developed by the Soviet Union in the 70s and 80s. Speaking to reporters after a meeting of the OPCW's governing council, Wilson said Russia will also have to tell the body how the substance managed to get to Britain from Russia. In an address to the OPCW earlier, Wilson said the only possible explanations were that Russia had failed to keep control over its material, or had used toxic agents intentionally in the attack - the same reasoning set out by British Prime Minister Theresa May in parliament on Monday.

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Earlier Tuesday, OPCW Director General Ahmet Uzumcu condemned the attack. It is not yet clear whether the organization, set up to prevent the use of chemical weapons and oversee the destruction of existing stockpiles, would investigate or take any other action. https://www.usnews.com/news/top-news/articles/2018-03-13/uk-points-finger-at-russia-in- chemical-weapons-watchdog-meeting Return to top

The Diplomat (Washington, D.C.) Russia Releases Footage of New 'Kinzhal' Nuclear-Capable Air-Launched Missile By Ankit Panda March 12, 2018 The Kinzhal resembles Russia’s land-based Iskander-M missile. The Russian government has released new footage of its “Kinzhal” air-launched missile — one of the new strategic weapons systems Russian President Vladimir Putin announced earlier this month. The missile is capable of delivering conventional and nuclear payloads. In a short one-minute video, the Kinzhal is shown mounted under a MiG-31 interceptor aircraft. The jet takes off and is shown releasing the Kinzhal in flight, followed by brief footage of the missile’s ignition and flight. According to the video, the Kinzhal appears to be a solid-fuel, air-launched ballistic missile, with visual similarity to Russia’s Iskander-M short-range ballistic missile, which is known for its precision and maneuverability. During his speech to Russia’s Federal Assembly earlier this month, Putin announced the new missile. The Kinzhal was announced alongside four other strategic weapons systems and other advanced systems, including a new laser. “The unique flight characteristics of the high-speed carrier aircraft allow the missile to be delivered to the point of discharge within minutes,” Putin said, emphasizing the Kinzhal’s promptness. “The missile flying at a hypersonic speed, 10 times faster than the speed of sound, can also maneuver at all phases of its flight trajectory,” Putin continued. This “also allows it to overcome all existing and, I think, prospective anti-aircraft and anti-missile defense systems, delivering nuclear and conventional warheads in a range of over 2,000 kilometers,” Putin added. Air-launched ballistic missiles have the advantage of depriving adversaries of lower-altitude boost- phase intercept opportunities. The ability to launch the missile from high altitudes from a range of locations would also complicate midcourse interception, leaving terminal phase interception as the only realistic option. If this missile performs like an Iskander, however, its hypersonic reentry speeds and maneuverability could stress existing terminal point defense systems, like the United States’ Patriot Advanced Capability-3 system or the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) systems. The hypersonic flight claims surrounding the Kinzhal are questionable, in addition to the range claimed by Putin during his speech. The Iskander-M, which appears to be the template for this

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// USAFCUWS Outreach Journal Issue 1306 // missile, is thought to have a maximum range of around 500 kilometers (to remain compliant with the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty). While both the Iskander-M and the Kinzhal may reach hypersonic speeds during the final minutes of flight, in terminal phase, the Kinzhal does not appear to be capable of maneuvering during “all phases of its flight” at Mach 10 speeds, as Putin has claimed. Moreover, it’s unclear if Russia will plan to use the MiG-31 as the primary delivery platform for this weapon. Even if the ballistic missile is capable of impressive maneuvers, the aircraft meant to deliver it is not particularly invulnerable or stealthy. https://thediplomat.com/2018/03/russia-releases-footage-of-new-kinzhal-nuclear-capable-air- launched-missile/ Return to top syracuse.com (Syracuse, N.Y.) Lockheed Martin Syracuse Will Add Jobs after Landing German Missile Defense Deal By Mark Weiner March 9, 2018 WASHINGTON -- Lockheed Martin said Friday it will likely add a significant number of jobs to its plant in suburban Syracuse after reaching a deal on a joint venture to supply Germany with an air and missile defense system worth about $4.9 billion. The Lockheed plant at Electronics Park in Salina will engineer and manufacture the surveillance radar for the Medium Extended Air Defense System, or MEADS, that Germany plans to deploy over the next 15 years. Lockheed Martin and European defense firm MBDA Deutschland announced a new joint venture this week that will produce the new air and missile defense system for Germany. The German system, TLVS, will incorporate MEADS, developed in partnership by the United States, Germany and Italy, into new defenses that will replace Germany's aging Patriot missile defense system. Initial plans call for Germany to buy a minimum of eight new systems to replace 12 Patriot units, but details must still be negotiated in a contract expected to be signed by the end of the year, Lockheed Martin officials said. Germany set aside about 4 billion euros ($4.9 billion) for the program after deciding in 2015 to proceed with MEADS, rather than Raytheon's Patriot system, for its future air and missile defense. Lockheed Martin spokeswoman Cheryl Amerine said Friday she could not provide an estimate on the number of new jobs that will be linked to the program at Lockheed Martin's plant in Salina until the final contract is negotiated. But she said the Salina plant is expected to have a "significant workshare" on a surveillance radar that is engineered, developed and manufactured at the Electronics Park complex. The local plant employs about 1,600 people. Amerine said demand for the MEADS radar is expected to grow as other NATO allies modernize their air and missile defenses.

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"Right now, we are only talking about the German contract," Amerine said. "With Germany as the launch customer for this system, we anticipate that other countries will want this needed capability in the future as well." MEADS provided the single largest radar contract in the history of Lockheed's plant in Salina. The plant received a $625 million share of MEADS development work over nine years. All told, the United States, Germany and Italy invested more than $4 billion developing the system over the course of more than a decade. A key component of the system is the MEADS surveillance radar developed by Lockheed in Salina. The radar can search 360-degrees for incoming missiles, planes and drones, and be hauled around on the back of a truck. Germany's selection of MEADS is significant because it will be the first nation to deploy the missile defense system. Germany is also NATO's lead country for missile defense and helps influence how allies upgrade their defenses. The United States decided not to fully deploy MEADS after initial development delays and cost overruns. But Army officials have said they would like to use some parts of the anti-missile system in future defense programs. As part of Lockheed's joint venture with MBDA, work on the German system will be led from an office in Schrobenhausen, Germany. The companies said related operations in the United States will be based in Syracuse, Dallas and Huntsville, Ala. http://www.syracuse.com/politics/index.ssf/2018/03/lockheed_martin_syracuse_will_add_jobs_af ter_landing_german_missile_defense_deal.html Return to top

MIDDLE EAST

The Jerusalem Post (Jerusalem, Israel) Elections Take Back Seat to Nuclearized Middle East at Cabinet Meeting By Herb Keinon March 11, 2018 Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu did not address the possibility of early elections in public comments before Sunday’s cabinet meeting, choosing instead to focus on the threat of the Iranian nuclear deal resulting in a more widely nuclearized Middle East. Netanyahu began the cabinet meeting by once again calling US President Donald Trump “a great friend of Israel.” He then said his recent talks in Washington focused on Iran, and that he made clear during those meetings that the nuclear agreement with the Islamic Republic has created numerous threats for the world, including that of wider nuclearization in the region. “Many countries in the Middle East are saying that if Iran has the right to enrich uranium, they should as well,” Netanyahu said. “Therefore, the way to prevent the danger of nuclearization in the Middle East is to thoroughly correct the agreement, or abrogate it.” Bloomberg News reported on Wednesday that in a closed door meeting with the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee on Tuesday, Netanyahu came out against a deal in the works that would allow

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US companies to build as many as 16 nuclear power plants in Saudi Arabia, enabling the Saudis to enrich uranium and reprocess plutonium. Bloomberg quoted committee chairman Bob Corker as saying Netanyahu was “certainly opposed.” The Saudis are gearing up for a fight in Washington over the proposed deal and have enlisted “blue- chip lobbyists in Washington” to push for the deal, which could be worth up to $80 billion and prove a huge boost for America’s flagging nuclear-power industry, Bloomberg reported. US Energy Secretary Rick Perry met earlier this month with Saudi officials to discuss the possible deal. Energy Minister Yuval Steinitz met with Perry in Houston last Wednesday. Channel 10 reported on Friday that during his talks with Trump, Netanyahu “raised concerns” over the possible deal. According to the report, Trump said that if the US did not sell the reactors, the Saudis would turn to the Russians or the Chinese. If the US was intent on going ahead with the deal, Netanyahu reportedly said, Washington should at least prevent the Saudis from enriching uranium. Trump was non-committal, the report said, and it was agreed that Jerusalem and Washington would continue a dialogue on the matter. Netanyahu said that fixing or doing away with the Iranian nuclear deal was the only way to prevent other countries in the region from demanding the right to enrich uranium, now that Iran has acquired that right under that deal. “The best way to prevent the nuclearization of the Middle East is to either fully fix the Iranian deal, or to fully nix it,” he said in New York on Thursday. “This is the only way to prevent the inevitable spread of nuclear technology and nuclear weapons in the Middle East.” Despite Netanyahu’s protestations, the proliferation of nuclear power in the Middle East is well underway. The first of four nuclear reactors in the United Arab Emirates is scheduled to go online this year, and Egypt, Jordan and Turkey have all signed deals with Russia for the construction of nuclear reactors. http://www.jpost.com/Israel-News/Elections-take-back-seat-to-nuclearized-Middle-East-at- cabinet-meeting-544774 Return to top

COMMENTARY

Modern War Institute (West Point, N.Y.) Who Killed the Dugway Sheep? Why It Matters Fifty Years Later By Al Mauroni March 13, 2018 One hundred years ago, Gen. John Pershing was leading the American Expeditionary Force in France, engaging an adversary whose arsenal included a significant chemical weapons component. Unlike the British, Canadian, and French forces, the US Army had never experienced chemical warfare and had, as a result, procured its chemical defense equipment and chemical munitions from its allies. Despite this support and ample training in France, American battalions integrated into the French and British lines in February 1918 suffered substantial casualties due to their inexperience in facing this new threat. Fortunately, the war would be over in November, and US casualties caused by chemical warfare agents were comparatively lighter than those of other nations.

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Because of the concern that nations would be developing chemical weapons for future conflicts, the US military formed a “Chemical Warfare Service” within the Army in June 1918, which became the Chemical Corps in 1946. To this day, the Army Chemical Corps remains the only military branch that addresses the threat of weapons of mass destructions with dedicated, full-time specialists. While the US government signed the Chemical Weapons Convention in 1993, agreeing to renounce the use of chemical weapons, the US military has a continued focus on understanding the effects of chemical and biological warfare agents and developing defensive countermeasures against them. Dugway’s Sheep Kill Incident Dugway Proving Ground is an Army test and evaluation center located about ninety minutes’ drive from Salt Lake City, Utah. It was established in 1942 to test US chemical and biological weapons, given that the German and Japanese military were suspected of developing these weapons, and the US. government wanted a retaliatory capability. Because of its large and remote nature (eight hundred thousand acres, surrounded on three sides by mountains), it was also a site for conventional weapons testing and Ranger desert training. During the 1950s and 1960s, these tests included testing of artillery shells, aerial bombs, and aerial spray tanks designed to dispense chemical and biological warfare agents. Fifty years ago this month, in 1968, this testing was interrupted by a significant off-post incident. State officials and veterinarians had been called to investigate reports of thousands of alleged dead sheep in Skull Valley, northeast of Dugway Proving Ground, on March 14. Many of those sheep were actually sick and unmoving, not dead but resisting medications. No other animal or human had been affected, but suspicion fell on the military center that its testing might have something to do with the illnesses. The general public began to hear news about the sheep deaths on March 19, causing the investigation to quickly escalate to the top levels of the Army and Utah state government. There had been three open-air nerve agent events on March 13, one of which was a test involving an F-4 fighter airplane operating two TMU-28B spray tanks, each holding 160 gallons of VX—a persistent nerve agent. VX nerve agent is a liquid, not a gas, designed to fall to the ground and contaminate a particular area. The Dugway scientists had planned this test carefully, using chemical simulants having similar physical characteristics as the nerve agent in early trials so as to understand where the agent should drop. They had droplet cards dispersed not only on the target area but also miles downwind of the target, to account for the drift of lighter particles. The plane flew and dispersed its liquid contents about thirty miles from the mountain range separating the proving grounds from the ranchers’ herds. Following the test, the scientists were able to account for 98 percent of the agent dispersed. And yet, the governor of Utah, Calvin Rampton, was convinced that the Army was at fault and should compensate the ranchers for the loss of their sheep. The scientists at Dugway were challenged by several factors. First they had no understanding of what VX nerve agent did to sheep, particularly if the sheep had eaten grass on which the agent had landed. They had worked with VX nerve agent for fifteen years, but never had a reason to test it on farm animals. Interestingly enough, no other animals or humans had shown signs of nerve agent poisoning. In attempts to replicate the incident, they exposed sheep to VX nerve agent and did not get the same symptoms of the disabled sheep in Skull Valley. Second, they were working at a military laboratory at the height of the Cold War. They weren’t supposed to talk about what they were doing or share data on VX nerve agent with civilians. Some in the public would view this silence as evidence of guilt. Army Materiel Command headquarters in Washington, DC wanted to compensate the ranchers without admitting any fault in the matter and get Dugway’s scientists back to work. They weren’t interested in a long, drawn-out public debate as to the dangers of chemical warfare agents, given

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// USAFCUWS Outreach Journal Issue 1306 // other priorities and inquiries from Congress as well as the Utah governor. No one was supportive of a long-term, comprehensive investigation. An alternate theory, that local ranchers had used an illegal organo-phosphate chemical herbicide to spray fields that were only a few miles from the affected sheep, was not accepted. Certainly there were organo-phosphate pesticides such as Malathion and Parathion in use within the United States, and there was no Environmental Protection Agency to regulate their use. The Utah congressional delegation and the governor preferred to believe that five gallons of liquid VX nerve agent—the unaccounted-for amount—had traveled as a gaseous cloud 30–45 miles from the spray incident over a mountain range and affected only sheep in Skull Valley. Thousands of the disabled sheep were still alive weeks after the spray trial. Many were shot by the ranchers and displayed to the Army investigators as “evidence.” At the end of the investigation, the Army would pay the ranchers for 4,372 sheep claimed to be killed by nerve agent, and 1,877 disabled and shot due to the ranchers being unable to sell their meat and wool. The Army paid $376,685 for the 6,249 sheep in the claims—about twice the market value at the time. Far from being over, though, the Army was drawn into a larger national debate over the US government’s role in developing chemical and biological weapons. The military’s heavy use of Agent Orange and related herbicides in Southwest Asia was getting significant congressional attention in early 1969. That summer, the United Nations secretary general released a report discussing the growing proliferation of chemical and biological weapons, warning that there was no defense against them for any nation. A leak of chemical weapons on Okinawa sickened more than twenty US soldiers who were repainting ammunition bunkers that held them. All recovered, but the media attention grew. Congress passed a public law in November 1969 forbidding the open-air testing of any lethal chemical or biological warfare agent within the United States, unless the secretary of defense determined that such testing was necessary in the interests of national security, the US surgeon general reviewed the tests to ensure the public’s health and safety were protected, and the president informed Congress thirty days prior to the testing. As a result, all live-agent testing within the United States had to be limited to secure laboratories, and chemical weapons modernization essentially stopped. The Impact of CB Weapons Testing Limitations Politics and perception had essentially overwhelmed science and reason. This probably wasn’t the first time that this had happened, nor would it be the last. The point of this narrative, other than as a historical observation, is to reflect on what this has done to the preparedness of US military forces today. Yes, the United States no longer has a chemical weapons program. Yes, there is a Chemical Weapons Convention that nearly all nations of the world have signed, effectively eliminating chemical weapons as a future tool of warfare—we hope. North Korea is a particular exception to that treaty, and most assumptions are that, if North Korea goes to war against South Korea, it will use thousands of tons of chemical warfare agents against US forces. Are we confident that our forces have the necessary gear to protect themselves and sustain combat operations in such an environment? And do we have plans for how US military bases and ports will recover after being attacked with chemical weapons? The answer is, it depends on the question. The US military has tested its chemical protective suits and detectors against different chemical warfare agents inside laboratories, and they should work just as well when exposed to the same chemicals in an outdoor environment. Standard military equipment, if contaminated with chemical agent, might remain a hazard for a long time, depending on the material upon which the agent was deposited and how persistent the chemical agent was. Much of it will probably be discarded rather than decontaminated. The larger question is what to do after the conflict if major defense systems, such as tanks, armored vehicles, fighter and strategic lift

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// USAFCUWS Outreach Journal Issue 1306 // aircraft, and large ships become contaminated. Can we safely and confidently reuse formerly contaminated defense equipment? The US military uses the Hazard Prediction and Assessment Capability (HPAC) to model the dispersion of chemical, biological, and radiological materials through the atmosphere. Using mathematical predictions of where the particles will go, based on points of impact, and knowing the exact hazard and weather and terrain information, one can estimate the deposition of the hazard and come up with casualty estimates. But it’s a prediction based on expected behaviors. Like all models, HPAC needs to be verified with actual test data which legally the Defense Department cannot obtain on its own. HPAC is very good software; however, all models need to be validated and verified if they are to be trusted. These issues translate into areas of operational concern when military and political leaders ask, for example, what happens if a particular air base or port is hit with Scud missiles carrying VX warheads. What kind of casualties are we looking at? How quickly could we get a major base up and running again? Would we be able to bring multi-million dollar defense systems that were contaminated with nerve agent back to the United States for repair? These are tough questions without obvious answers, in part because of this legal constraint against seeking more data on the behaviors of chemical warfare agents. This has an immediate impact on current and future operations. Because of the limited understanding of agent effects in a natural environment, there are different camps within the US military on what approach to take with regards to large-scale chemical weapons attacks on air bases and sea ports. One side claims that recent scientific data suggests agent persistency associated with VX nerve agent is relatively short-lived, especially if falling on asphalt and concrete, and therefore the issue can be handled without special equipment. Another side believes that persistent VX nerve agents will last days to weeks on equipment and buildings, that the old test data (pre-1970) was accurate. But we can’t confirm or refute that data without open-air testing. This uncertainty has real-world consequences. Before Syria agreed to join the Chemical Weapons Convention and give up its declared chemical weapons, there was an option to consider directly attacking its numerous production and stockpile sites rather than letting them fall into the hands of nonstate actors. But the US military doesn’t know to what extent its weapons would destroy the chemical agent and how much chemical agent would be released beyond its containment. There are models that can estimate the impact of certain weapon systems and the agent released in different scenarios, but again, these are math models that are not verified by actual operational data. A Way Forward We may never know what really happened at Dugway Proving Ground fifty years ago. The point of this article is not to defend the former Dugway officials or to suggest that the US military should restart large-scale open-air chemical weapons tests at Dugway. Politically speaking, that would be unrealistic and self-defeating. But this event was fifty years ago! Our ability to conduct discrete chemical weapons tests and to monitor them with increasingly sensitive devices has improved dramatically in that timeframe. The nature of the threat has changed, from the Soviet Union’s preparations to use artillery and rockets to disseminate large amounts of chemical agent to terrorists using small-scale, single attacks with crude chemical hazards. We need to understand how these chemicals work in the real world so as to better develop countermeasures for US military forces as well as for emergency responders in our cities and states. The case could be made that a national security emergency does in fact exist. In 1990, President George H.W. Bush signed an executive order identifying the proliferation of chemical and biological weapons as “an unusual and extraordinary threat” and declared a national emergency. This state of

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// USAFCUWS Outreach Journal Issue 1306 // national emergency was modified and extended by Presidents Bill Clinton, George W. Bush, and Barack Obama. There is a defined threat to national security here that requires better understanding of the threat, if we are to develop better defensive countermeasures to protect US service members and citizens. The testing does not have to involve the development and use of chemical-filled munitions in an outdoor environment. But at the least, being able to examine the reaction of grams of chemical agents poured onto asphalt, concrete, different soil compositions, and water in an outdoor environment would add realms of valuable data to necessary research. Being able to apply persistent nerve agent to the wing of an obsolete transport aircraft sitting in the desert would help engineer the next transport aircraft to resist said contamination. It doesn’t have to be done at Dugway (although Dugway should not be necessarily excluded from such testing). White Sands Missile Range could work, or the Nevada National Security Site might be feasible. If a remote geographical area can be identified and proper instrumentation and safe procedures developed, then the US government could present Congress with the justification to resume open- air chemical weapons tests and get ahead of this threat. Chemical weapons arrived on the battlefield one hundred years ago and were deemed a significant national security threat fifty years ago. They still remain a significant threat to US military operations and homeland security. We can improve US response capabilities without endangering the American public, given modern technology and proper oversight. All we require is the fortitude to take on a politically charged and bureaucratic process and make the case. https://mwi.usma.edu/killed-dugway-sheep-matters-fifty-years-later/ Return to top

The Diplomat (Washington, D.C.) What Does Trump Mean When Alluding to a North Korean 'Missile Test' Freeze? By Ankit Panda March 12, 2018 The Trump administration should sweat the details on North Korea’s ballistic missile testing freeze assurances. U.S. President Donald Trump is presumably hurtling toward a historic summit with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un. Since he was visited last week by two of South Korean President Moon Jae-in’s envoys, Trump appears to be under the impression that Kim has credibly made a promise to put denuclearization on the table during the summit — if it happens — and to refrain from any nuclear and missile testing during the preparation for the summit. On Saturday, Trump took to Twitter to underline that “North Korea has not conducted a Missile Test since November 28, 2017 and has promised not to do so through our meetings.” He added that he believes “they will honor that commitment!” Trump is correct that North Korea hasn’t flight- tested any missiles since the November 2017 test of the Hwasong-15 intercontinental-range ballistic missile, the first North Korean missile that would be capable of comfortably ranging the entire continental United States if flown on a normal trajectory. However, as I noted last week, it’ll be important for the administration to wrap its head around what behaviors it is willing to tolerate — if any — as part of Kim Jong-un’s presumed missile testing freeze. There are plenty of activities that North Korea could conduct under the threshold of a missile flight test that the Trump administration may perceive as unacceptable. While the

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// USAFCUWS Outreach Journal Issue 1306 // administration has every right to set the terms for what activities it’ll tolerate, what’s dangerous is leaving the terms ambiguous. A cautionary note here is the infamous 2012 “Leap Day” agreement, the Obama administration’s one productive diplomatic dalliance with North Korea. Following “exploratory” talks in Beijing, just months after Kim Jong-un’s father Kim Jong-il had died, the United States and North Korea arrived at a modest agreement: North Korea would submit to “a moratorium on long-range missile launches, nuclear tests and nuclear activities at Yongbyon, including uranium enrichment activities.” In exchange, North Korea would receive food aid. Had the agreement succeeded, it may have paved the path toward further diplomatic exchange. Instead, a little more than two weeks after the agreement had been concluded, North Korea announced plans for a new satellite launch and ended up going through with the launch. For Pyongyang, satellite launches were distinct from ballistic missile activities, even though the United States recognized the technological and knowledge overlap between the two fields. In April 2012, North Korea launched a failed satellite launch vehicle and the agreement fell apart. Even though the Obama administration’s negotiators had walked away with one understanding of the agreement, North Korea had a different interpretation. This may yet play out again this year. As the United States and South Korea head into their annual Foal Eagle exercises — something Kim Jong-un reportedly told South Korean negotiators that he will tolerate — North Korea may choose to carry out its own military readiness drills and perhaps even test missile components. What will the United States stand for short of the flight-testing of ballistic missiles? Even if Pyongyang is unlikely to launch the Hwasong-15 or Hwasong-14 ICBMs, the Hwasong-12 intermediate-range ballistic missile, the Pukguksong-2 and Pukguksong-1 solid-fuel missiles, its Scuds, extended-range Scuds, and Nodongs, understanding these systems to be strategic provocations, it may carry out other tests. North Korea could test its short-range Toksa missiles — including a new variant it appeared to show off at its February 2018 military parade. It could also use its multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) for exercises during Foal Eagle. Similarly, Kim may choose to authorize ejection tests for the country’s submarine-launched ballistic missiles, or new static engine tests — developmental activities clearly related to the country’s ballistic missile programs. It’s doubtful that a Trump-Kim summit will end up happening by May, as the South Koreans have suggested. Given the administration’s ambiguity and a lack of direct assurances from North Korea, it’s mighty likely that Pyongyang will behave in a way that the Trump administration finds to be insufficiently demonstrative of good faith intent. That could end up scuttle whatever progress in currently underway unless the administration clarifies its expectations in more precise terms. https://thediplomat.com/2018/03/what-does-trump-mean-when-alluding-to-a-north-korean- missile-test-freeze/ Return to top

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// USAFCUWS Outreach Journal Issue 1306 //

The New York Times (New York, N.Y.) How Trump’s Disdain for the Iran Deal Makes a North Korea Pact Even Harder By David E. Sanger March 11, 2018 WASHINGTON — The Iranian and North Korean nuclear programs, drastically different but often spoken of in the same breath, are now being thrust together, as President Trump’s determination to kill the landmark 2015 accord limiting Tehran’s capabilities is colliding with his scramble to reach a far more complex deal with Pyongyang. For years, as the Iranians watched the North Koreans build an arsenal and make deals with the West only to break them, they learned what the world was prepared to do — or was unwilling to risk — to stop them. More recently, the North Koreans picked apart what Tehran got in return for agreeing to a 15-year hiatus in its nuclear ambitions, weighing whether the promised economic benefits were worth giving up its nuclear capabilities. The North will be watching especially closely in May, when Mr. Trump will face another deadline on deciding whether to abandon the Iran deal, which he has called a “disaster.” The same month, if all goes as Mr. Trump plans, he will head into a face-to-face negotiation with North Korea’s dictator, Kim Jong-un — the first time an American president has ever spoken with the leader of that country — confident in his ability to do what his predecessors could not: persuade the North Koreans to denuclearize. “The ironies abound,” said Robert S. Litwak, the director of international security studies at the Woodrow Wilson Center for International Scholars and the author of “Preventing North Korea’s Nuclear Breakout.” “The man who wrote ‘The Art of the Deal’ has staked out a position that the Iran deal was the worst one in history,” he added. “And now he has to show that he can do much better, with a far harder case.” On Sunday, the C.I.A. director, Mike Pompeo, speaking on the CBS program “Face the Nation,” set an extraordinarily high bar for his boss, if he ever gets to that negotiation. Mr. Pompeo acknowledged that Mr. Trump, given his disparagement of the Iran deal reached by the Obama administration, will have to get a better deal out of Mr. Kim. “I think that’s the case,” he told the host, Margaret Brennan, adding that he thought Mr. Trump would be negotiating from a greater position of strength. That is a debatable notion. Mr. Kim has driven the pace of this diplomatic effort so far, and American officials have conceded surprise at his boldness. And if Mr. Trump pulls out of the Iran deal, Mr. Kim may well wonder why he should negotiate with the United States if a subsequent president can simply pull the plug on any agreement. By statute, Mr. Trump must decide by May 12 whether to make good on his threat to exit the Iran deal. American officials have said Mr. Trump could pull back if European allies agree to unilaterally crack down on Iran’s missile development — which is not covered by the nuclear deal — and begin a process to make the limits on Iran’s ability to produce nuclear material permanent.

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// USAFCUWS Outreach Journal Issue 1306 //

The British and the French are reluctantly going along, though they say they fear that unilateral demands would blow up an arrangement that is working. German officials are balking, saying that extending the duration of the deal would require new negotiations, and new concessions. Yet if Mr. Trump sticks with the agreement — as his top aides have quietly urged him to do — he faces a different challenge. While he will have to negotiate a deal with the North Koreans that is even stricter than the Iranian one that he has denounced as naïve, insufficient and dangerous, that task will be made all the harder by the fact that Pyongyang, unlike Tehran, actually possesses nuclear weapons. North Korea has at least 20 by some estimates, or upward of 60 by the count of the Defense Intelligence Agency. Iran has never produced one. North Korea produces both plutonium and uranium, and the C.I.A. suspects that some of it is produced at hidden sites. Iran gave up about 97 percent of its stockpile of low-enriched uranium, the material that the world feared it would use to “break out” of any agreement and build a bomb. Even with the most rigorous inspection regime, it will be hard to assure that the North Korean program is really dead. Faced with similar suspicions, Iran agreed to let inspectors roam the country. North Korea never has: Before international inspectors were thrown out of the country, they were limited to living and working at one site, the main nuclear reactor at Yongbyon. And while the Iran deal required months of secret talks followed by two years of public negotiations, but was aided by a unified stance among the United States, the Europeans, China and Russia. So far, none of those conditions exist in dealing with North Korea. “If the president gets the North Koreans just to stop what they are doing, and perhaps get a timetable for future action, that would be a huge step in slowing the North Koreans’ program,” said Christopher Hill, who negotiated the last major deal that the United States had with North Korea, under the George W. Bush administration. “But it still wouldn’t be close to what Iran agreed to do.” Part of the problem is that North Korea’s experience with its nuclear program is long and deep, which has left it adept at reversing even concessions that seemed large at the time. When a 1994 agreement during the Clinton administration barred it from one pathway to the bomb, it struck a secret deal with the head of Pakistan’s nuclear program, Abdul Qadeer Khan, and learned another. When Mr. Hill, now at the University of Denver, negotiated an accord at the end of the Bush administration, the North blew up its cooling tower at the Yongbyon reactor as evidence of its seriousness. It made for great television. But it did little to slow the nuclear program — the reactor has been back up and running for years. Mr. Trump’s problem goes deeper. His two major complaints about the Iran deal are that it is not permanent and that it is not broad enough — it does not deal with Iran’s weapons shipments to Hezbollah, its support of Syria’s president, Bashar al-Assad, or its human rights abuses. Matching those requirements in a North Korea deal would make it all the harder to reach. “In the North Korea case,” Mr. Litwak said, “no one has yet said what the scope of a deal would be, but if you look at the Iran deal critique, presumably it would have to solve a lot more than just our nuclear problems.” That could include stopping the North’s export of chemical weapons to Syria, and its nuclear and missile exports. It might also include eliminating the thousands of conventional artillery weapons along the demilitarized zone that are aimed at Seoul.

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// USAFCUWS Outreach Journal Issue 1306 //

And then there is the problem of North Korea’s gulags: At the State of the Union address this year, Mr. Trump invited a North Korean who had escaped to the South, suffering horrific injuries along the way. Secretary of State Rex W. Tillerson, who was caught by surprise when Mr. Trump agreed to sit down with Mr. Kim, has warned that any negotiation will be long and drawn out. This first meeting between Mr. Trump and Mr. Kim, if it happens, would simply be to build trust and set broad directions. So far, Mr. Trump is talking only about what the North Koreans would give up in any negotiation. The North Koreans are bound to demand that the United States withdraw American troops from South Korea, and perhaps that it agree to a peace treaty and an end to decades of economic sanctions. “The promise is they wouldn’t be shooting off missiles in the meantime, and they’re looking to de- nuke,” Mr. Trump shouted to reporters on the way to a rally in the Pittsburgh area on Saturday. The “promise” he referred to was conveyed by South Korea’s national security adviser; so far Mr. Kim has made no such commitment in public, nor agreed that American military exercises with the South can proceed, another of the conditions that the White House says the North has volunteered. https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/11/us/politics/north-korea-iran-nuclear.html Return to top

Time (New York, N.Y.) Mikhail Gorbachev: The U.S. and Russia Must Stop the Race to Nuclear War By Mikhail Gorbachev March 9, 2018 When I became the leader of the Soviet Union in 1985, I felt during my very first meetings with people that what worried them the most was the problem of war and peace. Do everything in order to prevent war, they said. By that time, the superpowers had accumulated mountains of weapons; military build-up plans called for “space combat stations,” “nuclear-powered lasers,” “kinetic space weapons” and similar inventions. Thank God, in the end none of them were built. What is more, negotiations between the U.S.S.R. and the United States opened the way to ending the nuclear arms race. We reached agreement with one of the most hawkish U.S. presidents, Ronald Reagan, to radically reduce the arsenals. Today, those achievements are in jeopardy. More and more, defense planning looks like preparation for real war amid continued militarization of politics, thinking and rhetoric. The National Security Strategy and Nuclear Posture Review published by U.S. President Donald Trump’s administration in February orients U.S. foreign policy toward “political, economic, and military competitions around the world” and calls for the development of new, “more flexible” nuclear weapons. This means lowering the threshold for the use of nuclear weapons even further. Against this backdrop, Russian President Vladimir Putin, in his recent address to the Federal Assembly, announced the development in Russia of several new types of weapons, including weapons that no country in the world yet possesses.

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// USAFCUWS Outreach Journal Issue 1306 //

The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, published in Chicago, set the symbolic Doomsday Clock half a minute closer to “Midnight” in January. As the scientists see it, we are now within two minutes of a global catastrophe. The last time this level of danger was recorded in 1953. The alarm that people feel today is fully justified. How should we respond to this new round of militarization? Above all, we must not give up; we must demand that world leaders return to the path of dialogue and negotiations. The primary responsibility for ending the current dangerous deadlock lies with the leaders of the United States and Russia. This is a responsibility they must not evade, since the two powers’ arsenals are still outsize compared to those of other countries. But we should not place all our hopes on the presidents. Two persons cannot undo all the roadblocks that it took years to pile up. We need dialog at all levels, including mobilization of the efforts of both nations’ expert communities. They represent an enormous pool of knowledge that should be used in the interest of peace. Things have come to a point where we must ask: Where is the United Nations? Where is its Security Council, its Secretary General? Isn’t it time to convene an emergency session of the General Assembly or a meeting of the Security Council at the level of heads of state? I am convinced that the world is waiting for such an initiative. There is no doubt in my mind that the vast majority of people both in Russia and in the United States will agree that war cannot be a solution to problems. Can weapons solve the problems of the environment, terrorism or poverty? Can they solve domestic economic problems? We must remind the leaders of all nuclear powers of their commitment under the Nuclear Non- Proliferation Treaty to negotiate reductions and eventually the elimination of nuclear weapons. Their predecessors signed that obligation, and it was ratified by the highest levels of their government. A world without nuclear weapons: There can be no other final goal. However dismal the current situation, however depressing and hopeless the atmosphere may seem, we must act to prevent the ultimate catastrophe. What we need is not the race to the abyss but a common victory over the demons of war. http://time.com/5191433/mikhail-gorbachev-nuclear-weapons-trump-putin-russia/ Return to top

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// USAFCUWS Outreach Journal Issue 1306 //

ABOUT THE USAF CUWS The USAF Counterproliferation Center was established in 1998 at the direction of the Chief of Staff of the Air Force. Located at Maxwell AFB, this Center capitalizes on the resident expertise of Air University, while extending its reach far beyond — and influences a wide audience of leaders and policy makers. A memorandum of agreement between the Air Staff Director for Nuclear and Counterproliferation (then AF/XON), now AF/A5XP) and Air War College Commandant established the initial manpower and responsibilities of the Center. This included integrating counterproliferation awareness into the curriculum and ongoing research at the Air University; establishing an information repository to promote research on counterproliferation and nonproliferation issues; and directing research on the various topics associated with counterproliferation and nonproliferation. The Secretary of Defense's Task Force on Nuclear Weapons Management released a report in 2008 that recommended "Air Force personnel connected to the nuclear mission be required to take a professional military education (PME) course on national, defense, and Air Force concepts for deterrence and defense." As a result, the Air Force Nuclear Weapons Center, in coordination with the AF/A10 and Air Force Global Strike Command, established a series of courses at Kirtland AFB to provide continuing education through the careers of those Air Force personnel working in or supporting the nuclear enterprise. This mission was transferred to the Counterproliferation Center in 2012, broadening its mandate to providing education and research to not just countering WMD but also nuclear deterrence. In February 2014, the Center’s name was changed to the Center for Unconventional Weapons Studies to reflect its broad coverage of unconventional weapons issues, both offensive and defensive, across the six joint operating concepts (deterrence operations, cooperative security, major combat operations, irregular warfare, stability operations, and homeland security). The term “unconventional weapons,” currently defined as nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, also includes the improvised use of chemical, biological, and radiological hazards. The CUWS's military insignia displays the symbols of nuclear, biological, and chemical hazards. The arrows above the hazards represent the four aspects of counterproliferation — counterforce, active defense, passive defense, and consequence management.

DISCLAIMER: Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the Air University, the United States Air Force, the Department of Defense, or any other US government agency.

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