DOCSLIB.ORG

Barry Eichengreen

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Barry Eichengreen Barry Eichengreen THE CRISIS OF (CONFIDENCE IN) GLOBAL CAPITALISM ABSTRACT: In The Crisis of Global Capitalism, George Soros claims that the international financial economy is inherently unstable, and that while econo- mists have failed to recognize this because of their commitment to static equilib- rium theory, politicians have failed to stabilize the global economy because of their commitment to an unquestioned faith in the complete efficiency of laissez faire.While Soros is right to argue that market participants’ expectations about the future can cause instability,he is wrong to maintain that this has gone unrec- ognized by economists, and his notion that we live in a world of economic laissez faire is equally mistaken. Indeed, his own analysis of the Asian financial crisis points to the “moral hazard” created by expectations of government inter- vention, rather than to laissez faire, as the culprit. In The Crisis of Global Capitalism (New York:PublicAffairs Press, ), George Soros—investment tycoon, philanthropist, and celebrity—lays out his life philosophy, delivers a stinging critique of modern economic theory, and comments on the health of the global financial system. He provides new information about his role and that of his investment partnerships, the Quantum Funds, in the Asian crisis in and Rus- sia’s default and devaluation in . And somewhat surprisingly for our leading international financier, he offers some stunningly ambitious proposals for protecting civil society from financial globalization. Critical Review (), no. ISSN ‒.© Critical Review Foundation. Barry Eichengreen is John L. Simpson Professor of Economics and Political Science at the University of California, Berkeley, CA ; Research Associate of the National Bureau of Economic Research; and Research Fellow of the Centre for Economic Policy Research. Critical Review Vol. 14, No. 1 Soros is a prominent public figure, and his opinions are taken seri- ously by the markets and by the congressional committees before which he is called to testify. It is therefore welcome to have his views in print. Unfortunately, they come in a frustrating form. The Crisis of Global Capitalism shows signs of having been rushed into print in response to what the author perceived as the last gasp of an expiring global finan- cial system. Divided into two parts, one of which lays out the author’s conceptual framework and another of which applies it to the present moment in history, the book in fact wanders back and forth between conceptual and historical material. Repetition is a problem. Together with the book’s informal tone, this leads one to suspect that portions are transcriptions of the author’s conversations with his editor. The book’s fatal flaw, though, is that it is inadequately grounded in the scholarly literature. This is, to be sure, a predictable criticism com- ing from an academic called upon to review a practitioner’s book. But pedantry aside, there is no question that Soros is led to commit some very serious blunders as a result of his ignorance, or at least disregard, of the relevant economic scholarship. “Reflexivity” vs. Economic Equilibrium At the core of the current approach to organizing economic activity, Soros argues, is a deep-seated belief that markets—financial markets in particular—are both stable and the best way of organizing economic and societal affairs. Soros attaches the label “market fundamentalism” to the belief in laissez faire of which he is so critical. He argues that finan- cial markets, contrary to the rigid beliefs of the fundamentalists, are in fact unstable, and that important social needs cannot be met by giving them free reign. Market fundamentalism, according to Soros, is grounded in notions of economic equilibrium. The basis for this argument is the author’s theory of “reflexivity.” In natural sciences such as physics, he observes, the concept of equilibrium is well defined. A swinging pendulum will eventually reach a stable resting point. This metaphor has been invoked by economists to describe the behavior of markets since at least Adam Smith, who argued that the self-interested actions of individuals will guide the economy to a stable, economically efficient outcome. Smith’s notion was extended to the social domain by F. A. Hayek, who argued Eichengreen • Global Capitalism that the common social good was the unintended byproduct of indi- viduals acting in their self-interest. The metaphor was formalized and refined, using the calculus, by the first postwar generation of welfare theorists, who took their cue from Paul Samuelson’s Foundations of Economic Analysis (). The tools of the natural sciences and the pro- fessionalization of academia thus conspired to lend a veneer of re- spectability to the doctrine and the techniques of neoclassical econom- ics—which are, in Soros’s view, built fundamentally on an inappropriate notion of equilibrium. Whatever damage this did to intellectual discourse, however, the damage to society (according to Soros) was far greater. Misguided equi- librium theorizing encouraged the United States (under Reagan), the United Kingdom (under Thatcher), and other countries to discard the regulated, mixed economy in favor of cut-throat capitalism. The result, Soros continues, has been to fray the social fabric, heighten the inci- dence of financial instability, and undermine political support for the market. Why, according to the author, do models characterized by stable, so- cially efficient equilibria offer a misleading picture of the market sys- tem? The critical point, in his view, is that markets, unlike the systems analyzed by physicists, are inhabited by conscious agents; recognition of this fact leads Soros to his theory of “reflexivity.”While “the facts about the natural world are independent of the statements that scientists make about them” (), financial markets are influenced by what market par- ticipants think other participants are likely to do. Expectations affect ac- tions, and actions affect expectations. Soros distinguishes the “passive function,” in which participants seek merely to understand the situation in which they participate, from the “active function,” in which they seek to make an impact on that situation. “Reflexivity” arises when both functions are at work. The reflexive interaction of expectations and outcomes can give rise to indeterminacy, Soros observes, since what happens will in general depend on what people think is going to happen. And it can give rise to instability, as agents impulsively reject one belief about what will happen in favor of another. When markets move as expected, partici- pants’ confidence in their understanding of the underlying dynamic will be reinforced, sustaining the initial trend. But when expectations are consistently violated, they will have to be revised, and that revision may precipitate a violent change in market direction. Market movements have such a powerful impact on expectations, Critical Review Vol. 14, No. 1 Soros argues, because the world in which we live is complex. Not only is information about its structure incomplete, but our ability to assimi- late the available data is bounded. Individuals make use of generaliza- tion, metaphor, and analogy (in other words, models) to impose order on this complexity. The stock they place in a model will be reinforced (or eroded) by the extent to which outcomes are consistent (or in con- flict) with its predictions. In financial markets, the beliefs and actions of market participants are profoundly conditioned by this “reflexive feedback.”Imagine, for exam- ple, that investors are cautiously bullish about the stock market. If eq- uity prices do rise, their bullishness will be reinforced, and they will adapt their behavior accordingly. As a result, prices may then rise at rates totally out of relation to any discernible change in market funda- mentals. Analogously, pessimism about future asset prices can be rein- forced by a decline in their current level, leading investors to sell into a falling market. Since economic predictions can be self-fulfilling, markets can be highly volatile. Soros adds structure to these observations by dividing the boom-bust cycle into stages: an initial stage at which the trend is not yet recog- nized; a subsequent stage of trend acceleration; and a stage of excessive exuberance, when the trend is sustained by the reinforcement of initial expectations, despite the accumulation of counterevidence. Eventually there comes the moment of truth, when expectations are blatantly vio- lated, and the trend reverses with a vengeance. In the worst-case sce- nario, an economic crisis ensues. Social systems are prone to overshoot, Soros hypothesizes, in much the same way as markets. He observes that the Soviet system became increasingly rigid and authoritarian as a result of the two-way interac- tion of the dogma and practice of bureaucratic planning. Similarly, in the United States, financial deregulation has enhanced the political power of financial-market participants to press for still further deregula- tion, resulting in the creation of a dog-eat-dog “transactional society.” An open society is thus threatened from two directions. While au- thoritarianism was long the more worrisome danger, the collapse of communism has left nothing to resist market fundamentalism. Drawing on Karl Popper’s book, The Open Society and Its Enemies (), Soros argues that unfettered markets dissolve social bonds and set the stage for an authoritarian backlash. They do not deliver the collective goods— the social justice, equity, cohesion, moral values, and support for strong Eichengreen • Global Capitalism families and intellectual achievement—that are the building blocks of an open society. Popper’s concept of the open society, in juxtaposition to authoritari- anism, was already prominent in Soros’s earlier book, The Alchemy of Fi- nance (). What is new here is his opposition to market fundamen- talism. Soros criticizes the Hayekian notion, popularized by works like Milton and Rose Friedman’s Capitalism and Freedom (), that democracy and capitalism go hand in hand. To the contrary, he argues, unfettered capitalism will inevitably provoke a reaction against the depredations of the market.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Law and Neoliberalism
    INTRODUCTION_PURDY_GREWAL_BOOKPROOF (DO NOT DELETE) 1/9/2015 12:36 AM INTRODUCTION: LAW AND NEOLIBERALISM DAVID SINGH GREWAL* JEDEDIAH PURDY** “Neoliberalism” refers to the revival of the doctrines of classical economic liberalism, also called laissez-faire, in politics, ideas, and law. These revived doctrines have taken new form in new settings: the “neo-” means not just that they are back, but that they are also different, a new generation of arguments. What unites the two periods of economic liberalism is their political effect: the assertion and defense of particular market imperatives and unequal economic power against political intervention. Neoliberalism’s advance over the past few decades has reshaped most important domains of public and private life, and the law has been no exception. From constitutional doctrine to financial regulation to intellectual property and family law, market and market- mimicking approaches are now commonplace in our jurisprudence. While the term “neoliberalism” may be unfamiliar to some American legal audiences, it is a common part of the scholarly lexicons of many disciplines and is widely used elsewhere in the world, notably in Latin America and Europe. Some of the explanation for the term’s unfamiliarity may be parochialism.1 But in the United States in particular, neoliberalism’s political expression has proven less the reincarnation of a doctrine thought to be abandoned (classical liberalism) than the intensification of a familiar and longstanding “anti- regulatory” politics.2 Familiar as this political expression may be, it is our Copyright © 2014 by David Singh Grewal & Jedediah Purdy. This article is also available at http://lcp.law.duke.edu/.
    [Show full text]
  • The Euro: It Can’T Happen
    EUROPEAN ECONOMY Economic Papers 395| December 2009 The euro: It can’t happen. It’s a bad idea. It won’t last. US economists on the EMU, 1989 - 2002 Lars Jonung and Eoin Drea EUROPEAN COMMISSION Economic Papers are written by the Staff of the Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs, or by experts working in association with them. The Papers are intended to increase awareness of the technical work being done by staff and to seek comments and suggestions for further analysis. The views expressed are the author’s alone and do not necessarily correspond to those of the European Commission. Comments and enquiries should be addressed to: European Commission Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs Publications B-1049 Brussels Belgium E-mail: [email protected] This paper exists in English only and can be downloaded from the website ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications A great deal of additional information is available on the Internet. It can be accessed through the Europa server (ec.europa.eu) ISBN 978-92-79-14395-3 © European Communities, 2009 The euro: It can’t happen, It’s a bad idea, It won’t last. US economists on the EMU, 1989 - 2002 Lars Jonung and Eoin Drea November 10, 2009 Abstract: The purpose of this study is to survey how US economists, those with the Federal Reserve System and those at US universities, looked upon European monetary unification from the publication of the Delors Report in 1989 to the introduction of euro notes and coins in January 2002. Our survey of approximately 170 publications
    [Show full text]
  • Completing the Eurozone Rescue: What More Needs to Be Done?
    Completing the Eurozone Rescue: What More NeedstoBeDone? Rescue:WhatMore Completing theEurozone The Eurozone’s life-threatening crisis in May 2010 was halted when Eurozone Completing theEurozoneRescue: leaders and the ECB took strong measures in May. But these were palliatives not a cure. The Eurozone’s life-threatening crisis in May 2010 was halted Completing The crisis is not over, according to the dozen world-renowned economists whose when Eurozone leaders and the ECB took strong measures in views are containedMay. But in these this book. were The palliatives Eurozone notrescue a cure.needs to be completed. More needs to be done. The crisis is not over, according to the dozen world-renowned What MoreNeedstoBeDone? the Eurozone The Eurozoneeconomists ‘ship’ is holed whose below theviews waterline. are Thecontained ECB actions in are this keeping book. it The afl oat for now,Eurozone but this rescueis accomplished needs toby besomething completed. akin to More bailing needs the water to beas done. fast as it leaksThe in. EuropeanEurozone leaders ‘ship’ must is veryholed soon fibelow nd a way the to fi waterline.x the hole. The ECB Rescue: This book actionsgathers the are thinking keeping of ait dozenafloat world-class for now, economistsbut this is on accomplished what they by need to dosomething on banking-sector akin to clean bailing up, thefi scal water discipline, as fast structural as it leaks policies, in. andEuropean What More Needs to leaders must very soon find a way to fix the hole. more. This book gathers the thinking of a dozen world-class economists Be Done? on what they need to do on banking-sector clean up, fiscal discipline, structural policies, and more.
    [Show full text]
  • 1 European Monetary Unification and International Monetary Cooperation
    c:\wp51\papers\cfr:12/16/96 European Monetary Unification and International Monetary Cooperation1 Barry Eichengreen and Fabio Ghironi University of California, Berkeley Revised, December 1996 Monetary affairs are not a leading sphere of U.S.-European cooperation. Were issues ranked by the extent of concerted and sustained cooperation, interest-rate and exchange-rate policy would surely fall behind security, financial-market regulation, and trade. Still, cooperation between the U.S. and Europe and among G-7 central banks and governments more generally has played a significant role on occasion, for example when the dollar soared in the mid-1980s and slumped in 1994, and during exceptional crises like the Mexican meltdown of 1995. European monetary unification, if and when it occurs, threatens to discourage even modest initiatives such as these. The European Central Bank (ECB) will assume tasks of the national central banks of the EU member states that participate in the monetary union. The Council of Ministers (in consultation with the ECB, the European Commission and the European Parliament) will make decisions regarding European participation in any new global exchange rate arrangement. European policymakers and others are understandably preoccupied by how these bodies will manage the monetary affairs of the newly-formed Euro zone, to the neglect of the implications for cooperation with the rest of the world. Many American observers essentially ignorant of the entire process. This development is unfortunate, for there is reason to think that EMU 1 The authors are John L. Simpson Professor of Economics and Political Science and Graduate Student in Economics at the University of California, Berkeley.
    [Show full text]
  • Nine Lives of Neoliberalism
    A Service of Leibniz-Informationszentrum econstor Wirtschaft Leibniz Information Centre Make Your Publications Visible. zbw for Economics Plehwe, Dieter (Ed.); Slobodian, Quinn (Ed.); Mirowski, Philip (Ed.) Book — Published Version Nine Lives of Neoliberalism Provided in Cooperation with: WZB Berlin Social Science Center Suggested Citation: Plehwe, Dieter (Ed.); Slobodian, Quinn (Ed.); Mirowski, Philip (Ed.) (2020) : Nine Lives of Neoliberalism, ISBN 978-1-78873-255-0, Verso, London, New York, NY, https://www.versobooks.com/books/3075-nine-lives-of-neoliberalism This Version is available at: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/215796 Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen: Terms of use: Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Documents in EconStor may be saved and copied for your Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden. personal and scholarly purposes. Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle You are not to copy documents for public or commercial Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich purposes, to exhibit the documents publicly, to make them machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen. publicly available on the internet, or to distribute or otherwise use the documents in public. Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, If the documents have been made available under an Open gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort Content Licence (especially Creative
    [Show full text]
  • Introduction to Political Economy Econ 119 / Poli 145 Fall 2012
    Introduction to Political Economy Econ 119 / Poli 145 Fall 2012 M-W 10:05-11:20 a.m. Class: White Lecture Hall Prof. Michael Munger [email protected] Office: Perkins 338 cell phone (emergencies only!): 919 369 6453 Office Hours: • Immediately after class, in Trinity Cafe • Tuesday 1:30-3:00 pm in Perkins 338 Teaching Assistant: Anna Schultz email: [email protected] Overview: This course serves three distinct purposes. • The course is an introduction to economics for non-majors. It is a self-contained and non- technical overview of the history of economic thought, the logic of microeconomic analysis, and the definitions of everyday terms and concepts in the macro economy. Consequently, it counts as a stand-alone Social Science credit, but it does not count toward an Economics major. If you are thinking of an Economics major, this class is a waste of your time. Get the math prereq’s out of the way and then take Econ 51 instead. • It is an introduction to the history of the notion of a political economy, with an emphasis on the moral and ethical problems that markets solve, and also those that markets fail to solve. Consequently it carries an Ethical Inquiry (EI) course credit. • It is a bridge to more advanced courses in philosophy, politics, and economics for the student who wants to sample these disciplines without committing to several semesters of coursework. Prerequisites: There are no prerequisites except for high school mathematics. On the other hand, the reading and studying commitments involved in this course are extensive.
    [Show full text]
  • NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES RMBI OR RMBR: IS the RENMINBI DESTINED to BECOME a GLOBAL OR REGIONAL CURRENCY? Barry Eichengreen Dome
    NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES RMBI OR RMBR: IS THE RENMINBI DESTINED TO BECOME A GLOBAL OR REGIONAL CURRENCY? Barry Eichengreen Domenico Lombardi Working Paper 21716 http://www.nber.org/papers/w21716 NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138 November 2015 The authors acknowledge CIGI for supporting this project and Coby Hu for excellent research assistance. The views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Bureau of Economic Research. NBER working papers are circulated for discussion and comment purposes. They have not been peer- reviewed or been subject to the review by the NBER Board of Directors that accompanies official NBER publications. © 2015 by Barry Eichengreen and Domenico Lombardi. All rights reserved. Short sections of text, not to exceed two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit, including © notice, is given to the source. RMBI or RMBR: Is the Renminbi Destined to Become a Global or Regional Currency? Barry Eichengreen and Domenico Lombardi NBER Working Paper No. 21716 November 2015 JEL No. F0,F02 ABSTRACT Previous studies have focused on when the renminbi will play a significant role as an international currency, but less attention has been paid to where. We fill this gap by contrasting two answers to the question. One is that the renminbi will assume the role of a global currency similar to the U.S. dollar. Supporters point to China’s widely diversified trade and financial flows and to its institutional initiatives, not just in Asia but around the world.
    [Show full text]
  • Advance Praise for Lost Decades Barry Eichengreen: "Here a Leading
    Advance praise for Lost Decades Barry Eichengreen: "Here a leading economist and leading political scientist team up to explain in simple, straightforward terms the political economy of the financial crisis. It is essential to understand both the politics and economics of how we got here to understand where we go next – and how we might avoid a lost decade. For its encompassing approach and global sweep, Chinn and Frieden’s book stands out from the growing mountain of publications on 2007-9. If you have time to read only one book on the crisis, read this." •Barry Eichengreen, University of California Berkeley, author of Exorbitant Privilege: The Rise and Fall of the Dollar and the Future of the International Monetary System Simon Johnson “An integrated and compelling account of where our debts came from – and why they won’t go away any time soon. Chinn and Frieden combine the smartest kind of economics with the toughest kind of political science. Read this book for a somewhat disheartening but completely enlightening education – and then send 10 copies to the White House and Capitol Hill.” •Simon Johnson, MIT, former Chief Economist of the International Monetary Fund, author of 13 Bankers: The Wall Street Takeover and the Next Financial Meltdown Raghuram G. Rajan “This wonderful book by two leading political economists identifies the roots of the recent financial crisis and the deep recession that followed, but more importantly, tells us what awaits us if we do not fix the underlying problems. It is political economy as it was meant to be - accessible and concise, even while deeply troubling.” •Raghuram G.
    [Show full text]
  • Epilogue: Three Perspectives on the Bretton Woods System
    This PDF is a selection from an out-of-print volume from the National Bureau of Economic Research Volume Title: A Retrospective on the Bretton Woods System: Lessons for International Monetary Reform Volume Author/Editor: Michael D. Bordo and Barry Eichengreen, editors Volume Publisher: University of Chicago Press Volume ISBN: 0-226-06587-1 Volume URL: http://www.nber.org/books/bord93-1 Conference Date: October 3-6, 1991 Publication Date: January 1993 Chapter Title: Epilogue: Three Perspectives on the Bretton Woods System Chapter Author: Barry Eichengreen Chapter URL: http://www.nber.org/chapters/c6883 Chapter pages in book: (p. 621 - 658) 14 Epilogue: Three Perspectives on the Bretton Woods System Barry Eichengreen Historians following too close on the heels of events, it is said, risk getting kicked in the teeth. Twenty years since the collapse of the Bretton Woods system is sufficient distance, one hopes, to assess the operation of the post- World War 11 exchange rate regime safely. This chapter approaches the history and historiography of Bretton Woods from three perspectives. First, I ask how the questions posed today about the operation of Bretton Woods differ from those asked twenty years ago. Second, I explore how today’s answers to fa- miliar questions differ from the answers offered in the past. Third, I examine the implications of the Bretton Woods experience for international monetary reform. In doing so, I summarize the contributions of the NBER conference papers collected in this volume. 14.1 The Questions In the 1960s and 1970s, most of the literature on the Bretton Woods system was organized around the “holy trinity” of adjustment, liquidity, and confi- dence.’ As Obstfeld (chap.
    [Show full text]
  • The IMF Adrift on a Sea of Liquidity BARRY EICHENGREEN
    25--Pt 5--Ch. 25--493-500 3/31/06 11:42 AM Page 495 25 The IMF Adrift on a Sea of Liquidity BARRY EICHENGREEN On this day of mixed metaphors, forgive me for adding yet another to our already overlong list. Sitting through today’s discussions—or, one might more appropriately say, today’s pronouncements—I was struck by the image of the IMF as a rudderless ship adrift on a sea of liquidity. On none of the key issues does the institution or its principal shareholders have a clear, or a clearly articulated, position. The first such issue is the resolution of global imbalances. No doubt the IMF is painfully aware of its inability to influence significantly the large- country policies that are responsible for the current account imbalances posing a growing threat to systemic financial stability and global eco- nomic growth. In reality, the institution has few instruments other than the bully pulpit with which to influence the policies of countries that do not borrow from it. This means that the Fund has little influence over countries that borrow abroad in their own currencies because they are in a position to undertake lender-of-last-resort operations on their own.1 It means that the Fund has little influence over countries with ample re- serves because they self-insure against capital account shocks. It means that the Fund has little influence over countries in current account surplus Barry Eichengreen is the George C. Pardee and Helen N. Pardee Professor of Economics and Profes- sor of Political Science at the University of California, Berkeley, where he has taught since 1987.
    [Show full text]
  • Introduction to Political Economy Econ 119 / Poli 145 Fall 2013
    Introduction to Political Economy Econ 119 / Poli 145 Fall 2013 T-Th 10:05-11:20 a.m. Class: White Lecture Hall Prof. Michael Munger [email protected] Campus Office: Gross Building 204E, in Political Science Instructor cell phone (text me in emergencies only!): 919 369 6453 Facebook: http://www.facebook.com/DukeIntroPolEcon2013 Instructor Web Site: http://www.michaelmunger.com Office Hours: Immediately after class, in Trinity Café Tuesday 1:30-3:30 pm in Gross Hall 204E Teaching Assistants: Cindy Cheng email: [email protected] Guadalupe Rojo email: [email protected] Overview: This course serves three distinct purposes. The course is an introduction to economics for non-majors. It is a self-contained and non- technical overview of the intellectual history of political economy, the logic of microeconomics, and the definitions used in macroeconomics. Consequently, it counts as a stand-alone Social Science credit, but it does not count as part of an Economics major. If you pretty sure you want to be an Economics major, this class is a waste of your time. Get the math prereq’s out of the way and then take Econ 101 instead. It introduces the notion of a political economy, emphasizing the moral and ethical problems that markets solve, and fail to solve. Consequently it carries an Ethical Inquiry (EI) course credit. It is a bridge to more advanced courses in philosophy, politics, and economics for the student who wants to sample these disciplines without committing to several semesters of coursework. Prerequisites: There are no prerequisites except for high school mathematics.
    [Show full text]
  • BARRY R. WEINGAST Office Address
    BARRY R. WEINGAST FEBRUARY 2017 PERSONAL Office Address: Hoover Institution Department of Political Science Stanford University Stanford University Stanford, CA 94305-6010 Stanford, CA 94305-2044 Telephone: (650) 723-3729 Email: [email protected] Website: https://www.stanford.edu/group/mcnollgast/cgi-bin/wordpress/ Google Scholar Citations 53,077 Citizenship: U.S.A. ACADEMIC BACKGROUND B.A. (Mathematics), University of California, Santa Cruz, June 1973. Ph.D. (Economics), California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, California, September 1977 (awarded June 1978). Thesis Title: "A Representative Legislature and Regulatory Agency Capture." PRINCIPAL PROFESSIONAL POSITIONS Assistant Professor, Department of Economics, and Research Associate, Center for the Study of American Business, Washington University, St. Louis, 1977-1983. Associate Professor, Department of Economics; Associate Professor of Economics and Political Economy, School of Business; and Research Associate, Center for the Study of American Business, Washington University, 1983-1986. Professor of Economics and Political Economy, School of Business; and Research Associate, Center for the Study of American Business, Washington University, 1986-1988. Senior Research Fellow, Hoover Institution, Stanford University, September 1987-August 1990. Senior Fellow, Hoover Institution, Stanford University, September 1990-present. Barry R. Weingast 2 Professor, Department of Political Science, Stanford University, September 1992-February 1997. Ward C. Krebs Family Professor, Department of Political Science, Stanford University, February 1997- present. Chair, Department of Political Science, Stanford University, September 1996-August 2001. OTHER PROFESSIONAL POSITIONS Visiting Scholar, Hoover Institution, Stanford University, April 1986-August 1987. Visiting Professor of Economics and Political Economy, Graduate School of Business, Stanford University, Spring 1987. Professor (by courtesy) of Economics, Stanford University, September 1989-present.
    [Show full text]